instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
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| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
if (current_url.is_empty()) {
if (new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
if (current_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) ||
new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
if (current_url.GetOrigin() != new_url.GetOrigin())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
SiteInstance* site_instance,
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
if (current_url.is_empty()) {
if (new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
if (current_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) ||
new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
if (current_url.GetOrigin() != new_url.GetOrigin())
return true;
}
// The checks below only matter if we can retrieve which extensions are
// installed.
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
if (!service)
return false;
// We must swap if the URL is for an extension and we are not using an
// extension process.
const Extension* new_extension =
service->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(new_url));
// Ignore all hosted apps except the Chrome Web Store, since they do not
// require their own BrowsingInstance (e.g., postMessage is ok).
if (new_extension &&
new_extension->is_hosted_app() &&
new_extension->id() != extension_misc::kWebStoreAppId)
new_extension = NULL;
if (new_extension &&
site_instance->HasProcess() &&
!service->process_map()->Contains(new_extension->id(),
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID()))
return true;
return false;
}
| 171,436 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
unsigned startcode, v;
int ret;
int vol = 0;
/* search next start code */
align_get_bits(gb);
if (s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("WV1F") && show_bits(gb, 24) == 0x575630) {
skip_bits(gb, 24);
if (get_bits(gb, 8) == 0xF0)
goto end;
}
startcode = 0xff;
for (;;) {
if (get_bits_count(gb) >= gb->size_in_bits) {
if (gb->size_in_bits == 8 &&
(ctx->divx_version >= 0 || ctx->xvid_build >= 0) || s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("QMP4")) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "frame skip %d\n", gb->size_in_bits);
return FRAME_SKIPPED; // divx bug
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // end of stream
}
/* use the bits after the test */
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
startcode = ((startcode << 8) | v) & 0xffffffff;
if ((startcode & 0xFFFFFF00) != 0x100)
continue; // no startcode
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "startcode: %3X ", startcode);
if (startcode <= 0x11F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x12F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Layer Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x13F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x15F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FGS bp start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1AF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode == 0x1B0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq End");
else if (startcode == 0x1B2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "User Data");
else if (startcode == 0x1B3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Group of VOP start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B4)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Session Error");
else if (startcode == 0x1B5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B6)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B7)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "slice start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B8)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "extension start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B9)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "fgs start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BA)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BB)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BC)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BD)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Still Texture Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Spatial Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture SNR Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Tile start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Shape Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "stuffing start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1C5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x1FF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "System start");
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " at %d\n", get_bits_count(gb));
}
if (startcode >= 0x120 && startcode <= 0x12F) {
if (vol) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring multiple VOL headers\n");
continue;
}
vol++;
if ((ret = decode_vol_header(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (startcode == USER_DATA_STARTCODE) {
decode_user_data(ctx, gb);
} else if (startcode == GOP_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_gop_header(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOS_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_profile_level(s, gb);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO &&
(s->avctx->level > 0 && s->avctx->level < 9)) {
s->studio_profile = 1;
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 0);
}
} else if (startcode == VISUAL_OBJ_STARTCODE) {
if (s->studio_profile) {
if ((ret = decode_studiovisualobject(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else
mpeg4_decode_visual_object(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOP_STARTCODE) {
break;
}
align_get_bits(gb);
startcode = 0xff;
}
end:
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_LOW_DELAY)
s->low_delay = 1;
s->avctx->has_b_frames = !s->low_delay;
if (s->studio_profile) {
if (!s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing VOL header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return decode_studio_vop_header(ctx, gb);
} else
return decode_vop_header(ctx, gb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Clear bits_per_raw_sample if it has originated from a previous instance
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_5.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <[email protected]>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int ff_mpeg4_decode_picture_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
unsigned startcode, v;
int ret;
int vol = 0;
/* search next start code */
align_get_bits(gb);
// If we have not switched to studio profile than we also did not switch bps
// that means something else (like a previous instance) outside set bps which
// would be inconsistant with the currect state, thus reset it
if (!s->studio_profile && s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample != 8)
s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = 0;
if (s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("WV1F") && show_bits(gb, 24) == 0x575630) {
skip_bits(gb, 24);
if (get_bits(gb, 8) == 0xF0)
goto end;
}
startcode = 0xff;
for (;;) {
if (get_bits_count(gb) >= gb->size_in_bits) {
if (gb->size_in_bits == 8 &&
(ctx->divx_version >= 0 || ctx->xvid_build >= 0) || s->codec_tag == AV_RL32("QMP4")) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "frame skip %d\n", gb->size_in_bits);
return FRAME_SKIPPED; // divx bug
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; // end of stream
}
/* use the bits after the test */
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
startcode = ((startcode << 8) | v) & 0xffffffff;
if ((startcode & 0xFFFFFF00) != 0x100)
continue; // no startcode
if (s->avctx->debug & FF_DEBUG_STARTCODE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "startcode: %3X ", startcode);
if (startcode <= 0x11F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x12F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Layer Start");
else if (startcode <= 0x13F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x15F)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FGS bp start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1AF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Reserved");
else if (startcode == 0x1B0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Seq End");
else if (startcode == 0x1B2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "User Data");
else if (startcode == 0x1B3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Group of VOP start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B4)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Session Error");
else if (startcode == 0x1B5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Visual Object Start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B6)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Video Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B7)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "slice start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B8)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "extension start");
else if (startcode == 0x1B9)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "fgs start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BA)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BB)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "FBA Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BC)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BD)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Mesh Object Plane start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BE)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Still Texture Object start");
else if (startcode == 0x1BF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Spatial Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C0)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture SNR Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C1)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Tile start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C2)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Texture Shape Layer start");
else if (startcode == 0x1C3)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "stuffing start");
else if (startcode <= 0x1C5)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "reserved");
else if (startcode <= 0x1FF)
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "System start");
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, " at %d\n", get_bits_count(gb));
}
if (startcode >= 0x120 && startcode <= 0x12F) {
if (vol) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring multiple VOL headers\n");
continue;
}
vol++;
if ((ret = decode_vol_header(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (startcode == USER_DATA_STARTCODE) {
decode_user_data(ctx, gb);
} else if (startcode == GOP_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_gop_header(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOS_STARTCODE) {
mpeg4_decode_profile_level(s, gb);
if (s->avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO &&
(s->avctx->level > 0 && s->avctx->level < 9)) {
s->studio_profile = 1;
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 0);
}
} else if (startcode == VISUAL_OBJ_STARTCODE) {
if (s->studio_profile) {
if ((ret = decode_studiovisualobject(ctx, gb)) < 0)
return ret;
} else
mpeg4_decode_visual_object(s, gb);
} else if (startcode == VOP_STARTCODE) {
break;
}
align_get_bits(gb);
startcode = 0xff;
}
end:
if (s->avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_LOW_DELAY)
s->low_delay = 1;
s->avctx->has_b_frames = !s->low_delay;
if (s->studio_profile) {
if (!s->avctx->bits_per_raw_sample) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing VOL header\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
return decode_studio_vop_header(ctx, gb);
} else
return decode_vop_header(ctx, gb);
}
| 169,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftHEVC::setDecodeArgs(ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader,
size_t timeStampIx) {
size_t sizeY = outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight();
size_t sizeUV;
uint8_t *pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_ip->e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_DECODE;
/* When in flush and after EOS with zero byte input,
* inHeader is set to zero. Hence check for non-null */
if (inHeader) {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = timeStampIx;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = inHeader->pBuffer
+ inHeader->nOffset;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = 0;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = NULL;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = 0;
}
if (outHeader) {
pBuf = outHeader->pBuffer;
} else {
pBuf = mFlushOutBuffer;
}
sizeUV = sizeY / 4;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[0] = sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[1] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[2] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0] = pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1] = pBuf + sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2] = pBuf + sizeY + sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs = 3;
return;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SoftHEVC::setDecodeArgs(ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
bool SoftHEVC::setDecodeArgs(ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader,
size_t timeStampIx) {
size_t sizeY = outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight();
size_t sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_ip->e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_DECODE;
/* When in flush and after EOS with zero byte input,
* inHeader is set to zero. Hence check for non-null */
if (inHeader) {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = timeStampIx;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = inHeader->pBuffer
+ inHeader->nOffset;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = 0;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = NULL;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = 0;
}
sizeUV = sizeY / 4;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[0] = sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[1] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[2] = sizeUV;
uint8_t *pBuf;
if (outHeader) {
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < sizeY + (sizeUV * 2)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27569635");
return false;
}
pBuf = outHeader->pBuffer;
} else {
// mFlushOutBuffer always has the right size.
pBuf = mFlushOutBuffer;
}
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0] = pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1] = pBuf + sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2] = pBuf + sizeY + sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs = 3;
return true;
}
| 174,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SWFInput_readSBits(SWFInput input, int number)
{
int num = SWFInput_readBits(input, number);
if ( num & (1<<(number-1)) )
return num - (1<<number);
else
return num;
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SWFInput_readSBits(SWFInput input, int number)
{
int num = SWFInput_readBits(input, number);
if(number && num & (1<<(number-1)))
return num - (1<<number);
else
return num;
}
| 169,648 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*received_update_, index);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return received_.GetListPrefValue(index);
}
| 171,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int bdrv_check_request(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
int nb_sectors)
{
return bdrv_check_byte_request(bs, sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int bdrv_check_request(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
int nb_sectors)
{
if (nb_sectors > INT_MAX / BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE) {
return -EIO;
}
return bdrv_check_byte_request(bs, sector_num * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE,
nb_sectors * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE);
}
| 165,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dbus_g_proxy_manager_filter (DBusConnection *connection,
DBusMessage *message,
void *user_data)
{
DBusGProxyManager *manager;
if (dbus_message_get_type (message) != DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL)
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
manager = user_data;
dbus_g_proxy_manager_ref (manager);
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
if (dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_LOCAL,
"Disconnected"))
{
/* Destroy all the proxies, quite possibly resulting in unreferencing
* the proxy manager and the connection as well.
*/
GSList *all;
GSList *tmp;
all = dbus_g_proxy_manager_list_all (manager);
tmp = all;
while (tmp != NULL)
{
DBusGProxy *proxy;
proxy = DBUS_G_PROXY (tmp->data);
UNLOCK_MANAGER (manager);
dbus_g_proxy_destroy (proxy);
g_object_unref (G_OBJECT (proxy));
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
tmp = tmp->next;
}
g_slist_free (all);
#ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS
if (manager->proxy_lists != NULL)
g_warning ("Disconnection emitted \"destroy\" on all DBusGProxy, but somehow new proxies were created in response to one of those destroy signals. This will cause a memory leak.");
#endif
}
else
{
char *tri;
GSList *full_list;
GSList *owned_names;
GSList *tmp;
const char *sender;
/* First we handle NameOwnerChanged internally */
if (dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_DBUS,
"NameOwnerChanged"))
{
DBusError derr;
dbus_error_init (&derr);
if (!dbus_message_get_args (message,
&derr,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&name,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&prev_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&new_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_INVALID))
{
/* Ignore this error */
dbus_error_free (&derr);
}
else if (manager->owner_names != NULL)
{
dbus_g_proxy_manager_replace_name_owner (manager, name, prev_owner, new_owner);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | dbus_g_proxy_manager_filter (DBusConnection *connection,
DBusMessage *message,
void *user_data)
{
DBusGProxyManager *manager;
if (dbus_message_get_type (message) != DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL)
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
manager = user_data;
dbus_g_proxy_manager_ref (manager);
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
if (dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_LOCAL,
"Disconnected"))
{
/* Destroy all the proxies, quite possibly resulting in unreferencing
* the proxy manager and the connection as well.
*/
GSList *all;
GSList *tmp;
all = dbus_g_proxy_manager_list_all (manager);
tmp = all;
while (tmp != NULL)
{
DBusGProxy *proxy;
proxy = DBUS_G_PROXY (tmp->data);
UNLOCK_MANAGER (manager);
dbus_g_proxy_destroy (proxy);
g_object_unref (G_OBJECT (proxy));
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
tmp = tmp->next;
}
g_slist_free (all);
#ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS
if (manager->proxy_lists != NULL)
g_warning ("Disconnection emitted \"destroy\" on all DBusGProxy, but somehow new proxies were created in response to one of those destroy signals. This will cause a memory leak.");
#endif
}
else
{
char *tri;
GSList *full_list;
GSList *owned_names;
GSList *tmp;
const char *sender;
sender = dbus_message_get_sender (message);
/* First we handle NameOwnerChanged internally */
if (g_strcmp0 (sender, DBUS_SERVICE_DBUS) == 0 &&
dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_DBUS,
"NameOwnerChanged"))
{
DBusError derr;
dbus_error_init (&derr);
if (!dbus_message_get_args (message,
&derr,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&name,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&prev_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&new_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_INVALID))
{
/* Ignore this error */
dbus_error_free (&derr);
}
else if (manager->owner_names != NULL)
{
dbus_g_proxy_manager_replace_name_owner (manager, name, prev_owner, new_owner);
}
}
}
}
| 164,781 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseInternalSubset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
/*
* Is there any DTD definition ?
*/
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
NEXT;
/*
* Parse the succession of Markup declarations and
* PEReferences.
* Subsequence (markupdecl | PEReference | S)*
*/
while (RAW != ']') {
const xmlChar *check = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xmlParseMarkupDecl(ctxt);
xmlParsePEReference(ctxt);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((CUR_PTR == check) && (cons == ctxt->input->consumed)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseInternalSubset: error detected in Markup declaration\n");
break;
}
}
if (RAW == ']') {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
/*
* We should be at the end of the DOCTYPE declaration.
*/
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
NEXT;
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseInternalSubset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
/*
* Is there any DTD definition ?
*/
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
NEXT;
/*
* Parse the succession of Markup declarations and
* PEReferences.
* Subsequence (markupdecl | PEReference | S)*
*/
while ((RAW != ']') && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
const xmlChar *check = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xmlParseMarkupDecl(ctxt);
xmlParsePEReference(ctxt);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((CUR_PTR == check) && (cons == ctxt->input->consumed)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseInternalSubset: error detected in Markup declaration\n");
break;
}
}
if (RAW == ']') {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
/*
* We should be at the end of the DOCTYPE declaration.
*/
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
NEXT;
}
| 171,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | PrintPreviewMessageHandler::PrintPreviewMessageHandler(
WebContents* web_contents)
: content::WebContentsObserver(web_contents), weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
}
| 171,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that resulted in the destruction of JP2 box data that had never
been constructed in the first place.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
// Mark the box data as never having been constructed
// so that we will not errantly attempt to destroy it later.
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UriSuite() {
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testDistinction)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpFour)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpSixPass)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpSixFail)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUri)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort22_Bug1948038)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_3)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_4)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_12)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort3)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort4)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort5)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort6)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostRegname)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFour1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFour2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpSix1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpSix2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFuture)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostEmpty)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriComponents)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriComponents_Bug20070701)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testEscaping)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUnescaping)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testTrailingSlash)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testAddBase)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToString)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToString_Bug1950126)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToStringCharsRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToStringCharsRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntaxMaskRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntax)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntaxComponents)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeCrash_Bug20080224)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testFilenameUriConversion)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_FreeUriMembers_Bug20080116)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_Report2418192)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testPervertedQueryString);
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryStringEndingInEqualSign_NonBug32);
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_MakeOwner_Bug20080207)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryList)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryListPair)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryDissection_Bug3590761)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testFreeCrash_Bug20080827)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testParseInvalid_Bug16)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testRangeComparison)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testRangeComparison_RemoveBaseUri_Issue19)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testEquals)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testHostTextTermination_Issue15)
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | UriSuite() {
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testDistinction)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpFour)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpSixPass)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testIpSixFail)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUri)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort22_Bug1948038)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_3)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_4)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_12)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort23_Bug3510198_related_2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort3)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort4)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort5)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriUserInfoHostPort6)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostRegname)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFour1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFour2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpSix1)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpSix2)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostIpFuture)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriHostEmpty)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriComponents)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUriComponents_Bug20070701)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testEscaping)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testUnescaping)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testTrailingSlash)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testAddBase)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToString)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToString_Bug1950126)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToStringCharsRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testToStringCharsRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntaxMaskRequired)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntax)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeSyntaxComponents)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testNormalizeCrash_Bug20080224)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testFilenameUriConversion)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_FreeUriMembers_Bug20080116)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_Report2418192)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testPervertedQueryString);
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryStringEndingInEqualSign_NonBug32);
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testCrash_MakeOwner_Bug20080207)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryList)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryListPair)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryDissection_Bug3590761)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testQueryCompositionMathWrite_GoogleAutofuzz113244572)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testFreeCrash_Bug20080827)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testParseInvalid_Bug16)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testRangeComparison)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testRangeComparison_RemoveBaseUri_Issue19)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testEquals)
TEST_ADD(UriSuite::testHostTextTermination_Issue15)
}
| 168,977 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void perform_gamma_scale16_tests(png_modifier *pm)
{
# ifndef PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8
# define PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8 11
# endif
# define SBIT_16_TO_8 PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8
/* Include the alpha cases here. Note that sbit matches the internal value
* used by the library - otherwise we will get spurious errors from the
* internal sbit style approximation.
*
* The threshold test is here because otherwise the 16 to 8 conversion will
* proceed *without* gamma correction, and the tests above will fail (but not
* by much) - this could be fixed, it only appears with the -g option.
*/
unsigned int i, j;
for (i=0; i<pm->ngamma_tests; ++i)
{
for (j=0; j<pm->ngamma_tests; ++j)
{
if (i != j &&
fabs(pm->gammas[j]/pm->gammas[i]-1) >= PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
{
gamma_transform_test(pm, 0, 16, 0, pm->interlace_type,
1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], SBIT_16_TO_8,
pm->use_input_precision_16to8, 1 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
gamma_transform_test(pm, 2, 16, 0, pm->interlace_type,
1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], SBIT_16_TO_8,
pm->use_input_precision_16to8, 1 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
gamma_transform_test(pm, 4, 16, 0, pm->interlace_type,
1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], SBIT_16_TO_8,
pm->use_input_precision_16to8, 1 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
gamma_transform_test(pm, 6, 16, 0, pm->interlace_type,
1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], SBIT_16_TO_8,
pm->use_input_precision_16to8, 1 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static void perform_gamma_scale16_tests(png_modifier *pm)
{
# ifndef PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8
# define PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8 11
# endif
# if defined PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8 || PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10700
# define SBIT_16_TO_8 PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8
# else
# define SBIT_16_TO_8 16
# endif
/* Include the alpha cases here. Note that sbit matches the internal value
* used by the library - otherwise we will get spurious errors from the
* internal sbit style approximation.
*
* The threshold test is here because otherwise the 16 to 8 conversion will
* proceed *without* gamma correction, and the tests above will fail (but not
* by much) - this could be fixed, it only appears with the -g option.
*/
unsigned int i, j;
for (i=0; i<pm->ngamma_tests; ++i)
{
for (j=0; j<pm->ngamma_tests; ++j)
{
if (i != j &&
fabs(pm->gammas[j]/pm->gammas[i]-1) >= PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
{
gamma_transform_test(pm, 0, 16, 0, pm->interlace_type,
1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], SBIT_16_TO_8,
pm->use_input_precision_16to8, 1 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
gamma_transform_test(pm, 2, 16, 0, pm->interlace_type,
1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], SBIT_16_TO_8,
pm->use_input_precision_16to8, 1 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
gamma_transform_test(pm, 4, 16, 0, pm->interlace_type,
1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], SBIT_16_TO_8,
pm->use_input_precision_16to8, 1 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
gamma_transform_test(pm, 6, 16, 0, pm->interlace_type,
1/pm->gammas[i], pm->gammas[j], SBIT_16_TO_8,
pm->use_input_precision_16to8, 1 /*scale16*/);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
}
}
}
| 173,681 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int hns_gmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int hns_gmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
| 169,398 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: z2grestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
if (!restore_page_device(igs, gs_gstate_saved(igs)))
return gs_grestore(igs);
return push_callout(i_ctx_p, "%grestorepagedevice");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | z2grestore(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
int code = restore_page_device(i_ctx_p, igs, gs_gstate_saved(igs));
if (code < 0) return code;
if (code == 0)
return gs_grestore(igs);
return push_callout(i_ctx_p, "%grestorepagedevice");
}
| 164,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369 | static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
/* in below tests */
/* Fixes reading id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 */
/* of https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/938 */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
/* See ISO-15441. B.12.1.3 Resolution level-position-component-layer progression */
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y,
(OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 168,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void php_snmp_object_free_storage(void *object TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_snmp_object *intern = (php_snmp_object *)object;
if (!intern) {
return;
}
netsnmp_session_free(&(intern->session));
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->zo TSRMLS_CC);
efree(intern);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static void php_snmp_object_free_storage(void *object TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_snmp_object *intern = (php_snmp_object *)object;
if (!intern) {
return;
}
netsnmp_session_free(&(intern->session));
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->zo TSRMLS_CC);
efree(intern);
}
| 164,977 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_strip_alpha_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
else if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
that->have_tRNS = 0;
that->alphaf = 1;
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_strip_alpha_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_strip_alpha_mod(const image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
const transform_display *display)
{
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
else if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
that->have_tRNS = 0;
that->alphaf = 1;
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
| 173,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int pop_sync_mailbox(struct Context *ctx, int *index_hint)
{
int i, j, ret = 0;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct Progress progress;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
header_cache_t *hc = NULL;
#endif
pop_data->check_time = 0;
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Marking messages deleted..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, WriteInc, ctx->deleted);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
hc = pop_hcache_open(pop_data, ctx->path);
#endif
for (i = 0, j = 0, ret = 0; ret == 0 && i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted && ctx->hdrs[i]->refno != -1)
{
j++;
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&progress, j, -1);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "DELE %d\r\n", ctx->hdrs[i]->refno);
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_bcache_del(pop_data->bcache, ctx->hdrs[i]->data);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_delete(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
#endif
}
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->changed)
{
mutt_hcache_store(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data),
ctx->hdrs[i], 0);
}
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "QUIT\r\n", sizeof(buf));
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
if (ret == 0)
{
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
pop_clear_cache(pop_data);
pop_data->status = POP_DISCONNECTED;
return 0;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
}
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static int pop_sync_mailbox(struct Context *ctx, int *index_hint)
{
int i, j, ret = 0;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct Progress progress;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
header_cache_t *hc = NULL;
#endif
pop_data->check_time = 0;
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Marking messages deleted..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, WriteInc, ctx->deleted);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
hc = pop_hcache_open(pop_data, ctx->path);
#endif
for (i = 0, j = 0, ret = 0; ret == 0 && i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted && ctx->hdrs[i]->refno != -1)
{
j++;
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&progress, j, -1);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "DELE %d\r\n", ctx->hdrs[i]->refno);
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_bcache_del(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_delete(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
#endif
}
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->changed)
{
mutt_hcache_store(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data),
ctx->hdrs[i], 0);
}
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
if (ret == 0)
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(buf, "QUIT\r\n", sizeof(buf));
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
if (ret == 0)
{
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
pop_clear_cache(pop_data);
pop_data->status = POP_DISCONNECTED;
return 0;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
}
}
| 169,123 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
Commit Message: misc oom and possible memory leak fix
CWE ID: | static char *escape_pathname(const char *inp)
{
const unsigned char *s;
char *escaped, *d;
if (!inp) {
return NULL;
}
escaped = malloc (4 * strlen(inp) + 1);
if (!escaped) {
perror("malloc");
return NULL;
}
for (d = escaped, s = (const unsigned char *)inp; *s; s++) {
if (needs_escape (*s)) {
snprintf (d, 5, "\\x%02x", *s);
d += strlen (d);
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
}
*d++ = '\0';
return escaped;
}
| 169,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Tracks::Parse()
{
assert(m_trackEntries == NULL);
assert(m_trackEntriesEnd == NULL);
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
int count = 0;
long long pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
if (id == 0x2E) //TrackEntry ID
++count;
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
if (count <= 0)
return 0; //success
m_trackEntries = new (std::nothrow) Track*[count];
if (m_trackEntries == NULL)
return -1;
m_trackEntriesEnd = m_trackEntries;
pos = m_start;
while (pos < stop)
{
const long long element_start = pos;
long long id, payload_size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
payload_size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (payload_size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long payload_stop = pos + payload_size;
assert(payload_stop <= stop); //checked in ParseElement
const long long element_size = payload_stop - element_start;
if (id == 0x2E) //TrackEntry ID
{
Track*& pTrack = *m_trackEntriesEnd;
pTrack = NULL;
const long status = ParseTrackEntry(
pos,
payload_size,
element_start,
element_size,
pTrack);
if (status)
return status;
if (pTrack)
++m_trackEntriesEnd;
}
pos = payload_stop;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Tracks::Parse()
| 174,408 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rpki_rtr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
u_int tlen, pdu_type, pdu_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const rpki_rtr_pdu *pdu_header;
tptr = pptr;
tlen = len;
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RPKI-RTR"));
return;
}
while (tlen >= sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(rpki_rtr_pdu));
pdu_header = (const rpki_rtr_pdu *)tptr;
pdu_type = pdu_header->pdu_type;
pdu_len = EXTRACT_32BITS(pdu_header->length);
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, pdu_len);
/* infinite loop check */
if (!pdu_type || !pdu_len) {
break;
}
if (tlen < pdu_len) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print the PDU.
*/
if (rpki_rtr_pdu_print(ndo, tptr, 8))
goto trunc;
tlen -= pdu_len;
tptr += pdu_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13050/RPKI-Router: fix a few bugs
The decoder didn't properly check that the PDU length stored in the PDU
header is correct. The only check in place was in rpki_rtr_print() and it
tested whether the length is zero but that is not sufficient. Make all
necessary length and bounds checks, both generic and type-specific, in
rpki_rtr_pdu_print() and reduce rpki_rtr_print() to a simple loop.
This also fixes a minor bug and PDU type 0 (Serial Notify from RFC 6810
Section 5.2) is valid again.
In rpki_rtr_pdu_print() any protocol version was considered version 0,
fix it to skip the rest of input if the PDU protocol version is unknown.
Ibid, the PDU type 10 (Error Report from RFC 6810 Section 5.10) case
block didn't consider the "Length of Error Text" data element mandatory,
put it right.
Ibid, when printing an encapsulated PDU, give itself (via recursion)
respective buffer length to make it possible to tell whether the
encapsulated PDU fits. Do not recurse deeper than 2nd level.
Update prior RPKI-Router test cases that now stop to decode earlier
because of the stricter checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | rpki_rtr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RPKI-RTR"));
return;
}
while (len) {
u_int pdu_len = rpki_rtr_pdu_print(ndo, pptr, len, 1, 8);
len -= pdu_len;
pptr += pdu_len;
}
}
| 167,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int validate_camera_metadata_structure(const camera_metadata_t *metadata,
const size_t *expected_size) {
if (metadata == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: metadata is null!", __FUNCTION__);
return ERROR;
}
{
static const struct {
const char *name;
size_t alignment;
} alignments[] = {
{
.name = "camera_metadata",
.alignment = METADATA_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_buffer_entry",
.alignment = ENTRY_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_data",
.alignment = DATA_ALIGNMENT
},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(alignments)/sizeof(alignments[0]); ++i) {
uintptr_t aligned_ptr = ALIGN_TO(metadata, alignments[i].alignment);
if ((uintptr_t)metadata != aligned_ptr) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata pointer is not aligned (actual %p, "
"expected %p) to type %s",
__FUNCTION__, metadata,
(void*)aligned_ptr, alignments[i].name);
return ERROR;
}
}
}
/**
* Check that the metadata contents are correct
*/
if (expected_size != NULL && metadata->size > *expected_size) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata size (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= expected size (%zu)",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->size, *expected_size);
return ERROR;
}
if (metadata->entry_count > metadata->entry_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry count (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= entry capacity "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->entry_count, metadata->entry_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t entries_end =
metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity;
if (entries_end < metadata->entries_start || // overflow check
entries_end > metadata->data_start) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= data start "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity),
metadata->data_start);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t data_end =
metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity;
if (data_end < metadata->data_start || // overflow check
data_end > metadata->size) {
ALOGE("%s: Data start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= total size "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity),
metadata->size);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_size_t entry_count = metadata->entry_count;
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entries = get_entries(metadata);
for (size_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
if ((uintptr_t)&entries[i] != ALIGN_TO(&entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad alignment (address %p),"
" expected alignment %zu",
__FUNCTION__, i, &entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT);
return ERROR;
}
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t entry = entries[i];
if (entry.type >= NUM_TYPES) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had a bad type %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
uint32_t tag_section = entry.tag >> 16;
int tag_type = get_camera_metadata_tag_type(entry.tag);
if (tag_type != (int)entry.type && tag_section < VENDOR_SECTION) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had tag type %d, but the type was %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, tag_type, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_size =
calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(entry.type,
entry.count);
if (data_size != 0) {
camera_metadata_data_t *data =
(camera_metadata_data_t*) (get_data(metadata) +
entry.data.offset);
if ((uintptr_t)data != ALIGN_TO(data, DATA_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad data alignment (address %p),"
" expected align %zu, (tag name %s, data size %zu)",
__FUNCTION__, i, data, DATA_ALIGNMENT,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown",
data_size);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_entry_end = entry.data.offset + data_size;
if (data_entry_end < entry.data.offset || // overflow check
data_entry_end > metadata->data_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu data ends (%zu) beyond the capacity "
"%" PRIu32, __FUNCTION__, i, data_entry_end,
metadata->data_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
} else if (entry.count == 0) {
if (entry.data.offset != 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had 0 items, but offset was non-0 "
"(%" PRIu32 "), tag name: %s", __FUNCTION__, i, entry.data.offset,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown");
return ERROR;
}
} // else data stored inline, so we look at value which can be anything.
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int validate_camera_metadata_structure(const camera_metadata_t *metadata,
const size_t *expected_size) {
if (metadata == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: metadata is null!", __FUNCTION__);
return ERROR;
}
{
static const struct {
const char *name;
size_t alignment;
} alignments[] = {
{
.name = "camera_metadata",
.alignment = METADATA_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_buffer_entry",
.alignment = ENTRY_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_data",
.alignment = DATA_ALIGNMENT
},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(alignments)/sizeof(alignments[0]); ++i) {
uintptr_t aligned_ptr = ALIGN_TO(metadata, alignments[i].alignment);
if ((uintptr_t)metadata != aligned_ptr) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata pointer is not aligned (actual %p, "
"expected %p) to type %s",
__FUNCTION__, metadata,
(void*)aligned_ptr, alignments[i].name);
return ERROR;
}
}
}
/**
* Check that the metadata contents are correct
*/
if (expected_size != NULL && metadata->size > *expected_size) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata size (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= expected size (%zu)",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->size, *expected_size);
return ERROR;
}
if (metadata->entry_count > metadata->entry_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry count (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= entry capacity "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->entry_count, metadata->entry_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t entries_end =
metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity;
if (entries_end < metadata->entries_start || // overflow check
entries_end > metadata->data_start) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= data start "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity),
metadata->data_start);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t data_end =
metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity;
if (data_end < metadata->data_start || // overflow check
data_end > metadata->size) {
ALOGE("%s: Data start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= total size "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity),
metadata->size);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_size_t entry_count = metadata->entry_count;
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entries = get_entries(metadata);
for (size_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
if ((uintptr_t)&entries[i] != ALIGN_TO(&entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad alignment (address %p),"
" expected alignment %zu",
__FUNCTION__, i, &entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT);
return ERROR;
}
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t entry = entries[i];
if (entry.type >= NUM_TYPES) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had a bad type %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
uint32_t tag_section = entry.tag >> 16;
int tag_type = get_camera_metadata_tag_type(entry.tag);
if (tag_type != (int)entry.type && tag_section < VENDOR_SECTION) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had tag type %d, but the type was %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, tag_type, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_size;
if (validate_and_calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(&data_size, entry.type,
entry.count) != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry data size is invalid. type: %u count: %u", __FUNCTION__, entry.type,
entry.count);
return ERROR;
}
if (data_size != 0) {
camera_metadata_data_t *data =
(camera_metadata_data_t*) (get_data(metadata) +
entry.data.offset);
if ((uintptr_t)data != ALIGN_TO(data, DATA_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad data alignment (address %p),"
" expected align %zu, (tag name %s, data size %zu)",
__FUNCTION__, i, data, DATA_ALIGNMENT,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown",
data_size);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_entry_end = entry.data.offset + data_size;
if (data_entry_end < entry.data.offset || // overflow check
data_entry_end > metadata->data_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu data ends (%zu) beyond the capacity "
"%" PRIu32, __FUNCTION__, i, data_entry_end,
metadata->data_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
} else if (entry.count == 0) {
if (entry.data.offset != 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had 0 items, but offset was non-0 "
"(%" PRIu32 "), tag name: %s", __FUNCTION__, i, entry.data.offset,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown");
return ERROR;
}
} // else data stored inline, so we look at value which can be anything.
}
return OK;
}
| 173,395 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
(void)remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
| 173,594 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: psf_fwrite (const void *ptr, sf_count_t bytes, sf_count_t items, SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ sf_count_t total = 0 ;
ssize_t count ;
if (psf->virtual_io)
return psf->vio.write (ptr, bytes*items, psf->vio_user_data) / bytes ;
items *= bytes ;
/* Do this check after the multiplication above. */
if (items <= 0)
return 0 ;
while (items > 0)
{ /* Break the writes down to a sensible size. */
count = (items > SENSIBLE_SIZE) ? SENSIBLE_SIZE : items ;
count = write (psf->file.filedes, ((const char*) ptr) + total, count) ;
if (count == -1)
{ if (errno == EINTR)
continue ;
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
break ;
} ;
if (count == 0)
break ;
total += count ;
items -= count ;
} ;
if (psf->is_pipe)
psf->pipeoffset += total ;
return total / bytes ;
} /* psf_fwrite */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189 | psf_fwrite (const void *ptr, sf_count_t bytes, sf_count_t items, SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ sf_count_t total = 0 ;
ssize_t count ;
if (bytes == 0 || items == 0)
return 0 ;
if (psf->virtual_io)
return psf->vio.write (ptr, bytes*items, psf->vio_user_data) / bytes ;
items *= bytes ;
/* Do this check after the multiplication above. */
if (items <= 0)
return 0 ;
while (items > 0)
{ /* Break the writes down to a sensible size. */
count = (items > SENSIBLE_SIZE) ? SENSIBLE_SIZE : items ;
count = write (psf->file.filedes, ((const char*) ptr) + total, count) ;
if (count == -1)
{ if (errno == EINTR)
continue ;
psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
break ;
} ;
if (count == 0)
break ;
total += count ;
items -= count ;
} ;
if (psf->is_pipe)
psf->pipeoffset += total ;
return total / bytes ;
} /* psf_fwrite */
| 166,754 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TestWebKitPlatformSupport::TestWebKitPlatformSupport(bool unit_test_mode)
: unit_test_mode_(unit_test_mode) {
v8::V8::SetCounterFunction(base::StatsTable::FindLocation);
WebKit::initialize(this);
WebKit::setLayoutTestMode(true);
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsLocal(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsNoAccess(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebScriptController::enableV8SingleThreadMode();
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSockets(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableApplicationCache(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDatabase(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDataTransferItems(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enablePushState(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableNotifications(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableTouch(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGamepad(true);
bool enable_media = false;
FilePath module_path;
if (PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &module_path)) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (base::mac::AmIBundled())
module_path = module_path.DirName().DirName().DirName();
#endif
if (media::InitializeMediaLibrary(module_path))
enable_media = true;
}
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableMediaPlayer(enable_media);
LOG_IF(WARNING, !enable_media) << "Failed to initialize the media library.\n";
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGeolocation(false);
if (!appcache_dir_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create a temp dir for the appcache, "
"using in-memory storage.";
DCHECK(appcache_dir_.path().empty());
}
SimpleAppCacheSystem::InitializeOnUIThread(appcache_dir_.path());
WebKit::WebDatabase::setObserver(&database_system_);
blob_registry_ = new TestShellWebBlobRegistryImpl();
file_utilities_.set_sandbox_enabled(false);
if (!file_system_root_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create a temp dir for the filesystem."
"FileSystem feature will be disabled.";
DCHECK(file_system_root_.path().empty());
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
SetThemeEngine(NULL);
#endif
net::HttpCache::Mode cache_mode = net::HttpCache::NORMAL;
net::CookieMonster::EnableFileScheme();
SimpleResourceLoaderBridge::Init(FilePath(), cache_mode, true);
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(" --expose-gc");
WebScriptController::registerExtension(extensions_v8::GCExtension::Get());
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | TestWebKitPlatformSupport::TestWebKitPlatformSupport(bool unit_test_mode)
: unit_test_mode_(unit_test_mode) {
v8::V8::SetCounterFunction(base::StatsTable::FindLocation);
WebKit::initialize(this);
WebKit::setLayoutTestMode(true);
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsLocal(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsNoAccess(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebKit::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsEmptyDocument(
WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("test-shell-resource"));
WebScriptController::enableV8SingleThreadMode();
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSockets(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableApplicationCache(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDatabase(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDataTransferItems(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enablePushState(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableNotifications(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableTouch(true);
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGamepad(true);
bool enable_media = false;
FilePath module_path;
if (PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &module_path)) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (base::mac::AmIBundled())
module_path = module_path.DirName().DirName().DirName();
#endif
if (media::InitializeMediaLibrary(module_path))
enable_media = true;
}
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableMediaPlayer(enable_media);
LOG_IF(WARNING, !enable_media) << "Failed to initialize the media library.\n";
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGeolocation(false);
if (!appcache_dir_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create a temp dir for the appcache, "
"using in-memory storage.";
DCHECK(appcache_dir_.path().empty());
}
SimpleAppCacheSystem::InitializeOnUIThread(appcache_dir_.path());
WebKit::WebDatabase::setObserver(&database_system_);
blob_registry_ = new TestShellWebBlobRegistryImpl();
file_utilities_.set_sandbox_enabled(false);
if (!file_system_root_.CreateUniqueTempDir()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to create a temp dir for the filesystem."
"FileSystem feature will be disabled.";
DCHECK(file_system_root_.path().empty());
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
SetThemeEngine(NULL);
#endif
net::HttpCache::Mode cache_mode = net::HttpCache::NORMAL;
net::CookieMonster::EnableFileScheme();
SimpleResourceLoaderBridge::Init(FilePath(), cache_mode, true);
webkit_glue::SetJavaScriptFlags(" --expose-gc");
WebScriptController::registerExtension(extensions_v8::GCExtension::Get());
}
| 171,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static size_t TrimTrailingSpaces ( char * firstChar, size_t origLen )
{
if ( origLen == 0 ) return 0;
char * lastChar = firstChar + origLen - 1;
if ( (*lastChar != ' ') && (*lastChar != 0) ) return origLen; // Nothing to do.
while ( (firstChar <= lastChar) && ((*lastChar == ' ') || (*lastChar == 0)) ) --lastChar;
XMP_Assert ( (lastChar == firstChar-1) ||
((lastChar >= firstChar) && (*lastChar != ' ') && (*lastChar != 0)) );
size_t newLen = (size_t)((lastChar+1) - firstChar);
XMP_Assert ( newLen <= origLen );
if ( newLen < origLen ) {
++lastChar;
*lastChar = 0;
}
return newLen;
} // TrimTrailingSpaces
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static size_t TrimTrailingSpaces ( char * firstChar, size_t origLen )
{
if ( !firstChar || origLen == 0 ) return 0;
char * lastChar = firstChar + origLen - 1;
if ( (*lastChar != ' ') && (*lastChar != 0) ) return origLen; // Nothing to do.
while ( (firstChar <= lastChar) && ((*lastChar == ' ') || (*lastChar == 0)) ) --lastChar;
XMP_Assert ( (lastChar == firstChar-1) ||
((lastChar >= firstChar) && (*lastChar != ' ') && (*lastChar != 0)) );
size_t newLen = (size_t)((lastChar+1) - firstChar);
XMP_Assert ( newLen <= origLen );
if ( newLen < origLen ) {
++lastChar;
*lastChar = 0;
}
return newLen;
} // TrimTrailingSpaces
| 165,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::CreateNewWindow(
int route_id,
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params validated_params(params);
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
delegate_->CreateNewWindow(route_id, validated_params,
session_storage_namespace);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderViewHostImpl::CreateNewWindow(
int route_id,
const ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params& params,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params validated_params(params);
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
FilterURL(policy, GetProcess(), false, &validated_params.opener_url);
FilterURL(policy, GetProcess(), true,
&validated_params.opener_security_origin);
delegate_->CreateNewWindow(route_id, validated_params,
session_storage_namespace);
}
| 171,498 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation(
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation) {
OperationID id = next_operation_id_++;
operations_.emplace(id, std::move(operation));
return id;
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation(
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation) {
OperationID id = next_operation_id_++;
operations_[id] = std::move(operation);
return id;
}
| 173,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
u_char *pkblob, *sig, have_sig;
size_t blen, slen;
int r, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
if (!authctxt->valid) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse request failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto done;
}
key_s = format_key(key);
if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
if (have_sig) {
debug3("%s: have %s signature for %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* reconstruct packet */
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg) != 0) ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
ssh->compat)) == 0) {
authenticated = 1;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
free(sig);
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
} else {
debug("%s: test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
done:
if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__);
authenticated = 0;
}
debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
sshauthopt_free(authopts);
sshkey_free(key);
free(userstyle);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(key_s);
free(ca_s);
return authenticated;
}
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt
CWE ID: CWE-200 | userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig;
size_t blen, slen;
int r, pktype;
int authenticated = 0;
struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse request failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto done;
}
key_s = format_key(key);
if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
if (have_sig) {
debug3("%s: have %s signature for %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
__func__);
goto done;
}
/* reconstruct packet */
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg) != 0) ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
ssh->compat)) == 0) {
authenticated = 1;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
} else {
debug("%s: test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
__func__);
goto done;
}
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
done:
if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__);
authenticated = 0;
}
debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
sshauthopt_free(authopts);
sshkey_free(key);
free(userstyle);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(key_s);
free(ca_s);
free(sig);
return authenticated;
}
| 169,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *vendor, const void **data, size_t *len)
{
struct vendor_attribute *attr;
attr = (struct vendor_attribute *)*data;
*vendor = ntohl(attr->vendor_value);
*data = attr->attrib_data;
*len = attr->attrib_len - 2;
return (attr->attrib_type);
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119 | rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *vendor, const void **data, size_t *len)
rad_get_vendor_attr(u_int32_t *vendor, unsigned char *type, const void **data, size_t *len, const void *raw, size_t raw_len)
{
struct vendor_attribute *attr;
if (raw_len < sizeof(struct vendor_attribute)) {
return -1;
}
attr = (struct vendor_attribute *) raw;
*vendor = ntohl(attr->vendor_value);
*type = attr->attrib_type;
*data = attr->attrib_data;
*len = attr->attrib_len - 2;
if ((attr->attrib_len + 4) > raw_len) {
return -1;
}
return (attr->attrib_type);
}
| 166,078 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
const size_t max_write = INT_MAX;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
/* In particular, this catches attempts to pass negative values. */
if (s > max_write)
s = max_write;
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
}
| 166,176 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, isValidPharFilename)
{
char *fname;
const char *ext_str;
size_t fname_len;
int ext_len, is_executable;
zend_bool executable = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|b", &fname, &fname_len, &executable) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
is_executable = executable;
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(fname, fname_len, &ext_str, &ext_len, is_executable, 2, 1) == SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, isValidPharFilename)
{
char *fname;
const char *ext_str;
size_t fname_len;
int ext_len, is_executable;
zend_bool executable = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p|b", &fname, &fname_len, &executable) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
is_executable = executable;
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(fname, fname_len, &ext_str, &ext_len, is_executable, 2, 1) == SUCCESS);
}
| 165,059 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_wstat(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
int err = 0;
int16_t unused;
V9fsStat v9stat;
size_t offset = 7;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_stat_init(&v9stat);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dwS", &fid, &unused, &v9stat);
goto out_nofid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static void coroutine_fn v9fs_wstat(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
int err = 0;
int16_t unused;
V9fsStat v9stat;
size_t offset = 7;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
v9fs_stat_init(&v9stat);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dwS", &fid, &unused, &v9stat);
goto out_nofid;
}
| 164,633 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
/* The +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
l_data_size = 1 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (#982)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
/* +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
/* and actually +2 required for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/982 */
/* TODO: is there a theoretical upper-bound for the compressed code */
/* block size ? */
l_data_size = 2 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 167,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::useBuffer(
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE **header,
OMX_U32 portIndex,
OMX_PTR appPrivate,
OMX_U32 size,
OMX_U8 *ptr) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK_LT(portIndex, mPorts.size());
*header = new OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE;
(*header)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*header)->nVersion.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nRevision = 0;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nStep = 0;
(*header)->pBuffer = ptr;
(*header)->nAllocLen = size;
(*header)->nFilledLen = 0;
(*header)->nOffset = 0;
(*header)->pAppPrivate = appPrivate;
(*header)->pPlatformPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->pInputPortPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->pOutputPortPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->hMarkTargetComponent = NULL;
(*header)->pMarkData = NULL;
(*header)->nTickCount = 0;
(*header)->nTimeStamp = 0;
(*header)->nFlags = 0;
(*header)->nOutputPortIndex = portIndex;
(*header)->nInputPortIndex = portIndex;
PortInfo *port = &mPorts.editItemAt(portIndex);
CHECK(mState == OMX_StateLoaded || port->mDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE);
CHECK_LT(port->mBuffers.size(), port->mDef.nBufferCountActual);
port->mBuffers.push();
BufferInfo *buffer =
&port->mBuffers.editItemAt(port->mBuffers.size() - 1);
buffer->mHeader = *header;
buffer->mOwnedByUs = false;
if (port->mBuffers.size() == port->mDef.nBufferCountActual) {
port->mDef.bPopulated = OMX_TRUE;
checkTransitions();
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: Check buffer size in useBuffer in software components
Test: No more crash from oob read/write with running poc.
Bug: 63522430
Change-Id: I232d256eacdfaa9347902fe9b42650999f0d2d85
(cherry picked from commit 4e79910fdb303fd28a37a9401bed1b7fbccb1373)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::useBuffer(
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE **header,
OMX_U32 portIndex,
OMX_PTR appPrivate,
OMX_U32 size,
OMX_U8 *ptr) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK_LT(portIndex, mPorts.size());
PortInfo *port = &mPorts.editItemAt(portIndex);
if (size < port->mDef.nBufferSize) {
ALOGE("b/63522430, Buffer size is too small.");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "63522430");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
*header = new OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE;
(*header)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*header)->nVersion.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nRevision = 0;
(*header)->nVersion.s.nStep = 0;
(*header)->pBuffer = ptr;
(*header)->nAllocLen = size;
(*header)->nFilledLen = 0;
(*header)->nOffset = 0;
(*header)->pAppPrivate = appPrivate;
(*header)->pPlatformPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->pInputPortPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->pOutputPortPrivate = NULL;
(*header)->hMarkTargetComponent = NULL;
(*header)->pMarkData = NULL;
(*header)->nTickCount = 0;
(*header)->nTimeStamp = 0;
(*header)->nFlags = 0;
(*header)->nOutputPortIndex = portIndex;
(*header)->nInputPortIndex = portIndex;
CHECK(mState == OMX_StateLoaded || port->mDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE);
CHECK_LT(port->mBuffers.size(), port->mDef.nBufferCountActual);
port->mBuffers.push();
BufferInfo *buffer =
&port->mBuffers.editItemAt(port->mBuffers.size() - 1);
buffer->mHeader = *header;
buffer->mOwnedByUs = false;
if (port->mBuffers.size() == port->mDef.nBufferCountActual) {
port->mDef.bPopulated = OMX_TRUE;
checkTransitions();
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,977 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void i2c_deblock_gpio_cfg(void)
{
/* set I2C bus 1 deblocking GPIOs input, but 0 value for open drain */
qrio_gpio_direction_input(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1);
qrio_gpio_direction_input(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1);
qrio_set_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1, 0);
qrio_set_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1, 0);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void i2c_deblock_gpio_cfg(void)
| 169,631 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
#endif
struct cred *new;
int ret;
if (
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
#endif
clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
) {
p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
get_cred(p->cred);
alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
return 0;
}
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
ret = create_user_ns(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_put;
}
/* cache user_ns in cred. Doesn't need a refcount because it will
* stay pinned by cred->user
*/
new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
* had one */
if (new->thread_keyring) {
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
}
/* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
* a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
* bit */
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tgcred) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error_put;
}
atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
release_tgcred(new);
new->tgcred = tgcred;
}
#endif
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
validate_creds(new);
return 0;
error_put:
put_cred(new);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct thread_group_cred *tgcred;
#endif
struct cred *new;
int ret;
p->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
if (
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
!p->cred->thread_keyring &&
#endif
clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
) {
p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
get_cred(p->cred);
alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
return 0;
}
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
ret = create_user_ns(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_put;
}
/* cache user_ns in cred. Doesn't need a refcount because it will
* stay pinned by cred->user
*/
new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
* had one */
if (new->thread_keyring) {
key_put(new->thread_keyring);
new->thread_keyring = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
}
/* we share the process and session keyrings between all the threads in
* a process - this is slightly icky as we violate COW credentials a
* bit */
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
tgcred = kmalloc(sizeof(*tgcred), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tgcred) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error_put;
}
atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
tgcred->process_keyring = NULL;
tgcred->session_keyring = key_get(new->tgcred->session_keyring);
release_tgcred(new);
new->tgcred = tgcred;
}
#endif
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
validate_creds(new);
return 0;
error_put:
put_cred(new);
return ret;
}
| 165,589 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mconvert(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, int flip)
{
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
uint8_t type;
switch (type = cvt_flip(m->type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
cvt_8(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_SHORT:
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
/* Null terminate and eat *trailing* return */
p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1] = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_PSTRING: {
size_t sz = file_pstring_length_size(m);
char *ptr1 = p->s, *ptr2 = ptr1 + sz;
size_t len = file_pstring_get_length(m, ptr1);
if (len >= sizeof(p->s)) {
/*
* The size of the pascal string length (sz)
* is 1, 2, or 4. We need at least 1 byte for NUL
* termination, but we've already truncated the
* string by p->s, so we need to deduct sz.
*/
len = sizeof(p->s) - sz;
}
while (len--)
*ptr1++ = *ptr2++;
*ptr1 = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_BESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|(p->hs[1]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[0]<<24)|(p->hl[1]<<16)|(p->hl[2]<<8)|(p->hl[3]));
if (type == FILE_BELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[7]));
if (type == FILE_BEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|(p->hs[0]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[3]<<24)|(p->hl[2]<<16)|(p->hl[1]<<8)|(p->hl[0]));
if (type == FILE_LELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[0]));
if (type == FILE_LEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[1]<<24)|(p->hl[0]<<16)|(p->hl[3]<<8)|(p->hl[2]));
if (type == FILE_MELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_FLOAT:
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[0]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[3]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[3]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[0]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[7]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[0]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in mconvert()", m->type);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: PR/398: Correctly truncate pascal strings (fixes out of bounds read of 1, 2,
or 4 bytes).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | mconvert(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, int flip)
{
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
uint8_t type;
switch (type = cvt_flip(m->type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
cvt_8(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_SHORT:
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
/* Null terminate and eat *trailing* return */
p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1] = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_PSTRING: {
size_t sz = file_pstring_length_size(m);
char *ptr1 = p->s, *ptr2 = ptr1 + sz;
size_t len = file_pstring_get_length(m, ptr1);
sz = sizeof(p->s) - sz; /* maximum length of string */
if (len >= sz) {
/*
* The size of the pascal string length (sz)
* is 1, 2, or 4. We need at least 1 byte for NUL
* termination, but we've already truncated the
* string by p->s, so we need to deduct sz.
* Because we can use one of the bytes of the length
* after we shifted as NUL termination.
*/
len = sz;
}
while (len--)
*ptr1++ = *ptr2++;
*ptr1 = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_BESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|(p->hs[1]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[0]<<24)|(p->hl[1]<<16)|(p->hl[2]<<8)|(p->hl[3]));
if (type == FILE_BELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[7]));
if (type == FILE_BEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|(p->hs[0]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[3]<<24)|(p->hl[2]<<16)|(p->hl[1]<<8)|(p->hl[0]));
if (type == FILE_LELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[0]));
if (type == FILE_LEQUAD)
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[1]<<24)|(p->hl[0]<<16)|(p->hl[3]<<8)|(p->hl[2]));
if (type == FILE_MELONG)
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_FLOAT:
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[0]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[3]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[3]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[0]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[7]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[0]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in mconvert()", m->type);
return 0;
}
}
| 166,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mcs_parse_domain_params(STREAM s)
{
int length;
ber_parse_header(s, MCS_TAG_DOMAIN_PARAMS, &length);
in_uint8s(s, length);
return s_check(s);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | mcs_parse_domain_params(STREAM s)
{
uint32 length;
struct stream packet = *s;
ber_parse_header(s, MCS_TAG_DOMAIN_PARAMS, &length);
if (!s_check_rem(s, length))
{
rdp_protocol_error("mcs_parse_domain_params(), consume domain params from stream would overrun", &packet);
}
in_uint8s(s, length);
return s_check(s);
}
| 169,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_gate_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct vm_area_struct **vma,
struct page **page)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
int ret = -EFAULT;
/* user gate pages are read-only */
if (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)
return -EFAULT;
if (address > TASK_SIZE)
pgd = pgd_offset_k(address);
else
pgd = pgd_offset_gate(mm, address);
BUG_ON(pgd_none(*pgd));
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
BUG_ON(p4d_none(*p4d));
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
BUG_ON(pud_none(*pud));
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return -EFAULT;
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
if (pte_none(*pte))
goto unmap;
*vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
if (!page)
goto out;
*page = vm_normal_page(*vma, address, *pte);
if (!*page) {
if ((gup_flags & FOLL_DUMP) || !is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(*pte)))
goto unmap;
*page = pte_page(*pte);
/*
* This should never happen (a device public page in the gate
* area).
*/
if (is_device_public_page(*page))
goto unmap;
}
get_page(*page);
out:
ret = 0;
unmap:
pte_unmap(pte);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int get_gate_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct vm_area_struct **vma,
struct page **page)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
int ret = -EFAULT;
/* user gate pages are read-only */
if (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)
return -EFAULT;
if (address > TASK_SIZE)
pgd = pgd_offset_k(address);
else
pgd = pgd_offset_gate(mm, address);
BUG_ON(pgd_none(*pgd));
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
BUG_ON(p4d_none(*p4d));
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
BUG_ON(pud_none(*pud));
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return -EFAULT;
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
if (pte_none(*pte))
goto unmap;
*vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
if (!page)
goto out;
*page = vm_normal_page(*vma, address, *pte);
if (!*page) {
if ((gup_flags & FOLL_DUMP) || !is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(*pte)))
goto unmap;
*page = pte_page(*pte);
/*
* This should never happen (a device public page in the gate
* area).
*/
if (is_device_public_page(*page))
goto unmap;
}
if (unlikely(!try_get_page(*page))) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto unmap;
}
out:
ret = 0;
unmap:
pte_unmap(pte);
return ret;
}
| 170,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DownloadController::CreateGETDownload(
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
bool must_download,
const DownloadInfo& info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadController::StartAndroidDownload,
base::Unretained(this),
wc_getter, must_download, info));
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void DownloadController::CreateGETDownload(
| 171,881 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResourcePrefetchPredictor::LearnOrigins(
const std::string& host,
const GURL& main_frame_origin,
const std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>& summaries) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (host.size() > ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::kMaxStringLength)
return;
OriginData data;
bool exists = origin_data_->TryGetData(host, &data);
if (!exists) {
data.set_host(host);
data.set_last_visit_time(base::Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
size_t origins_size = summaries.size();
auto ordered_origins =
std::vector<const OriginRequestSummary*>(origins_size);
for (const auto& kv : summaries) {
size_t index = kv.second.first_occurrence;
DCHECK_LT(index, origins_size);
ordered_origins[index] = &kv.second;
}
for (const OriginRequestSummary* summary : ordered_origins) {
auto* origin_to_add = data.add_origins();
InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(origin_to_add, *summary);
}
} else {
data.set_last_visit_time(base::Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
std::map<GURL, int> old_index;
int old_size = static_cast<int>(data.origins_size());
for (int i = 0; i < old_size; ++i) {
bool is_new =
old_index.insert({GURL(data.origins(i).origin()), i}).second;
DCHECK(is_new);
}
for (int i = 0; i < old_size; ++i) {
auto* old_origin = data.mutable_origins(i);
GURL origin(old_origin->origin());
auto it = summaries.find(origin);
if (it == summaries.end()) {
old_origin->set_number_of_misses(old_origin->number_of_misses() + 1);
old_origin->set_consecutive_misses(old_origin->consecutive_misses() +
1);
} else {
const auto& new_origin = it->second;
old_origin->set_always_access_network(new_origin.always_access_network);
old_origin->set_accessed_network(new_origin.accessed_network);
int position = new_origin.first_occurrence + 1;
int total =
old_origin->number_of_hits() + old_origin->number_of_misses();
old_origin->set_average_position(
((old_origin->average_position() * total) + position) /
(total + 1));
old_origin->set_number_of_hits(old_origin->number_of_hits() + 1);
old_origin->set_consecutive_misses(0);
}
}
for (const auto& kv : summaries) {
if (old_index.find(kv.first) != old_index.end())
continue;
auto* origin_to_add = data.add_origins();
InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(origin_to_add, kv.second);
}
}
ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::TrimOrigins(&data,
config_.max_consecutive_misses);
ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::SortOrigins(&data, main_frame_origin.spec());
if (data.origins_size() > static_cast<int>(config_.max_origins_per_entry)) {
data.mutable_origins()->DeleteSubrange(
config_.max_origins_per_entry,
data.origins_size() - config_.max_origins_per_entry);
}
if (data.origins_size() == 0)
origin_data_->DeleteData({host});
else
origin_data_->UpdateData(host, data);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ResourcePrefetchPredictor::LearnOrigins(
const std::string& host,
const GURL& main_frame_origin,
const std::map<url::Origin, OriginRequestSummary>& summaries) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (host.size() > ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::kMaxStringLength)
return;
OriginData data;
bool exists = origin_data_->TryGetData(host, &data);
if (!exists) {
data.set_host(host);
data.set_last_visit_time(base::Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
size_t origins_size = summaries.size();
auto ordered_origins =
std::vector<const OriginRequestSummary*>(origins_size);
for (const auto& kv : summaries) {
size_t index = kv.second.first_occurrence;
DCHECK_LT(index, origins_size);
ordered_origins[index] = &kv.second;
}
for (const OriginRequestSummary* summary : ordered_origins) {
auto* origin_to_add = data.add_origins();
InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(origin_to_add, *summary);
}
} else {
data.set_last_visit_time(base::Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
std::map<url::Origin, int> old_index;
int old_size = static_cast<int>(data.origins_size());
for (int i = 0; i < old_size; ++i) {
bool is_new =
old_index
.insert({url::Origin::Create(GURL(data.origins(i).origin())), i})
.second;
DCHECK(is_new);
}
for (int i = 0; i < old_size; ++i) {
auto* old_origin = data.mutable_origins(i);
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL(old_origin->origin()));
auto it = summaries.find(origin);
if (it == summaries.end()) {
old_origin->set_number_of_misses(old_origin->number_of_misses() + 1);
old_origin->set_consecutive_misses(old_origin->consecutive_misses() +
1);
} else {
const auto& new_origin = it->second;
old_origin->set_always_access_network(new_origin.always_access_network);
old_origin->set_accessed_network(new_origin.accessed_network);
int position = new_origin.first_occurrence + 1;
int total =
old_origin->number_of_hits() + old_origin->number_of_misses();
old_origin->set_average_position(
((old_origin->average_position() * total) + position) /
(total + 1));
old_origin->set_number_of_hits(old_origin->number_of_hits() + 1);
old_origin->set_consecutive_misses(0);
}
}
for (const auto& kv : summaries) {
if (old_index.find(kv.first) != old_index.end())
continue;
auto* origin_to_add = data.add_origins();
InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(origin_to_add, kv.second);
}
}
ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::TrimOrigins(&data,
config_.max_consecutive_misses);
ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::SortOrigins(&data, main_frame_origin.spec());
if (data.origins_size() > static_cast<int>(config_.max_origins_per_entry)) {
data.mutable_origins()->DeleteSubrange(
config_.max_origins_per_entry,
data.origins_size() - config_.max_origins_per_entry);
}
if (data.origins_size() == 0)
origin_data_->DeleteData({host});
else
origin_data_->UpdateData(host, data);
}
| 172,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: valid_length(uint8_t option, int dl, int *type)
{
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t sz;
if (dl == 0)
return -1;
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (opt->option != option)
continue;
if (type)
*type = opt->type;
if (opt->type == 0 ||
opt->type & (STRING | RFC3442 | RFC5969))
return 0;
sz = 0;
if (opt->type & (UINT32 | IPV4))
sz = sizeof(uint32_t);
if (opt->type & UINT16)
sz = sizeof(uint16_t);
if (opt->type & UINT8)
sz = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (opt->type & (IPV4 | ARRAY))
return dl % sz;
return (dl == sz ? 0 : -1);
}
/* unknown option, so let it pass */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
CWE ID: CWE-119 | valid_length(uint8_t option, int dl, int *type)
{
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t sz;
if (dl == 0)
return -1;
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (opt->option != option)
continue;
if (type)
*type = opt->type;
/* The size of RFC3442 and RFC5969 options is checked at a later
* stage in the code */
if (opt->type == 0 ||
opt->type & (STRING | RFC3442 | RFC5969))
return 0;
/* The code does not use SINT16 / SINT32 together with ARRAY.
* It is however far easier to reason about the code if all
* possible array elements are included, and also does not code
* any additional CPU resources. sizeof(uintXX_t) ==
* sizeof(intXX_t) can be assumed. */
sz = 0;
if (opt->type & (UINT32 | SINT32 | IPV4))
sz = sizeof(uint32_t);
else if (opt->type & (UINT16 | SINT16))
sz = sizeof(uint16_t);
else if (opt->type & UINT8)
sz = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (opt->type & ARRAY) {
/* The result of modulo zero is undefined. There are no
* options defined in this file that do not match one of
* the if-clauses above, so the following is not really
* necessary. However, to avoid confusion and unexpected
* behavior if the defined options are ever extended,
* returning false here seems sensible. */
if (!sz) return -1;
return (dl % sz == 0) ? 0 : -1;
}
return (sz == dl) ? 0 : -1;
}
/* unknown option, so let it pass */
return 0;
}
| 173,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc txcq_descr;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
/* Flush changes in TX descriptor before changing the counter value */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_inc_tx_completion_counter(s, qidx);
vmxnet3_trigger_interrupt(s, s->txq_descr[qidx].intr_idx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc txcq_descr;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
memset(&txcq_descr, 0, sizeof(txcq_descr));
txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
/* Flush changes in TX descriptor before changing the counter value */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_inc_tx_completion_counter(s, qidx);
vmxnet3_trigger_interrupt(s, s->txq_descr[qidx].intr_idx);
}
| 164,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kvm_irqfd(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args)
{
if (args->flags & ~(KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN | KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE))
return -EINVAL;
if (args->flags & KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN)
return kvm_irqfd_deassign(kvm, args);
return kvm_irqfd_assign(kvm, args);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | kvm_irqfd(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args)
{
if (args->flags & ~(KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN | KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_RESAMPLE))
return -EINVAL;
if (args->gsi >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES)
return -EINVAL;
if (args->flags & KVM_IRQFD_FLAG_DEASSIGN)
return kvm_irqfd_deassign(kvm, args);
return kvm_irqfd_assign(kvm, args);
}
| 167,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void _php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int image_type, char *tn, gdImagePtr (*func_p)(), gdImagePtr (*ioctx_func_p)())
{
char *file;
int file_len;
long srcx, srcy, width, height;
gdImagePtr im = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
FILE * fp = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
long ignore_warning;
#endif
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sllll", &file, &file_len, &srcx, &srcy, &width, &height) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (width < 1 || height < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Zero width or height not allowed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &file, &file_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", REPORT_ERRORS|IGNORE_PATH|IGNORE_URL_WIN, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifndef USE_GD_IOCTX
ioctx_func_p = NULL; /* don't allow sockets without IOCtx */
#endif
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_WEBP) {
size_t buff_size;
char *buff;
/* needs to be malloc (persistent) - GD will free() it later */
buff_size = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &buff, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 1);
if (!buff_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot read image data");
goto out_err;
}
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(buff_size, buff);
if (!im) {
goto out_err;
}
goto register_im;
}
/* try and avoid allocating a FILE* if the stream is not naturally a FILE* */
if (php_stream_is(stream, PHP_STREAM_IS_STDIO)) {
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO, (void**)&fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
goto out_err;
}
} else if (ioctx_func_p) {
#ifdef USE_GD_IOCTX
/* we can create an io context */
gdIOCtx* io_ctx;
size_t buff_size;
char *buff;
/* needs to be malloc (persistent) - GD will free() it later */
buff_size = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &buff, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 1);
if (!buff_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot read image data");
goto out_err;
}
io_ctx = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(buff_size, buff, 0);
if (!io_ctx) {
pefree(buff, 1);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot allocate GD IO context");
goto out_err;
}
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART) {
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx, srcx, srcy, width, height);
} else {
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx);
}
#if HAVE_LIBGD204
io_ctx->gd_free(io_ctx);
#else
io_ctx->free(io_ctx);
#endif
pefree(buff, 1);
#endif
}
else {
/* try and force the stream to be FILE* */
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO | PHP_STREAM_CAST_TRY_HARD, (void **) &fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
goto out_err;
}
}
if (!im && fp) {
switch (image_type) {
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART:
im = (*func_p)(fp, srcx, srcy, width, height);
break;
#if defined(HAVE_GD_XPM) && defined(HAVE_GD_BUNDLED)
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_XPM:
im = gdImageCreateFromXpm(file);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_JPG:
ignore_warning = INI_INT("gd.jpeg_ignore_warning");
#ifdef HAVE_GD_BUNDLED
im = gdImageCreateFromJpeg(fp, ignore_warning);
#else
im = gdImageCreateFromJpeg(fp);
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
im = (*func_p)(fp);
break;
}
fflush(fp);
}
register_im:
if (im) {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im, le_gd);
php_stream_close(stream);
return;
}
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s' is not a valid %s file", file, tn);
out_err:
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | static void _php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int image_type, char *tn, gdImagePtr (*func_p)(), gdImagePtr (*ioctx_func_p)())
{
char *file;
int file_len;
long srcx, srcy, width, height;
gdImagePtr im = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
FILE * fp = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
long ignore_warning;
#endif
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pllll", &file, &file_len, &srcx, &srcy, &width, &height) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (width < 1 || height < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Zero width or height not allowed");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &file, &file_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", REPORT_ERRORS|IGNORE_PATH|IGNORE_URL_WIN, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#ifndef USE_GD_IOCTX
ioctx_func_p = NULL; /* don't allow sockets without IOCtx */
#endif
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_WEBP) {
size_t buff_size;
char *buff;
/* needs to be malloc (persistent) - GD will free() it later */
buff_size = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &buff, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 1);
if (!buff_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot read image data");
goto out_err;
}
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(buff_size, buff);
if (!im) {
goto out_err;
}
goto register_im;
}
/* try and avoid allocating a FILE* if the stream is not naturally a FILE* */
if (php_stream_is(stream, PHP_STREAM_IS_STDIO)) {
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO, (void**)&fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
goto out_err;
}
} else if (ioctx_func_p) {
#ifdef USE_GD_IOCTX
/* we can create an io context */
gdIOCtx* io_ctx;
size_t buff_size;
char *buff;
/* needs to be malloc (persistent) - GD will free() it later */
buff_size = php_stream_copy_to_mem(stream, &buff, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 1);
if (!buff_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot read image data");
goto out_err;
}
io_ctx = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(buff_size, buff, 0);
if (!io_ctx) {
pefree(buff, 1);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Cannot allocate GD IO context");
goto out_err;
}
if (image_type == PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART) {
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx, srcx, srcy, width, height);
} else {
im = (*ioctx_func_p)(io_ctx);
}
#if HAVE_LIBGD204
io_ctx->gd_free(io_ctx);
#else
io_ctx->free(io_ctx);
#endif
pefree(buff, 1);
#endif
}
else {
/* try and force the stream to be FILE* */
if (FAILURE == php_stream_cast(stream, PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO | PHP_STREAM_CAST_TRY_HARD, (void **) &fp, REPORT_ERRORS)) {
goto out_err;
}
}
if (!im && fp) {
switch (image_type) {
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2PART:
im = (*func_p)(fp, srcx, srcy, width, height);
break;
#if defined(HAVE_GD_XPM) && defined(HAVE_GD_BUNDLED)
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_XPM:
im = gdImageCreateFromXpm(file);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_JPG:
ignore_warning = INI_INT("gd.jpeg_ignore_warning");
#ifdef HAVE_GD_BUNDLED
im = gdImageCreateFromJpeg(fp, ignore_warning);
#else
im = gdImageCreateFromJpeg(fp);
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
im = (*func_p)(fp);
break;
}
fflush(fp);
}
register_im:
if (im) {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im, le_gd);
php_stream_close(stream);
return;
}
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s' is not a valid %s file", file, tn);
out_err:
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
| 165,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftG711::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = mIsMLaw ? OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeMULaw
: OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeALaw;
} else {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
}
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftG711::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = mIsMLaw ? OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeMULaw
: OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeALaw;
} else {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
}
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void addArgumentToVtab(Parse *pParse){
if( pParse->sArg.z && pParse->pNewTable ){
const char *z = (const char*)pParse->sArg.z;
int n = pParse->sArg.n;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
addModuleArgument(db, pParse->pNewTable, sqlite3DbStrNDup(db, z, n));
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void addArgumentToVtab(Parse *pParse){
if( pParse->sArg.z && pParse->pNewTable ){
const char *z = (const char*)pParse->sArg.z;
int n = pParse->sArg.n;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
addModuleArgument(pParse, pParse->pNewTable, sqlite3DbStrNDup(db, z, n));
}
}
| 173,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __init ip6_tunnel_init(void)
{
int err;
if (xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip4ip6\n");
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
if (xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip6ip6_handler, AF_INET6)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip6ip6\n");
err = -EAGAIN;
goto unreg_ip4ip6;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&ip6_tnl_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto err_pernet;
return 0;
err_pernet:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&ip6ip6_handler, AF_INET6);
unreg_ip4ip6:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int __init ip6_tunnel_init(void)
{
int err;
err = register_pernet_device(&ip6_tnl_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto out_pernet;
err = xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET);
if (err < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip4ip6\n");
goto out_ip4ip6;
}
err = xfrm6_tunnel_register(&ip6ip6_handler, AF_INET6);
if (err < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ip6_tunnel init: can't register ip6ip6\n");
goto out_ip6ip6;
}
return 0;
out_ip6ip6:
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&ip4ip6_handler, AF_INET);
out_ip4ip6:
unregister_pernet_device(&ip6_tnl_net_ops);
out_pernet:
return err;
}
| 165,877 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_i32le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return (iw_int32)(iw_uint32)(b[0] | (b[1]<<8) | (b[2]<<16) | (b[3]<<24));
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_i32le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return (iw_int32)(iw_uint32)((unsigned int)b[0] | ((unsigned int)b[1]<<8) |
((unsigned int)b[2]<<16) | ((unsigned int)b[3]<<24));
}
| 168,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
libxml_globals->stream_context = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_buffer.c = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_list = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
libxml_globals->stream_context = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_buffer.c = NULL;
libxml_globals->error_list = NULL;
libxml_globals->entity_loader_disabled = 0;
}
| 164,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TextTrackCue::setStartTime(double value) {
if (start_time_ == value || value < 0)
return;
CueWillChange();
start_time_ = value;
CueDidChange(kCueMutationAffectsOrder);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | void TextTrackCue::setStartTime(double value) {
if (start_time_ == value)
return;
CueWillChange();
start_time_ = value;
CueDidChange(kCueMutationAffectsOrder);
}
| 171,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
uint8_t* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int j = 0;
uint8_t encoded_pixels;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (uint8_t*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(uint8_t));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & 127 ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if (encoded_pixels != 0) {
if (!((buffer_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) < image_block_size)) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < pixel_block_size; j++, bitmap_caret++) {
tga->bitmap[ bitmap_caret ] = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret + j ];
}
}
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if (encoded_pixels != 0) {
if (!((buffer_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) < image_block_size)) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
for( j = 0; j < pixel_block_size; j++, bitmap_caret++ ) {
tga->bitmap[ bitmap_caret ] = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret + j ];
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
}
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Proper fix for #248
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
uint8_t* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
uint8_t encoded_pixels;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (uint8_t*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(uint8_t));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & !TGA_RLE_FLAG ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) >= image_block_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, pixel_block_size);
bitmap_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) >= image_block_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
bitmap_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
buffer_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
| 166,980 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void XSSAuditor::Init(Document* document,
XSSAuditorDelegate* auditor_delegate) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
if (state_ != kUninitialized)
return;
state_ = kFilteringTokens;
if (Settings* settings = document->GetSettings())
is_enabled_ = settings->GetXSSAuditorEnabled();
if (!is_enabled_)
return;
document_url_ = document->Url().Copy();
if (!document->GetFrame()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document_url_.IsEmpty()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document_url_.ProtocolIsData()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document->Encoding().IsValid())
encoding_ = document->Encoding();
if (DocumentLoader* document_loader =
document->GetFrame()->Loader().GetDocumentLoader()) {
const AtomicString& header_value =
document_loader->GetResponse().HttpHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_XSS_Protection);
String error_details;
unsigned error_position = 0;
String report_url;
KURL xss_protection_report_url;
ReflectedXSSDisposition xss_protection_header = ParseXSSProtectionHeader(
header_value, error_details, error_position, report_url);
if (xss_protection_header == kAllowReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorDisabled);
else if (xss_protection_header == kFilterReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorEnabledFilter);
else if (xss_protection_header == kBlockReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorEnabledBlock);
else if (xss_protection_header == kReflectedXSSInvalid)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorInvalid);
did_send_valid_xss_protection_header_ =
xss_protection_header != kReflectedXSSUnset &&
xss_protection_header != kReflectedXSSInvalid;
if ((xss_protection_header == kFilterReflectedXSS ||
xss_protection_header == kBlockReflectedXSS) &&
!report_url.IsEmpty()) {
xss_protection_report_url = document->CompleteURL(report_url);
if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedContent(document->GetSecurityOrigin(),
xss_protection_report_url)) {
error_details = "insecure reporting URL for secure page";
xss_protection_header = kReflectedXSSInvalid;
xss_protection_report_url = KURL();
}
}
if (xss_protection_header == kReflectedXSSInvalid) {
document->AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Error parsing header X-XSS-Protection: " + header_value + ": " +
error_details + " at character position " +
String::Format("%u", error_position) +
". The default protections will be applied."));
}
xss_protection_ = xss_protection_header;
if (xss_protection_ == kReflectedXSSInvalid ||
xss_protection_ == kReflectedXSSUnset) {
xss_protection_ = kBlockReflectedXSS;
}
if (auditor_delegate)
auditor_delegate->SetReportURL(xss_protection_report_url.Copy());
EncodedFormData* http_body = document_loader->GetRequest().HttpBody();
if (http_body && !http_body->IsEmpty())
http_body_as_string_ = http_body->FlattenToString();
}
SetEncoding(encoding_);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | void XSSAuditor::Init(Document* document,
XSSAuditorDelegate* auditor_delegate) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
if (state_ != kUninitialized)
return;
state_ = kFilteringTokens;
if (Settings* settings = document->GetSettings())
is_enabled_ = settings->GetXSSAuditorEnabled();
if (!is_enabled_)
return;
document_url_ = document->Url().Copy();
if (!document->GetFrame()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document_url_.IsEmpty()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document_url_.ProtocolIsData()) {
is_enabled_ = false;
return;
}
if (document->Encoding().IsValid())
encoding_ = document->Encoding();
if (DocumentLoader* document_loader =
document->GetFrame()->Loader().GetDocumentLoader()) {
const AtomicString& header_value =
document_loader->GetResponse().HttpHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_XSS_Protection);
String error_details;
unsigned error_position = 0;
String report_url;
KURL xss_protection_report_url;
ReflectedXSSDisposition xss_protection_header = ParseXSSProtectionHeader(
header_value, error_details, error_position, report_url);
if (xss_protection_header == kAllowReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorDisabled);
else if (xss_protection_header == kFilterReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorEnabledFilter);
else if (xss_protection_header == kBlockReflectedXSS)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorEnabledBlock);
else if (xss_protection_header == kReflectedXSSInvalid)
UseCounter::Count(*document, WebFeature::kXSSAuditorInvalid);
did_send_valid_xss_protection_header_ =
xss_protection_header != kReflectedXSSUnset &&
xss_protection_header != kReflectedXSSInvalid;
if ((xss_protection_header == kFilterReflectedXSS ||
xss_protection_header == kBlockReflectedXSS) &&
!report_url.IsEmpty()) {
xss_protection_report_url = document->CompleteURL(report_url);
if (!SecurityOrigin::Create(xss_protection_report_url)
->IsSameSchemeHostPort(document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
error_details =
"reporting URL is not same scheme, host, and port as page";
xss_protection_header = kReflectedXSSInvalid;
xss_protection_report_url = KURL();
}
if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedContent(document->GetSecurityOrigin(),
xss_protection_report_url)) {
error_details = "insecure reporting URL for secure page";
xss_protection_header = kReflectedXSSInvalid;
xss_protection_report_url = KURL();
}
}
if (xss_protection_header == kReflectedXSSInvalid) {
document->AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Error parsing header X-XSS-Protection: " + header_value + ": " +
error_details + " at character position " +
String::Format("%u", error_position) +
". The default protections will be applied."));
}
xss_protection_ = xss_protection_header;
if (xss_protection_ == kReflectedXSSInvalid ||
xss_protection_ == kReflectedXSSUnset) {
xss_protection_ = kBlockReflectedXSS;
}
if (auditor_delegate)
auditor_delegate->SetReportURL(xss_protection_report_url.Copy());
EncodedFormData* http_body = document_loader->GetRequest().HttpBody();
if (http_body && !http_body->IsEmpty())
http_body_as_string_ = http_body->FlattenToString();
}
SetEncoding(encoding_);
}
| 172,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int btsock_thread_add_fd(int h, int fd, int type, int flags, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
if(flags & SOCK_THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC)
{
if(ts[h].thread_id == pthread_self())
{
flags &= ~SOCK_THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC;
add_poll(h, fd, type, flags, user_id);
return TRUE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC is not called in poll thread, fallback to async");
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_ADD_FD, fd, type, flags, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("adding fd:%d, flags:0x%x", fd, flags);
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0) == sizeof(cmd);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int btsock_thread_add_fd(int h, int fd, int type, int flags, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
if(flags & SOCK_THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC)
{
if(ts[h].thread_id == pthread_self())
{
flags &= ~SOCK_THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC;
add_poll(h, fd, type, flags, user_id);
return TRUE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("THREAD_ADD_FD_SYNC is not called in poll thread, fallback to async");
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_ADD_FD, fd, type, flags, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("adding fd:%d, flags:0x%x", fd, flags);
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0)) == sizeof(cmd);
}
| 173,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct bio *bio_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q,
const struct iov_iter *iter,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int j;
int nr_pages = 0;
struct page **pages;
struct bio *bio;
int cur_page = 0;
int ret, offset;
struct iov_iter i;
struct iovec iov;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* Overflow, abort
*/
if (end < start)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
nr_pages += end - start;
/*
* buffer must be aligned to at least logical block size for now
*/
if (uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!nr_pages)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages);
if (!bio)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_mask);
if (!pages)
goto out;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
const int local_nr_pages = end - start;
const int page_limit = cur_page + local_nr_pages;
ret = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, local_nr_pages,
(iter->type & WRITE) != WRITE,
&pages[cur_page]);
if (ret < local_nr_pages) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unmap;
}
offset = offset_in_page(uaddr);
for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) {
unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
if (len <= 0)
break;
if (bytes > len)
bytes = len;
/*
* sorry...
*/
if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, pages[j], bytes, offset) <
bytes)
break;
len -= bytes;
offset = 0;
}
cur_page = j;
/*
* release the pages we didn't map into the bio, if any
*/
while (j < page_limit)
put_page(pages[j++]);
}
kfree(pages);
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED);
/*
* subtle -- if bio_map_user_iov() ended up bouncing a bio,
* it would normally disappear when its bi_end_io is run.
* however, we need it for the unmap, so grab an extra
* reference to it
*/
bio_get(bio);
return bio;
out_unmap:
for (j = 0; j < nr_pages; j++) {
if (!pages[j])
break;
put_page(pages[j]);
}
out:
kfree(pages);
bio_put(bio);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | struct bio *bio_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q,
const struct iov_iter *iter,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int j;
int nr_pages = 0;
struct page **pages;
struct bio *bio;
int cur_page = 0;
int ret, offset;
struct iov_iter i;
struct iovec iov;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* Overflow, abort
*/
if (end < start)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
nr_pages += end - start;
/*
* buffer must be aligned to at least logical block size for now
*/
if (uaddr & queue_dma_alignment(q))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!nr_pages)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages);
if (!bio)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_mask);
if (!pages)
goto out;
iov_for_each(iov, i, *iter) {
unsigned long uaddr = (unsigned long) iov.iov_base;
unsigned long len = iov.iov_len;
unsigned long end = (uaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = uaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
const int local_nr_pages = end - start;
const int page_limit = cur_page + local_nr_pages;
ret = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, local_nr_pages,
(iter->type & WRITE) != WRITE,
&pages[cur_page]);
if (ret < local_nr_pages) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unmap;
}
offset = offset_in_page(uaddr);
for (j = cur_page; j < page_limit; j++) {
unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
unsigned short prev_bi_vcnt = bio->bi_vcnt;
if (len <= 0)
break;
if (bytes > len)
bytes = len;
/*
* sorry...
*/
if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, pages[j], bytes, offset) <
bytes)
break;
/*
* check if vector was merged with previous
* drop page reference if needed
*/
if (bio->bi_vcnt == prev_bi_vcnt)
put_page(pages[j]);
len -= bytes;
offset = 0;
}
cur_page = j;
/*
* release the pages we didn't map into the bio, if any
*/
while (j < page_limit)
put_page(pages[j++]);
}
kfree(pages);
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED);
/*
* subtle -- if bio_map_user_iov() ended up bouncing a bio,
* it would normally disappear when its bi_end_io is run.
* however, we need it for the unmap, so grab an extra
* reference to it
*/
bio_get(bio);
return bio;
out_unmap:
for (j = 0; j < nr_pages; j++) {
if (!pages[j])
break;
put_page(pages[j]);
}
out:
kfree(pages);
bio_put(bio);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
| 167,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool BaseSettingChange::Init(Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(profile);
profile_ = profile;
return true;
}
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool BaseSettingChange::Init(Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(profile && !profile_);
profile_ = profile;
return true;
}
| 170,756 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void VRDisplay::FocusChanged() {
vr_v_sync_provider_.reset();
ConnectVSyncProvider();
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | void VRDisplay::FocusChanged() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
vr_v_sync_provider_.reset();
ConnectVSyncProvider();
}
| 171,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: daemon_AuthUserPwd(char *username, char *password, char *errbuf)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/*
* Warning: the user which launches the process must have the
* SE_TCB_NAME right.
* This corresponds to have the "Act as part of the Operating System"
* turned on (administrative tools, local security settings, local
* policies, user right assignment)
* However, it seems to me that if you run it as a service, this
* right should be provided by default.
*
* XXX - hopefully, this returns errors such as ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE,
* which merely indicates that the user name or password is
* incorrect, not whether it's the user name or the password
* that's incorrect, so a client that's trying to brute-force
* accounts doesn't know whether it's the user name or the
* password that's incorrect, so it doesn't know whether to
* stop trying to log in with a given user name and move on
* to another user name.
*/
HANDLE Token;
if (LogonUser(username, ".", password, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &Token) == 0)
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "LogonUser() failed");
return -1;
}
if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Token) == 0)
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() failed");
CloseHandle(Token);
return -1;
}
CloseHandle(Token);
return 0;
#else
/*
* See
*
* http://www.unixpapa.com/incnote/passwd.html
*
* We use the Solaris/Linux shadow password authentication if
* we have getspnam(), otherwise we just do traditional
* authentication, which, on some platforms, might work, even
* with shadow passwords, if we're running as root. Traditional
* authenticaion won't work if we're not running as root, as
* I think these days all UN*Xes either won't return the password
* at all with getpwnam() or will only do so if you're root.
*
* XXX - perhaps what we *should* be using is PAM, if we have
* it. That might hide all the details of username/password
* authentication, whether it's done with a visible-to-root-
* only password database or some other authentication mechanism,
* behind its API.
*/
struct passwd *user;
char *user_password;
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
struct spwd *usersp;
#endif
char *crypt_password;
if ((user = getpwnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
if ((usersp = getspnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
user_password = usersp->sp_pwdp;
#else
/*
* XXX - what about other platforms?
* The unixpapa.com page claims this Just Works on *BSD if you're
* running as root - it's from 2000, so it doesn't indicate whether
* macOS (which didn't come out until 2001, under the name Mac OS
* X) behaves like the *BSDs or not, and might also work on AIX.
* HP-UX does something else.
*
* Again, hopefully PAM hides all that.
*/
user_password = user->pw_passwd;
#endif
crypt_password = crypt(password, user_password);
if (crypt_password == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(user_password, crypt_password) != 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
if (setuid(user->pw_uid))
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setuid");
return -1;
}
/* if (setgid(user->pw_gid))
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setgid");
return -1;
}
*/
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: On UN*X, don't tell the client why authentication failed.
"no such user" tells the client that the user ID isn't valid and,
therefore, that it needn't bother trying to do password cracking for
that user ID; just saying that the authentication failed dosn't give
them that hint.
This resolves the third problem in Include Security issue F11: [libpcap]
Remote Packet Capture Daemon Multiple Authentication Improvements.
The Windows LogonUser() API returns ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE for both cases,
so the Windows code doesn't have this issue. Just return the same
"Authentication failed" message on Windows to the user.
For various authentication failures *other* than "no such user" and
"password not valid", log a message, as there's a problem that may need
debugging. We don't need to tell the end user what the problem is, as
they may not bother reporting it and, even if they do, they may not give
the full error message.
CWE ID: CWE-345 | daemon_AuthUserPwd(char *username, char *password, char *errbuf)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/*
* Warning: the user which launches the process must have the
* SE_TCB_NAME right.
* This corresponds to have the "Act as part of the Operating System"
* turned on (administrative tools, local security settings, local
* policies, user right assignment)
* However, it seems to me that if you run it as a service, this
* right should be provided by default.
*
* XXX - hopefully, this returns errors such as ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE,
* which merely indicates that the user name or password is
* incorrect, not whether it's the user name or the password
* that's incorrect, so a client that's trying to brute-force
* accounts doesn't know whether it's the user name or the
* password that's incorrect, so it doesn't know whether to
* stop trying to log in with a given user name and move on
* to another user name.
*/
DWORD error;
HANDLE Token;
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to log
if (LogonUser(username, ".", password, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &Token) == 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
error = GetLastError();
if (error != ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE)
{
// Some error other than an authentication error;
// log it.
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errmsgbuf,
PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, error, "LogonUser() failed");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "%s", errmsgbuf);
}
return -1;
}
if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Token) == 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() failed");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "%s", errmsgbuf);
CloseHandle(Token);
return -1;
}
CloseHandle(Token);
return 0;
#else
/*
* See
*
* http://www.unixpapa.com/incnote/passwd.html
*
* We use the Solaris/Linux shadow password authentication if
* we have getspnam(), otherwise we just do traditional
* authentication, which, on some platforms, might work, even
* with shadow passwords, if we're running as root. Traditional
* authenticaion won't work if we're not running as root, as
* I think these days all UN*Xes either won't return the password
* at all with getpwnam() or will only do so if you're root.
*
* XXX - perhaps what we *should* be using is PAM, if we have
* it. That might hide all the details of username/password
* authentication, whether it's done with a visible-to-root-
* only password database or some other authentication mechanism,
* behind its API.
*/
int error;
struct passwd *user;
char *user_password;
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
struct spwd *usersp;
#endif
char *crypt_password;
if ((user = getpwnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
if ((usersp = getspnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
user_password = usersp->sp_pwdp;
#else
/*
* XXX - what about other platforms?
* The unixpapa.com page claims this Just Works on *BSD if you're
* running as root - it's from 2000, so it doesn't indicate whether
* macOS (which didn't come out until 2001, under the name Mac OS
* X) behaves like the *BSDs or not, and might also work on AIX.
* HP-UX does something else.
*
* Again, hopefully PAM hides all that.
*/
user_password = user->pw_passwd;
#endif
//
// The Single UNIX Specification says that if crypt() fails it
// sets errno, but some implementatons that haven't been run
// through the SUS test suite might not do so.
//
errno = 0;
crypt_password = crypt(password, user_password);
if (crypt_password == NULL)
{
error = errno;
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
if (error == 0)
{
// It didn't set errno.
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "crypt() failed");
}
else
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "crypt() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
}
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(user_password, crypt_password) != 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
if (setuid(user->pw_uid))
{
error = errno;
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
error, "setuid");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "setuid() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
return -1;
}
/* if (setgid(user->pw_gid))
{
error = errno;
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setgid");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "setgid() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
return -1;
}
*/
return 0;
#endif
}
| 169,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftG711::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
const uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mIsMLaw) {
DecodeMLaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
} else {
DecodeALaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SoftG711::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t) > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("output buffer too small (%d).", outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27793163");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
const uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mIsMLaw) {
DecodeMLaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
} else {
DecodeALaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 173,778 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
return 0;
}
| 173,849 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void voutf(struct GlobalConfig *config,
const char *prefix,
const char *fmt,
va_list ap)
{
size_t width = (79 - strlen(prefix));
if(!config->mute) {
size_t len;
char *ptr;
char *print_buffer;
print_buffer = curlx_mvaprintf(fmt, ap);
if(!print_buffer)
return;
len = strlen(print_buffer);
ptr = print_buffer;
while(len > 0) {
fputs(prefix, config->errors);
if(len > width) {
size_t cut = width-1;
while(!ISSPACE(ptr[cut]) && cut) {
cut--;
}
if(0 == cut)
/* not a single cutting position was found, just cut it at the
max text width then! */
cut = width-1;
(void)fwrite(ptr, cut + 1, 1, config->errors);
fputs("\n", config->errors);
ptr += cut + 1; /* skip the space too */
len -= cut;
}
else {
fputs(ptr, config->errors);
len = 0;
}
}
curl_free(print_buffer);
}
}
Commit Message: voutf: fix bad arethmetic when outputting warnings to stderr
CVE-2018-16842
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16842.html
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void voutf(struct GlobalConfig *config,
const char *prefix,
const char *fmt,
va_list ap)
{
size_t width = (79 - strlen(prefix));
if(!config->mute) {
size_t len;
char *ptr;
char *print_buffer;
print_buffer = curlx_mvaprintf(fmt, ap);
if(!print_buffer)
return;
len = strlen(print_buffer);
ptr = print_buffer;
while(len > 0) {
fputs(prefix, config->errors);
if(len > width) {
size_t cut = width-1;
while(!ISSPACE(ptr[cut]) && cut) {
cut--;
}
if(0 == cut)
/* not a single cutting position was found, just cut it at the
max text width then! */
cut = width-1;
(void)fwrite(ptr, cut + 1, 1, config->errors);
fputs("\n", config->errors);
ptr += cut + 1; /* skip the space too */
len -= cut + 1;
}
else {
fputs(ptr, config->errors);
len = 0;
}
}
curl_free(print_buffer);
}
}
| 169,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
{
if (size == 0 || ncount == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
return mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
| 168,647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string TestFlashMessageLoop::TestBasics() {
message_loop_ = new pp::flash::MessageLoop(instance_);
pp::CompletionCallback callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&TestFlashMessageLoop::QuitMessageLoopTask);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, callback);
int32_t result = message_loop_->Run();
ASSERT_TRUE(message_loop_);
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
ASSERT_EQ(PP_OK, result);
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | std::string TestFlashMessageLoop::TestBasics() {
message_loop_ = new pp::flash::MessageLoop(instance_);
pp::CompletionCallback callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&TestFlashMessageLoop::QuitMessageLoopTask);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, callback);
int32_t result = message_loop_->Run();
ASSERT_TRUE(message_loop_);
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = nullptr;
ASSERT_EQ(PP_OK, result);
PASS();
}
| 172,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_notify)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
long result_type = PGSQL_ASSOC;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGnotify *pgsql_notify;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|l",
&pgsql_link, &result_type) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (!(result_type & PGSQL_BOTH)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid result type");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PQconsumeInput(pgsql);
pgsql_notify = PQnotifies(pgsql);
if (!pgsql_notify) {
/* no notify message */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_string(return_value, 0, pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_index_long(return_value, 1, pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_index_string(return_value, 2, pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "message", pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "pid", pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_assoc_string(return_value, "payload", pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
PQfreemem(pgsql_notify);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int pg_get_pid([resource connection)
Get backend(server) pid */
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_pid)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r",
&pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
RETURN_LONG(PQbackendPID(pgsql));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_meta_data
* TODO: Add meta_data cache for better performance
*/
PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval *elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype = 'e' "
"FROM pg_class as c, pg_attribute a, pg_type t, pg_namespace n "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND a.attrelid = c.oid AND c.relname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND c.relnamespace = n.oid AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND a.atttypid = t.oid ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.c);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_long(elem, "num", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,1)));
add_assoc_string(elem, "type", PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,2), 1);
add_assoc_long(elem, "len", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,4), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 0);
}
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 0);
}
add_assoc_long(elem, "array dims", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,6)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,7), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 0);
}
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_notify)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
long result_type = PGSQL_ASSOC;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGnotify *pgsql_notify;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|l",
&pgsql_link, &result_type) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (!(result_type & PGSQL_BOTH)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid result type");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PQconsumeInput(pgsql);
pgsql_notify = PQnotifies(pgsql);
if (!pgsql_notify) {
/* no notify message */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_string(return_value, 0, pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_index_long(return_value, 1, pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_index_string(return_value, 2, pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "message", pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "pid", pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_assoc_string(return_value, "payload", pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
PQfreemem(pgsql_notify);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int pg_get_pid([resource connection)
Get backend(server) pid */
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_pid)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r",
&pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
RETURN_LONG(PQbackendPID(pgsql));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_meta_data
* TODO: Add meta_data cache for better performance
*/
PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval *elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name) {
efree(src);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype = 'e' "
"FROM pg_class as c, pg_attribute a, pg_type t, pg_namespace n "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND a.attrelid = c.oid AND c.relname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND c.relnamespace = n.oid AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND a.atttypid = t.oid ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.c);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_long(elem, "num", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,1)));
add_assoc_string(elem, "type", PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,2), 1);
add_assoc_long(elem, "len", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,4), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 0);
}
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 0);
}
add_assoc_long(elem, "array dims", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,6)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,7), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 0);
}
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
| 165,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
{
cJSON *next;
while ( c ) {
next = c->next;
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->child )
cJSON_Delete( c->child );
if ( ! ( c->type & cJSON_IsReference ) && c->valuestring )
cJSON_free( c->valuestring );
if ( c->string )
cJSON_free( c->string );
cJSON_free( c );
c = next;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_Delete( cJSON *c )
void cJSON_Delete(cJSON *c)
{
cJSON *next;
while (c)
{
next=c->next;
if (!(c->type&cJSON_IsReference) && c->child) cJSON_Delete(c->child);
if (!(c->type&cJSON_IsReference) && c->valuestring) cJSON_free(c->valuestring);
if (!(c->type&cJSON_StringIsConst) && c->string) cJSON_free(c->string);
cJSON_free(c);
c=next;
}
}
| 167,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: transform_image_validate(transform_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
/* Constants for the loop below: */
PNG_CONST png_store* PNG_CONST ps = dp->this.ps;
PNG_CONST png_byte in_ct = dp->this.colour_type;
PNG_CONST png_byte in_bd = dp->this.bit_depth;
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 w = dp->this.w;
PNG_CONST png_uint_32 h = dp->this.h;
PNG_CONST png_byte out_ct = dp->output_colour_type;
PNG_CONST png_byte out_bd = dp->output_bit_depth;
PNG_CONST png_byte sample_depth = (png_byte)(out_ct ==
PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE ? 8 : out_bd);
PNG_CONST png_byte red_sBIT = dp->this.red_sBIT;
PNG_CONST png_byte green_sBIT = dp->this.green_sBIT;
PNG_CONST png_byte blue_sBIT = dp->this.blue_sBIT;
PNG_CONST png_byte alpha_sBIT = dp->this.alpha_sBIT;
PNG_CONST int have_tRNS = dp->this.is_transparent;
double digitization_error;
store_palette out_palette;
png_uint_32 y;
UNUSED(pi)
/* Check for row overwrite errors */
store_image_check(dp->this.ps, pp, 0);
/* Read the palette corresponding to the output if the output colour type
* indicates a palette, othewise set out_palette to garbage.
*/
if (out_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
/* Validate that the palette count itself has not changed - this is not
* expected.
*/
int npalette = (-1);
(void)read_palette(out_palette, &npalette, pp, pi);
if (npalette != dp->this.npalette)
png_error(pp, "unexpected change in palette size");
digitization_error = .5;
}
else
{
png_byte in_sample_depth;
memset(out_palette, 0x5e, sizeof out_palette);
/* use-input-precision means assume that if the input has 8 bit (or less)
* samples and the output has 16 bit samples the calculations will be done
* with 8 bit precision, not 16.
*/
if (in_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE || in_bd < 16)
in_sample_depth = 8;
else
in_sample_depth = in_bd;
if (sample_depth != 16 || in_sample_depth > 8 ||
!dp->pm->calculations_use_input_precision)
digitization_error = .5;
/* Else calculations are at 8 bit precision, and the output actually
* consists of scaled 8-bit values, so scale .5 in 8 bits to the 16 bits:
*/
else
digitization_error = .5 * 257;
}
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_const_bytep PNG_CONST pRow = store_image_row(ps, pp, 0, y);
png_uint_32 x;
/* The original, standard, row pre-transforms. */
png_byte std[STANDARD_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, std, in_ct, in_bd, y);
/* Go through each original pixel transforming it and comparing with what
* libpng did to the same pixel.
*/
for (x=0; x<w; ++x)
{
image_pixel in_pixel, out_pixel;
unsigned int r, g, b, a;
/* Find out what we think the pixel should be: */
image_pixel_init(&in_pixel, std, in_ct, in_bd, x, dp->this.palette);
in_pixel.red_sBIT = red_sBIT;
in_pixel.green_sBIT = green_sBIT;
in_pixel.blue_sBIT = blue_sBIT;
in_pixel.alpha_sBIT = alpha_sBIT;
in_pixel.have_tRNS = have_tRNS;
/* For error detection, below. */
r = in_pixel.red;
g = in_pixel.green;
b = in_pixel.blue;
a = in_pixel.alpha;
dp->transform_list->mod(dp->transform_list, &in_pixel, pp, dp);
/* Read the output pixel and compare it to what we got, we don't
* use the error field here, so no need to update sBIT.
*/
image_pixel_init(&out_pixel, pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, out_palette);
/* We don't expect changes to the index here even if the bit depth is
* changed.
*/
if (in_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE &&
out_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (in_pixel.palette_index != out_pixel.palette_index)
png_error(pp, "unexpected transformed palette index");
}
/* Check the colours for palette images too - in fact the palette could
* be separately verified itself in most cases.
*/
if (in_pixel.red != out_pixel.red)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.red, in_pixel.redf,
out_pixel.red, sample_depth, in_pixel.rede,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.red_sBIT)-1)), "red/gray",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0 &&
in_pixel.green != out_pixel.green)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.green,
in_pixel.greenf, out_pixel.green, sample_depth, in_pixel.greene,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.green_sBIT)-1)), "green",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0 &&
in_pixel.blue != out_pixel.blue)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.blue, in_pixel.bluef,
out_pixel.blue, sample_depth, in_pixel.bluee,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.blue_sBIT)-1)), "blue",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 &&
in_pixel.alpha != out_pixel.alpha)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.alpha,
in_pixel.alphaf, out_pixel.alpha, sample_depth, in_pixel.alphae,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.alpha_sBIT)-1)), "alpha",
digitization_error);
} /* pixel (x) loop */
} /* row (y) loop */
/* Record that something was actually checked to avoid a false positive. */
dp->this.ps->validated = 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | transform_image_validate(transform_display *dp, png_const_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
/* Constants for the loop below: */
const png_store* const ps = dp->this.ps;
const png_byte in_ct = dp->this.colour_type;
const png_byte in_bd = dp->this.bit_depth;
const png_uint_32 w = dp->this.w;
const png_uint_32 h = dp->this.h;
const png_byte out_ct = dp->output_colour_type;
const png_byte out_bd = dp->output_bit_depth;
const png_byte sample_depth = (png_byte)(out_ct ==
PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE ? 8 : out_bd);
const png_byte red_sBIT = dp->this.red_sBIT;
const png_byte green_sBIT = dp->this.green_sBIT;
const png_byte blue_sBIT = dp->this.blue_sBIT;
const png_byte alpha_sBIT = dp->this.alpha_sBIT;
const int have_tRNS = dp->this.is_transparent;
double digitization_error;
store_palette out_palette;
png_uint_32 y;
UNUSED(pi)
/* Check for row overwrite errors */
store_image_check(dp->this.ps, pp, 0);
/* Read the palette corresponding to the output if the output colour type
* indicates a palette, othewise set out_palette to garbage.
*/
if (out_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
/* Validate that the palette count itself has not changed - this is not
* expected.
*/
int npalette = (-1);
(void)read_palette(out_palette, &npalette, pp, pi);
if (npalette != dp->this.npalette)
png_error(pp, "unexpected change in palette size");
digitization_error = .5;
}
else
{
png_byte in_sample_depth;
memset(out_palette, 0x5e, sizeof out_palette);
/* use-input-precision means assume that if the input has 8 bit (or less)
* samples and the output has 16 bit samples the calculations will be done
* with 8 bit precision, not 16.
*/
if (in_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE || in_bd < 16)
in_sample_depth = 8;
else
in_sample_depth = in_bd;
if (sample_depth != 16 || in_sample_depth > 8 ||
!dp->pm->calculations_use_input_precision)
digitization_error = .5;
/* Else calculations are at 8 bit precision, and the output actually
* consists of scaled 8-bit values, so scale .5 in 8 bits to the 16 bits:
*/
else
digitization_error = .5 * 257;
}
for (y=0; y<h; ++y)
{
png_const_bytep const pRow = store_image_row(ps, pp, 0, y);
png_uint_32 x;
/* The original, standard, row pre-transforms. */
png_byte std[STANDARD_ROWMAX];
transform_row(pp, std, in_ct, in_bd, y);
/* Go through each original pixel transforming it and comparing with what
* libpng did to the same pixel.
*/
for (x=0; x<w; ++x)
{
image_pixel in_pixel, out_pixel;
unsigned int r, g, b, a;
/* Find out what we think the pixel should be: */
image_pixel_init(&in_pixel, std, in_ct, in_bd, x, dp->this.palette,
NULL);
in_pixel.red_sBIT = red_sBIT;
in_pixel.green_sBIT = green_sBIT;
in_pixel.blue_sBIT = blue_sBIT;
in_pixel.alpha_sBIT = alpha_sBIT;
in_pixel.have_tRNS = have_tRNS != 0;
/* For error detection, below. */
r = in_pixel.red;
g = in_pixel.green;
b = in_pixel.blue;
a = in_pixel.alpha;
/* This applies the transforms to the input data, including output
* format operations which must be used when reading the output
* pixel that libpng produces.
*/
dp->transform_list->mod(dp->transform_list, &in_pixel, pp, dp);
/* Read the output pixel and compare it to what we got, we don't
* use the error field here, so no need to update sBIT. in_pixel
* says whether we expect libpng to change the output format.
*/
image_pixel_init(&out_pixel, pRow, out_ct, out_bd, x, out_palette,
&in_pixel);
/* We don't expect changes to the index here even if the bit depth is
* changed.
*/
if (in_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE &&
out_ct == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (in_pixel.palette_index != out_pixel.palette_index)
png_error(pp, "unexpected transformed palette index");
}
/* Check the colours for palette images too - in fact the palette could
* be separately verified itself in most cases.
*/
if (in_pixel.red != out_pixel.red)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.red, in_pixel.redf,
out_pixel.red, sample_depth, in_pixel.rede,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.red_sBIT)-1)), "red/gray",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0 &&
in_pixel.green != out_pixel.green)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.green,
in_pixel.greenf, out_pixel.green, sample_depth, in_pixel.greene,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.green_sBIT)-1)), "green",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0 &&
in_pixel.blue != out_pixel.blue)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.blue, in_pixel.bluef,
out_pixel.blue, sample_depth, in_pixel.bluee,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.blue_sBIT)-1)), "blue",
digitization_error);
if ((out_ct & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) != 0 &&
in_pixel.alpha != out_pixel.alpha)
transform_range_check(pp, r, g, b, a, in_pixel.alpha,
in_pixel.alphaf, out_pixel.alpha, sample_depth, in_pixel.alphae,
dp->pm->limit + 1./(2*((1U<<in_pixel.alpha_sBIT)-1)), "alpha",
digitization_error);
} /* pixel (x) loop */
} /* row (y) loop */
/* Record that something was actually checked to avoid a false positive. */
dp->this.ps->validated = 1;
}
| 173,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = 0U;
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c) {
int j, c1_int;
OPJ_UINT8 c1;
c1_int = getc(IN);
if (c1_int == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = c1;
}
} else {
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0;
++y;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else if (c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
} else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else { /* 03 .. 255 */
int j;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
int c1_int;
OPJ_UINT8 c1;
c1_int = getc(IN);
if (c1_int == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
*pix = c1;
}
if ((OPJ_UINT32)c & 1U) { /* skip padding byte */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
}/* while() */
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
as possible.
This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
Fixes #1059 (CVE-2018-6616).
CWE ID: CWE-400 | static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = written = 0U;
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c) {
int j, c1_int;
OPJ_UINT8 c1;
c1_int = getc(IN);
if (c1_int == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = c1;
written++;
}
} else {
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0;
++y;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else if (c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
} else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else { /* 03 .. 255 */
int j;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
int c1_int;
OPJ_UINT8 c1;
c1_int = getc(IN);
if (c1_int == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
*pix = c1;
written++;
}
if ((OPJ_UINT32)c & 1U) { /* skip padding byte */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
}/* while() */
if (written != width * height) {
fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 169,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct dst_entry *ip6_sk_dst_check(struct sock *sk,
struct dst_entry *dst,
const struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)dst;
if (!dst)
goto out;
/* Yes, checking route validity in not connected
* case is not very simple. Take into account,
* that we do not support routing by source, TOS,
* and MSG_DONTROUTE --ANK (980726)
*
* 1. ip6_rt_check(): If route was host route,
* check that cached destination is current.
* If it is network route, we still may
* check its validity using saved pointer
* to the last used address: daddr_cache.
* We do not want to save whole address now,
* (because main consumer of this service
* is tcp, which has not this problem),
* so that the last trick works only on connected
* sockets.
* 2. oif also should be the same.
*/
if (ip6_rt_check(&rt->rt6i_dst, &fl6->daddr, np->daddr_cache) ||
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ip6_rt_check(&rt->rt6i_src, &fl6->saddr, np->saddr_cache) ||
#endif
(fl6->flowi6_oif && fl6->flowi6_oif != dst->dev->ifindex)) {
dst_release(dst);
dst = NULL;
}
out:
return dst;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: ip6_sk_dst_check() must not assume ipv6 dst
It's possible to use AF_INET6 sockets and to connect to an IPv4
destination. After this, socket dst cache is a pointer to a rtable,
not rt6_info.
ip6_sk_dst_check() should check the socket dst cache is IPv6, or else
various corruptions/crashes can happen.
Dave Jones can reproduce immediate crash with
trinity -q -l off -n -c sendmsg -c connect
With help from Hannes Frederic Sowa
Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static struct dst_entry *ip6_sk_dst_check(struct sock *sk,
struct dst_entry *dst,
const struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct rt6_info *rt;
if (!dst)
goto out;
if (dst->ops->family != AF_INET6) {
dst_release(dst);
return NULL;
}
rt = (struct rt6_info *)dst;
/* Yes, checking route validity in not connected
* case is not very simple. Take into account,
* that we do not support routing by source, TOS,
* and MSG_DONTROUTE --ANK (980726)
*
* 1. ip6_rt_check(): If route was host route,
* check that cached destination is current.
* If it is network route, we still may
* check its validity using saved pointer
* to the last used address: daddr_cache.
* We do not want to save whole address now,
* (because main consumer of this service
* is tcp, which has not this problem),
* so that the last trick works only on connected
* sockets.
* 2. oif also should be the same.
*/
if (ip6_rt_check(&rt->rt6i_dst, &fl6->daddr, np->daddr_cache) ||
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES
ip6_rt_check(&rt->rt6i_src, &fl6->saddr, np->saddr_cache) ||
#endif
(fl6->flowi6_oif && fl6->flowi6_oif != dst->dev->ifindex)) {
dst_release(dst);
dst = NULL;
}
out:
return dst;
}
| 166,076 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InitNavigateParams(FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params* params,
int nav_entry_id,
bool did_create_new_entry,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition) {
params->nav_entry_id = nav_entry_id;
params->url = url;
params->referrer = Referrer();
params->transition = transition;
params->redirects = std::vector<GURL>();
params->should_update_history = false;
params->searchable_form_url = GURL();
params->searchable_form_encoding = std::string();
params->did_create_new_entry = did_create_new_entry;
params->gesture = NavigationGestureUser;
params->was_within_same_document = false;
params->method = "GET";
params->page_state = PageState::CreateFromURL(url);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void InitNavigateParams(FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params* params,
int nav_entry_id,
bool did_create_new_entry,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition) {
params->nav_entry_id = nav_entry_id;
params->url = url;
params->origin = url::Origin(url);
params->referrer = Referrer();
params->transition = transition;
params->redirects = std::vector<GURL>();
params->should_update_history = false;
params->searchable_form_url = GURL();
params->searchable_form_encoding = std::string();
params->did_create_new_entry = did_create_new_entry;
params->gesture = NavigationGestureUser;
params->was_within_same_document = false;
params->method = "GET";
params->page_state = PageState::CreateFromURL(url);
}
| 171,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: htmlInitParserCtxt(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
htmlSAXHandler *sax;
if (ctxt == NULL) return(-1);
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(htmlParserCtxt));
ctxt->dict = xmlDictCreate();
if (ctxt->dict == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
sax = (htmlSAXHandler *) xmlMalloc(sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
if (sax == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
else
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
/* Allocate the Input stack */
ctxt->inputTab = (htmlParserInputPtr *)
xmlMalloc(5 * sizeof(htmlParserInputPtr));
if (ctxt->inputTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 5;
ctxt->input = NULL;
ctxt->version = NULL;
ctxt->encoding = NULL;
ctxt->standalone = -1;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START;
/* Allocate the Node stack */
ctxt->nodeTab = (htmlNodePtr *) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(htmlNodePtr));
if (ctxt->nodeTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 10;
ctxt->node = NULL;
/* Allocate the Name stack */
ctxt->nameTab = (const xmlChar **) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->nameTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 0;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 10;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoTab = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeInfoMax = 0;
if (sax == NULL) ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &htmlDefaultSAXHandler;
else {
ctxt->sax = sax;
memcpy(sax, &htmlDefaultSAXHandler, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
}
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
ctxt->wellFormed = 1;
ctxt->replaceEntities = 0;
ctxt->linenumbers = xmlLineNumbersDefaultValue;
ctxt->html = 1;
ctxt->vctxt.finishDtd = XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_0;
ctxt->vctxt.userData = ctxt;
ctxt->vctxt.error = xmlParserValidityError;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = xmlParserValidityWarning;
ctxt->record_info = 0;
ctxt->validate = 0;
ctxt->nbChars = 0;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->catalogs = NULL;
xmlInitNodeInfoSeq(&ctxt->node_seq);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | htmlInitParserCtxt(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
htmlSAXHandler *sax;
if (ctxt == NULL) return(-1);
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(htmlParserCtxt));
ctxt->dict = xmlDictCreate();
if (ctxt->dict == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
sax = (htmlSAXHandler *) xmlMalloc(sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
if (sax == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
else
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
/* Allocate the Input stack */
ctxt->inputTab = (htmlParserInputPtr *)
xmlMalloc(5 * sizeof(htmlParserInputPtr));
if (ctxt->inputTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 5;
ctxt->input = NULL;
ctxt->version = NULL;
ctxt->encoding = NULL;
ctxt->standalone = -1;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START;
/* Allocate the Node stack */
ctxt->nodeTab = (htmlNodePtr *) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(htmlNodePtr));
if (ctxt->nodeTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 10;
ctxt->node = NULL;
/* Allocate the Name stack */
ctxt->nameTab = (const xmlChar **) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->nameTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 0;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 10;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoTab = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeInfoMax = 0;
if (sax == NULL) ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &htmlDefaultSAXHandler;
else {
ctxt->sax = sax;
memcpy(sax, &htmlDefaultSAXHandler, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
}
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
ctxt->wellFormed = 1;
ctxt->replaceEntities = 0;
ctxt->linenumbers = xmlLineNumbersDefaultValue;
ctxt->keepBlanks = xmlKeepBlanksDefaultValue;
ctxt->html = 1;
ctxt->vctxt.finishDtd = XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_0;
ctxt->vctxt.userData = ctxt;
ctxt->vctxt.error = xmlParserValidityError;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = xmlParserValidityWarning;
ctxt->record_info = 0;
ctxt->validate = 0;
ctxt->nbChars = 0;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->catalogs = NULL;
xmlInitNodeInfoSeq(&ctxt->node_seq);
return(0);
}
| 172,946 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *mr_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 30 && rdesc[29] == 0x05 && rdesc[30] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up button/consumer in HID report descriptor\n");
rdesc[30] = 0x0c;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static __u8 *mr_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 31 && rdesc[29] == 0x05 && rdesc[30] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up button/consumer in HID report descriptor\n");
rdesc[30] = 0x0c;
}
return rdesc;
}
| 166,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
u8 *buf = NULL;
int err;
if (!seed && slen) {
buf = kmalloc(slen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
seed = buf;
}
err = tfm->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
kfree(buf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
u8 *buf = NULL;
int err;
if (!seed && slen) {
buf = kmalloc(slen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
seed = buf;
}
err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
kfree(buf);
return err;
}
| 167,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: size_t jsuGetFreeStack() {
#ifdef ARM
void *frame = __builtin_frame_address(0);
size_t stackPos = (size_t)((char*)frame);
size_t stackEnd = (size_t)((char*)&LINKER_END_VAR);
if (stackPos < stackEnd) return 0; // should never happen, but just in case of overflow!
return stackPos - stackEnd;
#elif defined(LINUX)
char ptr; // this is on the stack
extern void *STACK_BASE;
uint32_t count = (uint32_t)((size_t)STACK_BASE - (size_t)&ptr);
return 1000000 - count; // give it 1 megabyte of stack
#else
return 1000000; // no stack depth check on this platform
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | size_t jsuGetFreeStack() {
#ifdef ARM
void *frame = __builtin_frame_address(0);
size_t stackPos = (size_t)((char*)frame);
size_t stackEnd = (size_t)((char*)&LINKER_END_VAR);
if (stackPos < stackEnd) return 0; // should never happen, but just in case of overflow!
return stackPos - stackEnd;
#elif defined(LINUX)
char ptr; // this is on the stack
extern void *STACK_BASE;
uint32_t count = (uint32_t)((size_t)STACK_BASE - (size_t)&ptr);
const uint32_t max_stack = 1000000; // give it 1 megabyte of stack
if (count>max_stack) return 0;
return max_stack - count;
#else
return 1000000; // no stack depth check on this platform
#endif
}
| 169,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool btsock_thread_remove_fd_and_close(int thread_handle, int fd)
{
if (thread_handle < 0 || thread_handle >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s invalid thread handle: %d", __func__, thread_handle);
return false;
}
if (fd == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s invalid file descriptor.", __func__);
return false;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_REMOVE_FD, fd, 0, 0, 0};
return send(ts[thread_handle].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0) == sizeof(cmd);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | bool btsock_thread_remove_fd_and_close(int thread_handle, int fd)
{
if (thread_handle < 0 || thread_handle >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s invalid thread handle: %d", __func__, thread_handle);
return false;
}
if (fd == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s invalid file descriptor.", __func__);
return false;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_REMOVE_FD, fd, 0, 0, 0};
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(ts[thread_handle].cmd_fdw, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0)) == sizeof(cmd);
}
| 173,463 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int hns_rcb_get_ring_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return HNS_RING_STATIC_REG_NUM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int hns_rcb_get_ring_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)
return HNS_RING_STATIC_REG_NUM;
return 0;
}
| 169,400 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
{
/* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long l;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
do {
while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
&p[s->init_num],
SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
0);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
return 0;
}
if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
* in the middle of a handshake message.
*/
if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
s->init_num = i - 1;
s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
return 1;
} else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
s->init_num += i;
}
skip_message = 0;
if (!s->server)
if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
/*
* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
* their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
* MAC.
*/
if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
s->init_num = 0;
skip_message = 1;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
} while (skip_message);
/* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
*mt = *p;
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
/*
* Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
* ClientHello
*
* Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
* plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
*/
l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
{
/* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long l;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
do {
while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
&p[s->init_num],
SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
0);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
return 0;
}
if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
* in the middle of a handshake message.
*/
if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
s->init_num = i - 1;
s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
return 1;
} else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
s->init_num += i;
}
skip_message = 0;
if (!s->server)
if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
/*
* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
* their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
* MAC.
*/
if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
s->init_num = 0;
skip_message = 1;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
} while (skip_message);
/* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
*mt = *p;
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
/*
* Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
* ClientHello
*
* Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
* plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
*/
l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
| 164,963 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding*[count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos,
size,
pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
// pos now designates start of element
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding* [count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
// pos now designates start of element
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos, size, pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
| 174,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext4_xattr_block_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry;
size_t size;
int error;
struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
name_index, name, buffer, (long)buffer_size);
error = -ENODATA;
if (!EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %llu",
(unsigned long long)EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
if (ext4_xattr_check_block(inode, bh)) {
bad_block:
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad block %llu",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
ext4_xattr_cache_insert(ext4_mb_cache, bh);
entry = BFIRST(bh);
error = ext4_xattr_find_entry(&entry, name_index, name, bh->b_size, 1);
if (error == -EFSCORRUPTED)
goto bad_block;
if (error)
goto cleanup;
size = le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size);
if (buffer) {
error = -ERANGE;
if (size > buffer_size)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(buffer, bh->b_data + le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs),
size);
}
error = size;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext4_xattr_block_get(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry;
size_t size;
int error;
struct mb2_cache *ext4_mb_cache = EXT4_GET_MB_CACHE(inode);
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, buffer=%p, buffer_size=%ld",
name_index, name, buffer, (long)buffer_size);
error = -ENODATA;
if (!EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
ea_idebug(inode, "reading block %llu",
(unsigned long long)EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)), le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount));
if (ext4_xattr_check_block(inode, bh)) {
bad_block:
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad block %llu",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
ext4_xattr_cache_insert(ext4_mb_cache, bh);
entry = BFIRST(bh);
error = ext4_xattr_find_entry(&entry, name_index, name, bh->b_size, 1);
if (error == -EFSCORRUPTED)
goto bad_block;
if (error)
goto cleanup;
size = le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size);
if (buffer) {
error = -ERANGE;
if (size > buffer_size)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(buffer, bh->b_data + le16_to_cpu(entry->e_value_offs),
size);
}
error = size;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
return error;
}
| 169,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
OM_uint32 minor, major;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_union_ctx_id_desc uctx;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec kgctx;
krb5_key k1, k2;
krb5_keyblock kb1, kb2;
gss_buffer_desc in, out;
unsigned char k1buf[32], k2buf[32], outbuf[44];
size_t i;
/*
* Fake up just enough of a krb5 GSS context to make gss_pseudo_random
* work, with chosen subkeys and acceptor subkeys. If we implement
* gss_import_lucid_sec_context, we can rewrite this to use public
* interfaces and stop using private headers and internal knowledge of the
* implementation.
*/
context = (gss_ctx_id_t)&uctx;
uctx.mech_type = &mech_krb5;
uctx.internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)&kgctx;
kgctx.k5_context = NULL;
kgctx.have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
kb1.contents = k1buf;
kb2.contents = k2buf;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
/* Set up the keys for this test. */
kb1.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb1.length = fromhex(tests[i].key1, k1buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb1, &k1));
kgctx.subkey = k1;
kb2.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb2.length = fromhex(tests[i].key2, k2buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb2, &k2));
kgctx.acceptor_subkey = k2;
/* Generate a PRF value with the subkey and an empty input, and compare
* it to the first expected output. */
in.length = 0;
in.value = NULL;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL, &in,
44, &out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out1, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Generate a PRF value with the acceptor subkey and the 61-byte input
* string, and compare it to the second expected output. */
in.length = strlen(inputstr);
in.value = (char *)inputstr;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 44,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out2, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Also check that generating zero bytes of output works. */
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 0,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
assert(out.length == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k1);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k2);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
OM_uint32 minor, major;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_union_ctx_id_desc uctx;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec kgctx;
krb5_key k1, k2;
krb5_keyblock kb1, kb2;
gss_buffer_desc in, out;
unsigned char k1buf[32], k2buf[32], outbuf[44];
size_t i;
/*
* Fake up just enough of a krb5 GSS context to make gss_pseudo_random
* work, with chosen subkeys and acceptor subkeys. If we implement
* gss_import_lucid_sec_context, we can rewrite this to use public
* interfaces and stop using private headers and internal knowledge of the
* implementation.
*/
context = (gss_ctx_id_t)&uctx;
uctx.mech_type = &mech_krb5;
uctx.internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)&kgctx;
kgctx.k5_context = NULL;
kgctx.established = 1;
kgctx.have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
kb1.contents = k1buf;
kb2.contents = k2buf;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
/* Set up the keys for this test. */
kb1.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb1.length = fromhex(tests[i].key1, k1buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb1, &k1));
kgctx.subkey = k1;
kb2.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb2.length = fromhex(tests[i].key2, k2buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb2, &k2));
kgctx.acceptor_subkey = k2;
/* Generate a PRF value with the subkey and an empty input, and compare
* it to the first expected output. */
in.length = 0;
in.value = NULL;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL, &in,
44, &out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out1, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Generate a PRF value with the acceptor subkey and the 61-byte input
* string, and compare it to the second expected output. */
in.length = strlen(inputstr);
in.value = (char *)inputstr;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 44,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out2, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Also check that generating zero bytes of output works. */
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 0,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
assert(out.length == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k1);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k2);
}
return 0;
}
| 166,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteCALSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
char
header[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*group4_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
density,
length,
orient_x,
orient_y;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*group4;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Create standard CALS header.
*/
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"srcdocid: NONE");
(void) count;
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"dstdocid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"txtfilid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"figid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"srcgph: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"doccls: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"rtype: 1");
orient_x=0;
orient_y=0;
switch (image->orientation)
{
case TopRightOrientation:
{
orient_x=180;
orient_y=270;
break;
}
case BottomRightOrientation:
{
orient_x=180;
orient_y=90;
break;
}
case BottomLeftOrientation:
{
orient_y=90;
break;
}
case LeftTopOrientation:
{
orient_x=270;
break;
}
case RightTopOrientation:
{
orient_x=270;
orient_y=180;
break;
}
case RightBottomOrientation:
{
orient_x=90;
orient_y=180;
break;
}
case LeftBottomOrientation:
{
orient_x=90;
break;
}
default:
{
orient_y=270;
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rorient: %03ld,%03ld",
(long) orient_x,(long) orient_y);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rpelcnt: %06lu,%06lu",
(unsigned long) image->columns,(unsigned long) image->rows);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
density=200;
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
(void) ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
density=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rdensty: %04lu",
(unsigned long) density);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"notes: NONE");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(header,' ',128);
for (i=0; i < 5; i++)
(void) WriteBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) header);
/*
Write CALS pixels.
*/
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->filename,"GROUP4:",MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->magick,"GROUP4",MaxTextExtent);
group4_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (group4_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
group4=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(write_info,group4_image,&length,
&image->exception);
group4_image=DestroyImage(group4_image);
if (group4 == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (WriteBlob(image,length,group4) != (ssize_t) length)
status=MagickFalse;
group4=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(group4);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/571
CWE ID: CWE-772 | static MagickBooleanType WriteCALSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
char
header[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*group4_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
density,
length,
orient_x,
orient_y;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*group4;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Create standard CALS header.
*/
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"srcdocid: NONE");
(void) count;
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"dstdocid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"txtfilid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"figid: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"srcgph: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"doccls: NONE");
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"rtype: 1");
orient_x=0;
orient_y=0;
switch (image->orientation)
{
case TopRightOrientation:
{
orient_x=180;
orient_y=270;
break;
}
case BottomRightOrientation:
{
orient_x=180;
orient_y=90;
break;
}
case BottomLeftOrientation:
{
orient_y=90;
break;
}
case LeftTopOrientation:
{
orient_x=270;
break;
}
case RightTopOrientation:
{
orient_x=270;
orient_y=180;
break;
}
case RightBottomOrientation:
{
orient_x=90;
orient_y=180;
break;
}
case LeftBottomOrientation:
{
orient_x=90;
break;
}
default:
{
orient_y=270;
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rorient: %03ld,%03ld",
(long) orient_x,(long) orient_y);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rpelcnt: %06lu,%06lu",
(unsigned long) image->columns,(unsigned long) image->rows);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
density=200;
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
(void) ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
density=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(header,sizeof(header),"rdensty: %04lu",
(unsigned long) density);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,header);
count=WriteCALSRecord(image,"notes: NONE");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(header,' ',128);
for (i=0; i < 5; i++)
(void) WriteBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) header);
/*
Write CALS pixels.
*/
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->filename,"GROUP4:",MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->magick,"GROUP4",MaxTextExtent);
group4_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (group4_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
group4=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(write_info,group4_image,&length,
&image->exception);
group4_image=DestroyImage(group4_image);
if (group4 == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (WriteBlob(image,length,group4) != (ssize_t) length)
status=MagickFalse;
group4=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(group4);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
| 167,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz)
{
off_t offset;
size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen;
tor_assert(sz > chunk->memlen);
offset = chunk->data - chunk->mem;
chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz));
chunk->memlen = sz;
chunk->data = chunk->mem + offset;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig));
chunk->DBG_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz);
#endif
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks +=
CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz) - CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig);
return chunk;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | chunk_grow(chunk_t *chunk, size_t sz)
{
off_t offset;
const size_t memlen_orig = chunk->memlen;
const size_t orig_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(memlen_orig);
const size_t new_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(sz);
tor_assert(sz > chunk->memlen);
offset = chunk->data - chunk->mem;
chunk = tor_realloc(chunk, new_alloc);
chunk->memlen = sz;
chunk->data = chunk->mem + offset;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
tor_assert(chunk->DBG_alloc == orig_alloc);
chunk->DBG_alloc = new_alloc;
#endif
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += new_alloc - orig_alloc;
CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(chunk, new_alloc);
return chunk;
}
| 168,757 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
int ret = 0;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
if (
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
# endif
0) {
if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
}
#endif
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
ret = s->hit;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST:
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
ret = (int)(s->s3->flags);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
(EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) >
(512 / 8))))
ret = 1;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
{
RSA *rsa = (RSA *)parg;
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return (ret);
}
if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return (ret);
}
if (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(s->cert->rsa_tmp);
s->cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
ret = 1;
}
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (ret);
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
{
DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
if (dh == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return (ret);
}
if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
DH_free(dh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
}
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
}
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
ret = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
int ret = 0;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
if (
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB ||
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH || cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB ||
# endif
0) {
if (!ssl_cert_inst(&s->cert)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
}
#endif
switch (cmd) {
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
ret = s->hit;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST:
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations;
s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS:
ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS:
ret = (int)(s->s3->flags);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
case SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA:
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp == NULL) &&
((s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL) ||
(EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) >
(512 / 8))))
ret = 1;
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA:
{
RSA *rsa = (RSA *)parg;
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return (ret);
}
if ((rsa = RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return (ret);
}
if (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(s->cert->rsa_tmp);
s->cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
ret = 1;
}
break;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB:
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return (ret);
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH:
{
DH *dh = (DH *)parg;
if (dh == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return (ret);
}
if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dh)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
}
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
ret = 1;
}
| 165,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
vp9_worker_end(&worker_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_get_worker_interface()->end(&worker_);
}
| 174,600 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickPixelPacket **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *images)
{
const Image
*next;
MagickPixelPacket
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
size_t
columns,
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(MagickPixelPacket **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (MagickPixelPacket **) NULL)
return((MagickPixelPacket **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
columns=images->columns;
for (next=images; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next->next)
columns=MagickMax(next->columns,columns);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
pixels[i]=(MagickPixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (MagickPixelPacket *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) columns; j++)
GetMagickPixelPacket(images,&pixels[i][j]);
}
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static MagickPixelPacket **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *images)
{
const Image
*next;
MagickPixelPacket
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
size_t
columns,
rows;
rows=MagickMax(GetImageListLength(images),
(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource));
pixels=(MagickPixelPacket **) AcquireQuantumMemory(rows,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (MagickPixelPacket **) NULL)
return((MagickPixelPacket **) NULL);
columns=images->columns;
for (next=images; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next->next)
columns=MagickMax(next->columns,columns);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) rows; i++)
{
pixels[i]=(MagickPixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (MagickPixelPacket *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) columns; j++)
GetMagickPixelPacket(images,&pixels[i][j]);
}
return(pixels);
}
| 169,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_InterpolateNoLoop (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_InterpolateNoLoop (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 phaseFrac;
EAS_I32 acc0;
const EAS_SAMPLE *pSamples;
EAS_I32 samp1;
EAS_I32 samp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
pSamples = (const EAS_SAMPLE*) pWTVoice->phaseAccum;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
/* fetch adjacent samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* linear interpolation */
acc0 = samp2 - samp1;
acc0 = acc0 * phaseFrac;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = samp1 + (acc0 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
/* save new output sample in buffer */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_I16)(acc0 >> 2);
/* increment phase */
phaseFrac += phaseInc;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
acc0 = phaseFrac >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS;
/* next sample */
if (acc0 > 0) {
/* advance sample pointer */
pSamples += acc0;
phaseFrac = (EAS_I32)((EAS_U32)phaseFrac & PHASE_FRAC_MASK);
/* fetch new samples */
#if defined(_8_BIT_SAMPLES)
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp1 = pSamples[0] << 8;
/*lint -e{701} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
samp2 = pSamples[1] << 8;
#else
samp1 = pSamples[0];
samp2 = pSamples[1];
#endif
}
}
/* save pointer and phase */
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = (EAS_U32) pSamples;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = (EAS_U32) phaseFrac;
}
| 173,919 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_sig_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev1_sig_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SIG)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,793 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void faad_resetbits(bitfile *ld, int bits)
{
uint32_t tmp;
int words = bits >> 5;
int remainder = bits & 0x1F;
ld->bytes_left = ld->buffer_size - words*4;
if (ld->bytes_left >= 4)
{
tmp = getdword(&ld->start[words]);
ld->bytes_left -= 4;
} else {
tmp = getdword_n(&ld->start[words], ld->bytes_left);
ld->bytes_left = 0;
}
ld->bufa = tmp;
if (ld->bytes_left >= 4)
{
tmp = getdword(&ld->start[words+1]);
ld->bytes_left -= 4;
} else {
tmp = getdword_n(&ld->start[words+1], ld->bytes_left);
ld->bytes_left = 0;
}
ld->bufb = tmp;
ld->bits_left = 32 - remainder;
ld->tail = &ld->start[words+2];
/* recheck for reading too many bytes */
ld->error = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void faad_resetbits(bitfile *ld, int bits)
{
uint32_t tmp;
int words = bits >> 5;
int remainder = bits & 0x1F;
if (ld->buffer_size < words * 4)
ld->bytes_left = 0;
else
ld->bytes_left = ld->buffer_size - words*4;
if (ld->bytes_left >= 4)
{
tmp = getdword(&ld->start[words]);
ld->bytes_left -= 4;
} else {
tmp = getdword_n(&ld->start[words], ld->bytes_left);
ld->bytes_left = 0;
}
ld->bufa = tmp;
if (ld->bytes_left >= 4)
{
tmp = getdword(&ld->start[words+1]);
ld->bytes_left -= 4;
} else {
tmp = getdword_n(&ld->start[words+1], ld->bytes_left);
ld->bytes_left = 0;
}
ld->bufb = tmp;
ld->bits_left = 32 - remainder;
ld->tail = &ld->start[words+2];
/* recheck for reading too many bytes */
ld->error = 0;
}
| 169,535 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int crypto_pcomp_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_comp rpcomp;
snprintf(rpcomp.type, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", "pcomp");
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_COMPRESS,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_comp), &rpcomp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | static int crypto_pcomp_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_comp rpcomp;
strncpy(rpcomp.type, "pcomp", sizeof(rpcomp.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_COMPRESS,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_comp), &rpcomp))
goto nla_put_failure;
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
| 166,070 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Atom::ParseDisplay(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
if (!ExpandDisplaysArray())
return -1;
Display& d = m_displays[m_displays_count++];
d.Init();
return d.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Chapters::Atom::ParseDisplay(
| 174,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: onig_new_deluxe(regex_t** reg, const UChar* pattern, const UChar* pattern_end,
OnigCompileInfo* ci, OnigErrorInfo* einfo)
{
int r;
UChar *cpat, *cpat_end;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(einfo)) einfo->par = (UChar* )NULL;
if (ci->pattern_enc != ci->target_enc) {
r = conv_encoding(ci->pattern_enc, ci->target_enc, pattern, pattern_end,
&cpat, &cpat_end);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
else {
cpat = (UChar* )pattern;
cpat_end = (UChar* )pattern_end;
}
*reg = (regex_t* )xmalloc(sizeof(regex_t));
if (IS_NULL(*reg)) {
r = ONIGERR_MEMORY;
goto err2;
}
r = onig_reg_init(*reg, ci->option, ci->case_fold_flag, ci->target_enc,
ci->syntax);
if (r != 0) goto err;
r = onig_compile(*reg, cpat, cpat_end, einfo);
if (r != 0) {
err:
onig_free(*reg);
*reg = NULL;
}
err2:
if (cpat != pattern) xfree(cpat);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13224: don't allow different encodings for onig_new_deluxe()
CWE ID: CWE-416 | onig_new_deluxe(regex_t** reg, const UChar* pattern, const UChar* pattern_end,
OnigCompileInfo* ci, OnigErrorInfo* einfo)
{
int r;
UChar *cpat, *cpat_end;
if (IS_NOT_NULL(einfo)) einfo->par = (UChar* )NULL;
if (ci->pattern_enc != ci->target_enc) {
return ONIGERR_NOT_SUPPORTED_ENCODING_COMBINATION;
}
else {
cpat = (UChar* )pattern;
cpat_end = (UChar* )pattern_end;
}
*reg = (regex_t* )xmalloc(sizeof(regex_t));
if (IS_NULL(*reg)) {
r = ONIGERR_MEMORY;
goto err2;
}
r = onig_reg_init(*reg, ci->option, ci->case_fold_flag, ci->target_enc,
ci->syntax);
if (r != 0) goto err;
r = onig_compile(*reg, cpat, cpat_end, einfo);
if (r != 0) {
err:
onig_free(*reg);
*reg = NULL;
}
err2:
if (cpat != pattern) xfree(cpat);
return r;
}
| 169,613 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
{
struct rds_iovec vec;
struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages * sizeof(struct scatterlist);
}
Commit Message: RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()
When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size
calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate
pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access
to a specific memory region.
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
{
struct rds_iovec vec;
struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
if (args->nr_local == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages * sizeof(struct scatterlist);
}
| 169,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnProcessLaunched() {
FilePath irt_path;
const char* irt_path_var = getenv("NACL_IRT_LIBRARY");
if (irt_path_var != NULL) {
FilePath::StringType string(irt_path_var,
irt_path_var + strlen(irt_path_var));
irt_path = FilePath(string);
} else {
FilePath plugin_dir;
if (!PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_INTERNAL_PLUGINS, &plugin_dir)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to locate the plugins directory";
delete this;
return;
}
irt_path = plugin_dir.Append(GetIrtLibraryFilename());
}
base::FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpenCallback* callback =
callback_factory_.NewCallback(&NaClProcessHost::OpenIrtFileDone);
if (!base::FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpen(
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
irt_path,
base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN | base::PLATFORM_FILE_READ,
callback)) {
delete callback;
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void NaClProcessHost::OnProcessLaunched() {
FilePath irt_path;
const char* irt_path_var = getenv("NACL_IRT_LIBRARY");
if (irt_path_var != NULL) {
FilePath::StringType string(irt_path_var,
irt_path_var + strlen(irt_path_var));
irt_path = FilePath(string);
} else {
FilePath plugin_dir;
if (!PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_INTERNAL_PLUGINS, &plugin_dir)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to locate the plugins directory";
delete this;
return;
}
irt_path = plugin_dir.Append(GetIrtLibraryFilename());
}
base::FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpenCallback* callback =
callback_factory_.NewCallback(&NaClProcessHost::OpenIrtFileDone);
if (!base::FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpen(
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
irt_path,
base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN | base::PLATFORM_FILE_READ,
callback)) {
delete this;
}
}
| 170,275 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags)
{
struct super_block *s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct super_block), GFP_USER);
static const struct super_operations default_op;
int i;
if (!s)
return NULL;
if (security_sb_alloc(s))
goto fail;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
s->s_files = alloc_percpu(struct list_head);
if (!s->s_files)
goto fail;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(per_cpu_ptr(s->s_files, i));
#else
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_files);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++) {
if (percpu_counter_init(&s->s_writers.counter[i], 0) < 0)
goto fail;
lockdep_init_map(&s->s_writers.lock_map[i], sb_writers_name[i],
&type->s_writers_key[i], 0);
}
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait);
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait_unfrozen);
s->s_flags = flags;
s->s_bdi = &default_backing_dev_info;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&s->s_instances);
INIT_HLIST_BL_HEAD(&s->s_anon);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_inodes);
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_dentry_lru))
goto fail;
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_inode_lru))
goto fail;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_mounts);
init_rwsem(&s->s_umount);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_umount, &type->s_umount_key);
/*
* sget() can have s_umount recursion.
*
* When it cannot find a suitable sb, it allocates a new
* one (this one), and tries again to find a suitable old
* one.
*
* In case that succeeds, it will acquire the s_umount
* lock of the old one. Since these are clearly distrinct
* locks, and this object isn't exposed yet, there's no
* risk of deadlocks.
*
* Annotate this by putting this lock in a different
* subclass.
*/
down_write_nested(&s->s_umount, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
s->s_count = 1;
atomic_set(&s->s_active, 1);
mutex_init(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex, &type->s_vfs_rename_key);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqonoff_mutex);
init_rwsem(&s->s_dquot.dqptr_sem);
s->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
s->s_op = &default_op;
s->s_time_gran = 1000000000;
s->cleancache_poolid = -1;
s->s_shrink.seeks = DEFAULT_SEEKS;
s->s_shrink.scan_objects = super_cache_scan;
s->s_shrink.count_objects = super_cache_count;
s->s_shrink.batch = 1024;
s->s_shrink.flags = SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE;
return s;
fail:
destroy_super(s);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags)
{
struct super_block *s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct super_block), GFP_USER);
static const struct super_operations default_op;
int i;
if (!s)
return NULL;
if (security_sb_alloc(s))
goto fail;
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++) {
if (percpu_counter_init(&s->s_writers.counter[i], 0) < 0)
goto fail;
lockdep_init_map(&s->s_writers.lock_map[i], sb_writers_name[i],
&type->s_writers_key[i], 0);
}
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait);
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait_unfrozen);
s->s_flags = flags;
s->s_bdi = &default_backing_dev_info;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&s->s_instances);
INIT_HLIST_BL_HEAD(&s->s_anon);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_inodes);
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_dentry_lru))
goto fail;
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_inode_lru))
goto fail;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_mounts);
init_rwsem(&s->s_umount);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_umount, &type->s_umount_key);
/*
* sget() can have s_umount recursion.
*
* When it cannot find a suitable sb, it allocates a new
* one (this one), and tries again to find a suitable old
* one.
*
* In case that succeeds, it will acquire the s_umount
* lock of the old one. Since these are clearly distrinct
* locks, and this object isn't exposed yet, there's no
* risk of deadlocks.
*
* Annotate this by putting this lock in a different
* subclass.
*/
down_write_nested(&s->s_umount, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
s->s_count = 1;
atomic_set(&s->s_active, 1);
mutex_init(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex, &type->s_vfs_rename_key);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqonoff_mutex);
init_rwsem(&s->s_dquot.dqptr_sem);
s->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
s->s_op = &default_op;
s->s_time_gran = 1000000000;
s->cleancache_poolid = -1;
s->s_shrink.seeks = DEFAULT_SEEKS;
s->s_shrink.scan_objects = super_cache_scan;
s->s_shrink.count_objects = super_cache_count;
s->s_shrink.batch = 1024;
s->s_shrink.flags = SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE;
return s;
fail:
destroy_super(s);
return NULL;
}
| 166,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void encode_openhdr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_openargs *arg)
{
__be32 *p;
/*
* opcode 4, seqid 4, share_access 4, share_deny 4, clientid 8, ownerlen 4,
* owner 4 = 32
*/
RESERVE_SPACE(8);
WRITE32(OP_OPEN);
WRITE32(arg->seqid->sequence->counter);
encode_share_access(xdr, arg->open_flags);
RESERVE_SPACE(28);
WRITE64(arg->clientid);
WRITE32(16);
WRITEMEM("open id:", 8);
WRITE64(arg->id);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static inline void encode_openhdr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_openargs *arg)
{
__be32 *p;
/*
* opcode 4, seqid 4, share_access 4, share_deny 4, clientid 8, ownerlen 4,
* owner 4 = 32
*/
RESERVE_SPACE(8);
WRITE32(OP_OPEN);
WRITE32(arg->seqid->sequence->counter);
encode_share_access(xdr, arg->fmode);
RESERVE_SPACE(28);
WRITE64(arg->clientid);
WRITE32(16);
WRITEMEM("open id:", 8);
WRITE64(arg->id);
}
| 165,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PPB_URLLoader_Impl::~PPB_URLLoader_Impl() {
}
Commit Message: Break path whereby AssociatedURLLoader::~AssociatedURLLoader() is re-entered on top of itself.
BUG=159429
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11359222
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168150 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | PPB_URLLoader_Impl::~PPB_URLLoader_Impl() {
// There is a path whereby the destructor for the loader_ member can
// invoke InstanceWasDeleted() upon this PPB_URLLoader_Impl, thereby
// re-entering the scoped_ptr destructor with the same scoped_ptr object
// via loader_.reset(). Be sure that loader_ is first NULL then destroy
// the scoped_ptr. See http://crbug.com/159429.
scoped_ptr<WebKit::WebURLLoader> for_destruction_only(loader_.release());
}
| 170,670 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ext4_io_end_t *ext4_init_io_end (struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io = NULL;
io = kmalloc(sizeof(*io), GFP_NOFS);
if (io) {
igrab(inode);
io->inode = inode;
io->flag = 0;
io->offset = 0;
io->size = 0;
io->error = 0;
INIT_WORK(&io->work, ext4_end_io_work);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&io->list);
}
return io;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static ext4_io_end_t *ext4_init_io_end (struct inode *inode)
static ext4_io_end_t *ext4_init_io_end (struct inode *inode, gfp_t flags)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io = NULL;
io = kmalloc(sizeof(*io), flags);
if (io) {
igrab(inode);
io->inode = inode;
io->flag = 0;
io->offset = 0;
io->size = 0;
io->page = NULL;
INIT_WORK(&io->work, ext4_end_io_work);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&io->list);
}
return io;
}
| 167,546 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void QuicStreamHost::Finish() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(p2p_stream_);
p2p_stream_->Finish();
writeable_ = false;
if (!readable_ && !writeable_) {
Delete();
}
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void QuicStreamHost::Finish() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(p2p_stream_);
std::vector<uint8_t> data;
p2p_stream_->WriteData(data, true);
writeable_ = false;
if (!readable_ && !writeable_) {
Delete();
}
}
| 172,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GF_Err hdlr_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_HandlerBox *p = (GF_HandlerBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "HandlerBox", trace);
if (p->nameUTF8 && (u32) p->nameUTF8[0] == strlen(p->nameUTF8+1)) {
fprintf(trace, "hdlrType=\"%s\" Name=\"%s\" ", gf_4cc_to_str(p->handlerType), p->nameUTF8+1);
} else {
fprintf(trace, "hdlrType=\"%s\" Name=\"%s\" ", gf_4cc_to_str(p->handlerType), p->nameUTF8);
}
fprintf(trace, "reserved1=\"%d\" reserved2=\"", p->reserved1);
dump_data(trace, (char *) p->reserved2, 12);
fprintf(trace, "\"");
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("HandlerBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | GF_Err hdlr_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_HandlerBox *p = (GF_HandlerBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "HandlerBox", trace);
if (p->nameUTF8 && (u32) p->nameUTF8[0] == strlen(p->nameUTF8)-1) {
fprintf(trace, "hdlrType=\"%s\" Name=\"%s\" ", gf_4cc_to_str(p->handlerType), p->nameUTF8+1);
} else {
fprintf(trace, "hdlrType=\"%s\" Name=\"%s\" ", gf_4cc_to_str(p->handlerType), p->nameUTF8);
}
fprintf(trace, "reserved1=\"%d\" reserved2=\"", p->reserved1);
dump_data(trace, (char *) p->reserved2, 12);
fprintf(trace, "\"");
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("HandlerBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
| 169,168 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int udf_encode_fh(struct inode *inode, __u32 *fh, int *lenp,
struct inode *parent)
{
int len = *lenp;
struct kernel_lb_addr location = UDF_I(inode)->i_location;
struct fid *fid = (struct fid *)fh;
int type = FILEID_UDF_WITHOUT_PARENT;
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*lenp = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*lenp = 3;
return 255;
}
*lenp = 3;
fid->udf.block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.generation = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
location = UDF_I(parent)->i_location;
fid->udf.parent_block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.parent_partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.parent_generation = inode->i_generation;
*lenp = 5;
type = FILEID_UDF_WITH_PARENT;
}
return type;
}
Commit Message: udf: avoid info leak on export
For type 0x51 the udf.parent_partref member in struct fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int udf_encode_fh(struct inode *inode, __u32 *fh, int *lenp,
struct inode *parent)
{
int len = *lenp;
struct kernel_lb_addr location = UDF_I(inode)->i_location;
struct fid *fid = (struct fid *)fh;
int type = FILEID_UDF_WITHOUT_PARENT;
if (parent && (len < 5)) {
*lenp = 5;
return 255;
} else if (len < 3) {
*lenp = 3;
return 255;
}
*lenp = 3;
fid->udf.block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.parent_partref = 0;
fid->udf.generation = inode->i_generation;
if (parent) {
location = UDF_I(parent)->i_location;
fid->udf.parent_block = location.logicalBlockNum;
fid->udf.parent_partref = location.partitionReferenceNum;
fid->udf.parent_generation = inode->i_generation;
*lenp = 5;
type = FILEID_UDF_WITH_PARENT;
}
return type;
}
| 166,178 |
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