instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPid(
base::ProcessId pid,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback) {
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
callback.Run(false, nullptr);
return;
}
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpType::SUMMARY_ONLY,
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND, {},
false /* addToTrace */, pid);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void CoordinatorImpl::RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPid(
base::ProcessId pid,
const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback) {
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
callback.Run(false, nullptr);
return;
}
auto adapter = [](const RequestGlobalMemoryDumpForPidCallback& callback,
bool success, uint64_t,
mojom::GlobalMemoryDumpPtr global_memory_dump) {
callback.Run(success, std::move(global_memory_dump));
};
QueuedRequest::Args args(
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpType::SUMMARY_ONLY,
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail::BACKGROUND, {},
false /* add_to_trace */, pid);
RequestGlobalMemoryDumpInternal(args, base::BindRepeating(adapter, callback));
}
| 172,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params, portIndex, true);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBufferWithBackup(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
// metadata buffers are not connected cross process; only copy if not meta
bool copy = mMetadataType[portIndex] == kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex,
(portIndex == kPortIndexInput) && copy /* copyToOmx */,
(portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) && copy /* copyFromOmx */,
NULL /* data */);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, allottedSize);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBufferWithBackup, err,
SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
memset(header->pBuffer, 0, header->nAllocLen);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBufferWithBackup, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p :> %u@%p",
params->size(), params->pointer(), allottedSize, header->pBuffer));
return OK;
}
| 174,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SplashOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashImageSource src;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = maskColors;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
break;
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
src = maskColors ? &alphaImageSrc : &imageSrc;
splash->drawImage(src, &imgData, srcMode, maskColors ? gTrue : gFalse,
width, height, mat);
if (inlineImg) {
while (imgData.y < height) {
imgData.imgStr->getLine();
++imgData.y;
}
}
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void SplashOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageData imgData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashImageSource src;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.maskColors = maskColors;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
break;
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
src = maskColors ? &alphaImageSrc : &imageSrc;
splash->drawImage(src, &imgData, srcMode, maskColors ? gTrue : gFalse,
width, height, mat);
if (inlineImg) {
while (imgData.y < height) {
imgData.imgStr->getLine();
++imgData.y;
}
}
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
| 164,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadHALDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
cube_size,
level;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Create HALD color lookup table image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
level=0;
if (*image_info->filename != '\0')
level=StringToUnsignedLong(image_info->filename);
if (level < 2)
level=8;
status=MagickTrue;
cube_size=level*level;
image->columns=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
image->rows=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=(ssize_t) level)
{
ssize_t
blue,
green,
red;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,(size_t) level,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
blue=y/(ssize_t) level;
for (green=0; green < (ssize_t) cube_size; green++)
{
for (red=0; red < (ssize_t) cube_size; red++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*red/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*green/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*blue/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadHALDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
cube_size,
level;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Create HALD color lookup table image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
level=0;
if (*image_info->filename != '\0')
level=StringToUnsignedLong(image_info->filename);
if (level < 2)
level=8;
status=MagickTrue;
cube_size=level*level;
image->columns=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
image->rows=(size_t) (level*cube_size);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=(ssize_t) level)
{
ssize_t
blue,
green,
red;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,(size_t) level,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
blue=y/(ssize_t) level;
for (green=0; green < (ssize_t) cube_size; green++)
{
for (red=0; red < (ssize_t) cube_size; red++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*red/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*green/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum((MagickRealType)
(QuantumRange*blue/(cube_size-1.0))));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,569 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Block::SetKey(bool bKey)
{
if (bKey)
m_flags |= static_cast<unsigned char>(1 << 7);
else
m_flags &= 0x7F;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Block::SetKey(bool bKey)
Block::Lacing Block::GetLacing() const {
const int value = int(m_flags & 0x06) >> 1;
return static_cast<Lacing>(value);
}
| 174,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(const LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason discard_reason) {
DecisionDetails decision_details;
EXPECT_FALSE(lifecycle_unit->CanDiscard(discard_reason, &decision_details));
EXPECT_FALSE(decision_details.IsPositive());
EXPECT_TRUE(decision_details.reasons().empty());
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | void ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(const LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason discard_reason) {
DecisionDetails decision_details;
EXPECT_FALSE(lifecycle_unit->CanDiscard(discard_reason, &decision_details));
EXPECT_FALSE(decision_details.IsPositive());
// |reasons()| will either contain the status for the 4 local site features
// heuristics or be empty if the database doesn't track this lifecycle unit.
EXPECT_TRUE(decision_details.reasons().empty() ||
(decision_details.reasons().size() == 4));
}
| 172,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetFocusedRenderWidgetHost(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* receiving_widget) {
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible())
return receiving_widget;
if (receiving_widget != GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost())
return receiving_widget;
WebContentsImpl* focused_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
FrameTreeNode* focused_frame = nullptr;
if (focused_contents->browser_plugin_guest_ &&
!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(focused_contents)) {
focused_frame = frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
} else {
focused_frame = GetFocusedWebContents()->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
}
if (!focused_frame)
return receiving_widget;
RenderWidgetHostView* view = focused_frame->current_frame_host()->GetView();
if (!view)
return nullptr;
return RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetFocusedRenderWidgetHost(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* receiving_widget) {
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible())
return receiving_widget;
if (receiving_widget != GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost())
return receiving_widget;
WebContentsImpl* focused_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_contents->interstitial_page_->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
FrameTreeNode* focused_frame = nullptr;
if (focused_contents->browser_plugin_guest_ &&
!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(focused_contents)) {
focused_frame = frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
} else {
focused_frame = GetFocusedWebContents()->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
}
if (!focused_frame)
return receiving_widget;
RenderWidgetHostView* view = focused_frame->current_frame_host()->GetView();
if (!view)
return nullptr;
return RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
}
| 172,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host,
ContentViewCoreImpl* content_view_core)
: host_(widget_host),
is_layer_attached_(true),
content_view_core_(NULL),
ime_adapter_android_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
cached_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
texture_id_in_layer_(0) {
if (CompositorImpl::UsesDirectGL()) {
surface_texture_transport_.reset(new SurfaceTextureTransportClient());
layer_ = surface_texture_transport_->Initialize();
} else {
texture_layer_ = cc::TextureLayer::create(0);
layer_ = texture_layer_;
}
layer_->setContentsOpaque(true);
layer_->setIsDrawable(true);
host_->SetView(this);
SetContentViewCore(content_view_core);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host,
ContentViewCoreImpl* content_view_core)
: host_(widget_host),
is_layer_attached_(true),
content_view_core_(NULL),
ime_adapter_android_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
cached_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
texture_id_in_layer_(0),
current_buffer_id_(0) {
if (CompositorImpl::UsesDirectGL()) {
surface_texture_transport_.reset(new SurfaceTextureTransportClient());
layer_ = surface_texture_transport_->Initialize();
} else {
texture_layer_ = cc::TextureLayer::create(0);
layer_ = texture_layer_;
}
layer_->setContentsOpaque(true);
layer_->setIsDrawable(true);
host_->SetView(this);
SetContentViewCore(content_view_core);
}
| 171,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Cues::Find(
long long time_ns,
const Track* pTrack,
const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const
{
assert(time_ns >= 0);
assert(pTrack);
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //establish invariant
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count > 0);
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(pReader);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#else
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return false;
if (m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#endif
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool Cues::Find(
bool Cues::Find(long long time_ns, const Track* pTrack, const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const {
assert(time_ns >= 0);
assert(pTrack);
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //establish invariant
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count > 0);
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(pReader);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#else
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return false;
if (m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment)) {
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
| 174,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void start_daemon()
{
struct usb_sock_t *usb_sock;
if (g_options.noprinter_mode == 0) {
usb_sock = usb_open();
if (usb_sock == NULL)
goto cleanup_usb;
} else
usb_sock = NULL;
uint16_t desired_port = g_options.desired_port;
struct tcp_sock_t *tcp_socket;
while ((tcp_socket = tcp_open(desired_port)) == NULL &&
g_options.only_desired_port == 0) {
desired_port ++;
if (desired_port == 1 || desired_port == 0)
desired_port = 49152;
}
if (tcp_socket == NULL)
goto cleanup_tcp;
uint16_t real_port = tcp_port_number_get(tcp_socket);
if (desired_port != 0 && g_options.only_desired_port == 1 &&
desired_port != real_port) {
ERR("Received port number did not match requested port number."
" The requested port number may be too high.");
goto cleanup_tcp;
}
printf("%u|", real_port);
fflush(stdout);
uint16_t pid;
if (!g_options.nofork_mode && (pid = fork()) > 0) {
printf("%u|", pid);
exit(0);
}
if (usb_can_callback(usb_sock))
usb_register_callback(usb_sock);
for (;;) {
struct service_thread_param *args = calloc(1, sizeof(*args));
if (args == NULL) {
ERR("Failed to alloc space for thread args");
goto cleanup_thread;
}
args->usb_sock = usb_sock;
args->tcp = tcp_conn_accept(tcp_socket);
if (args->tcp == NULL) {
ERR("Failed to open tcp connection");
goto cleanup_thread;
}
int status = pthread_create(&args->thread_handle, NULL,
&service_connection, args);
if (status) {
ERR("Failed to spawn thread, error %d", status);
goto cleanup_thread;
}
continue;
cleanup_thread:
if (args != NULL) {
if (args->tcp != NULL)
tcp_conn_close(args->tcp);
free(args);
}
break;
}
cleanup_tcp:
if (tcp_socket!= NULL)
tcp_close(tcp_socket);
cleanup_usb:
if (usb_sock != NULL)
usb_close(usb_sock);
return;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void start_daemon()
{
struct usb_sock_t *usb_sock;
if (g_options.noprinter_mode == 0) {
usb_sock = usb_open();
if (usb_sock == NULL)
goto cleanup_usb;
} else
usb_sock = NULL;
uint16_t desired_port = g_options.desired_port;
struct tcp_sock_t *tcp_socket = NULL, *tcp6_socket = NULL;
for (;;) {
tcp_socket = tcp_open(desired_port);
tcp6_socket = tcp6_open(desired_port);
if (tcp_socket || tcp6_socket || g_options.only_desired_port)
break;
desired_port ++;
if (desired_port == 1 || desired_port == 0)
desired_port = 49152;
NOTE("Access to desired port failed, trying alternative port %d", desired_port);
}
if (tcp_socket == NULL && tcp6_socket == NULL)
goto cleanup_tcp;
uint16_t real_port;
if (tcp_socket)
real_port = tcp_port_number_get(tcp_socket);
else
real_port = tcp_port_number_get(tcp6_socket);
if (desired_port != 0 && g_options.only_desired_port == 1 &&
desired_port != real_port) {
ERR("Received port number did not match requested port number."
" The requested port number may be too high.");
goto cleanup_tcp;
}
printf("%u|", real_port);
fflush(stdout);
NOTE("Port: %d, IPv4 %savailable, IPv6 %savailable",
real_port, tcp_socket ? "" : "not ", tcp6_socket ? "" : "not ");
uint16_t pid;
if (!g_options.nofork_mode && (pid = fork()) > 0) {
printf("%u|", pid);
exit(0);
}
if (usb_can_callback(usb_sock))
usb_register_callback(usb_sock);
for (;;) {
struct service_thread_param *args = calloc(1, sizeof(*args));
if (args == NULL) {
ERR("Failed to alloc space for thread args");
goto cleanup_thread;
}
args->usb_sock = usb_sock;
// For each request/response round we use the socket (IPv4 or
// IPv6) which receives data first
args->tcp = tcp_conn_select(tcp_socket, tcp6_socket);
if (args->tcp == NULL) {
ERR("Failed to open tcp connection");
goto cleanup_thread;
}
int status = pthread_create(&args->thread_handle, NULL,
&service_connection, args);
if (status) {
ERR("Failed to spawn thread, error %d", status);
goto cleanup_thread;
}
continue;
cleanup_thread:
if (args != NULL) {
if (args->tcp != NULL)
tcp_conn_close(args->tcp);
free(args);
}
break;
}
cleanup_tcp:
if (tcp_socket!= NULL)
tcp_close(tcp_socket);
if (tcp6_socket!= NULL)
tcp_close(tcp6_socket);
cleanup_usb:
if (usb_sock != NULL)
usb_close(usb_sock);
return;
}
| 166,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int asepcos_parse_sec_attr(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file, const u8 *buf,
size_t len)
{
const u8 *p = buf;
while (len != 0) {
unsigned int amode, tlen = 3;
if (len < 5 && p[0] != 0x80 && p[1] != 0x01) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid access mode encoding");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
amode = p[2];
if (p[3] == 0x90 && p[4] == 0x00) {
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, 0, SC_AC_NONE);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2;
} else if (p[3] == 0x97 && p[4] == 0x00) {
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, 0, SC_AC_NEVER);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2;
} else if (p[3] == 0xA0 && len >= 4U + p[4]) {
/* TODO: support OR expressions */
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, p[5], SC_AC_CHV);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2 + p[4]; /* FIXME */
} else if (p[3] == 0xAF && len >= 4U + p[4]) {
/* TODO: support AND expressions */
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, p[5], SC_AC_CHV);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2 + p[4]; /* FIXME */
} else {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid security condition");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
p += tlen;
len -= tlen;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int asepcos_parse_sec_attr(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file, const u8 *buf,
size_t len)
{
const u8 *p = buf;
while (len != 0) {
unsigned int amode, tlen = 3;
if (len < 5 || p[0] != 0x80 || p[1] != 0x01) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid access mode encoding");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
amode = p[2];
if (p[3] == 0x90 && p[4] == 0x00) {
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, 0, SC_AC_NONE);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2;
} else if (p[3] == 0x97 && p[4] == 0x00) {
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, 0, SC_AC_NEVER);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2;
} else if (p[3] == 0xA0 && len >= 4U + p[4]) {
/* TODO: support OR expressions */
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, p[5], SC_AC_CHV);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2 + p[4]; /* FIXME */
} else if (p[3] == 0xAF && len >= 4U + p[4]) {
/* TODO: support AND expressions */
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, p[5], SC_AC_CHV);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2 + p[4]; /* FIXME */
} else {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid security condition");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
p += tlen;
len -= tlen;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jpc_streamlist_t *jpc_ppmstabtostreams(jpc_ppxstab_t *tab)
{
jpc_streamlist_t *streams;
uchar *dataptr;
uint_fast32_t datacnt;
uint_fast32_t tpcnt;
jpc_ppxstabent_t *ent;
int entno;
jas_stream_t *stream;
int n;
if (!(streams = jpc_streamlist_create())) {
goto error;
}
if (!tab->numents) {
return streams;
}
entno = 0;
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
for (;;) {
/* Get the length of the packet header data for the current
tile-part. */
if (datacnt < 4) {
goto error;
}
if (!(stream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jpc_streamlist_insert(streams, jpc_streamlist_numstreams(streams),
stream)) {
goto error;
}
tpcnt = (dataptr[0] << 24) | (dataptr[1] << 16) | (dataptr[2] << 8)
| dataptr[3];
datacnt -= 4;
dataptr += 4;
/* Get the packet header data for the current tile-part. */
while (tpcnt) {
if (!datacnt) {
if (++entno >= tab->numents) {
goto error;
}
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
}
n = JAS_MIN(tpcnt, datacnt);
if (jas_stream_write(stream, dataptr, n) != n) {
goto error;
}
tpcnt -= n;
dataptr += n;
datacnt -= n;
}
jas_stream_rewind(stream);
if (!datacnt) {
if (++entno >= tab->numents) {
break;
}
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
}
}
return streams;
error:
if (streams) {
jpc_streamlist_destroy(streams);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | jpc_streamlist_t *jpc_ppmstabtostreams(jpc_ppxstab_t *tab)
{
jpc_streamlist_t *streams;
jas_uchar *dataptr;
uint_fast32_t datacnt;
uint_fast32_t tpcnt;
jpc_ppxstabent_t *ent;
int entno;
jas_stream_t *stream;
int n;
if (!(streams = jpc_streamlist_create())) {
goto error;
}
if (!tab->numents) {
return streams;
}
entno = 0;
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
for (;;) {
/* Get the length of the packet header data for the current
tile-part. */
if (datacnt < 4) {
goto error;
}
if (!(stream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jpc_streamlist_insert(streams, jpc_streamlist_numstreams(streams),
stream)) {
goto error;
}
tpcnt = (dataptr[0] << 24) | (dataptr[1] << 16) | (dataptr[2] << 8)
| dataptr[3];
datacnt -= 4;
dataptr += 4;
/* Get the packet header data for the current tile-part. */
while (tpcnt) {
if (!datacnt) {
if (++entno >= tab->numents) {
goto error;
}
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
}
n = JAS_MIN(tpcnt, datacnt);
if (jas_stream_write(stream, dataptr, n) != n) {
goto error;
}
tpcnt -= n;
dataptr += n;
datacnt -= n;
}
jas_stream_rewind(stream);
if (!datacnt) {
if (++entno >= tab->numents) {
break;
}
ent = tab->ents[entno];
dataptr = ent->data;
datacnt = ent->len;
}
}
return streams;
error:
if (streams) {
jpc_streamlist_destroy(streams);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::ProgressEventTimerFired(TimerBase*) {
if (network_state_ != kNetworkLoading)
return;
double time = WTF::CurrentTime();
double timedelta = time - previous_progress_time_;
if (GetWebMediaPlayer() && GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidLoadingProgress()) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::progress);
previous_progress_time_ = time;
sent_stalled_event_ = false;
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
} else if (timedelta > 3.0 && !sent_stalled_event_) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::stalled);
sent_stalled_event_ = true;
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
}
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void HTMLMediaElement::ProgressEventTimerFired(TimerBase*) {
if (network_state_ != kNetworkLoading)
return;
// If this is an cross-origin request, and we haven't discovered whether
// the media is actually playable yet, don't fire any progress events as
// those may let the page know information about the resource that it's
// not supposed to know.
if (MediaShouldBeOpaque())
return;
double time = WTF::CurrentTime();
double timedelta = time - previous_progress_time_;
if (GetWebMediaPlayer() && GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidLoadingProgress()) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::progress);
previous_progress_time_ = time;
sent_stalled_event_ = false;
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
} else if (timedelta > 3.0 && !sent_stalled_event_) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::stalled);
sent_stalled_event_ = true;
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
}
}
| 173,164 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cpStripToTile(uint8* out, uint8* in,
uint32 rows, uint32 cols, int outskew, int inskew)
{
while (rows-- > 0) {
uint32 j = cols;
while (j-- > 0)
*out++ = *in++;
out += outskew;
in += inskew;
}
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix uint32 underflow/overflow that can cause heap-based
buffer overflow.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2610
CWE ID: CWE-190 | cpStripToTile(uint8* out, uint8* in,
uint32 rows, uint32 cols, int outskew, int64 inskew)
{
while (rows-- > 0) {
uint32 j = cols;
while (j-- > 0)
*out++ = *in++;
out += outskew;
in += inskew;
}
}
| 168,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void llc_cmsg_rcv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(skb->sk);
if (llc->cmsg_flags & LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO) {
struct llc_pktinfo info;
info.lpi_ifindex = llc_sk(skb->sk)->dev->ifindex;
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &info.lpi_sap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, info.lpi_mac);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_LLC, LLC_OPT_PKTINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in llc
The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void llc_cmsg_rcv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(skb->sk);
if (llc->cmsg_flags & LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO) {
struct llc_pktinfo info;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.lpi_ifindex = llc_sk(skb->sk)->dev->ifindex;
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &info.lpi_sap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, info.lpi_mac);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_LLC, LLC_OPT_PKTINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
| 167,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ProfileSyncService::OnExperimentsChanged(
const browser_sync::Experiments& experiments) {
if (current_experiments.Matches(experiments))
return;
if (migrator_.get() &&
migrator_->state() != browser_sync::BackendMigrator::IDLE) {
DVLOG(1) << "Dropping OnExperimentsChanged due to migrator busy.";
return;
}
const syncable::ModelTypeSet registered_types = GetRegisteredDataTypes();
syncable::ModelTypeSet to_add;
if (experiments.sync_tabs)
to_add.Put(syncable::SESSIONS);
const syncable::ModelTypeSet to_register =
Difference(to_add, registered_types);
DVLOG(2) << "OnExperimentsChanged called with types: "
<< syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_add);
DVLOG(2) << "Enabling types: " << syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_register);
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::Iterator it = to_register.First();
it.Good(); it.Inc()) {
RegisterNewDataType(it.Get());
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::string experiment_name = GetExperimentNameForDataType(it.Get());
if (experiment_name.empty())
continue;
about_flags::SetExperimentEnabled(g_browser_process->local_state(),
experiment_name,
true);
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
if (sync_prefs_.HasKeepEverythingSynced()) {
sync_prefs_.SetPreferredDataTypes(registered_types, registered_types);
if (!to_register.Empty() && HasSyncSetupCompleted() && migrator_.get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Dynamically enabling new datatypes: "
<< syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_register);
OnMigrationNeededForTypes(to_register);
}
}
if (experiments.sync_tab_favicons) {
DVLOG(1) << "Enabling syncing of tab favicons.";
about_flags::SetExperimentEnabled(g_browser_process->local_state(),
"sync-tab-favicons",
true);
}
current_experiments = experiments;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void ProfileSyncService::OnExperimentsChanged(
const browser_sync::Experiments& experiments) {
if (current_experiments.Matches(experiments))
return;
if (migrator_.get() &&
migrator_->state() != browser_sync::BackendMigrator::IDLE) {
DVLOG(1) << "Dropping OnExperimentsChanged due to migrator busy.";
return;
}
const syncable::ModelTypeSet registered_types = GetRegisteredDataTypes();
syncable::ModelTypeSet to_add;
const syncable::ModelTypeSet to_register =
Difference(to_add, registered_types);
DVLOG(2) << "OnExperimentsChanged called with types: "
<< syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_add);
DVLOG(2) << "Enabling types: " << syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_register);
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::Iterator it = to_register.First();
it.Good(); it.Inc()) {
RegisterNewDataType(it.Get());
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::string experiment_name = GetExperimentNameForDataType(it.Get());
if (experiment_name.empty())
continue;
about_flags::SetExperimentEnabled(g_browser_process->local_state(),
experiment_name,
true);
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
if (sync_prefs_.HasKeepEverythingSynced()) {
sync_prefs_.SetPreferredDataTypes(registered_types, registered_types);
if (!to_register.Empty() && HasSyncSetupCompleted() && migrator_.get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Dynamically enabling new datatypes: "
<< syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(to_register);
OnMigrationNeededForTypes(to_register);
}
}
if (experiments.sync_tab_favicons) {
DVLOG(1) << "Enabling syncing of tab favicons.";
about_flags::SetExperimentEnabled(g_browser_process->local_state(),
"sync-tab-favicons",
true);
}
current_experiments = experiments;
}
| 170,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sg_build_indirect(Sg_scatter_hold * schp, Sg_fd * sfp, int buff_size)
{
int ret_sz = 0, i, k, rem_sz, num, mx_sc_elems;
int sg_tablesize = sfp->parentdp->sg_tablesize;
int blk_size = buff_size, order;
gfp_t gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN;
struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
if (blk_size < 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (0 == blk_size)
++blk_size; /* don't know why */
/* round request up to next highest SG_SECTOR_SZ byte boundary */
blk_size = ALIGN(blk_size, SG_SECTOR_SZ);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_build_indirect: buff_size=%d, blk_size=%d\n",
buff_size, blk_size));
/* N.B. ret_sz carried into this block ... */
mx_sc_elems = sg_build_sgat(schp, sfp, sg_tablesize);
if (mx_sc_elems < 0)
return mx_sc_elems; /* most likely -ENOMEM */
num = scatter_elem_sz;
if (unlikely(num != scatter_elem_sz_prev)) {
if (num < PAGE_SIZE) {
scatter_elem_sz = PAGE_SIZE;
scatter_elem_sz_prev = PAGE_SIZE;
} else
scatter_elem_sz_prev = num;
}
if (sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma)
gfp_mask |= GFP_DMA;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
gfp_mask |= __GFP_ZERO;
order = get_order(num);
retry:
ret_sz = 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + order);
for (k = 0, rem_sz = blk_size; rem_sz > 0 && k < mx_sc_elems;
k++, rem_sz -= ret_sz) {
num = (rem_sz > scatter_elem_sz_prev) ?
scatter_elem_sz_prev : rem_sz;
schp->pages[k] = alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order);
if (!schp->pages[k])
goto out;
if (num == scatter_elem_sz_prev) {
if (unlikely(ret_sz > scatter_elem_sz_prev)) {
scatter_elem_sz = ret_sz;
scatter_elem_sz_prev = ret_sz;
}
}
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(5, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_build_indirect: k=%d, num=%d, ret_sz=%d\n",
k, num, ret_sz));
} /* end of for loop */
schp->page_order = order;
schp->k_use_sg = k;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(5, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_build_indirect: k_use_sg=%d, rem_sz=%d\n",
k, rem_sz));
schp->bufflen = blk_size;
if (rem_sz > 0) /* must have failed */
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
out:
for (i = 0; i < k; i++)
__free_pages(schp->pages[i], order);
if (--order >= 0)
goto retry;
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect()
This shall help avoid copying uninitialized memory to the userspace when
calling ioctl(fd, SG_IO) with an empty command.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | sg_build_indirect(Sg_scatter_hold * schp, Sg_fd * sfp, int buff_size)
{
int ret_sz = 0, i, k, rem_sz, num, mx_sc_elems;
int sg_tablesize = sfp->parentdp->sg_tablesize;
int blk_size = buff_size, order;
gfp_t gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN;
struct sg_device *sdp = sfp->parentdp;
if (blk_size < 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (0 == blk_size)
++blk_size; /* don't know why */
/* round request up to next highest SG_SECTOR_SZ byte boundary */
blk_size = ALIGN(blk_size, SG_SECTOR_SZ);
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_build_indirect: buff_size=%d, blk_size=%d\n",
buff_size, blk_size));
/* N.B. ret_sz carried into this block ... */
mx_sc_elems = sg_build_sgat(schp, sfp, sg_tablesize);
if (mx_sc_elems < 0)
return mx_sc_elems; /* most likely -ENOMEM */
num = scatter_elem_sz;
if (unlikely(num != scatter_elem_sz_prev)) {
if (num < PAGE_SIZE) {
scatter_elem_sz = PAGE_SIZE;
scatter_elem_sz_prev = PAGE_SIZE;
} else
scatter_elem_sz_prev = num;
}
if (sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma)
gfp_mask |= GFP_DMA;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
gfp_mask |= __GFP_ZERO;
order = get_order(num);
retry:
ret_sz = 1 << (PAGE_SHIFT + order);
for (k = 0, rem_sz = blk_size; rem_sz > 0 && k < mx_sc_elems;
k++, rem_sz -= ret_sz) {
num = (rem_sz > scatter_elem_sz_prev) ?
scatter_elem_sz_prev : rem_sz;
schp->pages[k] = alloc_pages(gfp_mask | __GFP_ZERO, order);
if (!schp->pages[k])
goto out;
if (num == scatter_elem_sz_prev) {
if (unlikely(ret_sz > scatter_elem_sz_prev)) {
scatter_elem_sz = ret_sz;
scatter_elem_sz_prev = ret_sz;
}
}
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(5, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_build_indirect: k=%d, num=%d, ret_sz=%d\n",
k, num, ret_sz));
} /* end of for loop */
schp->page_order = order;
schp->k_use_sg = k;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(5, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sfp->parentdp,
"sg_build_indirect: k_use_sg=%d, rem_sz=%d\n",
k, rem_sz));
schp->bufflen = blk_size;
if (rem_sz > 0) /* must have failed */
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
out:
for (i = 0; i < k; i++)
__free_pages(schp->pages[i], order);
if (--order >= 0)
goto retry;
return -ENOMEM;
}
| 168,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool FrameworkListener::onDataAvailable(SocketClient *c) {
char buffer[CMD_BUF_SIZE];
int len;
len = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(c->getSocket(), buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
if (len < 0) {
SLOGE("read() failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return false;
} else if (!len)
return false;
if(buffer[len-1] != '\0')
SLOGW("String is not zero-terminated");
int offset = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (buffer[i] == '\0') {
/* IMPORTANT: dispatchCommand() expects a zero-terminated string */
dispatchCommand(c, buffer + offset);
offset = i + 1;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix vold vulnerability in FrameworkListener
Modify FrameworkListener to ignore commands that exceed the maximum
buffer length and send an error message.
Bug: 29831647
Change-Id: I9e57d1648d55af2ca0191bb47868e375ecc26950
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit baa126dc158a40bc83c17c6d428c760e5b93fb1a)
(cherry picked from commit 470484d2a25ad432190a01d1c763b4b36db33c7e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool FrameworkListener::onDataAvailable(SocketClient *c) {
char buffer[CMD_BUF_SIZE];
int len;
len = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(c->getSocket(), buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
if (len < 0) {
SLOGE("read() failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return false;
} else if (!len) {
return false;
} else if (buffer[len-1] != '\0') {
SLOGW("String is not zero-terminated");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29831647");
c->sendMsg(500, "Command too large for buffer", false);
mSkipToNextNullByte = true;
return false;
}
int offset = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (buffer[i] == '\0') {
/* IMPORTANT: dispatchCommand() expects a zero-terminated string */
if (mSkipToNextNullByte) {
mSkipToNextNullByte = false;
} else {
dispatchCommand(c, buffer + offset);
}
offset = i + 1;
}
}
mSkipToNextNullByte = false;
return true;
}
| 173,391 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
{
struct keydata *keyptr;
__u32 hash[4];
keyptr = get_keyptr();
/*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
* The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
* which is then hashed with random data.
*/
hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
| 165,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(
WebContents* contents,
const DictionaryValue* changed_properties,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
// Overwrite the second argument with the appropriate properties dictionary,
// depending on extension permissions.
DictionaryValue* properties_value = changed_properties->DeepCopy();
ExtensionTabUtil::ScrubTabValueForExtension(contents, extension,
properties_value);
event_args->Set(1, properties_value);
// Overwrite the third arg with our tab value as seen by this extension.
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
| 171,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
CWE ID: CWE-787 | PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0 || ncolors > INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero and no more than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, (int)ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 166,953 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::Focus() {
if (web_view_->Client())
web_view_->Client()->DidFocus();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | void ChromeClientImpl::Focus() {
void ChromeClientImpl::Focus(LocalFrame* calling_frame) {
if (web_view_->Client()) {
web_view_->Client()->DidFocus(
calling_frame ? WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(calling_frame) : nullptr);
}
}
| 172,724 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_default_root(pool *p, int allow_symlinks, const char **root) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
const char *dir = NULL;
int res;
c = find_config(main_server->conf, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
while (c != NULL) {
pr_signals_handle();
/* Check the groups acl */
if (c->argc < 2) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
res = pr_expr_eval_group_and(((char **) c->argv)+1);
if (res) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
c = find_config_next(c, c->next, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
}
if (dir != NULL) {
const char *new_dir;
/* Check for any expandable variables. */
new_dir = path_subst_uservar(p, &dir);
if (new_dir != NULL) {
dir = new_dir;
}
if (strncmp(dir, "/", 2) == 0) {
dir = NULL;
} else {
char *realdir;
int xerrno = 0;
if (allow_symlinks == FALSE) {
char *path, target_path[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
struct stat st;
size_t pathlen;
/* First, deal with any possible interpolation. dir_realpath() will
* do this for us, but dir_realpath() ALSO automatically follows
* symlinks, which is what we do NOT want to do here.
*/
path = pstrdup(p, dir);
if (*path != '/') {
if (*path == '~') {
if (pr_fs_interpolate(dir, target_path,
sizeof(target_path)-1) < 0) {
return -1;
}
path = target_path;
}
}
/* Note: lstat(2) is sensitive to the presence of a trailing slash on
* the path, particularly in the case of a symlink to a directory.
* Thus to get the correct test, we need to remove any trailing slash
* that might be present. Subtle.
*/
pathlen = strlen(path);
if (pathlen > 1 &&
path[pathlen-1] == '/') {
path[pathlen-1] = '\0';
}
pr_fs_clear_cache2(path);
res = pr_fsio_lstat(path, &st);
if (res < 0) {
xerrno = errno;
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING, "error: unable to check %s: %s", path,
strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
return -1;
}
if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING,
"error: DefaultRoot %s is a symlink (denied by AllowChrootSymlinks "
"config)", path);
errno = EPERM;
return -1;
}
}
/* We need to be the final user here so that if the user has their home
* directory with a mode the user proftpd is running (i.e. the User
* directive) as can not traverse down, we can still have the default
* root.
*/
pr_fs_clear_cache2(dir);
PRIVS_USER
realdir = dir_realpath(p, dir);
xerrno = errno;
PRIVS_RELINQUISH
if (realdir) {
dir = realdir;
} else {
/* Try to provide a more informative message. */
char interp_dir[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
memset(interp_dir, '\0', sizeof(interp_dir));
(void) pr_fs_interpolate(dir, interp_dir, sizeof(interp_dir)-1);
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_NOTICE,
"notice: unable to use DefaultRoot '%s' [resolved to '%s']: %s",
dir, interp_dir, strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
}
}
}
*root = dir;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | static int get_default_root(pool *p, int allow_symlinks, const char **root) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
const char *dir = NULL;
int res;
c = find_config(main_server->conf, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
while (c != NULL) {
pr_signals_handle();
/* Check the groups acl */
if (c->argc < 2) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
res = pr_expr_eval_group_and(((char **) c->argv)+1);
if (res) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
c = find_config_next(c, c->next, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
}
if (dir != NULL) {
const char *new_dir;
/* Check for any expandable variables. */
new_dir = path_subst_uservar(p, &dir);
if (new_dir != NULL) {
dir = new_dir;
}
if (strncmp(dir, "/", 2) == 0) {
dir = NULL;
} else {
char *realdir;
int xerrno = 0;
if (allow_symlinks == FALSE) {
char *path, target_path[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
size_t pathlen;
/* First, deal with any possible interpolation. dir_realpath() will
* do this for us, but dir_realpath() ALSO automatically follows
* symlinks, which is what we do NOT want to do here.
*/
path = pstrdup(p, dir);
if (*path != '/') {
if (*path == '~') {
if (pr_fs_interpolate(dir, target_path,
sizeof(target_path)-1) < 0) {
return -1;
}
path = target_path;
}
}
/* Note: lstat(2) is sensitive to the presence of a trailing slash on
* the path, particularly in the case of a symlink to a directory.
* Thus to get the correct test, we need to remove any trailing slash
* that might be present. Subtle.
*/
pathlen = strlen(path);
if (pathlen > 1 &&
path[pathlen-1] == '/') {
path[pathlen-1] = '\0';
}
res = is_symlink_path(p, path, pathlen);
if (res < 0) {
if (errno == EPERM) {
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING, "error: DefaultRoot %s is a symlink "
"(denied by AllowChrootSymlinks config)", path);
}
errno = EPERM;
return -1;
}
}
/* We need to be the final user here so that if the user has their home
* directory with a mode the user proftpd is running (i.e. the User
* directive) as can not traverse down, we can still have the default
* root.
*/
pr_fs_clear_cache2(dir);
PRIVS_USER
realdir = dir_realpath(p, dir);
xerrno = errno;
PRIVS_RELINQUISH
if (realdir) {
dir = realdir;
} else {
/* Try to provide a more informative message. */
char interp_dir[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
memset(interp_dir, '\0', sizeof(interp_dir));
(void) pr_fs_interpolate(dir, interp_dir, sizeof(interp_dir)-1);
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_NOTICE,
"notice: unable to use DefaultRoot '%s' [resolved to '%s']: %s",
dir, interp_dir, strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
}
}
}
*root = dir;
return 0;
}
| 168,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings*
data_reduction_proxy_settings =
DataReductionProxyChromeSettingsFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
browser_context);
return data_reduction_proxy_settings &&
data_reduction_proxy_settings->IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
return profile && data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings::
IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(profile->GetPrefs());
}
| 172,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BufferMeta(size_t size, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | BufferMeta(size_t size, OMX_U32 portIndex)
: mSize(size),
mCopyFromOmx(false),
mCopyToOmx(false),
mPortIndex(portIndex),
mBackup(NULL) {
}
| 174,125 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
ReloadIfTerminated(render_view_host);
ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(render_view_host);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
ReloadIfTerminated(render_view_host);
ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(render_view_host);
const Extension* extension = GetExtension(render_view_host);
if (!extension)
return;
int process_id = render_view_host->GetProcess()->GetID();
auto policy = content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance();
// Components of chrome that are implemented as extensions or platform apps
// are allowed to use chrome://resources/ URLs.
if ((extension->is_extension() || extension->is_platform_app()) &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location())) {
policy->GrantOrigin(process_id,
url::Origin(GURL(content::kChromeUIResourcesURL)));
}
// Extensions, legacy packaged apps, and component platform apps are allowed
// to use chrome://favicon/ and chrome://extension-icon/ URLs. Hosted apps are
// not allowed because they are served via web servers (and are generally
// never given access to Chrome APIs).
if (extension->is_extension() ||
extension->is_legacy_packaged_app() ||
(extension->is_platform_app() &&
Manifest::IsComponentLocation(extension->location()))) {
policy->GrantOrigin(process_id,
url::Origin(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIFaviconURL)));
policy->GrantOrigin(process_id,
url::Origin(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIExtensionIconURL)));
}
}
| 171,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an array is a possibly empty sequence of array elements, separated by
* commas and surrounded by square brackets.
*/
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
if (astart != NULL)
(*astart) (sem->semstate);
* array end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START);
if (lex_peek(lex) != JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END)
{
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (aend != NULL)
(*aend) (sem->semstate);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | parse_array(JsonLexContext *lex, JsonSemAction *sem)
{
/*
* an array is a possibly empty sequence of array elements, separated by
* commas and surrounded by square brackets.
*/
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
json_struct_action astart = sem->array_start;
json_struct_action aend = sem->array_end;
check_stack_depth();
if (astart != NULL)
(*astart) (sem->semstate);
* array end.
*/
lex->lex_level++;
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_START, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_START);
if (lex_peek(lex) != JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END)
{
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
while (lex_accept(lex, JSON_TOKEN_COMMA, NULL))
parse_array_element(lex, sem);
}
lex_expect(JSON_PARSE_ARRAY_NEXT, lex, JSON_TOKEN_ARRAY_END);
lex->lex_level--;
if (aend != NULL)
(*aend) (sem->semstate);
}
| 164,679 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InputImeEventRouter* InputImeEventRouterFactory::GetRouter(Profile* profile) {
if (!profile)
return nullptr;
InputImeEventRouter* router = router_map_[profile];
if (!router) {
router = new InputImeEventRouter(profile);
router_map_[profile] = router;
}
return router;
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | InputImeEventRouter* InputImeEventRouterFactory::GetRouter(Profile* profile) {
if (!profile)
return nullptr;
// The |router_map_| is keyed by the original profile.
// Refers to the comments in |RemoveProfile| method for the reason.
profile = profile->GetOriginalProfile();
InputImeEventRouter* router = router_map_[profile];
if (!router) {
// The router must attach to the profile from which the extension can
// receive events. If |profile| has an off-the-record profile, attach the
// off-the-record profile. e.g. In guest mode, the extension is running with
// the incognito profile instead of its original profile.
router = new InputImeEventRouter(profile->HasOffTheRecordProfile()
? profile->GetOffTheRecordProfile()
: profile);
router_map_[profile] = router;
}
return router;
}
| 172,647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jpg_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
uchar buf[JPG_MAGICLEN];
int i;
int n;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= JPG_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, JPG_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough data? */
if (n < JPG_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
/* Does this look like JPEG? */
if (buf[0] != (JPG_MAGIC >> 8) || buf[1] != (JPG_MAGIC & 0xff)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int jpg_validate(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jas_uchar buf[JPG_MAGICLEN];
int i;
int n;
assert(JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK >= JPG_MAGICLEN);
/* Read the validation data (i.e., the data used for detecting
the format). */
if ((n = jas_stream_read(in, buf, JPG_MAGICLEN)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* Put the validation data back onto the stream, so that the
stream position will not be changed. */
for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, buf[i]) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
/* Did we read enough data? */
if (n < JPG_MAGICLEN) {
return -1;
}
/* Does this look like JPEG? */
if (buf[0] != (JPG_MAGIC >> 8) || buf[1] != (JPG_MAGIC & 0xff)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::CheckForCompletedRasterTasks() {
TRACE_EVENT0(
"cc", "PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::CheckForCompletedRasterTasks");
DCHECK(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_);
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_callback_.Cancel();
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_pending_ = false;
CheckForCompletedWorkerTasks();
CheckForCompletedUploads();
FlushUploads();
bool will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending =
(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_ &&
!HasPendingTasksRequiredForActivation());
bool will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending =
(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_ &&
!HasPendingTasks());
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_ &=
!will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending;
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_ &=
!will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending;
scheduled_raster_task_count_ = 0;
if (PendingRasterTaskCount())
ScheduleMoreTasks();
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO1(
"cc", "ScheduledTasks", this, StateName(),
"state", TracedValue::FromValue(StateAsValue().release()));
if (HasPendingTasks())
ScheduleCheckForCompletedRasterTasks();
if (will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending) {
DCHECK(std::find_if(raster_tasks_required_for_activation().begin(),
raster_tasks_required_for_activation().end(),
WasCanceled) ==
raster_tasks_required_for_activation().end());
client()->DidFinishRunningTasksRequiredForActivation();
}
if (will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("cc", "ScheduledTasks", this);
DCHECK(!HasPendingTasksRequiredForActivation());
client()->DidFinishRunningTasks();
}
}
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::CheckForCompletedRasterTasks() {
TRACE_EVENT0(
"cc", "PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::CheckForCompletedRasterTasks");
DCHECK(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_);
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_callback_.Cancel();
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_pending_ = false;
CheckForCompletedWorkerTasks();
CheckForCompletedUploads();
FlushUploads();
bool will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending =
(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_ &&
!raster_required_for_activation_finished_task_pending_ &&
!HasPendingTasksRequiredForActivation());
bool will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending =
(should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_ &&
!raster_finished_task_pending_ &&
!HasPendingTasks());
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_ &=
!will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending;
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_ &=
!will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending;
scheduled_raster_task_count_ = 0;
if (PendingRasterTaskCount())
ScheduleMoreTasks();
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO1(
"cc", "ScheduledTasks", this, StateName(),
"state", TracedValue::FromValue(StateAsValue().release()));
if (HasPendingTasks())
ScheduleCheckForCompletedRasterTasks();
if (will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending) {
DCHECK(std::find_if(raster_tasks_required_for_activation().begin(),
raster_tasks_required_for_activation().end(),
WasCanceled) ==
raster_tasks_required_for_activation().end());
client()->DidFinishRunningTasksRequiredForActivation();
}
if (will_notify_client_that_no_tasks_are_pending) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("cc", "ScheduledTasks", this);
DCHECK(!HasPendingTasksRequiredForActivation());
client()->DidFinishRunningTasks();
}
}
| 171,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void get_icu_value_src_php( char* tag_name, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
char* tag_value = NULL;
char* empty_result = "";
int result = 0;
char* msg = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name ,&loc_name_len ) == FAILURE) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to parse input params", tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Call ICU get */
tag_value = get_icu_value_internal( loc_name , tag_name , &result ,0);
/* No value found */
if( result == -1 ) {
if( tag_value){
efree( tag_value);
}
RETURN_STRING( empty_result , TRUE);
}
/* value found */
if( tag_value){
RETURN_STRING( tag_value , FALSE);
}
/* Error encountered while fetching the value */
if( result ==0) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to get locale %s", tag_name , tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, status, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_NULL();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void get_icu_value_src_php( char* tag_name, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
static void get_icu_value_src_php( char* tag_name, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
char* tag_value = NULL;
char* empty_result = "";
int result = 0;
char* msg = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name ,&loc_name_len ) == FAILURE) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to parse input params", tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Call ICU get */
tag_value = get_icu_value_internal( loc_name , tag_name , &result ,0);
/* No value found */
if( result == -1 ) {
if( tag_value){
efree( tag_value);
}
RETURN_STRING( empty_result , TRUE);
}
/* value found */
if( tag_value){
RETURN_STRING( tag_value , FALSE);
}
/* Error encountered while fetching the value */
if( result ==0) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to get locale %s", tag_name , tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, status, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_NULL();
}
}
| 167,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_VoiceGain (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
EAS_PCM *pInputBuffer;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
EAS_I32 gainLeft, gainRight;
#endif
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
pInputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->frame.gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
gainLeft = pWTVoice->gainLeft;
gainRight = pWTVoice->gainRight;
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* incremental gain step to prevent zipper noise */
tmp0 = *pInputBuffer++;
gain += gainIncrement;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = gain >> 16;
/* scale sample by gain */
tmp2 *= tmp0;
/* stereo output */
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> 14;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* left channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainLeft;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* right channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainRight;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* mono output */
#else
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> (NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS - 1);
tmp1 += tmp2;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_VoiceGain (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
EAS_PCM *pInputBuffer;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
EAS_I32 gainLeft, gainRight;
#endif
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
pInputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->frame.gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
gainLeft = pWTVoice->gainLeft;
gainRight = pWTVoice->gainRight;
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* incremental gain step to prevent zipper noise */
tmp0 = *pInputBuffer++;
gain += gainIncrement;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = gain >> 16;
/* scale sample by gain */
tmp2 *= tmp0;
/* stereo output */
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> 14;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* left channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainLeft;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* right channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainRight;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* mono output */
#else
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> (NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS - 1);
tmp1 += tmp2;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
#endif
}
}
| 174,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: read_gif(Gif_Reader *grr, int read_flags,
const char* landmark, Gif_ReadErrorHandler handler)
{
Gif_Stream *gfs;
Gif_Image *gfi;
Gif_Context gfc;
int unknown_block_type = 0;
if (gifgetc(grr) != 'G' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'I' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'F')
return 0;
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
gfs = Gif_NewStream();
gfi = Gif_NewImage();
gfc.stream = gfs;
gfc.prefix = Gif_NewArray(Gif_Code, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.suffix = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.length = Gif_NewArray(uint16_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.handler = handler;
gfc.gfi = gfi;
gfc.errors[0] = gfc.errors[1] = 0;
if (!gfs || !gfi || !gfc.prefix || !gfc.suffix || !gfc.length)
goto done;
gfs->landmark = landmark;
GIF_DEBUG(("\nGIF "));
if (!read_logical_screen_descriptor(gfs, grr))
goto done;
GIF_DEBUG(("logscrdesc "));
while (!gifeof(grr)) {
uint8_t block = gifgetbyte(grr);
switch (block) {
case ',': /* image block */
GIF_DEBUG(("imageread %d ", gfs->nimages));
gfi->identifier = last_name;
last_name = 0;
if (!Gif_AddImage(gfs, gfi))
goto done;
else if (!read_image(grr, &gfc, gfi, read_flags)) {
Gif_RemoveImage(gfs, gfs->nimages - 1);
gfi = 0;
goto done;
}
gfc.gfi = gfi = Gif_NewImage();
if (!gfi)
goto done;
break;
case ';': /* terminator */
GIF_DEBUG(("term\n"));
goto done;
case '!': /* extension */
block = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("ext(0x%02X) ", block));
switch (block) {
case 0xF9:
read_graphic_control_extension(&gfc, gfi, grr);
break;
case 0xCE:
last_name = suck_data(last_name, 0, grr);
break;
case 0xFE:
if (!read_comment_extension(gfi, grr)) goto done;
break;
case 0xFF:
read_application_extension(&gfc, grr);
break;
default:
read_unknown_extension(&gfc, grr, block, 0, 0);
break;
}
break;
default:
if (!unknown_block_type) {
char buf[256];
sprintf(buf, "unknown block type %d at file offset %u", block, grr->pos - 1);
gif_read_error(&gfc, 1, buf);
unknown_block_type = 1;
}
break;
}
}
done:
/* Move comments and extensions after last image into stream. */
if (gfs && gfi) {
Gif_Extension* gfex;
gfs->end_comment = gfi->comment;
gfi->comment = 0;
gfs->end_extension_list = gfi->extension_list;
gfi->extension_list = 0;
for (gfex = gfs->end_extension_list; gfex; gfex = gfex->next)
gfex->image = NULL;
}
Gif_DeleteImage(gfi);
Gif_DeleteArray(last_name);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.prefix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.suffix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.length);
gfc.gfi = 0;
if (gfs)
gfs->errors = gfc.errors[1];
if (gfs && gfc.errors[1] == 0
&& !(read_flags & GIF_READ_TRAILING_GARBAGE_OK)
&& !grr->eofer(grr))
gif_read_error(&gfc, 0, "trailing garbage after GIF ignored");
/* finally, export last message */
gif_read_error(&gfc, -1, 0);
return gfs;
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | read_gif(Gif_Reader *grr, int read_flags,
const char* landmark, Gif_ReadErrorHandler handler)
{
Gif_Stream *gfs;
Gif_Image *gfi;
Gif_Context gfc;
int unknown_block_type = 0;
if (gifgetc(grr) != 'G' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'I' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'F')
return 0;
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
gfs = Gif_NewStream();
gfi = Gif_NewImage();
gfc.stream = gfs;
gfc.prefix = Gif_NewArray(Gif_Code, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.suffix = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.length = Gif_NewArray(uint16_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.handler = handler;
gfc.gfi = gfi;
gfc.errors[0] = gfc.errors[1] = 0;
if (!gfs || !gfi || !gfc.prefix || !gfc.suffix || !gfc.length)
goto done;
gfs->landmark = landmark;
GIF_DEBUG(("\nGIF "));
if (!read_logical_screen_descriptor(gfs, grr))
goto done;
GIF_DEBUG(("logscrdesc "));
while (!gifeof(grr)) {
uint8_t block = gifgetbyte(grr);
switch (block) {
case ',': /* image block */
GIF_DEBUG(("imageread %d ", gfs->nimages));
gfi->identifier = last_name;
last_name = 0;
if (!Gif_AddImage(gfs, gfi))
goto done;
else if (!read_image(grr, &gfc, gfi, read_flags)) {
Gif_RemoveImage(gfs, gfs->nimages - 1);
gfi = 0;
goto done;
}
gfc.gfi = gfi = Gif_NewImage();
if (!gfi)
goto done;
break;
case ';': /* terminator */
GIF_DEBUG(("term\n"));
goto done;
case '!': /* extension */
block = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("ext(0x%02X) ", block));
switch (block) {
case 0xF9:
read_graphic_control_extension(&gfc, gfi, grr);
break;
case 0xCE:
last_name = suck_data(last_name, 0, grr);
break;
case 0xFE:
if (!read_comment_extension(gfi, grr)) goto done;
break;
case 0xFF:
read_application_extension(&gfc, grr);
break;
default:
read_unknown_extension(&gfc, grr, block, 0, 0);
break;
}
break;
default:
if (!unknown_block_type) {
char buf[256];
sprintf(buf, "unknown block type %d at file offset %u", block, grr->pos - 1);
gif_read_error(&gfc, 1, buf);
unknown_block_type = 1;
}
break;
}
}
done:
/* Move comments and extensions after last image into stream. */
if (gfs && gfi) {
Gif_Extension* gfex;
gfs->end_comment = gfi->comment;
gfi->comment = 0;
gfs->end_extension_list = gfi->extension_list;
gfi->extension_list = 0;
for (gfex = gfs->end_extension_list; gfex; gfex = gfex->next)
gfex->image = NULL;
}
Gif_DeleteImage(gfi);
Gif_DeleteArray(last_name);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.prefix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.suffix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.length);
gfc.gfi = 0;
last_name = 0;
if (gfs)
gfs->errors = gfc.errors[1];
if (gfs && gfc.errors[1] == 0
&& !(read_flags & GIF_READ_TRAILING_GARBAGE_OK)
&& !grr->eofer(grr))
gif_read_error(&gfc, 0, "trailing garbage after GIF ignored");
/* finally, export last message */
gif_read_error(&gfc, -1, 0);
return gfs;
}
| 169,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (!channel_->renderer_process())
return;
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
uint32 size = 0;
gpu::Buffer buffer = command_buffer_->GetTransferBuffer(id);
if (buffer.shared_memory) {
buffer.shared_memory->ShareToProcess(channel_->renderer_process(),
&transfer_buffer);
size = buffer.size;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
transfer_buffer,
size);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
uint32 size = 0;
gpu::Buffer buffer = command_buffer_->GetTransferBuffer(id);
if (buffer.shared_memory) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
transfer_buffer = NULL;
sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle(buffer.shared_memory->handle(),
channel_->renderer_pid(), &transfer_buffer, FILE_MAP_READ |
FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0);
CHECK(transfer_buffer != NULL);
#else
buffer.shared_memory->ShareToProcess(channel_->renderer_pid(),
&transfer_buffer);
#endif
size = buffer.size;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
transfer_buffer,
size);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
| 170,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg)
{
RSA *rsa=NULL;
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0,i;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
ctx2=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
bitsq=bits-bitsp;
rsa=RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL) goto err;
/* set e */
rsa->e=BN_new();
if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err;
#if 1
/* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG,
* unsigned long can be larger */
for (i=0; i<sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++)
{
if (e_value & (1<<i))
BN_set_bit(rsa->e,i);
}
#else
if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err;
#endif
/* generate p and q */
for (;;)
{
rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
BN_free(rsa->p);
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
for (;;)
{
rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0))
break;
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
BN_free(rsa->q);
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg);
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
{
tmp=rsa->p;
rsa->p=rsa->q;
rsa->q=tmp;
}
/* calculate n */
rsa->n=BN_new();
if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */
/* for (;;)
{
if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r3)) break;
if (1)
{
if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err;
continue;
}
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
goto err;
}
*/
rsa->d=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->e,r0,ctx2); /* d */
if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
rsa->dmp1=BN_new();
if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
rsa->dmq1=BN_new();
if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2);
if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,ERR_LIB_BN);
ok=0;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx2);
if (!ok)
{
if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa);
return(NULL);
}
else
return(rsa);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e_value,
void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg)
{
RSA *rsa=NULL;
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0,i;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
ctx2=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
bitsq=bits-bitsp;
rsa=RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL) goto err;
/* set e */
rsa->e=BN_new();
if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err;
#if 1
/* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG,
* unsigned long can be larger */
for (i=0; i<sizeof(unsigned long)*8; i++)
{
if (e_value & (1UL<<i))
BN_set_bit(rsa->e,i);
}
#else
if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err;
#endif
/* generate p and q */
for (;;)
{
rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
BN_free(rsa->p);
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg);
for (;;)
{
rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(NULL,bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg);
if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0))
break;
if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg);
BN_free(rsa->q);
}
if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg);
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
{
tmp=rsa->p;
rsa->p=rsa->q;
rsa->q=tmp;
}
/* calculate n */
rsa->n=BN_new();
if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */
/* for (;;)
{
if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r3)) break;
if (1)
{
if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err;
continue;
}
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
goto err;
}
*/
rsa->d=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->e,r0,ctx2); /* d */
if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
rsa->dmp1=BN_new();
if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
rsa->dmq1=BN_new();
if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2);
if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,ERR_LIB_BN);
ok=0;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx2);
if (!ok)
{
if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa);
return(NULL);
}
else
return(rsa);
}
| 165,345 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fb_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct * vma)
{
struct fb_info *info = file_fb_info(file);
struct fb_ops *fb;
unsigned long off;
unsigned long start;
u32 len;
if (!info)
return -ENODEV;
if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT))
return -EINVAL;
off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
fb = info->fbops;
if (!fb)
return -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&info->mm_lock);
if (fb->fb_mmap) {
int res;
res = fb->fb_mmap(info, vma);
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
return res;
}
/* frame buffer memory */
start = info->fix.smem_start;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + info->fix.smem_len);
if (off >= len) {
/* memory mapped io */
off -= len;
if (info->var.accel_flags) {
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
return -EINVAL;
}
start = info->fix.mmio_start;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + info->fix.mmio_len);
}
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
start &= PAGE_MASK;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start + off) > len)
return -EINVAL;
off += start;
vma->vm_pgoff = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP are set by io_remap_pfn_range()*/
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
fb_pgprotect(file, vma, off);
if (io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, off >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start, vma->vm_page_prot))
return -EAGAIN;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | fb_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct * vma)
{
struct fb_info *info = file_fb_info(file);
struct fb_ops *fb;
unsigned long mmio_pgoff;
unsigned long start;
u32 len;
if (!info)
return -ENODEV;
fb = info->fbops;
if (!fb)
return -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&info->mm_lock);
if (fb->fb_mmap) {
int res;
res = fb->fb_mmap(info, vma);
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
return res;
}
/*
* Ugh. This can be either the frame buffer mapping, or
* if pgoff points past it, the mmio mapping.
*/
start = info->fix.smem_start;
len = info->fix.smem_len;
mmio_pgoff = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (vma->vm_pgoff >= mmio_pgoff) {
vma->vm_pgoff -= mmio_pgoff;
start = info->fix.mmio_start;
len = info->fix.mmio_len;
}
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
fb_pgprotect(file, vma, start);
return vm_iomap_memory(vma, start, len);
}
| 166,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: append_quoted (struct stringbuf *sb, const unsigned char *value, size_t length,
int skip)
{
unsigned char tmp[4];
const unsigned char *s = value;
size_t n = 0;
for (;;)
{
for (value = s; n+skip < length; n++, s++)
{
s += skip;
n += skip;
if (*s < ' ' || *s > 126 || strchr (",+\"\\<>;", *s) )
break;
}
if (s != value)
put_stringbuf_mem_skip (sb, value, s-value, skip);
if (n+skip >= length)
return; /* ready */
s += skip;
n += skip;
if ( *s < ' ' || *s > 126 )
{
sprintf (tmp, "\\%02X", *s);
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 3);
}
else
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = *s;
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
}
n++; s++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | append_quoted (struct stringbuf *sb, const unsigned char *value, size_t length,
int skip)
{
unsigned char tmp[4];
const unsigned char *s = value;
size_t n = 0;
for (;;)
{
for (value = s; n+skip < length; n++, s++)
{
s += skip;
n += skip;
if (*s < ' ' || *s > 126 || strchr (",+\"\\<>;", *s) )
break;
}
if (s != value)
put_stringbuf_mem_skip (sb, value, s-value, skip);
if (n+skip >= length)
return; /* ready */
s += skip;
n += skip;
if ( *s < ' ' || *s > 126 )
{
snprintf (tmp, sizeof tmp, "\\%02X", *s);
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 3);
}
else
{
tmp[0] = '\\';
tmp[1] = *s;
put_stringbuf_mem (sb, tmp, 2);
}
n++; s++;
}
}
| 165,049 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::Abort(const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBTransaction::Abort", "txn.id", id());
DCHECK(!processing_event_queue_);
if (state_ == FINISHED)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.TransactionAbortReason",
ExceptionCodeToUmaEnum(error.code()),
UmaIDBExceptionExclusiveMaxValue);
timeout_timer_.Stop();
state_ = FINISHED;
should_process_queue_ = false;
if (backing_store_transaction_begun_)
transaction_->Rollback();
while (!abort_task_stack_.empty())
abort_task_stack_.pop().Run();
preemptive_task_queue_.clear();
pending_preemptive_events_ = 0;
task_queue_.clear();
CloseOpenCursors();
transaction_->Reset();
database_->transaction_coordinator().DidFinishTransaction(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
DCHECK(!database_->transaction_coordinator().IsActive(this));
#endif
if (callbacks_.get())
callbacks_->OnAbort(*this, error);
database_->TransactionFinished(this, false);
connection_->RemoveTransaction(id_);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | void IndexedDBTransaction::Abort(const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBTransaction::Abort", "txn.id", id());
DCHECK(!processing_event_queue_);
if (state_ == FINISHED)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.TransactionAbortReason",
ExceptionCodeToUmaEnum(error.code()),
UmaIDBExceptionExclusiveMaxValue);
timeout_timer_.Stop();
state_ = FINISHED;
should_process_queue_ = false;
if (backing_store_transaction_begun_)
transaction_->Rollback();
while (!abort_task_stack_.empty())
abort_task_stack_.pop().Run();
preemptive_task_queue_.clear();
pending_preemptive_events_ = 0;
task_queue_.clear();
CloseOpenCursors();
transaction_->Reset();
database_->transaction_coordinator().DidFinishTransaction(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
DCHECK(!database_->transaction_coordinator().IsActive(this));
#endif
if (callbacks_.get())
callbacks_->OnAbort(*this, error);
database_->TransactionFinished(this, false);
// Note: During force-close situations, the connection can be destroyed during
// the |IndexedDBDatabase::TransactionFinished| call
if (connection_)
connection_->RemoveTransaction(id_);
}
| 173,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ossl_cipher_init(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self, int mode)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], *p_key = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *p_iv = NULL;
VALUE pass, init_v;
if(rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "02", &pass, &init_v) > 0){
/*
* oops. this code mistakes salt for IV.
* We deprecated the arguments for this method, but we decided
* keeping this behaviour for backward compatibility.
*/
VALUE cname = rb_class_path(rb_obj_class(self));
rb_warn("arguments for %"PRIsVALUE"#encrypt and %"PRIsVALUE"#decrypt were deprecated; "
"use %"PRIsVALUE"#pkcs5_keyivgen to derive key and IV",
cname, cname, cname);
StringValue(pass);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
if (NIL_P(init_v)) memcpy(iv, "OpenSSL for Ruby rulez!", sizeof(iv));
else{
StringValue(init_v);
if (EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH > RSTRING_LEN(init_v)) {
memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
memcpy(iv, RSTRING_PTR(init_v), RSTRING_LEN(init_v));
}
else memcpy(iv, RSTRING_PTR(init_v), sizeof(iv));
}
EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), EVP_md5(), iv,
(unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(pass), RSTRING_LENINT(pass), 1, key, NULL);
p_key = key;
p_iv = iv;
}
else {
GetCipher(self, ctx);
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, p_key, p_iv, mode) != 1) {
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
}
return self;
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310 | ossl_cipher_init(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE self, int mode)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], *p_key = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *p_iv = NULL;
VALUE pass, init_v;
if(rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "02", &pass, &init_v) > 0){
/*
* oops. this code mistakes salt for IV.
* We deprecated the arguments for this method, but we decided
* keeping this behaviour for backward compatibility.
*/
VALUE cname = rb_class_path(rb_obj_class(self));
rb_warn("arguments for %"PRIsVALUE"#encrypt and %"PRIsVALUE"#decrypt were deprecated; "
"use %"PRIsVALUE"#pkcs5_keyivgen to derive key and IV",
cname, cname, cname);
StringValue(pass);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
if (NIL_P(init_v)) memcpy(iv, "OpenSSL for Ruby rulez!", sizeof(iv));
else{
StringValue(init_v);
if (EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH > RSTRING_LEN(init_v)) {
memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
memcpy(iv, RSTRING_PTR(init_v), RSTRING_LEN(init_v));
}
else memcpy(iv, RSTRING_PTR(init_v), sizeof(iv));
}
EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx), EVP_md5(), iv,
(unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(pass), RSTRING_LENINT(pass), 1, key, NULL);
p_key = key;
p_iv = iv;
}
else {
GetCipher(self, ctx);
}
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, p_key, p_iv, mode) != 1) {
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
}
if (p_key)
rb_ivar_set(self, id_key_set, Qtrue);
return self;
}
| 168,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: report_error (const char *format, ...)
#else
report_error (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
error_prolog (1);
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
va_end (args);
if (exit_immediately_on_error)
exit_shell (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | report_error (const char *format, ...)
#else
report_error (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
error_prolog (1);
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (stderr, format, args);
fprintf (stderr, "\n");
va_end (args);
if (exit_immediately_on_error)
{
if (last_command_exit_value == 0)
last_command_exit_value = 1;
exit_shell (last_command_exit_value);
}
}
| 165,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::internal)
return;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
protocol::DictionaryValue* headers =
state_->getObject(NetworkAgentState::kExtraRequestHeaders);
if (headers) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < headers->size(); ++i) {
auto header = headers->at(i);
String value;
if (header.second->asString(&value))
request.SetHTTPHeaderField(AtomicString(header.first),
AtomicString(value));
}
}
request.SetReportRawHeaders(true);
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kCacheDisabled, false)) {
if (LoadsFromCacheOnly(request) &&
request.GetRequestContext() != WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal) {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassCacheLoadOnlyFromCache);
} else {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassingCache);
}
request.SetShouldResetAppCache(true);
}
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kBypassServiceWorker, false))
request.SetServiceWorkerMode(WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info);
if (!host_id_.IsEmpty()) {
request.AddHTTPHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_DevTools_Emulate_Network_Conditions_Client_Id,
AtomicString(host_id_));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
Resource::Type resource_type) {
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::internal)
return;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
protocol::DictionaryValue* headers =
state_->getObject(NetworkAgentState::kExtraRequestHeaders);
if (headers) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < headers->size(); ++i) {
auto header = headers->at(i);
String value;
if (header.second->asString(&value))
request.SetHTTPHeaderField(AtomicString(header.first),
AtomicString(value));
}
}
request.SetReportRawHeaders(true);
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kCacheDisabled, false)) {
if (LoadsFromCacheOnly(request) &&
request.GetRequestContext() != WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal) {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassCacheLoadOnlyFromCache);
} else {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassingCache);
}
request.SetShouldResetAppCache(true);
}
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kBypassServiceWorker, false))
request.SetServiceWorkerMode(WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type =
InspectorPageAgent::ToResourceType(resource_type);
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info, type);
if (!host_id_.IsEmpty()) {
request.AddHTTPHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_DevTools_Emulate_Network_Conditions_Client_Id,
AtomicString(host_id_));
}
}
| 172,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(
long long start_offset,
long long size,
long long discard_padding)
{
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = start_offset;
const long long stop = start_offset + size;
long long prev = 1; //nonce
long long next = 0; //nonce
long long duration = -1; //really, this is unsigned
long long bpos = -1;
long long bsize = -1;
while (pos < stop)
{
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume size
if (id == 0x21) //Block ID
{
if (bpos < 0) //Block ID
{
bpos = pos;
bsize = size;
}
}
else if (id == 0x1B) //Duration ID
{
assert(size <= 8);
duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(duration >= 0); //TODO
}
else if (id == 0x7B) //ReferenceBlock
{
assert(size <= 8);
const long size_ = static_cast<long>(size);
long long time;
long status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size_, time);
assert(status == 0);
if (status != 0)
return -1;
if (time <= 0) //see note above
prev = time;
else //weird
next = time;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
assert(bpos >= 0);
assert(bsize >= 0);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow) BlockGroup(
this,
idx,
bpos,
bsize,
prev,
next,
duration,
discard_padding);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
BlockGroup* const p = static_cast<BlockGroup*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0) //success
{
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) { // error
pLast = NULL;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) // no new block
break;
}
| 174,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int em_loop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
register_address_increment(ctxt, reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX), -1);
if ((address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) != 0) &&
(ctxt->b == 0xe2 || test_cc(ctxt->b ^ 0x5, ctxt->eflags)))
jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int em_loop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
register_address_increment(ctxt, reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX), -1);
if ((address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) != 0) &&
(ctxt->b == 0xe2 || test_cc(ctxt->b ^ 0x5, ctxt->eflags)))
rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
return rc;
}
| 169,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreEarlyInitialization() {
base::CommandLine* singleton_command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableSync);
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableExtensions);
browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled = false;
}
if (!base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginManager) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kLoginUser,
cryptohome::Identification(user_manager::StubAccountId()).id());
if (!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginProfile)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kLoginProfile,
chrome::kTestUserProfileDir);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Running as stub user with profile dir: "
<< singleton_command_line
->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kLoginProfile)
.value();
}
RegisterStubPathOverridesIfNecessary();
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
const char kChromeOSReleaseTrack[] = "CHROMEOS_RELEASE_TRACK";
std::string channel;
if (base::SysInfo::GetLsbReleaseValue(kChromeOSReleaseTrack, &channel))
chrome::SetChannel(channel);
#endif
dbus_pre_early_init_ = std::make_unique<internal::DBusPreEarlyInit>();
return ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreEarlyInitialization();
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | int ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreEarlyInitialization() {
base::CommandLine* singleton_command_line =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableSync);
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitch(::switches::kDisableExtensions);
browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled = false;
}
if (!base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginManager) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kGuestSession)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kLoginUser,
cryptohome::Identification(user_manager::StubAccountId()).id());
if (!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginProfile)) {
singleton_command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kLoginProfile,
chrome::kTestUserProfileDir);
}
LOG(WARNING) << "Running as stub user with profile dir: "
<< singleton_command_line
->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kLoginProfile)
.value();
}
RegisterStubPathOverridesIfNecessary();
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
const char kChromeOSReleaseTrack[] = "CHROMEOS_RELEASE_TRACK";
std::string channel;
if (base::SysInfo::GetLsbReleaseValue(kChromeOSReleaseTrack, &channel))
chrome::SetChannel(channel);
#endif
dbus_pre_early_init_ = std::make_unique<internal::DBusPreEarlyInit>();
if (!base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(
switches::kFakeDriveFsLauncherChrootPath) &&
parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(
switches::kFakeDriveFsLauncherSocketPath)) {
drivefs::FakeDriveFsLauncherClient::Init(
parsed_command_line().GetSwitchValuePath(
switches::kFakeDriveFsLauncherChrootPath),
parsed_command_line().GetSwitchValuePath(
switches::kFakeDriveFsLauncherSocketPath));
}
return ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreEarlyInitialization();
}
| 171,728 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ipt_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0 &&
unconditional(&s->ip)) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ipt_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (unconditional(s) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
| 167,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct vfsmount *collect_mounts(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *tree;
namespace_lock();
tree = copy_tree(real_mount(path->mnt), path->dentry,
CL_COPY_ALL | CL_PRIVATE);
namespace_unlock();
if (IS_ERR(tree))
return ERR_CAST(tree);
return &tree->mnt;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c
In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.
The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.
Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | struct vfsmount *collect_mounts(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *tree;
namespace_lock();
if (!check_mnt(real_mount(path->mnt)))
tree = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
else
tree = copy_tree(real_mount(path->mnt), path->dentry,
CL_COPY_ALL | CL_PRIVATE);
namespace_unlock();
if (IS_ERR(tree))
return ERR_CAST(tree);
return &tree->mnt;
}
| 167,563 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: process_db_args(krb5_context context, char **db_args, xargs_t *xargs,
OPERATION optype)
{
int i=0;
krb5_error_code st=0;
char *arg=NULL, *arg_val=NULL;
char **dptr=NULL;
unsigned int arg_val_len=0;
if (db_args) {
for (i=0; db_args[i]; ++i) {
arg = strtok_r(db_args[i], "=", &arg_val);
if (strcmp(arg, TKTPOLICY_ARG) == 0) {
dptr = &xargs->tktpolicydn;
} else {
if (strcmp(arg, USERDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL ||
xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->containerdn != NULL ||
xargs->linkdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->dn;
} else if (strcmp(arg, CONTAINERDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL ||
xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->containerdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->containerdn;
} else if (strcmp(arg, LINKDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->linkdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->linkdn;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("unknown option: %s"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
xargs->dn_from_kbd = TRUE;
if (arg_val == NULL || strlen(arg_val) == 0) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option value missing"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (arg_val == NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option value missing"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
arg_val_len = strlen(arg_val) + 1;
if (strcmp(arg, TKTPOLICY_ARG) == 0) {
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context,
arg_val,
dptr)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
*dptr = k5memdup(arg_val, arg_val_len, &st);
if (*dptr == NULL)
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
cleanup:
return st;
}
Commit Message: Fix LDAP null deref on empty arg [CVE-2016-3119]
In the LDAP KDB module's process_db_args(), strtok_r() may return NULL
if there is an empty string in the db_args array. Check for this case
and avoid dereferencing a null pointer.
CVE-2016-3119:
In MIT krb5 1.6 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying an empty DB argument to the modify_principal
command, if kadmind is configured to use the LDAP KDB module.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:ND
ticket: 8383 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | process_db_args(krb5_context context, char **db_args, xargs_t *xargs,
OPERATION optype)
{
int i=0;
krb5_error_code st=0;
char *arg=NULL, *arg_val=NULL;
char **dptr=NULL;
unsigned int arg_val_len=0;
if (db_args) {
for (i=0; db_args[i]; ++i) {
arg = strtok_r(db_args[i], "=", &arg_val);
arg = (arg != NULL) ? arg : "";
if (strcmp(arg, TKTPOLICY_ARG) == 0) {
dptr = &xargs->tktpolicydn;
} else {
if (strcmp(arg, USERDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL ||
xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->containerdn != NULL ||
xargs->linkdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->dn;
} else if (strcmp(arg, CONTAINERDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL ||
xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->containerdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->containerdn;
} else if (strcmp(arg, LINKDN_ARG) == 0) {
if (xargs->dn != NULL || xargs->linkdn != NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option not supported"),
arg);
goto cleanup;
}
dptr = &xargs->linkdn;
} else {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("unknown option: %s"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
xargs->dn_from_kbd = TRUE;
if (arg_val == NULL || strlen(arg_val) == 0) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option value missing"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (arg_val == NULL) {
st = EINVAL;
k5_setmsg(context, st, _("%s option value missing"), arg);
goto cleanup;
}
arg_val_len = strlen(arg_val) + 1;
if (strcmp(arg, TKTPOLICY_ARG) == 0) {
if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context,
arg_val,
dptr)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
*dptr = k5memdup(arg_val, arg_val_len, &st);
if (*dptr == NULL)
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
cleanup:
return st;
}
| 167,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *print_number( cJSON *item )
{
char *str;
double f, f2;
int64_t i;
str = (char*) cJSON_malloc( 64 );
if ( str ) {
f = item->valuefloat;
i = f;
f2 = i;
if ( f2 == f && item->valueint >= LLONG_MIN && item->valueint <= LLONG_MAX )
sprintf( str, "%lld", (long long) item->valueint );
else
sprintf( str, "%g", item->valuefloat );
}
return str;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static char *print_number( cJSON *item )
static int update(printbuffer *p)
{
char *str;
if (!p || !p->buffer) return 0;
str=p->buffer+p->offset;
return p->offset+strlen(str);
}
/* Render the number nicely from the given item into a string. */
static char *print_number(cJSON *item,printbuffer *p)
{
char *str=0;
double d=item->valuedouble;
if (d==0)
{
if (p) str=ensure(p,2);
else str=(char*)cJSON_malloc(2); /* special case for 0. */
if (str) strcpy(str,"0");
}
else if (fabs(((double)item->valueint)-d)<=DBL_EPSILON && d<=LLONG_MAX && d>=LLONG_MIN)
{
if (p) str=ensure(p,64);
else str=(char*)cJSON_malloc(64);
if (str) sprintf(str,"%lld",(long long) item->valueint);
}
else
{
if (p) str=ensure(p,64);
else str=(char*)cJSON_malloc(64); /* This is a nice tradeoff. */
if (str)
{
if (fpclassify(d) != FP_ZERO && !isnormal(d)) sprintf(str,"null");
else if (fabs(floor(d)-d)<=DBL_EPSILON && fabs(d)<1.0e60) sprintf(str,"%.0f",d);
else if (fabs(d)<1.0e-6 || fabs(d)>1.0e9) sprintf(str,"%e",d);
else sprintf(str,"%f",d);
}
}
return str;
}
| 167,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ActionReply Smb4KMountHelper::mount(const QVariantMap &args)
{
ActionReply reply;
reply.addData("mh_mountpoint", args["mh_mountpoint"]);
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << args["mh_command"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
#else
#endif
proc.setProgram(command);
proc.start();
if (proc.waitForStarted(-1))
{
bool user_kill = false;
QStringList command;
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
command << args["mh_command"].toString();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << args["mh_command"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
{
}
if (HelperSupport::isStopped())
{
proc.kill();
user_kill = true;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
if (proc.exitStatus() == KProcess::CrashExit)
{
if (!user_kill)
{
reply.setErrorCode(ActionReply::HelperError);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("The mount process crashed."));
return reply;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
QString stdErr = QString::fromUtf8(proc.readAllStandardError());
reply.addData("mh_error_message", stdErr.trimmed());
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ActionReply Smb4KMountHelper::mount(const QVariantMap &args)
{
ActionReply reply;
//
// Get the mount executable
//
const QString mount = findMountExecutable();
//
// Check the executable
//
if (mount != args["mh_command"].toString())
{
// Something weird is going on, bail out.
reply.setErrorCode(ActionReply::HelperError);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("Wrong executable passed. Bailing out."));
return reply;
}
else
{
// Do nothing
}
reply.addData("mh_mountpoint", args["mh_mountpoint"]);
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << args["mh_command"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
#else
#endif
proc.setProgram(command);
proc.start();
if (proc.waitForStarted(-1))
{
bool user_kill = false;
QStringList command;
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
command << mount;
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << mount;
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
{
}
if (HelperSupport::isStopped())
{
proc.kill();
user_kill = true;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
if (proc.exitStatus() == KProcess::CrashExit)
{
if (!user_kill)
{
reply.setErrorCode(ActionReply::HelperError);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("The mount process crashed."));
return reply;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
QString stdErr = QString::fromUtf8(proc.readAllStandardError());
reply.addData("mh_error_message", stdErr.trimmed());
}
}
| 164,826 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::Deserialize(const void* data,
size_t num_bytes,
const ports::PortName* ports,
size_t num_ports,
PlatformHandle* handles,
size_t num_handles) {
if (num_ports != 1 || num_handles != 1 ||
num_bytes != sizeof(SerializedState)) {
return nullptr;
}
const SerializedState* state = static_cast<const SerializedState*>(data);
if (!state->options.capacity_num_bytes || !state->options.element_num_bytes ||
state->options.capacity_num_bytes < state->options.element_num_bytes) {
return nullptr;
}
NodeController* node_controller = Core::Get()->GetNodeController();
ports::PortRef port;
if (node_controller->node()->GetPort(ports[0], &port) != ports::OK)
return nullptr;
auto region_handle = CreateSharedMemoryRegionHandleFromPlatformHandles(
std::move(handles[0]), PlatformHandle());
auto region = base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Take(
std::move(region_handle),
base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Mode::kUnsafe,
state->options.capacity_num_bytes,
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(state->buffer_guid_high,
state->buffer_guid_low));
auto ring_buffer =
base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion::Deserialize(std::move(region));
if (!ring_buffer.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to deserialize shared buffer handle.";
return nullptr;
}
scoped_refptr<DataPipeConsumerDispatcher> dispatcher =
new DataPipeConsumerDispatcher(node_controller, port,
std::move(ring_buffer), state->options,
state->pipe_id);
{
base::AutoLock lock(dispatcher->lock_);
dispatcher->read_offset_ = state->read_offset;
dispatcher->bytes_available_ = state->bytes_available;
dispatcher->new_data_available_ = state->bytes_available > 0;
dispatcher->peer_closed_ = state->flags & kFlagPeerClosed;
if (!dispatcher->InitializeNoLock())
return nullptr;
dispatcher->UpdateSignalsStateNoLock();
}
return dispatcher;
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::Deserialize(const void* data,
size_t num_bytes,
const ports::PortName* ports,
size_t num_ports,
PlatformHandle* handles,
size_t num_handles) {
if (num_ports != 1 || num_handles != 1 ||
num_bytes != sizeof(SerializedState)) {
return nullptr;
}
const SerializedState* state = static_cast<const SerializedState*>(data);
if (!state->options.capacity_num_bytes || !state->options.element_num_bytes ||
state->options.capacity_num_bytes < state->options.element_num_bytes ||
state->read_offset >= state->options.capacity_num_bytes ||
state->bytes_available > state->options.capacity_num_bytes) {
return nullptr;
}
NodeController* node_controller = Core::Get()->GetNodeController();
ports::PortRef port;
if (node_controller->node()->GetPort(ports[0], &port) != ports::OK)
return nullptr;
auto region_handle = CreateSharedMemoryRegionHandleFromPlatformHandles(
std::move(handles[0]), PlatformHandle());
auto region = base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Take(
std::move(region_handle),
base::subtle::PlatformSharedMemoryRegion::Mode::kUnsafe,
state->options.capacity_num_bytes,
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(state->buffer_guid_high,
state->buffer_guid_low));
auto ring_buffer =
base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion::Deserialize(std::move(region));
if (!ring_buffer.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to deserialize shared buffer handle.";
return nullptr;
}
scoped_refptr<DataPipeConsumerDispatcher> dispatcher =
new DataPipeConsumerDispatcher(node_controller, port,
std::move(ring_buffer), state->options,
state->pipe_id);
{
base::AutoLock lock(dispatcher->lock_);
dispatcher->read_offset_ = state->read_offset;
dispatcher->bytes_available_ = state->bytes_available;
dispatcher->new_data_available_ = state->bytes_available > 0;
dispatcher->peer_closed_ = state->flags & kFlagPeerClosed;
if (!dispatcher->InitializeNoLock())
return nullptr;
if (state->options.capacity_num_bytes >
dispatcher->ring_buffer_mapping_.mapped_size()) {
return nullptr;
}
dispatcher->UpdateSignalsStateNoLock();
}
return dispatcher;
}
| 173,176 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::RecognitionAllowedCallback(int session_id,
bool ask_user,
bool is_allowed) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto iter = sessions_.find(session_id);
if (iter == sessions_.end())
return;
Session* session = iter->second.get();
if (session->abort_requested)
return;
if (ask_user) {
SpeechRecognitionSessionContext& context = session->context;
context.label = media_stream_manager_->MakeMediaAccessRequest(
context.render_process_id, context.render_frame_id, session_id,
StreamControls(true, false), context.security_origin,
base::BindOnce(
&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::MediaRequestPermissionCallback,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id));
return;
}
if (is_allowed) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::DispatchEvent,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id, EVENT_START));
} else {
OnRecognitionError(
session_id, blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionError(
blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionErrorCode::kNotAllowed,
blink::mojom::SpeechAudioErrorDetails::kNone));
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::DispatchEvent,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id, EVENT_ABORT));
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::RecognitionAllowedCallback(int session_id,
bool ask_user,
bool is_allowed) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto iter = sessions_.find(session_id);
if (iter == sessions_.end())
return;
Session* session = iter->second.get();
if (session->abort_requested)
return;
if (ask_user) {
SpeechRecognitionSessionContext& context = session->context;
context.label = media_stream_manager_->MakeMediaAccessRequest(
context.render_process_id, context.render_frame_id, requester_id_,
session_id, StreamControls(true, false), context.security_origin,
base::BindOnce(
&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::MediaRequestPermissionCallback,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id));
return;
}
if (is_allowed) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::DispatchEvent,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id, EVENT_START));
} else {
OnRecognitionError(
session_id, blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionError(
blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionErrorCode::kNotAllowed,
blink::mojom::SpeechAudioErrorDetails::kNone));
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::DispatchEvent,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), session_id, EVENT_ABORT));
}
}
| 173,110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDAT_list_extend(struct IDAT_list *tail)
{
/* Use the previous cached value if available. */
struct IDAT_list *next = tail->next;
if (next == NULL)
{
/* Insert a new, malloc'ed, block of IDAT information buffers, this
* one twice as large as the previous one:
*/
unsigned int length = 2 * tail->length;
if (length < tail->length) /* arithmetic overflow */
length = tail->length;
next = png_voidcast(IDAT_list*, malloc(IDAT_list_size(NULL, length)));
CLEAR(*next);
/* The caller must handle this: */
if (next == NULL)
return NULL;
next->next = NULL;
next->length = length;
tail->next = next;
}
return next;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | IDAT_list_extend(struct IDAT_list *tail)
{
/* Use the previous cached value if available. */
struct IDAT_list *next = tail->next;
if (next == NULL)
{
/* Insert a new, malloc'ed, block of IDAT information buffers, this
* one twice as large as the previous one:
*/
unsigned int length = 2 * tail->length;
if (length < tail->length) /* arithmetic overflow */
length = tail->length;
next = voidcast(IDAT_list*, malloc(IDAT_list_size(NULL, length)));
CLEAR(*next);
/* The caller must handle this: */
if (next == NULL)
return NULL;
next->next = NULL;
next->length = length;
tail->next = next;
}
return next;
}
| 173,728 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::GetAllowedUkmFeatures() {
static base::NoDestructor<UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::UkmFeatureList>
opt_in_features(std::initializer_list<WebFeature>({
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrate,
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrateSubFrame,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedForcedDocumentPassiveNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kDataUriHasOctothorpe,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kMixedContentAudio,
WebFeature::kMixedContentImage,
WebFeature::kMixedContentVideo,
WebFeature::kMixedContentPlugin,
WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kUsbRequestDevice,
WebFeature::kXMLHttpRequestSynchronous,
WebFeature::kPaymentHandler,
WebFeature::kPaymentRequestShowWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLImports,
WebFeature::kHTMLImportsHasStyleSheets,
WebFeature::kElementCreateShadowRoot,
WebFeature::kDocumentRegisterElement,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerCreatePublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerMakePublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kV8AudioContext_Constructor,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadow,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowOpen,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowClosed,
WebFeature::kCustomElementRegistryDefine,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_Speak,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_SpeakDisallowedByAutoplay,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetTop,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetLeft,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetRight,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetBottom,
WebFeature::kMediaControlsDisplayCutoutGesture,
WebFeature::kPolymerV1Detected,
WebFeature::kPolymerV2Detected,
WebFeature::kFullscreenSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kFullscreenInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullScreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullScreen,
WebFeature::kDocumentLevelPassiveDefaultEventListenerPreventedWheel,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainBlockedCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainEnabledCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kSuppressHistoryEntryWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT32x32,
WebFeature::kCursorImageLE32x32,
WebFeature::kHistoryPushState,
WebFeature::kHistoryReplaceState,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT64x64,
WebFeature::kAdClick,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingAddressChange,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingOptionChange,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInMainFrame,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInSubFrame,
WebFeature::kWebShareShare,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kOpenWebDatabase,
WebFeature::kV8MediaCapabilities_DecodingInfo_Method,
}));
return *opt_in_features;
}
Commit Message: Add kOpenerNavigationDownloadCrossOriginNoGesture to UKM whitelist
Bug: 632514
Change-Id: Ibd09c4d8635873e02f9b484ec720b71ae6e3588f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1399521
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Harrison <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#620513}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::GetAllowedUkmFeatures() {
static base::NoDestructor<UseCounterPageLoadMetricsObserver::UkmFeatureList>
opt_in_features(std::initializer_list<WebFeature>({
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrate,
WebFeature::kNavigatorVibrateSubFrame,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kTouchEventPreventedForcedDocumentPassiveNoTouchAction,
WebFeature::kDataUriHasOctothorpe,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kApplicationCacheManifestSelectSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kMixedContentAudio,
WebFeature::kMixedContentImage,
WebFeature::kMixedContentVideo,
WebFeature::kMixedContentPlugin,
WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kUsbRequestDevice,
WebFeature::kXMLHttpRequestSynchronous,
WebFeature::kPaymentHandler,
WebFeature::kPaymentRequestShowWithoutGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLImports,
WebFeature::kHTMLImportsHasStyleSheets,
WebFeature::kElementCreateShadowRoot,
WebFeature::kDocumentRegisterElement,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerCreatePublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredential,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerMakePublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kCredentialManagerGetPublicKeyCredentialSuccess,
WebFeature::kV8AudioContext_Constructor,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadow,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowOpen,
WebFeature::kElementAttachShadowClosed,
WebFeature::kCustomElementRegistryDefine,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_Speak,
WebFeature::kTextToSpeech_SpeakDisallowedByAutoplay,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetTop,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetLeft,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetRight,
WebFeature::kCSSEnvironmentVariable_SafeAreaInsetBottom,
WebFeature::kMediaControlsDisplayCutoutGesture,
WebFeature::kPolymerV1Detected,
WebFeature::kPolymerV2Detected,
WebFeature::kFullscreenSecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kFullscreenInsecureOrigin,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullscreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoEnterFullScreen,
WebFeature::kPrefixedVideoExitFullScreen,
WebFeature::kDocumentLevelPassiveDefaultEventListenerPreventedWheel,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainBlockedCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kDocumentDomainEnabledCrossOriginAccess,
WebFeature::kSuppressHistoryEntryWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT32x32,
WebFeature::kCursorImageLE32x32,
WebFeature::kHistoryPushState,
WebFeature::kHistoryReplaceState,
WebFeature::kCursorImageGT64x64,
WebFeature::kAdClick,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingAddressChange,
WebFeature::kUpdateWithoutShippingOptionOnShippingOptionChange,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInMainFrame,
WebFeature::kSignedExchangeInnerResponseInSubFrame,
WebFeature::kWebShareShare,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kHTMLAnchorElementDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kNavigationDownloadInSandboxWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithUserGesture,
WebFeature::kDownloadInAdFrameWithoutUserGesture,
WebFeature::kOpenWebDatabase,
WebFeature::kV8MediaCapabilities_DecodingInfo_Method,
WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationDownloadCrossOriginNoGesture,
}));
return *opt_in_features;
}
| 173,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dn_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
switch (sock->type) {
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
if (protocol != DNPROTO_NSP)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
break;
case SOCK_STREAM:
break;
default:
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
}
if ((sk = dn_alloc_sock(net, sock, GFP_KERNEL, kern)) == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int dn_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
if (protocol < 0 || protocol > SK_PROTOCOL_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
switch (sock->type) {
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
if (protocol != DNPROTO_NSP)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
break;
case SOCK_STREAM:
break;
default:
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
}
if ((sk = dn_alloc_sock(net, sock, GFP_KERNEL, kern)) == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
return 0;
}
| 166,563 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: views::NonClientFrameView* ShellWindowViews::CreateNonClientFrameView(
views::Widget* widget) {
ShellWindowFrameView* frame_view = new ShellWindowFrameView();
frame_view->Init(window_);
return frame_view;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | views::NonClientFrameView* ShellWindowViews::CreateNonClientFrameView(
views::Widget* widget) {
ShellWindowFrameView* frame_view =
new ShellWindowFrameView(use_custom_frame_);
frame_view->Init(window_);
return frame_view;
}
| 170,710 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLDocument::removeItemFromMap(HashCountedSet<StringImpl*>& map, const AtomicString& name)
{
if (name.isEmpty())
return;
map.remove(name.impl());
if (Frame* f = frame())
f->script()->namedItemRemoved(this, name);
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void HTMLDocument::removeItemFromMap(HashCountedSet<StringImpl*>& map, const AtomicString& name)
void HTMLDocument::removeItemFromMap(HashCountedSet<AtomicString>& map, const AtomicString& name)
{
if (name.isEmpty())
return;
map.remove(name);
if (Frame* f = frame())
f->script()->namedItemRemoved(this, name);
}
| 171,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long SegmentInfo::GetTimeCodeScale() const
{
return m_timecodeScale;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long SegmentInfo::GetTimeCodeScale() const
| 174,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rdpsnd_process_training(STREAM in)
{
uint16 tick;
uint16 packsize;
STREAM out;
in_uint16_le(in, tick);
in_uint16_le(in, packsize);
logger(Sound, Debug, "rdpsnd_process_training(), tick=0x%04x", (unsigned) tick);
out = rdpsnd_init_packet(SNDC_TRAINING, 4);
out_uint16_le(out, tick);
out_uint16_le(out, packsize);
s_mark_end(out);
rdpsnd_send(out);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | rdpsnd_process_training(STREAM in)
{
uint16 tick;
uint16 packsize;
STREAM out;
struct stream packet = *in;
if (!s_check_rem(in, 4))
{
rdp_protocol_error("rdpsnd_process_training(), consume of training data from stream would overrun", &packet);
}
in_uint16_le(in, tick);
in_uint16_le(in, packsize);
logger(Sound, Debug, "rdpsnd_process_training(), tick=0x%04x", (unsigned) tick);
out = rdpsnd_init_packet(SNDC_TRAINING, 4);
out_uint16_le(out, tick);
out_uint16_le(out, packsize);
s_mark_end(out);
rdpsnd_send(out);
}
| 169,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: string16 ExtensionGlobalError::GenerateMessageSection(
const ExtensionIdSet* extensions,
int template_message_id) {
CHECK(extensions);
CHECK(template_message_id);
string16 message;
for (ExtensionIdSet::const_iterator iter = extensions->begin();
iter != extensions->end(); ++iter) {
const Extension* e = extension_service_->GetExtensionById(*iter, true);
message += l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
template_message_id,
string16(ASCIIToUTF16(e->name())),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
}
return message;
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | string16 ExtensionGlobalError::GenerateMessageSection(
const ExtensionIdSet* extensions,
int template_message_id) {
CHECK(extensions);
CHECK(template_message_id);
string16 message;
for (ExtensionIdSet::const_iterator iter = extensions->begin();
iter != extensions->end(); ++iter) {
const Extension* e = extension_service_->GetExtensionById(*iter, true);
message += l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(template_message_id,
string16(ASCIIToUTF16(e->name())));
}
return message;
}
| 170,980 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void php_wddx_serialize_object(wddx_packet *packet, zval *obj)
{
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
zval **ent, *fname, **varname;
zval *retval = NULL;
const char *key;
ulong idx;
char tmp_buf[WDDX_BUF_LEN];
HashTable *objhash, *sleephash;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__sleep", 1);
/*
* We try to call __sleep() method on object. It's supposed to return an
* array of property names to be serialized.
*/
if (call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), &obj, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (retval && (sleephash = HASH_OF(retval))) {
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(sleephash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(sleephash, (void **)&varname) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(sleephash)) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(varname) != IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "__sleep should return an array only containing the names of instance-variables to serialize.");
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_find(objhash, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname)+1, (void **)&ent) == SUCCESS) {
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname) TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
} else {
uint key_len;
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(objhash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(objhash, (void**)&ent) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(objhash)) {
if (*ent == obj) {
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(objhash, &key, &key_len, &idx, 0, NULL) == HASH_KEY_IS_STRING) {
const char *class_name, *prop_name;
zend_unmangle_property_name(key, key_len-1, &class_name, &prop_name);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, prop_name, strlen(prop_name)+1 TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
key_len = slprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%ld", idx);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, tmp_buf, key_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static void php_wddx_serialize_object(wddx_packet *packet, zval *obj)
{
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
zval **ent, *fname, **varname;
zval *retval = NULL;
const char *key;
ulong idx;
char tmp_buf[WDDX_BUF_LEN];
HashTable *objhash, *sleephash;
zend_class_entry *ce;
PHP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
PHP_SET_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES(obj);
ce = Z_OBJCE_P(obj);
if (!ce || ce->serialize || ce->unserialize) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Class %s can not be serialized", class_name);
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
return;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__sleep", 1);
/*
* We try to call __sleep() method on object. It's supposed to return an
* array of property names to be serialized.
*/
if (call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), &obj, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 1, NULL TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (retval && (sleephash = HASH_OF(retval))) {
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(sleephash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(sleephash, (void **)&varname) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(sleephash)) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(varname) != IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "__sleep should return an array only containing the names of instance-variables to serialize.");
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_find(objhash, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname)+1, (void **)&ent) == SUCCESS) {
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, Z_STRVAL_PP(varname), Z_STRLEN_PP(varname) TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
} else {
uint key_len;
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
snprintf(tmp_buf, WDDX_BUF_LEN, WDDX_VAR_S, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR);
php_wddx_add_chunk(packet, tmp_buf);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, class_name, name_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_VAR_E);
objhash = HASH_OF(obj);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(objhash);
zend_hash_get_current_data(objhash, (void**)&ent) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward(objhash)) {
if (*ent == obj) {
continue;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(objhash, &key, &key_len, &idx, 0, NULL) == HASH_KEY_IS_STRING) {
const char *class_name, *prop_name;
zend_unmangle_property_name(key, key_len-1, &class_name, &prop_name);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, prop_name, strlen(prop_name)+1 TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
key_len = slprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%ld", idx);
php_wddx_serialize_var(packet, *ent, tmp_buf, key_len TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
}
PHP_CLEANUP_CLASS_ATTRIBUTES();
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
| 168,670 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
const char *connector_name = connector->name;
char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL;
struct edid *edid;
if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
/*
* If there are multiple edid files specified and separated
* by commas, search through the list looking for one that
* matches the connector.
*
* If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep
* the last one found one as a fallback.
*/
fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
edidstr = fwstr;
while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {
if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname))
continue;
edidname = colon + 1;
break;
}
if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */
fallback = edidname;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
{
const char *connector_name = connector->name;
char *edidname, *last, *colon, *fwstr, *edidstr, *fallback = NULL;
struct edid *edid;
if (edid_firmware[0] == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
/*
* If there are multiple edid files specified and separated
* by commas, search through the list looking for one that
* matches the connector.
*
* If there's one or more that doesn't specify a connector, keep
* the last one found one as a fallback.
*/
fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fwstr)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
edidstr = fwstr;
while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {
if (strncmp(connector_name, edidname, colon - edidname))
continue;
edidname = colon + 1;
break;
}
if (*edidname != '\0') /* corner case: multiple ',' */
fallback = edidname;
}
| 164,709 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void update_db_bp_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
clr_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
clr_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
if (svm->nmi_singlestep)
set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
if (vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
set_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
} else
vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void update_db_bp_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static void update_bp_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
clr_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
set_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
} else
vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
}
| 166,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bootp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register const struct bootp *bp;
static const u_char vm_cmu[4] = VM_CMU;
static const u_char vm_rfc1048[4] = VM_RFC1048;
bp = (const struct bootp *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_op);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BOOTP/DHCP, %s",
tok2str(bootp_op_values, "unknown (0x%02x)", bp->bp_op)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_hlen);
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6 && bp->bp_op == BOOTPREQUEST) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_secs);
/* The usual hardware address type is 1 (10Mb Ethernet) */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", htype %d", bp->bp_htype));
/* The usual length for 10Mb Ethernet address is 6 bytes */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1 || bp->bp_hlen != 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hlen %d", bp->bp_hlen));
/* Only print interesting fields */
if (bp->bp_hops)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hops %d", bp->bp_hops));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", xid 0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", secs %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(bootp_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (0x%04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags)));
/* Client's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_ciaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_ciaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_ciaddr)));
/* 'your' ip address (bootp client) */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_yiaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_yiaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Your-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_yiaddr)));
/* Server's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_siaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_siaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Server-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_siaddr)));
/* Gateway's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_giaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_giaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Gateway-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_giaddr)));
/* Client's Ethernet address */
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-Ethernet-Address %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_sname[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_sname) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t sname \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_sname, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_sname,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_file[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_file) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t file \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_file, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_file,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
/* Decode the vendor buffer */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_vend[0]);
if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_rfc1048,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
rfc1048_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_cmu,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
cmu_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else {
uint32_t ul;
ul = EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_vend);
if (ul != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor-#0x%x", ul));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13028/BOOTP: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
CWE ID: CWE-125 | bootp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register const struct bootp *bp;
static const u_char vm_cmu[4] = VM_CMU;
static const u_char vm_rfc1048[4] = VM_RFC1048;
bp = (const struct bootp *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_op);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BOOTP/DHCP, %s",
tok2str(bootp_op_values, "unknown (0x%02x)", bp->bp_op)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_hlen);
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6 && bp->bp_op == BOOTPREQUEST) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_secs);
/* The usual hardware address type is 1 (10Mb Ethernet) */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", htype %d", bp->bp_htype));
/* The usual length for 10Mb Ethernet address is 6 bytes */
if (bp->bp_htype != 1 || bp->bp_hlen != 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hlen %d", bp->bp_hlen));
/* Only print interesting fields */
if (bp->bp_hops)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", hops %d", bp->bp_hops));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", xid 0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_xid)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", secs %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_secs)));
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_flags);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(bootp_flag_values, "none", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags))));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (0x%04x)", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp->bp_flags)));
/* Client's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_ciaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_ciaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_ciaddr)));
/* 'your' ip address (bootp client) */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_yiaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_yiaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Your-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_yiaddr)));
/* Server's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_siaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_siaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Server-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_siaddr)));
/* Gateway's ip address */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_giaddr);
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_giaddr.s_addr))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Gateway-IP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp->bp_giaddr)));
/* Client's Ethernet address */
if (bp->bp_htype == 1 && bp->bp_hlen == 6) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_chaddr[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Client-Ethernet-Address %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, bp->bp_chaddr)));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_sname[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_sname) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t sname \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_sname, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_sname,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp->bp_file[0], 1); /* check first char only */
if (*bp->bp_file) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t file \""));
if (fn_printztn(ndo, bp->bp_file, (u_int)sizeof bp->bp_file,
ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr + 1));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
/* Decode the vendor buffer */
ND_TCHECK(bp->bp_vend[0]);
if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_rfc1048,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
rfc1048_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else if (memcmp((const char *)bp->bp_vend, vm_cmu,
sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0)
cmu_print(ndo, bp->bp_vend);
else {
uint32_t ul;
ul = EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp->bp_vend);
if (ul != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Vendor-#0x%x", ul));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
| 170,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __init big_key_init(void)
{
return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <[email protected]>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <[email protected]>
cc: Artem Savkov <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int __init big_key_init(void)
{
| 166,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: set_modifier_for_read(png_modifier *pm, png_infopp ppi, png_uint_32 id,
PNG_CONST char *name)
{
/* Do this first so that the modifier fields are cleared even if an error
* happens allocating the png_struct. No allocation is done here so no
* cleanup is required.
*/
pm->state = modifier_start;
pm->bit_depth = 0;
pm->colour_type = 255;
pm->pending_len = 0;
pm->pending_chunk = 0;
pm->flush = 0;
pm->buffer_count = 0;
pm->buffer_position = 0;
return set_store_for_read(&pm->this, ppi, id, name);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | set_modifier_for_read(png_modifier *pm, png_infopp ppi, png_uint_32 id,
const char *name)
{
/* Do this first so that the modifier fields are cleared even if an error
* happens allocating the png_struct. No allocation is done here so no
* cleanup is required.
*/
pm->state = modifier_start;
pm->bit_depth = 0;
pm->colour_type = 255;
pm->pending_len = 0;
pm->pending_chunk = 0;
pm->flush = 0;
pm->buffer_count = 0;
pm->buffer_position = 0;
return set_store_for_read(&pm->this, ppi, id, name);
}
| 173,694 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static zval *xml_call_handler(xml_parser *parser, zval *handler, zend_function *function_ptr, int argc, zval **argv)
{
int i;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (parser && handler && !EG(exception)) {
zval ***args;
zval *retval;
int result;
zend_fcall_info fci;
args = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval **), argc, 0);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
args[i] = &argv[i];
}
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
fci.function_name = handler;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object_ptr = parser->object;
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval;
fci.param_count = argc;
fci.params = args;
fci.no_separation = 0;
/*fci.function_handler_cache = &function_ptr;*/
result = zend_call_function(&fci, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (result == FAILURE) {
zval **method;
zval **obj;
if (Z_TYPE_P(handler) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s()", Z_STRVAL_P(handler));
} else if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 0, (void **) &obj) == SUCCESS &&
zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 1, (void **) &method) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(obj) == IS_OBJECT &&
Z_TYPE_PP(method) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s::%s()", Z_OBJCE_PP(obj)->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(method));
} else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler");
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(args[i]);
}
efree(args);
if (result == FAILURE) {
return NULL;
} else {
return EG(exception) ? NULL : retval;
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static zval *xml_call_handler(xml_parser *parser, zval *handler, zend_function *function_ptr, int argc, zval **argv)
{
int i;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (parser && handler && !EG(exception)) {
zval ***args;
zval *retval;
int result;
zend_fcall_info fci;
args = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval **), argc, 0);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
args[i] = &argv[i];
}
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
fci.function_name = handler;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object_ptr = parser->object;
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval;
fci.param_count = argc;
fci.params = args;
fci.no_separation = 0;
/*fci.function_handler_cache = &function_ptr;*/
result = zend_call_function(&fci, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (result == FAILURE) {
zval **method;
zval **obj;
if (Z_TYPE_P(handler) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s()", Z_STRVAL_P(handler));
} else if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 0, (void **) &obj) == SUCCESS &&
zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 1, (void **) &method) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(obj) == IS_OBJECT &&
Z_TYPE_PP(method) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s::%s()", Z_OBJCE_PP(obj)->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(method));
} else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler");
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(args[i]);
}
efree(args);
if (result == FAILURE) {
return NULL;
} else {
return EG(exception) ? NULL : retval;
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
}
| 165,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static __forceinline void draw_line(float *output, int x0, int y0, int x1, int y1, int n)
{
int dy = y1 - y0;
int adx = x1 - x0;
int ady = abs(dy);
int base;
int x=x0,y=y0;
int err = 0;
int sy;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (adx < DIVTAB_DENOM && ady < DIVTAB_NUMER) {
if (dy < 0) {
base = -integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base-1;
} else {
base = integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base+1;
}
} else {
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
}
#else
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
#endif
ady -= abs(base) * adx;
if (x1 > n) x1 = n;
if (x < x1) {
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y]);
for (++x; x < x1; ++x) {
err += ady;
if (err >= adx) {
err -= adx;
y += sy;
} else
y += base;
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static __forceinline void draw_line(float *output, int x0, int y0, int x1, int y1, int n)
{
int dy = y1 - y0;
int adx = x1 - x0;
int ady = abs(dy);
int base;
int x=x0,y=y0;
int err = 0;
int sy;
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDE_TABLE
if (adx < DIVTAB_DENOM && ady < DIVTAB_NUMER) {
if (dy < 0) {
base = -integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base-1;
} else {
base = integer_divide_table[ady][adx];
sy = base+1;
}
} else {
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
}
#else
base = dy / adx;
if (dy < 0)
sy = base - 1;
else
sy = base+1;
#endif
ady -= abs(base) * adx;
if (x1 > n) x1 = n;
if (x < x1) {
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y&255]);
for (++x; x < x1; ++x) {
err += ady;
if (err >= adx) {
err -= adx;
y += sy;
} else
y += base;
LINE_OP(output[x], inverse_db_table[y&255]);
}
}
}
| 169,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint8_t* input() const {
return input_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | uint8_t* input() const {
uint8_t *input() const {
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ == 0) {
return input_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
} else {
return CONVERT_TO_BYTEPTR(input16_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize +
BorderLeft());
}
#else
return input_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
#endif
}
| 174,510 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
mComponentRole,
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != mCodingType
|| formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused
|| formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case kPrepareForAdaptivePlaybackIndex:
{
const PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams* adaptivePlaybackParams =
(const PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams *)params;
mIsAdaptive = adaptivePlaybackParams->bEnable;
if (mIsAdaptive) {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = adaptivePlaybackParams->nMaxFrameWidth;
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = adaptivePlaybackParams->nMaxFrameHeight;
mWidth = mAdaptiveMaxWidth;
mHeight = mAdaptiveMaxHeight;
} else {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = 0;
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = 0;
}
updatePortDefinitions(true /* updateCrop */, true /* updateInputSize */);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *newParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
OMX_VIDEO_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *video_def = &newParams->format.video;
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(newParams->nPortIndex)->mDef;
uint32_t oldWidth = def->format.video.nFrameWidth;
uint32_t oldHeight = def->format.video.nFrameHeight;
uint32_t newWidth = video_def->nFrameWidth;
uint32_t newHeight = video_def->nFrameHeight;
if (newWidth != oldWidth || newHeight != oldHeight) {
bool outputPort = (newParams->nPortIndex == kOutputPortIndex);
if (outputPort) {
mWidth = newWidth;
mHeight = newHeight;
updatePortDefinitions(true /* updateCrop */, true /* updateInputSize */);
newParams->nBufferSize = def->nBufferSize;
} else {
def->format.video.nFrameWidth = newWidth;
def->format.video.nFrameHeight = newHeight;
}
}
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
mComponentRole,
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > kMaxPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != mCodingType
|| formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused
|| formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case kPrepareForAdaptivePlaybackIndex:
{
const PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams* adaptivePlaybackParams =
(const PrepareForAdaptivePlaybackParams *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(adaptivePlaybackParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mIsAdaptive = adaptivePlaybackParams->bEnable;
if (mIsAdaptive) {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = adaptivePlaybackParams->nMaxFrameWidth;
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = adaptivePlaybackParams->nMaxFrameHeight;
mWidth = mAdaptiveMaxWidth;
mHeight = mAdaptiveMaxHeight;
} else {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = 0;
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = 0;
}
updatePortDefinitions(true /* updateCrop */, true /* updateInputSize */);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *newParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(newParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
OMX_VIDEO_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *video_def = &newParams->format.video;
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(newParams->nPortIndex)->mDef;
uint32_t oldWidth = def->format.video.nFrameWidth;
uint32_t oldHeight = def->format.video.nFrameHeight;
uint32_t newWidth = video_def->nFrameWidth;
uint32_t newHeight = video_def->nFrameHeight;
if (newWidth != oldWidth || newHeight != oldHeight) {
bool outputPort = (newParams->nPortIndex == kOutputPortIndex);
if (outputPort) {
mWidth = newWidth;
mHeight = newHeight;
updatePortDefinitions(true /* updateCrop */, true /* updateInputSize */);
newParams->nBufferSize = def->nBufferSize;
} else {
def->format.video.nFrameWidth = newWidth;
def->format.video.nFrameHeight = newHeight;
}
}
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tBTA_AV_EVT bta_av_proc_meta_cmd(tAVRC_RESPONSE* p_rc_rsp,
tBTA_AV_RC_MSG* p_msg, uint8_t* p_ctype) {
tBTA_AV_EVT evt = BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT;
uint8_t u8, pdu, *p;
uint16_t u16;
tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_vendor = &p_msg->msg.vendor;
pdu = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data);
p_rc_rsp->pdu = pdu;
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_REJ;
/* Check to ansure a valid minimum meta data length */
if ((AVRC_MIN_META_CMD_LEN + p_vendor->vendor_len) > AVRC_META_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
/* reject it */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid meta-command length: %d", __func__,
p_vendor->vendor_len);
return 0;
}
/* Metadata messages only use PANEL sub-unit type */
if (p_vendor->hdr.subunit_type != AVRC_SUB_PANEL) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: SUBUNIT must be PANEL", __func__);
/* reject it */
evt = 0;
p_vendor->hdr.ctype = AVRC_RSP_NOT_IMPL;
p_vendor->vendor_len = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
} else if (!AVRC_IsValidAvcType(pdu, p_vendor->hdr.ctype)) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid pdu/ctype: 0x%x, %d", __func__, pdu,
p_vendor->hdr.ctype);
/* reject invalid message without reporting to app */
evt = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_CMD;
} else {
switch (pdu) {
case AVRC_PDU_GET_CAPABILITIES:
/* process GetCapabilities command without reporting the event to app */
evt = 0;
u8 = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 4);
p = p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 2;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.capability_id = u8;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(u16, p);
if ((u16 != 1) || (p_vendor->vendor_len != 5)) {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
} else {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR;
if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_COMPANY_ID) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.company_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_co_ids,
(p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids << 2));
} else if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_EVENTS_SUPPORTED) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.event_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_evt_ids, p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids);
} else {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid capability ID: 0x%x", __func__, u8);
/* reject - unknown capability ID */
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
}
}
break;
case AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION:
/* make sure the event_id is implemented */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = bta_av_chk_notif_evt_id(p_vendor);
if (p_rc_rsp->rsp.status != BTA_AV_STS_NO_RSP) evt = 0;
break;
}
}
return evt;
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | tBTA_AV_EVT bta_av_proc_meta_cmd(tAVRC_RESPONSE* p_rc_rsp,
tBTA_AV_RC_MSG* p_msg, uint8_t* p_ctype) {
tBTA_AV_EVT evt = BTA_AV_META_MSG_EVT;
uint8_t u8, pdu, *p;
uint16_t u16;
tAVRC_MSG_VENDOR* p_vendor = &p_msg->msg.vendor;
pdu = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data);
p_rc_rsp->pdu = pdu;
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_REJ;
/* Check to ansure a valid minimum meta data length */
if ((AVRC_MIN_META_CMD_LEN + p_vendor->vendor_len) > AVRC_META_CMD_BUF_SIZE) {
/* reject it */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid meta-command length: %d", __func__,
p_vendor->vendor_len);
return 0;
}
/* Metadata messages only use PANEL sub-unit type */
if (p_vendor->hdr.subunit_type != AVRC_SUB_PANEL) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: SUBUNIT must be PANEL", __func__);
/* reject it */
evt = 0;
p_vendor->hdr.ctype = AVRC_RSP_NOT_IMPL;
p_vendor->vendor_len = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
} else if (!AVRC_IsValidAvcType(pdu, p_vendor->hdr.ctype)) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid pdu/ctype: 0x%x, %d", __func__, pdu,
p_vendor->hdr.ctype);
/* reject invalid message without reporting to app */
evt = 0;
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_CMD;
} else {
switch (pdu) {
case AVRC_PDU_GET_CAPABILITIES:
/* process GetCapabilities command without reporting the event to app */
evt = 0;
if (p_vendor->vendor_len != 5) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111893951");
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
break;
}
u8 = *(p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 4);
p = p_vendor->p_vendor_data + 2;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.capability_id = u8;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(u16, p);
if (u16 != 1) {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_INTERNAL_ERR;
} else {
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR;
if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_COMPANY_ID) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.company_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_co_ids,
(p_bta_av_cfg->num_co_ids << 2));
} else if (u8 == AVRC_CAP_EVENTS_SUPPORTED) {
*p_ctype = AVRC_RSP_IMPL_STBL;
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.count = p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids;
memcpy(p_rc_rsp->get_caps.param.event_id,
p_bta_av_cfg->p_meta_evt_ids, p_bta_av_cfg->num_evt_ids);
} else {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Invalid capability ID: 0x%x", __func__, u8);
/* reject - unknown capability ID */
p_rc_rsp->get_caps.status = AVRC_STS_BAD_PARAM;
}
}
break;
case AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION:
/* make sure the event_id is implemented */
p_rc_rsp->rsp.status = bta_av_chk_notif_evt_id(p_vendor);
if (p_rc_rsp->rsp.status != BTA_AV_STS_NO_RSP) evt = 0;
break;
}
}
return evt;
}
| 174,078 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = data.readInt32();
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
uint32_t format = data.readInt32();
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, w, h, format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IBinder> token = data.readStrongBinder();
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(token, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Commit Message: IGraphicBufferProducer: fix QUEUE_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338109
Change-Id: I8a979469bfe1e317ebdefa43685e19f9302baea8
CWE ID: CWE-254 | status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = data.readInt32();
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
uint32_t format = data.readInt32();
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, w, h, format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
memset(output, 0, sizeof(QueueBufferOutput));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IBinder> token = data.readStrongBinder();
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(token, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
| 173,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_unwrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | spnego_gss_unwrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
| 166,666 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_init)
{
size_t argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zval *arg_str;
char *arg_pattern = NULL, *arg_options = NULL;
int arg_pattern_len = 0, arg_options_len = 0;
OnigSyntaxType *syntax = NULL;
OnigOptionType option;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "z|ss", &arg_str, &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &arg_options, &arg_options_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc > 1 && arg_pattern_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty pattern");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
option = MBREX(regex_default_options);
syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
if (argc == 3) {
option = 0;
_php_mb_regex_init_options(arg_options, arg_options_len, &option, &syntax, NULL);
}
if (argc > 1) {
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((MBREX(search_re) = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, option, MBREX(current_mbctype), syntax TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (MBREX(search_str) != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_str) = (zval *)NULL;
}
MBREX(search_str) = arg_str;
Z_ADDREF_P(MBREX(search_str));
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_pos) = 0;
if (MBREX(search_regs) != NULL) {
onig_region_free(MBREX(search_regs), 1);
MBREX(search_regs) = (OnigRegion *) NULL;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_init)
{
size_t argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zval *arg_str;
char *arg_pattern = NULL, *arg_options = NULL;
int arg_pattern_len = 0, arg_options_len = 0;
OnigSyntaxType *syntax = NULL;
OnigOptionType option;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "z|ss", &arg_str, &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &arg_options, &arg_options_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc > 1 && arg_pattern_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty pattern");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
option = MBREX(regex_default_options);
syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
if (argc == 3) {
option = 0;
_php_mb_regex_init_options(arg_options, arg_options_len, &option, &syntax, NULL);
}
if (argc > 1) {
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((MBREX(search_re) = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, option, MBREX(current_mbctype), syntax TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (MBREX(search_str) != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_str) = (zval *)NULL;
}
MBREX(search_str) = arg_str;
Z_ADDREF_P(MBREX(search_str));
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_pos) = 0;
if (MBREX(search_regs) != NULL) {
onig_region_free(MBREX(search_regs), 1);
MBREX(search_regs) = (OnigRegion *) NULL;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 167,116 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static dma_addr_t dma_map_xdr(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct xdr_buf *xdr,
u32 xdr_off, size_t len, int dir)
{
struct page *page;
dma_addr_t dma_addr;
if (xdr_off < xdr->head[0].iov_len) {
/* This offset is in the head */
xdr_off += (unsigned long)xdr->head[0].iov_base & ~PAGE_MASK;
page = virt_to_page(xdr->head[0].iov_base);
} else {
xdr_off -= xdr->head[0].iov_len;
if (xdr_off < xdr->page_len) {
/* This offset is in the page list */
xdr_off += xdr->page_base;
page = xdr->pages[xdr_off >> PAGE_SHIFT];
xdr_off &= ~PAGE_MASK;
} else {
/* This offset is in the tail */
xdr_off -= xdr->page_len;
xdr_off += (unsigned long)
xdr->tail[0].iov_base & ~PAGE_MASK;
page = virt_to_page(xdr->tail[0].iov_base);
}
}
dma_addr = ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device, page, xdr_off,
min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE, len), dir);
return dma_addr;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static dma_addr_t dma_map_xdr(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
/* The client provided a Write list in the Call message. Fill in
* the segments in the first Write chunk in the Reply's transport
* header with the number of bytes consumed in each segment.
* Remaining chunks are returned unused.
*
* Assumptions:
* - Client has provided only one Write chunk
*/
static void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_write_list(__be32 *rdma_resp, __be32 *wr_ch,
unsigned int consumed)
{
unsigned int nsegs;
__be32 *p, *q;
/* RPC-over-RDMA V1 replies never have a Read list. */
p = rdma_resp + rpcrdma_fixed_maxsz + 1;
q = wr_ch;
while (*q != xdr_zero) {
nsegs = xdr_encode_write_chunk(p, q, consumed);
q += 2 + nsegs * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz;
p += 2 + nsegs * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz;
consumed = 0;
}
/* Terminate Write list */
*p++ = xdr_zero;
/* Reply chunk discriminator; may be replaced later */
*p = xdr_zero;
}
/* The client provided a Reply chunk in the Call message. Fill in
* the segments in the Reply chunk in the Reply message with the
* number of bytes consumed in each segment.
*
* Assumptions:
* - Reply can always fit in the provided Reply chunk
*/
static void svc_rdma_xdr_encode_reply_chunk(__be32 *rdma_resp, __be32 *rp_ch,
unsigned int consumed)
{
__be32 *p;
/* Find the Reply chunk in the Reply's xprt header.
* RPC-over-RDMA V1 replies never have a Read list.
*/
p = rdma_resp + rpcrdma_fixed_maxsz + 1;
/* Skip past Write list */
while (*p++ != xdr_zero)
p += 1 + be32_to_cpup(p) * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz;
xdr_encode_write_chunk(p, rp_ch, consumed);
}
| 168,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pagenr)
{
if (pagenr < 256)
return 1;
if (iomem_is_exclusive(pagenr << PAGE_SHIFT))
return 0;
if (!page_is_ram(pagenr))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-732 | int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pagenr)
{
if (page_is_ram(pagenr)) {
/*
* For disallowed memory regions in the low 1MB range,
* request that the page be shown as all zeros.
*/
if (pagenr < 256)
return 2;
return 0;
}
/*
* This must follow RAM test, since System RAM is considered a
* restricted resource under CONFIG_STRICT_IOMEM.
*/
if (iomem_is_exclusive(pagenr << PAGE_SHIFT)) {
/* Low 1MB bypasses iomem restrictions. */
if (pagenr < 256)
return 1;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
| 168,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BlobDataHandle::~BlobDataHandle()
{
ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(m_internalURL);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | BlobDataHandle::~BlobDataHandle()
{
BlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(m_internalURL);
}
| 170,695 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int multipath_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct multipath *m = (struct multipath *) ti->private;
struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
fmode_t mode = 0;
unsigned long flags;
int r = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->current_pgpath)
__choose_pgpath(m, 0);
if (m->current_pgpath) {
bdev = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->bdev;
mode = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->mode;
}
if (m->queue_io)
r = -EAGAIN;
else if (!bdev)
r = -EIO;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return r ? : __blkdev_driver_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int multipath_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct multipath *m = (struct multipath *) ti->private;
struct block_device *bdev = NULL;
fmode_t mode = 0;
unsigned long flags;
int r = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->current_pgpath)
__choose_pgpath(m, 0);
if (m->current_pgpath) {
bdev = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->bdev;
mode = m->current_pgpath->path.dev->mode;
}
if (m->queue_io)
r = -EAGAIN;
else if (!bdev)
r = -EIO;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
/*
* Only pass ioctls through if the device sizes match exactly.
*/
if (!r && ti->len != i_size_read(bdev->bd_inode) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)
r = scsi_verify_blk_ioctl(NULL, cmd);
return r ? : __blkdev_driver_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, arg);
}
| 165,724 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (lsa) {
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (lsa->l2tp_family && lsa->l2tp_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
daddr = &lsa->l2tp_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = lsa->l2tp_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
lsa->l2tp_scope_id &&
ipv6_addr_type(daddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
fl6.flowi6_oif = lsa->l2tp_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
}
if (fl6.flowi6_oif == 0)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
if (opt == NULL)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, ip_generic_getfrag, msg,
ulen, transhdrlen, hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = l2tp_ip6_push_pending_frames(sk);
release_sock(sk);
done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *, lsa, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_to_free = NULL;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (lsa) {
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (lsa->l2tp_family && lsa->l2tp_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
daddr = &lsa->l2tp_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = lsa->l2tp_flowinfo & IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
lsa->l2tp_scope_id &&
ipv6_addr_type(daddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
fl6.flowi6_oif = lsa->l2tp_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
}
if (fl6.flowi6_oif == 0)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (flowlabel == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
if (!opt) {
opt = txopt_get(np);
opt_to_free = opt;
}
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, ip_generic_getfrag, msg,
ulen, transhdrlen, hlimit, tclass, opt,
&fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = l2tp_ip6_push_pending_frames(sk);
release_sock(sk);
done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
txopt_put(opt_to_free);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
| 167,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool TracingControllerImpl::StartTracing(
const base::trace_event::TraceConfig& trace_config,
StartTracingDoneCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (IsTracing()) {
if (trace_config.process_filter_config().empty() ||
trace_config_->process_filter_config().empty()) {
return false;
}
base::trace_event::TraceConfig old_config_copy(*trace_config_);
base::trace_event::TraceConfig new_config_copy(trace_config);
old_config_copy.SetProcessFilterConfig(
base::trace_event::TraceConfig::ProcessFilterConfig());
new_config_copy.SetProcessFilterConfig(
base::trace_event::TraceConfig::ProcessFilterConfig());
if (old_config_copy.ToString() != new_config_copy.ToString())
return false;
}
trace_config_ =
std::make_unique<base::trace_event::TraceConfig>(trace_config);
start_tracing_done_ = std::move(callback);
ConnectToServiceIfNeeded();
coordinator_->StartTracing(trace_config.ToString());
if (start_tracing_done_ &&
(base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()->IsEnabled() ||
!trace_config.process_filter_config().IsEnabled(
base::Process::Current().Pid()))) {
std::move(start_tracing_done_).Run();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
[email protected]
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | bool TracingControllerImpl::StartTracing(
const base::trace_event::TraceConfig& trace_config,
StartTracingDoneCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (IsTracing()) {
if (trace_config.process_filter_config().empty() ||
trace_config_->process_filter_config().empty()) {
return false;
}
base::trace_event::TraceConfig old_config_copy(*trace_config_);
base::trace_event::TraceConfig new_config_copy(trace_config);
old_config_copy.SetProcessFilterConfig(
base::trace_event::TraceConfig::ProcessFilterConfig());
new_config_copy.SetProcessFilterConfig(
base::trace_event::TraceConfig::ProcessFilterConfig());
if (old_config_copy.ToString() != new_config_copy.ToString())
return false;
}
trace_config_ =
std::make_unique<base::trace_event::TraceConfig>(trace_config);
start_tracing_done_ = std::move(callback);
coordinator_->StartTracing(trace_config.ToString());
if (start_tracing_done_ &&
(base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()->IsEnabled() ||
!trace_config.process_filter_config().IsEnabled(
base::Process::Current().Pid()))) {
std::move(start_tracing_done_).Run();
}
return true;
}
| 172,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AdjustSurfaceProtection() {
bool surface_is_protected =
current_surface_ ||
!host_->is_hidden() ||
(current_surface_is_protected_ &&
(pending_thumbnail_tasks_ > 0 ||
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_));
if (current_surface_is_protected_ == surface_is_protected)
return;
current_surface_is_protected_ = surface_is_protected;
++protection_state_id_;
if (!surface_route_id_ || !shared_surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendFrontSurfaceIsProtected(
surface_is_protected,
protection_state_id_,
surface_route_id_,
shared_surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AdjustSurfaceProtection() {
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetSurfaceNotInUseByCompositor(
scoped_refptr<ui::Texture>) {
}
| 171,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetBrightnessLibrary(
BrightnessLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->brightness_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetBrightnessLibrary(
| 170,635 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct fileIdentDesc *udf_find_entry(struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *child,
struct udf_fileident_bh *fibh,
struct fileIdentDesc *cfi)
{
struct fileIdentDesc *fi = NULL;
loff_t f_pos;
int block, flen;
unsigned char *fname = NULL;
unsigned char *nameptr;
uint8_t lfi;
uint16_t liu;
loff_t size;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint32_t elen;
sector_t offset;
struct extent_position epos = {};
struct udf_inode_info *dinfo = UDF_I(dir);
int isdotdot = child->len == 2 &&
child->name[0] == '.' && child->name[1] == '.';
size = udf_ext0_offset(dir) + dir->i_size;
f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(dir);
fibh->sbh = fibh->ebh = NULL;
fibh->soffset = fibh->eoffset = f_pos & (dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
if (inode_bmap(dir, f_pos >> dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits, &epos,
&eloc, &elen, &offset) != (EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED >> 30))
goto out_err;
block = udf_get_lb_pblock(dir->i_sb, &eloc, offset);
if ((++offset << dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits) < elen) {
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct short_ad);
else if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct long_ad);
} else
offset = 0;
fibh->sbh = fibh->ebh = udf_tread(dir->i_sb, block);
if (!fibh->sbh)
goto out_err;
}
fname = kmalloc(UDF_NAME_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
if (!fname)
goto out_err;
while (f_pos < size) {
fi = udf_fileident_read(dir, &f_pos, fibh, cfi, &epos, &eloc,
&elen, &offset);
if (!fi)
goto out_err;
liu = le16_to_cpu(cfi->lengthOfImpUse);
lfi = cfi->lengthFileIdent;
if (fibh->sbh == fibh->ebh) {
nameptr = fi->fileIdent + liu;
} else {
int poffset; /* Unpaded ending offset */
poffset = fibh->soffset + sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc) +
liu + lfi;
if (poffset >= lfi)
nameptr = (uint8_t *)(fibh->ebh->b_data +
poffset - lfi);
else {
nameptr = fname;
memcpy(nameptr, fi->fileIdent + liu,
lfi - poffset);
memcpy(nameptr + lfi - poffset,
fibh->ebh->b_data, poffset);
}
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_DELETED) != 0) {
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(dir->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UNDELETE))
continue;
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_HIDDEN) != 0) {
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(dir->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UNHIDE))
continue;
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_PARENT) &&
isdotdot)
goto out_ok;
if (!lfi)
continue;
flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, fname, lfi);
if (flen && udf_match(flen, fname, child->len, child->name))
goto out_ok;
}
out_err:
fi = NULL;
if (fibh->sbh != fibh->ebh)
brelse(fibh->ebh);
brelse(fibh->sbh);
out_ok:
brelse(epos.bh);
kfree(fname);
return fi;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: [email protected]
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static struct fileIdentDesc *udf_find_entry(struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *child,
struct udf_fileident_bh *fibh,
struct fileIdentDesc *cfi)
{
struct fileIdentDesc *fi = NULL;
loff_t f_pos;
int block, flen;
unsigned char *fname = NULL;
unsigned char *nameptr;
uint8_t lfi;
uint16_t liu;
loff_t size;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint32_t elen;
sector_t offset;
struct extent_position epos = {};
struct udf_inode_info *dinfo = UDF_I(dir);
int isdotdot = child->len == 2 &&
child->name[0] == '.' && child->name[1] == '.';
size = udf_ext0_offset(dir) + dir->i_size;
f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(dir);
fibh->sbh = fibh->ebh = NULL;
fibh->soffset = fibh->eoffset = f_pos & (dir->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
if (inode_bmap(dir, f_pos >> dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits, &epos,
&eloc, &elen, &offset) != (EXT_RECORDED_ALLOCATED >> 30))
goto out_err;
block = udf_get_lb_pblock(dir->i_sb, &eloc, offset);
if ((++offset << dir->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits) < elen) {
if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct short_ad);
else if (dinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG)
epos.offset -= sizeof(struct long_ad);
} else
offset = 0;
fibh->sbh = fibh->ebh = udf_tread(dir->i_sb, block);
if (!fibh->sbh)
goto out_err;
}
fname = kmalloc(UDF_NAME_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
if (!fname)
goto out_err;
while (f_pos < size) {
fi = udf_fileident_read(dir, &f_pos, fibh, cfi, &epos, &eloc,
&elen, &offset);
if (!fi)
goto out_err;
liu = le16_to_cpu(cfi->lengthOfImpUse);
lfi = cfi->lengthFileIdent;
if (fibh->sbh == fibh->ebh) {
nameptr = fi->fileIdent + liu;
} else {
int poffset; /* Unpaded ending offset */
poffset = fibh->soffset + sizeof(struct fileIdentDesc) +
liu + lfi;
if (poffset >= lfi)
nameptr = (uint8_t *)(fibh->ebh->b_data +
poffset - lfi);
else {
nameptr = fname;
memcpy(nameptr, fi->fileIdent + liu,
lfi - poffset);
memcpy(nameptr + lfi - poffset,
fibh->ebh->b_data, poffset);
}
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_DELETED) != 0) {
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(dir->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UNDELETE))
continue;
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_HIDDEN) != 0) {
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(dir->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UNHIDE))
continue;
}
if ((cfi->fileCharacteristics & FID_FILE_CHAR_PARENT) &&
isdotdot)
goto out_ok;
if (!lfi)
continue;
flen = udf_get_filename(dir->i_sb, nameptr, lfi, fname,
UDF_NAME_LEN);
if (flen && udf_match(flen, fname, child->len, child->name))
goto out_ok;
}
out_err:
fi = NULL;
if (fibh->sbh != fibh->ebh)
brelse(fibh->ebh);
brelse(fibh->sbh);
out_ok:
brelse(epos.bh);
kfree(fname);
return fi;
}
| 166,756 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void VRDisplay::BeginPresent() {
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (capabilities_->hasExternalDisplay()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError,
"VR Presentation not implemented for this VRDisplay.");
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Reject(exception);
}
ReportPresentationResult(
PresentationResult::kPresentationNotSupportedByDisplay);
return;
} else {
if (layer_.source().isHTMLCanvasElement()) {
} else {
DCHECK(layer_.source().isOffscreenCanvas());
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "OffscreenCanvas presentation not implemented.");
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver =
pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Reject(exception);
}
ReportPresentationResult(
PresentationResult::kPresentationNotSupportedByDisplay);
return;
}
}
if (doc) {
Platform::Current()->RecordRapporURL("VR.WebVR.PresentSuccess",
WebURL(doc->Url()));
}
is_presenting_ = true;
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kSuccess);
UpdateLayerBounds();
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Resolve();
}
OnPresentChange();
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | void VRDisplay::BeginPresent() {
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (capabilities_->hasExternalDisplay()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError,
"VR Presentation not implemented for this VRDisplay.");
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Reject(exception);
}
ReportPresentationResult(
PresentationResult::kPresentationNotSupportedByDisplay);
return;
} else {
if (layer_.source().isHTMLCanvasElement()) {
} else {
DCHECK(layer_.source().isOffscreenCanvas());
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "OffscreenCanvas presentation not implemented.");
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver =
pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Reject(exception);
}
ReportPresentationResult(
PresentationResult::kPresentationNotSupportedByDisplay);
return;
}
}
if (doc) {
Platform::Current()->RecordRapporURL("VR.WebVR.PresentSuccess",
WebURL(doc->Url()));
}
is_presenting_ = true;
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kSuccess);
UpdateLayerBounds();
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Resolve();
}
OnPresentChange();
// For GVR, we shut down normal vsync processing during VR presentation.
// Run window.rAF once manually so that applications get a chance to
// schedule a VRDisplay.rAF in case they do so only while presenting.
if (!pending_vrdisplay_raf_ && !capabilities_->hasExternalDisplay()) {
double timestamp = WTF::MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE, WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledWindowAnimations,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), timestamp));
}
}
| 171,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
if (*notecount == 0)
return 0;
--*notecount;
if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return xnh_sizeof + offset;
}
(void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)namesz);
return 0;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)descsz);
return 0;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_OS_NOTE) == 0) {
if (do_os_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID) == 0) {
if (do_bid_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX) == 0) {
if (do_pax_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) == 0) {
if (do_core_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz))
return size;
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) {
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
return size;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s", (int)descsz,
(const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return size;
break;
}
return size;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: Limit string printing to 100 chars, and add flags I forgot in the previous
commit.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
if (*notecount == 0)
return 0;
--*notecount;
if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return xnh_sizeof + offset;
}
(void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)namesz);
return 0;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)descsz);
return 0;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_OS_NOTE) == 0) {
if (do_os_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID) == 0) {
if (do_bid_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX) == 0) {
if (do_pax_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) == 0) {
if (do_core_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz))
return size;
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) {
if (descsz > 100)
descsz = 100;
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
return size;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN)
return size;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN;
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return size;
break;
}
return size;
}
return offset;
}
| 166,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw;
BYTE ccl;
const BYTE* src;
BYTE* yplane = NULL;
BYTE* coplane = NULL;
BYTE* cgplane = NULL;
BYTE* aplane = NULL;
INT16 r_val;
INT16 g_val;
INT16 b_val;
BYTE a_val;
UINT32 tempWidth;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
rw = (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? tempWidth : context->width);
ccl = context->ColorLossLevel;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
src = data + (context->height - 1 - y) * scanline;
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width;
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
switch (context->format)
{
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRX32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBX32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBA32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR24:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB24:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR16:
b_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
r_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB16:
r_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
b_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_A4:
{
int shift;
BYTE idx;
shift = (7 - (x % 8));
idx = ((*src) >> shift) & 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 1)) >> shift) & 1) << 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 2)) >> shift) & 1) << 2;
idx |= (((*(src + 3)) >> shift) & 1) << 3;
idx *= 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
if (shift == 0)
src += 4;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB8:
{
int idx = (*src) * 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
src++;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
default:
r_val = g_val = b_val = a_val = 0;
break;
}
*yplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val >> 2) + (g_val >> 1) + (b_val >> 2));
/* Perform color loss reduction here */
*coplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val - b_val) >> ccl);
*cgplane++ = (BYTE)((-(r_val >> 1) + g_val - (b_val >> 1)) >> ccl);
*aplane++ = a_val;
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (x % 2) == 1)
{
*yplane = *(yplane - 1);
*coplane = *(coplane - 1);
*cgplane = *(cgplane - 1);
}
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (y % 2) == 1)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
CopyMemory(yplane, yplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(coplane, coplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(cgplane, cgplane - rw, rw);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
static BOOL nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
UINT16 x;
UINT16 y;
UINT16 rw;
BYTE ccl;
const BYTE* src;
BYTE* yplane = NULL;
BYTE* coplane = NULL;
BYTE* cgplane = NULL;
BYTE* aplane = NULL;
INT16 r_val;
INT16 g_val;
INT16 b_val;
BYTE a_val;
UINT32 tempWidth;
if (!context || data || (scanline == 0))
return FALSE;
tempWidth = ROUND_UP_TO(context->width, 8);
rw = (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel ? tempWidth : context->width);
ccl = context->ColorLossLevel;
if (context->priv->PlaneBuffersLength < rw * scanline)
return FALSE;
if (rw < scanline * 2)
return FALSE;
for (y = 0; y < context->height; y++)
{
src = data + (context->height - 1 - y) * scanline;
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
aplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3] + y * context->width;
for (x = 0; x < context->width; x++)
{
switch (context->format)
{
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRX32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBX32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBA32:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = *src++;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR24:
b_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
r_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB24:
r_val = *src++;
g_val = *src++;
b_val = *src++;
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR16:
b_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
r_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB16:
r_val = (INT16)(((*(src + 1)) & 0xF8) | ((*(src + 1)) >> 5));
g_val = (INT16)((((*(src + 1)) & 0x07) << 5) | (((*src) & 0xE0) >> 3));
b_val = (INT16)((((*src) & 0x1F) << 3) | (((*src) >> 2) & 0x07));
a_val = 0xFF;
src += 2;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_A4:
{
int shift;
BYTE idx;
shift = (7 - (x % 8));
idx = ((*src) >> shift) & 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 1)) >> shift) & 1) << 1;
idx |= (((*(src + 2)) >> shift) & 1) << 2;
idx |= (((*(src + 3)) >> shift) & 1) << 3;
idx *= 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
if (shift == 0)
src += 4;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
case PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB8:
{
int idx = (*src) * 3;
r_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx];
g_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 1];
b_val = (INT16) context->palette[idx + 2];
src++;
}
a_val = 0xFF;
break;
default:
r_val = g_val = b_val = a_val = 0;
break;
}
*yplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val >> 2) + (g_val >> 1) + (b_val >> 2));
/* Perform color loss reduction here */
*coplane++ = (BYTE)((r_val - b_val) >> ccl);
*cgplane++ = (BYTE)((-(r_val >> 1) + g_val - (b_val >> 1)) >> ccl);
*aplane++ = a_val;
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (x % 2) == 1)
{
*yplane = *(yplane - 1);
*coplane = *(coplane - 1);
*cgplane = *(cgplane - 1);
}
}
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel && (y % 2) == 1)
{
yplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0] + y * rw;
coplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1] + y * rw;
cgplane = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2] + y * rw;
CopyMemory(yplane, yplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(coplane, coplane - rw, rw);
CopyMemory(cgplane, cgplane - rw, rw);
}
return TRUE;
}
| 169,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int powermate_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev (intf);
struct usb_host_interface *interface;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
struct powermate_device *pm;
struct input_dev *input_dev;
int pipe, maxp;
int error = -ENOMEM;
interface = intf->cur_altsetting;
endpoint = &interface->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
return -EIO;
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0a, USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
0, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
pm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct powermate_device), GFP_KERNEL);
input_dev = input_allocate_device();
if (!pm || !input_dev)
goto fail1;
if (powermate_alloc_buffers(udev, pm))
goto fail2;
pm->irq = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->irq)
goto fail2;
pm->config = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->config)
goto fail3;
pm->udev = udev;
pm->intf = intf;
pm->input = input_dev;
usb_make_path(udev, pm->phys, sizeof(pm->phys));
strlcat(pm->phys, "/input0", sizeof(pm->phys));
spin_lock_init(&pm->lock);
switch (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct)) {
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_NEW:
input_dev->name = pm_name_powermate;
break;
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_OLD:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
break;
default:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: unknown product id %04x\n",
le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct));
}
input_dev->phys = pm->phys;
usb_to_input_id(udev, &input_dev->id);
input_dev->dev.parent = &intf->dev;
input_set_drvdata(input_dev, pm);
input_dev->event = powermate_input_event;
input_dev->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL) |
BIT_MASK(EV_MSC);
input_dev->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_0)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_0);
input_dev->relbit[BIT_WORD(REL_DIAL)] = BIT_MASK(REL_DIAL);
input_dev->mscbit[BIT_WORD(MSC_PULSELED)] = BIT_MASK(MSC_PULSELED);
/* get a handle to the interrupt data pipe */
pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(udev, endpoint->bEndpointAddress);
maxp = usb_maxpacket(udev, pipe, usb_pipeout(pipe));
if (maxp < POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN || maxp > POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: Expected payload of %d--%d bytes, found %d bytes!\n",
POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN, POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX, maxp);
maxp = POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(pm->irq, udev, pipe, pm->data,
maxp, powermate_irq,
pm, endpoint->bInterval);
pm->irq->transfer_dma = pm->data_dma;
pm->irq->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* register our interrupt URB with the USB system */
if (usb_submit_urb(pm->irq, GFP_KERNEL)) {
error = -EIO;
goto fail4;
}
error = input_register_device(pm->input);
if (error)
goto fail5;
/* force an update of everything */
pm->requires_update = UPDATE_PULSE_ASLEEP | UPDATE_PULSE_AWAKE | UPDATE_PULSE_MODE | UPDATE_STATIC_BRIGHTNESS;
powermate_pulse_led(pm, 0x80, 255, 0, 1, 0); // set default pulse parameters
usb_set_intfdata(intf, pm);
return 0;
fail5: usb_kill_urb(pm->irq);
fail4: usb_free_urb(pm->config);
fail3: usb_free_urb(pm->irq);
fail2: powermate_free_buffers(udev, pm);
fail1: input_free_device(input_dev);
kfree(pm);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its
probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for
the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of
endpoints on the interface before using them.
The full report for this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int powermate_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev (intf);
struct usb_host_interface *interface;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
struct powermate_device *pm;
struct input_dev *input_dev;
int pipe, maxp;
int error = -ENOMEM;
interface = intf->cur_altsetting;
if (interface->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1)
return -EINVAL;
endpoint = &interface->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
return -EIO;
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0a, USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
0, interface->desc.bInterfaceNumber, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
pm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct powermate_device), GFP_KERNEL);
input_dev = input_allocate_device();
if (!pm || !input_dev)
goto fail1;
if (powermate_alloc_buffers(udev, pm))
goto fail2;
pm->irq = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->irq)
goto fail2;
pm->config = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->config)
goto fail3;
pm->udev = udev;
pm->intf = intf;
pm->input = input_dev;
usb_make_path(udev, pm->phys, sizeof(pm->phys));
strlcat(pm->phys, "/input0", sizeof(pm->phys));
spin_lock_init(&pm->lock);
switch (le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct)) {
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_NEW:
input_dev->name = pm_name_powermate;
break;
case POWERMATE_PRODUCT_OLD:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
break;
default:
input_dev->name = pm_name_soundknob;
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: unknown product id %04x\n",
le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct));
}
input_dev->phys = pm->phys;
usb_to_input_id(udev, &input_dev->id);
input_dev->dev.parent = &intf->dev;
input_set_drvdata(input_dev, pm);
input_dev->event = powermate_input_event;
input_dev->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL) |
BIT_MASK(EV_MSC);
input_dev->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_0)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_0);
input_dev->relbit[BIT_WORD(REL_DIAL)] = BIT_MASK(REL_DIAL);
input_dev->mscbit[BIT_WORD(MSC_PULSELED)] = BIT_MASK(MSC_PULSELED);
/* get a handle to the interrupt data pipe */
pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(udev, endpoint->bEndpointAddress);
maxp = usb_maxpacket(udev, pipe, usb_pipeout(pipe));
if (maxp < POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN || maxp > POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "powermate: Expected payload of %d--%d bytes, found %d bytes!\n",
POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MIN, POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX, maxp);
maxp = POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(pm->irq, udev, pipe, pm->data,
maxp, powermate_irq,
pm, endpoint->bInterval);
pm->irq->transfer_dma = pm->data_dma;
pm->irq->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* register our interrupt URB with the USB system */
if (usb_submit_urb(pm->irq, GFP_KERNEL)) {
error = -EIO;
goto fail4;
}
error = input_register_device(pm->input);
if (error)
goto fail5;
/* force an update of everything */
pm->requires_update = UPDATE_PULSE_ASLEEP | UPDATE_PULSE_AWAKE | UPDATE_PULSE_MODE | UPDATE_STATIC_BRIGHTNESS;
powermate_pulse_led(pm, 0x80, 255, 0, 1, 0); // set default pulse parameters
usb_set_intfdata(intf, pm);
return 0;
fail5: usb_kill_urb(pm->irq);
fail4: usb_free_urb(pm->config);
fail3: usb_free_urb(pm->irq);
fail2: powermate_free_buffers(udev, pm);
fail1: input_free_device(input_dev);
kfree(pm);
return error;
}
| 167,432 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(snmp, __construct)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
char *a1, *a2;
int a1_len, a2_len;
long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
long version = SNMP_DEFAULT_VERSION;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zend_error_handling error_handling;
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, NULL, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "lss|ll", &version, &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch(version) {
case SNMP_VERSION_1:
case SNMP_VERSION_2c:
case SNMP_VERSION_3:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), "Unknown SNMP protocol version", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
/* handle re-open of snmp session */
if (snmp_object->session) {
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
}
if (netsnmp_session_init(&(snmp_object->session), version, a1, a2, timeout, retries TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
snmp_object->max_oids = 0;
snmp_object->valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
snmp_object->enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
snmp_object->oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
snmp_object->quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
snmp_object->oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
snmp_object->exceptions_enabled = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | PHP_METHOD(snmp, __construct)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
char *a1, *a2;
int a1_len, a2_len;
long timeout = SNMP_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
long retries = SNMP_DEFAULT_RETRIES;
long version = SNMP_DEFAULT_VERSION;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zend_error_handling error_handling;
snmp_object = (php_snmp_object *)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, NULL, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "lss|ll", &version, &a1, &a1_len, &a2, &a2_len, &timeout, &retries) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch(version) {
case SNMP_VERSION_1:
case SNMP_VERSION_2c:
case SNMP_VERSION_3:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), "Unknown SNMP protocol version", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
/* handle re-open of snmp session */
if (snmp_object->session) {
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
}
if (netsnmp_session_init(&(snmp_object->session), version, a1, a2, timeout, retries TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
snmp_object->max_oids = 0;
snmp_object->valueretrieval = SNMP_G(valueretrieval);
snmp_object->enum_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_PRINT_NUMERIC_ENUM);
snmp_object->oid_output_format = netsnmp_ds_get_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT);
snmp_object->quick_print = netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_QUICK_PRINT);
snmp_object->oid_increasing_check = TRUE;
snmp_object->exceptions_enabled = 0;
}
| 164,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long ZEXPORT inflateMark(strm)
z_streamp strm;
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return -1L << 16;
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
return ((long)(state->back) << 16) +
(state->mode == COPY ? state->length :
(state->mode == MATCH ? state->was - state->length : 0));
}
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | long ZEXPORT inflateMark(strm)
z_streamp strm;
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL)
return (long)(((unsigned long)0 - 1) << 16);
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
return (long)(((unsigned long)((long)state->back)) << 16) +
(state->mode == COPY ? state->length :
(state->mode == MATCH ? state->was - state->length : 0));
}
| 168,673 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange(Range* fromRange, Range* toRange, EAffinity affinity, bool stillSelecting)
{
if (m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree)
return m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree->shouldChangeSelectedDOMRangeToDOMRangeAffinityStillSelecting(fromRange, toRange, static_cast<int>(affinity), stillSelecting);
Frame* frame = m_webPagePrivate->focusedOrMainFrame();
if (frame && frame->document()) {
if (frame->document()->focusedNode() && frame->document()->focusedNode()->hasTagName(HTMLNames::selectTag))
return false;
if (m_webPagePrivate->m_inputHandler->isInputMode() && fromRange && toRange && (fromRange->startContainer() == toRange->startContainer()))
m_webPagePrivate->m_inputHandler->notifyClientOfKeyboardVisibilityChange(true);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | bool EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange(Range* fromRange, Range* toRange, EAffinity affinity, bool stillSelecting)
{
if (m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree)
return m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree->shouldChangeSelectedDOMRangeToDOMRangeAffinityStillSelecting(fromRange, toRange, static_cast<int>(affinity), stillSelecting);
Frame* frame = m_webPagePrivate->focusedOrMainFrame();
if (frame && frame->document()) {
if (Node* focusedNode = frame->document()->focusedNode()) {
if (focusedNode->hasTagName(HTMLNames::selectTag))
return false;
if (focusedNode->isElementNode() && DOMSupport::isPopupInputField(static_cast<Element*>(focusedNode)))
return false;
}
if (m_webPagePrivate->m_inputHandler->isInputMode() && fromRange && toRange && (fromRange->startContainer() == toRange->startContainer()))
m_webPagePrivate->m_inputHandler->notifyClientOfKeyboardVisibilityChange(true);
}
return true;
}
| 170,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s)
{
int i;
VMW_CFPRN("MTU is %u", s->mtu);
s->max_rx_frags =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED16(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.maxNumRxSG);
if (s->max_rx_frags == 0) {
s->max_rx_frags = 1;
}
VMW_CFPRN("Max RX fragments is %u", s->max_rx_frags);
s->event_int_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.intrConf.eventIntrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->event_int_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("Events interrupt line is %u", s->event_int_idx);
s->auto_int_masking =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.intrConf.autoMask);
VMW_CFPRN("Automatic interrupt masking is %d", (int)s->auto_int_masking);
s->txq_num =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numTxQueues);
s->rxq_num =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numRxQueues);
VMW_CFPRN("Number of TX/RX queues %u/%u", s->txq_num, s->rxq_num);
assert(s->txq_num <= VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_TX_QUEUES);
qdescr_table_pa =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.queueDescPA);
VMW_CFPRN("TX queues descriptors table is at 0x%" PRIx64, qdescr_table_pa);
/*
* Worst-case scenario is a packet that holds all TX rings space so
* we calculate total size of all TX rings for max TX fragments number
*/
s->max_tx_frags = 0;
/* TX queues */
for (i = 0; i < s->txq_num; i++) {
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numRxQueues);
VMW_CFPRN("Number of TX/RX queues %u/%u", s->txq_num, s->rxq_num);
assert(s->txq_num <= VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_TX_QUEUES);
qdescr_table_pa =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.queueDescPA);
VMW_CFPRN("TX Queue %d interrupt: %d", i, s->txq_descr[i].intr_idx);
/* Read rings memory locations for TX queues */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qdescr_pa, conf.txRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa, conf.txRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc), false);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TX", i, &s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring);
s->max_tx_frags += size;
/* TXC ring */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qdescr_pa, conf.compRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa, conf.compRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc), true);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TXC", i, &s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring);
s->txq_descr[i].tx_stats_pa =
qdescr_pa + offsetof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc, stats);
memset(&s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats, 0,
sizeof(s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats));
/* Fill device-managed parameters for queues */
VMXNET3_WRITE_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa,
ctrl.txThreshold,
VMXNET3_DEF_TX_THRESHOLD);
}
/* Preallocate TX packet wrapper */
VMW_CFPRN("Max TX fragments is %u", s->max_tx_frags);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_init(&s->tx_pkt, s->max_tx_frags, s->peer_has_vhdr);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_init(&s->rx_pkt, s->peer_has_vhdr);
/* Read rings memory locations for RX queues */
for (i = 0; i < s->rxq_num; i++) {
int j;
hwaddr qd_pa =
qdescr_table_pa + s->txq_num * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc) +
i * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxQueueDesc);
/* Read interrupt number for this RX queue */
s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR8(qd_pa, conf.intrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("RX Queue %d interrupt: %d", i, s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx);
/* Read rings memory locations */
for (j = 0; j < VMXNET3_RX_RINGS_PER_QUEUE; j++) {
/* RX rings */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qd_pa, conf.rxRingBasePA[j]);
size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qd_pa, conf.rxRingSize[j]);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->rxq_descr[i].rx_ring[j], pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc), false);
VMW_CFPRN("RX queue %d:%d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d",
i, j, pa, size);
}
/* RXC ring */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qd_pa, conf.compRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qd_pa, conf.compRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->rxq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc), true);
VMW_CFPRN("RXC queue %d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d", i, pa, size);
s->rxq_descr[i].rx_stats_pa =
qd_pa + offsetof(struct Vmxnet3_RxQueueDesc, stats);
memset(&s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats, 0,
sizeof(s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats));
}
vmxnet3_validate_interrupts(s);
/* Make sure everything is in place before device activation */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_reset_mac(s);
s->device_active = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void vmxnet3_activate_device(VMXNET3State *s)
{
int i;
VMW_CFPRN("MTU is %u", s->mtu);
s->max_rx_frags =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED16(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.maxNumRxSG);
if (s->max_rx_frags == 0) {
s->max_rx_frags = 1;
}
VMW_CFPRN("Max RX fragments is %u", s->max_rx_frags);
s->event_int_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.intrConf.eventIntrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->event_int_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("Events interrupt line is %u", s->event_int_idx);
s->auto_int_masking =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.intrConf.autoMask);
VMW_CFPRN("Automatic interrupt masking is %d", (int)s->auto_int_masking);
s->txq_num =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numTxQueues);
s->rxq_num =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numRxQueues);
VMW_CFPRN("Number of TX/RX queues %u/%u", s->txq_num, s->rxq_num);
assert(s->txq_num <= VMXNET3_DEVICE_MAX_TX_QUEUES);
qdescr_table_pa =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.queueDescPA);
VMW_CFPRN("TX queues descriptors table is at 0x%" PRIx64, qdescr_table_pa);
/*
* Worst-case scenario is a packet that holds all TX rings space so
* we calculate total size of all TX rings for max TX fragments number
*/
s->max_tx_frags = 0;
/* TX queues */
for (i = 0; i < s->txq_num; i++) {
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED8(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.numRxQueues);
VMW_CFPRN("Number of TX/RX queues %u/%u", s->txq_num, s->rxq_num);
vmxnet3_validate_queues(s);
qdescr_table_pa =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(s->drv_shmem, devRead.misc.queueDescPA);
VMW_CFPRN("TX Queue %d interrupt: %d", i, s->txq_descr[i].intr_idx);
/* Read rings memory locations for TX queues */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qdescr_pa, conf.txRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa, conf.txRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxDesc), false);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TX", i, &s->txq_descr[i].tx_ring);
s->max_tx_frags += size;
/* TXC ring */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qdescr_pa, conf.compRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa, conf.compRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc), true);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_CFPRN, "TXC", i, &s->txq_descr[i].comp_ring);
s->txq_descr[i].tx_stats_pa =
qdescr_pa + offsetof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc, stats);
memset(&s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats, 0,
sizeof(s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats));
/* Fill device-managed parameters for queues */
VMXNET3_WRITE_TX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qdescr_pa,
ctrl.txThreshold,
VMXNET3_DEF_TX_THRESHOLD);
}
/* Preallocate TX packet wrapper */
VMW_CFPRN("Max TX fragments is %u", s->max_tx_frags);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_init(&s->tx_pkt, s->max_tx_frags, s->peer_has_vhdr);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_init(&s->rx_pkt, s->peer_has_vhdr);
/* Read rings memory locations for RX queues */
for (i = 0; i < s->rxq_num; i++) {
int j;
hwaddr qd_pa =
qdescr_table_pa + s->txq_num * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_TxQueueDesc) +
i * sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxQueueDesc);
/* Read interrupt number for this RX queue */
s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx =
VMXNET3_READ_TX_QUEUE_DESCR8(qd_pa, conf.intrIdx);
assert(vmxnet3_verify_intx(s, s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx));
VMW_CFPRN("RX Queue %d interrupt: %d", i, s->rxq_descr[i].intr_idx);
/* Read rings memory locations */
for (j = 0; j < VMXNET3_RX_RINGS_PER_QUEUE; j++) {
/* RX rings */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qd_pa, conf.rxRingBasePA[j]);
size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qd_pa, conf.rxRingSize[j]);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->rxq_descr[i].rx_ring[j], pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc), false);
VMW_CFPRN("RX queue %d:%d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d",
i, j, pa, size);
}
/* RXC ring */
pa = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR64(qd_pa, conf.compRingBasePA);
size = VMXNET3_READ_RX_QUEUE_DESCR32(qd_pa, conf.compRingSize);
vmxnet3_ring_init(&s->rxq_descr[i].comp_ring, pa, size,
sizeof(struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc), true);
VMW_CFPRN("RXC queue %d: Base: %" PRIx64 ", Size: %d", i, pa, size);
s->rxq_descr[i].rx_stats_pa =
qd_pa + offsetof(struct Vmxnet3_RxQueueDesc, stats);
memset(&s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats, 0,
sizeof(s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats));
}
vmxnet3_validate_interrupts(s);
/* Make sure everything is in place before device activation */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_reset_mac(s);
s->device_active = true;
}
| 165,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SampleTable::isValid() const {
return mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0
&& mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0
&& mSampleSizeOffset >= 0
&& !mTimeToSample.empty();
}
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool SampleTable::isValid() const {
return mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0
&& mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0
&& mSampleSizeOffset >= 0
&& mHasTimeToSample;
}
| 173,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PaymentRequest::UpdateWith(mojom::PaymentDetailsPtr details) {
std::string error;
if (!ValidatePaymentDetails(ConvertPaymentDetails(details), &error)) {
LOG(ERROR) << error;
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (details->shipping_address_errors &&
!PaymentsValidators::IsValidAddressErrorsFormat(
details->shipping_address_errors, &error)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << error;
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (!details->total) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Missing total";
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
spec_->UpdateWith(std::move(details));
}
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void PaymentRequest::UpdateWith(mojom::PaymentDetailsPtr details) {
std::string error;
if (!ValidatePaymentDetails(ConvertPaymentDetails(details), &error)) {
log_.Error(error);
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (details->shipping_address_errors &&
!PaymentsValidators::IsValidAddressErrorsFormat(
details->shipping_address_errors, &error)) {
log_.Error(error);
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (!details->total) {
log_.Error("Missing total");
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
spec_->UpdateWith(std::move(details));
}
| 173,088 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (node.isNull() || !node.document().frame()) {
return;
}
if (is_preview_enabled_) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithNode(node);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE);
} else {
WebKit::WebNode duplicate_node(node);
Print(duplicate_node.document().frame(), duplicate_node);
}
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (node.isNull() || !node.document().frame()) {
return;
}
if (print_node_in_progress_) {
// This can happen as a result of processing sync messages when printing
// from ppapi plugins. It's a rare case, so its OK to just fail here.
// See http://crbug.com/159165.
return;
}
print_node_in_progress_ = true;
if (is_preview_enabled_) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithNode(node);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE);
} else {
WebKit::WebNode duplicate_node(node);
Print(duplicate_node.document().frame(), duplicate_node);
}
print_node_in_progress_ = false;
}
| 170,697 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: init_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value dest, mrb_value obj)
{
switch (mrb_type(obj)) {
case MRB_TT_CLASS:
case MRB_TT_MODULE:
copy_class(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_remove(mrb, dest, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "__classname__"));
break;
case MRB_TT_OBJECT:
case MRB_TT_SCLASS:
case MRB_TT_HASH:
case MRB_TT_DATA:
case MRB_TT_EXCEPTION:
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
break;
case MRB_TT_ISTRUCT:
mrb_istruct_copy(dest, obj);
break;
default:
break;
}
mrb_funcall(mrb, dest, "initialize_copy", 1, obj);
}
Commit Message: Should not call `initialize_copy` for `TT_ICLASS`; fix #4027
Since `TT_ICLASS` is a internal object that should never be revealed
to Ruby world.
CWE ID: CWE-824 | init_copy(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value dest, mrb_value obj)
{
switch (mrb_type(obj)) {
case MRB_TT_ICLASS:
copy_class(mrb, dest, obj);
return;
case MRB_TT_CLASS:
case MRB_TT_MODULE:
copy_class(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
mrb_iv_remove(mrb, dest, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "__classname__"));
break;
case MRB_TT_OBJECT:
case MRB_TT_SCLASS:
case MRB_TT_HASH:
case MRB_TT_DATA:
case MRB_TT_EXCEPTION:
mrb_iv_copy(mrb, dest, obj);
break;
case MRB_TT_ISTRUCT:
mrb_istruct_copy(dest, obj);
break;
default:
break;
}
mrb_funcall(mrb, dest, "initialize_copy", 1, obj);
}
| 169,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterXWDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("XWD","XWD","X Windows system window dump (color)");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXWDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteXWDImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXWD;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1553
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ModuleExport size_t RegisterXWDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("XWD","XWD","X Windows system window dump (color)");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXWDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteXWDImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXWD;
entry->flags|=CoderDecoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| 169,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: crm_client_new(qb_ipcs_connection_t * c, uid_t uid_client, gid_t gid_client)
{
static uid_t uid_server = 0;
static gid_t gid_cluster = 0;
crm_client_t *client = NULL;
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(c);
if (c == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (gid_cluster == 0) {
uid_server = getuid();
if(crm_user_lookup(CRM_DAEMON_USER, NULL, &gid_cluster) < 0) {
static bool have_error = FALSE;
if(have_error == FALSE) {
crm_warn("Could not find group for user %s", CRM_DAEMON_USER);
have_error = TRUE;
}
}
}
if(gid_cluster != 0 && gid_client != 0) {
uid_t best_uid = -1; /* Passing -1 to chown(2) means don't change */
if(uid_client == 0 || uid_server == 0) { /* Someone is priveliged, but the other may not be */
best_uid = QB_MAX(uid_client, uid_server);
crm_trace("Allowing user %u to clean up after disconnect", best_uid);
}
crm_trace("Giving access to group %u", gid_cluster);
qb_ipcs_connection_auth_set(c, best_uid, gid_cluster, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP);
}
crm_client_init();
/* TODO: Do our own auth checking, return NULL if unauthorized */
client = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_client_t));
client->ipcs = c;
client->kind = CRM_CLIENT_IPC;
client->pid = crm_ipcs_client_pid(c);
client->id = crm_generate_uuid();
crm_debug("Connecting %p for uid=%d gid=%d pid=%u id=%s", c, uid_client, gid_client, client->pid, client->id);
#if ENABLE_ACL
client->user = uid2username(uid_client);
#endif
g_hash_table_insert(client_connections, c, client);
return client;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285 | crm_client_new(qb_ipcs_connection_t * c, uid_t uid_client, gid_t gid_client)
{
static gid_t gid_cluster = 0;
crm_client_t *client = NULL;
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(c);
if (c == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (gid_cluster == 0) {
if(crm_user_lookup(CRM_DAEMON_USER, NULL, &gid_cluster) < 0) {
static bool have_error = FALSE;
if(have_error == FALSE) {
crm_warn("Could not find group for user %s", CRM_DAEMON_USER);
have_error = TRUE;
}
}
}
if (uid_client != 0) {
crm_trace("Giving access to group %u", gid_cluster);
/* Passing -1 to chown(2) means don't change */
qb_ipcs_connection_auth_set(c, -1, gid_cluster, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP);
}
crm_client_init();
/* TODO: Do our own auth checking, return NULL if unauthorized */
client = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_client_t));
client->ipcs = c;
client->kind = CRM_CLIENT_IPC;
client->pid = crm_ipcs_client_pid(c);
client->id = crm_generate_uuid();
crm_debug("Connecting %p for uid=%d gid=%d pid=%u id=%s", c, uid_client, gid_client, client->pid, client->id);
#if ENABLE_ACL
client->user = uid2username(uid_client);
#endif
g_hash_table_insert(client_connections, c, client);
return client;
}
| 169,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void php_wddx_push_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **atts)
{
st_entry ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
if (!strcmp(name, EL_PACKET)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i=0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VERSION)) {
/* nothing for now */
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING)) {
ent.type = ST_STRING;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
ent.type = ST_BINARY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_CHAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_CHAR_CODE) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
char tmp_buf[2];
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%c", (char)strtol(atts[i], NULL, 16));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, tmp_buf, strlen(tmp_buf));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER)) {
ent.type = ST_NUMBER;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
Z_LVAL_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VALUE) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
ent.type = ST_BOOLEAN;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_BOOL;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, atts[i], strlen(atts[i]));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NULL)) {
ent.type = ST_NULL;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
ZVAL_NULL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY)) {
ent.type = ST_ARRAY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT)) {
ent.type = ST_STRUCT;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
if (stack->varname) efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = estrdup(atts[i]);
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET)) {
int i;
ent.type = ST_RECORDSET;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], "fieldNames") && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
zval *tmp;
char *key;
char *p1, *p2, *endp;
endp = (char *)atts[i] + strlen(atts[i]);
p1 = (char *)atts[i];
while ((p2 = php_memnstr(p1, ",", sizeof(",")-1, endp)) != NULL) {
key = estrndup(p1, p2 - p1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, key, p2 - p1 + 1, tmp);
p1 = p2 + sizeof(",")-1;
efree(key);
}
if (p1 <= endp) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, p1, endp - p1 + 1, tmp);
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
int i;
st_entry ent;
ent.type = ST_FIELD;
ent.varname = NULL;
ent.data = NULL;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[++i] && atts[i][0]) {
st_entry *recordset;
zval **field;
if (wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&recordset) == SUCCESS &&
recordset->type == ST_RECORDSET &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(recordset->data), (char*)atts[i], strlen(atts[i])+1, (void**)&field) == SUCCESS) {
ent.data = *field;
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
ent.type = ST_DATETIME;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73065: Out-Of-Bounds Read in php_wddx_push_element of wddx.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void php_wddx_push_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name, const XML_Char **atts)
{
st_entry ent;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
if (!strcmp(name, EL_PACKET)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i=0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VERSION)) {
/* nothing for now */
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING)) {
ent.type = ST_STRING;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
ent.type = ST_BINARY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_STRING;
Z_STRVAL_P(ent.data) = STR_EMPTY_ALLOC();
Z_STRLEN_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_CHAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_CHAR_CODE) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
char tmp_buf[2];
snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "%c", (char)strtol(atts[i+1], NULL, 16));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, tmp_buf, strlen(tmp_buf));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER)) {
ent.type = ST_NUMBER;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
Z_LVAL_P(ent.data) = 0;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_VALUE) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
ent.type = ST_BOOLEAN;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_BOOL;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
php_wddx_process_data(user_data, atts[i+1], strlen(atts[i+1]));
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_NULL)) {
ent.type = ST_NULL;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
ZVAL_NULL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY)) {
ent.type = ST_ARRAY;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT)) {
ent.type = ST_STRUCT;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR)) {
int i;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
if (stack->varname) efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = estrdup(atts[i+1]);
break;
}
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET)) {
int i;
ent.type = ST_RECORDSET;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ent.data);
array_init(ent.data);
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], "fieldNames") && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
zval *tmp;
char *key;
char *p1, *p2, *endp;
i++;
endp = (char *)atts[i] + strlen(atts[i]);
p1 = (char *)atts[i];
while ((p2 = php_memnstr(p1, ",", sizeof(",")-1, endp)) != NULL) {
key = estrndup(p1, p2 - p1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, key, p2 - p1 + 1, tmp);
p1 = p2 + sizeof(",")-1;
efree(key);
}
if (p1 <= endp) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init(tmp);
add_assoc_zval_ex(ent.data, p1, endp - p1 + 1, tmp);
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
int i;
st_entry ent;
ent.type = ST_FIELD;
ent.varname = NULL;
ent.data = NULL;
if (atts) for (i = 0; atts[i]; i++) {
if (!strcmp(atts[i], EL_NAME) && atts[i+1] && atts[i+1][0]) {
st_entry *recordset;
zval **field;
if (wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&recordset) == SUCCESS &&
recordset->type == ST_RECORDSET &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(recordset->data), (char*)atts[i+1], strlen(atts[i+1])+1, (void**)&field) == SUCCESS) {
ent.data = *field;
}
break;
}
}
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
ent.type = ST_DATETIME;
SET_STACK_VARNAME;
ALLOC_ZVAL(ent.data);
INIT_PZVAL(ent.data);
Z_TYPE_P(ent.data) = IS_LONG;
wddx_stack_push((wddx_stack *)stack, &ent, sizeof(st_entry));
}
}
| 166,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void print_maps(struct pid_info_t* info)
{
FILE *maps;
size_t offset;
char device[10];
long int inode;
char file[PATH_MAX];
strlcat(info->path, "maps", sizeof(info->path));
maps = fopen(info->path, "r");
if (!maps)
goto out;
while (fscanf(maps, "%*x-%*x %*s %zx %s %ld %s\n", &offset, device, &inode,
file) == 4) {
if (inode == 0 || !strcmp(device, "00:00"))
continue;
printf("%-9s %5d %10s %4s %9s %18s %9zd %10ld %s\n",
info->cmdline, info->pid, info->user, "mem",
"???", device, offset, inode, file);
}
fclose(maps);
out:
info->path[info->parent_length] = '\0';
}
Commit Message: Fix scanf %s in lsof.
Bug: http://b/28175237
Change-Id: Ief0ba299b09693ad9afc0e3d17a8f664c2fbb8c2
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void print_maps(struct pid_info_t* info)
{
FILE *maps;
size_t offset;
char device[10];
long int inode;
char file[1024];
strlcat(info->path, "maps", sizeof(info->path));
maps = fopen(info->path, "r");
if (!maps)
goto out;
while (fscanf(maps, "%*x-%*x %*s %zx %5s %ld %1023s\n",
&offset, device, &inode, file) == 4) {
if (inode == 0 || !strcmp(device, "00:00"))
continue;
printf("%-9s %5d %10s %4s %9s %18s %9zd %10ld %s\n",
info->cmdline, info->pid, info->user, "mem",
"???", device, offset, inode, file);
}
fclose(maps);
out:
info->path[info->parent_length] = '\0';
}
| 173,560 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_baddr)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
int i;
if (bin->hdr.filetype != MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.filetype != MH_DYLINKER)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; ++i)
if (bin->segs[i].fileoff == 0 && bin->segs[i].filesize != 0)
return bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | ut64 MACH0_(get_baddr)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
int i;
if (bin->hdr.filetype != MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.filetype != MH_DYLINKER) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; ++i) {
if (bin->segs[i].fileoff == 0 && bin->segs[i].filesize != 0) {
return bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 168,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct wireless_dev *wdev,
struct cfg80211_mgmt_tx_params *params, u64 *cookie)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct ieee80211_channel *chan = params->chan;
const u8 *buf = params->buf;
size_t len = params->len;
const struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif;
s32 err = 0;
s32 ie_offset;
s32 ie_len;
struct brcmf_fil_action_frame_le *action_frame;
struct brcmf_fil_af_params_le *af_params;
bool ack;
s32 chan_nr;
u32 freq;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
*cookie = 0;
mgmt = (const struct ieee80211_mgmt *)buf;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(mgmt->frame_control)) {
brcmf_err("Driver only allows MGMT packet type\n");
return -EPERM;
}
vif = container_of(wdev, struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif, wdev);
if (ieee80211_is_probe_resp(mgmt->frame_control)) {
/* Right now the only reason to get a probe response */
/* is for p2p listen response or for p2p GO from */
/* wpa_supplicant. Unfortunately the probe is send */
/* on primary ndev, while dongle wants it on the p2p */
/* vif. Since this is only reason for a probe */
/* response to be sent, the vif is taken from cfg. */
/* If ever desired to send proberesp for non p2p */
/* response then data should be checked for */
/* "DIRECT-". Note in future supplicant will take */
/* dedicated p2p wdev to do this and then this 'hack'*/
/* is not needed anymore. */
ie_offset = DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN +
DOT11_BCN_PRB_FIXED_LEN;
ie_len = len - ie_offset;
if (vif == cfg->p2p.bss_idx[P2PAPI_BSSCFG_PRIMARY].vif)
vif = cfg->p2p.bss_idx[P2PAPI_BSSCFG_DEVICE].vif;
err = brcmf_vif_set_mgmt_ie(vif,
BRCMF_VNDR_IE_PRBRSP_FLAG,
&buf[ie_offset],
ie_len);
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, true,
GFP_KERNEL);
} else if (ieee80211_is_action(mgmt->frame_control)) {
af_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*af_params), GFP_KERNEL);
if (af_params == NULL) {
brcmf_err("unable to allocate frame\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto exit;
}
action_frame = &af_params->action_frame;
/* Add the packet Id */
action_frame->packet_id = cpu_to_le32(*cookie);
/* Add BSSID */
memcpy(&action_frame->da[0], &mgmt->da[0], ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&af_params->bssid[0], &mgmt->bssid[0], ETH_ALEN);
/* Add the length exepted for 802.11 header */
action_frame->len = cpu_to_le16(len - DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN);
/* Add the channel. Use the one specified as parameter if any or
* the current one (got from the firmware) otherwise
*/
if (chan)
freq = chan->center_freq;
else
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_get(vif->ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_CHANNEL,
&freq);
chan_nr = ieee80211_frequency_to_channel(freq);
af_params->channel = cpu_to_le32(chan_nr);
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Action frame, cookie=%lld, len=%d, freq=%d\n",
*cookie, le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len), freq);
ack = brcmf_p2p_send_action_frame(cfg, cfg_to_ndev(cfg),
af_params);
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, ack,
GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(af_params);
} else {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Unhandled, fc=%04x!!\n", mgmt->frame_control);
brcmf_dbg_hex_dump(true, buf, len, "payload, len=%zu\n", len);
}
exit:
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: [email protected] # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct wireless_dev *wdev,
struct cfg80211_mgmt_tx_params *params, u64 *cookie)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct ieee80211_channel *chan = params->chan;
const u8 *buf = params->buf;
size_t len = params->len;
const struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif;
s32 err = 0;
s32 ie_offset;
s32 ie_len;
struct brcmf_fil_action_frame_le *action_frame;
struct brcmf_fil_af_params_le *af_params;
bool ack;
s32 chan_nr;
u32 freq;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
*cookie = 0;
mgmt = (const struct ieee80211_mgmt *)buf;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(mgmt->frame_control)) {
brcmf_err("Driver only allows MGMT packet type\n");
return -EPERM;
}
vif = container_of(wdev, struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif, wdev);
if (ieee80211_is_probe_resp(mgmt->frame_control)) {
/* Right now the only reason to get a probe response */
/* is for p2p listen response or for p2p GO from */
/* wpa_supplicant. Unfortunately the probe is send */
/* on primary ndev, while dongle wants it on the p2p */
/* vif. Since this is only reason for a probe */
/* response to be sent, the vif is taken from cfg. */
/* If ever desired to send proberesp for non p2p */
/* response then data should be checked for */
/* "DIRECT-". Note in future supplicant will take */
/* dedicated p2p wdev to do this and then this 'hack'*/
/* is not needed anymore. */
ie_offset = DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN +
DOT11_BCN_PRB_FIXED_LEN;
ie_len = len - ie_offset;
if (vif == cfg->p2p.bss_idx[P2PAPI_BSSCFG_PRIMARY].vif)
vif = cfg->p2p.bss_idx[P2PAPI_BSSCFG_DEVICE].vif;
err = brcmf_vif_set_mgmt_ie(vif,
BRCMF_VNDR_IE_PRBRSP_FLAG,
&buf[ie_offset],
ie_len);
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, true,
GFP_KERNEL);
} else if (ieee80211_is_action(mgmt->frame_control)) {
if (len > BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE + DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN) {
brcmf_err("invalid action frame length\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
af_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*af_params), GFP_KERNEL);
if (af_params == NULL) {
brcmf_err("unable to allocate frame\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto exit;
}
action_frame = &af_params->action_frame;
/* Add the packet Id */
action_frame->packet_id = cpu_to_le32(*cookie);
/* Add BSSID */
memcpy(&action_frame->da[0], &mgmt->da[0], ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&af_params->bssid[0], &mgmt->bssid[0], ETH_ALEN);
/* Add the length exepted for 802.11 header */
action_frame->len = cpu_to_le16(len - DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN);
/* Add the channel. Use the one specified as parameter if any or
* the current one (got from the firmware) otherwise
*/
if (chan)
freq = chan->center_freq;
else
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_get(vif->ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_CHANNEL,
&freq);
chan_nr = ieee80211_frequency_to_channel(freq);
af_params->channel = cpu_to_le32(chan_nr);
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Action frame, cookie=%lld, len=%d, freq=%d\n",
*cookie, le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len), freq);
ack = brcmf_p2p_send_action_frame(cfg, cfg_to_ndev(cfg),
af_params);
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, ack,
GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(af_params);
} else {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Unhandled, fc=%04x!!\n", mgmt->frame_control);
brcmf_dbg_hex_dump(true, buf, len, "payload, len=%zu\n", len);
}
exit:
return err;
}
| 168,261 |
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