instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcSendEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
WindowPtr pWin;
WindowPtr effectiveFocus = NullWindow; /* only set if dest==InputFocus */
DeviceIntPtr dev = PickPointer(client);
DeviceIntPtr keybd = GetMaster(dev, MASTER_KEYBOARD);
SpritePtr pSprite = dev->spriteInfo->sprite;
REQUEST(xSendEventReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xSendEventReq);
/* libXext and other extension libraries may set the bit indicating
* that this event came from a SendEvent request so remove it
* since otherwise the event type may fail the range checks
* and cause an invalid BadValue error to be returned.
*
* This is safe to do since we later add the SendEvent bit (0x80)
* back in once we send the event to the client */
stuff->event.u.u.type &= ~(SEND_EVENT_BIT);
/* The client's event type must be a core event type or one defined by an
extension. */
if (!((stuff->event.u.u.type > X_Reply &&
stuff->event.u.u.type < LASTEvent) ||
(stuff->event.u.u.type >= EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE &&
stuff->event.u.u.type < (unsigned) lastEvent))) {
client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
if (stuff->event.u.u.type == ClientMessage &&
stuff->event.u.u.detail != 8 &&
stuff->event.u.u.detail != 16 && stuff->event.u.u.detail != 32) {
}
if (stuff->destination == PointerWindow)
pWin = pSprite->win;
else if (stuff->destination == InputFocus) {
WindowPtr inputFocus = (keybd) ? keybd->focus->win : NoneWin;
if (inputFocus == NoneWin)
return Success;
/* If the input focus is PointerRootWin, send the event to where
the pointer is if possible, then perhaps propogate up to root. */
if (inputFocus == PointerRootWin)
inputFocus = GetCurrentRootWindow(dev);
if (IsParent(inputFocus, pSprite->win)) {
effectiveFocus = inputFocus;
pWin = pSprite->win;
}
else
effectiveFocus = pWin = inputFocus;
}
else
dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->destination, client, DixSendAccess);
if (!pWin)
return BadWindow;
if ((stuff->propagate != xFalse) && (stuff->propagate != xTrue)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->propagate;
return BadValue;
}
stuff->event.u.u.type |= SEND_EVENT_BIT;
if (stuff->propagate) {
for (; pWin; pWin = pWin->parent) {
if (XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin,
&stuff->event, 1))
return Success;
if (DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin,
&stuff->event, 1, stuff->eventMask,
NullGrab))
return Success;
if (pWin == effectiveFocus)
return Success;
stuff->eventMask &= ~wDontPropagateMask(pWin);
if (!stuff->eventMask)
break;
}
}
else if (!XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin, &stuff->event, 1))
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin, &stuff->event,
1, stuff->eventMask, NullGrab);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ProcSendEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
WindowPtr pWin;
WindowPtr effectiveFocus = NullWindow; /* only set if dest==InputFocus */
DeviceIntPtr dev = PickPointer(client);
DeviceIntPtr keybd = GetMaster(dev, MASTER_KEYBOARD);
SpritePtr pSprite = dev->spriteInfo->sprite;
REQUEST(xSendEventReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xSendEventReq);
/* libXext and other extension libraries may set the bit indicating
* that this event came from a SendEvent request so remove it
* since otherwise the event type may fail the range checks
* and cause an invalid BadValue error to be returned.
*
* This is safe to do since we later add the SendEvent bit (0x80)
* back in once we send the event to the client */
stuff->event.u.u.type &= ~(SEND_EVENT_BIT);
/* The client's event type must be a core event type or one defined by an
extension. */
if (!((stuff->event.u.u.type > X_Reply &&
stuff->event.u.u.type < LASTEvent) ||
(stuff->event.u.u.type >= EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE &&
stuff->event.u.u.type < (unsigned) lastEvent))) {
client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
/* Generic events can have variable size, but SendEvent request holds
exactly 32B of event data. */
if (stuff->event.u.u.type == GenericEvent) {
client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
if (stuff->event.u.u.type == ClientMessage &&
stuff->event.u.u.detail != 8 &&
stuff->event.u.u.detail != 16 && stuff->event.u.u.detail != 32) {
}
if (stuff->destination == PointerWindow)
pWin = pSprite->win;
else if (stuff->destination == InputFocus) {
WindowPtr inputFocus = (keybd) ? keybd->focus->win : NoneWin;
if (inputFocus == NoneWin)
return Success;
/* If the input focus is PointerRootWin, send the event to where
the pointer is if possible, then perhaps propogate up to root. */
if (inputFocus == PointerRootWin)
inputFocus = GetCurrentRootWindow(dev);
if (IsParent(inputFocus, pSprite->win)) {
effectiveFocus = inputFocus;
pWin = pSprite->win;
}
else
effectiveFocus = pWin = inputFocus;
}
else
dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->destination, client, DixSendAccess);
if (!pWin)
return BadWindow;
if ((stuff->propagate != xFalse) && (stuff->propagate != xTrue)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->propagate;
return BadValue;
}
stuff->event.u.u.type |= SEND_EVENT_BIT;
if (stuff->propagate) {
for (; pWin; pWin = pWin->parent) {
if (XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin,
&stuff->event, 1))
return Success;
if (DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin,
&stuff->event, 1, stuff->eventMask,
NullGrab))
return Success;
if (pWin == effectiveFocus)
return Success;
stuff->eventMask &= ~wDontPropagateMask(pWin);
if (!stuff->eventMask)
break;
}
}
else if (!XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin, &stuff->event, 1))
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin, &stuff->event,
1, stuff->eventMask, NullGrab);
return Success;
}
| 164,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FT_Stream_EnterFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong count )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong read_bytes;
/* check for nested frame access */
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor == 0 );
if ( stream->read )
{
/* allocate the frame in memory */
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
/* simple sanity check */
if ( count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" frame size (%lu) larger than stream size (%lu)\n",
count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
/* assume _ft_debug_file and _ft_debug_lineno are already set */
stream->base = (unsigned char*)ft_mem_qalloc( memory, count, &error );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
#else
if ( FT_QALLOC( stream->base, count ) )
goto Exit;
#endif
/* read it */
read_bytes = stream->read( stream, stream->pos,
stream->base, count );
if ( read_bytes < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid read; expected %lu bytes, got %lu\n",
count, read_bytes ));
FT_FREE( stream->base );
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
}
stream->cursor = stream->base;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += read_bytes;
}
else
{
/* check current and new position */
if ( stream->pos >= stream->size ||
stream->pos + count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, count = %lu, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
/* set cursor */
stream->cursor = stream->base + stream->pos;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += count;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | FT_Stream_EnterFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong count )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong read_bytes;
/* check for nested frame access */
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor == 0 );
if ( stream->read )
{
/* allocate the frame in memory */
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
/* simple sanity check */
if ( count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" frame size (%lu) larger than stream size (%lu)\n",
count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
/* assume _ft_debug_file and _ft_debug_lineno are already set */
stream->base = (unsigned char*)ft_mem_qalloc( memory, count, &error );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
#else
if ( FT_QALLOC( stream->base, count ) )
goto Exit;
#endif
/* read it */
read_bytes = stream->read( stream, stream->pos,
stream->base, count );
if ( read_bytes < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid read; expected %lu bytes, got %lu\n",
count, read_bytes ));
FT_FREE( stream->base );
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
}
stream->cursor = stream->base;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += read_bytes;
}
else
{
/* check current and new position */
if ( stream->pos >= stream->size ||
stream->size - stream->pos < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, count = %lu, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
/* set cursor */
stream->cursor = stream->base + stream->pos;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += count;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
| 164,986 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InternalWebIntentsDispatcherTest() {
replied_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized member in ctor.
[email protected]
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10377180
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137606 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | InternalWebIntentsDispatcherTest() {
InternalWebIntentsDispatcherTest()
: replied_(0),
notified_reply_type_(webkit_glue::WEB_INTENT_REPLY_INVALID) {
}
| 170,761 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::OnShutdownTaskQueue(
const scoped_refptr<MainThreadTaskQueue>& task_queue) {
if (main_thread_only().was_shutdown)
return;
if (task_queue_throttler_)
task_queue_throttler_->ShutdownTaskQueue(task_queue.get());
if (task_runners_.erase(task_queue)) {
switch (task_queue->queue_class()) {
case MainThreadTaskQueue::QueueClass::kTimer:
task_queue->RemoveTaskObserver(
&main_thread_only().timer_task_cost_estimator);
case MainThreadTaskQueue::QueueClass::kLoading:
task_queue->RemoveTaskObserver(
&main_thread_only().loading_task_cost_estimator);
default:
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
[email protected]
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RendererSchedulerImpl::OnShutdownTaskQueue(
const scoped_refptr<MainThreadTaskQueue>& task_queue) {
if (main_thread_only().was_shutdown)
return;
if (task_queue_throttler_)
task_queue_throttler_->ShutdownTaskQueue(task_queue.get());
if (task_runners_.erase(task_queue)) {
switch (task_queue->queue_class()) {
case MainThreadTaskQueue::QueueClass::kTimer:
task_queue->RemoveTaskObserver(
&main_thread_only().timer_task_cost_estimator);
break;
case MainThreadTaskQueue::QueueClass::kLoading:
task_queue->RemoveTaskObserver(
&main_thread_only().loading_task_cost_estimator);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
| 172,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int NsGetParameter(preproc_effect_t *effect,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int NsGetParameter(preproc_effect_t *effect,
int NsGetParameter(preproc_effect_t *effect __unused,
void *pParam __unused,
uint32_t *pValueSize __unused,
void *pValue __unused)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
| 173,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int sc_asn1_read_tag(const u8 ** buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int *cla_out,
unsigned int *tag_out, size_t *taglen)
{
const u8 *p = *buf;
size_t left = buflen, len;
unsigned int cla, tag, i;
if (left < 2)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
*buf = NULL;
if (*p == 0xff || *p == 0) {
/* end of data reached */
*taglen = 0;
*tag_out = SC_ASN1_TAG_EOC;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
/* parse tag byte(s)
* Resulted tag is presented by integer that has not to be
* confused with the 'tag number' part of ASN.1 tag.
*/
cla = (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CLASS) | (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CONSTRUCTED);
tag = *p & SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE;
p++;
left--;
if (tag == SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE) {
/* high tag number */
size_t n = SC_ASN1_TAGNUM_SIZE - 1;
/* search the last tag octet */
while (left-- != 0 && n != 0) {
tag <<= 8;
tag |= *p;
if ((*p++ & 0x80) == 0)
break;
n--;
}
if (left == 0 || n == 0)
/* either an invalid tag or it doesn't fit in
* unsigned int */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
}
/* parse length byte(s) */
len = *p & 0x7f;
if (*p++ & 0x80) {
unsigned int a = 0;
if (len > 4 || len > left)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
left -= len;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
a <<= 8;
a |= *p;
p++;
}
len = a;
}
*cla_out = cla;
*tag_out = tag;
*taglen = len;
*buf = p;
if (len > left)
return SC_ERROR_ASN1_END_OF_CONTENTS;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int sc_asn1_read_tag(const u8 ** buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int *cla_out,
unsigned int *tag_out, size_t *taglen)
{
const u8 *p = *buf;
size_t left = buflen, len;
unsigned int cla, tag, i;
if (left < 2)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
*buf = NULL;
if (*p == 0xff || *p == 0) {
/* end of data reached */
*taglen = 0;
*tag_out = SC_ASN1_TAG_EOC;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
/* parse tag byte(s)
* Resulted tag is presented by integer that has not to be
* confused with the 'tag number' part of ASN.1 tag.
*/
cla = (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CLASS) | (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CONSTRUCTED);
tag = *p & SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE;
p++;
left--;
if (tag == SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE) {
/* high tag number */
size_t n = SC_ASN1_TAGNUM_SIZE - 1;
/* search the last tag octet */
while (left-- != 0 && n != 0) {
tag <<= 8;
tag |= *p;
if ((*p++ & 0x80) == 0)
break;
n--;
}
if (left == 0 || n == 0)
/* either an invalid tag or it doesn't fit in
* unsigned int */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
}
/* parse length byte(s) */
len = *p & 0x7f;
if (*p++ & 0x80) {
unsigned int a = 0;
left--;
if (len > 4 || len > left)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
left -= len;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
a <<= 8;
a |= *p;
p++;
}
len = a;
}
*cla_out = cla;
*tag_out = tag;
*taglen = len;
*buf = p;
if (len > left)
return SC_ERROR_ASN1_END_OF_CONTENTS;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int avpriv_ac3_parse_header(AC3HeaderInfo **phdr, const uint8_t *buf,
size_t size)
{
GetBitContext gb;
AC3HeaderInfo *hdr;
int err;
if (!*phdr)
*phdr = av_mallocz(sizeof(AC3HeaderInfo));
if (!*phdr)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
hdr = *phdr;
init_get_bits8(&gb, buf, size);
err = ff_ac3_parse_header(&gb, hdr);
if (err < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
return get_bits_count(&gb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/ac3_parser: Check init_get_bits8() for failure
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_6.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int avpriv_ac3_parse_header(AC3HeaderInfo **phdr, const uint8_t *buf,
size_t size)
{
GetBitContext gb;
AC3HeaderInfo *hdr;
int err;
if (!*phdr)
*phdr = av_mallocz(sizeof(AC3HeaderInfo));
if (!*phdr)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
hdr = *phdr;
err = init_get_bits8(&gb, buf, size);
if (err < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
err = ff_ac3_parse_header(&gb, hdr);
if (err < 0)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
return get_bits_count(&gb);
}
| 169,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 1);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13009/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it:
Add a comment giving the RFC for IPv6 mobility headers.
Clean up some bounds checks to make it clearer what they're checking, by
matching the subsequent EXTRACT_ calls or memcpy.
For the binding update, if none of the flag bits are set, don't check
the individual flag bits.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
}
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[1]);
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[hlen]);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[hlen], 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(-1);
}
| 167,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nm_ip4_config_commit (const NMIP4Config *config, int ifindex, guint32 default_route_metric)
{
NMIP4ConfigPrivate *priv = NM_IP4_CONFIG_GET_PRIVATE (config);
guint32 mtu = nm_ip4_config_get_mtu (config);
int i;
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex > 0, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex > 0, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (config != NULL, FALSE);
/* Addresses */
nm_platform_ip4_address_sync (ifindex, priv->addresses, default_route_metric);
/* Routes */
{
int count = nm_ip4_config_get_num_routes (config);
GArray *routes = g_array_sized_new (FALSE, FALSE, sizeof (NMPlatformIP4Route), count);
const NMPlatformIP4Route *route;
gboolean success;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
route = nm_ip4_config_get_route (config, i);
/* Don't add the route if it's more specific than one of the subnets
* the device already has an IP address on.
*/
if ( route->gateway == 0
&& nm_ip4_config_destination_is_direct (config, route->network, route->plen))
continue;
g_array_append_vals (routes, route, 1);
}
success = nm_route_manager_ip4_route_sync (nm_route_manager_get (), ifindex, routes);
g_array_unref (routes);
return FALSE;
}
/* MTU */
if (mtu && mtu != nm_platform_link_get_mtu (ifindex))
nm_platform_link_set_mtu (ifindex, mtu);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | nm_ip4_config_commit (const NMIP4Config *config, int ifindex, guint32 default_route_metric)
{
NMIP4ConfigPrivate *priv = NM_IP4_CONFIG_GET_PRIVATE (config);
int i;
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex > 0, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (ifindex > 0, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (config != NULL, FALSE);
/* Addresses */
nm_platform_ip4_address_sync (ifindex, priv->addresses, default_route_metric);
/* Routes */
{
int count = nm_ip4_config_get_num_routes (config);
GArray *routes = g_array_sized_new (FALSE, FALSE, sizeof (NMPlatformIP4Route), count);
const NMPlatformIP4Route *route;
gboolean success;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
route = nm_ip4_config_get_route (config, i);
/* Don't add the route if it's more specific than one of the subnets
* the device already has an IP address on.
*/
if ( route->gateway == 0
&& nm_ip4_config_destination_is_direct (config, route->network, route->plen))
continue;
g_array_append_vals (routes, route, 1);
}
success = nm_route_manager_ip4_route_sync (nm_route_manager_get (), ifindex, routes);
g_array_unref (routes);
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 164,815 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int sd_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct gendisk *disk = bdev->bd_disk;
struct scsi_disk *sdkp = scsi_disk(disk);
struct scsi_device *sdp = sdkp->device;
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int error;
SCSI_LOG_IOCTL(1, sd_printk(KERN_INFO, sdkp, "sd_ioctl: disk=%s, "
"cmd=0x%x\n", disk->disk_name, cmd));
/*
* If we are in the middle of error recovery, don't let anyone
* else try and use this device. Also, if error recovery fails, it
* may try and take the device offline, in which case all further
* access to the device is prohibited.
*/
error = scsi_nonblockable_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p,
(mode & FMODE_NDELAY) != 0);
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp) || !error)
goto out;
/*
* Send SCSI addressing ioctls directly to mid level, send other
* ioctls to block level and then onto mid level if they can't be
* resolved.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_IDLUN:
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_BUS_NUMBER:
error = scsi_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p);
break;
default:
error = scsi_cmd_blk_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, p);
if (error != -ENOTTY)
break;
error = scsi_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p);
break;
}
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int sd_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct gendisk *disk = bdev->bd_disk;
struct scsi_disk *sdkp = scsi_disk(disk);
struct scsi_device *sdp = sdkp->device;
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int error;
SCSI_LOG_IOCTL(1, sd_printk(KERN_INFO, sdkp, "sd_ioctl: disk=%s, "
"cmd=0x%x\n", disk->disk_name, cmd));
error = scsi_verify_blk_ioctl(bdev, cmd);
if (error < 0)
return error;
/*
* If we are in the middle of error recovery, don't let anyone
* else try and use this device. Also, if error recovery fails, it
* may try and take the device offline, in which case all further
* access to the device is prohibited.
*/
error = scsi_nonblockable_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p,
(mode & FMODE_NDELAY) != 0);
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp) || !error)
goto out;
/*
* Send SCSI addressing ioctls directly to mid level, send other
* ioctls to block level and then onto mid level if they can't be
* resolved.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_IDLUN:
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_BUS_NUMBER:
error = scsi_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p);
break;
default:
error = scsi_cmd_blk_ioctl(bdev, mode, cmd, p);
if (error != -ENOTTY)
break;
error = scsi_ioctl(sdp, cmd, p);
break;
}
out:
return error;
}
| 169,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: update_info_partition_on_linux_dmmp (Device *device)
{
const gchar *dm_name;
const gchar* const *targets_type;
const gchar* const *targets_params;
gchar *params;
gint linear_slave_major;
gint linear_slave_minor;
guint64 offset_sectors;
Device *linear_slave;
gchar *s;
params = NULL;
dm_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_NAME");
if (dm_name == NULL)
goto out;
targets_type = g_udev_device_get_property_as_strv (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE");
if (targets_type == NULL || g_strcmp0 (targets_type[0], "linear") != 0)
goto out;
goto out;
params = decode_udev_encoded_string (targets_params[0]);
if (sscanf (params,
"%d:%d %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT,
&linear_slave_major,
&linear_slave_minor,
&offset_sectors) != 3)
goto out;
linear_slave = daemon_local_find_by_dev (device->priv->daemon,
makedev (linear_slave_major, linear_slave_minor));
if (linear_slave == NULL)
goto out;
if (!linear_slave->priv->device_is_linux_dmmp)
goto out;
/* The Partition* properties has been set as part of
* update_info_partition() by reading UDISKS_PARTITION_*
* properties.. so here we bascially just update the presentation
* device file name and and whether the device is a drive.
*/
s = g_strdup_printf ("/dev/mapper/%s", dm_name);
device_set_device_file_presentation (device, s);
g_free (s);
device_set_device_is_drive (device, FALSE);
out:
g_free (params);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | update_info_partition_on_linux_dmmp (Device *device)
{
const gchar *dm_name;
const gchar* const *targets_type;
const gchar* const *targets_params;
gchar *params;
gint linear_slave_major;
gint linear_slave_minor;
guint64 offset_sectors;
Device *linear_slave;
gchar *s;
params = NULL;
dm_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_NAME");
if (dm_name == NULL)
goto out;
targets_type = g_udev_device_get_property_as_strv (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE");
/* If we ever need this for other types than "linear", remember to update
udisks-dm-export.c as well. */
if (targets_type == NULL || g_strcmp0 (targets_type[0], "linear") != 0)
goto out;
goto out;
params = decode_udev_encoded_string (targets_params[0]);
if (sscanf (params,
"%d:%d %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT,
&linear_slave_major,
&linear_slave_minor,
&offset_sectors) != 3)
goto out;
linear_slave = daemon_local_find_by_dev (device->priv->daemon,
makedev (linear_slave_major, linear_slave_minor));
if (linear_slave == NULL)
goto out;
if (!linear_slave->priv->device_is_linux_dmmp)
goto out;
/* The Partition* properties has been set as part of
* update_info_partition() by reading UDISKS_PARTITION_*
* properties.. so here we bascially just update the presentation
* device file name and and whether the device is a drive.
*/
s = g_strdup_printf ("/dev/mapper/%s", dm_name);
device_set_device_file_presentation (device, s);
g_free (s);
device_set_device_is_drive (device, FALSE);
out:
g_free (params);
return TRUE;
}
| 165,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_client_method());
#endif
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_client_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_client_method());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_client_method());
#endif
if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_client_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
| 165,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MockPrinter::UpdateSettings(int cookie,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* params,
const std::vector<int>& pages) {
EXPECT_EQ(document_cookie_, cookie);
params->Reset();
params->pages = pages;
SetPrintParams(&(params->params));
printer_status_ = PRINTER_PRINTING;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void MockPrinter::UpdateSettings(int cookie,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* params,
const std::vector<int>& pages) {
if (document_cookie_ == -1) {
document_cookie_ = CreateDocumentCookie();
}
params->Reset();
params->pages = pages;
SetPrintParams(&(params->params));
printer_status_ = PRINTER_PRINTING;
}
| 170,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
if (n < 0) {
jas_deprecated("negative count for jas_stream_pad");
}
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
| 168,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
{
static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e)
{
static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
}
| 167,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = kiocb->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret = 0;
switch (kiocb->ki_opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_left)))
break;
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(kiocb);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_read)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_left)))
break;
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(kiocb);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_write)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
break;
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(READ, kiocb, compat);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_read)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
break;
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(WRITE, kiocb, compat);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_write)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_fsync)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_fdsync;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_fsync)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_fsync;
break;
default:
dprintk("EINVAL: io_submit: no operation provided\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (!kiocb->ki_retry)
return ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = kiocb->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret = 0;
switch (kiocb->ki_opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_left)))
break;
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(READ, file, kiocb);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_read)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_left)))
break;
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(WRITE, file, kiocb);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_write)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
break;
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(READ, kiocb, compat);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_read)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
break;
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(WRITE, kiocb, compat);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_write)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_fsync)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_fdsync;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_fsync)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_fsync;
break;
default:
dprintk("EINVAL: io_submit: no operation provided\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (!kiocb->ki_retry)
return ret;
return 0;
}
| 167,611 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nfs4_close_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
int clear_rd, clear_wr, clear_rdwr;
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(calldata->arg.seqid, task) != 0)
return;
clear_rd = clear_wr = clear_rdwr = 0;
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
/* Calculate the change in open mode */
if (state->n_rdwr == 0) {
if (state->n_rdonly == 0) {
clear_rd |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
clear_rdwr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
if (state->n_wronly == 0) {
clear_wr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
clear_rdwr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
if (!clear_rd && !clear_wr && !clear_rdwr) {
/* Note: exit _without_ calling nfs4_close_done */
task->tk_action = NULL;
return;
}
nfs_fattr_init(calldata->res.fattr);
if (test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_DOWNGRADE];
calldata->arg.open_flags = FMODE_READ;
} else if (test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_DOWNGRADE];
calldata->arg.open_flags = FMODE_WRITE;
}
calldata->timestamp = jiffies;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static void nfs4_close_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
int clear_rd, clear_wr, clear_rdwr;
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(calldata->arg.seqid, task) != 0)
return;
clear_rd = clear_wr = clear_rdwr = 0;
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
/* Calculate the change in open mode */
if (state->n_rdwr == 0) {
if (state->n_rdonly == 0) {
clear_rd |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
clear_rdwr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
if (state->n_wronly == 0) {
clear_wr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
clear_rdwr |= test_and_clear_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
if (!clear_rd && !clear_wr && !clear_rdwr) {
/* Note: exit _without_ calling nfs4_close_done */
task->tk_action = NULL;
return;
}
nfs_fattr_init(calldata->res.fattr);
if (test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_DOWNGRADE];
calldata->arg.fmode = FMODE_READ;
} else if (test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_DOWNGRADE];
calldata->arg.fmode = FMODE_WRITE;
}
calldata->timestamp = jiffies;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
| 165,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static UINT drdynvc_virtual_channel_event_data_received(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc,
void* pData, UINT32 dataLength, UINT32 totalLength, UINT32 dataFlags)
{
wStream* data_in;
if ((dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_SUSPEND) || (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_RESUME))
{
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
if (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_FIRST)
{
if (drdynvc->data_in)
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = Stream_New(NULL, totalLength);
}
if (!(data_in = drdynvc->data_in))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(data_in, (int) dataLength))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity failed!");
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Stream_Write(data_in, pData, dataLength);
if (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_LAST)
{
if (Stream_Capacity(data_in) != Stream_GetPosition(data_in))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "drdynvc_plugin_process_received: read error");
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
Stream_SealLength(data_in);
Stream_SetPosition(data_in, 0);
if (!MessageQueue_Post(drdynvc->queue, NULL, 0, (void*) data_in, NULL))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "MessageQueue_Post failed!");
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | static UINT drdynvc_virtual_channel_event_data_received(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc,
void* pData, UINT32 dataLength, UINT32 totalLength, UINT32 dataFlags)
{
wStream* data_in;
if ((dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_SUSPEND) || (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_RESUME))
{
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
if (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_FIRST)
{
if (drdynvc->data_in)
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = Stream_New(NULL, totalLength);
}
if (!(data_in = drdynvc->data_in))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(data_in, dataLength))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity failed!");
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Stream_Write(data_in, pData, dataLength);
if (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_LAST)
{
if (Stream_Capacity(data_in) != Stream_GetPosition(data_in))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "drdynvc_plugin_process_received: read error");
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
Stream_SealLength(data_in);
Stream_SetPosition(data_in, 0);
if (!MessageQueue_Post(drdynvc->queue, NULL, 0, (void*) data_in, NULL))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "MessageQueue_Post failed!");
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
| 168,939 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, mode_t open_flags)
{
if ((delegation->type & open_flags) != open_flags)
return 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags))
return 0;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(delegation);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, mode_t open_flags)
static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, fmode_t fmode)
{
if ((delegation->type & fmode) != fmode)
return 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM, &delegation->flags))
return 0;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(delegation);
return 1;
}
| 165,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
{
/* convert pages-jiffies to Mbyte-usec */
stats->coremem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_rss_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
stats->virtmem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_vm_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
if (p->mm) {
/* adjust to KB unit */
stats->hiwater_rss = p->mm->hiwater_rss * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
stats->hiwater_vm = p->mm->hiwater_vm * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
}
stats->read_char = p->rchar;
stats->write_char = p->wchar;
stats->read_syscalls = p->syscr;
stats->write_syscalls = p->syscw;
}
Commit Message: [PATCH] xacct_add_tsk: fix pure theoretical ->mm use-after-free
Paranoid fix. The task can free its ->mm after the 'if (p->mm)' check.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <[email protected]>
Cc: Balbir Singh <[email protected]>
Cc: Jay Lan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void xacct_add_tsk(struct taskstats *stats, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
/* convert pages-jiffies to Mbyte-usec */
stats->coremem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_rss_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
stats->virtmem = jiffies_to_usecs(p->acct_vm_mem1) * PAGE_SIZE / MB;
mm = get_task_mm(p);
if (mm) {
/* adjust to KB unit */
stats->hiwater_rss = mm->hiwater_rss * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
stats->hiwater_vm = mm->hiwater_vm * PAGE_SIZE / KB;
mmput(mm);
}
stats->read_char = p->rchar;
stats->write_char = p->wchar;
stats->read_syscalls = p->syscr;
stats->write_syscalls = p->syscw;
}
| 165,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: hb_buffer_clear (hb_buffer_t *buffer)
{
buffer->have_output = FALSE;
buffer->have_positions = FALSE;
buffer->len = 0;
buffer->out_len = 0;
buffer->i = 0;
buffer->max_lig_id = 0;
buffer->max_lig_id = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | hb_buffer_clear (hb_buffer_t *buffer)
{
buffer->have_output = FALSE;
buffer->have_positions = FALSE;
buffer->in_error = FALSE;
buffer->len = 0;
buffer->out_len = 0;
buffer->i = 0;
buffer->max_lig_id = 0;
buffer->max_lig_id = 0;
}
| 164,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Add buffer range check to emptyBuffer
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: If351dbd573bb4aeb6968bfa33f6d407225bc752c
(cherry picked from commit d971df0eb300356b3c995d533289216f43aa60de)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
// rangeLength and rangeOffset must be a subset of the allocated data in the buffer.
// corner case: we permit rangeOffset == end-of-buffer with rangeLength == 0.
if (rangeOffset > header->nAllocLen
|| rangeLength > header->nAllocLen - rangeOffset) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer);
}
| 174,122 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int Tar::ReadHeaders( void )
{
FILE *in;
TarHeader lHeader;
TarRecord lRecord;
unsigned int iBegData = 0;
char buf_header[512];
in = fopen(mFilePath.fn_str(), "rb");
if(in == NULL)
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: File '%s' not found! Cannot read data."), mFilePath.c_str());
return 1;
}
wxString lDmodDizPath;
mmDmodDescription = _T("");
mInstalledDmodDirectory = _T("");
int total_read = 0;
while (true)
{
memset(&lHeader, 0, sizeof(TarHeader));
memset(&lRecord, 0, sizeof(TarRecord));
fread((char*)&lHeader.Name, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mode, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Size, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mtime, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Chksum, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkflag, 1, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkname, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Magic, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devmajor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devminor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Padding, 167, 1, in);
total_read += 512;
if(!VerifyChecksum(&lHeader))
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: This .dmod file has an invalid checksum! Cannot read file."));
return 1;
}
strncpy(lRecord.Name, lHeader.Name, 100);
if (strcmp(lHeader.Name, "\xFF") == 0)
continue;
sscanf((const char*)&lHeader.Size, "%o", &lRecord.iFileSize);
lRecord.iFilePosBegin = total_read;
if(strcmp(lHeader.Name, "") == 0)
{
break;
}
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
if (mInstalledDmodDirectory.Length() == 0)
{
mInstalledDmodDirectory = lPath.SubString( 0, lPath.Find( '/' ) );
lDmodDizPath = mInstalledDmodDirectory + _T("dmod.diz");
lDmodDizPath.LowerCase();
}
}
else
{
int remaining = lRecord.iFileSize;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
while (remaining > 0)
{
if (feof(in))
break; // TODO: error, unexpected end of file
int nb_read = fread(buf, 1, (remaining > BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ : remaining, in);
remaining -= nb_read;
}
}
total_read += lRecord.iFileSize;
TarRecords.push_back(lRecord);
int padding_size = (512 - (total_read % 512)) % 512;
fread(buf_header, 1, padding_size, in);
total_read += padding_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | int Tar::ReadHeaders( void )
{
FILE *in;
TarHeader lHeader;
TarRecord lRecord;
unsigned int iBegData = 0;
char buf_header[512];
in = fopen(mFilePath.fn_str(), "rb");
if(in == NULL)
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: File '%s' not found! Cannot read data."), mFilePath.c_str());
return 1;
}
wxString lDmodDizPath;
mmDmodDescription = _T("");
mInstalledDmodDirectory = _T("");
int total_read = 0;
while (true)
{
memset(&lHeader, 0, sizeof(TarHeader));
memset(&lRecord, 0, sizeof(TarRecord));
fread((char*)&lHeader.Name, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mode, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gid, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Size, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Mtime, 12, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Chksum, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkflag, 1, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Linkname, 100, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Magic, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Uname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Gname, 32, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devmajor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Devminor, 8, 1, in);
fread((char*)&lHeader.Padding, 167, 1, in);
total_read += 512;
if(!VerifyChecksum(&lHeader))
{
wxLogFatalError(_("Error: This .dmod file has an invalid checksum! Cannot read file."));
return 1;
}
strncpy(lRecord.Name, lHeader.Name, 100);
if (strcmp(lHeader.Name, "\xFF") == 0)
continue;
sscanf((const char*)&lHeader.Size, "%o", &lRecord.iFileSize);
lRecord.iFilePosBegin = total_read;
if(strcmp(lHeader.Name, "") == 0)
{
break;
}
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
wxString lPath(lRecord.Name, wxConvUTF8);
if (mInstalledDmodDirectory.Length() == 0)
{
// Security: ensure the D-Mod directory is non-empty
wxString firstDir = GetFirstDir(lPath);
if (firstDir.IsSameAs("", true) || firstDir.IsSameAs("..", true) || firstDir.IsSameAs("dink", true))
{
wxLogError(_("Error: invalid D-Mod directory. Stopping."));
return 1;
}
mInstalledDmodDirectory = firstDir;
lDmodDizPath = mInstalledDmodDirectory + _T("dmod.diz");
lDmodDizPath.LowerCase();
}
}
else
{
int remaining = lRecord.iFileSize;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
while (remaining > 0)
{
if (feof(in))
break; // TODO: error, unexpected end of file
int nb_read = fread(buf, 1, (remaining > BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ : remaining, in);
remaining -= nb_read;
}
}
total_read += lRecord.iFileSize;
TarRecords.push_back(lRecord);
int padding_size = (512 - (total_read % 512)) % 512;
fread(buf_header, 1, padding_size, in);
total_read += padding_size;
}
| 165,347 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltNumber(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemNumberPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemNumberPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
if (comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:number : compilation failed\n");
return;
}
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (comp == NULL))
return;
comp->numdata.doc = inst->doc;
comp->numdata.node = inst;
xsltNumberFormat(ctxt, &comp->numdata, node);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltNumber(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemNumberPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemNumberPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
int oldXPNsNr;
if (comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:number : compilation failed\n");
return;
}
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (comp == NULL))
return;
comp->numdata.doc = inst->doc;
comp->numdata.node = inst;
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
xsltNumberFormat(ctxt, &comp->numdata, node);
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
}
| 173,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unsigned long long Track::GetSeekPreRoll() const
{
return m_info.seekPreRoll;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | unsigned long long Track::GetSeekPreRoll() const
| 174,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NodeIterator::NodeIterator(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> rootNode, unsigned whatToShow, PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<NodeFilter> filter)
: NodeIteratorBase(rootNode, whatToShow, filter)
, m_referenceNode(root(), true)
{
root()->document().attachNodeIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix detached Attr nodes interaction with NodeIterator
- Don't register NodeIterator to document when attaching to Attr node.
-- NodeIterator is registered to its document to receive updateForNodeRemoval notifications.
-- However it wouldn't make sense on Attr nodes, as they never have children.
BUG=572537
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1577213003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#369687}
CWE ID: | NodeIterator::NodeIterator(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> rootNode, unsigned whatToShow, PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<NodeFilter> filter)
: NodeIteratorBase(rootNode, whatToShow, filter)
, m_referenceNode(root(), true)
{
// If NodeIterator target is Attr node, don't subscribe for nodeWillBeRemoved, as it would never have child nodes.
if (!root()->isAttributeNode())
root()->document().attachNodeIterator(this);
}
| 172,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
int tlen, int offset)
{
__wsum csum = skb->csum;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
return;
if (offset != 0)
csum = csum_sub(csum,
csum_partial(skb_transport_header(skb) + tlen,
offset, 0));
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_CHECKSUM, sizeof(__wsum), &csum);
}
Commit Message: ip: fix IP_CHECKSUM handling
The skbs processed by ip_cmsg_recv() are not guaranteed to
be linear e.g. when sending UDP packets over loopback with
MSGMORE.
Using csum_partial() on [potentially] the whole skb len
is dangerous; instead be on the safe side and use skb_checksum().
Thanks to syzkaller team to detect the issue and provide the
reproducer.
v1 -> v2:
- move the variable declaration in a tighter scope
Fixes: ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to ip_cmsg_recv")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
int tlen, int offset)
{
__wsum csum = skb->csum;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
return;
if (offset != 0) {
int tend_off = skb_transport_offset(skb) + tlen;
csum = csum_sub(csum, skb_checksum(skb, tend_off, offset, 0));
}
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_CHECKSUM, sizeof(__wsum), &csum);
}
| 168,345 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ext4_invalidatepage(struct page *page, unsigned long offset)
{
journal_t *journal = EXT4_JOURNAL(page->mapping->host);
/*
* If it's a full truncate we just forget about the pending dirtying
*/
if (offset == 0)
ClearPageChecked(page);
if (journal)
jbd2_journal_invalidatepage(journal, page, offset);
else
block_invalidatepage(page, offset);
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static void ext4_invalidatepage(struct page *page, unsigned long offset)
{
journal_t *journal = EXT4_JOURNAL(page->mapping->host);
/*
* free any io_end structure allocated for buffers to be discarded
*/
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(page->mapping->host))
ext4_invalidatepage_free_endio(page, offset);
/*
* If it's a full truncate we just forget about the pending dirtying
*/
if (offset == 0)
ClearPageChecked(page);
if (journal)
jbd2_journal_invalidatepage(journal, page, offset);
else
block_invalidatepage(page, offset);
}
| 167,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleGetPreview(const ListValue* args) {
DCHECK_EQ(3U, args->GetSize());
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> settings(GetSettingsDictionary(args));
if (!settings.get())
return;
int request_id = -1;
if (!settings->GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, &request_id))
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = static_cast<PrintPreviewUI*>(
web_ui()->GetController());
print_preview_ui->OnPrintPreviewRequest(request_id);
settings->SetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr,
print_preview_ui->GetPrintPreviewUIAddress());
++regenerate_preview_request_count_;
TabContents* initiator_tab = GetInitiatorTab();
if (!initiator_tab) {
ReportUserActionHistogram(INITIATOR_TAB_CLOSED);
print_preview_ui->OnClosePrintPreviewTab();
return;
}
bool display_header_footer = false;
if (!settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled,
&display_header_footer)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
if (display_header_footer) {
settings->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterTitle,
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetTitle());
std::string url;
NavigationEntry* entry =
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry)
url = entry->GetVirtualURL().spec();
settings->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterURL, url);
}
bool generate_draft_data = false;
bool success = settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData,
&generate_draft_data);
DCHECK(success);
if (!generate_draft_data) {
double draft_page_count_double = -1;
success = args->GetDouble(1, &draft_page_count_double);
DCHECK(success);
int draft_page_count = static_cast<int>(draft_page_count_double);
bool preview_modifiable = false;
success = args->GetBoolean(2, &preview_modifiable);
DCHECK(success);
if (draft_page_count != -1 && preview_modifiable &&
print_preview_ui->GetAvailableDraftPageCount() != draft_page_count) {
settings->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData, true);
}
}
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request start";
RenderViewHost* rvh = initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost();
rvh->Send(new PrintMsg_PrintPreview(rvh->GetRoutingID(), *settings));
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleGetPreview(const ListValue* args) {
DCHECK_EQ(3U, args->GetSize());
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> settings(GetSettingsDictionary(args));
if (!settings.get())
return;
int request_id = -1;
if (!settings->GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, &request_id))
return;
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = static_cast<PrintPreviewUI*>(
web_ui()->GetController());
print_preview_ui->OnPrintPreviewRequest(request_id);
settings->SetInteger(printing::kPreviewUIID,
print_preview_ui->GetIDForPrintPreviewUI());
++regenerate_preview_request_count_;
TabContents* initiator_tab = GetInitiatorTab();
if (!initiator_tab) {
ReportUserActionHistogram(INITIATOR_TAB_CLOSED);
print_preview_ui->OnClosePrintPreviewTab();
return;
}
bool display_header_footer = false;
if (!settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled,
&display_header_footer)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
if (display_header_footer) {
settings->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterTitle,
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetTitle());
std::string url;
NavigationEntry* entry =
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry)
url = entry->GetVirtualURL().spec();
settings->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterURL, url);
}
bool generate_draft_data = false;
bool success = settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData,
&generate_draft_data);
DCHECK(success);
if (!generate_draft_data) {
double draft_page_count_double = -1;
success = args->GetDouble(1, &draft_page_count_double);
DCHECK(success);
int draft_page_count = static_cast<int>(draft_page_count_double);
bool preview_modifiable = false;
success = args->GetBoolean(2, &preview_modifiable);
DCHECK(success);
if (draft_page_count != -1 && preview_modifiable &&
print_preview_ui->GetAvailableDraftPageCount() != draft_page_count) {
settings->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData, true);
}
}
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request start";
RenderViewHost* rvh = initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost();
rvh->Send(new PrintMsg_PrintPreview(rvh->GetRoutingID(), *settings));
}
| 170,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MemoryInfo *AcquireVirtualMemory(const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
MemoryInfo
*memory_info;
size_t
length;
length=count*quantum;
if ((count == 0) || (quantum != (length/count)))
{
errno=ENOMEM;
return((MemoryInfo *) NULL);
}
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) MagickAssumeAligned(AcquireAlignedMemory(1,
sizeof(*memory_info)));
if (memory_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(memory_info,0,sizeof(*memory_info));
memory_info->length=length;
memory_info->signature=MagickSignature;
if (AcquireMagickResource(MemoryResource,length) != MagickFalse)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireAlignedMemory(1,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=AlignedVirtualMemory;
else
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,length);
}
if ((memory_info->blob == NULL) &&
(AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,length) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Heap memory failed, try anonymous memory mapping.
*/
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(-1,IOMode,0,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
else
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,length);
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
{
int
file;
/*
Anonymous memory mapping failed, try file-backed memory mapping.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
if (file != -1)
{
if ((lseek(file,length-1,SEEK_SET) >= 0) && (write(file,"",1) == 1))
{
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(file,IOMode,0,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
{
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
(void) AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,length);
}
}
(void) close(file);
}
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireMagickMemory(length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=UnalignedVirtualMemory;
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
return(memory_info);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | MagickExport MemoryInfo *AcquireVirtualMemory(const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
MemoryInfo
*memory_info;
size_t
length;
length=count*quantum;
if ((count == 0) || (quantum != (length/count)))
{
errno=ENOMEM;
return((MemoryInfo *) NULL);
}
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) MagickAssumeAligned(AcquireAlignedMemory(1,
sizeof(*memory_info)));
if (memory_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(memory_info,0,sizeof(*memory_info));
memory_info->length=length;
memory_info->signature=MagickSignature;
if (AcquireMagickResource(MemoryResource,length) != MagickFalse)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireAlignedMemory(1,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=AlignedVirtualMemory;
else
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,length);
}
if ((memory_info->blob == NULL) &&
(AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,length) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Heap memory failed, try anonymous memory mapping.
*/
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(-1,IOMode,0,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
else
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,length);
}
if ((memory_info->blob == NULL) &&
(AcquireMagickResource(DiskResource,length) != MagickFalse))
{
int
file;
/*
Anonymous memory mapping failed, try file-backed memory mapping.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
if (file == -1)
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,length);
else
{
if ((lseek(file,length-1,SEEK_SET) < 0) || (write(file,"",1) != 1))
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,length);
else
{
if (AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,length) == MagickFalse)
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,length);
else
{
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(file,IOMode,0,length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
else
{
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,length);
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,length);
}
}
}
(void) close(file);
}
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireMagickMemory(length);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=UnalignedVirtualMemory;
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
return(memory_info);
}
| 168,859 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob(const GURL& blob_url,
const FilePath& virtual_path,
const FilePath& platform_path) {
FilePath::StringType extension = virtual_path.Extension();
if (!extension.empty())
extension = extension.substr(1); // Strip leading ".".
scoped_refptr<webkit_blob::ShareableFileReference> shareable_file =
webkit_blob::ShareableFileReference::Get(platform_path);
if (shareable_file &&
!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanReadFile(
process_id_, platform_path)) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->GrantReadFile(
process_id_, platform_path);
shareable_file->AddFinalReleaseCallback(
base::Bind(&RevokeFilePermission, process_id_));
}
std::string mime_type;
net::GetWellKnownMimeTypeFromExtension(extension, &mime_type);
BlobData::Item item;
item.SetToFilePathRange(platform_path, 0, -1, base::Time());
BlobStorageController* controller = blob_storage_context_->controller();
controller->StartBuildingBlob(blob_url);
controller->AppendBlobDataItem(blob_url, item);
controller->FinishBuildingBlob(blob_url, mime_type);
blob_urls_.insert(blob_url.spec());
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob(const GURL& blob_url,
const FileSystemURL& url,
const FilePath& platform_path) {
FilePath::StringType extension = url.path().Extension();
if (!extension.empty())
extension = extension.substr(1); // Strip leading ".".
scoped_refptr<webkit_blob::ShareableFileReference> shareable_file =
webkit_blob::ShareableFileReference::Get(platform_path);
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanReadFile(
process_id_, platform_path)) {
// If the underlying file system implementation is returning a new
// (likely temporary) snapshot file or the file is for sandboxed
// filesystems it's ok to grant permission here.
// (Note that we have also already checked if the renderer has the
// read permission for this file in OnCreateSnapshotFile.)
DCHECK(shareable_file ||
fileapi::SandboxMountPointProvider::CanHandleType(url.type()));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->GrantReadFile(
process_id_, platform_path);
if (shareable_file) {
// This will revoke all permissions for the file when the last ref
// of the file is dropped (assuming it's ok).
shareable_file->AddFinalReleaseCallback(
base::Bind(&RevokeFilePermission, process_id_));
}
}
std::string mime_type;
net::GetWellKnownMimeTypeFromExtension(extension, &mime_type);
BlobData::Item item;
item.SetToFilePathRange(platform_path, 0, -1, base::Time());
BlobStorageController* controller = blob_storage_context_->controller();
controller->StartBuildingBlob(blob_url);
controller->AppendBlobDataItem(blob_url, item);
controller->FinishBuildingBlob(blob_url, mime_type);
blob_urls_.insert(blob_url.spec());
}
| 171,587 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void parse_sec_attr_44(sc_file_t *file, const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
/* OpenSc Operation values for each command operation-type */
const int df_idx[8] = { /* byte 1 = OpenSC type of AC Bit0, byte 2 = OpenSC type of AC Bit1 ...*/
SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_CREATE, SC_AC_OP_CREATE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
SC_AC_OP_LOCK, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, -1};
const int ef_idx[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_WRITE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
-1, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, -1};
const int efi_idx[8] = { /* internal EF used for RSA keys */
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
-1, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, -1};
u8 bValue;
int i;
int iKeyRef = 0;
int iMethod;
int iPinCount;
int iOffset = 0;
int iOperation;
const int* p_idx;
/* Check all sub-AC definitions within the total AC */
while (len > 1) { /* minimum length = 2 */
int iACLen = buf[iOffset] & 0x0F;
iPinCount = -1; /* default no pin required */
iMethod = SC_AC_NONE; /* default no authentication required */
if (buf[iOffset] & 0X80) { /* AC in adaptive coding */
/* Evaluates only the command-byte, not the optional P1/P2/Option bytes */
int iParmLen = 1; /* command-byte is always present */
int iKeyLen = 0; /* Encryption key is optional */
if (buf[iOffset] & 0x20) iKeyLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x40) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x20) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x10) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x08) iParmLen++;
/* Get KeyNumber if available */
if(iKeyLen) {
int iSC = buf[iOffset+iACLen];
switch( (iSC>>5) & 0x03 ){
case 0:
iMethod = SC_AC_TERM; /* key authentication */
break;
case 1:
iMethod = SC_AC_AUT; /* key authentication */
break;
case 2:
case 3:
iMethod = SC_AC_PRO; /* secure messaging */
break;
}
iKeyRef = iSC & 0x1F; /* get key number */
}
/* Get PinNumber if available */
if (iACLen > (1+iParmLen+iKeyLen)) { /* check via total length if pin is present */
iKeyRef = buf[iOffset+1+1+iParmLen]; /* PTL + AM-header + parameter-bytes */
iMethod = SC_AC_CHV;
}
/* Convert SETCOS command to OpenSC command group */
switch(buf[iOffset+2]){
case 0x2A: /* crypto operation */
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_CRYPTO;
break;
case 0x46: /* key-generation operation */
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_UPDATE;
break;
default:
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_SELECT;
break;
}
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, iOperation, iMethod, iKeyRef);
}
else { /* AC in simple coding */
/* Initial AC is treated as an operational AC */
/* Get specific Cmd groups for specified file-type */
switch (file->type) {
case SC_FILE_TYPE_DF: /* DF */
p_idx = df_idx;
break;
case SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF: /* EF for RSA keys */
p_idx = efi_idx;
break;
default: /* EF */
p_idx = ef_idx;
break;
}
/* Encryption key present ? */
iPinCount = iACLen - 1;
if (buf[iOffset] & 0x20) {
int iSC = buf[iOffset + iACLen];
switch( (iSC>>5) & 0x03 ) {
case 0:
iMethod = SC_AC_TERM; /* key authentication */
break;
case 1:
iMethod = SC_AC_AUT; /* key authentication */
break;
case 2:
case 3:
iMethod = SC_AC_PRO; /* secure messaging */
break;
}
iKeyRef = iSC & 0x1F; /* get key number */
iPinCount--; /* one byte used for keyReference */
}
/* Pin present ? */
if ( iPinCount > 0 ) {
iKeyRef = buf[iOffset + 2]; /* pin ref */
iMethod = SC_AC_CHV;
}
/* Add AC for each command-operationType into OpenSc structure */
bValue = buf[iOffset + 1];
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if((bValue & 1) && (p_idx[i] >= 0))
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, p_idx[i], iMethod, iKeyRef);
bValue >>= 1;
}
}
/* Current field treated, get next AC sub-field */
iOffset += iACLen +1; /* AC + PTL-byte */
len -= iACLen +1;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void parse_sec_attr_44(sc_file_t *file, const u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
/* OpenSc Operation values for each command operation-type */
const int df_idx[8] = { /* byte 1 = OpenSC type of AC Bit0, byte 2 = OpenSC type of AC Bit1 ...*/
SC_AC_OP_DELETE, SC_AC_OP_CREATE, SC_AC_OP_CREATE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
SC_AC_OP_LOCK, SC_AC_OP_DELETE, -1};
const int ef_idx[8] = {
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, SC_AC_OP_WRITE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
-1, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, -1};
const int efi_idx[8] = { /* internal EF used for RSA keys */
SC_AC_OP_READ, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE,
SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
-1, SC_AC_OP_ERASE, -1};
u8 bValue;
int i;
int iKeyRef = 0;
int iMethod;
int iPinCount;
int iOffset = 0;
int iOperation;
const int* p_idx;
/* Check all sub-AC definitions within the total AC */
while (len > 1) { /* minimum length = 2 */
int iACLen = buf[iOffset] & 0x0F;
if ((size_t) iACLen > len)
break;
iPinCount = -1; /* default no pin required */
iMethod = SC_AC_NONE; /* default no authentication required */
if (buf[iOffset] & 0X80) { /* AC in adaptive coding */
/* Evaluates only the command-byte, not the optional P1/P2/Option bytes */
int iParmLen = 1; /* command-byte is always present */
int iKeyLen = 0; /* Encryption key is optional */
if (buf[iOffset] & 0x20) iKeyLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x40) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x20) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x10) iParmLen++;
if (buf[iOffset+1] & 0x08) iParmLen++;
/* Get KeyNumber if available */
if(iKeyLen) {
int iSC;
if (len < 1+iACLen)
break;
iSC = buf[iOffset+iACLen];
switch( (iSC>>5) & 0x03 ){
case 0:
iMethod = SC_AC_TERM; /* key authentication */
break;
case 1:
iMethod = SC_AC_AUT; /* key authentication */
break;
case 2:
case 3:
iMethod = SC_AC_PRO; /* secure messaging */
break;
}
iKeyRef = iSC & 0x1F; /* get key number */
}
/* Get PinNumber if available */
if (iACLen > (1+iParmLen+iKeyLen)) { /* check via total length if pin is present */
if (len < 1+1+1+iParmLen)
break;
iKeyRef = buf[iOffset+1+1+iParmLen]; /* PTL + AM-header + parameter-bytes */
iMethod = SC_AC_CHV;
}
/* Convert SETCOS command to OpenSC command group */
if (len < 1+2)
break;
switch(buf[iOffset+2]){
case 0x2A: /* crypto operation */
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_CRYPTO;
break;
case 0x46: /* key-generation operation */
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_UPDATE;
break;
default:
iOperation = SC_AC_OP_SELECT;
break;
}
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, iOperation, iMethod, iKeyRef);
}
else { /* AC in simple coding */
/* Initial AC is treated as an operational AC */
/* Get specific Cmd groups for specified file-type */
switch (file->type) {
case SC_FILE_TYPE_DF: /* DF */
p_idx = df_idx;
break;
case SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF: /* EF for RSA keys */
p_idx = efi_idx;
break;
default: /* EF */
p_idx = ef_idx;
break;
}
/* Encryption key present ? */
iPinCount = iACLen - 1;
if (buf[iOffset] & 0x20) {
int iSC;
if (len < 1 + iACLen)
break;
iSC = buf[iOffset + iACLen];
switch( (iSC>>5) & 0x03 ) {
case 0:
iMethod = SC_AC_TERM; /* key authentication */
break;
case 1:
iMethod = SC_AC_AUT; /* key authentication */
break;
case 2:
case 3:
iMethod = SC_AC_PRO; /* secure messaging */
break;
}
iKeyRef = iSC & 0x1F; /* get key number */
iPinCount--; /* one byte used for keyReference */
}
/* Pin present ? */
if ( iPinCount > 0 ) {
if (len < 1 + 2)
break;
iKeyRef = buf[iOffset + 2]; /* pin ref */
iMethod = SC_AC_CHV;
}
/* Add AC for each command-operationType into OpenSc structure */
bValue = buf[iOffset + 1];
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if((bValue & 1) && (p_idx[i] >= 0))
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, p_idx[i], iMethod, iKeyRef);
bValue >>= 1;
}
}
/* Current field treated, get next AC sub-field */
iOffset += iACLen +1; /* AC + PTL-byte */
len -= iACLen +1;
}
}
| 169,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void silk_NLSF_stabilize(
opus_int16 *NLSF_Q15, /* I/O Unstable/stabilized normalized LSF vector in Q15 [L] */
const opus_int16 *NDeltaMin_Q15, /* I Min distance vector, NDeltaMin_Q15[L] must be >= 1 [L+1] */
const opus_int L /* I Number of NLSF parameters in the input vector */
)
{
opus_int i, I=0, k, loops;
opus_int16 center_freq_Q15;
opus_int32 diff_Q15, min_diff_Q15, min_center_Q15, max_center_Q15;
/* This is necessary to ensure an output within range of a opus_int16 */
silk_assert( NDeltaMin_Q15[L] >= 1 );
for( loops = 0; loops < MAX_LOOPS; loops++ ) {
/**************************/
/* Find smallest distance */
/**************************/
/* First element */
min_diff_Q15 = NLSF_Q15[0] - NDeltaMin_Q15[0];
I = 0;
/* Middle elements */
for( i = 1; i <= L-1; i++ ) {
diff_Q15 = NLSF_Q15[i] - ( NLSF_Q15[i-1] + NDeltaMin_Q15[i] );
if( diff_Q15 < min_diff_Q15 ) {
min_diff_Q15 = diff_Q15;
I = i;
}
}
/* Last element */
diff_Q15 = ( 1 << 15 ) - ( NLSF_Q15[L-1] + NDeltaMin_Q15[L] );
if( diff_Q15 < min_diff_Q15 ) {
min_diff_Q15 = diff_Q15;
I = L;
}
/***************************************************/
/* Now check if the smallest distance non-negative */
/***************************************************/
if( min_diff_Q15 >= 0 ) {
return;
}
if( I == 0 ) {
/* Move away from lower limit */
NLSF_Q15[0] = NDeltaMin_Q15[0];
} else if( I == L) {
/* Move away from higher limit */
NLSF_Q15[L-1] = ( 1 << 15 ) - NDeltaMin_Q15[L];
} else {
/* Find the lower extreme for the location of the current center frequency */
min_center_Q15 = 0;
for( k = 0; k < I; k++ ) {
min_center_Q15 += NDeltaMin_Q15[k];
}
min_center_Q15 += silk_RSHIFT( NDeltaMin_Q15[I], 1 );
/* Find the upper extreme for the location of the current center frequency */
max_center_Q15 = 1 << 15;
for( k = L; k > I; k-- ) {
max_center_Q15 -= NDeltaMin_Q15[k];
}
max_center_Q15 -= silk_RSHIFT( NDeltaMin_Q15[I], 1 );
/* Move apart, sorted by value, keeping the same center frequency */
center_freq_Q15 = (opus_int16)silk_LIMIT_32( silk_RSHIFT_ROUND( (opus_int32)NLSF_Q15[I-1] + (opus_int32)NLSF_Q15[I], 1 ),
min_center_Q15, max_center_Q15 );
NLSF_Q15[I-1] = center_freq_Q15 - silk_RSHIFT( NDeltaMin_Q15[I], 1 );
NLSF_Q15[I] = NLSF_Q15[I-1] + NDeltaMin_Q15[I];
}
}
/* Safe and simple fall back method, which is less ideal than the above */
if( loops == MAX_LOOPS )
{
/* Insertion sort (fast for already almost sorted arrays): */
/* Best case: O(n) for an already sorted array */
/* Worst case: O(n^2) for an inversely sorted array */
silk_insertion_sort_increasing_all_values_int16( &NLSF_Q15[0], L );
/* First NLSF should be no less than NDeltaMin[0] */
NLSF_Q15[0] = silk_max_int( NLSF_Q15[0], NDeltaMin_Q15[0] );
/* Keep delta_min distance between the NLSFs */
for( i = 1; i < L; i++ )
NLSF_Q15[i] = silk_max_int( NLSF_Q15[i], NLSF_Q15[i-1] + NDeltaMin_Q15[i] );
/* Last NLSF should be no higher than 1 - NDeltaMin[L] */
NLSF_Q15[L-1] = silk_min_int( NLSF_Q15[L-1], (1<<15) - NDeltaMin_Q15[L] );
/* Keep NDeltaMin distance between the NLSFs */
for( i = L-2; i >= 0; i-- )
NLSF_Q15[i] = silk_min_int( NLSF_Q15[i], NLSF_Q15[i+1] - NDeltaMin_Q15[i+1] );
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure that NLSF cannot be negative when computing a min distance between them
b/31607432
Signed-off-by: Jean-Marc Valin <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit d9d5ac4027c5ee1da2ff1c6572ae3b35a845db19)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void silk_NLSF_stabilize(
opus_int16 *NLSF_Q15, /* I/O Unstable/stabilized normalized LSF vector in Q15 [L] */
const opus_int16 *NDeltaMin_Q15, /* I Min distance vector, NDeltaMin_Q15[L] must be >= 1 [L+1] */
const opus_int L /* I Number of NLSF parameters in the input vector */
)
{
opus_int i, I=0, k, loops;
opus_int16 center_freq_Q15;
opus_int32 diff_Q15, min_diff_Q15, min_center_Q15, max_center_Q15;
/* This is necessary to ensure an output within range of a opus_int16 */
silk_assert( NDeltaMin_Q15[L] >= 1 );
for( loops = 0; loops < MAX_LOOPS; loops++ ) {
/**************************/
/* Find smallest distance */
/**************************/
/* First element */
min_diff_Q15 = NLSF_Q15[0] - NDeltaMin_Q15[0];
I = 0;
/* Middle elements */
for( i = 1; i <= L-1; i++ ) {
diff_Q15 = NLSF_Q15[i] - ( NLSF_Q15[i-1] + NDeltaMin_Q15[i] );
if( diff_Q15 < min_diff_Q15 ) {
min_diff_Q15 = diff_Q15;
I = i;
}
}
/* Last element */
diff_Q15 = ( 1 << 15 ) - ( NLSF_Q15[L-1] + NDeltaMin_Q15[L] );
if( diff_Q15 < min_diff_Q15 ) {
min_diff_Q15 = diff_Q15;
I = L;
}
/***************************************************/
/* Now check if the smallest distance non-negative */
/***************************************************/
if( min_diff_Q15 >= 0 ) {
return;
}
if( I == 0 ) {
/* Move away from lower limit */
NLSF_Q15[0] = NDeltaMin_Q15[0];
} else if( I == L) {
/* Move away from higher limit */
NLSF_Q15[L-1] = ( 1 << 15 ) - NDeltaMin_Q15[L];
} else {
/* Find the lower extreme for the location of the current center frequency */
min_center_Q15 = 0;
for( k = 0; k < I; k++ ) {
min_center_Q15 += NDeltaMin_Q15[k];
}
min_center_Q15 += silk_RSHIFT( NDeltaMin_Q15[I], 1 );
/* Find the upper extreme for the location of the current center frequency */
max_center_Q15 = 1 << 15;
for( k = L; k > I; k-- ) {
max_center_Q15 -= NDeltaMin_Q15[k];
}
max_center_Q15 -= silk_RSHIFT( NDeltaMin_Q15[I], 1 );
/* Move apart, sorted by value, keeping the same center frequency */
center_freq_Q15 = (opus_int16)silk_LIMIT_32( silk_RSHIFT_ROUND( (opus_int32)NLSF_Q15[I-1] + (opus_int32)NLSF_Q15[I], 1 ),
min_center_Q15, max_center_Q15 );
NLSF_Q15[I-1] = center_freq_Q15 - silk_RSHIFT( NDeltaMin_Q15[I], 1 );
NLSF_Q15[I] = NLSF_Q15[I-1] + NDeltaMin_Q15[I];
}
}
/* Safe and simple fall back method, which is less ideal than the above */
if( loops == MAX_LOOPS )
{
/* Insertion sort (fast for already almost sorted arrays): */
/* Best case: O(n) for an already sorted array */
/* Worst case: O(n^2) for an inversely sorted array */
silk_insertion_sort_increasing_all_values_int16( &NLSF_Q15[0], L );
/* First NLSF should be no less than NDeltaMin[0] */
NLSF_Q15[0] = silk_max_int( NLSF_Q15[0], NDeltaMin_Q15[0] );
/* Keep delta_min distance between the NLSFs */
for( i = 1; i < L; i++ )
NLSF_Q15[i] = silk_max_int( NLSF_Q15[i], silk_ADD_SAT16( NLSF_Q15[i-1], NDeltaMin_Q15[i] ) );
/* Last NLSF should be no higher than 1 - NDeltaMin[L] */
NLSF_Q15[L-1] = silk_min_int( NLSF_Q15[L-1], (1<<15) - NDeltaMin_Q15[L] );
/* Keep NDeltaMin distance between the NLSFs */
for( i = L-2; i >= 0; i-- )
NLSF_Q15[i] = silk_min_int( NLSF_Q15[i], NLSF_Q15[i+1] - NDeltaMin_Q15[i+1] );
}
}
| 174,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_cdtext_generic (void *p_user_data)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = p_user_data;
uint8_t *p_cdtext_data = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!p_env) return NULL;
if (p_env->b_cdtext_error) return NULL;
if (NULL == p_env->cdtext) {
p_cdtext_data = read_cdtext_generic (p_env);
if (NULL != p_cdtext_data) {
len = CDIO_MMC_GET_LEN16(p_cdtext_data)-2;
p_env->cdtext = cdtext_init();
if(len <= 0 || 0 != cdtext_data_init (p_env->cdtext, &p_cdtext_data[4], len)) {
p_env->b_cdtext_error = true;
cdtext_destroy (p_env->cdtext);
free(p_env->cdtext);
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
}
}
free(p_cdtext_data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415 | get_cdtext_generic (void *p_user_data)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = p_user_data;
uint8_t *p_cdtext_data = NULL;
size_t len;
if (!p_env) return NULL;
if (p_env->b_cdtext_error) return NULL;
if (NULL == p_env->cdtext) {
p_cdtext_data = read_cdtext_generic (p_env);
if (NULL != p_cdtext_data) {
len = CDIO_MMC_GET_LEN16(p_cdtext_data)-2;
p_env->cdtext = cdtext_init();
if(len <= 0 || 0 != cdtext_data_init (p_env->cdtext, &p_cdtext_data[4], len)) {
p_env->b_cdtext_error = true;
free(p_env->cdtext);
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
}
}
free(p_cdtext_data);
}
}
| 165,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool parse_reconnect(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *sockaddr_url, *stratum_port, *tmp;
char *url, *port, address[256];
if (opt_disable_client_reconnect) {
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Stratum client.reconnect forbidden, aborting.");
return false;
}
memset(address, 0, 255);
url = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 0));
if (!url)
url = pool->sockaddr_url;
port = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!port)
port = pool->stratum_port;
sprintf(address, "%s:%s", url, port);
if (!extract_sockaddr(address, &sockaddr_url, &stratum_port))
return false;
applog(LOG_NOTICE, "Reconnect requested from %s to %s", get_pool_name(pool), address);
clear_pool_work(pool);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
__suspend_stratum(pool);
tmp = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->sockaddr_url = sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
free(tmp);
tmp = pool->stratum_port;
pool->stratum_port = stratum_port;
free(tmp);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (!restart_stratum(pool)) {
pool_failed(pool);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_reconnect(): treat pool-sent URL as untrusted.
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <[email protected]> for reminding
that this existed and highlighting the offender.
Also to Luke-jr for actually fixing this in bfgminer. :D
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static bool parse_reconnect(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
if (opt_disable_client_reconnect) {
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Stratum client.reconnect received but is disabled, not reconnecting.");
return false;
}
char *url, *port, address[256];
char *sockaddr_url, *stratum_port, *tmp; /* Tempvars. */
url = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 0));
if (!url)
url = pool->sockaddr_url;
port = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!port)
port = pool->stratum_port;
snprintf(address, sizeof(address), "%s:%s", url, port);
if (!extract_sockaddr(address, &sockaddr_url, &stratum_port))
return false;
applog(LOG_NOTICE, "Reconnect requested from %s to %s", get_pool_name(pool), address);
clear_pool_work(pool);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
__suspend_stratum(pool);
tmp = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->sockaddr_url = sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
free(tmp);
tmp = pool->stratum_port;
pool->stratum_port = stratum_port;
free(tmp);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (!restart_stratum(pool)) {
pool_failed(pool);
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 169,907 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: construct_command_line(struct manager_ctx *manager, struct server *server)
{
static char cmd[BUF_SIZE];
char *method = manager->method;
int i;
build_config(working_dir, server);
if (server->method) method = server->method;
memset(cmd, 0, BUF_SIZE);
snprintf(cmd, BUF_SIZE,
"%s -m %s --manager-address %s -f %s/.shadowsocks_%s.pid -c %s/.shadowsocks_%s.conf",
executable, method, manager->manager_address,
working_dir, server->port, working_dir, server->port);
if (manager->acl != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --acl %s", manager->acl);
}
if (manager->timeout != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -t %s", manager->timeout);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
if (manager->nofile) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -n %d", manager->nofile);
}
#endif
if (manager->user != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -a %s", manager->user);
}
if (manager->verbose) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -v");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == UDP_ONLY) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -U");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == TCP_AND_UDP) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -u");
}
if (server->fast_open[0] == 0 && manager->fast_open) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --fast-open");
}
if (manager->ipv6first) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -6");
}
if (manager->mtu) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --mtu %d", manager->mtu);
}
if (server->plugin == NULL && manager->plugin) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin \"%s\"", manager->plugin);
}
if (server->plugin_opts == NULL && manager->plugin_opts) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin-opts \"%s\"", manager->plugin_opts);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->nameserver_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -d %s", manager->nameservers[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->host_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -s %s", manager->hosts[i]);
}
{
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --reuse-port");
}
if (verbose) {
LOGI("cmd: %s", cmd);
}
return cmd;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1734
CWE ID: CWE-78 | construct_command_line(struct manager_ctx *manager, struct server *server)
{
static char cmd[BUF_SIZE];
int i;
int port;
port = atoi(server->port);
build_config(working_dir, manager, server);
memset(cmd, 0, BUF_SIZE);
snprintf(cmd, BUF_SIZE,
"%s --manager-address %s -f %s/.shadowsocks_%d.pid -c %s/.shadowsocks_%d.conf",
executable, manager->manager_address, working_dir, port, working_dir, port);
if (manager->acl != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --acl %s", manager->acl);
}
if (manager->timeout != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -t %s", manager->timeout);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
if (manager->nofile) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -n %d", manager->nofile);
}
#endif
if (manager->user != NULL) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -a %s", manager->user);
}
if (manager->verbose) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -v");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == UDP_ONLY) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -U");
}
if (server->mode == NULL && manager->mode == TCP_AND_UDP) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -u");
}
if (server->fast_open[0] == 0 && manager->fast_open) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --fast-open");
}
if (manager->ipv6first) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -6");
}
if (manager->mtu) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --mtu %d", manager->mtu);
}
if (server->plugin == NULL && manager->plugin) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin \"%s\"", manager->plugin);
}
if (server->plugin_opts == NULL && manager->plugin_opts) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --plugin-opts \"%s\"", manager->plugin_opts);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->nameserver_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -d %s", manager->nameservers[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < manager->host_num; i++) {
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " -s %s", manager->hosts[i]);
}
{
int len = strlen(cmd);
snprintf(cmd + len, BUF_SIZE - len, " --reuse-port");
}
if (verbose) {
LOGI("cmd: %s", cmd);
}
return cmd;
}
| 167,714 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: display_log(struct display *dp, error_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
/* 'level' is as above, fmt is a stdio style format string. This routine
* does not return if level is above LIBPNG_WARNING
*/
{
dp->results |= 1U << level;
if (level > (error_level)(dp->options & LEVEL_MASK))
{
const char *lp;
va_list ap;
switch (level)
{
case INFORMATION: lp = "information"; break;
case LIBPNG_WARNING: lp = "warning(libpng)"; break;
case APP_WARNING: lp = "warning(pngimage)"; break;
case APP_FAIL: lp = "error(continuable)"; break;
case LIBPNG_ERROR: lp = "error(libpng)"; break;
case LIBPNG_BUG: lp = "bug(libpng)"; break;
case APP_ERROR: lp = "error(pngimage)"; break;
case USER_ERROR: lp = "error(user)"; break;
case INTERNAL_ERROR: /* anything unexpected is an internal error: */
case VERBOSE: case WARNINGS: case ERRORS: case QUIET:
default: lp = "bug(pngimage)"; break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: %s",
dp->filename != NULL ? dp->filename : "<stdin>", lp, dp->operation);
if (dp->transforms != 0)
{
int tr = dp->transforms;
if (is_combo(tr))
fprintf(stderr, "(0x%x)", tr);
else
fprintf(stderr, "(%s)", transform_name(tr));
}
fprintf(stderr, ": ");
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
/* else do not output any message */
/* Errors cause this routine to exit to the fail code */
if (level > APP_FAIL || (level > ERRORS && !(dp->options & CONTINUE)))
longjmp(dp->error_return, level);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | display_log(struct display *dp, error_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
/* 'level' is as above, fmt is a stdio style format string. This routine
* does not return if level is above LIBPNG_WARNING
*/
{
dp->results |= 1U << level;
if (level > (error_level)(dp->options & LEVEL_MASK))
{
const char *lp;
va_list ap;
switch (level)
{
case INFORMATION: lp = "information"; break;
case LIBPNG_WARNING: lp = "warning(libpng)"; break;
case APP_WARNING: lp = "warning(pngimage)"; break;
case APP_FAIL: lp = "error(continuable)"; break;
case LIBPNG_ERROR: lp = "error(libpng)"; break;
case LIBPNG_BUG: lp = "bug(libpng)"; break;
case APP_ERROR: lp = "error(pngimage)"; break;
case USER_ERROR: lp = "error(user)"; break;
case INTERNAL_ERROR: /* anything unexpected is an internal error: */
case VERBOSE: case WARNINGS: case ERRORS: case QUIET:
default: lp = "bug(pngimage)"; break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: %s",
dp->filename != NULL ? dp->filename : "<stdin>", lp, dp->operation);
if (dp->transforms != 0)
{
int tr = dp->transforms;
if (is_combo(tr))
{
if (dp->options & LIST_COMBOS)
{
int trx = tr;
fprintf(stderr, "(");
if (trx)
{
int start = 0;
while (trx)
{
int trz = trx & -trx;
if (start) fprintf(stderr, "+");
fprintf(stderr, "%s", transform_name(trz));
start = 1;
trx &= ~trz;
}
}
else
fprintf(stderr, "-");
fprintf(stderr, ")");
}
else
fprintf(stderr, "(0x%x)", tr);
}
else
fprintf(stderr, "(%s)", transform_name(tr));
}
fprintf(stderr, ": ");
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
/* else do not output any message */
/* Errors cause this routine to exit to the fail code */
if (level > APP_FAIL || (level > ERRORS && !(dp->options & CONTINUE)))
longjmp(dp->error_return, level);
}
| 173,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool decode_openldap_dereference(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control *control;
struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result **r = NULL;
int i = 0;
if (!data) return false;
control = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control);
if (!control) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
control = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control);
if (!control) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
while (asn1_tag_remaining(data) > 0) {
r = talloc_realloc(control, r, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result *, i + 2);
if (!r) {
return false;
}
r[i] = talloc_zero(r, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result);
if (!r[i]) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
asn1_read_OctetString_talloc(r[i], data, &r[i]->source_attribute);
asn1_read_OctetString_talloc(r[i], data, &r[i]->dereferenced_dn);
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
return false;
}
ldap_decode_attribs_bare(r, data, &r[i]->attributes,
&r[i]->num_attributes);
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
i++;
r[i] = NULL;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
control->attributes = r;
*out = control;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static bool decode_openldap_dereference(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control *control;
struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result **r = NULL;
int i = 0;
if (!data) return false;
control = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control);
if (!control) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
control = talloc(mem_ctx, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result_control);
if (!control) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
while (asn1_tag_remaining(data) > 0) {
r = talloc_realloc(control, r, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result *, i + 2);
if (!r) {
return false;
}
r[i] = talloc_zero(r, struct dsdb_openldap_dereference_result);
if (!r[i]) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
asn1_read_OctetString_talloc(r[i], data, &r[i]->source_attribute);
asn1_read_OctetString_talloc(r[i], data, &r[i]->dereferenced_dn);
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!ldap_decode_attribs_bare(r, data, &r[i]->attributes,
&r[i]->num_attributes)) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
i++;
r[i] = NULL;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
control->attributes = r;
*out = control;
return true;
}
| 164,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int do_devinfo_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_devinfo __user *arg,
struct file *file)
{
struct comedi_devinfo devinfo;
const unsigned minor = iminor(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info =
comedi_get_device_file_info(minor);
struct comedi_subdevice *read_subdev =
comedi_get_read_subdevice(dev_file_info);
struct comedi_subdevice *write_subdev =
comedi_get_write_subdevice(dev_file_info);
memset(&devinfo, 0, sizeof(devinfo));
/* fill devinfo structure */
devinfo.version_code = COMEDI_VERSION_CODE;
devinfo.n_subdevs = dev->n_subdevices;
memcpy(devinfo.driver_name, dev->driver->driver_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
memcpy(devinfo.board_name, dev->board_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
if (read_subdev)
devinfo.read_subdevice = read_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.read_subdevice = -1;
if (write_subdev)
devinfo.write_subdevice = write_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.write_subdevice = -1;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &devinfo, sizeof(struct comedi_devinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int do_devinfo_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_devinfo __user *arg,
struct file *file)
{
struct comedi_devinfo devinfo;
const unsigned minor = iminor(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info =
comedi_get_device_file_info(minor);
struct comedi_subdevice *read_subdev =
comedi_get_read_subdevice(dev_file_info);
struct comedi_subdevice *write_subdev =
comedi_get_write_subdevice(dev_file_info);
memset(&devinfo, 0, sizeof(devinfo));
/* fill devinfo structure */
devinfo.version_code = COMEDI_VERSION_CODE;
devinfo.n_subdevs = dev->n_subdevices;
strlcpy(devinfo.driver_name, dev->driver->driver_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
strlcpy(devinfo.board_name, dev->board_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
if (read_subdev)
devinfo.read_subdevice = read_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.read_subdevice = -1;
if (write_subdev)
devinfo.write_subdevice = write_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.write_subdevice = -1;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &devinfo, sizeof(struct comedi_devinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 166,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltCopyNamespaceList(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNsPtr cur) {
xmlNsPtr ret = NULL, tmp;
xmlNsPtr p = NULL,q;
if (cur == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
return(NULL);
/*
* One can add namespaces only on element nodes
*/
if ((node != NULL) && (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
node = NULL;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
break;
/*
* Avoid duplicating namespace declarations in the tree if
* a matching declaration is in scope.
*/
if (node != NULL) {
if ((node->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->prefix, cur->prefix)) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->href, cur->href))) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
tmp = xmlSearchNs(node->doc, node, cur->prefix);
if ((tmp != NULL) && (xmlStrEqual(tmp->href, cur->href))) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Namespace exclusion and ns-aliasing is performed at
* compilation-time in the refactored code.
*/
q = xmlNewNs(node, cur->href, cur->prefix);
if (p == NULL) {
ret = p = q;
} else {
p->next = q;
p = q;
}
#else
/*
* TODO: Remove this if the refactored code gets enabled.
*/
if (!xmlStrEqual(cur->href, XSLT_NAMESPACE)) {
const xmlChar *URI;
/* TODO apply cascading */
URI = (const xmlChar *) xmlHashLookup(ctxt->style->nsAliases,
cur->href);
if (URI == UNDEFINED_DEFAULT_NS)
continue;
if (URI != NULL) {
q = xmlNewNs(node, URI, cur->prefix);
} else {
q = xmlNewNs(node, cur->href, cur->prefix);
}
if (p == NULL) {
ret = p = q;
} else {
p->next = q;
p = q;
}
}
#endif
cur = cur->next;
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltCopyNamespaceList(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNsPtr cur) {
xmlNsPtr ret = NULL, tmp;
xmlNsPtr p = NULL,q;
if (cur == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
return(NULL);
/*
* One can add namespaces only on element nodes
*/
if ((node != NULL) && (node->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
node = NULL;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
break;
/*
* Avoid duplicating namespace declarations in the tree if
* a matching declaration is in scope.
*/
if (node != NULL) {
if ((node->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->prefix, cur->prefix)) &&
(xmlStrEqual(node->ns->href, cur->href))) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
tmp = xmlSearchNs(node->doc, node, cur->prefix);
if ((tmp != NULL) && (xmlStrEqual(tmp->href, cur->href))) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
}
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
/*
* Namespace exclusion and ns-aliasing is performed at
* compilation-time in the refactored code.
*/
q = xmlNewNs(node, cur->href, cur->prefix);
if (p == NULL) {
ret = p = q;
} else {
p->next = q;
p = q;
}
#else
/*
* TODO: Remove this if the refactored code gets enabled.
*/
if (!xmlStrEqual(cur->href, XSLT_NAMESPACE)) {
const xmlChar *URI;
/* TODO apply cascading */
URI = (const xmlChar *) xmlHashLookup(ctxt->style->nsAliases,
cur->href);
if (URI == UNDEFINED_DEFAULT_NS) {
cur = cur->next;
continue;
}
if (URI != NULL) {
q = xmlNewNs(node, URI, cur->prefix);
} else {
q = xmlNewNs(node, cur->href, cur->prefix);
}
if (p == NULL) {
ret = p = q;
} else {
p->next = q;
p = q;
}
}
#endif
cur = cur->next;
}
return(ret);
}
| 173,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ContentUtilityClient* ShellMainDelegate::CreateContentUtilityClient() {
utility_client_.reset(new ShellContentUtilityClient);
return utility_client_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | ContentUtilityClient* ShellMainDelegate::CreateContentUtilityClient() {
utility_client_.reset(new ShellContentUtilityClient(is_browsertest_));
return utility_client_.get();
}
| 172,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintJobWorker::GetSettingsWithUI(
int document_page_count,
bool has_selection,
bool is_scripted) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (is_scripted) {
PrintingContextDelegate* printing_context_delegate =
static_cast<PrintingContextDelegate*>(printing_context_delegate_.get());
content::WebContents* web_contents =
printing_context_delegate->GetWebContents();
TabAndroid* tab =
web_contents ? TabAndroid::FromWebContents(web_contents) : nullptr;
if (tab)
tab->SetPendingPrint();
}
#endif
printing_context_->AskUserForSettings(
document_page_count, has_selection, is_scripted,
base::Bind(&PostOnOwnerThread, make_scoped_refptr(owner_),
base::Bind(&PrintJobWorker::GetSettingsDone,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PrintJobWorker::GetSettingsWithUI(
int document_page_count,
bool has_selection,
bool is_scripted) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
PrintingContextDelegate* printing_context_delegate =
static_cast<PrintingContextDelegate*>(printing_context_delegate_.get());
content::WebContents* web_contents =
printing_context_delegate->GetWebContents();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (is_scripted) {
TabAndroid* tab =
web_contents ? TabAndroid::FromWebContents(web_contents) : nullptr;
if (tab)
tab->SetPendingPrint();
}
#endif
// Running a dialog causes an exit to webpage-initiated fullscreen.
// http://crbug.com/728276
if (web_contents->IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
web_contents->ExitFullscreen(true);
printing_context_->AskUserForSettings(
document_page_count, has_selection, is_scripted,
base::Bind(&PostOnOwnerThread, make_scoped_refptr(owner_),
base::Bind(&PrintJobWorker::GetSettingsDone,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
| 172,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Frame* ReuseExistingWindow(LocalFrame& active_frame,
LocalFrame& lookup_frame,
const AtomicString& frame_name,
NavigationPolicy policy,
const KURL& destination_url) {
if (!frame_name.IsEmpty() && !EqualIgnoringASCIICase(frame_name, "_blank") &&
policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore) {
if (Frame* frame = lookup_frame.FindFrameForNavigation(
frame_name, active_frame, destination_url)) {
if (!EqualIgnoringASCIICase(frame_name, "_self")) {
if (Page* page = frame->GetPage()) {
if (page == active_frame.GetPage())
page->GetFocusController().SetFocusedFrame(frame);
else
page->GetChromeClient().Focus();
}
}
return frame;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | static Frame* ReuseExistingWindow(LocalFrame& active_frame,
LocalFrame& lookup_frame,
const AtomicString& frame_name,
NavigationPolicy policy,
const KURL& destination_url) {
if (!frame_name.IsEmpty() && !EqualIgnoringASCIICase(frame_name, "_blank") &&
policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore) {
if (Frame* frame = lookup_frame.FindFrameForNavigation(
frame_name, active_frame, destination_url)) {
if (!EqualIgnoringASCIICase(frame_name, "_self")) {
if (Page* page = frame->GetPage()) {
if (page == active_frame.GetPage())
page->GetFocusController().SetFocusedFrame(frame);
else
page->GetChromeClient().Focus(&active_frame);
}
}
return frame;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
| 172,725 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void save_text_if_changed(const char *name, const char *new_value)
{
/* a text value can't be change if the file is not loaded */
/* returns NULL if the name is not found; otherwise nonzero */
if (!g_hash_table_lookup(g_loaded_texts, name))
return;
const char *old_value = g_cd ? problem_data_get_content_or_NULL(g_cd, name) : "";
if (!old_value)
old_value = "";
if (strcmp(new_value, old_value) != 0)
{
struct dump_dir *dd = wizard_open_directory_for_writing(g_dump_dir_name);
if (dd)
dd_save_text(dd, name, new_value);
dd_close(dd);
problem_data_reload_from_dump_dir();
update_gui_state_from_problem_data(/* don't update selected event */ 0);
}
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void save_text_if_changed(const char *name, const char *new_value)
{
/* a text value can't be change if the file is not loaded */
/* returns NULL if the name is not found; otherwise nonzero */
if (!g_hash_table_lookup(g_loaded_texts, name))
return;
const char *old_value = g_cd ? problem_data_get_content_or_NULL(g_cd, name) : "";
if (!old_value)
old_value = "";
if (strcmp(new_value, old_value) != 0)
{
struct dump_dir *dd = wizard_open_directory_for_writing(g_dump_dir_name);
if (dd)
dd_save_text(dd, name, new_value);
dd_close(dd);
}
}
| 166,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::hasContentEditableAttributeSet() const {
const AtomicString& contentEditableValue = getAttribute(contenteditableAttr);
if (contentEditableValue.isNull())
return false;
return contentEditableValue.isEmpty() ||
equalIgnoringCase(contentEditableValue, "true");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXNodeObject::hasContentEditableAttributeSet() const {
const AtomicString& contentEditableValue = getAttribute(contenteditableAttr);
if (contentEditableValue.isNull())
return false;
return contentEditableValue.isEmpty() ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(contentEditableValue, "true");
}
| 171,913 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderView::RenderView(RenderThreadBase* render_thread,
gfx::NativeViewId parent_hwnd,
int32 opener_id,
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name)
: RenderWidget(render_thread, WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone),
webkit_preferences_(webkit_prefs),
send_content_state_immediately_(false),
enabled_bindings_(0),
send_preferred_size_changes_(false),
is_loading_(false),
navigation_gesture_(NavigationGestureUnknown),
opened_by_user_gesture_(true),
opener_suppressed_(false),
page_id_(-1),
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_(-1),
history_list_offset_(-1),
history_list_length_(0),
target_url_status_(TARGET_NONE),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(pepper_delegate_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(accessibility_method_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(cookie_jar_(this)),
geolocation_dispatcher_(NULL),
speech_input_dispatcher_(NULL),
device_orientation_dispatcher_(NULL),
accessibility_ack_pending_(false),
p2p_socket_dispatcher_(NULL),
session_storage_namespace_id_(session_storage_namespace_id) {
routing_id_ = routing_id;
if (opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
opener_id_ = opener_id;
webwidget_ = WebView::create(this);
if (counter) {
shared_popup_counter_ = counter;
shared_popup_counter_->data++;
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = true;
} else {
shared_popup_counter_ = new SharedRenderViewCounter(0);
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = false;
}
notification_provider_ = new NotificationProvider(this);
render_thread_->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
AddRef();
if (opener_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
did_show_ = true;
CompleteInit(parent_hwnd);
}
g_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(webview(), this));
webkit_preferences_.Apply(webview());
webview()->initializeMainFrame(this);
if (!frame_name.empty())
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(frame_name);
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
is_hidden() ? webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval :
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
OnSetRendererPrefs(renderer_prefs);
host_window_ = parent_hwnd;
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccessibility))
WebAccessibilityCache::enableAccessibility();
#if defined(ENABLE_P2P_APIS)
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ = new P2PSocketDispatcher(this);
#endif
new MHTMLGenerator(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
media_stream_impl_ = new MediaStreamImpl(
RenderThread::current()->video_capture_impl_manager());
}
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderViewCreated(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | RenderView::RenderView(RenderThreadBase* render_thread,
gfx::NativeViewId parent_hwnd,
int32 opener_id,
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name)
: RenderWidget(render_thread, WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone),
webkit_preferences_(webkit_prefs),
send_content_state_immediately_(false),
enabled_bindings_(0),
send_preferred_size_changes_(false),
is_loading_(false),
navigation_gesture_(NavigationGestureUnknown),
opened_by_user_gesture_(true),
opener_suppressed_(false),
page_id_(-1),
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_(-1),
history_list_offset_(-1),
history_list_length_(0),
target_url_status_(TARGET_NONE),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(pepper_delegate_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(accessibility_method_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(cookie_jar_(this)),
geolocation_dispatcher_(NULL),
speech_input_dispatcher_(NULL),
device_orientation_dispatcher_(NULL),
accessibility_ack_pending_(false),
p2p_socket_dispatcher_(NULL),
session_storage_namespace_id_(session_storage_namespace_id) {
routing_id_ = routing_id;
if (opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
opener_id_ = opener_id;
webwidget_ = WebView::create(this);
if (counter) {
shared_popup_counter_ = counter;
shared_popup_counter_->data++;
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = true;
} else {
shared_popup_counter_ = new SharedRenderViewCounter(0);
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = false;
}
notification_provider_ = new NotificationProvider(this);
render_thread_->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
AddRef();
if (opener_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
did_show_ = true;
CompleteInit(parent_hwnd);
}
g_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(webview(), this));
webkit_preferences_.Apply(webview());
webview()->initializeMainFrame(this);
if (!frame_name.empty())
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(frame_name);
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
is_hidden() ? webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval :
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
OnSetRendererPrefs(renderer_prefs);
host_window_ = parent_hwnd;
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccessibility))
WebAccessibilityCache::enableAccessibility();
#if defined(ENABLE_P2P_APIS)
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ = new P2PSocketDispatcher(this);
#endif
new MHTMLGenerator(this);
new DevToolsAgent(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
media_stream_impl_ = new MediaStreamImpl(
RenderThread::current()->video_capture_impl_manager());
}
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderViewCreated(this);
}
| 170,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
| 174,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LayoutSVGContainer::layout()
{
ASSERT(needsLayout());
LayoutAnalyzer::Scope analyzer(*this);
calcViewport();
bool updatedTransform = calculateLocalTransform();
m_didScreenScaleFactorChange = updatedTransform || SVGLayoutSupport::screenScaleFactorChanged(parent());
determineIfLayoutSizeChanged();
bool layoutSizeChanged = element()->hasRelativeLengths()
&& SVGLayoutSupport::layoutSizeOfNearestViewportChanged(this);
SVGLayoutSupport::layoutChildren(firstChild(), false, m_didScreenScaleFactorChange, layoutSizeChanged);
if (everHadLayout() && needsLayout())
SVGResourcesCache::clientLayoutChanged(this);
if (m_needsBoundariesUpdate || updatedTransform) {
updateCachedBoundaries();
m_needsBoundariesUpdate = false;
LayoutSVGModelObject::setNeedsBoundariesUpdate();
}
ASSERT(!m_needsBoundariesUpdate);
clearNeedsLayout();
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | void LayoutSVGContainer::layout()
{
ASSERT(needsLayout());
LayoutAnalyzer::Scope analyzer(*this);
calcViewport();
TransformChange transformChange = calculateLocalTransform();
m_didScreenScaleFactorChange =
transformChange == TransformChange::Full || SVGLayoutSupport::screenScaleFactorChanged(parent());
determineIfLayoutSizeChanged();
bool layoutSizeChanged = element()->hasRelativeLengths()
&& SVGLayoutSupport::layoutSizeOfNearestViewportChanged(this);
SVGLayoutSupport::layoutChildren(firstChild(), false, m_didScreenScaleFactorChange, layoutSizeChanged);
if (everHadLayout() && needsLayout())
SVGResourcesCache::clientLayoutChanged(this);
if (m_needsBoundariesUpdate || transformChange != TransformChange::None) {
updateCachedBoundaries();
m_needsBoundariesUpdate = false;
LayoutSVGModelObject::setNeedsBoundariesUpdate();
}
ASSERT(!m_needsBoundariesUpdate);
clearNeedsLayout();
}
| 171,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MockRenderThread::RemoveRoute(int32 routing_id) {
EXPECT_EQ(routing_id_, routing_id);
widget_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void MockRenderThread::RemoveRoute(int32 routing_id) {
// We may hear this for views created from OnMsgCreateWindow as well,
// in which case we don't want to track the new widget.
if (routing_id_ == routing_id)
widget_ = NULL;
}
| 171,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::GetCreateHistogramResultHistogram();
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(
kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, "HistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator() {
GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithLocalMemory(
kAllocatorMemorySize, 0, "HistogramAllocatorTest");
allocator_ = GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get()->memory_allocator();
}
| 172,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *,
infop, int, options, struct rusage __user *, ru)
{
struct rusage r;
struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0};
long err = kernel_waitid(which, upid, &info, options, ru ? &r : NULL);
int signo = 0;
if (err > 0) {
signo = SIGCHLD;
err = 0;
}
if (!err) {
if (ru && copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(struct rusage)))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!infop)
return err;
user_access_begin();
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault);
user_access_end();
return err;
Efault:
user_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *,
infop, int, options, struct rusage __user *, ru)
{
struct rusage r;
struct waitid_info info = {.status = 0};
long err = kernel_waitid(which, upid, &info, options, ru ? &r : NULL);
int signo = 0;
if (err > 0) {
signo = SIGCHLD;
err = 0;
if (ru && copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(struct rusage)))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (!infop)
return err;
user_access_begin();
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.pid, &infop->si_pid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.uid, &infop->si_uid, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.status, &infop->si_status, Efault);
user_access_end();
return err;
Efault:
user_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
| 167,743 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::initEncParams() {
CHECK(mHandle != NULL);
memset(mHandle, 0, sizeof(tagvideoEncControls));
CHECK(mEncParams != NULL);
memset(mEncParams, 0, sizeof(tagvideoEncOptions));
if (!PVGetDefaultEncOption(mEncParams, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get default encoding parameters");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mEncParams->encMode = mEncodeMode;
mEncParams->encWidth[0] = mWidth;
mEncParams->encHeight[0] = mHeight;
mEncParams->encFrameRate[0] = mFramerate >> 16; // mFramerate is in Q16 format
mEncParams->rcType = VBR_1;
mEncParams->vbvDelay = 5.0f;
mEncParams->profile_level = CORE_PROFILE_LEVEL2;
mEncParams->packetSize = 32;
mEncParams->rvlcEnable = PV_OFF;
mEncParams->numLayers = 1;
mEncParams->timeIncRes = 1000;
mEncParams->tickPerSrc = ((int64_t)mEncParams->timeIncRes << 16) / mFramerate;
mEncParams->bitRate[0] = mBitrate;
mEncParams->iQuant[0] = 15;
mEncParams->pQuant[0] = 12;
mEncParams->quantType[0] = 0;
mEncParams->noFrameSkipped = PV_OFF;
if (mColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar || mInputDataIsMeta) {
free(mInputFrameData);
mInputFrameData =
(uint8_t *) malloc((mWidth * mHeight * 3 ) >> 1);
CHECK(mInputFrameData != NULL);
}
if (mWidth % 16 != 0 || mHeight % 16 != 0) {
ALOGE("Video frame size %dx%d must be a multiple of 16",
mWidth, mHeight);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec < 0) {
mEncParams->intraPeriod = -1;
} else if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec == 0) {
mEncParams->intraPeriod = 1; // All I frames
} else {
mEncParams->intraPeriod =
(mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec * mFramerate) >> 16;
}
mEncParams->numIntraMB = 0;
mEncParams->sceneDetect = PV_ON;
mEncParams->searchRange = 16;
mEncParams->mv8x8Enable = PV_OFF;
mEncParams->gobHeaderInterval = 0;
mEncParams->useACPred = PV_ON;
mEncParams->intraDCVlcTh = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE - libstagefright: check requested memory size before allocation for SoftMPEG4Encoder and SoftVPXEncoder.
Bug: 25812794
Change-Id: I96dc74734380d462583f6efa33d09946f9532809
(cherry picked from commit 87f8cbb223ee516803dbb99699320c2484cbf3ba)
(cherry picked from commit 0462975291796e414891e04bcec9da993914e458)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::initEncParams() {
CHECK(mHandle != NULL);
memset(mHandle, 0, sizeof(tagvideoEncControls));
CHECK(mEncParams != NULL);
memset(mEncParams, 0, sizeof(tagvideoEncOptions));
if (!PVGetDefaultEncOption(mEncParams, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get default encoding parameters");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mEncParams->encMode = mEncodeMode;
mEncParams->encWidth[0] = mWidth;
mEncParams->encHeight[0] = mHeight;
mEncParams->encFrameRate[0] = mFramerate >> 16; // mFramerate is in Q16 format
mEncParams->rcType = VBR_1;
mEncParams->vbvDelay = 5.0f;
mEncParams->profile_level = CORE_PROFILE_LEVEL2;
mEncParams->packetSize = 32;
mEncParams->rvlcEnable = PV_OFF;
mEncParams->numLayers = 1;
mEncParams->timeIncRes = 1000;
mEncParams->tickPerSrc = ((int64_t)mEncParams->timeIncRes << 16) / mFramerate;
mEncParams->bitRate[0] = mBitrate;
mEncParams->iQuant[0] = 15;
mEncParams->pQuant[0] = 12;
mEncParams->quantType[0] = 0;
mEncParams->noFrameSkipped = PV_OFF;
if (mColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar || mInputDataIsMeta) {
free(mInputFrameData);
mInputFrameData = NULL;
if (((uint64_t)mWidth * mHeight) > ((uint64_t)INT32_MAX / 3)) {
ALOGE("b/25812794, Buffer size is too big.");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mInputFrameData =
(uint8_t *) malloc((mWidth * mHeight * 3 ) >> 1);
CHECK(mInputFrameData != NULL);
}
if (mWidth % 16 != 0 || mHeight % 16 != 0) {
ALOGE("Video frame size %dx%d must be a multiple of 16",
mWidth, mHeight);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec < 0) {
mEncParams->intraPeriod = -1;
} else if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec == 0) {
mEncParams->intraPeriod = 1; // All I frames
} else {
mEncParams->intraPeriod =
(mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec * mFramerate) >> 16;
}
mEncParams->numIntraMB = 0;
mEncParams->sceneDetect = PV_ON;
mEncParams->searchRange = 16;
mEncParams->mv8x8Enable = PV_OFF;
mEncParams->gobHeaderInterval = 0;
mEncParams->useACPred = PV_ON;
mEncParams->intraDCVlcTh = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
| 173,970 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const CuePoint::TrackPosition* CuePoint::Find(const Track* pTrack) const
{
assert(pTrack);
const long long n = pTrack->GetNumber();
const TrackPosition* i = m_track_positions;
const TrackPosition* const j = i + m_track_positions_count;
while (i != j)
{
const TrackPosition& p = *i++;
if (p.m_track == n)
return &p;
}
return NULL; //no matching track number found
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const CuePoint::TrackPosition* CuePoint::Find(const Track* pTrack) const
const long long n = pTrack->GetNumber();
const TrackPosition* i = m_track_positions;
const TrackPosition* const j = i + m_track_positions_count;
while (i != j) {
const TrackPosition& p = *i++;
if (p.m_track == n)
return &p;
}
return NULL; // no matching track number found
}
| 174,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mem_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
int ret;
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
long newbufsize;
long newpos;
assert(buf);
assert(cnt >= 0);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
newpos = m->pos_ + cnt;
if (newpos > m->bufsize_ && m->growable_) {
newbufsize = m->bufsize_;
while (newbufsize < newpos) {
newbufsize <<= 1;
assert(newbufsize >= 0);
}
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write resizing from %d to %z\n", m->bufsize_,
newbufsize));
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write resizing from %d to %ul\n", m->bufsize_,
JAS_CAST(unsigned long, newbufsize)));
if (mem_resize(m, newbufsize)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
/* The current position is beyond the end of the file, so
pad the file to the current position with zeros. */
n = JAS_MIN(m->pos_, m->bufsize_) - m->len_;
if (n > 0) {
memset(&m->buf_[m->len_], 0, n);
m->len_ += n;
}
if (m->pos_ != m->len_) {
/* The buffer is not big enough. */
return 0;
}
}
n = m->bufsize_ - m->pos_;
ret = JAS_MIN(n, cnt);
if (ret > 0) {
memcpy(&m->buf_[m->pos_], buf, ret);
m->pos_ += ret;
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
m->len_ = m->pos_;
}
assert(ret == cnt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int mem_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
size_t n;
int ret;
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
size_t newbufsize;
size_t newpos;
assert(buf);
assert(cnt >= 0);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
newpos = m->pos_ + cnt;
if (newpos > m->bufsize_ && m->growable_) {
newbufsize = m->bufsize_;
while (newbufsize < newpos) {
//newbufsize <<= 1;
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(newbufsize, 2, &newbufsize)) {
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("new buffer size would cause overflow\n"));
return -1;
}
}
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write resizing from %d to %zu\n", m->bufsize_,
newbufsize));
assert(newbufsize > 0);
if (mem_resize(m, newbufsize)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
/* The current position is beyond the end of the file, so
pad the file to the current position with zeros. */
n = JAS_MIN(m->pos_, m->bufsize_) - m->len_;
if (n > 0) {
memset(&m->buf_[m->len_], 0, n);
m->len_ += n;
}
if (m->pos_ != m->len_) {
/* The buffer is not big enough. */
return 0;
}
}
n = m->bufsize_ - m->pos_;
ret = JAS_MIN(n, cnt);
if (ret > 0) {
memcpy(&m->buf_[m->pos_], buf, ret);
m->pos_ += ret;
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
m->len_ = m->pos_;
}
assert(ret == cnt);
return ret;
}
| 168,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,
EHCIitd *itd,
uint32_t addr)
{
USBDevice *dev;
USBEndpoint *ep;
uint32_t i, len, pid, dir, devaddr, endp;
uint32_t pg, off, ptr1, ptr2, max, mult;
ehci->periodic_sched_active = PERIODIC_ACTIVE;
dir =(itd->bufptr[1] & ITD_BUFPTR_DIRECTION);
devaddr = get_field(itd->bufptr[0], ITD_BUFPTR_DEVADDR);
endp = get_field(itd->bufptr[0], ITD_BUFPTR_EP);
max = get_field(itd->bufptr[1], ITD_BUFPTR_MAXPKT);
mult = get_field(itd->bufptr[2], ITD_BUFPTR_MULT);
for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_ACTIVE) {
pg = get_field(itd->transact[i], ITD_XACT_PGSEL);
off = itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_OFFSET_MASK;
ptr1 = (itd->bufptr[pg] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
ptr2 = (itd->bufptr[pg+1] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
len = get_field(itd->transact[i], ITD_XACT_LENGTH);
if (len > max * mult) {
len = max * mult;
}
if (len > BUFF_SIZE) {
return -1;
}
qemu_sglist_init(&ehci->isgl, ehci->device, 2, ehci->as);
if (off + len > 4096) {
/* transfer crosses page border */
uint32_t len2 = off + len - 4096;
uint32_t len1 = len - len2;
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr1 + off, len1);
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr2, len2);
} else {
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr1 + off, len);
}
pid = dir ? USB_TOKEN_IN : USB_TOKEN_OUT;
dev = ehci_find_device(ehci, devaddr);
ep = usb_ep_get(dev, pid, endp);
if (ep && ep->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
usb_packet_setup(&ehci->ipacket, pid, ep, 0, addr, false,
(itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_IOC) != 0);
usb_packet_map(&ehci->ipacket, &ehci->isgl);
usb_handle_packet(dev, &ehci->ipacket);
usb_packet_unmap(&ehci->ipacket, &ehci->isgl);
} else {
DPRINTF("ISOCH: attempt to addess non-iso endpoint\n");
ehci->ipacket.status = USB_RET_NAK;
ehci->ipacket.actual_length = 0;
}
qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
switch (ehci->ipacket.status) {
case USB_RET_SUCCESS:
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected iso usb result: %d\n",
ehci->ipacket.status);
/* Fall through */
case USB_RET_IOERROR:
case USB_RET_NODEV:
/* 3.3.2: XACTERR is only allowed on IN transactions */
if (dir) {
itd->transact[i] |= ITD_XACT_XACTERR;
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
}
break;
case USB_RET_BABBLE:
itd->transact[i] |= ITD_XACT_BABBLE;
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
break;
case USB_RET_NAK:
/* no data for us, so do a zero-length transfer */
ehci->ipacket.actual_length = 0;
break;
}
if (!dir) {
set_field(&itd->transact[i], len - ehci->ipacket.actual_length,
ITD_XACT_LENGTH); /* OUT */
} else {
set_field(&itd->transact[i], ehci->ipacket.actual_length,
ITD_XACT_LENGTH); /* IN */
}
if (itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_IOC) {
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_INT);
}
itd->transact[i] &= ~ITD_XACT_ACTIVE;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,
EHCIitd *itd,
uint32_t addr)
{
USBDevice *dev;
USBEndpoint *ep;
uint32_t i, len, pid, dir, devaddr, endp, xfers = 0;
uint32_t pg, off, ptr1, ptr2, max, mult;
ehci->periodic_sched_active = PERIODIC_ACTIVE;
dir =(itd->bufptr[1] & ITD_BUFPTR_DIRECTION);
devaddr = get_field(itd->bufptr[0], ITD_BUFPTR_DEVADDR);
endp = get_field(itd->bufptr[0], ITD_BUFPTR_EP);
max = get_field(itd->bufptr[1], ITD_BUFPTR_MAXPKT);
mult = get_field(itd->bufptr[2], ITD_BUFPTR_MULT);
for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_ACTIVE) {
pg = get_field(itd->transact[i], ITD_XACT_PGSEL);
off = itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_OFFSET_MASK;
ptr1 = (itd->bufptr[pg] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
ptr2 = (itd->bufptr[pg+1] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
len = get_field(itd->transact[i], ITD_XACT_LENGTH);
if (len > max * mult) {
len = max * mult;
}
if (len > BUFF_SIZE) {
return -1;
}
qemu_sglist_init(&ehci->isgl, ehci->device, 2, ehci->as);
if (off + len > 4096) {
/* transfer crosses page border */
uint32_t len2 = off + len - 4096;
uint32_t len1 = len - len2;
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr1 + off, len1);
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr2, len2);
} else {
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr1 + off, len);
}
pid = dir ? USB_TOKEN_IN : USB_TOKEN_OUT;
dev = ehci_find_device(ehci, devaddr);
ep = usb_ep_get(dev, pid, endp);
if (ep && ep->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
usb_packet_setup(&ehci->ipacket, pid, ep, 0, addr, false,
(itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_IOC) != 0);
usb_packet_map(&ehci->ipacket, &ehci->isgl);
usb_handle_packet(dev, &ehci->ipacket);
usb_packet_unmap(&ehci->ipacket, &ehci->isgl);
} else {
DPRINTF("ISOCH: attempt to addess non-iso endpoint\n");
ehci->ipacket.status = USB_RET_NAK;
ehci->ipacket.actual_length = 0;
}
qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
switch (ehci->ipacket.status) {
case USB_RET_SUCCESS:
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected iso usb result: %d\n",
ehci->ipacket.status);
/* Fall through */
case USB_RET_IOERROR:
case USB_RET_NODEV:
/* 3.3.2: XACTERR is only allowed on IN transactions */
if (dir) {
itd->transact[i] |= ITD_XACT_XACTERR;
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
}
break;
case USB_RET_BABBLE:
itd->transact[i] |= ITD_XACT_BABBLE;
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
break;
case USB_RET_NAK:
/* no data for us, so do a zero-length transfer */
ehci->ipacket.actual_length = 0;
break;
}
if (!dir) {
set_field(&itd->transact[i], len - ehci->ipacket.actual_length,
ITD_XACT_LENGTH); /* OUT */
} else {
set_field(&itd->transact[i], ehci->ipacket.actual_length,
ITD_XACT_LENGTH); /* IN */
}
if (itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_IOC) {
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_INT);
}
itd->transact[i] &= ~ITD_XACT_ACTIVE;
xfers++;
}
}
return xfers ? 0 : -1;
}
| 165,279 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_send_plaintext(int sock, xmlNode * msg)
{
char *xml_text = dump_xml_unformatted(msg);
if (xml_text != NULL) {
int rc = 0;
char *unsent = xml_text;
int len = strlen(xml_text);
len++; /* null char */
crm_trace("Message on socket %d: size=%d", sock, len);
retry:
rc = write(sock, unsent, len);
if (rc < 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EINTR:
case EAGAIN:
crm_trace("Retry");
goto retry;
default:
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Could only write %d of the remaining %d bytes", rc, len);
break;
}
} else if (rc < len) {
crm_trace("Only sent %d of %d remaining bytes", rc, len);
len -= rc;
unsent += rc;
goto retry;
} else {
crm_trace("Sent %d bytes: %.100s", rc, xml_text);
}
}
free(xml_text);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_send_plaintext(int sock, xmlNode * msg)
static int
crm_send_plaintext(int sock, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
int rc = 0;
const char *unsent = buf;
int total_send;
if (buf == NULL) {
return -1;
}
total_send = len;
crm_trace("Message on socket %d: size=%d", sock, len);
retry:
rc = write(sock, unsent, len);
if (rc < 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EINTR:
case EAGAIN:
crm_trace("Retry");
goto retry;
default:
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Could only write %d of the remaining %d bytes", rc, (int) len);
break;
}
} else if (rc < len) {
crm_trace("Only sent %d of %d remaining bytes", rc, len);
len -= rc;
unsent += rc;
goto retry;
} else {
crm_trace("Sent %d bytes: %.100s", rc, buf);
}
return rc < 0 ? rc : total_send;
}
| 166,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = ssd->bufsize;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int interface_get_command(QXLInstance *sin, struct QXLCommandExt *ext)
{
SimpleSpiceDisplay *ssd = container_of(sin, SimpleSpiceDisplay, qxl);
info->num_memslots = NUM_MEMSLOTS;
info->num_memslots_groups = NUM_MEMSLOTS_GROUPS;
info->internal_groupslot_id = 0;
info->qxl_ram_size = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
info->n_surfaces = ssd->num_surfaces;
}
| 165,150 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
struct Curl_multi *m;
if(!data)
return CURLE_OK;
Curl_expire_clear(data); /* shut off timers */
m = data->multi;
if(m)
/* This handle is still part of a multi handle, take care of this first
and detach this handle from there. */
curl_multi_remove_handle(data->multi, data);
if(data->multi_easy)
/* when curl_easy_perform() is used, it creates its own multi handle to
use and this is the one */
curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy);
/* Destroy the timeout list that is held in the easy handle. It is
/normally/ done by curl_multi_remove_handle() but this is "just in
case" */
Curl_llist_destroy(&data->state.timeoutlist, NULL);
data->magic = 0; /* force a clear AFTER the possibly enforced removal from
the multi handle, since that function uses the magic
field! */
if(data->state.rangestringalloc)
free(data->state.range);
/* freed here just in case DONE wasn't called */
Curl_free_request_state(data);
/* Close down all open SSL info and sessions */
Curl_ssl_close_all(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.first_host);
Curl_safefree(data->state.scratch);
Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
/* Cleanup possible redirect junk */
free(data->req.newurl);
data->req.newurl = NULL;
if(data->change.referer_alloc) {
Curl_safefree(data->change.referer);
data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;
}
data->change.referer = NULL;
Curl_up_free(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.buffer);
Curl_safefree(data->state.headerbuff);
Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf);
Curl_flush_cookies(data, 1);
Curl_digest_cleanup(data);
Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype);
Curl_safefree(data->info.wouldredirect);
/* this destroys the channel and we cannot use it anymore after this */
Curl_resolver_cleanup(data->state.resolver);
Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(data);
Curl_convert_close(data);
/* No longer a dirty share, if it exists */
if(data->share) {
Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE);
data->share->dirty--;
Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE);
}
/* destruct wildcard structures if it is needed */
Curl_wildcard_dtor(&data->wildcard);
Curl_freeset(data);
free(data);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
struct Curl_multi *m;
if(!data)
return CURLE_OK;
Curl_expire_clear(data); /* shut off timers */
m = data->multi;
if(m)
/* This handle is still part of a multi handle, take care of this first
and detach this handle from there. */
curl_multi_remove_handle(data->multi, data);
if(data->multi_easy) {
/* when curl_easy_perform() is used, it creates its own multi handle to
use and this is the one */
curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy);
data->multi_easy = NULL;
}
/* Destroy the timeout list that is held in the easy handle. It is
/normally/ done by curl_multi_remove_handle() but this is "just in
case" */
Curl_llist_destroy(&data->state.timeoutlist, NULL);
data->magic = 0; /* force a clear AFTER the possibly enforced removal from
the multi handle, since that function uses the magic
field! */
if(data->state.rangestringalloc)
free(data->state.range);
/* freed here just in case DONE wasn't called */
Curl_free_request_state(data);
/* Close down all open SSL info and sessions */
Curl_ssl_close_all(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.first_host);
Curl_safefree(data->state.scratch);
Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
/* Cleanup possible redirect junk */
free(data->req.newurl);
data->req.newurl = NULL;
if(data->change.referer_alloc) {
Curl_safefree(data->change.referer);
data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;
}
data->change.referer = NULL;
Curl_up_free(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.buffer);
Curl_safefree(data->state.headerbuff);
Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf);
Curl_flush_cookies(data, 1);
Curl_digest_cleanup(data);
Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype);
Curl_safefree(data->info.wouldredirect);
/* this destroys the channel and we cannot use it anymore after this */
Curl_resolver_cleanup(data->state.resolver);
Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(data);
Curl_convert_close(data);
/* No longer a dirty share, if it exists */
if(data->share) {
Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE);
data->share->dirty--;
Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE);
}
/* destruct wildcard structures if it is needed */
Curl_wildcard_dtor(&data->wildcard);
Curl_freeset(data);
free(data);
return CURLE_OK;
}
| 169,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN_context(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v, int context)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(context));
asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
} else {
*v = false;
}
asn1_end_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN_context(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v, int context)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT_SIMPLE(context))) return false;
*v = false;
if (!asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp)) return false;
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
}
return asn1_end_tag(data);
}
| 164,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FLACParser::FLACParser(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource,
const sp<MetaData> &fileMetadata,
const sp<MetaData> &trackMetadata)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mFileMetadata(fileMetadata),
mTrackMetadata(trackMetadata),
mInitCheck(false),
mMaxBufferSize(0),
mGroup(NULL),
mCopy(copyTrespass),
mDecoder(NULL),
mCurrentPos(0LL),
mEOF(false),
mStreamInfoValid(false),
mWriteRequested(false),
mWriteCompleted(false),
mWriteBuffer(NULL),
mErrorStatus((FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus) -1)
{
ALOGV("FLACParser::FLACParser");
memset(&mStreamInfo, 0, sizeof(mStreamInfo));
memset(&mWriteHeader, 0, sizeof(mWriteHeader));
mInitCheck = init();
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | FLACParser::FLACParser(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource,
const sp<MetaData> &fileMetadata,
const sp<MetaData> &trackMetadata)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mFileMetadata(fileMetadata),
mTrackMetadata(trackMetadata),
mInitCheck(false),
mMaxBufferSize(0),
mGroup(NULL),
mCopy(copyTrespass),
mDecoder(NULL),
mCurrentPos(0LL),
mEOF(false),
mStreamInfoValid(false),
mWriteRequested(false),
mWriteCompleted(false),
mErrorStatus((FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus) -1)
{
ALOGV("FLACParser::FLACParser");
memset(&mStreamInfo, 0, sizeof(mStreamInfo));
memset(&mWriteHeader, 0, sizeof(mWriteHeader));
mInitCheck = init();
}
| 174,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar buf[XML_MAX_NAMELEN + 5];
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNmToken++;
#endif
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (len >= XML_MAX_NAMELEN) {
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge token, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
xmlChar *buffer;
int max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buffer[len] = 0;
return(buffer);
}
}
if (len == 0)
return(NULL);
return(xmlStrndup(buf, len));
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar buf[XML_MAX_NAMELEN + 5];
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNmToken++;
#endif
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (len >= XML_MAX_NAMELEN) {
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge token, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
xmlChar *buffer;
int max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
}
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buffer[len] = 0;
return(buffer);
}
}
if (len == 0)
return(NULL);
return(xmlStrndup(buf, len));
}
| 171,298 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static gboolean netscreen_read(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info,
gint64 *data_offset)
{
gint64 offset;
int pkt_len;
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
char cap_int[NETSCREEN_MAX_INT_NAME_LENGTH];
gboolean cap_dir;
char cap_dst[13];
/* Find the next packet */
offset = netscreen_seek_next_packet(wth, err, err_info, line);
if (offset < 0)
return FALSE;
/* Parse the header */
pkt_len = parse_netscreen_rec_hdr(&wth->phdr, line, cap_int, &cap_dir,
cap_dst, err, err_info);
if (pkt_len == -1)
return FALSE;
/* Convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data, and fill in some
struct wtap_pkthdr fields */
if (!parse_netscreen_hex_dump(wth->fh, pkt_len, cap_int,
cap_dst, &wth->phdr, wth->frame_buffer, err, err_info))
return FALSE;
/*
* If the per-file encapsulation isn't known, set it to this
* packet's encapsulation.
*
* If it *is* known, and it isn't this packet's encapsulation,
* set it to WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET, as this file doesn't
* have a single encapsulation for all packets in the file.
*/
if (wth->file_encap == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN)
wth->file_encap = wth->phdr.pkt_encap;
else {
if (wth->file_encap != wth->phdr.pkt_encap)
wth->file_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET;
}
*data_offset = offset;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I7f981f9cdcbea7ecdeb88bfff2f12d875de2244f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15176
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static gboolean netscreen_read(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info,
gint64 *data_offset)
{
gint64 offset;
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
/* Find the next packet */
offset = netscreen_seek_next_packet(wth, err, err_info, line);
if (offset < 0)
return FALSE;
/* Parse the header and convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data */
if (!parse_netscreen_packet(wth->fh, &wth->phdr,
wth->frame_buffer, line, err, err_info))
return FALSE;
/*
* If the per-file encapsulation isn't known, set it to this
* packet's encapsulation.
*
* If it *is* known, and it isn't this packet's encapsulation,
* set it to WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET, as this file doesn't
* have a single encapsulation for all packets in the file.
*/
if (wth->file_encap == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN)
wth->file_encap = wth->phdr.pkt_encap;
else {
if (wth->file_encap != wth->phdr.pkt_encap)
wth->file_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET;
}
*data_offset = offset;
return TRUE;
}
| 167,146 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jas_iccprof_t *jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(uchar *buf, int len)
{
jas_stream_t *in;
jas_iccprof_t *prof;
if (!(in = jas_stream_memopen(JAS_CAST(char *, buf), len)))
goto error;
if (!(prof = jas_iccprof_load(in)))
goto error;
jas_stream_close(in);
return prof;
error:
if (in)
jas_stream_close(in);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | jas_iccprof_t *jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(uchar *buf, int len)
jas_iccprof_t *jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(jas_uchar *buf, int len)
{
jas_stream_t *in;
jas_iccprof_t *prof;
if (!(in = jas_stream_memopen(JAS_CAST(char *, buf), len)))
goto error;
if (!(prof = jas_iccprof_load(in)))
goto error;
jas_stream_close(in);
return prof;
error:
if (in)
jas_stream_close(in);
return 0;
}
| 168,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct dst_entry *inet_csk_route_req(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
struct rtable *rt;
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ip_options *opt = inet_rsk(req)->opt;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct flowi4 fl4;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_mark,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
sk->sk_protocol, inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
(opt && opt->srr) ? opt->faddr : ireq->rmt_addr,
ireq->loc_addr, ireq->rmt_port, inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
if (opt && opt->is_strictroute && rt->rt_dst != rt->rt_gateway)
goto route_err;
return &rt->dst;
route_err:
ip_rt_put(rt);
no_route:
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | struct dst_entry *inet_csk_route_req(struct sock *sk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
struct rtable *rt;
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ip_options_rcu *opt = inet_rsk(req)->opt;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct flowi4 fl4;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, sk->sk_bound_dev_if, sk->sk_mark,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
sk->sk_protocol, inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
(opt && opt->opt.srr) ? opt->opt.faddr : ireq->rmt_addr,
ireq->loc_addr, ireq->rmt_port, inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
if (opt && opt->opt.is_strictroute && rt->rt_dst != rt->rt_gateway)
goto route_err;
return &rt->dst;
route_err:
ip_rt_put(rt);
no_route:
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
return NULL;
}
| 165,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return -1;
}
if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey))
/* Carry on */
return 2;
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return -1;
}
if (rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, NULL, sigalg, pkey) > 0) {
/* Carry on */
return 2;
}
return -1;
}
| 164,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: zlib_end(struct zlib *zlib)
{
/* Output the summary line now; this ensures a summary line always gets
* output regardless of the manner of exit.
*/
if (!zlib->global->quiet)
{
if (zlib->ok_bits < 16) /* stream was read ok */
{
const char *reason;
if (zlib->cksum)
reason = "CHK"; /* checksum error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits > zlib->file_bits)
reason = "TFB"; /* fixing a too-far-back error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits == zlib->file_bits)
reason = "OK ";
else
reason = "OPT"; /* optimizing window bits */
/* SUMMARY FORMAT (for a successful zlib inflate):
*
* IDAT reason flevel file-bits ok-bits compressed uncompressed file
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" %s %s %d %d ", reason, zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib->ok_bits);
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
uarb_print(zlib->uncompressed_bytes, zlib->uncompressed_digits,
stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
else
{
/* This is a zlib read error; the chunk will be skipped. For an IDAT
* stream this will also cause a fatal read error (via stop()).
*
* SUMMARY FORMAT:
*
* IDAT SKP flevel file-bits z-rc compressed message file
*
* z-rc is the zlib failure code; message is the error message with
* spaces replaced by '-'. The compressed byte count indicates where
* in the zlib stream the error occured.
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" SKP %s %d %s ", zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib_rc(zlib));
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
emit_string(zlib->z.msg ? zlib->z.msg : "[no_message]", stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
}
if (zlib->state >= 0)
{
zlib->rc = inflateEnd(&zlib->z);
if (zlib->rc != Z_OK)
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
}
CLEAR(*zlib);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | zlib_end(struct zlib *zlib)
{
/* Output the summary line now; this ensures a summary line always gets
* output regardless of the manner of exit.
*/
if (!zlib->global->quiet)
{
if (zlib->ok_bits < 16) /* stream was read ok */
{
const char *reason;
if (zlib->cksum)
reason = "CHK"; /* checksum error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits > zlib->file_bits)
reason = "TFB"; /* fixing a too-far-back error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits == zlib->file_bits)
reason = "OK ";
else
reason = "OPT"; /* optimizing window bits */
/* SUMMARY FORMAT (for a successful zlib inflate):
*
* IDAT reason flevel file-bits ok-bits compressed uncompressed file
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" %s %s %d %d ", reason, zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib->ok_bits);
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
uarb_print(zlib->uncompressed_bytes, zlib->uncompressed_digits,
stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
else
{
/* This is a zlib read error; the chunk will be skipped. For an IDAT
* stream this will also cause a fatal read error (via stop()).
*
* SUMMARY FORMAT:
*
* IDAT SKP flevel file-bits z-rc compressed message file
*
* z-rc is the zlib failure code; message is the error message with
* spaces replaced by '-'. The compressed byte count indicates where
* in the zlib stream the error occurred.
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" SKP %s %d %s ", zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib_rc(zlib));
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
emit_string(zlib->z.msg ? zlib->z.msg : "[no_message]", stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
}
if (zlib->state >= 0)
{
zlib->rc = inflateEnd(&zlib->z);
if (zlib->rc != Z_OK)
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
}
CLEAR(*zlib);
}
| 173,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InstalledBubbleContent(Browser* browser,
const Extension* extension,
ExtensionInstalledBubble::BubbleType type,
SkBitmap* icon,
ExtensionInstalledBubble* bubble)
: browser_(browser),
extension_id_(extension->id()),
bubble_(bubble),
type_(type),
info_(NULL) {
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
const gfx::Font& font = rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::BaseFont);
gfx::Size size(icon->width(), icon->height());
if (size.width() > kIconSize || size.height() > kIconSize)
size = gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize);
icon_ = new views::ImageView();
icon_->SetImageSize(size);
icon_->SetImage(*icon);
AddChildView(icon_);
string16 extension_name = UTF8ToUTF16(extension->name());
base::i18n::AdjustStringForLocaleDirection(&extension_name);
heading_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING,
extension_name,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME)));
heading_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
heading_->SetMultiLine(true);
heading_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(heading_);
switch (type_) {
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::PAGE_ACTION: {
info_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_PAGE_ACTION_INFO));
info_->SetFont(font);
info_->SetMultiLine(true);
info_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(info_);
break;
}
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::OMNIBOX_KEYWORD: {
info_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_OMNIBOX_KEYWORD_INFO,
UTF8ToUTF16(extension->omnibox_keyword())));
info_->SetFont(font);
info_->SetMultiLine(true);
info_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(info_);
break;
}
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::APP: {
views::Link* link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_APP_INFO));
link->set_listener(this);
manage_ = link;
manage_->SetFont(font);
manage_->SetMultiLine(true);
manage_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(manage_);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (type_ != ExtensionInstalledBubble::APP) {
manage_ = new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_MANAGE_INFO));
manage_->SetFont(font);
manage_->SetMultiLine(true);
manage_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(manage_);
}
close_button_ = new views::ImageButton(this);
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_NORMAL,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR));
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_HOT,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_H));
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_P));
AddChildView(close_button_);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | InstalledBubbleContent(Browser* browser,
const Extension* extension,
ExtensionInstalledBubble::BubbleType type,
SkBitmap* icon,
ExtensionInstalledBubble* bubble)
: browser_(browser),
extension_id_(extension->id()),
bubble_(bubble),
type_(type),
info_(NULL) {
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
const gfx::Font& font = rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::BaseFont);
gfx::Size size(icon->width(), icon->height());
if (size.width() > kIconSize || size.height() > kIconSize)
size = gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize);
icon_ = new views::ImageView();
icon_->SetImageSize(size);
icon_->SetImage(*icon);
AddChildView(icon_);
string16 extension_name = UTF8ToUTF16(extension->name());
base::i18n::AdjustStringForLocaleDirection(&extension_name);
heading_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING, extension_name));
heading_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
heading_->SetMultiLine(true);
heading_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(heading_);
switch (type_) {
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::PAGE_ACTION: {
info_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_PAGE_ACTION_INFO));
info_->SetFont(font);
info_->SetMultiLine(true);
info_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(info_);
break;
}
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::OMNIBOX_KEYWORD: {
info_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_OMNIBOX_KEYWORD_INFO,
UTF8ToUTF16(extension->omnibox_keyword())));
info_->SetFont(font);
info_->SetMultiLine(true);
info_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(info_);
break;
}
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::APP: {
views::Link* link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_APP_INFO));
link->set_listener(this);
manage_ = link;
manage_->SetFont(font);
manage_->SetMultiLine(true);
manage_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(manage_);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (type_ != ExtensionInstalledBubble::APP) {
manage_ = new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_MANAGE_INFO));
manage_->SetFont(font);
manage_->SetMultiLine(true);
manage_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(manage_);
}
close_button_ = new views::ImageButton(this);
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_NORMAL,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR));
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_HOT,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_H));
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_P));
AddChildView(close_button_);
}
| 170,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int vivid_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par;
switch (cmd) {
case FBIOGET_VBLANK: {
struct fb_vblank vblank;
vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT |
FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC;
vblank.count = 0;
vblank.vcount = 0;
vblank.hcount = 0;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &vblank, sizeof(vblank)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
default:
dprintk(dev, 1, "Unknown ioctl %08x\n", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int vivid_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par;
switch (cmd) {
case FBIOGET_VBLANK: {
struct fb_vblank vblank;
memset(&vblank, 0, sizeof(vblank));
vblank.flags = FB_VBLANK_HAVE_COUNT | FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VCOUNT |
FB_VBLANK_HAVE_VSYNC;
vblank.count = 0;
vblank.vcount = 0;
vblank.hcount = 0;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &vblank, sizeof(vblank)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
default:
dprintk(dev, 1, "Unknown ioctl %08x\n", cmd);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigateOnUIThread(
const GURL& url,
const std::vector<GURL> url_chain,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool has_user_gesture,
const ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = wc_getter.Run();
if (web_contents) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = referrer;
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void NavigateOnUIThread(
void NavigateOnUIThread(const GURL& url,
const std::vector<GURL> url_chain,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool has_user_gesture,
const ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
int frame_tree_node_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = wc_getter.Run();
if (web_contents) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(url);
params.has_user_gesture = has_user_gesture;
params.referrer = referrer;
params.redirect_chain = url_chain;
params.frame_tree_node_id = frame_tree_node_id;
web_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
}
| 173,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: swabHorDiff32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
horDiff32(tif, cp0, cc);
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | swabHorDiff32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
if( !horDiff32(tif, cp0, cc) )
return 0;
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
return 1;
}
| 166,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
MPIMsgSCSIIORequest *scsi_io,
hwaddr addr)
{
MPTSASRequest *req;
MPIMsgSCSIIOReply reply;
SCSIDevice *sdev;
int status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_endianness(scsi_io);
trace_mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->DataLength);
status = mptsas_scsi_device_find(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN, &sdev);
if (status) {
goto bad;
}
req = g_new(MPTSASRequest, 1);
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
req->dev = s;
status = mptsas_build_sgl(s, req, addr);
if (status) {
goto free_bad;
}
if (req->qsg.size < scsi_io->DataLength) {
trace_mptsas_sgl_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, scsi_io->DataLength,
req->qsg.size);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_INVALID_SGL;
goto free_bad;
}
req->sreq = scsi_req_new(sdev, scsi_io->MsgContext,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->CDB, req);
if (req->sreq->cmd.xfer > scsi_io->DataLength) {
goto overrun;
}
switch (scsi_io->Control & MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_DATADIRECTION_MASK) {
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_NODATATRANSFER:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_NONE) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_WRITE:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_READ:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_FROM_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
}
if (scsi_req_enqueue(req->sreq)) {
scsi_req_continue(req->sreq);
}
return 0;
overrun:
trace_mptsas_scsi_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, req->sreq->cmd.xfer,
scsi_io->DataLength);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_SCSI_DATA_OVERRUN;
free_bad:
mptsas_free_request(req);
bad:
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
reply.TargetID = scsi_io->TargetID;
reply.Bus = scsi_io->Bus;
reply.MsgLength = sizeof(reply) / 4;
reply.Function = scsi_io->Function;
reply.CDBLength = scsi_io->CDBLength;
reply.SenseBufferLength = scsi_io->SenseBufferLength;
reply.MsgContext = scsi_io->MsgContext;
reply.SCSIState = MPI_SCSI_STATE_NO_SCSI_STATUS;
reply.IOCStatus = status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_reply_endianness(&reply);
mptsas_reply(s, (MPIDefaultReply *)&reply);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static int mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(MPTSASState *s,
MPIMsgSCSIIORequest *scsi_io,
hwaddr addr)
{
MPTSASRequest *req;
MPIMsgSCSIIOReply reply;
SCSIDevice *sdev;
int status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_endianness(scsi_io);
trace_mptsas_process_scsi_io_request(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->DataLength);
status = mptsas_scsi_device_find(s, scsi_io->Bus, scsi_io->TargetID,
scsi_io->LUN, &sdev);
if (status) {
goto bad;
}
req = g_new0(MPTSASRequest, 1);
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->pending, req, next);
req->scsi_io = *scsi_io;
req->dev = s;
status = mptsas_build_sgl(s, req, addr);
if (status) {
goto free_bad;
}
if (req->qsg.size < scsi_io->DataLength) {
trace_mptsas_sgl_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, scsi_io->DataLength,
req->qsg.size);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_INVALID_SGL;
goto free_bad;
}
req->sreq = scsi_req_new(sdev, scsi_io->MsgContext,
scsi_io->LUN[1], scsi_io->CDB, req);
if (req->sreq->cmd.xfer > scsi_io->DataLength) {
goto overrun;
}
switch (scsi_io->Control & MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_DATADIRECTION_MASK) {
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_NODATATRANSFER:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_NONE) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_WRITE:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
case MPI_SCSIIO_CONTROL_READ:
if (req->sreq->cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_FROM_DEV) {
goto overrun;
}
break;
}
if (scsi_req_enqueue(req->sreq)) {
scsi_req_continue(req->sreq);
}
return 0;
overrun:
trace_mptsas_scsi_overflow(s, scsi_io->MsgContext, req->sreq->cmd.xfer,
scsi_io->DataLength);
status = MPI_IOCSTATUS_SCSI_DATA_OVERRUN;
free_bad:
mptsas_free_request(req);
bad:
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
reply.TargetID = scsi_io->TargetID;
reply.Bus = scsi_io->Bus;
reply.MsgLength = sizeof(reply) / 4;
reply.Function = scsi_io->Function;
reply.CDBLength = scsi_io->CDBLength;
reply.SenseBufferLength = scsi_io->SenseBufferLength;
reply.MsgContext = scsi_io->MsgContext;
reply.SCSIState = MPI_SCSI_STATE_NO_SCSI_STATUS;
reply.IOCStatus = status;
mptsas_fix_scsi_io_reply_endianness(&reply);
mptsas_reply(s, (MPIDefaultReply *)&reply);
return 0;
}
| 164,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettings(
int document_cookie, const DictionaryValue& job_settings,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query;
print_job_manager_->PopPrinterQuery(document_cookie, &printer_query);
if (printer_query.get()) {
CancelableTask* task = NewRunnableMethod(
this,
&PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply,
printer_query,
reply_msg);
printer_query->SetSettings(job_settings, task);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettings(
int document_cookie, const DictionaryValue& job_settings,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
scoped_refptr<printing::PrinterQuery> printer_query;
if (!print_job_manager_->printing_enabled()) {
// Reply with NULL query.
OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply(printer_query, reply_msg);
return;
}
print_job_manager_->PopPrinterQuery(document_cookie, &printer_query);
if (!printer_query.get())
printer_query = new printing::PrinterQuery;
CancelableTask* task = NewRunnableMethod(
this,
&PrintingMessageFilter::OnUpdatePrintSettingsReply,
printer_query,
reply_msg);
printer_query->SetSettings(job_settings, task);
}
| 170,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dpcm_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame_ptr, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf_end = buf + buf_size;
DPCMContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int out = 0, ret;
int predictor[2];
int ch = 0;
int stereo = s->channels - 1;
int16_t *output_samples;
/* calculate output size */
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
out = buf_size - 2 * s->channels;
break;
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3)
out = buf_size * 2;
else
out = buf_size;
break;
}
if (out <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet is too small\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* get output buffer */
s->frame.nb_samples = out / s->channels;
if ((ret = avctx->get_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "get_buffer() failed\n");
return ret;
}
output_samples = (int16_t *)s->frame.data[0];
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
buf += 6;
if (stereo) {
predictor[1] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
predictor[0] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
} else {
predictor[0] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
}
/* decode the samples */
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += s->roq_square_array[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_DPCM:
buf += 6; /* skip over the stream mask and stream length */
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
}
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += interplay_delta_table[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
{
int shift[2] = { 4, 4 };
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++)
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
int16_t diff = (n & 0xFC) << 8;
if ((n & 0x03) == 3)
shift[ch]++;
else
shift[ch] -= (2 * (n & 3));
/* saturate the shifter to a lower limit of 0 */
if (shift[ch] < 0)
shift[ch] = 0;
diff >>= shift[ch];
predictor[ch] += diff;
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
}
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3) {
uint8_t *output_samples_u8 = s->frame.data[0];
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
s->sample[0] += s->sol_table[n >> 4];
s->sample[0] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[0]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[0];
s->sample[stereo] += s->sol_table[n & 0x0F];
s->sample[stereo] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[stereo]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[stereo];
}
} else {
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
if (n & 0x80) s->sample[ch] -= sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
else s->sample[ch] += sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
s->sample[ch] = av_clip_int16(s->sample[ch]);
*output_samples++ = s->sample[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
}
break;
}
*got_frame_ptr = 1;
*(AVFrame *)data = s->frame;
return buf_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int dpcm_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame_ptr, AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf_end = buf + buf_size;
DPCMContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int out = 0, ret;
int predictor[2];
int ch = 0;
int stereo = s->channels - 1;
int16_t *output_samples;
if (stereo && (buf_size & 1)) {
buf_size--;
buf_end--;
}
/* calculate output size */
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
out = buf_size - 2 * s->channels;
break;
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3)
out = buf_size * 2;
else
out = buf_size;
break;
}
if (out <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "packet is too small\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* get output buffer */
s->frame.nb_samples = out / s->channels;
if ((ret = avctx->get_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "get_buffer() failed\n");
return ret;
}
output_samples = (int16_t *)s->frame.data[0];
switch(avctx->codec->id) {
case CODEC_ID_ROQ_DPCM:
buf += 6;
if (stereo) {
predictor[1] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
predictor[0] = (int16_t)(bytestream_get_byte(&buf) << 8);
} else {
predictor[0] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
}
/* decode the samples */
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += s->roq_square_array[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_DPCM:
buf += 6; /* skip over the stream mask and stream length */
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++) {
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
}
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
predictor[ch] += interplay_delta_table[*buf++];
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
case CODEC_ID_XAN_DPCM:
{
int shift[2] = { 4, 4 };
for (ch = 0; ch < s->channels; ch++)
predictor[ch] = (int16_t)bytestream_get_le16(&buf);
ch = 0;
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
int16_t diff = (n & 0xFC) << 8;
if ((n & 0x03) == 3)
shift[ch]++;
else
shift[ch] -= (2 * (n & 3));
/* saturate the shifter to a lower limit of 0 */
if (shift[ch] < 0)
shift[ch] = 0;
diff >>= shift[ch];
predictor[ch] += diff;
predictor[ch] = av_clip_int16(predictor[ch]);
*output_samples++ = predictor[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
break;
}
case CODEC_ID_SOL_DPCM:
if (avctx->codec_tag != 3) {
uint8_t *output_samples_u8 = s->frame.data[0];
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
s->sample[0] += s->sol_table[n >> 4];
s->sample[0] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[0]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[0];
s->sample[stereo] += s->sol_table[n & 0x0F];
s->sample[stereo] = av_clip_uint8(s->sample[stereo]);
*output_samples_u8++ = s->sample[stereo];
}
} else {
while (buf < buf_end) {
uint8_t n = *buf++;
if (n & 0x80) s->sample[ch] -= sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
else s->sample[ch] += sol_table_16[n & 0x7F];
s->sample[ch] = av_clip_int16(s->sample[ch]);
*output_samples++ = s->sample[ch];
/* toggle channel */
ch ^= stereo;
}
}
break;
}
*got_frame_ptr = 1;
*(AVFrame *)data = s->frame;
return buf_size;
}
| 165,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static u_int mp_dss_len(const struct mp_dss *m, int csum)
{
u_int len;
len = 4;
if (m->flags & MP_DSS_A) {
/* Ack present - 4 or 8 octets */
len += (m->flags & MP_DSS_a) ? 8 : 4;
}
if (m->flags & MP_DSS_M) {
/*
* Data Sequence Number (DSN), Subflow Sequence Number (SSN),
* Data-Level Length present, and Checksum possibly present.
* All but the Checksum are 10 bytes if the m flag is
* clear (4-byte DSN) and 14 bytes if the m flag is set
* (8-byte DSN).
*/
len += (m->flags & MP_DSS_m) ? 14 : 10;
/*
* The Checksum is present only if negotiated.
*/
if (csum)
len += 2;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13040/MPTCP: Clean up printing DSS suboption.
Do the length checking inline; that means we print stuff up to the point
at which we run out of option data.
First check to make sure we have at least 4 bytes of option, so we have
flags to check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static u_int mp_dss_len(const struct mp_dss *m, int csum)
| 167,836 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nbd_negotiate_read(QIOChannel *ioc, void *buffer, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret;
guint watch;
assert(qemu_in_coroutine());
/* Negotiation are always in main loop. */
watch = qio_channel_add_watch(ioc,
G_IO_IN,
nbd_negotiate_continue,
qemu_coroutine_self(),
NULL);
ret = nbd_read(ioc, buffer, size, NULL);
g_source_remove(watch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int nbd_negotiate_read(QIOChannel *ioc, void *buffer, size_t size)
| 165,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, getFilename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, getFilename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
}
| 167,033 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
RemoveInterstitialObservers(old_contents);
AddInterstitialObservers(new_contents->web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserCommandController::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
RemoveInterstitialObservers(old_contents->web_contents());
AddInterstitialObservers(new_contents->web_contents());
}
| 171,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ip6t_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0 &&
unconditional(&s->ipv6)) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ip6t_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (unconditional(s) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
| 167,374 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Display::Display()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Chapters::Display::Display()
| 174,263 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WallpaperManager::OnWallpaperDecoded(
const AccountId& account_id,
const wallpaper::WallpaperInfo& info,
bool update_wallpaper,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage> user_image) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("ui", "LoadAndDecodeWallpaper", this);
if (user_image->image().isNull()) {
wallpaper::WallpaperInfo default_info(
"", wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER_CROPPED, wallpaper::DEFAULT,
base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight());
SetUserWallpaperInfo(account_id, default_info, true);
if (update_wallpaper)
DoSetDefaultWallpaper(account_id, std::move(on_finish));
return;
}
wallpaper_cache_[account_id].second = user_image->image();
if (update_wallpaper)
SetWallpaper(user_image->image(), info);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void WallpaperManager::OnWallpaperDecoded(
const AccountId& account_id,
const wallpaper::WallpaperInfo& info,
bool update_wallpaper,
MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder on_finish,
std::unique_ptr<user_manager::UserImage> user_image) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("ui", "LoadAndDecodeWallpaper", this);
if (user_image->image().isNull()) {
wallpaper::WallpaperInfo default_info(
"", wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER_CROPPED, wallpaper::DEFAULT,
base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight());
SetUserWallpaperInfo(account_id, default_info, true);
DoSetDefaultWallpaper(account_id, update_wallpaper, std::move(on_finish));
return;
}
wallpaper_cache_[account_id].second = user_image->image();
if (update_wallpaper)
SetWallpaper(user_image->image(), info);
}
| 171,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void pdf_load_pages_kids(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, id, dummy;
char *buf, *c;
long start, sz;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Load all kids for all xref tables (versions) */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && (pdf->xrefs[i].end != 0))
{
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
while (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) != 't')))
; /* Iterate to trailer */
/* Get root catalog */
sz = pdf->xrefs[i].end - ftell(fp);
buf = malloc(sz + 1);
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, sz, fp), sz, "Failed to load /Root.\n");
buf[sz] = '\0';
if (!(c = strstr(buf, "/Root")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Jump to catalog (root) */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Root") + 1);
free(buf);
buf = get_object(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i], NULL, &dummy);
if (!buf || !(c = strstr(buf, "/Pages")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Start at the first Pages obj and get kids */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Pages") + 1);
load_kids(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
free(buf);
}
}
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void pdf_load_pages_kids(FILE *fp, pdf_t *pdf)
{
int i, id, dummy;
char *buf, *c;
long start, sz;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Load all kids for all xref tables (versions) */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
{
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version && (pdf->xrefs[i].end != 0))
{
fseek(fp, pdf->xrefs[i].start, SEEK_SET);
while (SAFE_F(fp, (fgetc(fp) != 't')))
; /* Iterate to trailer */
/* Get root catalog */
sz = pdf->xrefs[i].end - ftell(fp);
buf = safe_calloc(sz + 1);
SAFE_E(fread(buf, 1, sz, fp), sz, "Failed to load /Root.\n");
buf[sz] = '\0';
if (!(c = strstr(buf, "/Root")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Jump to catalog (root) */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Root") + 1);
free(buf);
buf = get_object(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i], NULL, &dummy);
if (!buf || !(c = strstr(buf, "/Pages")))
{
free(buf);
continue;
}
/* Start at the first Pages obj and get kids */
id = atoi(c + strlen("/Pages") + 1);
load_kids(fp, id, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
free(buf);
}
}
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
| 169,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cg_getattr(const char *path, struct stat *sb)
{
struct timespec now;
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char * cgdir = NULL;
char *fpath = NULL, *path1, *path2;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
const char *cgroup;
const char *controller = NULL;
int ret = -ENOENT;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
memset(sb, 0, sizeof(struct stat));
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
sb->st_uid = sb->st_gid = 0;
sb->st_atim = sb->st_mtim = sb->st_ctim = now;
sb->st_size = 0;
if (strcmp(path, "/cgroup") == 0) {
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
return 0;
}
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EIO;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return it as a dir */
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
return 0;
}
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath) {
path1 = "/";
path2 = cgdir;
} else {
path1 = cgdir;
path2 = fpath;
}
/* check that cgcopy is either a child cgroup of cgdir, or listed in its keys.
* Then check that caller's cgroup is under path if fpath is a child
* cgroup, or cgdir if fpath is a file */
if (is_child_cgroup(controller, path1, path2)) {
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, cgroup, NULL)) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return it as a dir */
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00555;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, cgroup, NULL, O_RDONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
k = cgfs_get_key(controller, cgroup, "tasks");
if (!k) {
sb->st_uid = sb->st_gid = 0;
} else {
sb->st_uid = k->uid;
sb->st_gid = k->gid;
}
free_key(k);
sb->st_nlink = 2;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(controller, path1, path2)) != NULL) {
sb->st_mode = S_IFREG | k->mode;
sb->st_nlink = 1;
sb->st_uid = k->uid;
sb->st_gid = k->gid;
sb->st_size = 0;
free_key(k);
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, path1, NULL)) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, path1, path2, O_RDONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
}
out:
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int cg_getattr(const char *path, struct stat *sb)
{
struct timespec now;
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char * cgdir = NULL;
char *fpath = NULL, *path1, *path2;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
const char *cgroup;
const char *controller = NULL;
int ret = -ENOENT;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
memset(sb, 0, sizeof(struct stat));
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
sb->st_uid = sb->st_gid = 0;
sb->st_atim = sb->st_mtim = sb->st_ctim = now;
sb->st_size = 0;
if (strcmp(path, "/cgroup") == 0) {
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
return 0;
}
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EIO;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return it as a dir */
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
return 0;
}
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath) {
path1 = "/";
path2 = cgdir;
} else {
path1 = cgdir;
path2 = fpath;
}
/* check that cgcopy is either a child cgroup of cgdir, or listed in its keys.
* Then check that caller's cgroup is under path if fpath is a child
* cgroup, or cgdir if fpath is a file */
if (is_child_cgroup(controller, path1, path2)) {
if (!caller_may_see_dir(fc->pid, controller, cgroup)) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, cgroup, NULL)) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return it as a dir */
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00555;
sb->st_nlink = 2;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, cgroup, NULL, O_RDONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
sb->st_mode = S_IFDIR | 00755;
k = cgfs_get_key(controller, cgroup, "tasks");
if (!k) {
sb->st_uid = sb->st_gid = 0;
} else {
sb->st_uid = k->uid;
sb->st_gid = k->gid;
}
free_key(k);
sb->st_nlink = 2;
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if ((k = cgfs_get_key(controller, path1, path2)) != NULL) {
sb->st_mode = S_IFREG | k->mode;
sb->st_nlink = 1;
sb->st_uid = k->uid;
sb->st_gid = k->gid;
sb->st_size = 0;
free_key(k);
if (!caller_is_in_ancestor(fc->pid, controller, path1, NULL)) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
if (!fc_may_access(fc, controller, path1, path2, O_RDONLY)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
}
out:
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
| 166,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: horDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
uint16 *wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc/2;
assert((cc%(2*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
wp += wc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] - (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp--)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | horDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
uint16 *wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc/2;
if((cc%(2*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "horDiff8",
"%s", "(cc%(2*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
wp += wc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] - (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp--)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
return 1;
}
| 166,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
__be16 proto)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct net_device *dev_curr;
__be16 proto_curr;
bool need_rehook;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = 0;
bool unlisted = false;
if (po->fanout)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (name) {
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), name);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (dev)
dev_hold(dev);
proto_curr = po->prot_hook.type;
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
need_rehook = proto_curr != proto || dev_curr != dev;
if (need_rehook) {
if (po->running) {
rcu_read_unlock();
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
rcu_read_lock();
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
if (dev)
unlisted = !dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
dev->ifindex);
}
po->num = proto;
po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
dev_put(dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
po->ifindex = -1;
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
} else {
po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
}
}
if (dev_curr)
dev_put(dev_curr);
if (proto == 0 || !need_rehook)
goto out_unlock;
if (!unlisted && (!dev || (dev->flags & IFF_UP))) {
register_prot_hook(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
__be16 proto)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct net_device *dev_curr;
__be16 proto_curr;
bool need_rehook;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = 0;
bool unlisted = false;
lock_sock(sk);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (po->fanout) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (name) {
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), name);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (dev)
dev_hold(dev);
proto_curr = po->prot_hook.type;
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
need_rehook = proto_curr != proto || dev_curr != dev;
if (need_rehook) {
if (po->running) {
rcu_read_unlock();
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
rcu_read_lock();
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
if (dev)
unlisted = !dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
dev->ifindex);
}
po->num = proto;
po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
dev_put(dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
po->ifindex = -1;
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
} else {
po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
}
}
if (dev_curr)
dev_put(dev_curr);
if (proto == 0 || !need_rehook)
goto out_unlock;
if (!unlisted && (!dev || (dev->flags & IFF_UP))) {
register_prot_hook(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
| 167,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: H264SwDecRet H264SwDecInit(H264SwDecInst *decInst, u32 noOutputReordering)
{
u32 rv = 0;
decContainer_t *pDecCont;
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit#");
/* check that right shift on negative numbers is performed signed */
/*lint -save -e* following check causes multiple lint messages */
if ( ((-1)>>1) != (-1) )
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: Right shift is not signed");
return(H264SWDEC_INITFAIL);
}
/*lint -restore */
if (decInst == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: decInst == NULL");
return(H264SWDEC_PARAM_ERR);
}
pDecCont = (decContainer_t *)H264SwDecMalloc(sizeof(decContainer_t));
if (pDecCont == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: Memory allocation failed");
return(H264SWDEC_MEMFAIL);
}
#ifdef H264DEC_TRACE
sprintf(pDecCont->str, "H264SwDecInit# decInst %p noOutputReordering %d",
(void*)decInst, noOutputReordering);
DEC_API_TRC(pDecCont->str);
#endif
rv = h264bsdInit(&pDecCont->storage, noOutputReordering);
if (rv != HANTRO_OK)
{
H264SwDecRelease(pDecCont);
return(H264SWDEC_MEMFAIL);
}
pDecCont->decStat = INITIALIZED;
pDecCont->picNumber = 0;
#ifdef H264DEC_TRACE
sprintf(pDecCont->str, "H264SwDecInit# OK: return %p", (void*)pDecCont);
DEC_API_TRC(pDecCont->str);
#endif
*decInst = (decContainer_t *)pDecCont;
return(H264SWDEC_OK);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | H264SwDecRet H264SwDecInit(H264SwDecInst *decInst, u32 noOutputReordering)
{
u32 rv = 0;
decContainer_t *pDecCont;
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit#");
/* check that right shift on negative numbers is performed signed */
/*lint -save -e* following check causes multiple lint messages */
if ( ((-1)>>1) != (-1) )
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: Right shift is not signed");
return(H264SWDEC_INITFAIL);
}
/*lint -restore */
if (decInst == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: decInst == NULL");
return(H264SWDEC_PARAM_ERR);
}
pDecCont = (decContainer_t *)H264SwDecMalloc(sizeof(decContainer_t), 1);
if (pDecCont == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecInit# ERROR: Memory allocation failed");
return(H264SWDEC_MEMFAIL);
}
#ifdef H264DEC_TRACE
sprintf(pDecCont->str, "H264SwDecInit# decInst %p noOutputReordering %d",
(void*)decInst, noOutputReordering);
DEC_API_TRC(pDecCont->str);
#endif
rv = h264bsdInit(&pDecCont->storage, noOutputReordering);
if (rv != HANTRO_OK)
{
H264SwDecRelease(pDecCont);
return(H264SWDEC_MEMFAIL);
}
pDecCont->decStat = INITIALIZED;
pDecCont->picNumber = 0;
#ifdef H264DEC_TRACE
sprintf(pDecCont->str, "H264SwDecInit# OK: return %p", (void*)pDecCont);
DEC_API_TRC(pDecCont->str);
#endif
*decInst = (decContainer_t *)pDecCont;
return(H264SWDEC_OK);
}
| 173,874 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin::ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin()
: speech_synthesizer_(NULL),
paused_(false) {
CoCreateInstance(
CLSID_SpVoice,
NULL,
CLSCTX_SERVER,
IID_ISpVoice,
reinterpret_cast<void**>(&speech_synthesizer_));
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin::ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin()
: speech_synthesizer_(NULL),
paused_(false) {
CoCreateInstance(
CLSID_SpVoice,
NULL,
CLSCTX_SERVER,
IID_ISpVoice,
reinterpret_cast<void**>(&speech_synthesizer_));
if (speech_synthesizer_) {
ULONGLONG event_mask =
SPFEI(SPEI_START_INPUT_STREAM) |
SPFEI(SPEI_TTS_BOOKMARK) |
SPFEI(SPEI_WORD_BOUNDARY) |
SPFEI(SPEI_SENTENCE_BOUNDARY) |
SPFEI(SPEI_END_INPUT_STREAM);
speech_synthesizer_->SetInterest(event_mask, event_mask);
speech_synthesizer_->SetNotifyCallbackFunction(
ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin::SpeechEventCallback, 0, 0);
}
}
| 170,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPinCode(const std::string& pincode) {
if (!agent_.get() || pincode_callback_.is_null())
return;
pincode_callback_.Run(SUCCESS, pincode);
pincode_callback_.Reset();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPinCode(const std::string& pincode) {
if (!pairing_context_.get())
return;
pairing_context_->SetPinCode(pincode);
}
| 171,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cac_read_binary(sc_card_t *card, unsigned int idx,
unsigned char *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
int r = 0;
u8 *tl = NULL, *val = NULL;
u8 *tl_ptr, *val_ptr, *tlv_ptr, *tl_start;
u8 *cert_ptr;
size_t tl_len, val_len, tlv_len;
size_t len, tl_head_len, cert_len;
u8 cert_type, tag;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* if we didn't return it all last time, return the remainder */
if (priv->cached) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"returning cached value idx=%d count=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
idx, count);
if (idx > priv->cache_buf_len) {
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_END_REACHED);
}
len = MIN(count, priv->cache_buf_len-idx);
memcpy(buf, &priv->cache_buf[idx], len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, len);
}
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"clearing cache idx=%d count=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
idx, count);
if (priv->cache_buf) {
free(priv->cache_buf);
priv->cache_buf = NULL;
priv->cache_buf_len = 0;
}
if (priv->object_type <= 0)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
r = cac_read_file(card, CAC_FILE_TAG, &tl, &tl_len);
if (r < 0) {
goto done;
}
r = cac_read_file(card, CAC_FILE_VALUE, &val, &val_len);
if (r < 0)
goto done;
switch (priv->object_type) {
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_TLV_FILE:
tlv_len = tl_len + val_len;
priv->cache_buf = malloc(tlv_len);
if (priv->cache_buf == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
priv->cache_buf_len = tlv_len;
for (tl_ptr = tl, val_ptr=val, tlv_ptr = priv->cache_buf;
tl_len >= 2 && tlv_len > 0;
val_len -= len, tlv_len -= len, val_ptr += len, tlv_ptr += len) {
/* get the tag and the length */
tl_start = tl_ptr;
if (sc_simpletlv_read_tag(&tl_ptr, tl_len, &tag, &len) != SC_SUCCESS)
break;
tl_head_len = (tl_ptr - tl_start);
sc_simpletlv_put_tag(tag, len, tlv_ptr, tlv_len, &tlv_ptr);
tlv_len -= tl_head_len;
tl_len -= tl_head_len;
/* don't crash on bad data */
if (val_len < len) {
len = val_len;
}
/* if we run out of return space, truncate */
if (tlv_len < len) {
len = tlv_len;
}
memcpy(tlv_ptr, val_ptr, len);
}
break;
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_CERT:
/* read file */
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
" obj= cert_file, val_len=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u (0x%04"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"x)",
val_len, val_len);
cert_len = 0;
cert_ptr = NULL;
cert_type = 0;
for (tl_ptr = tl, val_ptr=val; tl_len >= 2;
val_len -= len, val_ptr += len, tl_len -= tl_head_len) {
tl_start = tl_ptr;
if (sc_simpletlv_read_tag(&tl_ptr, tl_len, &tag, &len) != SC_SUCCESS)
break;
tl_head_len = tl_ptr - tl_start;
if (tag == CAC_TAG_CERTIFICATE) {
cert_len = len;
cert_ptr = val_ptr;
}
if (tag == CAC_TAG_CERTINFO) {
if ((len >= 1) && (val_len >=1)) {
cert_type = *val_ptr;
}
}
if (tag == CAC_TAG_MSCUID) {
sc_log_hex(card->ctx, "MSCUID", val_ptr, len);
}
if ((val_len < len) || (tl_len < tl_head_len)) {
break;
}
}
/* if the info byte is 1, then the cert is compressed, decompress it */
if ((cert_type & 0x3) == 1) {
#ifdef ENABLE_ZLIB
r = sc_decompress_alloc(&priv->cache_buf, &priv->cache_buf_len,
cert_ptr, cert_len, COMPRESSION_AUTO);
#else
sc_log(card->ctx, "CAC compression not supported, no zlib");
r = SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#endif
if (r)
goto done;
} else if (cert_len > 0) {
priv->cache_buf = malloc(cert_len);
if (priv->cache_buf == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
priv->cache_buf_len = cert_len;
memcpy(priv->cache_buf, cert_ptr, cert_len);
} else {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Can't read zero-length certificate");
goto done;
}
break;
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_GENERIC:
/* TODO
* We have some two buffers in unknown encoding that we
* need to present in PKCS#15 layer.
*/
default:
/* Unknown object type */
sc_log(card->ctx, "Unknown object type: %x", priv->object_type);
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto done;
}
/* OK we've read the data, now copy the required portion out to the callers buffer */
priv->cached = 1;
len = MIN(count, priv->cache_buf_len-idx);
memcpy(buf, &priv->cache_buf[idx], len);
r = len;
done:
if (tl)
free(tl);
if (val)
free(val);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int cac_read_binary(sc_card_t *card, unsigned int idx,
unsigned char *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
int r = 0;
u8 *tl = NULL, *val = NULL;
u8 *tl_ptr, *val_ptr, *tlv_ptr, *tl_start;
u8 *cert_ptr;
size_t tl_len, val_len, tlv_len;
size_t len, tl_head_len, cert_len;
u8 cert_type, tag;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* if we didn't return it all last time, return the remainder */
if (priv->cached) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"returning cached value idx=%d count=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
idx, count);
if (idx > priv->cache_buf_len) {
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_END_REACHED);
}
len = MIN(count, priv->cache_buf_len-idx);
memcpy(buf, &priv->cache_buf[idx], len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, len);
}
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"clearing cache idx=%d count=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
idx, count);
if (priv->cache_buf) {
free(priv->cache_buf);
priv->cache_buf = NULL;
priv->cache_buf_len = 0;
}
if (priv->object_type <= 0)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
r = cac_read_file(card, CAC_FILE_TAG, &tl, &tl_len);
if (r < 0) {
goto done;
}
r = cac_read_file(card, CAC_FILE_VALUE, &val, &val_len);
if (r < 0)
goto done;
switch (priv->object_type) {
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_TLV_FILE:
tlv_len = tl_len + val_len;
priv->cache_buf = malloc(tlv_len);
if (priv->cache_buf == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
priv->cache_buf_len = tlv_len;
for (tl_ptr = tl, val_ptr=val, tlv_ptr = priv->cache_buf;
tl_len >= 2 && tlv_len > 0;
val_len -= len, tlv_len -= len, val_ptr += len, tlv_ptr += len) {
/* get the tag and the length */
tl_start = tl_ptr;
if (sc_simpletlv_read_tag(&tl_ptr, tl_len, &tag, &len) != SC_SUCCESS)
break;
tl_head_len = (tl_ptr - tl_start);
sc_simpletlv_put_tag(tag, len, tlv_ptr, tlv_len, &tlv_ptr);
tlv_len -= tl_head_len;
tl_len -= tl_head_len;
/* don't crash on bad data */
if (val_len < len) {
len = val_len;
}
/* if we run out of return space, truncate */
if (tlv_len < len) {
len = tlv_len;
}
memcpy(tlv_ptr, val_ptr, len);
}
break;
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_CERT:
/* read file */
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
" obj= cert_file, val_len=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u (0x%04"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"x)",
val_len, val_len);
cert_len = 0;
cert_ptr = NULL;
cert_type = 0;
for (tl_ptr = tl, val_ptr = val; tl_len >= 2;
val_len -= len, val_ptr += len, tl_len -= tl_head_len) {
tl_start = tl_ptr;
if (sc_simpletlv_read_tag(&tl_ptr, tl_len, &tag, &len) != SC_SUCCESS)
break;
tl_head_len = tl_ptr - tl_start;
/* incomplete value */
if (val_len < len)
break;
if (tag == CAC_TAG_CERTIFICATE) {
cert_len = len;
cert_ptr = val_ptr;
}
if (tag == CAC_TAG_CERTINFO) {
if ((len >= 1) && (val_len >=1)) {
cert_type = *val_ptr;
}
}
if (tag == CAC_TAG_MSCUID) {
sc_log_hex(card->ctx, "MSCUID", val_ptr, len);
}
if ((val_len < len) || (tl_len < tl_head_len)) {
break;
}
}
/* if the info byte is 1, then the cert is compressed, decompress it */
if ((cert_type & 0x3) == 1) {
#ifdef ENABLE_ZLIB
r = sc_decompress_alloc(&priv->cache_buf, &priv->cache_buf_len,
cert_ptr, cert_len, COMPRESSION_AUTO);
#else
sc_log(card->ctx, "CAC compression not supported, no zlib");
r = SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#endif
if (r)
goto done;
} else if (cert_len > 0) {
priv->cache_buf = malloc(cert_len);
if (priv->cache_buf == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
priv->cache_buf_len = cert_len;
memcpy(priv->cache_buf, cert_ptr, cert_len);
} else {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Can't read zero-length certificate");
goto done;
}
break;
case CAC_OBJECT_TYPE_GENERIC:
/* TODO
* We have some two buffers in unknown encoding that we
* need to present in PKCS#15 layer.
*/
default:
/* Unknown object type */
sc_log(card->ctx, "Unknown object type: %x", priv->object_type);
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
goto done;
}
/* OK we've read the data, now copy the required portion out to the callers buffer */
priv->cached = 1;
len = MIN(count, priv->cache_buf_len-idx);
memcpy(buf, &priv->cache_buf[idx], len);
r = len;
done:
if (tl)
free(tl);
if (val)
free(val);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
| 169,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http *hp)
{
int u;
int seen_host = 0;
for (u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {
if (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)
continue;
AN(hp->hd[u].b);
AN(hp->hd[u].e);
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Host)) {
if (seen_host) {
return (400);
}
seen_host = 1;
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID: | htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http *hp)
htc_request_check_hdrs(struct sess *sp, struct http *hp)
{
int u;
int seen_host = 0;
int seen_cl = 0;
for (u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {
if (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)
continue;
AN(hp->hd[u].b);
AN(hp->hd[u].e);
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Host)) {
if (seen_host) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error, "Duplicated Host header");
return (400);
}
seen_host = 1;
}
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Content_Length)) {
if (seen_cl) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error,
"Duplicated Content-Length header");
return (400);
}
seen_cl = 1;
}
}
return (0);
}
| 167,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ServiceManagerContext::ServiceManagerContext() {
service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest packaged_services_request;
if (service_manager::ServiceManagerIsRemote()) {
auto invitation =
mojo::edk::IncomingBrokerClientInvitation::AcceptFromCommandLine(
mojo::edk::TransportProtocol::kLegacy);
packaged_services_request =
service_manager::GetServiceRequestFromCommandLine(invitation.get());
} else {
std::unique_ptr<BuiltinManifestProvider> manifest_provider =
base::MakeUnique<BuiltinManifestProvider>();
static const struct ManifestInfo {
const char* name;
int resource_id;
} kManifests[] = {
{mojom::kBrowserServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_BROWSER_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kGpuServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_GPU_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kPackagedServicesServiceName,
IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_PACKAGED_SERVICES_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kPluginServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_PLUGIN_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kRendererServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_RENDERER_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kUtilityServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_UTILITY_MANIFEST},
{catalog::mojom::kServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CATALOG_MANIFEST},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kManifests); ++i) {
manifest_provider->AddServiceManifest(kManifests[i].name,
kManifests[i].resource_id);
}
for (const auto& manifest :
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetExtraServiceManifests()) {
manifest_provider->AddServiceManifest(manifest.name,
manifest.resource_id);
}
in_process_context_ = new InProcessServiceManagerContext;
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr packaged_services_service;
packaged_services_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&packaged_services_service);
in_process_context_->Start(packaged_services_service.PassInterface(),
std::move(manifest_provider));
}
packaged_services_connection_ = ServiceManagerConnection::Create(
std::move(packaged_services_request),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr root_browser_service;
ServiceManagerConnection::SetForProcess(ServiceManagerConnection::Create(
mojo::MakeRequest(&root_browser_service),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO)));
auto* browser_connection = ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess();
service_manager::mojom::PIDReceiverPtr pid_receiver;
packaged_services_connection_->GetConnector()->StartService(
service_manager::Identity(mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
service_manager::mojom::kRootUserID),
std::move(root_browser_service), mojo::MakeRequest(&pid_receiver));
pid_receiver->SetPID(base::GetCurrentProcId());
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo device_info;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
base::android::ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> java_nfc_delegate;
java_nfc_delegate.Reset(Java_ContentNfcDelegate_create(env));
DCHECK(!java_nfc_delegate.is_null());
device_info.factory =
base::Bind(&device::CreateDeviceService,
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO),
base::Bind(&WakeLockContextHost::GetNativeViewForContext),
std::move(java_nfc_delegate));
#else
device_info.factory =
base::Bind(&device::CreateDeviceService,
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
#endif
device_info.task_runner = base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get();
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(device::mojom::kServiceName,
device_info);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGlobalResourceCoordinator)) {
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo resource_coordinator_info;
resource_coordinator_info.factory =
base::Bind(&resource_coordinator::ResourceCoordinatorService::Create);
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(
resource_coordinator::mojom::kServiceName, resource_coordinator_info);
}
ContentBrowserClient::StaticServiceMap services;
GetContentClient()->browser()->RegisterInProcessServices(&services);
for (const auto& entry : services) {
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(entry.first,
entry.second);
}
g_io_thread_connector.Get() = browser_connection->GetConnector()->Clone();
ContentBrowserClient::OutOfProcessServiceMap out_of_process_services;
GetContentClient()->browser()->RegisterOutOfProcessServices(
&out_of_process_services);
out_of_process_services[data_decoder::mojom::kServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Data Decoder Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_UTILITY};
bool network_service_enabled =
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService);
if (network_service_enabled) {
out_of_process_services[content::mojom::kNetworkServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Network Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NETWORK};
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(video_capture::kMojoVideoCapture)) {
out_of_process_services[video_capture::mojom::kServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Video Capture Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NO_SANDBOX};
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_UTILITY_PROCESS)
out_of_process_services[media::mojom::kMediaServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Media Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NO_SANDBOX};
#endif
for (const auto& service : out_of_process_services) {
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
service.first, base::Bind(&StartServiceInUtilityProcess, service.first,
service.second.first, service.second.second));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_GPU_PROCESS)
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
media::mojom::kMediaServiceName,
base::Bind(&StartServiceInGpuProcess, media::mojom::kMediaServiceName));
#endif
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
base::Bind(&StartServiceInGpuProcess,
shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName));
packaged_services_connection_->Start();
RegisterCommonBrowserInterfaces(browser_connection);
browser_connection->Start();
if (network_service_enabled) {
browser_connection->GetConnector()->StartService(
mojom::kNetworkServiceName);
}
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ServiceManagerContext::ServiceManagerContext() {
service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest packaged_services_request;
if (service_manager::ServiceManagerIsRemote()) {
auto invitation =
mojo::edk::IncomingBrokerClientInvitation::AcceptFromCommandLine(
mojo::edk::TransportProtocol::kLegacy);
packaged_services_request =
service_manager::GetServiceRequestFromCommandLine(invitation.get());
} else {
std::unique_ptr<BuiltinManifestProvider> manifest_provider =
base::MakeUnique<BuiltinManifestProvider>();
static const struct ManifestInfo {
const char* name;
int resource_id;
} kManifests[] = {
{mojom::kBrowserServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_BROWSER_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kGpuServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_GPU_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kPackagedServicesServiceName,
IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_PACKAGED_SERVICES_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kPluginServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_PLUGIN_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kRendererServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_RENDERER_MANIFEST},
{mojom::kUtilityServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CONTENT_UTILITY_MANIFEST},
{catalog::mojom::kServiceName, IDR_MOJO_CATALOG_MANIFEST},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kManifests); ++i) {
manifest_provider->AddServiceManifest(kManifests[i].name,
kManifests[i].resource_id);
}
for (const auto& manifest :
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetExtraServiceManifests()) {
manifest_provider->AddServiceManifest(manifest.name,
manifest.resource_id);
}
in_process_context_ = new InProcessServiceManagerContext;
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr packaged_services_service;
packaged_services_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&packaged_services_service);
in_process_context_->Start(packaged_services_service.PassInterface(),
std::move(manifest_provider));
}
packaged_services_connection_ = ServiceManagerConnection::Create(
std::move(packaged_services_request),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr root_browser_service;
ServiceManagerConnection::SetForProcess(ServiceManagerConnection::Create(
mojo::MakeRequest(&root_browser_service),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO)));
auto* browser_connection = ServiceManagerConnection::GetForProcess();
service_manager::mojom::PIDReceiverPtr pid_receiver;
packaged_services_connection_->GetConnector()->StartService(
service_manager::Identity(mojom::kBrowserServiceName,
service_manager::mojom::kRootUserID),
std::move(root_browser_service), mojo::MakeRequest(&pid_receiver));
pid_receiver->SetPID(base::GetCurrentProcId());
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo device_info;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
base::android::ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> java_nfc_delegate;
java_nfc_delegate.Reset(Java_ContentNfcDelegate_create(env));
DCHECK(!java_nfc_delegate.is_null());
device_info.factory =
base::Bind(&device::CreateDeviceService,
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO),
base::Bind(&WakeLockContextHost::GetNativeViewForContext),
std::move(java_nfc_delegate));
#else
device_info.factory =
base::Bind(&device::CreateDeviceService,
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
#endif
device_info.task_runner = base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get();
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(device::mojom::kServiceName,
device_info);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kGlobalResourceCoordinator)) {
service_manager::EmbeddedServiceInfo resource_coordinator_info;
resource_coordinator_info.factory =
base::Bind(&resource_coordinator::ResourceCoordinatorService::Create);
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(
resource_coordinator::mojom::kServiceName, resource_coordinator_info);
}
ContentBrowserClient::StaticServiceMap services;
GetContentClient()->browser()->RegisterInProcessServices(&services);
for (const auto& entry : services) {
packaged_services_connection_->AddEmbeddedService(entry.first,
entry.second);
}
g_io_thread_connector.Get() = browser_connection->GetConnector()->Clone();
ContentBrowserClient::OutOfProcessServiceMap out_of_process_services;
GetContentClient()->browser()->RegisterOutOfProcessServices(
&out_of_process_services);
out_of_process_services[data_decoder::mojom::kServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Data Decoder Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_UTILITY};
bool network_service_enabled =
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService);
if (network_service_enabled) {
out_of_process_services[content::mojom::kNetworkServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Network Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NETWORK};
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(video_capture::kMojoVideoCapture)) {
out_of_process_services[video_capture::mojom::kServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Video Capture Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_NO_SANDBOX};
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_UTILITY_PROCESS)
out_of_process_services[media::mojom::kMediaServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Media Service"), SANDBOX_TYPE_UTILITY};
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_STANDALONE_CDM_SERVICE)
out_of_process_services[media::mojom::kCdmServiceName] = {
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Content Decryption Module Service"),
SANDBOX_TYPE_NO_SANDBOX};
#endif
for (const auto& service : out_of_process_services) {
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
service.first, base::Bind(&StartServiceInUtilityProcess, service.first,
service.second.first, service.second.second));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MOJO_MEDIA_IN_GPU_PROCESS)
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
media::mojom::kMediaServiceName,
base::Bind(&StartServiceInGpuProcess, media::mojom::kMediaServiceName));
#endif
packaged_services_connection_->AddServiceRequestHandler(
shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName,
base::Bind(&StartServiceInGpuProcess,
shape_detection::mojom::kServiceName));
packaged_services_connection_->Start();
RegisterCommonBrowserInterfaces(browser_connection);
browser_connection->Start();
if (network_service_enabled) {
browser_connection->GetConnector()->StartService(
mojom::kNetworkServiceName);
}
}
| 171,939 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(
long& cue_points_size,
long long pos) const
{
assert(m_count == 0);
if (m_preload_count >= cue_points_size)
{
const long n = (cue_points_size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2*cue_points_size;
CuePoint** const qq = new CuePoint*[n];
CuePoint** q = qq; //beginning of target
CuePoint** p = m_cue_points; //beginning of source
CuePoint** const pp = p + m_preload_count; //end of source
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_cue_points;
m_cue_points = qq;
cue_points_size = n;
}
CuePoint* const pCP = new CuePoint(m_preload_count, pos);
m_cue_points[m_preload_count++] = pCP;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Cues::PreloadCuePoint(
continue;
}
assert(m_preload_count > 0);
CuePoint* const pCP = m_cue_points[m_count];
assert(pCP);
assert((pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0) || (-pCP->GetTimeCode() == idpos));
if (pCP->GetTimeCode() < 0 && (-pCP->GetTimeCode() != idpos))
return false;
pCP->Load(pReader);
++m_count;
--m_preload_count;
m_pos += size; // consume payload
assert(m_pos <= stop);
return true; // yes, we loaded a cue point
}
// return (m_pos < stop);
return false; // no, we did not load a cue point
}
| 174,432 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PrintPreviewUI::~PrintPreviewUI() {
print_preview_data_service()->RemoveEntry(preview_ui_addr_str_);
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Erase(preview_ui_addr_str_);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | PrintPreviewUI::~PrintPreviewUI() {
print_preview_data_service()->RemoveEntry(id_);
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Erase(id_);
g_print_preview_ui_id_map.Get().Remove(id_);
}
| 170,844 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int yr_re_match(
RE* re,
const char* target)
{
return yr_re_exec(
re->code,
(uint8_t*) target,
strlen(target),
re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int yr_re_match(
RE* re,
const char* target)
{
return yr_re_exec(
re->code,
(uint8_t*) target,
strlen(target),
0,
re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL);
}
| 168,203 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int rtnl_fill_link_ifmap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct rtnl_link_ifmap map = {
.mem_start = dev->mem_start,
.mem_end = dev->mem_end,
.base_addr = dev->base_addr,
.irq = dev->irq,
.dma = dev->dma,
.port = dev->if_port,
};
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_MAP, sizeof(map), &map))
return -EMSGSIZE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int rtnl_fill_link_ifmap(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct rtnl_link_ifmap map;
memset(&map, 0, sizeof(map));
map.mem_start = dev->mem_start;
map.mem_end = dev->mem_end;
map.base_addr = dev->base_addr;
map.irq = dev->irq;
map.dma = dev->dma;
map.port = dev->if_port;
if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_MAP, sizeof(map), &map))
return -EMSGSIZE;
return 0;
}
| 167,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int em_ret_near_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->_eip;
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int em_ret_near_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long eip;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = assign_eip_near(ctxt, eip);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
| 169,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BackgroundLoaderOffliner::StartSnapshot() {
if (!pending_request_.get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Pending request was cleared during delay.";
return;
}
DCHECK(is_low_bar_met_)
<< "Minimum quality must have been reached before saving a snapshot";
AddLoadingSignal("Snapshotting");
SavePageRequest request(*pending_request_.get());
if (page_load_state_ != SUCCESS) {
Offliner::RequestStatus status;
switch (page_load_state_) {
case RETRIABLE_NET_ERROR:
status = Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED_NET_ERROR;
break;
case RETRIABLE_HTTP_ERROR:
status = Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED_HTTP_ERROR;
break;
case NONRETRIABLE:
status = Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED_NO_RETRY;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
status = Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED;
}
std::move(completion_callback_).Run(request, status);
ResetState();
return;
}
content::WebContents* web_contents(
content::WebContentsObserver::web_contents());
Offliner::RequestStatus loaded_page_error =
CanSavePageInBackground(web_contents);
if (loaded_page_error != Offliner::RequestStatus::UNKNOWN) {
std::move(completion_callback_).Run(request, loaded_page_error);
ResetState();
return;
}
save_state_ = SAVING;
RequestStats& image_stats = stats_[ResourceDataType::IMAGE];
RequestStats& css_stats = stats_[ResourceDataType::TEXT_CSS];
RequestStats& xhr_stats = stats_[ResourceDataType::XHR];
bool image_complete = (image_stats.requested == image_stats.completed);
bool css_complete = (css_stats.requested == css_stats.completed);
bool xhr_complete = (xhr_stats.requested == xhr_stats.completed);
RecordResourceCompletionUMA(image_complete, css_complete, xhr_complete);
if (IsOfflinePagesLoadSignalCollectingEnabled()) {
signal_data_.SetDouble("StartedImages", image_stats.requested);
signal_data_.SetDouble("CompletedImages", image_stats.completed);
signal_data_.SetDouble("StartedCSS", css_stats.requested);
signal_data_.SetDouble("CompletedCSS", css_stats.completed);
signal_data_.SetDouble("StartedXHR", xhr_stats.requested);
signal_data_.SetDouble("CompletedXHR", xhr_stats.completed);
std::string headers = base::StringPrintf(
"%s\r\n%s\r\n\r\n", kContentTransferEncodingBinary, kXHeaderForSignals);
std::string body;
base::JSONWriter::Write(signal_data_, &body);
std::string content_type = kContentType;
std::string content_location = base::StringPrintf(
"cid:signal-data-%" PRId64 "@mhtml.blink", request.request_id());
content::MHTMLExtraParts* extra_parts =
content::MHTMLExtraParts::FromWebContents(web_contents);
DCHECK(extra_parts);
if (extra_parts != nullptr) {
extra_parts->AddExtraMHTMLPart(content_type, content_location, headers,
body);
}
}
std::unique_ptr<OfflinePageArchiver> archiver(new OfflinePageMHTMLArchiver());
OfflinePageModel::SavePageParams params;
params.url = web_contents->GetLastCommittedURL();
params.client_id = request.client_id();
params.proposed_offline_id = request.request_id();
params.is_background = true;
params.use_page_problem_detectors = true;
params.request_origin = request.request_origin();
if (!request.original_url().is_empty())
params.original_url = request.original_url();
else if (params.url != request.url())
params.original_url = request.url();
offline_page_model_->SavePage(
params, std::move(archiver), web_contents,
base::Bind(&BackgroundLoaderOffliner::OnPageSaved,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void BackgroundLoaderOffliner::StartSnapshot() {
if (!pending_request_.get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Pending request was cleared during delay.";
return;
}
DCHECK(is_low_bar_met_)
<< "Minimum quality must have been reached before saving a snapshot";
AddLoadingSignal("Snapshotting");
SavePageRequest request(*pending_request_.get());
if (page_load_state_ != SUCCESS) {
Offliner::RequestStatus status;
switch (page_load_state_) {
case RETRIABLE_NET_ERROR:
status = Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED_NET_ERROR;
break;
case RETRIABLE_HTTP_ERROR:
status = Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED_HTTP_ERROR;
break;
case NONRETRIABLE:
status = Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED_NO_RETRY;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
status = Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED;
}
std::move(completion_callback_).Run(request, status);
ResetState();
return;
}
content::WebContents* web_contents(
content::WebContentsObserver::web_contents());
Offliner::RequestStatus loaded_page_error =
CanSavePageInBackground(web_contents);
if (loaded_page_error != Offliner::RequestStatus::UNKNOWN) {
std::move(completion_callback_).Run(request, loaded_page_error);
ResetState();
return;
}
save_state_ = SAVING;
RequestStats& image_stats = stats_[ResourceDataType::IMAGE];
RequestStats& css_stats = stats_[ResourceDataType::TEXT_CSS];
RequestStats& xhr_stats = stats_[ResourceDataType::XHR];
if (IsOfflinePagesLoadSignalCollectingEnabled()) {
signal_data_.SetDouble("StartedImages", image_stats.requested);
signal_data_.SetDouble("CompletedImages", image_stats.completed);
signal_data_.SetDouble("StartedCSS", css_stats.requested);
signal_data_.SetDouble("CompletedCSS", css_stats.completed);
signal_data_.SetDouble("StartedXHR", xhr_stats.requested);
signal_data_.SetDouble("CompletedXHR", xhr_stats.completed);
std::string headers = base::StringPrintf(
"%s\r\n%s\r\n\r\n", kContentTransferEncodingBinary, kXHeaderForSignals);
std::string body;
base::JSONWriter::Write(signal_data_, &body);
std::string content_type = kContentType;
std::string content_location = base::StringPrintf(
"cid:signal-data-%" PRId64 "@mhtml.blink", request.request_id());
content::MHTMLExtraParts* extra_parts =
content::MHTMLExtraParts::FromWebContents(web_contents);
DCHECK(extra_parts);
if (extra_parts != nullptr) {
extra_parts->AddExtraMHTMLPart(content_type, content_location, headers,
body);
}
}
std::unique_ptr<OfflinePageArchiver> archiver(new OfflinePageMHTMLArchiver());
OfflinePageModel::SavePageParams params;
params.url = web_contents->GetLastCommittedURL();
params.client_id = request.client_id();
params.proposed_offline_id = request.request_id();
params.is_background = true;
params.use_page_problem_detectors = true;
params.request_origin = request.request_origin();
if (!request.original_url().is_empty())
params.original_url = request.original_url();
else if (params.url != request.url())
params.original_url = request.url();
offline_page_model_->SavePage(
params, std::move(archiver), web_contents,
base::Bind(&BackgroundLoaderOffliner::OnPageSaved,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
| 172,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(DownloadId global_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!ContainsKey(downloads_, global_id))
return;
DownloadFile* download_file = downloads_[global_id];
VLOG(20) << " " << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " id = " << global_id
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
download_file->Detach();
EraseDownload(global_id);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(DownloadId global_id) {
void DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload(
DownloadId global_id, const base::Closure& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
if (!ContainsKey(downloads_, global_id))
return;
DownloadFile* download_file = downloads_[global_id];
VLOG(20) << " " << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " id = " << global_id
<< " download_file = " << download_file->DebugString();
// Done here on Windows so that anti-virus scanners invoked by
// the attachment service actually see the data; see
// http://crbug.com/127999.
// Done here for mac because we only want to do this once; see
// http://crbug.com/13120 for details.
// Other platforms don't currently do source annotation.
download_file->AnnotateWithSourceInformation();
download_file->Detach();
EraseDownload(global_id);
// Notify our caller we've let it go.
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE, callback);
}
| 170,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags,
struct dev_pagemap **pgmap)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct page *page;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *ptep, pte;
retry:
if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
pte = *ptep;
if (!pte_present(pte)) {
swp_entry_t entry;
/*
* KSM's break_ksm() relies upon recognizing a ksm page
* even while it is being migrated, so for that case we
* need migration_entry_wait().
*/
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
goto no_page;
if (pte_none(pte))
goto no_page;
entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (!is_migration_entry(entry))
goto no_page;
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd, address);
goto retry;
}
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
goto no_page;
if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return NULL;
}
page = vm_normal_page(vma, address, pte);
if (!page && pte_devmap(pte) && (flags & FOLL_GET)) {
/*
* Only return device mapping pages in the FOLL_GET case since
* they are only valid while holding the pgmap reference.
*/
*pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pte_pfn(pte), *pgmap);
if (*pgmap)
page = pte_page(pte);
else
goto no_page;
} else if (unlikely(!page)) {
if (flags & FOLL_DUMP) {
/* Avoid special (like zero) pages in core dumps */
page = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
goto out;
}
if (is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(pte))) {
page = pte_page(pte);
} else {
int ret;
ret = follow_pfn_pte(vma, address, ptep, flags);
page = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
}
if (flags & FOLL_SPLIT && PageTransCompound(page)) {
int ret;
get_page(page);
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
lock_page(page);
ret = split_huge_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
goto retry;
}
if (flags & FOLL_GET)
get_page(page);
if (flags & FOLL_TOUCH) {
if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) &&
!pte_dirty(pte) && !PageDirty(page))
set_page_dirty(page);
/*
* pte_mkyoung() would be more correct here, but atomic care
* is needed to avoid losing the dirty bit: it is easier to use
* mark_page_accessed().
*/
mark_page_accessed(page);
}
if ((flags & FOLL_MLOCK) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)) {
/* Do not mlock pte-mapped THP */
if (PageTransCompound(page))
goto out;
/*
* The preliminary mapping check is mainly to avoid the
* pointless overhead of lock_page on the ZERO_PAGE
* which might bounce very badly if there is contention.
*
* If the page is already locked, we don't need to
* handle it now - vmscan will handle it later if and
* when it attempts to reclaim the page.
*/
if (page->mapping && trylock_page(page)) {
lru_add_drain(); /* push cached pages to LRU */
/*
* Because we lock page here, and migration is
* blocked by the pte's page reference, and we
* know the page is still mapped, we don't even
* need to check for file-cache page truncation.
*/
mlock_vma_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
}
}
out:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return page;
no_page:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
if (!pte_none(pte))
return NULL;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags,
struct dev_pagemap **pgmap)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct page *page;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *ptep, pte;
retry:
if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
pte = *ptep;
if (!pte_present(pte)) {
swp_entry_t entry;
/*
* KSM's break_ksm() relies upon recognizing a ksm page
* even while it is being migrated, so for that case we
* need migration_entry_wait().
*/
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
goto no_page;
if (pte_none(pte))
goto no_page;
entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (!is_migration_entry(entry))
goto no_page;
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd, address);
goto retry;
}
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
goto no_page;
if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return NULL;
}
page = vm_normal_page(vma, address, pte);
if (!page && pte_devmap(pte) && (flags & FOLL_GET)) {
/*
* Only return device mapping pages in the FOLL_GET case since
* they are only valid while holding the pgmap reference.
*/
*pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pte_pfn(pte), *pgmap);
if (*pgmap)
page = pte_page(pte);
else
goto no_page;
} else if (unlikely(!page)) {
if (flags & FOLL_DUMP) {
/* Avoid special (like zero) pages in core dumps */
page = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
goto out;
}
if (is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(pte))) {
page = pte_page(pte);
} else {
int ret;
ret = follow_pfn_pte(vma, address, ptep, flags);
page = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
}
if (flags & FOLL_SPLIT && PageTransCompound(page)) {
int ret;
get_page(page);
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
lock_page(page);
ret = split_huge_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
goto retry;
}
if (flags & FOLL_GET) {
if (unlikely(!try_get_page(page))) {
page = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto out;
}
}
if (flags & FOLL_TOUCH) {
if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) &&
!pte_dirty(pte) && !PageDirty(page))
set_page_dirty(page);
/*
* pte_mkyoung() would be more correct here, but atomic care
* is needed to avoid losing the dirty bit: it is easier to use
* mark_page_accessed().
*/
mark_page_accessed(page);
}
if ((flags & FOLL_MLOCK) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)) {
/* Do not mlock pte-mapped THP */
if (PageTransCompound(page))
goto out;
/*
* The preliminary mapping check is mainly to avoid the
* pointless overhead of lock_page on the ZERO_PAGE
* which might bounce very badly if there is contention.
*
* If the page is already locked, we don't need to
* handle it now - vmscan will handle it later if and
* when it attempts to reclaim the page.
*/
if (page->mapping && trylock_page(page)) {
lru_add_drain(); /* push cached pages to LRU */
/*
* Because we lock page here, and migration is
* blocked by the pte's page reference, and we
* know the page is still mapped, we don't even
* need to check for file-cache page truncation.
*/
mlock_vma_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
}
}
out:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return page;
no_page:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
if (!pte_none(pte))
return NULL;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
| 170,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void set_roi_map(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec) {
unsigned int i;
vpx_roi_map_t roi = {0};
roi.rows = (cfg->g_h + 15) / 16;
roi.cols = (cfg->g_w + 15) / 16;
roi.delta_q[0] = 0;
roi.delta_q[1] = -2;
roi.delta_q[2] = -4;
roi.delta_q[3] = -6;
roi.delta_lf[0] = 0;
roi.delta_lf[1] = 1;
roi.delta_lf[2] = 2;
roi.delta_lf[3] = 3;
roi.static_threshold[0] = 1500;
roi.static_threshold[1] = 1000;
roi.static_threshold[2] = 500;
roi.static_threshold[3] = 0;
roi.roi_map = (uint8_t *)malloc(roi.rows * roi.cols);
for (i = 0; i < roi.rows * roi.cols; ++i)
roi.roi_map[i] = i % 4;
if (vpx_codec_control(codec, VP8E_SET_ROI_MAP, &roi))
die_codec(codec, "Failed to set ROI map");
free(roi.roi_map);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void set_roi_map(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec) {
unsigned int i;
vpx_roi_map_t roi;
memset(&roi, 0, sizeof(roi));
roi.rows = (cfg->g_h + 15) / 16;
roi.cols = (cfg->g_w + 15) / 16;
roi.delta_q[0] = 0;
roi.delta_q[1] = -2;
roi.delta_q[2] = -4;
roi.delta_q[3] = -6;
roi.delta_lf[0] = 0;
roi.delta_lf[1] = 1;
roi.delta_lf[2] = 2;
roi.delta_lf[3] = 3;
roi.static_threshold[0] = 1500;
roi.static_threshold[1] = 1000;
roi.static_threshold[2] = 500;
roi.static_threshold[3] = 0;
roi.roi_map = (uint8_t *)malloc(roi.rows * roi.cols);
for (i = 0; i < roi.rows * roi.cols; ++i)
roi.roi_map[i] = i % 4;
if (vpx_codec_control(codec, VP8E_SET_ROI_MAP, &roi))
die_codec(codec, "Failed to set ROI map");
free(roi.roi_map);
}
| 174,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
ScopedSendOnIOThread delayed_send(
host_id_,
new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(params.route_id, false, 0));
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view = GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(
params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
delayed_send.Cancel();
static const base::TimeDelta swap_delay = GetSwapDelay();
if (swap_delay.ToInternalValue())
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(swap_delay);
view->AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params, host_id_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
ScopedSendOnIOThread delayed_send(
host_id_,
new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(params.route_id,
params.surface_handle,
0));
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view = GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(
params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
delayed_send.Cancel();
static const base::TimeDelta swap_delay = GetSwapDelay();
if (swap_delay.ToInternalValue())
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(swap_delay);
view->AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params, host_id_);
}
| 171,357 |
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