instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
139k
| output
stringlengths 16
138k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static inline int l2cap_connect_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data)
{
struct l2cap_conn_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_conn_rsp *) data;
u16 scid, dcid, result, status;
struct sock *sk;
u8 req[128];
scid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->scid);
dcid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->dcid);
result = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->result);
status = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->status);
BT_DBG("dcid 0x%4.4x scid 0x%4.4x result 0x%2.2x status 0x%2.2x", dcid, scid, result, status);
if (scid) {
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(&conn->chan_list, scid);
if (!sk)
return 0;
} else {
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(&conn->chan_list, cmd->ident);
if (!sk)
return 0;
}
switch (result) {
case L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS:
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
l2cap_pi(sk)->ident = 0;
l2cap_pi(sk)->dcid = dcid;
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state |= L2CAP_CONF_REQ_SENT;
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state &= ~L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND;
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, l2cap_get_ident(conn), L2CAP_CONF_REQ,
l2cap_build_conf_req(sk, req), req);
break;
case L2CAP_CR_PEND:
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state |= L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND;
break;
default:
l2cap_chan_del(sk, ECONNREFUSED);
break;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static inline int l2cap_connect_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data)
{
struct l2cap_conn_rsp *rsp = (struct l2cap_conn_rsp *) data;
u16 scid, dcid, result, status;
struct sock *sk;
u8 req[128];
scid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->scid);
dcid = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->dcid);
result = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->result);
status = __le16_to_cpu(rsp->status);
BT_DBG("dcid 0x%4.4x scid 0x%4.4x result 0x%2.2x status 0x%2.2x", dcid, scid, result, status);
if (scid) {
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(&conn->chan_list, scid);
if (!sk)
return 0;
} else {
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(&conn->chan_list, cmd->ident);
if (!sk)
return 0;
}
switch (result) {
case L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS:
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
l2cap_pi(sk)->ident = 0;
l2cap_pi(sk)->dcid = dcid;
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state |= L2CAP_CONF_REQ_SENT;
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state &= ~L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND;
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, l2cap_get_ident(conn), L2CAP_CONF_REQ,
l2cap_build_conf_req(sk, req), req);
l2cap_pi(sk)->num_conf_req++;
break;
case L2CAP_CR_PEND:
l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state |= L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND;
break;
default:
l2cap_chan_del(sk, ECONNREFUSED);
break;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
| 167,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev2_gen_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ikev2_gen_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void copyMultiCh24(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] >> 8;
}
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void copyMultiCh24(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
static void copyMultiCh24(short *dst, const int * src[FLACParser::kMaxChannels], unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] >> 8;
}
}
}
| 174,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AcpiNsEvaluate (
ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO *Info)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsEvaluate);
if (!Info)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_PARAMETER);
}
if (!Info->Node)
{
/*
* Get the actual namespace node for the target object if we
* need to. Handles these cases:
*
* 1) Null node, valid pathname from root (absolute path)
* 2) Node and valid pathname (path relative to Node)
* 3) Node, Null pathname
*/
Status = AcpiNsGetNode (Info->PrefixNode, Info->RelativePathname,
ACPI_NS_NO_UPSEARCH, &Info->Node);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
/*
* For a method alias, we must grab the actual method node so that
* proper scoping context will be established before execution.
*/
if (AcpiNsGetType (Info->Node) == ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_METHOD_ALIAS)
{
Info->Node = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, Info->Node->Object);
}
/* Complete the info block initialization */
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
Info->NodeFlags = Info->Node->Flags;
Info->ObjDesc = AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (Info->Node);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES, "%s [%p] Value %p\n",
Info->RelativePathname, Info->Node,
AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (Info->Node)));
/* Get info if we have a predefined name (_HID, etc.) */
Info->Predefined = AcpiUtMatchPredefinedMethod (Info->Node->Name.Ascii);
/* Get the full pathname to the object, for use in warning messages */
Info->FullPathname = AcpiNsGetNormalizedPathname (Info->Node, TRUE);
if (!Info->FullPathname)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NO_MEMORY);
}
/* Count the number of arguments being passed in */
Info->ParamCount = 0;
if (Info->Parameters)
{
while (Info->Parameters[Info->ParamCount])
{
Info->ParamCount++;
}
/* Warn on impossible argument count */
if (Info->ParamCount > ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS)
{
ACPI_WARN_PREDEFINED ((AE_INFO, Info->FullPathname, ACPI_WARN_ALWAYS,
"Excess arguments (%u) - using only %u",
Info->ParamCount, ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS));
Info->ParamCount = ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS;
}
}
/*
* For predefined names: Check that the declared argument count
* matches the ACPI spec -- otherwise this is a BIOS error.
*/
AcpiNsCheckAcpiCompliance (Info->FullPathname, Info->Node,
Info->Predefined);
/*
* For all names: Check that the incoming argument count for
* this method/object matches the actual ASL/AML definition.
*/
AcpiNsCheckArgumentCount (Info->FullPathname, Info->Node,
Info->ParamCount, Info->Predefined);
/* For predefined names: Typecheck all incoming arguments */
AcpiNsCheckArgumentTypes (Info);
/*
* Three major evaluation cases:
*
* 1) Object types that cannot be evaluated by definition
* 2) The object is a control method -- execute it
* 3) The object is not a method -- just return it's current value
*/
switch (AcpiNsGetType (Info->Node))
{
case ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE:
case ACPI_TYPE_EVENT:
case ACPI_TYPE_MUTEX:
case ACPI_TYPE_REGION:
case ACPI_TYPE_THERMAL:
case ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_SCOPE:
/*
* 1) Disallow evaluation of certain object types. For these,
* object evaluation is undefined and not supported.
*/
ACPI_ERROR ((AE_INFO,
"%s: Evaluation of object type [%s] is not supported",
Info->FullPathname,
AcpiUtGetTypeName (Info->Node->Type)));
Status = AE_TYPE;
goto Cleanup;
case ACPI_TYPE_METHOD:
/*
* 2) Object is a control method - execute it
*/
/* Verify that there is a method object associated with this node */
if (!Info->ObjDesc)
{
ACPI_ERROR ((AE_INFO, "%s: Method has no attached sub-object",
Info->FullPathname));
Status = AE_NULL_OBJECT;
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC,
"**** Execute method [%s] at AML address %p length %X\n",
Info->FullPathname,
Info->ObjDesc->Method.AmlStart + 1,
Info->ObjDesc->Method.AmlLength - 1));
/*
* Any namespace deletion must acquire both the namespace and
* interpreter locks to ensure that no thread is using the portion of
* the namespace that is being deleted.
*
* Execute the method via the interpreter. The interpreter is locked
* here before calling into the AML parser
*/
AcpiExEnterInterpreter ();
Status = AcpiPsExecuteMethod (Info);
AcpiExExitInterpreter ();
break;
default:
/*
* 3) All other non-method objects -- get the current object value
*/
/*
* Some objects require additional resolution steps (e.g., the Node
* may be a field that must be read, etc.) -- we can't just grab
* the object out of the node.
*
* Use ResolveNodeToValue() to get the associated value.
*
* NOTE: we can get away with passing in NULL for a walk state because
* the Node is guaranteed to not be a reference to either a method
* local or a method argument (because this interface is never called
* from a running method.)
*
* Even though we do not directly invoke the interpreter for object
* resolution, we must lock it because we could access an OpRegion.
* The OpRegion access code assumes that the interpreter is locked.
*/
AcpiExEnterInterpreter ();
/* TBD: ResolveNodeToValue has a strange interface, fix */
Info->ReturnObject = ACPI_CAST_PTR (ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT, Info->Node);
Status = AcpiExResolveNodeToValue (ACPI_CAST_INDIRECT_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, &Info->ReturnObject), NULL);
AcpiExExitInterpreter ();
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES, "Returned object %p [%s]\n",
Info->ReturnObject,
AcpiUtGetObjectTypeName (Info->ReturnObject)));
Status = AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE; /* Always has a "return value" */
break;
}
/*
* For predefined names, check the return value against the ACPI
* specification. Some incorrect return value types are repaired.
*/
(void) AcpiNsCheckReturnValue (Info->Node, Info, Info->ParamCount,
Status, &Info->ReturnObject);
/* Check if there is a return value that must be dealt with */
if (Status == AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE)
{
/* If caller does not want the return value, delete it */
if (Info->Flags & ACPI_IGNORE_RETURN_VALUE)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Info->ReturnObject);
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
}
/* Map AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE to AE_OK, we are done with it */
Status = AE_OK;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES,
"*** Completed evaluation of object %s ***\n",
Info->RelativePathname));
Cleanup:
/*
* Namespace was unlocked by the handling AcpiNs* function, so we
* just free the pathname and return
*/
ACPI_FREE (Info->FullPathname);
Info->FullPathname = NULL;
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in nseval.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.464168] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.467022] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.469376] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.471647] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.477997] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.482706] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.487503] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.492136] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB._INI] (Node ffff88021710a618), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.497683] ACPI: Interpreter enabled
>[ 0.499385] ACPI: (supports S0)
>[ 0.501151] ACPI: Using IOAPIC for interrupt routing
>[ 0.503342] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.506522] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.510463] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.514477] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_PIC] (Node ffff88021710ab18), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.518867] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, Evaluating _PIC (20170303/bus-991)
>[ 0.522384] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.524597] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.526795] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.529668] Call Trace:
>[ 0.530811] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.532240] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.533905] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.535497] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.537237] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.538701] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.540008] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.541593] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.543008] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.546202] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.547513] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.548817] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.550587] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.551716] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.553744] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.555038] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found AcpiNsEvaluate() function
only removes Info->ReturnObject in AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE case. But, when errors
occur, the status value is not AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE, and Info->ReturnObject is
also not null. Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
AcpiNsEvaluate (
ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO *Info)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsEvaluate);
if (!Info)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_PARAMETER);
}
if (!Info->Node)
{
/*
* Get the actual namespace node for the target object if we
* need to. Handles these cases:
*
* 1) Null node, valid pathname from root (absolute path)
* 2) Node and valid pathname (path relative to Node)
* 3) Node, Null pathname
*/
Status = AcpiNsGetNode (Info->PrefixNode, Info->RelativePathname,
ACPI_NS_NO_UPSEARCH, &Info->Node);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
/*
* For a method alias, we must grab the actual method node so that
* proper scoping context will be established before execution.
*/
if (AcpiNsGetType (Info->Node) == ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_METHOD_ALIAS)
{
Info->Node = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, Info->Node->Object);
}
/* Complete the info block initialization */
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
Info->NodeFlags = Info->Node->Flags;
Info->ObjDesc = AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (Info->Node);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES, "%s [%p] Value %p\n",
Info->RelativePathname, Info->Node,
AcpiNsGetAttachedObject (Info->Node)));
/* Get info if we have a predefined name (_HID, etc.) */
Info->Predefined = AcpiUtMatchPredefinedMethod (Info->Node->Name.Ascii);
/* Get the full pathname to the object, for use in warning messages */
Info->FullPathname = AcpiNsGetNormalizedPathname (Info->Node, TRUE);
if (!Info->FullPathname)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NO_MEMORY);
}
/* Count the number of arguments being passed in */
Info->ParamCount = 0;
if (Info->Parameters)
{
while (Info->Parameters[Info->ParamCount])
{
Info->ParamCount++;
}
/* Warn on impossible argument count */
if (Info->ParamCount > ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS)
{
ACPI_WARN_PREDEFINED ((AE_INFO, Info->FullPathname, ACPI_WARN_ALWAYS,
"Excess arguments (%u) - using only %u",
Info->ParamCount, ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS));
Info->ParamCount = ACPI_METHOD_NUM_ARGS;
}
}
/*
* For predefined names: Check that the declared argument count
* matches the ACPI spec -- otherwise this is a BIOS error.
*/
AcpiNsCheckAcpiCompliance (Info->FullPathname, Info->Node,
Info->Predefined);
/*
* For all names: Check that the incoming argument count for
* this method/object matches the actual ASL/AML definition.
*/
AcpiNsCheckArgumentCount (Info->FullPathname, Info->Node,
Info->ParamCount, Info->Predefined);
/* For predefined names: Typecheck all incoming arguments */
AcpiNsCheckArgumentTypes (Info);
/*
* Three major evaluation cases:
*
* 1) Object types that cannot be evaluated by definition
* 2) The object is a control method -- execute it
* 3) The object is not a method -- just return it's current value
*/
switch (AcpiNsGetType (Info->Node))
{
case ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE:
case ACPI_TYPE_EVENT:
case ACPI_TYPE_MUTEX:
case ACPI_TYPE_REGION:
case ACPI_TYPE_THERMAL:
case ACPI_TYPE_LOCAL_SCOPE:
/*
* 1) Disallow evaluation of certain object types. For these,
* object evaluation is undefined and not supported.
*/
ACPI_ERROR ((AE_INFO,
"%s: Evaluation of object type [%s] is not supported",
Info->FullPathname,
AcpiUtGetTypeName (Info->Node->Type)));
Status = AE_TYPE;
goto Cleanup;
case ACPI_TYPE_METHOD:
/*
* 2) Object is a control method - execute it
*/
/* Verify that there is a method object associated with this node */
if (!Info->ObjDesc)
{
ACPI_ERROR ((AE_INFO, "%s: Method has no attached sub-object",
Info->FullPathname));
Status = AE_NULL_OBJECT;
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC,
"**** Execute method [%s] at AML address %p length %X\n",
Info->FullPathname,
Info->ObjDesc->Method.AmlStart + 1,
Info->ObjDesc->Method.AmlLength - 1));
/*
* Any namespace deletion must acquire both the namespace and
* interpreter locks to ensure that no thread is using the portion of
* the namespace that is being deleted.
*
* Execute the method via the interpreter. The interpreter is locked
* here before calling into the AML parser
*/
AcpiExEnterInterpreter ();
Status = AcpiPsExecuteMethod (Info);
AcpiExExitInterpreter ();
break;
default:
/*
* 3) All other non-method objects -- get the current object value
*/
/*
* Some objects require additional resolution steps (e.g., the Node
* may be a field that must be read, etc.) -- we can't just grab
* the object out of the node.
*
* Use ResolveNodeToValue() to get the associated value.
*
* NOTE: we can get away with passing in NULL for a walk state because
* the Node is guaranteed to not be a reference to either a method
* local or a method argument (because this interface is never called
* from a running method.)
*
* Even though we do not directly invoke the interpreter for object
* resolution, we must lock it because we could access an OpRegion.
* The OpRegion access code assumes that the interpreter is locked.
*/
AcpiExEnterInterpreter ();
/* TBD: ResolveNodeToValue has a strange interface, fix */
Info->ReturnObject = ACPI_CAST_PTR (ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT, Info->Node);
Status = AcpiExResolveNodeToValue (ACPI_CAST_INDIRECT_PTR (
ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, &Info->ReturnObject), NULL);
AcpiExExitInterpreter ();
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
goto Cleanup;
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES, "Returned object %p [%s]\n",
Info->ReturnObject,
AcpiUtGetObjectTypeName (Info->ReturnObject)));
Status = AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE; /* Always has a "return value" */
break;
}
/*
* For predefined names, check the return value against the ACPI
* specification. Some incorrect return value types are repaired.
*/
(void) AcpiNsCheckReturnValue (Info->Node, Info, Info->ParamCount,
Status, &Info->ReturnObject);
/* Check if there is a return value that must be dealt with */
if (Status == AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE)
{
/* If caller does not want the return value, delete it */
if (Info->Flags & ACPI_IGNORE_RETURN_VALUE)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Info->ReturnObject);
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
}
/* Map AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE to AE_OK, we are done with it */
Status = AE_OK;
}
else if (ACPI_FAILURE(Status))
{
/* If ReturnObject exists, delete it */
if (Info->ReturnObject)
{
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Info->ReturnObject);
Info->ReturnObject = NULL;
}
}
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_NAMES,
"*** Completed evaluation of object %s ***\n",
Info->RelativePathname));
Cleanup:
/*
* Namespace was unlocked by the handling AcpiNs* function, so we
* just free the pathname and return
*/
ACPI_FREE (Info->FullPathname);
Info->FullPathname = NULL;
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
| 167,786 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: start_input_bmp(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
{
bmp_source_ptr source = (bmp_source_ptr)sinfo;
U_CHAR bmpfileheader[14];
U_CHAR bmpinfoheader[64];
#define GET_2B(array, offset) \
((unsigned short)UCH(array[offset]) + \
(((unsigned short)UCH(array[offset + 1])) << 8))
#define GET_4B(array, offset) \
((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset]) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 1])) << 8) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 2])) << 16) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 3])) << 24))
unsigned int bfOffBits;
unsigned int headerSize;
int biWidth;
int biHeight;
unsigned short biPlanes;
unsigned int biCompression;
int biXPelsPerMeter, biYPelsPerMeter;
unsigned int biClrUsed = 0;
int mapentrysize = 0; /* 0 indicates no colormap */
int bPad;
JDIMENSION row_width = 0;
/* Read and verify the bitmap file header */
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpfileheader, 14))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
if (GET_2B(bmpfileheader, 0) != 0x4D42) /* 'BM' */
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_NOT);
bfOffBits = GET_4B(bmpfileheader, 10);
/* We ignore the remaining fileheader fields */
/* The infoheader might be 12 bytes (OS/2 1.x), 40 bytes (Windows),
* or 64 bytes (OS/2 2.x). Check the first 4 bytes to find out which.
*/
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpinfoheader, 4))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
headerSize = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 0);
if (headerSize < 12 || headerSize > 64)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpinfoheader + 4, headerSize - 4))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
switch (headerSize) {
case 12:
/* Decode OS/2 1.x header (Microsoft calls this a BITMAPCOREHEADER) */
biWidth = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 4);
biHeight = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 6);
biPlanes = GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 8);
source->bits_per_pixel = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 10);
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8: /* colormapped image */
mapentrysize = 3; /* OS/2 uses RGBTRIPLE colormap */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_OS2_MAPPED, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 24: /* RGB image */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_OS2, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
break;
}
break;
case 40:
case 64:
/* Decode Windows 3.x header (Microsoft calls this a BITMAPINFOHEADER) */
/* or OS/2 2.x header, which has additional fields that we ignore */
biWidth = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 4);
biHeight = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 8);
biPlanes = GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 12);
source->bits_per_pixel = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 14);
biCompression = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 16);
biXPelsPerMeter = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 24);
biYPelsPerMeter = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 28);
biClrUsed = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 32);
/* biSizeImage, biClrImportant fields are ignored */
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8: /* colormapped image */
mapentrysize = 4; /* Windows uses RGBQUAD colormap */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_MAPPED, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 24: /* RGB image */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 32: /* RGB image + Alpha channel */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
break;
}
if (biCompression != 0)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_COMPRESSED);
if (biXPelsPerMeter > 0 && biYPelsPerMeter > 0) {
/* Set JFIF density parameters from the BMP data */
cinfo->X_density = (UINT16)(biXPelsPerMeter / 100); /* 100 cm per meter */
cinfo->Y_density = (UINT16)(biYPelsPerMeter / 100);
cinfo->density_unit = 2; /* dots/cm */
}
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
return;
}
if (biWidth <= 0 || biHeight <= 0)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_EMPTY);
if (biPlanes != 1)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADPLANES);
/* Compute distance to bitmap data --- will adjust for colormap below */
bPad = bfOffBits - (headerSize + 14);
/* Read the colormap, if any */
if (mapentrysize > 0) {
if (biClrUsed <= 0)
biClrUsed = 256; /* assume it's 256 */
else if (biClrUsed > 256)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADCMAP);
/* Allocate space to store the colormap */
source->colormap = (*cinfo->mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, (JDIMENSION)biClrUsed, (JDIMENSION)3);
/* and read it from the file */
read_colormap(source, (int)biClrUsed, mapentrysize);
/* account for size of colormap */
bPad -= biClrUsed * mapentrysize;
}
/* Skip any remaining pad bytes */
if (bPad < 0) /* incorrect bfOffBits value? */
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
while (--bPad >= 0) {
(void)read_byte(source);
}
/* Compute row width in file, including padding to 4-byte boundary */
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_RGB;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE)
cinfo->input_components = 1;
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)biWidth;
break;
case 24:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_BGR;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)(biWidth * 3);
break;
case 32:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_BGRA;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)(biWidth * 4);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
}
while ((row_width & 3) != 0) row_width++;
source->row_width = row_width;
if (source->use_inversion_array) {
/* Allocate space for inversion array, prepare for preload pass */
source->whole_image = (*cinfo->mem->request_virt_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, FALSE,
row_width, (JDIMENSION)biHeight, (JDIMENSION)1);
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = preload_image;
if (cinfo->progress != NULL) {
cd_progress_ptr progress = (cd_progress_ptr)cinfo->progress;
progress->total_extra_passes++; /* count file input as separate pass */
}
} else {
source->iobuffer = (U_CHAR *)
(*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, row_width);
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_8bit_row;
break;
case 24:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_24bit_row;
break;
case 32:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_32bit_row;
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
}
}
/* Ensure that biWidth * cinfo->input_components doesn't exceed the maximum
value of the JDIMENSION type. This is only a danger with BMP files, since
their width and height fields are 32-bit integers. */
if ((unsigned long long)biWidth *
(unsigned long long)cinfo->input_components > 0xFFFFFFFFULL)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_WIDTH_OVERFLOW);
/* Allocate one-row buffer for returned data */
source->pub.buffer = (*cinfo->mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
(JDIMENSION)(biWidth * cinfo->input_components), (JDIMENSION)1);
source->pub.buffer_height = 1;
cinfo->data_precision = 8;
cinfo->image_width = (JDIMENSION)biWidth;
cinfo->image_height = (JDIMENSION)biHeight;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
start_input_bmp(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
{
bmp_source_ptr source = (bmp_source_ptr)sinfo;
U_CHAR bmpfileheader[14];
U_CHAR bmpinfoheader[64];
#define GET_2B(array, offset) \
((unsigned short)UCH(array[offset]) + \
(((unsigned short)UCH(array[offset + 1])) << 8))
#define GET_4B(array, offset) \
((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset]) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 1])) << 8) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 2])) << 16) + \
(((unsigned int)UCH(array[offset + 3])) << 24))
unsigned int bfOffBits;
unsigned int headerSize;
int biWidth;
int biHeight;
unsigned short biPlanes;
unsigned int biCompression;
int biXPelsPerMeter, biYPelsPerMeter;
unsigned int biClrUsed = 0;
int mapentrysize = 0; /* 0 indicates no colormap */
int bPad;
JDIMENSION row_width = 0;
/* Read and verify the bitmap file header */
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpfileheader, 14))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
if (GET_2B(bmpfileheader, 0) != 0x4D42) /* 'BM' */
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_NOT);
bfOffBits = GET_4B(bmpfileheader, 10);
/* We ignore the remaining fileheader fields */
/* The infoheader might be 12 bytes (OS/2 1.x), 40 bytes (Windows),
* or 64 bytes (OS/2 2.x). Check the first 4 bytes to find out which.
*/
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpinfoheader, 4))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
headerSize = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 0);
if (headerSize < 12 || headerSize > 64)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, bmpinfoheader + 4, headerSize - 4))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
switch (headerSize) {
case 12:
/* Decode OS/2 1.x header (Microsoft calls this a BITMAPCOREHEADER) */
biWidth = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 4);
biHeight = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 6);
biPlanes = GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 8);
source->bits_per_pixel = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 10);
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8: /* colormapped image */
mapentrysize = 3; /* OS/2 uses RGBTRIPLE colormap */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_OS2_MAPPED, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 24: /* RGB image */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_OS2, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
break;
}
break;
case 40:
case 64:
/* Decode Windows 3.x header (Microsoft calls this a BITMAPINFOHEADER) */
/* or OS/2 2.x header, which has additional fields that we ignore */
biWidth = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 4);
biHeight = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 8);
biPlanes = GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 12);
source->bits_per_pixel = (int)GET_2B(bmpinfoheader, 14);
biCompression = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 16);
biXPelsPerMeter = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 24);
biYPelsPerMeter = (int)GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 28);
biClrUsed = GET_4B(bmpinfoheader, 32);
/* biSizeImage, biClrImportant fields are ignored */
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8: /* colormapped image */
mapentrysize = 4; /* Windows uses RGBQUAD colormap */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP_MAPPED, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 24: /* RGB image */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
case 32: /* RGB image + Alpha channel */
TRACEMS2(cinfo, 1, JTRC_BMP, biWidth, biHeight);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
break;
}
if (biCompression != 0)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_COMPRESSED);
if (biXPelsPerMeter > 0 && biYPelsPerMeter > 0) {
/* Set JFIF density parameters from the BMP data */
cinfo->X_density = (UINT16)(biXPelsPerMeter / 100); /* 100 cm per meter */
cinfo->Y_density = (UINT16)(biYPelsPerMeter / 100);
cinfo->density_unit = 2; /* dots/cm */
}
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
return;
}
if (biWidth <= 0 || biHeight <= 0)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_EMPTY);
if (biPlanes != 1)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADPLANES);
/* Compute distance to bitmap data --- will adjust for colormap below */
bPad = bfOffBits - (headerSize + 14);
/* Read the colormap, if any */
if (mapentrysize > 0) {
if (biClrUsed <= 0)
biClrUsed = 256; /* assume it's 256 */
else if (biClrUsed > 256)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADCMAP);
/* Allocate space to store the colormap */
source->colormap = (*cinfo->mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, (JDIMENSION)biClrUsed, (JDIMENSION)3);
source->cmap_length = (int)biClrUsed;
/* and read it from the file */
read_colormap(source, (int)biClrUsed, mapentrysize);
/* account for size of colormap */
bPad -= biClrUsed * mapentrysize;
}
/* Skip any remaining pad bytes */
if (bPad < 0) /* incorrect bfOffBits value? */
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADHEADER);
while (--bPad >= 0) {
(void)read_byte(source);
}
/* Compute row width in file, including padding to 4-byte boundary */
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_RGB;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE)
cinfo->input_components = 1;
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)biWidth;
break;
case 24:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_BGR;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)(biWidth * 3);
break;
case 32:
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->in_color_space = JCS_EXT_BGRA;
if (IsExtRGB(cinfo->in_color_space))
cinfo->input_components = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK)
cinfo->input_components = 4;
else
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BAD_IN_COLORSPACE);
row_width = (JDIMENSION)(biWidth * 4);
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
}
while ((row_width & 3) != 0) row_width++;
source->row_width = row_width;
if (source->use_inversion_array) {
/* Allocate space for inversion array, prepare for preload pass */
source->whole_image = (*cinfo->mem->request_virt_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, FALSE,
row_width, (JDIMENSION)biHeight, (JDIMENSION)1);
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = preload_image;
if (cinfo->progress != NULL) {
cd_progress_ptr progress = (cd_progress_ptr)cinfo->progress;
progress->total_extra_passes++; /* count file input as separate pass */
}
} else {
source->iobuffer = (U_CHAR *)
(*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, row_width);
switch (source->bits_per_pixel) {
case 8:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_8bit_row;
break;
case 24:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_24bit_row;
break;
case 32:
source->pub.get_pixel_rows = get_32bit_row;
break;
default:
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_BMP_BADDEPTH);
}
}
/* Ensure that biWidth * cinfo->input_components doesn't exceed the maximum
value of the JDIMENSION type. This is only a danger with BMP files, since
their width and height fields are 32-bit integers. */
if ((unsigned long long)biWidth *
(unsigned long long)cinfo->input_components > 0xFFFFFFFFULL)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_WIDTH_OVERFLOW);
/* Allocate one-row buffer for returned data */
source->pub.buffer = (*cinfo->mem->alloc_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE,
(JDIMENSION)(biWidth * cinfo->input_components), (JDIMENSION)1);
source->pub.buffer_height = 1;
cinfo->data_precision = 8;
cinfo->image_width = (JDIMENSION)biWidth;
cinfo->image_height = (JDIMENSION)biHeight;
}
| 169,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t ppos)
{
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data;
ssize_t ret;
int do_wakeup;
struct iovec *iov = (struct iovec *)_iov;
size_t total_len;
ssize_t chars;
total_len = iov_length(iov, nr_segs);
/* Null write succeeds. */
if (unlikely(total_len == 0))
return 0;
do_wakeup = 0;
ret = 0;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
if (!pipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
ret = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
/* We try to merge small writes */
chars = total_len & (PAGE_SIZE-1); /* size of the last buffer */
if (pipe->nrbufs && chars != 0) {
int lastbuf = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs - 1) &
(pipe->buffers - 1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + lastbuf;
const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops = buf->ops;
int offset = buf->offset + buf->len;
if (ops->can_merge && offset + chars <= PAGE_SIZE) {
int error, atomic = 1;
void *addr;
error = ops->confirm(pipe, buf);
if (error)
goto out;
iov_fault_in_pages_read(iov, chars);
redo1:
if (atomic)
addr = kmap_atomic(buf->page);
else
addr = kmap(buf->page);
error = pipe_iov_copy_from_user(offset + addr, iov,
chars, atomic);
if (atomic)
kunmap_atomic(addr);
else
kunmap(buf->page);
ret = error;
do_wakeup = 1;
if (error) {
if (atomic) {
atomic = 0;
goto redo1;
}
goto out;
}
buf->len += chars;
total_len -= chars;
ret = chars;
if (!total_len)
goto out;
}
}
for (;;) {
int bufs;
if (!pipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
bufs = pipe->nrbufs;
if (bufs < pipe->buffers) {
int newbuf = (pipe->curbuf + bufs) & (pipe->buffers-1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + newbuf;
struct page *page = pipe->tmp_page;
char *src;
int error, atomic = 1;
if (!page) {
page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
if (unlikely(!page)) {
ret = ret ? : -ENOMEM;
break;
}
pipe->tmp_page = page;
}
/* Always wake up, even if the copy fails. Otherwise
* we lock up (O_NONBLOCK-)readers that sleep due to
* syscall merging.
* FIXME! Is this really true?
*/
do_wakeup = 1;
chars = PAGE_SIZE;
if (chars > total_len)
chars = total_len;
iov_fault_in_pages_read(iov, chars);
redo2:
if (atomic)
src = kmap_atomic(page);
else
src = kmap(page);
error = pipe_iov_copy_from_user(src, iov, chars,
atomic);
if (atomic)
kunmap_atomic(src);
else
kunmap(page);
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (atomic) {
atomic = 0;
goto redo2;
}
if (!ret)
ret = error;
break;
}
ret += chars;
/* Insert it into the buffer array */
buf->page = page;
buf->ops = &anon_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->offset = 0;
buf->len = chars;
buf->flags = 0;
if (is_packetized(filp)) {
buf->ops = &packet_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->flags = PIPE_BUF_FLAG_PACKET;
}
pipe->nrbufs = ++bufs;
pipe->tmp_page = NULL;
total_len -= chars;
if (!total_len)
break;
}
if (bufs < pipe->buffers)
continue;
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (!ret)
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
do_wakeup = 0;
}
pipe->waiting_writers++;
pipe_wait(pipe);
pipe->waiting_writers--;
}
out:
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
if (ret > 0 && sb_start_write_trylock(file_inode(filp)->i_sb)) {
int err = file_update_time(filp);
if (err)
ret = err;
sb_end_write(file_inode(filp)->i_sb);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
|
pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data;
ssize_t ret = 0;
int do_wakeup = 0;
size_t total_len = iov_iter_count(from);
ssize_t chars;
/* Null write succeeds. */
if (unlikely(total_len == 0))
return 0;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
if (!pipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
ret = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
/* We try to merge small writes */
chars = total_len & (PAGE_SIZE-1); /* size of the last buffer */
if (pipe->nrbufs && chars != 0) {
int lastbuf = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs - 1) &
(pipe->buffers - 1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + lastbuf;
const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops = buf->ops;
int offset = buf->offset + buf->len;
if (ops->can_merge && offset + chars <= PAGE_SIZE) {
int error = ops->confirm(pipe, buf);
if (error)
goto out;
ret = copy_page_from_iter(buf->page, offset, chars, from);
if (unlikely(ret < chars)) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
do_wakeup = 1;
buf->len += chars;
ret = chars;
if (!iov_iter_count(from))
goto out;
}
}
for (;;) {
int bufs;
if (!pipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
bufs = pipe->nrbufs;
if (bufs < pipe->buffers) {
int newbuf = (pipe->curbuf + bufs) & (pipe->buffers-1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + newbuf;
struct page *page = pipe->tmp_page;
int copied;
if (!page) {
page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
if (unlikely(!page)) {
ret = ret ? : -ENOMEM;
break;
}
pipe->tmp_page = page;
}
/* Always wake up, even if the copy fails. Otherwise
* we lock up (O_NONBLOCK-)readers that sleep due to
* syscall merging.
* FIXME! Is this really true?
*/
do_wakeup = 1;
copied = copy_page_from_iter(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE, from);
if (unlikely(copied < PAGE_SIZE && iov_iter_count(from))) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret += copied;
/* Insert it into the buffer array */
buf->page = page;
buf->ops = &anon_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->offset = 0;
buf->len = copied;
buf->flags = 0;
if (is_packetized(filp)) {
buf->ops = &packet_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->flags = PIPE_BUF_FLAG_PACKET;
}
pipe->nrbufs = ++bufs;
pipe->tmp_page = NULL;
if (!iov_iter_count(from))
break;
}
if (bufs < pipe->buffers)
continue;
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (!ret)
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
do_wakeup = 0;
}
pipe->waiting_writers++;
pipe_wait(pipe);
pipe->waiting_writers--;
}
out:
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
if (ret > 0 && sb_start_write_trylock(file_inode(filp)->i_sb)) {
int err = file_update_time(filp);
if (err)
ret = err;
sb_end_write(file_inode(filp)->i_sb);
}
return ret;
}
| 166,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start, long long size_,
Entry* pEntry) {
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) // SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); // payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; // consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) // SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; // consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
bool SeekHead::ParseEntry(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start, long long size_,
Entry* pEntry) {
if (size_ <= 0)
return false;
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size_;
long len;
const long long seekIdId = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdId < 0)
return false;
if (seekIdId != 0x13AB) // SeekID ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume SeekID id
const long long seekIdSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekIdSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size of field
if ((pos + seekIdSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len); // payload
if (pEntry->id <= 0)
return false;
if (len != seekIdSize)
return false;
pos += seekIdSize; // consume SeekID payload
const long long seekPosId = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosId != 0x13AC) // SeekPos ID
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long seekPosSize = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (seekPosSize <= 0)
return false;
if ((pos + len) > stop)
return false;
pos += len; // consume size
if ((pos + seekPosSize) > stop)
return false;
pEntry->pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, seekPosSize);
if (pEntry->pos < 0)
return false;
pos += seekPosSize; // consume payload
if (pos != stop)
return false;
return true;
}
| 173,855 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡဒვპ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Map U+0909 and U+0993 to 3 when checking for confusables
U+0909 (उ) and U+0993 (ও) look similar to the number 3. Thic cl adds
these two characters to the mapping to 3 when determining whether to
fall back to punycode when displaying URLs.
Bug: 895885
Change-Id: I233127570c8e34e791ef5663c1ece9207d6c7bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1287031
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600544}
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// - {U+0437 (з), U+0499 (ҙ), U+04E1 (ӡ), U+0909 (उ), U+0993 (ও),
// U+1012 (ဒ), U+10D5 (ვ), U+10DE (პ)} => 3
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡउওဒვპ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ProcessHeap::Init() {
total_allocated_space_ = 0;
total_allocated_object_size_ = 0;
total_marked_object_size_ = 0;
GCInfoTable::Init();
base::SamplingHeapProfiler::SetHooksInstallCallback([]() {
HeapAllocHooks::SetAllocationHook(&BlinkGCAllocHook);
HeapAllocHooks::SetFreeHook(&BlinkGCFreeHook);
});
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
void ProcessHeap::Init() {
total_allocated_space_ = 0;
total_allocated_object_size_ = 0;
total_marked_object_size_ = 0;
base::SamplingHeapProfiler::SetHooksInstallCallback([]() {
HeapAllocHooks::SetAllocationHook(&BlinkGCAllocHook);
HeapAllocHooks::SetFreeHook(&BlinkGCFreeHook);
});
}
| 173,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void comps_rtree_unite(COMPS_RTree *rt1, COMPS_RTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_rtree_set(rt1,
pair->key,
rt2->data_cloner(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void comps_rtree_unite(COMPS_RTree *rt1, COMPS_RTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_rtree_set(rt1,
pair->key,
rt2->data_cloner(((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
| 169,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DaemonProcessTest::LaunchNetworkProcess() {
terminal_id_ = 0;
daemon_process_->OnChannelConnected();
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void DaemonProcessTest::LaunchNetworkProcess() {
terminal_id_ = 0;
daemon_process_->OnChannelConnected(0);
}
| 171,541 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const std::vector<base::ProcessId>& pids,
GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
uint64_t dump_guid = ++next_dump_id_;
std::unique_ptr<QueuedVmRegionRequest> request =
std::make_unique<QueuedVmRegionRequest>(dump_guid, std::move(callback));
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid] = std::move(request);
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request_ptr =
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid].get();
auto os_callback =
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpForVMRegions,
base::Unretained(this), dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatchVmRegionRequest(request_ptr, clients,
pids, os_callback);
FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied(dump_guid);
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void CoordinatorImpl::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
const std::vector<base::ProcessId>& pids,
GetVmRegionsForHeapProfilerCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
uint64_t dump_guid = ++next_dump_id_;
std::unique_ptr<QueuedVmRegionRequest> request =
std::make_unique<QueuedVmRegionRequest>(dump_guid, std::move(callback));
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid] = std::move(request);
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
QueuedVmRegionRequest* request_ptr =
in_progress_vm_region_requests_[dump_guid].get();
auto os_callback =
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpForVMRegions,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatchVmRegionRequest(request_ptr, clients,
pids, os_callback);
FinalizeVmRegionDumpIfAllManagersReplied(dump_guid);
}
| 173,213 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void iov_iter_pipe(struct iov_iter *i, int direction,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
size_t count)
{
BUG_ON(direction != ITER_PIPE);
i->type = direction;
i->pipe = pipe;
i->idx = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
i->iov_offset = 0;
i->count = count;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void iov_iter_pipe(struct iov_iter *i, int direction,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
size_t count)
{
BUG_ON(direction != ITER_PIPE);
WARN_ON(pipe->nrbufs == pipe->buffers);
i->type = direction;
i->pipe = pipe;
i->idx = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
i->iov_offset = 0;
i->count = count;
}
| 168,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool WebMediaPlayerMS::DidPassCORSAccessCheck() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
|
bool WebMediaPlayerMS::DidPassCORSAccessCheck() const {
| 172,621 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
EOSseen = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
}
if (mImg == NULL) {
if (vpx_codec_decode(
(vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
NULL,
0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
}
if (mImg != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, IMG_FMT_I420);
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nFlags = EOSseen ? OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS : 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE - Remove deprecated image defines
libvpx has always supported the VPX_ prefixed versions of these defines.
The unprefixed versions have been removed in the most recent release.
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libvpx/+/9cdaa3d72eade9ad162ef8f78a93bd8f85c6de10
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: I8a656f2262f117d7a95271f45100b8c6fd0a470f
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
EOSseen = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
}
if (mImg == NULL) {
if (vpx_codec_decode(
(vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
NULL,
0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
}
if (mImg != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420);
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nFlags = EOSseen ? OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS : 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[VPX_PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[VPX_PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 173,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void dump_boot(DOS_FS * fs, struct boot_sector *b, unsigned lss)
{
unsigned short sectors;
printf("Boot sector contents:\n");
if (!atari_format) {
char id[9];
strncpy(id, (const char *)b->system_id, 8);
id[8] = 0;
printf("System ID \"%s\"\n", id);
} else {
/* On Atari, a 24 bit serial number is stored at offset 8 of the boot
* sector */
printf("Serial number 0x%x\n",
b->system_id[5] | (b->system_id[6] << 8) | (b->
system_id[7] << 16));
}
printf("Media byte 0x%02x (%s)\n", b->media, get_media_descr(b->media));
printf("%10d bytes per logical sector\n", GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sector_size));
printf("%10d bytes per cluster\n", fs->cluster_size);
printf("%10d reserved sector%s\n", le16toh(b->reserved),
le16toh(b->reserved) == 1 ? "" : "s");
printf("First FAT starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start / lss);
printf("%10d FATs, %d bit entries\n", b->fats, fs->fat_bits);
printf("%10d bytes per FAT (= %u sectors)\n", fs->fat_size,
fs->fat_size / lss);
if (!fs->root_cluster) {
printf("Root directory starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start / lss);
printf("%10d root directory entries\n", fs->root_entries);
} else {
printf("Root directory start at cluster %lu (arbitrary size)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->root_cluster);
}
printf("Data area starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start / lss);
printf("%10lu data clusters (%llu bytes)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->data_clusters,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_clusters * fs->cluster_size);
printf("%u sectors/track, %u heads\n", le16toh(b->secs_track),
le16toh(b->heads));
printf("%10u hidden sectors\n", atari_format ?
/* On Atari, the hidden field is only 16 bit wide and unused */
(((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[0] |
((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[1] << 8) : le32toh(b->hidden));
sectors = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sectors);
printf("%10u sectors total\n", sectors ? sectors : le32toh(b->total_sect));
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void dump_boot(DOS_FS * fs, struct boot_sector *b, unsigned lss)
{
unsigned short sectors;
printf("Boot sector contents:\n");
if (!atari_format) {
char id[9];
strncpy(id, (const char *)b->system_id, 8);
id[8] = 0;
printf("System ID \"%s\"\n", id);
} else {
/* On Atari, a 24 bit serial number is stored at offset 8 of the boot
* sector */
printf("Serial number 0x%x\n",
b->system_id[5] | (b->system_id[6] << 8) | (b->
system_id[7] << 16));
}
printf("Media byte 0x%02x (%s)\n", b->media, get_media_descr(b->media));
printf("%10d bytes per logical sector\n", GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sector_size));
printf("%10d bytes per cluster\n", fs->cluster_size);
printf("%10d reserved sector%s\n", le16toh(b->reserved),
le16toh(b->reserved) == 1 ? "" : "s");
printf("First FAT starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->fat_start / lss);
printf("%10d FATs, %d bit entries\n", b->fats, fs->fat_bits);
printf("%10lld bytes per FAT (= %llu sectors)\n", (long long)fs->fat_size,
(long long)fs->fat_size / lss);
if (!fs->root_cluster) {
printf("Root directory starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->root_start / lss);
printf("%10d root directory entries\n", fs->root_entries);
} else {
printf("Root directory start at cluster %lu (arbitrary size)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->root_cluster);
}
printf("Data area starts at byte %llu (sector %llu)\n",
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_start / lss);
printf("%10lu data clusters (%llu bytes)\n",
(unsigned long)fs->data_clusters,
(unsigned long long)fs->data_clusters * fs->cluster_size);
printf("%u sectors/track, %u heads\n", le16toh(b->secs_track),
le16toh(b->heads));
printf("%10u hidden sectors\n", atari_format ?
/* On Atari, the hidden field is only 16 bit wide and unused */
(((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[0] |
((unsigned char *)&b->hidden)[1] << 8) : le32toh(b->hidden));
sectors = GET_UNALIGNED_W(b->sectors);
printf("%10u sectors total\n", sectors ? sectors : le32toh(b->total_sect));
}
| 167,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
sk_sp<SkImage> image) {
CHECK(image);
DCHECK(!image->isLazyGenerated());
paint_image_ =
CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(std::move(image), cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId())
.TakePaintImage();
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
sk_sp<SkImage> image) {
CHECK(image);
DCHECK(!image->isLazyGenerated());
paint_image_ =
CreatePaintImageBuilder()
.set_image(std::move(image), cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId())
.TakePaintImage();
}
| 172,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
if (buf->ops)
buf->ops->release(pipe, buf);
}
if (pipe->tmp_page)
__free_page(pipe->tmp_page);
kfree(pipe->bufs);
kfree(pipe);
}
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
{
int i;
account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, 0);
free_uid(pipe->user);
for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
if (buf->ops)
buf->ops->release(pipe, buf);
}
if (pipe->tmp_page)
__free_page(pipe->tmp_page);
kfree(pipe->bufs);
kfree(pipe);
}
| 167,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long long Cluster::GetPosition() const
{
const long long pos = m_element_start - m_pSegment->m_start;
assert(pos >= 0);
return pos;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long long Cluster::GetPosition() const
long Cluster::GetIndex() const { return m_index; }
long long Cluster::GetPosition() const {
const long long pos = m_element_start - m_pSegment->m_start;
assert(pos >= 0);
return pos;
}
| 174,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int max)
{
this->redf = this->red / (double)max;
this->greenf = this->green / (double)max;
this->bluef = this->blue / (double)max;
this->alphaf = this->alpha / (double)max;
if (this->red < max)
this->rede = this->redf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->rede = 0;
if (this->green < max)
this->greene = this->greenf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->greene = 0;
if (this->blue < max)
this->bluee = this->bluef * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->bluee = 0;
if (this->alpha < max)
this->alphae = this->alphaf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->alphae = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int max)
image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int rMax, unsigned int gMax,
unsigned int bMax, unsigned int aMax)
{
this->redf = this->red / (double)rMax;
this->greenf = this->green / (double)gMax;
this->bluef = this->blue / (double)bMax;
this->alphaf = this->alpha / (double)aMax;
if (this->red < rMax)
this->rede = this->redf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->rede = 0;
if (this->green < gMax)
this->greene = this->greenf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->greene = 0;
if (this->blue < bMax)
this->bluee = this->bluef * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->bluee = 0;
if (this->alpha < aMax)
this->alphae = this->alphaf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->alphae = 0;
}
| 173,618 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void opj_get_all_encoding_parameters( const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res,
OPJ_UINT32 ** p_resolutions )
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers*/
const opj_tcp_t *tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* to store l_dx, l_dy, w and h for each resolution and component.*/
OPJ_UINT32 * lResolutionPtr;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations*/
tcp = &p_cp->tcps [tileno];
l_tccp = tcp->tccps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
p = tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, l_dx and l_dy */
*p_tx0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + (p + 1) * p_cp->tdx), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->x1);
*p_ty0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + (q + 1) * p_cp->tdy), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->y1);
/* max precision and resolution is 0 (can only grow)*/
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min*/
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* aritmetic variables to calculate*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy , l_pw , l_ph;
lResolutionPtr = p_resolutions[compno];
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts*/
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1;
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height*/
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdx;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdy;
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_level_no));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_level_no));
/* take the minimum size for l_dx for each comp and resolution*/
*p_dx_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dx_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dx);
*p_dy_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dy_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents*/
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0==l_rx1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0==l_ry1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pw;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_ph;
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision*/
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
--l_level_no;
}
++l_tccp;
++l_img_comp;
}
}
Commit Message: [trunk] fixed a buffer overflow in opj_tcd_init_decode_tile
Update issue 431
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
void opj_get_all_encoding_parameters( const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res,
OPJ_UINT32 ** p_resolutions )
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers*/
const opj_tcp_t *tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* to store l_dx, l_dy, w and h for each resolution and component.*/
OPJ_UINT32 * lResolutionPtr;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations*/
tcp = &p_cp->tcps [tileno];
l_tccp = tcp->tccps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
/* position in x and y of tile*/
p = tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, l_dx and l_dy */
*p_tx0 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_max(p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx, p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_min(p_cp->tx0 + (p + 1) * p_cp->tdx, p_image->x1);
*p_ty0 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_max(p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy, p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = (OPJ_INT32)opj_uint_min(p_cp->ty0 + (q + 1) * p_cp->tdy, p_image->y1);
/* max precision and resolution is 0 (can only grow)*/
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min*/
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* aritmetic variables to calculate*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy , l_pw , l_ph;
lResolutionPtr = p_resolutions[compno];
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts*/
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1;
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height*/
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdx;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pdy;
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_level_no));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_level_no));
/* take the minimum size for l_dx for each comp and resolution*/
*p_dx_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dx_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dx);
*p_dy_min = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)*p_dy_min, (OPJ_INT32)l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents*/
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0==l_rx1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0==l_ry1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_pw;
*lResolutionPtr++ = l_ph;
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision*/
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
--l_level_no;
}
++l_tccp;
++l_img_comp;
}
}
| 170,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void libxsmm_sparse_csc_reader( libxsmm_generated_code* io_generated_code,
const char* i_csc_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
double** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csc_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_column_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csc_file_handle = fopen( i_csc_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csc_file_handle == NULL ) {
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_INPUT );
return;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csc_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose( l_csc_file_handle ); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_LEN );
return;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) == 3 ) {
/* allocate CSC data structure matching mtx file */
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * ((size_t)(*o_column_count) + 1));
*o_values = (double*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_column_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_column_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_column_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csc_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_ALLOC_DATA );
return;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * ((size_t)(*o_column_count) + 1));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
memset(l_column_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_column_count));
/* init column idx */
for (l_i = 0; l_i <= *o_column_count; ++l_i) {
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = *o_element_count;
}
/* init */
(*o_column_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_DESC );
fclose( l_csc_file_handle ); /* close mtx file */
return;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row = 0, l_column = 0;
double l_value = 0;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csc_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_ELEMS );
return;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = l_row;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_column_idx_id[l_column] = 1;
(*o_column_idx)[l_column+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csc_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_LEN );
return;
}
if ( l_column_idx_id != NULL ) {
/* let's handle empty columns */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_column_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_column_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_column_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_column_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
free( l_column_idx_id );
}
}
Commit Message: Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1).
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void libxsmm_sparse_csc_reader( libxsmm_generated_code* io_generated_code,
const char* i_csc_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
double** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csc_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_column_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csc_file_handle = fopen( i_csc_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csc_file_handle == NULL ) {
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_INPUT );
return;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csc_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose( l_csc_file_handle ); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_LEN );
return;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if (3 == sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) &&
0 != *o_row_count && 0 != *o_column_count && 0 != *o_element_count)
{
/* allocate CSC data structure matching mtx file */
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * ((size_t)(*o_column_count) + 1));
*o_values = (double*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_column_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_column_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_column_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csc_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_ALLOC_DATA );
return;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * ((size_t)(*o_column_count) + 1));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
memset(l_column_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_column_count));
/* init column idx */
for (l_i = 0; l_i <= *o_column_count; ++l_i) {
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = *o_element_count;
}
/* init */
(*o_column_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_DESC );
fclose( l_csc_file_handle ); /* close mtx file */
return;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row = 0, l_column = 0;
double l_value = 0;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
fclose(l_csc_file_handle); /* close mtx file */
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_READ_ELEMS );
return;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
LIBXSMM_ASSERT(0 != l_row && 0 != l_column);
l_row--; l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = l_row;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_column_idx_id[l_column] = 1;
(*o_column_idx)[l_column+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csc_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
free(*o_row_idx); free(*o_column_idx); free(*o_values); free(l_column_idx_id);
*o_row_idx = 0; *o_column_idx = 0; *o_values = 0;
LIBXSMM_HANDLE_ERROR( io_generated_code, LIBXSMM_ERR_CSC_LEN );
return;
}
if ( l_column_idx_id != NULL ) {
/* let's handle empty columns */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_column_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_column_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_column_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_column_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
free( l_column_idx_id );
}
}
| 168,950 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_unescape)
{
char *str = NULL, *out = NULL;
size_t str_len = 0;
int out_len;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &zid, &str, &str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (str_len > INT_MAX) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ((out = curl_easy_unescape(ch->cp, str, str_len, &out_len))) {
RETVAL_STRINGL(out, out_len);
curl_free(out);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
PHP_FUNCTION(curl_unescape)
{
char *str = NULL, *out = NULL;
size_t str_len = 0;
int out_len;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &zid, &str, &str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZEND_SIZE_T_INT_OVFL(str_len)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ((out = curl_easy_unescape(ch->cp, str, str_len, &out_len))) {
RETVAL_STRINGL(out, out_len);
curl_free(out);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 166,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int cdrom_ioctl_drive_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_DRIVE_STATUS\n");
if (!(cdi->ops->capability & CDC_DRIVE_STATUS))
return -ENOSYS;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC) ||
(arg == CDSL_CURRENT || arg == CDSL_NONE))
return cdi->ops->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (((int)arg >= cdi->capacity))
return -EINVAL;
return cdrom_slot_status(cdi, arg);
}
Commit Message: cdrom: Fix info leak/OOB read in cdrom_ioctl_drive_status
Like d88b6d04: "cdrom: information leak in cdrom_ioctl_media_changed()"
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static int cdrom_ioctl_drive_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_DRIVE_STATUS\n");
if (!(cdi->ops->capability & CDC_DRIVE_STATUS))
return -ENOSYS;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC) ||
(arg == CDSL_CURRENT || arg == CDSL_NONE))
return cdi->ops->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (arg >= cdi->capacity)
return -EINVAL;
return cdrom_slot_status(cdi, arg);
}
| 169,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SMB2_read(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_io_parms *io_parms,
unsigned int *nbytes, char **buf, int *buf_type)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
int resp_buftype, rc = -EACCES;
struct smb2_read_plain_req *req = NULL;
struct smb2_read_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
unsigned int total_len;
int flags = CIFS_LOG_ERROR;
struct cifs_ses *ses = io_parms->tcon->ses;
*nbytes = 0;
rc = smb2_new_read_req((void **)&req, &total_len, io_parms, NULL, 0, 0);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (smb3_encryption_required(io_parms->tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
iov[0].iov_len = total_len;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_read_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (rc) {
if (rc != -ENODATA) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(io_parms->tcon, SMB2_READ_HE);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Send error in read = %d\n", rc);
trace_smb3_read_err(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, io_parms->length,
rc);
} else
trace_smb3_read_done(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, 0);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp_iov.iov_base);
return rc == -ENODATA ? 0 : rc;
} else
trace_smb3_read_done(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, io_parms->length);
*nbytes = le32_to_cpu(rsp->DataLength);
if ((*nbytes > CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE) ||
(*nbytes > io_parms->length)) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "bad length %d for count %d\n",
*nbytes, io_parms->length);
rc = -EIO;
*nbytes = 0;
}
if (*buf) {
memcpy(*buf, (char *)rsp + rsp->DataOffset, *nbytes);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp_iov.iov_base);
} else if (resp_buftype != CIFS_NO_BUFFER) {
*buf = rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (resp_buftype == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER)
*buf_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER;
else if (resp_buftype == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER)
*buf_type = CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CC: Stable <[email protected]> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
SMB2_read(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_io_parms *io_parms,
unsigned int *nbytes, char **buf, int *buf_type)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
int resp_buftype, rc = -EACCES;
struct smb2_read_plain_req *req = NULL;
struct smb2_read_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[1];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
unsigned int total_len;
int flags = CIFS_LOG_ERROR;
struct cifs_ses *ses = io_parms->tcon->ses;
*nbytes = 0;
rc = smb2_new_read_req((void **)&req, &total_len, io_parms, NULL, 0, 0);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (smb3_encryption_required(io_parms->tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
iov[0].iov_len = total_len;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
rsp = (struct smb2_read_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (rc) {
if (rc != -ENODATA) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(io_parms->tcon, SMB2_READ_HE);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Send error in read = %d\n", rc);
trace_smb3_read_err(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, io_parms->length,
rc);
} else
trace_smb3_read_done(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, 0);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp_iov.iov_base);
return rc == -ENODATA ? 0 : rc;
} else
trace_smb3_read_done(xid, req->PersistentFileId,
io_parms->tcon->tid, ses->Suid,
io_parms->offset, io_parms->length);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
*nbytes = le32_to_cpu(rsp->DataLength);
if ((*nbytes > CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE) ||
(*nbytes > io_parms->length)) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "bad length %d for count %d\n",
*nbytes, io_parms->length);
rc = -EIO;
*nbytes = 0;
}
if (*buf) {
memcpy(*buf, (char *)rsp + rsp->DataOffset, *nbytes);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp_iov.iov_base);
} else if (resp_buftype != CIFS_NO_BUFFER) {
*buf = rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (resp_buftype == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER)
*buf_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER;
else if (resp_buftype == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER)
*buf_type = CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER;
}
return rc;
}
| 169,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, int len)
{
int stlv_type, stlv_len, tmp;
while (len > 2)
{
stlv_type = *(tptr++);
stlv_len = *(tptr++);
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_mt_capability_subtlv_values, "unknown", stlv_type),
stlv_type,
stlv_len));
len = len - 2;
switch (stlv_type)
{
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t CIST Root-ID: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Path Cost: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Prio: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr + 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 5));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", V: %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 4) & 0x0001));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", SPSource-ID: %d",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) & 0x000fffff)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", No of Trees: %x", *(tptr)));
tmp = *(tptr++);
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN;
while (tmp)
{
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t U:%d, M:%d, A:%d, RES:%d",
*(tptr) >> 7, (*(tptr) >> 6) & 0x01,
(*(tptr) >> 5) & 0x01, (*(tptr) & 0x1f)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ECT: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr + 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", BVID: %d, SPVID: %d",
(EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr) >> 12) & 0x000fff,
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr) & 0x000fff));
tptr = tptr + 3;
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN;
tmp--;
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPBM_SI:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t BMAC: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RES: %d, VID: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 12,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)) & 0x0fff));
tptr = tptr+2;
len = len - 8;
stlv_len = stlv_len - 8;
while (stlv_len >= 4) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T: %d, R: %d, RES: %d, ISID: %d",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 31),
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 30) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 24) & 0x03f,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)) & 0x0ffffff));
tptr = tptr + 4;
len = len - 4;
stlv_len = stlv_len - 4;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13026/IS-IS: Clean up processing of subTLVs.
Add bounds checks, do a common check to make sure we captured the entire
subTLV, add checks to make sure the subTLV fits within the TLV.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture files won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update existing tests for changes to IS-IS dissector.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, int len)
{
int stlv_type, stlv_len, tmp;
while (len > 2)
{
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 2);
stlv_type = *(tptr++);
stlv_len = *(tptr++);
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_mt_capability_subtlv_values, "unknown", stlv_type),
stlv_type,
stlv_len));
len = len - 2;
/* Make sure the subTLV fits within the space left */
if (len < stlv_len)
goto trunc;
/* Make sure the entire subTLV is in the captured data */
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr), stlv_len);
switch (stlv_type)
{
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE:
if (stlv_len < ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t CIST Root-ID: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Path Cost: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Prio: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr + 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 5));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", V: %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 4) & 0x0001));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", SPSource-ID: %d",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) & 0x000fffff)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", No of Trees: %x", *(tptr)));
tmp = *(tptr++);
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN;
stlv_len = stlv_len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN;
while (tmp)
{
if (stlv_len < ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t U:%d, M:%d, A:%d, RES:%d",
*(tptr) >> 7, (*(tptr) >> 6) & 0x01,
(*(tptr) >> 5) & 0x01, (*(tptr) & 0x1f)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ECT: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr + 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", BVID: %d, SPVID: %d",
(EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr) >> 12) & 0x000fff,
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr) & 0x000fff));
tptr = tptr + 3;
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN;
stlv_len = stlv_len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN;
tmp--;
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPBM_SI:
if (stlv_len < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t BMAC: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RES: %d, VID: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 12,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)) & 0x0fff));
tptr = tptr+2;
len = len - 8;
stlv_len = stlv_len - 8;
while (stlv_len >= 4) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T: %d, R: %d, RES: %d, ISID: %d",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 31),
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 30) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 24) & 0x03f,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)) & 0x0ffffff));
tptr = tptr + 4;
len = len - 4;
stlv_len = stlv_len - 4;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
tptr += stlv_len;
len -= stlv_len;
}
return 0;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
}
| 167,864 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info, int replace)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_kcontrol kctl, *_kctl;
unsigned int access;
long private_size;
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
if (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
return -ENOMEM;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;
access = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :
(info->access & (SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_INACTIVE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));
info->id.numid = 0;
memset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
_kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);
err = 0;
if (_kctl) {
if (replace)
err = snd_ctl_remove(card, _kctl);
else
err = -EBUSY;
} else {
if (replace)
err = -ENOENT;
}
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (err < 0)
return err;
memcpy(&kctl.id, &info->id, sizeof(info->id));
kctl.count = info->owner ? info->owner : 1;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER;
if (info->type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED)
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_enum_info;
else
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_info;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READ)
kctl.get = snd_ctl_elem_user_get;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE)
kctl.put = snd_ctl_elem_user_put;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE) {
kctl.tlv.c = snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK;
}
switch (info->type) {
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER:
private_size = sizeof(long);
if (info->count > 128)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER64:
private_size = sizeof(long long);
if (info->count > 64)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned int);
if (info->count > 128 || info->value.enumerated.items == 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BYTES:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned char);
if (info->count > 512)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_IEC958:
private_size = sizeof(struct snd_aes_iec958);
if (info->count != 1)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
private_size *= info->count;
ue = kzalloc(sizeof(struct user_element) + private_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ue == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ue->info = *info;
ue->info.access = 0;
ue->elem_data = (char *)ue + sizeof(*ue);
ue->elem_data_size = private_size;
if (ue->info.type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED) {
err = snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(ue);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(ue);
return err;
}
}
kctl.private_free = snd_ctl_elem_user_free;
_kctl = snd_ctl_new(&kctl, access);
if (_kctl == NULL) {
kfree(ue->priv_data);
kfree(ue);
return -ENOMEM;
}
_kctl->private_data = ue;
for (idx = 0; idx < _kctl->count; idx++)
_kctl->vd[idx].owner = file;
err = snd_ctl_add(card, _kctl);
if (err < 0)
return err;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
card->user_ctl_count++;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
|
static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info, int replace)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_kcontrol kctl, *_kctl;
unsigned int access;
long private_size;
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
if (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
return -ENOMEM;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;
access = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :
(info->access & (SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_INACTIVE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));
info->id.numid = 0;
memset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
_kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);
err = 0;
if (_kctl) {
if (replace)
err = snd_ctl_remove(card, _kctl);
else
err = -EBUSY;
} else {
if (replace)
err = -ENOENT;
}
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (err < 0)
return err;
memcpy(&kctl.id, &info->id, sizeof(info->id));
kctl.count = info->owner ? info->owner : 1;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER;
if (info->type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED)
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_enum_info;
else
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_info;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READ)
kctl.get = snd_ctl_elem_user_get;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE)
kctl.put = snd_ctl_elem_user_put;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE) {
kctl.tlv.c = snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK;
}
switch (info->type) {
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER:
private_size = sizeof(long);
if (info->count > 128)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER64:
private_size = sizeof(long long);
if (info->count > 64)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned int);
if (info->count > 128 || info->value.enumerated.items == 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BYTES:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned char);
if (info->count > 512)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_IEC958:
private_size = sizeof(struct snd_aes_iec958);
if (info->count != 1)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
private_size *= info->count;
ue = kzalloc(sizeof(struct user_element) + private_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ue == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ue->card = card;
ue->info = *info;
ue->info.access = 0;
ue->elem_data = (char *)ue + sizeof(*ue);
ue->elem_data_size = private_size;
if (ue->info.type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED) {
err = snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(ue);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(ue);
return err;
}
}
kctl.private_free = snd_ctl_elem_user_free;
_kctl = snd_ctl_new(&kctl, access);
if (_kctl == NULL) {
kfree(ue->priv_data);
kfree(ue);
return -ENOMEM;
}
_kctl->private_data = ue;
for (idx = 0; idx < _kctl->count; idx++)
_kctl->vd[idx].owner = file;
err = snd_ctl_add(card, _kctl);
if (err < 0)
return err;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
card->user_ctl_count++;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
return 0;
}
| 166,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int mwifiex_update_vs_ie(const u8 *ies, int ies_len,
struct mwifiex_ie **ie_ptr, u16 mask,
unsigned int oui, u8 oui_type)
{
struct ieee_types_header *vs_ie;
struct mwifiex_ie *ie = *ie_ptr;
const u8 *vendor_ie;
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(oui, oui_type, ies, ies_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
if (!*ie_ptr) {
*ie_ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*ie_ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
ie = *ie_ptr;
}
vs_ie = (struct ieee_types_header *)vendor_ie;
memcpy(ie->ie_buffer + le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length),
vs_ie, vs_ie->len + 2);
le16_unaligned_add_cpu(&ie->ie_length, vs_ie->len + 2);
ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(mask);
ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK);
}
*ie_ptr = ie;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-120
|
static int mwifiex_update_vs_ie(const u8 *ies, int ies_len,
struct mwifiex_ie **ie_ptr, u16 mask,
unsigned int oui, u8 oui_type)
{
struct ieee_types_header *vs_ie;
struct mwifiex_ie *ie = *ie_ptr;
const u8 *vendor_ie;
vendor_ie = cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(oui, oui_type, ies, ies_len);
if (vendor_ie) {
if (!*ie_ptr) {
*ie_ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!*ie_ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
ie = *ie_ptr;
}
vs_ie = (struct ieee_types_header *)vendor_ie;
if (le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length) + vs_ie->len + 2 >
IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(ie->ie_buffer + le16_to_cpu(ie->ie_length),
vs_ie, vs_ie->len + 2);
le16_unaligned_add_cpu(&ie->ie_length, vs_ie->len + 2);
ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(mask);
ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK);
}
*ie_ptr = ie;
return 0;
}
| 169,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, setFileClass)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_class_entry *ce = spl_ce_SplFileObject;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|C", &ce) == SUCCESS) {
intern->file_class = ce;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, setFileClass)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_class_entry *ce = spl_ce_SplFileObject;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|C", &ce) == SUCCESS) {
intern->file_class = ce;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CastStreamingNativeHandler::CastStreamingNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
last_transport_id_(1),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction("CreateSession",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::CreateCastSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("DestroyCastRtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::DestroyCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"GetSupportedParamsCastRtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetSupportedParamsCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StartCastRtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StartCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StopCastRtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StopCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("DestroyCastUdpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::DestroyCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"SetDestinationCastUdpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::SetDestinationCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"SetOptionsCastUdpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::SetOptionsCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("ToggleLogging",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::ToggleLogging,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("GetRawEvents",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetRawEvents,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("GetStats", base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetStats,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StartCastRtpReceiver",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StartCastRtpReceiver,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
|
CastStreamingNativeHandler::CastStreamingNativeHandler(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
last_transport_id_(1),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction("CreateSession", "cast.streaming.session",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::CreateCastSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("DestroyCastRtpStream", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::DestroyCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"GetSupportedParamsCastRtpStream", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetSupportedParamsCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StartCastRtpStream", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StartCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StopCastRtpStream", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StopCastRtpStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("DestroyCastUdpTransport", "cast.streaming.udpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::DestroyCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"SetDestinationCastUdpTransport", "cast.streaming.udpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::SetDestinationCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction(
"SetOptionsCastUdpTransport", "cast.streaming.udpTransport",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::SetOptionsCastUdpTransport,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("ToggleLogging", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::ToggleLogging,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("GetRawEvents", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetRawEvents,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("GetStats", "cast.streaming.rtpStream",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetStats,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("StartCastRtpReceiver", "cast.streaming.receiverSession",
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::StartCastRtpReceiver,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
| 173,270 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*image->columns*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*image->columns*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/105
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
extent,
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
extent=MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*extent*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*extent*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
| 168,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int __sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags,
struct used_address *used_address)
{
struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat =
(struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
unsigned char ctl[sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + 20]
__attribute__ ((aligned(sizeof(__kernel_size_t))));
/* 20 is size of ipv6_pktinfo */
unsigned char *ctl_buf = ctl;
int err, ctl_len, iov_size, total_len;
err = -EFAULT;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
return -EFAULT;
/* do not move before msg_sys is valid */
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
goto out;
/* Check whether to allocate the iovec area */
err = -ENOMEM;
iov_size = msg_sys->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
iov = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, iov_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
goto out;
}
/* This will also move the address data into kernel space */
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = verify_compat_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
} else
err = verify_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
total_len = err;
err = -ENOBUFS;
if (msg_sys->msg_controllen > INT_MAX)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
if ((MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) && ctl_len) {
err =
cmsghdr_from_user_compat_to_kern(msg_sys, sock->sk, ctl,
sizeof(ctl));
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_buf = msg_sys->msg_control;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
} else if (ctl_len) {
if (ctl_len > sizeof(ctl)) {
ctl_buf = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, ctl_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctl_buf == NULL)
goto out_freeiov;
}
err = -EFAULT;
/*
* Careful! Before this, msg_sys->msg_control contains a user pointer.
* Afterwards, it will be a kernel pointer. Thus the compiler-assisted
* checking falls down on this.
*/
if (copy_from_user(ctl_buf,
(void __user __force *)msg_sys->msg_control,
ctl_len))
goto out_freectl;
msg_sys->msg_control = ctl_buf;
}
msg_sys->msg_flags = flags;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
msg_sys->msg_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and current destination address is same as
* previously succeeded address, omit asking LSM's decision.
* used_address->name_len is initialized to UINT_MAX so that the first
* destination address never matches.
*/
if (used_address && used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
!memcmp(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
used_address->name_len)) {
err = sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
goto out_freectl;
}
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and sending to current destination address was
* successful, remember it.
*/
if (used_address && err >= 0) {
used_address->name_len = msg_sys->msg_namelen;
memcpy(&used_address->name, msg->msg_name,
used_address->name_len);
}
out_freectl:
if (ctl_buf != ctl)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, ctl_buf, ctl_len);
out_freeiov:
if (iov != iovstack)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, iov, iov_size);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
CC: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
CC: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CC: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
|
static int __sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned flags,
struct used_address *used_address)
{
struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat =
(struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
unsigned char ctl[sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + 20]
__attribute__ ((aligned(sizeof(__kernel_size_t))));
/* 20 is size of ipv6_pktinfo */
unsigned char *ctl_buf = ctl;
int err, ctl_len, iov_size, total_len;
err = -EFAULT;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (copy_from_user(msg_sys, msg, sizeof(struct msghdr)))
return -EFAULT;
/* do not move before msg_sys is valid */
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
goto out;
/* Check whether to allocate the iovec area */
err = -ENOMEM;
iov_size = msg_sys->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
iov = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, iov_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
goto out;
}
/* This will also move the address data into kernel space */
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = verify_compat_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
} else
err = verify_iovec(msg_sys, iov,
(struct sockaddr *)&address,
VERIFY_READ);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
total_len = err;
err = -ENOBUFS;
if (msg_sys->msg_controllen > INT_MAX)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
if ((MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) && ctl_len) {
err =
cmsghdr_from_user_compat_to_kern(msg_sys, sock->sk, ctl,
sizeof(ctl));
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_buf = msg_sys->msg_control;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
} else if (ctl_len) {
if (ctl_len > sizeof(ctl)) {
ctl_buf = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, ctl_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctl_buf == NULL)
goto out_freeiov;
}
err = -EFAULT;
/*
* Careful! Before this, msg_sys->msg_control contains a user pointer.
* Afterwards, it will be a kernel pointer. Thus the compiler-assisted
* checking falls down on this.
*/
if (copy_from_user(ctl_buf,
(void __user __force *)msg_sys->msg_control,
ctl_len))
goto out_freectl;
msg_sys->msg_control = ctl_buf;
}
msg_sys->msg_flags = flags;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
msg_sys->msg_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and current destination address is same as
* previously succeeded address, omit asking LSM's decision.
* used_address->name_len is initialized to UINT_MAX so that the first
* destination address never matches.
*/
if (used_address && msg_sys->msg_name &&
used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
!memcmp(&used_address->name, msg_sys->msg_name,
used_address->name_len)) {
err = sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
goto out_freectl;
}
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and sending to current destination address was
* successful, remember it.
*/
if (used_address && err >= 0) {
used_address->name_len = msg_sys->msg_namelen;
if (msg_sys->msg_name)
memcpy(&used_address->name, msg_sys->msg_name,
used_address->name_len);
}
out_freectl:
if (ctl_buf != ctl)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, ctl_buf, ctl_len);
out_freeiov:
if (iov != iovstack)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, iov, iov_size);
out:
return err;
}
| 165,680 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void fdctrl_handle_drive_specification_command(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x80) {
/* Command parameters done */
if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x40) {
fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->fifo[1];
fdctrl->fifo[2] = 0;
fdctrl->fifo[3] = 0;
}
} else if (fdctrl->data_len > 7) {
/* ERROR */
fdctrl->fifo[0] = 0x80 |
(cur_drv->head << 2) | GET_CUR_DRV(fdctrl);
fdctrl_set_fifo(fdctrl, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void fdctrl_handle_drive_specification_command(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
uint32_t pos;
pos = fdctrl->data_pos - 1;
pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
if (fdctrl->fifo[pos] & 0x80) {
/* Command parameters done */
if (fdctrl->fifo[pos] & 0x40) {
fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->fifo[1];
fdctrl->fifo[2] = 0;
fdctrl->fifo[3] = 0;
}
} else if (fdctrl->data_len > 7) {
/* ERROR */
fdctrl->fifo[0] = 0x80 |
(cur_drv->head << 2) | GET_CUR_DRV(fdctrl);
fdctrl_set_fifo(fdctrl, 1);
}
}
| 164,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::OnBluetoothChooserEvent(
BluetoothChooser::Event event,
const std::string& device_address) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(chooser_.get());
switch (event) {
case BluetoothChooser::Event::RESCAN:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
device_ids_.clear();
PopulateConnectedDevices();
DCHECK(chooser_);
StartDeviceDiscovery();
return;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::DENIED_PERMISSION:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::
CHOOSER_NOT_SHOWN_USER_DENIED_PERMISSION_TO_SCAN);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::CANCELLED:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_OVERVIEW_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Overview Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_ADAPTER_OFF_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Adapter Off Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_NEED_LOCATION_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Need Location Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SELECTED:
RecordNumOfDevices(options_->accept_all_devices, device_ids_.size());
PostSuccessCallback(device_address);
break;
}
chooser_.reset();
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::OnBluetoothChooserEvent(
BluetoothChooser::Event event,
const std::string& device_address) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(chooser_.get());
switch (event) {
case BluetoothChooser::Event::RESCAN:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
device_ids_.clear();
PopulateConnectedDevices();
DCHECK(chooser_);
StartDeviceDiscovery();
return;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::DENIED_PERMISSION:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(
WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_NOT_SHOWN_USER_DENIED_PERMISSION_TO_SCAN);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::CANCELLED:
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_OVERVIEW_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Overview Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_ADAPTER_OFF_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Adapter Off Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SHOW_NEED_LOCATION_HELP:
DVLOG(1) << "Need Location Help link pressed.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(OutcomeFromChooserEvent(event));
PostErrorCallback(WebBluetoothResult::CHOOSER_CANCELLED);
break;
case BluetoothChooser::Event::SELECTED:
RecordNumOfDevices(options_->accept_all_devices, device_ids_.size());
PostSuccessCallback(device_address);
break;
}
chooser_.reset();
}
| 172,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
{
struct hlist_head *hashent = ucounts_hashentry(ns, uid);
struct ucounts *ucounts, *new;
spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
if (!ucounts) {
spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
new->ns = ns;
new->uid = uid;
atomic_set(&new->count, 0);
spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
if (ucounts) {
kfree(new);
} else {
hlist_add_head(&new->node, hashent);
ucounts = new;
}
}
if (!atomic_add_unless(&ucounts->count, 1, INT_MAX))
ucounts = NULL;
spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
return ucounts;
}
Commit Message: ucount: Remove the atomicity from ucount->count
Always increment/decrement ucount->count under the ucounts_lock. The
increments are there already and moving the decrements there means the
locking logic of the code is simpler. This simplification in the
locking logic fixes a race between put_ucounts and get_ucounts that
could result in a use-after-free because the count could go zero then
be found by get_ucounts and then be freed by put_ucounts.
A bug presumably this one was found by a combination of syzkaller and
KASAN. JongWhan Kim reported the syzkaller failure and Dmitry Vyukov
spotted the race in the code.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: f6b2db1a3e8d ("userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
{
struct hlist_head *hashent = ucounts_hashentry(ns, uid);
struct ucounts *ucounts, *new;
spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
if (!ucounts) {
spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
new->ns = ns;
new->uid = uid;
new->count = 0;
spin_lock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
ucounts = find_ucounts(ns, uid, hashent);
if (ucounts) {
kfree(new);
} else {
hlist_add_head(&new->node, hashent);
ucounts = new;
}
}
if (ucounts->count == INT_MAX)
ucounts = NULL;
else
ucounts->count += 1;
spin_unlock_irq(&ucounts_lock);
return ucounts;
}
| 168,315 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: exsltDateCreateDate (exsltDateType type)
{
exsltDateValPtr ret;
ret = (exsltDateValPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltDateCreateDate: out of memory\n");
return (NULL);
}
memset (ret, 0, sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (type != EXSLT_UNKNOWN)
ret->type = type;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
exsltDateCreateDate (exsltDateType type)
{
exsltDateValPtr ret;
ret = (exsltDateValPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltDateCreateDate: out of memory\n");
return (NULL);
}
memset (ret, 0, sizeof(exsltDateVal));
if (type != XS_DURATION) {
ret->value.date.mon = 1;
ret->value.date.day = 1;
}
if (type != EXSLT_UNKNOWN)
ret->type = type;
return ret;
}
| 173,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void *atomic_thread(void *context) {
struct atomic_test_s32_s *at = (struct atomic_test_s32_s *)context;
for (int i = 0; i < at->max_val; i++) {
usleep(1);
atomic_inc_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
|
void *atomic_thread(void *context) {
struct atomic_test_s32_s *at = (struct atomic_test_s32_s *)context;
for (int i = 0; i < at->max_val; i++) {
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(1));
atomic_inc_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
| 173,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
char *xattr_value,
size_t xattr_value_len,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
int rc, xattr_len;
if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
return iint->evm_status;
/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
/* first need to know the sig type */
rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
GFP_NOFS);
if (rc <= 0) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
if (rc == -ENODATA) {
rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
if (rc > 0)
evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
else if (rc == 0)
evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
} else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
goto out;
}
xattr_len = rc;
/* check value type */
switch (xattr_data->type) {
case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
sizeof(calc.digest));
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
if (!rc) {
/* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
* not immutable
*/
if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
!IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
}
break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rc)
evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
out:
if (iint)
iint->evm_status = evm_status;
kfree(xattr_data);
return evm_status;
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
|
static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *xattr_name,
char *xattr_value,
size_t xattr_value_len,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
int rc, xattr_len;
if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS)
return iint->evm_status;
/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
/* first need to know the sig type */
rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0,
GFP_NOFS);
if (rc <= 0) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
if (rc == -ENODATA) {
rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry);
if (rc > 0)
evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
else if (rc == 0)
evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */
} else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
}
goto out;
}
xattr_len = rc;
/* check value type */
switch (xattr_data->type) {
case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
sizeof(calc.digest));
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
if (!rc) {
/* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and
* not immutable
*/
if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) &&
!IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name,
xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
}
break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rc)
evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ?
INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL;
out:
if (iint)
iint->evm_status = evm_status;
kfree(xattr_data);
return evm_status;
}
| 167,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static u_char *php_parserr(u_char *cp, querybuf *answer, int type_to_fetch, int store, int raw, zval **subarray)
{
u_short type, class, dlen;
u_long ttl;
long n, i;
u_short s;
u_char *tp, *p;
char name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
int have_v6_break = 0, in_v6_break = 0;
*subarray = NULL;
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, sizeof(name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
GETSHORT(type, cp);
GETSHORT(class, cp);
GETLONG(ttl, cp);
GETSHORT(dlen, cp);
if (type_to_fetch != T_ANY && type != type_to_fetch) {
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
if (!store) {
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(*subarray);
array_init(*subarray);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "host", name, 1);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "class", "IN", 1);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "ttl", ttl);
if (raw) {
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "type", type);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "data", (char*) cp, (uint) dlen, 1);
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
switch (type) {
case DNS_T_A:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "A", 1);
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d.%d.%d.%d", cp[0], cp[1], cp[2], cp[3]);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ip", name, 1);
cp += dlen;
break;
case DNS_T_MX:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "MX", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pri", n);
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_CNAME:
if (type == DNS_T_CNAME) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "CNAME", 1);
}
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_NS:
if (type == DNS_T_NS) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "NS", 1);
}
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_PTR:
if (type == DNS_T_PTR) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "PTR", 1);
}
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "target", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_HINFO:
/* See RFC 1010 for values */
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "HINFO", 1);
n = *cp & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "cpu", (char*)cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = *cp & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "os", (char*)cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
break;
case DNS_T_TXT:
{
int ll = 0;
zval *entries = NULL;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "TXT", 1);
tp = emalloc(dlen + 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(entries);
array_init(entries);
while (ll < dlen) {
n = cp[ll];
memcpy(tp + ll , cp + ll + 1, n);
add_next_index_stringl(entries, cp + ll + 1, n, 1);
ll = ll + n + 1;
}
tp[dlen] = '\0';
cp += dlen;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "txt", tp, (dlen>0)?dlen - 1:0, 0);
add_assoc_zval(*subarray, "entries", entries);
}
break;
case DNS_T_SOA:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "SOA", 1);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) -2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "mname", name, 1);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) -2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "rname", name, 1);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "serial", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "refresh", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "retry", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "expire", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "minimum-ttl", n);
break;
case DNS_T_AAAA:
tp = (u_char*)name;
for(i=0; i < 8; i++) {
GETSHORT(s, cp);
if (s != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp += sprintf((char*)tp,"%x",s);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
}
if (have_v6_break && in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp[0] = '\0';
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "AAAA", 1);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ipv6", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_A6:
p = cp;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "A6", 1);
n = ((int)cp[0]) & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "masklen", n);
tp = (u_char*)name;
if (n > 15) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
if (n % 16 > 8) {
/* Partial short */
if (cp[0] != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
sprintf((char*)tp, "%x", cp[0] & 0xFF);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
cp++;
}
for (i = (n + 8) / 16; i < 8; i++) {
GETSHORT(s, cp);
if (s != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp += sprintf((char*)tp,"%x",s);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
}
if (have_v6_break && in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp[0] = '\0';
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ipv6", name, 1);
if (cp < p + dlen) {
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "chain", name, 1);
}
break;
case DNS_T_SRV:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "SRV", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pri", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "weight", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "port", n);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "target", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_NAPTR:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "NAPTR", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "order", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pref", n);
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "flags", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "services", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "regex", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "replacement", name, 1);
break;
default:
zval_ptr_dtor(subarray);
*subarray = NULL;
cp += dlen;
break;
}
return cp;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'PHP-5.6'
* PHP-5.6:
Fix potential segfault in dns_get_record()
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static u_char *php_parserr(u_char *cp, querybuf *answer, int type_to_fetch, int store, int raw, zval **subarray)
{
u_short type, class, dlen;
u_long ttl;
long n, i;
u_short s;
u_char *tp, *p;
char name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
int have_v6_break = 0, in_v6_break = 0;
*subarray = NULL;
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, sizeof(name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
GETSHORT(type, cp);
GETSHORT(class, cp);
GETLONG(ttl, cp);
GETSHORT(dlen, cp);
if (type_to_fetch != T_ANY && type != type_to_fetch) {
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
if (!store) {
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(*subarray);
array_init(*subarray);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "host", name, 1);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "class", "IN", 1);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "ttl", ttl);
if (raw) {
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "type", type);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "data", (char*) cp, (uint) dlen, 1);
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
switch (type) {
case DNS_T_A:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "A", 1);
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d.%d.%d.%d", cp[0], cp[1], cp[2], cp[3]);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ip", name, 1);
cp += dlen;
break;
case DNS_T_MX:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "MX", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pri", n);
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_CNAME:
if (type == DNS_T_CNAME) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "CNAME", 1);
}
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_NS:
if (type == DNS_T_NS) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "NS", 1);
}
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_PTR:
if (type == DNS_T_PTR) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "PTR", 1);
}
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "target", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_HINFO:
/* See RFC 1010 for values */
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "HINFO", 1);
n = *cp & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "cpu", (char*)cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = *cp & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "os", (char*)cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
break;
case DNS_T_TXT:
{
int ll = 0;
zval *entries = NULL;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "TXT", 1);
tp = emalloc(dlen + 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(entries);
array_init(entries);
while (ll < dlen) {
n = cp[ll];
if ((ll + n) >= dlen) {
// Invalid chunk length, truncate
n = dlen - (ll + 1);
}
memcpy(tp + ll , cp + ll + 1, n);
add_next_index_stringl(entries, cp + ll + 1, n, 1);
ll = ll + n + 1;
}
tp[dlen] = '\0';
cp += dlen;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "txt", tp, (dlen>0)?dlen - 1:0, 0);
add_assoc_zval(*subarray, "entries", entries);
}
break;
case DNS_T_SOA:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "SOA", 1);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) -2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "mname", name, 1);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) -2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "rname", name, 1);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "serial", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "refresh", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "retry", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "expire", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "minimum-ttl", n);
break;
case DNS_T_AAAA:
tp = (u_char*)name;
for(i=0; i < 8; i++) {
GETSHORT(s, cp);
if (s != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp += sprintf((char*)tp,"%x",s);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
}
if (have_v6_break && in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp[0] = '\0';
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "AAAA", 1);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ipv6", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_A6:
p = cp;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "A6", 1);
n = ((int)cp[0]) & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "masklen", n);
tp = (u_char*)name;
if (n > 15) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
if (n % 16 > 8) {
/* Partial short */
if (cp[0] != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
sprintf((char*)tp, "%x", cp[0] & 0xFF);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
cp++;
}
for (i = (n + 8) / 16; i < 8; i++) {
GETSHORT(s, cp);
if (s != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp += sprintf((char*)tp,"%x",s);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
}
if (have_v6_break && in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp[0] = '\0';
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ipv6", name, 1);
if (cp < p + dlen) {
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "chain", name, 1);
}
break;
case DNS_T_SRV:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "SRV", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pri", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "weight", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "port", n);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "target", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_NAPTR:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "NAPTR", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "order", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pref", n);
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "flags", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "services", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "regex", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "replacement", name, 1);
break;
default:
zval_ptr_dtor(subarray);
*subarray = NULL;
cp += dlen;
break;
}
return cp;
}
| 166,314 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool svc_rdma_prealloc_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
{
unsigned int i;
/* One for each receive buffer on this connection. */
i = xprt->sc_max_requests;
while (i--) {
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map;
map = alloc_req_map(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!map) {
dprintk("svcrdma: No memory for request map\n");
return false;
}
list_add(&map->free, &xprt->sc_maps);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
static bool svc_rdma_prealloc_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
| 168,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void CallbackAndDie(bool succeeded) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = context_->isolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> args[] = {v8::Boolean::New(isolate, succeeded)};
context_->CallFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::New(isolate, callback_),
arraysize(args), args);
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Fix re-entrancy and lifetime issue in RenderFrameObserverNatives::OnDocumentElementCreated
BUG=585268,568130
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1684953002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374758}
CWE ID:
|
void CallbackAndDie(bool succeeded) {
// Use PostTask to avoid running user scripts while handling this
// DidFailProvisionalLoad notification.
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback_, false));
delete this;
}
| 172,144 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void GetPreviewDataForIndex(int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
if (index != printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX &&
index < printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX) {
return;
}
PreviewPageDataMap::iterator it = page_data_map_.find(index);
if (it != page_data_map_.end())
*data = it->second.get();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void GetPreviewDataForIndex(int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
if (IsInvalidIndex(index))
return;
PreviewPageDataMap::iterator it = page_data_map_.find(index);
if (it != page_data_map_.end())
*data = it->second.get();
}
| 170,822 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(spl_filesystem_object *intern, char *path, int len, int use_copy TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *p1, *p2;
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
}
intern->file_name = use_copy ? estrndup(path, len) : path;
intern->file_name_len = len;
while(IS_SLASH_AT(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len-1) && intern->file_name_len > 1) {
intern->file_name[intern->file_name_len-1] = 0;
intern->file_name_len--;
}
p1 = strrchr(intern->file_name, '/');
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) || defined(NETWARE)
p2 = strrchr(intern->file_name, '\\');
#else
p2 = 0;
#endif
if (p1 || p2) {
intern->_path_len = (p1 > p2 ? p1 : p2) - intern->file_name;
} else {
intern->_path_len = 0;
}
if (intern->_path) {
efree(intern->_path);
}
intern->_path = estrndup(path, intern->_path_len);
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
void spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(spl_filesystem_object *intern, char *path, int len, int use_copy TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *p1, *p2;
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
}
intern->file_name = use_copy ? estrndup(path, len) : path;
intern->file_name_len = len;
while(IS_SLASH_AT(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len-1) && intern->file_name_len > 1) {
intern->file_name[intern->file_name_len-1] = 0;
intern->file_name_len--;
}
p1 = strrchr(intern->file_name, '/');
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) || defined(NETWARE)
p2 = strrchr(intern->file_name, '\\');
#else
p2 = 0;
#endif
if (p1 || p2) {
intern->_path_len = (p1 > p2 ? p1 : p2) - intern->file_name;
} else {
intern->_path_len = 0;
}
if (intern->_path) {
efree(intern->_path);
}
intern->_path = estrndup(path, intern->_path_len);
} /* }}} */
| 167,079 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: zend_function *spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check(zval **object_ptr, char *method, int method_len, const struct _zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *fsobj = zend_object_store_get_object(*object_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
if (fsobj->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] == '\0' && fsobj->orig_path == NULL) {
method = "_bad_state_ex";
method_len = sizeof("_bad_state_ex") - 1;
key = NULL;
}
return zend_get_std_object_handlers()->get_method(object_ptr, method, method_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
zend_function *spl_filesystem_object_get_method_check(zval **object_ptr, char *method, int method_len, const struct _zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *fsobj = zend_object_store_get_object(*object_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
if (fsobj->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] == '\0' && fsobj->orig_path == NULL) {
method = "_bad_state_ex";
method_len = sizeof("_bad_state_ex") - 1;
key = NULL;
}
return zend_get_std_object_handlers()->get_method(object_ptr, method, method_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
| 167,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int decode_zbuf(AVBPrint *bp, const uint8_t *data,
const uint8_t *data_end)
{
z_stream zstream;
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned buf_size;
int ret;
zstream.zalloc = ff_png_zalloc;
zstream.zfree = ff_png_zfree;
zstream.opaque = NULL;
if (inflateInit(&zstream) != Z_OK)
return AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
zstream.next_in = (unsigned char *)data;
zstream.avail_in = data_end - data;
av_bprint_init(bp, 0, -1);
while (zstream.avail_in > 0) {
av_bprint_get_buffer(bp, 1, &buf, &buf_size);
if (!buf_size) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
zstream.next_out = buf;
zstream.avail_out = buf_size;
ret = inflate(&zstream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
if (ret != Z_OK && ret != Z_STREAM_END) {
ret = AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
goto fail;
}
bp->len += zstream.next_out - buf;
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
break;
}
inflateEnd(&zstream);
bp->str[bp->len] = 0;
return 0;
fail:
inflateEnd(&zstream);
av_bprint_finalize(bp, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Fix off by 1 size in decode_zbuf()
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 444/fuzz-2-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_PNG_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static int decode_zbuf(AVBPrint *bp, const uint8_t *data,
const uint8_t *data_end)
{
z_stream zstream;
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned buf_size;
int ret;
zstream.zalloc = ff_png_zalloc;
zstream.zfree = ff_png_zfree;
zstream.opaque = NULL;
if (inflateInit(&zstream) != Z_OK)
return AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
zstream.next_in = (unsigned char *)data;
zstream.avail_in = data_end - data;
av_bprint_init(bp, 0, -1);
while (zstream.avail_in > 0) {
av_bprint_get_buffer(bp, 2, &buf, &buf_size);
if (buf_size < 2) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
zstream.next_out = buf;
zstream.avail_out = buf_size - 1;
ret = inflate(&zstream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
if (ret != Z_OK && ret != Z_STREAM_END) {
ret = AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
goto fail;
}
bp->len += zstream.next_out - buf;
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
break;
}
inflateEnd(&zstream);
bp->str[bp->len] = 0;
return 0;
fail:
inflateEnd(&zstream);
av_bprint_finalize(bp, NULL);
return ret;
}
| 168,245 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xmlParseElement(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL;
const xmlChar *URI = NULL;
xmlParserNodeInfo node_info;
int line, tlen;
xmlNodePtr ret;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if (((unsigned int) ctxt->nameNr > xmlParserMaxDepth) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Excessive depth in document: %d use XML_PARSE_HUGE option\n",
xmlParserMaxDepth);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
return;
}
/* Capture start position */
if (ctxt->record_info) {
node_info.begin_pos = ctxt->input->consumed +
(CUR_PTR - ctxt->input->base);
node_info.begin_line = ctxt->input->line;
}
if (ctxt->spaceNr == 0)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else if (*ctxt->space == -2)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else
spacePush(ctxt, *ctxt->space);
line = ctxt->input->line;
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax2)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
name = xmlParseStartTag2(ctxt, &prefix, &URI, &tlen);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
name = xmlParseStartTag(ctxt);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (name == NULL) {
spacePop(ctxt);
return;
}
namePush(ctxt, name);
ret = ctxt->node;
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
/*
* [ VC: Root Element Type ]
* The Name in the document type declaration must match the element
* type of the root element.
*/
if (ctxt->validate && ctxt->wellFormed && ctxt->myDoc &&
ctxt->node && (ctxt->node == ctxt->myDoc->children))
ctxt->valid &= xmlValidateRoot(&ctxt->vctxt, ctxt->myDoc);
#endif /* LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED */
/*
* Check for an Empty Element.
*/
if ((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
if (ctxt->sax2) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, name, prefix, URI);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElement(ctxt->userData, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
}
namePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != ctxt->nsNr)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
if ( ret != NULL && ctxt->record_info ) {
node_info.end_pos = ctxt->input->consumed +
(CUR_PTR - ctxt->input->base);
node_info.end_line = ctxt->input->line;
node_info.node = ret;
xmlParserAddNodeInfo(ctxt, &node_info);
}
return;
}
if (RAW == '>') {
NEXT1;
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED,
"Couldn't find end of Start Tag %s line %d\n",
name, line, NULL);
/*
* end of parsing of this node.
*/
nodePop(ctxt);
namePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != ctxt->nsNr)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
/*
* Capture end position and add node
*/
if ( ret != NULL && ctxt->record_info ) {
node_info.end_pos = ctxt->input->consumed +
(CUR_PTR - ctxt->input->base);
node_info.end_line = ctxt->input->line;
node_info.node = ret;
xmlParserAddNodeInfo(ctxt, &node_info);
}
return;
}
/*
* Parse the content of the element:
*/
xmlParseContent(ctxt);
if (!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NOT_FINISHED,
"Premature end of data in tag %s line %d\n",
name, line, NULL);
/*
* end of parsing of this node.
*/
nodePop(ctxt);
namePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != ctxt->nsNr)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
return;
}
/*
* parse the end of tag: '</' should be here.
*/
if (ctxt->sax2) {
xmlParseEndTag2(ctxt, prefix, URI, line, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr, tlen);
namePop(ctxt);
}
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, line);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
/*
* Capture end position and add node
*/
if ( ret != NULL && ctxt->record_info ) {
node_info.end_pos = ctxt->input->consumed +
(CUR_PTR - ctxt->input->base);
node_info.end_line = ctxt->input->line;
node_info.node = ret;
xmlParserAddNodeInfo(ctxt, &node_info);
}
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xmlParseElement(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL;
const xmlChar *URI = NULL;
xmlParserNodeInfo node_info;
int line, tlen;
xmlNodePtr ret;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if (((unsigned int) ctxt->nameNr > xmlParserMaxDepth) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Excessive depth in document: %d use XML_PARSE_HUGE option\n",
xmlParserMaxDepth);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
return;
}
/* Capture start position */
if (ctxt->record_info) {
node_info.begin_pos = ctxt->input->consumed +
(CUR_PTR - ctxt->input->base);
node_info.begin_line = ctxt->input->line;
}
if (ctxt->spaceNr == 0)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else if (*ctxt->space == -2)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else
spacePush(ctxt, *ctxt->space);
line = ctxt->input->line;
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax2)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
name = xmlParseStartTag2(ctxt, &prefix, &URI, &tlen);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
name = xmlParseStartTag(ctxt);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (name == NULL) {
spacePop(ctxt);
return;
}
namePush(ctxt, name);
ret = ctxt->node;
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
/*
* [ VC: Root Element Type ]
* The Name in the document type declaration must match the element
* type of the root element.
*/
if (ctxt->validate && ctxt->wellFormed && ctxt->myDoc &&
ctxt->node && (ctxt->node == ctxt->myDoc->children))
ctxt->valid &= xmlValidateRoot(&ctxt->vctxt, ctxt->myDoc);
#endif /* LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED */
/*
* Check for an Empty Element.
*/
if ((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
if (ctxt->sax2) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, name, prefix, URI);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElement(ctxt->userData, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
}
namePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != ctxt->nsNr)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
if ( ret != NULL && ctxt->record_info ) {
node_info.end_pos = ctxt->input->consumed +
(CUR_PTR - ctxt->input->base);
node_info.end_line = ctxt->input->line;
node_info.node = ret;
xmlParserAddNodeInfo(ctxt, &node_info);
}
return;
}
if (RAW == '>') {
NEXT1;
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED,
"Couldn't find end of Start Tag %s line %d\n",
name, line, NULL);
/*
* end of parsing of this node.
*/
nodePop(ctxt);
namePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != ctxt->nsNr)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
/*
* Capture end position and add node
*/
if ( ret != NULL && ctxt->record_info ) {
node_info.end_pos = ctxt->input->consumed +
(CUR_PTR - ctxt->input->base);
node_info.end_line = ctxt->input->line;
node_info.node = ret;
xmlParserAddNodeInfo(ctxt, &node_info);
}
return;
}
/*
* Parse the content of the element:
*/
xmlParseContent(ctxt);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NOT_FINISHED,
"Premature end of data in tag %s line %d\n",
name, line, NULL);
/*
* end of parsing of this node.
*/
nodePop(ctxt);
namePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != ctxt->nsNr)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
return;
}
/*
* parse the end of tag: '</' should be here.
*/
if (ctxt->sax2) {
xmlParseEndTag2(ctxt, prefix, URI, line, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr, tlen);
namePop(ctxt);
}
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, line);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
/*
* Capture end position and add node
*/
if ( ret != NULL && ctxt->record_info ) {
node_info.end_pos = ctxt->input->consumed +
(CUR_PTR - ctxt->input->base);
node_info.end_line = ctxt->input->line;
node_info.node = ret;
xmlParserAddNodeInfo(ctxt, &node_info);
}
}
| 171,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int sc_asn1_read_tag(const u8 ** buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int *cla_out,
unsigned int *tag_out, size_t *taglen)
{
const u8 *p = *buf;
size_t left = buflen, len;
unsigned int cla, tag, i;
if (left < 2)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
*buf = NULL;
if (*p == 0xff || *p == 0) {
/* end of data reached */
*taglen = 0;
*tag_out = SC_ASN1_TAG_EOC;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
/* parse tag byte(s)
* Resulted tag is presented by integer that has not to be
* confused with the 'tag number' part of ASN.1 tag.
*/
cla = (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CLASS) | (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CONSTRUCTED);
tag = *p & SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE;
p++;
left--;
if (tag == SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE) {
/* high tag number */
size_t n = SC_ASN1_TAGNUM_SIZE - 1;
/* search the last tag octet */
while (left-- != 0 && n != 0) {
tag <<= 8;
tag |= *p;
if ((*p++ & 0x80) == 0)
break;
n--;
}
if (left == 0 || n == 0)
/* either an invalid tag or it doesn't fit in
* unsigned int */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
}
/* parse length byte(s) */
len = *p & 0x7f;
if (*p++ & 0x80) {
unsigned int a = 0;
if (len > 4 || len > left)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
left -= len;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
a <<= 8;
a |= *p;
p++;
}
len = a;
}
*cla_out = cla;
*tag_out = tag;
*taglen = len;
*buf = p;
if (len > left)
return SC_ERROR_ASN1_END_OF_CONTENTS;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
int sc_asn1_read_tag(const u8 ** buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int *cla_out,
unsigned int *tag_out, size_t *taglen)
{
const u8 *p = *buf;
size_t left = buflen, len;
unsigned int cla, tag, i;
if (left < 2)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
*buf = NULL;
if (*p == 0xff || *p == 0) {
/* end of data reached */
*taglen = 0;
*tag_out = SC_ASN1_TAG_EOC;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
/* parse tag byte(s)
* Resulted tag is presented by integer that has not to be
* confused with the 'tag number' part of ASN.1 tag.
*/
cla = (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CLASS) | (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CONSTRUCTED);
tag = *p & SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE;
p++;
left--;
if (tag == SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE) {
/* high tag number */
size_t n = SC_ASN1_TAGNUM_SIZE - 1;
/* search the last tag octet */
while (left-- != 0 && n != 0) {
tag <<= 8;
tag |= *p;
if ((*p++ & 0x80) == 0)
break;
n--;
}
if (left == 0 || n == 0)
/* either an invalid tag or it doesn't fit in
* unsigned int */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
}
/* parse length byte(s) */
len = *p & 0x7f;
if (*p++ & 0x80) {
unsigned int a = 0;
left--;
if (len > 4 || len > left)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
left -= len;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
a <<= 8;
a |= *p;
p++;
}
len = a;
}
*cla_out = cla;
*tag_out = tag;
*taglen = len;
*buf = p;
if (len > left)
return SC_ERROR_ASN1_END_OF_CONTENTS;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void WebUIExtension::Send(gin::Arguments* args) {
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame;
RenderFrame* render_frame;
if (!ShouldRespondToRequest(&frame, &render_frame))
return;
std::string message;
if (!args->GetNext(&message)) {
args->ThrowError();
return;
}
if (base::EndsWith(message, "RequiringGesture",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) &&
!blink::WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(frame)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> content;
if (args->PeekNext().IsEmpty() || args->PeekNext()->IsUndefined()) {
content.reset(new base::ListValue());
} else {
v8::Local<v8::Object> obj;
if (!args->GetNext(&obj)) {
args->ThrowError();
return;
}
content = base::ListValue::From(V8ValueConverter::Create()->FromV8Value(
obj, frame->MainWorldScriptContext()));
DCHECK(content);
}
render_frame->Send(new FrameHostMsg_WebUISend(render_frame->GetRoutingID(),
frame->GetDocument().Url(),
message, *content));
}
Commit Message: Validate frame after conversion in chrome.send
BUG=797511
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/797511#c1
Change-Id: Ib1a99db4d7648fb1325eb6d7af4ef111d6dda4cb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844076
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526197}
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
void WebUIExtension::Send(gin::Arguments* args) {
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame;
RenderFrame* render_frame;
if (!ShouldRespondToRequest(&frame, &render_frame))
return;
std::string message;
if (!args->GetNext(&message)) {
args->ThrowError();
return;
}
if (base::EndsWith(message, "RequiringGesture",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE) &&
!blink::WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(frame)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> content;
if (args->PeekNext().IsEmpty() || args->PeekNext()->IsUndefined()) {
content.reset(new base::ListValue());
} else {
v8::Local<v8::Object> obj;
if (!args->GetNext(&obj)) {
args->ThrowError();
return;
}
content = base::ListValue::From(V8ValueConverter::Create()->FromV8Value(
obj, frame->MainWorldScriptContext()));
DCHECK(content);
// The conversion of |obj| could have triggered arbitrary JavaScript code,
// so check that the frame is still valid to avoid dereferencing a stale
// pointer.
if (frame != blink::WebLocalFrame::FrameForCurrentContext()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
render_frame->Send(new FrameHostMsg_WebUISend(render_frame->GetRoutingID(),
frame->GetDocument().Url(),
message, *content));
}
| 172,695 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ikev2_t_print(netdissect_options *ndo, int tcount,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep)
{
const struct ikev2_t *p;
struct ikev2_t t;
uint16_t t_id;
const u_char *cp;
const char *idstr;
const struct attrmap *map;
size_t nmap;
const u_char *ep2;
p = (const struct ikev2_t *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&t, ext, sizeof(t));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T), t.h.critical);
t_id = ntohs(t.t_id);
map = NULL;
nmap = 0;
switch (t.t_type) {
case IV2_T_ENCR:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, esp_p_map);
map = encr_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(encr_t_map)/sizeof(encr_t_map[0]);
break;
case IV2_T_PRF:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, prf_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_INTEG:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, integ_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_DH:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, dh_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_ESN:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, esn_p_map);
break;
default:
idstr = NULL;
break;
}
if (idstr)
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u type=%s id=%s ", tcount,
STR_OR_ID(t.t_type, ikev2_t_type_map),
idstr));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u type=%s id=%u ", tcount,
STR_OR_ID(t.t_type, ikev2_t_type_map),
t.t_id));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
if (map && nmap) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, (ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2,
map, nmap);
} else
cp = ikev1_attr_print(ndo, cp, (ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2);
}
if (ep < ep2)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"..."));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13039/IKEv1: Do more bounds checking.
Have ikev1_attrmap_print() and ikev1_attr_print() do full bounds
checking, and return null on a bounds overflow. Have their callers
check for a null return.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
ikev2_t_print(netdissect_options *ndo, int tcount,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep)
{
const struct ikev2_t *p;
struct ikev2_t t;
uint16_t t_id;
const u_char *cp;
const char *idstr;
const struct attrmap *map;
size_t nmap;
const u_char *ep2;
p = (const struct ikev2_t *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&t, ext, sizeof(t));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T), t.h.critical);
t_id = ntohs(t.t_id);
map = NULL;
nmap = 0;
switch (t.t_type) {
case IV2_T_ENCR:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, esp_p_map);
map = encr_t_map;
nmap = sizeof(encr_t_map)/sizeof(encr_t_map[0]);
break;
case IV2_T_PRF:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, prf_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_INTEG:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, integ_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_DH:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, dh_p_map);
break;
case IV2_T_ESN:
idstr = STR_OR_ID(t_id, esn_p_map);
break;
default:
idstr = NULL;
break;
}
if (idstr)
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u type=%s id=%s ", tcount,
STR_OR_ID(t.t_type, ikev2_t_type_map),
idstr));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," #%u type=%s id=%u ", tcount,
STR_OR_ID(t.t_type, ikev2_t_type_map),
t.t_id));
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1);
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
if (map && nmap) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
} else
cp = ikev1_attr_print(ndo, cp, ep2);
if (cp == NULL)
goto trunc;
}
if (ep < ep2)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"..."));
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_T)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,843 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void Set(const std::string& addr, int value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_[addr] = value;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void Set(const std::string& addr, int value) {
// Sets the |value| for |preview_id|.
void Set(int32 preview_id, int value) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
map_[preview_id] = value;
}
| 170,842 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings*
data_reduction_proxy_settings =
DataReductionProxyChromeSettingsFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
browser_context);
return data_reduction_proxy_settings &&
data_reduction_proxy_settings->IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
return profile && data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings::
IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(profile->GetPrefs());
}
| 172,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetGet)
{
char *fname, *error;
size_t fname_len;
zval zfname;
phar_entry_info *entry;
zend_string *sfname;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
/* security is 0 here so that we can get a better error message than "entry doesn't exist" */
if (!(entry = phar_get_entry_info_dir(phar_obj->archive, fname, fname_len, 1, &error, 0))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Entry %s does not exist%s%s", fname, error?", ":"", error?error:"");
} else {
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getStub", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getAlias", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot directly get any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (entry->is_temp_dir) {
efree(entry->filename);
efree(entry);
}
sfname = strpprintf(0, "phar://%s/%s", phar_obj->archive->fname, fname);
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&zfname, sfname);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex1(phar_obj->spl.info_class, return_value, &zfname);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zfname);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetGet)
{
char *fname, *error;
size_t fname_len;
zval zfname;
phar_entry_info *entry;
zend_string *sfname;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
/* security is 0 here so that we can get a better error message than "entry doesn't exist" */
if (!(entry = phar_get_entry_info_dir(phar_obj->archive, fname, fname_len, 1, &error, 0))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Entry %s does not exist%s%s", fname, error?", ":"", error?error:"");
} else {
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getStub", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getAlias", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot directly get any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (entry->is_temp_dir) {
efree(entry->filename);
efree(entry);
}
sfname = strpprintf(0, "phar://%s/%s", phar_obj->archive->fname, fname);
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&zfname, sfname);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex1(phar_obj->spl.info_class, return_value, &zfname);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zfname);
}
}
| 165,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewDataSource::StartDataRequest(const std::string& path,
bool is_incognito,
int request_id) {
if (!EndsWith(path, "/print.pdf", true)) {
ChromeWebUIDataSource::StartDataRequest(path, is_incognito, request_id);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data;
std::vector<std::string> url_substr;
base::SplitString(path, '/', &url_substr);
int page_index = 0;
if (url_substr.size() == 3 && base::StringToInt(url_substr[1], &page_index)) {
PrintPreviewDataService::GetInstance()->GetDataEntry(
url_substr[0], page_index, &data);
}
if (data.get()) {
SendResponse(request_id, data);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> empty_bytes(new base::RefCountedBytes);
SendResponse(request_id, empty_bytes);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void PrintPreviewDataSource::StartDataRequest(const std::string& path,
bool is_incognito,
int request_id) {
if (!EndsWith(path, "/print.pdf", true)) {
ChromeWebUIDataSource::StartDataRequest(path, is_incognito, request_id);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data;
std::vector<std::string> url_substr;
base::SplitString(path, '/', &url_substr);
int preview_ui_id = -1;
int page_index = 0;
if (url_substr.size() == 3 &&
base::StringToInt(url_substr[0], &preview_ui_id),
base::StringToInt(url_substr[1], &page_index) &&
preview_ui_id >= 0) {
PrintPreviewDataService::GetInstance()->GetDataEntry(
preview_ui_id, page_index, &data);
}
if (data.get()) {
SendResponse(request_id, data);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> empty_bytes(new base::RefCountedBytes);
SendResponse(request_id, empty_bytes);
}
| 170,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: parse_wcc_attr(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint32_t *dp)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, " sz %" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " mtime %u.%06u ctime %u.%06u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]), EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[3]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]), EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[5])));
return (dp + 6);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12898/NFS: Fix bounds checking.
Fix the bounds checking for the NFSv3 WRITE procedure to check whether the
length of the opaque data being written is present in the captured data,
not just whether the byte count is present in the captured data.
furthest forward in the packet, not the item before it. (This also lets
us eliminate the check for the "stable" argument being present in the
captured data; rewrite the code to print that to make it a bit clearer.)
Check that the entire ar_stat field is present in the capture.
Note that parse_wcc_attr() is called after we've already checked whether
the wcc_data is present.
Check before fetching the "access" part of the NFSv3 ACCESS results.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Include a test for the "check before fetching the "access" part..." fix,
using the capture supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
parse_wcc_attr(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint32_t *dp)
{
/* Our caller has already checked this */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " sz %" PRIu64, EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " mtime %u.%06u ctime %u.%06u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]), EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[3]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]), EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[5])));
return (dp + 6);
}
| 167,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, rewind)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index = 0;
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(intern->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, rewind)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index = 0;
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(intern->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::CreateSharedSurfaceHandle() {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return gfx::GLSurfaceHandle();
}
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle handle = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(
gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
handle.parent_gpu_process_id = context_->GetGPUProcessID();
handle.parent_client_id = context_->GetChannelID();
handle.parent_context_id = context_->GetContextID();
handle.parent_texture_id[0] = context_->createTexture();
handle.parent_texture_id[1] = context_->createTexture();
handle.sync_point = context_->insertSyncPoint();
context_->flush();
return handle;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
|
CmdBufferImageTransportFactory::CreateSharedSurfaceHandle() {
if (!context_->makeContextCurrent()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Failed to make shared graphics context current";
return gfx::GLSurfaceHandle();
}
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle handle = gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(
gfx::kNullPluginWindow, true);
handle.parent_gpu_process_id = context_->GetGPUProcessID();
context_->flush();
return handle;
}
| 171,363 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: keepalived_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
bool report_stopped = true;
struct utsname uname_buf;
char *end;
/* Ensure time_now is set. We then don't have to check anywhere
* else if it is set. */
set_time_now();
/* Save command line options in case need to log them later */
save_cmd_line_options(argc, argv);
/* Init debugging level */
debug = 0;
/* We are the parent process */
#ifndef _DEBUG_
prog_type = PROG_TYPE_PARENT;
#endif
/* Initialise daemon_mode */
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
__set_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
__set_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
__set_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
#endif
/* Open log with default settings so we can log initially */
openlog(PACKAGE_NAME, LOG_PID, log_facility);
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_
mem_log_init(PACKAGE_NAME, "Parent process");
#endif
/* Some functionality depends on kernel version, so get the version here */
if (uname(&uname_buf))
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to get uname() information - error %d", errno);
else {
os_major = (unsigned)strtoul(uname_buf.release, &end, 10);
if (*end != '.')
os_major = 0;
else {
os_minor = (unsigned)strtoul(end + 1, &end, 10);
if (*end != '.')
os_major = 0;
else {
if (!isdigit(end[1]))
os_major = 0;
else
os_release = (unsigned)strtoul(end + 1, &end, 10);
}
}
if (!os_major)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to parse kernel version %s", uname_buf.release);
/* config_id defaults to hostname */
if (!config_id) {
end = strchrnul(uname_buf.nodename, '.');
config_id = MALLOC((size_t)(end - uname_buf.nodename) + 1);
strncpy(config_id, uname_buf.nodename, (size_t)(end - uname_buf.nodename));
config_id[end - uname_buf.nodename] = '\0';
}
}
/*
* Parse command line and set debug level.
* bits 0..7 reserved by main.c
*/
if (parse_cmdline(argc, argv)) {
closelog();
if (!__test_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug))
openlog(PACKAGE_NAME, LOG_PID | ((__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug)) ? LOG_CONS : 0) , log_facility);
}
if (__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug))
enable_console_log();
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Starting %s, git commit %s", version_string, GIT_COMMIT);
#else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Starting %s", version_string);
#endif
/* Handle any core file requirements */
core_dump_init();
if (os_major) {
if (KERNEL_VERSION(os_major, os_minor, os_release) < LINUX_VERSION_CODE) {
/* keepalived was build for a later kernel version */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "WARNING - keepalived was build for newer Linux %d.%d.%d, running on %s %s %s",
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff,
uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version);
} else {
/* keepalived was build for a later kernel version */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Running on %s %s %s (built for Linux %d.%d.%d)",
uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff);
}
}
#ifndef _DEBUG_
log_command_line(0);
#endif
/* Check we can read the configuration file(s).
NOTE: the working directory will be / if we
forked, but will be the current working directory
when keepalived was run if we haven't forked.
This means that if any config file names are not
absolute file names, the behaviour will be different
depending on whether we forked or not. */
if (!check_conf_file(conf_file)) {
if (__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug))
config_test_exit();
goto end;
}
global_data = alloc_global_data();
read_config_file();
init_global_data(global_data, NULL);
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (override_namespace) {
if (global_data->network_namespace) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Overriding config net_namespace '%s' with command line namespace '%s'", global_data->network_namespace, override_namespace);
FREE(global_data->network_namespace);
}
global_data->network_namespace = override_namespace;
override_namespace = NULL;
}
#endif
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug) &&
(global_data->instance_name
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
|| global_data->network_namespace
#endif
)) {
if ((syslog_ident = make_syslog_ident(PACKAGE_NAME))) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Changing syslog ident to %s", syslog_ident);
closelog();
openlog(syslog_ident, LOG_PID | ((__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug)) ? LOG_CONS : 0), log_facility);
}
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to change syslog ident");
use_pid_dir = true;
open_log_file(log_file_name,
NULL,
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
global_data->network_namespace,
#else
NULL,
#endif
global_data->instance_name);
}
/* Initialise pointer to child finding function */
set_child_finder_name(find_keepalived_child_name);
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
if (use_pid_dir) {
/* Create the directory for pid files */
create_pid_dir();
}
}
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (global_data->network_namespace) {
if (global_data->network_namespace && !set_namespaces(global_data->network_namespace)) {
log_message(LOG_ERR, "Unable to set network namespace %s - exiting", global_data->network_namespace);
goto end;
}
}
#endif
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
if (global_data->instance_name) {
if (!main_pidfile && (main_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_main_pidfile = true;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile && (checkers_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_checkers_pidfile = true;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile && (vrrp_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_vrrp_pidfile = true;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile && (bfd_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_bfd_pidfile = true;
#endif
}
if (use_pid_dir) {
if (!main_pidfile)
main_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile)
checkers_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile)
vrrp_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile)
bfd_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR BFD_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
}
else
{
if (!main_pidfile)
main_pidfile = PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile)
checkers_pidfile = PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile)
vrrp_pidfile = PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile)
bfd_pidfile = PID_DIR BFD_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
}
/* Check if keepalived is already running */
if (keepalived_running(daemon_mode)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "daemon is already running");
report_stopped = false;
goto end;
}
}
/* daemonize process */
if (!__test_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug) &&
xdaemon(false, false, true) > 0) {
closelog();
FREE_PTR(config_id);
FREE_PTR(orig_core_dump_pattern);
close_std_fd();
exit(0);
}
/* Set file creation mask */
umask(0);
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_
enable_mem_log_termination();
#endif
if (__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
validate_config();
config_test_exit();
}
/* write the father's pidfile */
if (!pidfile_write(main_pidfile, getpid()))
goto end;
/* Create the master thread */
master = thread_make_master();
/* Signal handling initialization */
signal_init();
/* Init daemon */
if (!start_keepalived())
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Warning - keepalived has no configuration to run");
initialise_debug_options();
#ifdef THREAD_DUMP
register_parent_thread_addresses();
#endif
/* Launch the scheduling I/O multiplexer */
launch_thread_scheduler(master);
/* Finish daemon process */
stop_keepalived();
#ifdef THREAD_DUMP
deregister_thread_addresses();
#endif
/*
* Reached when terminate signal catched.
* finally return from system
*/
end:
if (report_stopped) {
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Stopped %s, git commit %s", version_string, GIT_COMMIT);
#else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Stopped %s", version_string);
#endif
}
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (global_data && global_data->network_namespace)
clear_namespaces();
#endif
if (use_pid_dir)
remove_pid_dir();
/* Restore original core_pattern if necessary */
if (orig_core_dump_pattern)
update_core_dump_pattern(orig_core_dump_pattern);
free_parent_mallocs_startup(false);
free_parent_mallocs_exit();
free_global_data(global_data);
closelog();
#ifndef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
FREE_PTR(syslog_ident);
#else
if (syslog_ident)
free(syslog_ident);
#endif
close_std_fd();
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
keepalived_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
bool report_stopped = true;
struct utsname uname_buf;
char *end;
/* Ensure time_now is set. We then don't have to check anywhere
* else if it is set. */
set_time_now();
/* Save command line options in case need to log them later */
save_cmd_line_options(argc, argv);
/* Init debugging level */
debug = 0;
/* We are the parent process */
#ifndef _DEBUG_
prog_type = PROG_TYPE_PARENT;
#endif
/* Initialise daemon_mode */
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
__set_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
__set_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
__set_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
#endif
/* Set default file creation mask */
umask(022);
/* Open log with default settings so we can log initially */
openlog(PACKAGE_NAME, LOG_PID, log_facility);
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_
mem_log_init(PACKAGE_NAME, "Parent process");
#endif
/* Some functionality depends on kernel version, so get the version here */
if (uname(&uname_buf))
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to get uname() information - error %d", errno);
else {
os_major = (unsigned)strtoul(uname_buf.release, &end, 10);
if (*end != '.')
os_major = 0;
else {
os_minor = (unsigned)strtoul(end + 1, &end, 10);
if (*end != '.')
os_major = 0;
else {
if (!isdigit(end[1]))
os_major = 0;
else
os_release = (unsigned)strtoul(end + 1, &end, 10);
}
}
if (!os_major)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to parse kernel version %s", uname_buf.release);
/* config_id defaults to hostname */
if (!config_id) {
end = strchrnul(uname_buf.nodename, '.');
config_id = MALLOC((size_t)(end - uname_buf.nodename) + 1);
strncpy(config_id, uname_buf.nodename, (size_t)(end - uname_buf.nodename));
config_id[end - uname_buf.nodename] = '\0';
}
}
/*
* Parse command line and set debug level.
* bits 0..7 reserved by main.c
*/
if (parse_cmdline(argc, argv)) {
closelog();
if (!__test_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug))
openlog(PACKAGE_NAME, LOG_PID | ((__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug)) ? LOG_CONS : 0) , log_facility);
}
if (__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug))
enable_console_log();
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Starting %s, git commit %s", version_string, GIT_COMMIT);
#else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Starting %s", version_string);
#endif
/* Handle any core file requirements */
core_dump_init();
if (os_major) {
if (KERNEL_VERSION(os_major, os_minor, os_release) < LINUX_VERSION_CODE) {
/* keepalived was build for a later kernel version */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "WARNING - keepalived was build for newer Linux %d.%d.%d, running on %s %s %s",
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff,
uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version);
} else {
/* keepalived was build for a later kernel version */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Running on %s %s %s (built for Linux %d.%d.%d)",
uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff);
}
}
#ifndef _DEBUG_
log_command_line(0);
#endif
/* Check we can read the configuration file(s).
NOTE: the working directory will be / if we
forked, but will be the current working directory
when keepalived was run if we haven't forked.
This means that if any config file names are not
absolute file names, the behaviour will be different
depending on whether we forked or not. */
if (!check_conf_file(conf_file)) {
if (__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug))
config_test_exit();
goto end;
}
global_data = alloc_global_data();
global_data->umask = umask_val;
read_config_file();
init_global_data(global_data, NULL);
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (override_namespace) {
if (global_data->network_namespace) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Overriding config net_namespace '%s' with command line namespace '%s'", global_data->network_namespace, override_namespace);
FREE(global_data->network_namespace);
}
global_data->network_namespace = override_namespace;
override_namespace = NULL;
}
#endif
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug) &&
(global_data->instance_name
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
|| global_data->network_namespace
#endif
)) {
if ((syslog_ident = make_syslog_ident(PACKAGE_NAME))) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Changing syslog ident to %s", syslog_ident);
closelog();
openlog(syslog_ident, LOG_PID | ((__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug)) ? LOG_CONS : 0), log_facility);
}
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to change syslog ident");
use_pid_dir = true;
open_log_file(log_file_name,
NULL,
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
global_data->network_namespace,
#else
NULL,
#endif
global_data->instance_name);
}
/* Initialise pointer to child finding function */
set_child_finder_name(find_keepalived_child_name);
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
if (use_pid_dir) {
/* Create the directory for pid files */
create_pid_dir();
}
}
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (global_data->network_namespace) {
if (global_data->network_namespace && !set_namespaces(global_data->network_namespace)) {
log_message(LOG_ERR, "Unable to set network namespace %s - exiting", global_data->network_namespace);
goto end;
}
}
#endif
if (!__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
if (global_data->instance_name) {
if (!main_pidfile && (main_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_main_pidfile = true;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile && (checkers_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_checkers_pidfile = true;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile && (vrrp_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_vrrp_pidfile = true;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile && (bfd_pidfile = make_pidfile_name(KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE, global_data->instance_name, PID_EXTENSION)))
free_bfd_pidfile = true;
#endif
}
if (use_pid_dir) {
if (!main_pidfile)
main_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile)
checkers_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile)
vrrp_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile)
bfd_pidfile = KEEPALIVED_PID_DIR BFD_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
}
else
{
if (!main_pidfile)
main_pidfile = PID_DIR KEEPALIVED_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
if (!checkers_pidfile)
checkers_pidfile = PID_DIR CHECKERS_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
if (!vrrp_pidfile)
vrrp_pidfile = PID_DIR VRRP_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
if (!bfd_pidfile)
bfd_pidfile = PID_DIR BFD_PID_FILE PID_EXTENSION;
#endif
}
/* Check if keepalived is already running */
if (keepalived_running(daemon_mode)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "daemon is already running");
report_stopped = false;
goto end;
}
}
/* daemonize process */
if (!__test_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug) &&
xdaemon(false, false, true) > 0) {
closelog();
FREE_PTR(config_id);
FREE_PTR(orig_core_dump_pattern);
close_std_fd();
exit(0);
}
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_
enable_mem_log_termination();
#endif
if (__test_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug)) {
validate_config();
config_test_exit();
}
/* write the father's pidfile */
if (!pidfile_write(main_pidfile, getpid()))
goto end;
/* Create the master thread */
master = thread_make_master();
/* Signal handling initialization */
signal_init();
/* Init daemon */
if (!start_keepalived())
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Warning - keepalived has no configuration to run");
initialise_debug_options();
#ifdef THREAD_DUMP
register_parent_thread_addresses();
#endif
/* Launch the scheduling I/O multiplexer */
launch_thread_scheduler(master);
/* Finish daemon process */
stop_keepalived();
#ifdef THREAD_DUMP
deregister_thread_addresses();
#endif
/*
* Reached when terminate signal catched.
* finally return from system
*/
end:
if (report_stopped) {
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Stopped %s, git commit %s", version_string, GIT_COMMIT);
#else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Stopped %s", version_string);
#endif
}
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
if (global_data && global_data->network_namespace)
clear_namespaces();
#endif
if (use_pid_dir)
remove_pid_dir();
/* Restore original core_pattern if necessary */
if (orig_core_dump_pattern)
update_core_dump_pattern(orig_core_dump_pattern);
free_parent_mallocs_startup(false);
free_parent_mallocs_exit();
free_global_data(global_data);
closelog();
#ifndef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
FREE_PTR(syslog_ident);
#else
if (syslog_ident)
free(syslog_ident);
#endif
close_std_fd();
exit(KEEPALIVED_EXIT_OK);
}
| 168,982 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void *__ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct ns_common *ns)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = nsfs_mnt;
struct qstr qname = { .name = "", };
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
unsigned long d;
rcu_read_lock();
d = atomic_long_read(&ns->stashed);
if (!d)
goto slow;
dentry = (struct dentry *)d;
if (!lockref_get_not_dead(&dentry->d_lockref))
goto slow;
rcu_read_unlock();
ns->ops->put(ns);
got_it:
path->mnt = mntget(mnt);
path->dentry = dentry;
return NULL;
slow:
rcu_read_unlock();
inode = new_inode_pseudo(mnt->mnt_sb);
if (!inode) {
ns->ops->put(ns);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
inode->i_ino = ns->inum;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
inode->i_flags |= S_IMMUTABLE;
inode->i_mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUGO;
inode->i_fop = &ns_file_operations;
inode->i_private = ns;
dentry = d_alloc_pseudo(mnt->mnt_sb, &qname);
if (!dentry) {
iput(inode);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)ns->ops;
d = atomic_long_cmpxchg(&ns->stashed, 0, (unsigned long)dentry);
if (d) {
d_delete(dentry); /* make sure ->d_prune() does nothing */
dput(dentry);
cpu_relax();
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
goto got_it;
}
Commit Message: nsfs: mark dentry with DCACHE_RCUACCESS
Andrey reported a use-after-free in __ns_get_path():
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
lockref_get_not_dead+0x19/0x80 lib/lockref.c:179
__ns_get_path+0x197/0x860 fs/nsfs.c:66
open_related_ns+0xda/0x200 fs/nsfs.c:143
sock_ioctl+0x39d/0x440 net/socket.c:1001
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:45 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x1bf/0x1780 fs/ioctl.c:685
SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:700 [inline]
SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:691
We are under rcu read lock protection at that point:
rcu_read_lock();
d = atomic_long_read(&ns->stashed);
if (!d)
goto slow;
dentry = (struct dentry *)d;
if (!lockref_get_not_dead(&dentry->d_lockref))
goto slow;
rcu_read_unlock();
but don't use a proper RCU API on the free path, therefore a parallel
__d_free() could free it at the same time. We need to mark the stashed
dentry with DCACHE_RCUACCESS so that __d_free() will be called after all
readers leave RCU.
Fixes: e149ed2b805f ("take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs")
Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
|
static void *__ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct ns_common *ns)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = nsfs_mnt;
struct qstr qname = { .name = "", };
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
unsigned long d;
rcu_read_lock();
d = atomic_long_read(&ns->stashed);
if (!d)
goto slow;
dentry = (struct dentry *)d;
if (!lockref_get_not_dead(&dentry->d_lockref))
goto slow;
rcu_read_unlock();
ns->ops->put(ns);
got_it:
path->mnt = mntget(mnt);
path->dentry = dentry;
return NULL;
slow:
rcu_read_unlock();
inode = new_inode_pseudo(mnt->mnt_sb);
if (!inode) {
ns->ops->put(ns);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
inode->i_ino = ns->inum;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
inode->i_flags |= S_IMMUTABLE;
inode->i_mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUGO;
inode->i_fop = &ns_file_operations;
inode->i_private = ns;
dentry = d_alloc_pseudo(mnt->mnt_sb, &qname);
if (!dentry) {
iput(inode);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)ns->ops;
d = atomic_long_cmpxchg(&ns->stashed, 0, (unsigned long)dentry);
if (d) {
d_delete(dentry); /* make sure ->d_prune() does nothing */
dput(dentry);
cpu_relax();
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
goto got_it;
}
| 169,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: make_random_bytes(png_uint_32* seed, void* pv, size_t size)
{
png_uint_32 u0 = seed[0], u1 = seed[1];
png_bytep bytes = png_voidcast(png_bytep, pv);
/* There are thirty-three bits; the next bit in the sequence is bit-33 XOR
* bit-20. The top 1 bit is in u1, the bottom 32 are in u0.
*/
size_t i;
for (i=0; i<size; ++i)
{
/* First generate 8 new bits then shift them in at the end. */
png_uint_32 u = ((u0 >> (20-8)) ^ ((u1 << 7) | (u0 >> (32-7)))) & 0xff;
u1 <<= 8;
u1 |= u0 >> 24;
u0 <<= 8;
u0 |= u;
*bytes++ = (png_byte)u;
}
seed[0] = u0;
seed[1] = u1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
make_random_bytes(png_uint_32* seed, void* pv, size_t size)
{
png_uint_32 u0 = seed[0], u1 = seed[1];
png_bytep bytes = voidcast(png_bytep, pv);
/* There are thirty-three bits; the next bit in the sequence is bit-33 XOR
* bit-20. The top 1 bit is in u1, the bottom 32 are in u0.
*/
size_t i;
for (i=0; i<size; ++i)
{
/* First generate 8 new bits then shift them in at the end. */
png_uint_32 u = ((u0 >> (20-8)) ^ ((u1 << 7) | (u0 >> (32-7)))) & 0xff;
u1 <<= 8;
u1 |= u0 >> 24;
u0 <<= 8;
u0 |= u;
*bytes++ = (png_byte)u;
}
seed[0] = u0;
seed[1] = u1;
}
| 173,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void smp_proc_master_id(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, true);
STREAM_TO_UINT16(le_key.ediv, p);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(le_key.rand, p, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
/* store the encryption keys from peer device */
memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE*)&le_key, true);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add packet length check in smp_proc_master_id
Bug: 111937027
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1144c9879e84fa79d68ad9d5fece4f58e2a3b075
(cherry picked from commit c8294662d07a98e9b8b1cab1ab681ec0805ce4e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void smp_proc_master_id(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len < 11) { // 1(Code) + 2(EDIV) + 8(Rand)
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937027");
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid command length: %d, should be at least 11",
__func__, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len);
return;
}
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, true);
STREAM_TO_UINT16(le_key.ediv, p);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(le_key.rand, p, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
/* store the encryption keys from peer device */
memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE*)&le_key, true);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
| 174,076 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void _out_verify(conn_t out, nad_t nad) {
int attr, ns;
jid_t from, to;
conn_t in;
char *rkey;
int valid;
attr = nad_find_attr(nad, 0, -1, "from", NULL);
if(attr < 0 || (from = jid_new(NAD_AVAL(nad, attr), NAD_AVAL_L(nad, attr))) == NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "missing or invalid from on db verify packet");
nad_free(nad);
return;
}
attr = nad_find_attr(nad, 0, -1, "to", NULL);
if(attr < 0 || (to = jid_new(NAD_AVAL(nad, attr), NAD_AVAL_L(nad, attr))) == NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "missing or invalid to on db verify packet");
jid_free(from);
nad_free(nad);
return;
}
attr = nad_find_attr(nad, 0, -1, "id", NULL);
if(attr < 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "missing id on db verify packet");
jid_free(from);
jid_free(to);
nad_free(nad);
return;
}
/* get the incoming conn */
in = xhash_getx(out->s2s->in, NAD_AVAL(nad, attr), NAD_AVAL_L(nad, attr));
if(in == NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "got a verify for incoming conn %.*s, but it doesn't exist, dropping the packet", NAD_AVAL_L(nad, attr), NAD_AVAL(nad, attr));
jid_free(from);
jid_free(to);
nad_free(nad);
return;
}
rkey = s2s_route_key(NULL, to->domain, from->domain);
attr = nad_find_attr(nad, 0, -1, "type", "valid");
if(attr >= 0) {
xhash_put(in->states, pstrdup(xhash_pool(in->states), rkey), (void *) conn_VALID);
log_write(in->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] incoming route '%s' is now valid%s%s", in->fd->fd, in->ip, in->port, rkey, (in->s->flags & SX_SSL_WRAPPER) ? ", TLS negotiated" : "", in->s->compressed ? ", ZLIB compression enabled" : "");
valid = 1;
} else {
log_write(in->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] incoming route '%s' is now invalid", in->fd->fd, in->ip, in->port, rkey);
valid = 0;
}
free(rkey);
nad_free(nad);
/* decrement outstanding verify counter */
--out->verify;
/* let them know what happened */
nad = nad_new();
ns = nad_add_namespace(nad, uri_DIALBACK, "db");
nad_append_elem(nad, ns, "result", 0);
nad_append_attr(nad, -1, "to", from->domain);
nad_append_attr(nad, -1, "from", to->domain);
nad_append_attr(nad, -1, "type", valid ? "valid" : "invalid");
/* off it goes */
sx_nad_write(in->s, nad);
/* if invalid, close the stream */
if (!valid) {
/* generate stream error */
sx_error(in->s, stream_err_INVALID_ID, "dialback negotiation failed");
/* close the incoming stream */
sx_close(in->s);
}
jid_free(from);
jid_free(to);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static void _out_verify(conn_t out, nad_t nad) {
int attr, ns;
jid_t from, to;
conn_t in;
char *rkey;
int valid;
attr = nad_find_attr(nad, 0, -1, "from", NULL);
if(attr < 0 || (from = jid_new(NAD_AVAL(nad, attr), NAD_AVAL_L(nad, attr))) == NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "missing or invalid from on db verify packet");
nad_free(nad);
return;
}
attr = nad_find_attr(nad, 0, -1, "to", NULL);
if(attr < 0 || (to = jid_new(NAD_AVAL(nad, attr), NAD_AVAL_L(nad, attr))) == NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "missing or invalid to on db verify packet");
jid_free(from);
nad_free(nad);
return;
}
attr = nad_find_attr(nad, 0, -1, "id", NULL);
if(attr < 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "missing id on db verify packet");
jid_free(from);
jid_free(to);
nad_free(nad);
return;
}
/* get the incoming conn */
in = xhash_getx(out->s2s->in, NAD_AVAL(nad, attr), NAD_AVAL_L(nad, attr));
if(in == NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "got a verify for incoming conn %.*s, but it doesn't exist, dropping the packet", NAD_AVAL_L(nad, attr), NAD_AVAL(nad, attr));
jid_free(from);
jid_free(to);
nad_free(nad);
return;
}
rkey = s2s_route_key(NULL, to->domain, from->domain);
attr = nad_find_attr(nad, 0, -1, "type", "valid");
if(attr >= 0 && xhash_get(in->states, rkey) == (void*) conn_INPROGRESS) {
xhash_put(in->states, pstrdup(xhash_pool(in->states), rkey), (void *) conn_VALID);
log_write(in->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] incoming route '%s' is now valid%s%s", in->fd->fd, in->ip, in->port, rkey, (in->s->flags & SX_SSL_WRAPPER) ? ", TLS negotiated" : "", in->s->compressed ? ", ZLIB compression enabled" : "");
valid = 1;
} else {
log_write(in->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] incoming route '%s' is now invalid", in->fd->fd, in->ip, in->port, rkey);
valid = 0;
}
free(rkey);
nad_free(nad);
/* decrement outstanding verify counter */
--out->verify;
/* let them know what happened */
nad = nad_new();
ns = nad_add_namespace(nad, uri_DIALBACK, "db");
nad_append_elem(nad, ns, "result", 0);
nad_append_attr(nad, -1, "to", from->domain);
nad_append_attr(nad, -1, "from", to->domain);
nad_append_attr(nad, -1, "type", valid ? "valid" : "invalid");
/* off it goes */
sx_nad_write(in->s, nad);
/* if invalid, close the stream */
if (!valid) {
/* generate stream error */
sx_error(in->s, stream_err_INVALID_ID, "dialback negotiation failed");
/* close the incoming stream */
sx_close(in->s);
}
jid_free(from);
jid_free(to);
}
| 165,577 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: main (int argc,
char **argv)
{
mode_t old_umask;
cleanup_free char *base_path = NULL;
int clone_flags;
char *old_cwd = NULL;
pid_t pid;
int event_fd = -1;
int child_wait_fd = -1;
const char *new_cwd;
uid_t ns_uid;
gid_t ns_gid;
struct stat sbuf;
uint64_t val;
int res UNUSED;
real_uid = getuid ();
real_gid = getgid ();
/* Get the (optional) privileges we need */
acquire_privs ();
/* Never gain any more privs during exec */
if (prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_CAPS) failed");
/* The initial code is run with high permissions
(i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so take lots of care. */
read_overflowids ();
argv0 = argv[0];
if (isatty (1))
host_tty_dev = ttyname (1);
argv++;
argc--;
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
parse_args (&argc, &argv);
/* We have to do this if we weren't installed setuid (and we're not
* root), so let's just DWIM */
if (!is_privileged && getuid () != 0)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
if (opt_unshare_user_try &&
stat ("/proc/self/ns/user", &sbuf) == 0)
{
bool disabled = FALSE;
/* RHEL7 has a kernel module parameter that lets you enable user namespaces */
if (stat ("/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable", &sbuf) == 0)
{
cleanup_free char *enable = NULL;
enable = load_file_at (AT_FDCWD, "/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable");
if (enable != NULL && enable[0] == 'N')
disabled = TRUE;
}
/* Debian lets you disable *unprivileged* user namespaces. However this is not
a problem if we're privileged, and if we're not opt_unshare_user is TRUE
already, and there is not much we can do, its just a non-working setup. */
if (!disabled)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
}
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
__debug__ (("Creating root mount point\n"));
if (opt_sandbox_uid == -1)
opt_sandbox_uid = real_uid;
if (opt_sandbox_gid == -1)
opt_sandbox_gid = real_gid;
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_uid != real_uid)
die ("Specifying --uid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_gid != real_gid)
die ("Specifying --gid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_uts && opt_sandbox_hostname != NULL)
die ("Specifying --hostname requires --unshare-uts");
/* We need to read stuff from proc during the pivot_root dance, etc.
Lets keep a fd to it open */
proc_fd = open ("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_PATH);
if (proc_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't open /proc");
/* We need *some* mountpoint where we can mount the root tmpfs.
We first try in /run, and if that fails, try in /tmp. */
base_path = xasprintf ("/run/user/%d/.bubblewrap", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
{
free (base_path);
base_path = xasprintf ("/tmp/.bubblewrap-%d", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
die_with_error ("Creating root mountpoint failed");
}
__debug__ (("creating new namespace\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid)
{
event_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC | EFD_NONBLOCK);
if (event_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
}
/* We block sigchild here so that we can use signalfd in the monitor. */
block_sigchild ();
clone_flags = SIGCHLD | CLONE_NEWNS;
if (opt_unshare_user)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
if (opt_unshare_pid)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;
if (opt_unshare_net)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;
if (opt_unshare_ipc)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWIPC;
if (opt_unshare_uts)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUTS;
if (opt_unshare_cgroup)
{
if (stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
die ("Cannot create new cgroup namespace because the kernel does not support it");
else
die_with_error ("stat on /proc/self/ns/cgroup failed");
}
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
}
if (opt_unshare_cgroup_try)
if (!stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
child_wait_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC);
if (child_wait_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
pid = raw_clone (clone_flags, NULL);
if (pid == -1)
{
if (opt_unshare_user)
{
if (errno == EINVAL)
die ("Creating new namespace failed, likely because the kernel does not support user namespaces. bwrap must be installed setuid on such systems.");
else if (errno == EPERM && !is_privileged)
die ("No permissions to creating new namespace, likely because the kernel does not allow non-privileged user namespaces. On e.g. debian this can be enabled with 'sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1'.");
}
die_with_error ("Creating new namespace failed");
}
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Parent, outside sandbox, privileged (initially) */
if (is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* We're running as euid 0, but the uid we want to map is
* not 0. This means we're not allowed to write this from
* the child user namespace, so we do it from the parent.
*
* Also, we map uid/gid 0 in the namespace (to overflowuid)
* if opt_needs_devpts is true, because otherwise the mount
* of devpts fails due to root not being mapped.
*/
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
pid, TRUE, opt_needs_devpts);
}
/* Initial launched process, wait for exec:ed command to exit */
/* We don't need any privileges in the launcher, drop them immediately. */
drop_privs ();
/* Let child run now that the uid maps are set up */
val = 1;
res = write (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
/* Ignore res, if e.g. the child died and closed child_wait_fd we don't want to error out here */
close (child_wait_fd);
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *output = xasprintf ("{\n \"child-pid\": %i\n}\n", pid);
size_t len = strlen (output);
if (write (opt_info_fd, output, len) != len)
die_with_error ("Write to info_fd");
close (opt_info_fd);
}
monitor_child (event_fd);
exit (0); /* Should not be reached, but better safe... */
}
/* Child, in sandbox, privileged in the parent or in the user namespace (if --unshare-user).
*
* Note that for user namespaces we run as euid 0 during clone(), so
* the child user namespace is owned by euid 0., This means that the
* regular user namespace parent (with uid != 0) doesn't have any
* capabilities in it, which is nice as we can't exploit those. In
* particular the parent user namespace doesn't have CAP_PTRACE
* which would otherwise allow the parent to hijack of the child
* after this point.
*
* Unfortunately this also means you can't ptrace the final
* sandboxed process from outside the sandbox either.
*/
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
close (opt_info_fd);
/* Wait for the parent to init uid/gid maps and drop caps */
res = read (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
close (child_wait_fd);
/* At this point we can completely drop root uid, but retain the
* required permitted caps. This allow us to do full setup as
* the user uid, which makes e.g. fuse access work.
*/
switch_to_user_with_privs ();
if (opt_unshare_net && loopback_setup () != 0)
die ("Can't create loopback device");
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (!is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* In the unprivileged case we have to write the uid/gid maps in
* the child, because we have no caps in the parent */
if (opt_needs_devpts)
{
/* This is a bit hacky, but we need to first map the real uid/gid to
0, otherwise we can't mount the devpts filesystem because root is
not mapped. Later we will create another child user namespace and
map back to the real uid */
ns_uid = 0;
ns_gid = 0;
}
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
-1, TRUE, FALSE);
}
old_umask = umask (0);
/* Need to do this before the chroot, but after we're the real uid */
resolve_symlinks_in_ops ();
/* Mark everything as slave, so that we still
* receive mounts from the real root, but don't
* propagate mounts to the real root. */
if (mount (NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make / slave");
/* Create a tmpfs which we will use as / in the namespace */
if (mount ("", base_path, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV | MS_NOSUID, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to mount tmpfs");
old_cwd = get_current_dir_name ();
/* Chdir to the new root tmpfs mount. This will be the CWD during
the entire setup. Access old or new root via "oldroot" and "newroot". */
if (chdir (base_path) != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir base_path");
/* We create a subdir "$base_path/newroot" for the new root, that
* way we can pivot_root to base_path, and put the old root at
* "$base_path/oldroot". This avoids problems accessing the oldroot
* dir if the user requested to bind mount something over / */
if (mkdir ("newroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating newroot failed");
if (mkdir ("oldroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating oldroot failed");
if (pivot_root (base_path, "oldroot"))
die_with_error ("pivot_root");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir / (base path)");
if (is_privileged)
{
pid_t child;
int privsep_sockets[2];
if (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, privsep_sockets) != 0)
die_with_error ("Can't create privsep socket");
child = fork ();
if (child == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork unprivileged helper");
if (child == 0)
{
/* Unprivileged setup process */
drop_privs ();
close (privsep_sockets[0]);
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, privsep_sockets[1]);
exit (0);
}
else
{
int status;
uint32_t buffer[2048]; /* 8k, but is int32 to guarantee nice alignment */
uint32_t op, flags;
const char *arg1, *arg2;
cleanup_fd int unpriv_socket = -1;
unpriv_socket = privsep_sockets[0];
close (privsep_sockets[1]);
do
{
op = read_priv_sec_op (unpriv_socket, buffer, sizeof (buffer),
&flags, &arg1, &arg2);
privileged_op (-1, op, flags, arg1, arg2);
if (write (unpriv_socket, buffer, 1) != 1)
die ("Can't write to op_socket");
}
while (op != PRIV_SEP_OP_DONE);
waitpid (child, &status, 0);
/* Continue post setup */
}
}
else
{
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, -1);
}
/* The old root better be rprivate or we will send unmount events to the parent namespace */
if (mount ("oldroot", "oldroot", NULL, MS_REC | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make old root rprivate");
if (umount2 ("oldroot", MNT_DETACH))
die_with_error ("unmount old root");
if (opt_unshare_user &&
(ns_uid != opt_sandbox_uid || ns_gid != opt_sandbox_gid))
{
/* Now that devpts is mounted and we've no need for mount
permissions we can create a new userspace and map our uid
1:1 */
if (unshare (CLONE_NEWUSER))
die_with_error ("unshare user ns");
write_uid_gid_map (opt_sandbox_uid, ns_uid,
opt_sandbox_gid, ns_gid,
-1, FALSE, FALSE);
}
/* Now make /newroot the real root */
if (chdir ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir newroot");
if (chroot ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chroot /newroot");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir /");
/* All privileged ops are done now, so drop it */
drop_privs ();
if (opt_block_fd != -1)
{
char b[1];
read (opt_block_fd, b, 1);
close (opt_block_fd);
}
if (opt_seccomp_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *seccomp_data = NULL;
size_t seccomp_len;
struct sock_fprog prog;
seccomp_data = load_file_data (opt_seccomp_fd, &seccomp_len);
if (seccomp_data == NULL)
die_with_error ("Can't read seccomp data");
if (seccomp_len % 8 != 0)
die ("Invalid seccomp data, must be multiple of 8");
prog.len = seccomp_len / 8;
prog.filter = (struct sock_filter *) seccomp_data;
close (opt_seccomp_fd);
if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) != 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
}
umask (old_umask);
new_cwd = "/";
if (opt_chdir_path)
{
if (chdir (opt_chdir_path))
die_with_error ("Can't chdir to %s", opt_chdir_path);
new_cwd = opt_chdir_path;
}
else if (chdir (old_cwd) == 0)
{
/* If the old cwd is mapped in the sandbox, go there */
new_cwd = old_cwd;
}
else
{
/* If the old cwd is not mapped, go to home */
const char *home = getenv ("HOME");
if (home != NULL &&
chdir (home) == 0)
new_cwd = home;
}
xsetenv ("PWD", new_cwd, 1);
free (old_cwd);
__debug__ (("forking for child\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid || lock_files != NULL || opt_sync_fd != -1)
{
/* We have to have a pid 1 in the pid namespace, because
* otherwise we'll get a bunch of zombies as nothing reaps
* them. Alternatively if we're using sync_fd or lock_files we
* need some process to own these.
*/
pid = fork ();
if (pid == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork for pid 1");
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Close fds in pid 1, except stdio and optionally event_fd
(for syncing pid 2 lifetime with monitor_child) and
opt_sync_fd (for syncing sandbox lifetime with outside
process).
Any other fds will been passed on to the child though. */
{
int dont_close[3];
int j = 0;
if (event_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = event_fd;
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = opt_sync_fd;
dont_close[j++] = -1;
fdwalk (proc_fd, close_extra_fds, dont_close);
}
return do_init (event_fd, pid);
}
}
__debug__ (("launch executable %s\n", argv[0]));
if (proc_fd != -1)
close (proc_fd);
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
close (opt_sync_fd);
/* We want sigchild in the child */
unblock_sigchild ();
if (label_exec (opt_exec_label) == -1)
die_with_error ("label_exec %s", argv[0]);
if (execvp (argv[0], argv) == -1)
die_with_error ("execvp %s", argv[0]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
main (int argc,
char **argv)
{
mode_t old_umask;
cleanup_free char *base_path = NULL;
int clone_flags;
char *old_cwd = NULL;
pid_t pid;
int event_fd = -1;
int child_wait_fd = -1;
const char *new_cwd;
uid_t ns_uid;
gid_t ns_gid;
struct stat sbuf;
uint64_t val;
int res UNUSED;
real_uid = getuid ();
real_gid = getgid ();
/* Get the (optional) privileges we need */
acquire_privs ();
/* Never gain any more privs during exec */
if (prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_CAPS) failed");
/* The initial code is run with high permissions
(i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so take lots of care. */
read_overflowids ();
argv0 = argv[0];
if (isatty (1))
host_tty_dev = ttyname (1);
argv++;
argc--;
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
parse_args (&argc, &argv);
/* We have to do this if we weren't installed setuid (and we're not
* root), so let's just DWIM */
if (!is_privileged && getuid () != 0)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
if (opt_unshare_user_try &&
stat ("/proc/self/ns/user", &sbuf) == 0)
{
bool disabled = FALSE;
/* RHEL7 has a kernel module parameter that lets you enable user namespaces */
if (stat ("/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable", &sbuf) == 0)
{
cleanup_free char *enable = NULL;
enable = load_file_at (AT_FDCWD, "/sys/module/user_namespace/parameters/enable");
if (enable != NULL && enable[0] == 'N')
disabled = TRUE;
}
/* Debian lets you disable *unprivileged* user namespaces. However this is not
a problem if we're privileged, and if we're not opt_unshare_user is TRUE
already, and there is not much we can do, its just a non-working setup. */
if (!disabled)
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
}
if (argc == 0)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE, stderr);
__debug__ (("Creating root mount point\n"));
if (opt_sandbox_uid == -1)
opt_sandbox_uid = real_uid;
if (opt_sandbox_gid == -1)
opt_sandbox_gid = real_gid;
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_uid != real_uid)
die ("Specifying --uid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_user && opt_sandbox_gid != real_gid)
die ("Specifying --gid requires --unshare-user");
if (!opt_unshare_uts && opt_sandbox_hostname != NULL)
die ("Specifying --hostname requires --unshare-uts");
/* We need to read stuff from proc during the pivot_root dance, etc.
Lets keep a fd to it open */
proc_fd = open ("/proc", O_RDONLY | O_PATH);
if (proc_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't open /proc");
/* We need *some* mountpoint where we can mount the root tmpfs.
We first try in /run, and if that fails, try in /tmp. */
base_path = xasprintf ("/run/user/%d/.bubblewrap", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
{
free (base_path);
base_path = xasprintf ("/tmp/.bubblewrap-%d", real_uid);
if (mkdir (base_path, 0755) && errno != EEXIST)
die_with_error ("Creating root mountpoint failed");
}
__debug__ (("creating new namespace\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid)
{
event_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC | EFD_NONBLOCK);
if (event_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
}
/* We block sigchild here so that we can use signalfd in the monitor. */
block_sigchild ();
clone_flags = SIGCHLD | CLONE_NEWNS;
if (opt_unshare_user)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
if (opt_unshare_pid)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;
if (opt_unshare_net)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;
if (opt_unshare_ipc)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWIPC;
if (opt_unshare_uts)
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWUTS;
if (opt_unshare_cgroup)
{
if (stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
die ("Cannot create new cgroup namespace because the kernel does not support it");
else
die_with_error ("stat on /proc/self/ns/cgroup failed");
}
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
}
if (opt_unshare_cgroup_try)
if (!stat ("/proc/self/ns/cgroup", &sbuf))
clone_flags |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
child_wait_fd = eventfd (0, EFD_CLOEXEC);
if (child_wait_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("eventfd()");
pid = raw_clone (clone_flags, NULL);
if (pid == -1)
{
if (opt_unshare_user)
{
if (errno == EINVAL)
die ("Creating new namespace failed, likely because the kernel does not support user namespaces. bwrap must be installed setuid on such systems.");
else if (errno == EPERM && !is_privileged)
die ("No permissions to creating new namespace, likely because the kernel does not allow non-privileged user namespaces. On e.g. debian this can be enabled with 'sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1'.");
}
die_with_error ("Creating new namespace failed");
}
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Parent, outside sandbox, privileged (initially) */
if (is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* We're running as euid 0, but the uid we want to map is
* not 0. This means we're not allowed to write this from
* the child user namespace, so we do it from the parent.
*
* Also, we map uid/gid 0 in the namespace (to overflowuid)
* if opt_needs_devpts is true, because otherwise the mount
* of devpts fails due to root not being mapped.
*/
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
pid, TRUE, opt_needs_devpts);
}
/* Initial launched process, wait for exec:ed command to exit */
/* We don't need any privileges in the launcher, drop them immediately. */
drop_privs ();
/* Let child run now that the uid maps are set up */
val = 1;
res = write (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
/* Ignore res, if e.g. the child died and closed child_wait_fd we don't want to error out here */
close (child_wait_fd);
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *output = xasprintf ("{\n \"child-pid\": %i\n}\n", pid);
size_t len = strlen (output);
if (write (opt_info_fd, output, len) != len)
die_with_error ("Write to info_fd");
close (opt_info_fd);
}
monitor_child (event_fd);
exit (0); /* Should not be reached, but better safe... */
}
/* Child, in sandbox, privileged in the parent or in the user namespace (if --unshare-user).
*
* Note that for user namespaces we run as euid 0 during clone(), so
* the child user namespace is owned by euid 0., This means that the
* regular user namespace parent (with uid != 0) doesn't have any
* capabilities in it, which is nice as we can't exploit those. In
* particular the parent user namespace doesn't have CAP_PTRACE
* which would otherwise allow the parent to hijack of the child
* after this point.
*
* Unfortunately this also means you can't ptrace the final
* sandboxed process from outside the sandbox either.
*/
if (opt_info_fd != -1)
close (opt_info_fd);
/* Wait for the parent to init uid/gid maps and drop caps */
res = read (child_wait_fd, &val, 8);
close (child_wait_fd);
/* At this point we can completely drop root uid, but retain the
* required permitted caps. This allow us to do full setup as
* the user uid, which makes e.g. fuse access work.
*/
switch_to_user_with_privs ();
if (opt_unshare_net && loopback_setup () != 0)
die ("Can't create loopback device");
ns_uid = opt_sandbox_uid;
ns_gid = opt_sandbox_gid;
if (!is_privileged && opt_unshare_user)
{
/* In the unprivileged case we have to write the uid/gid maps in
* the child, because we have no caps in the parent */
if (opt_needs_devpts)
{
/* This is a bit hacky, but we need to first map the real uid/gid to
0, otherwise we can't mount the devpts filesystem because root is
not mapped. Later we will create another child user namespace and
map back to the real uid */
ns_uid = 0;
ns_gid = 0;
}
write_uid_gid_map (ns_uid, real_uid,
ns_gid, real_gid,
-1, TRUE, FALSE);
}
old_umask = umask (0);
/* Need to do this before the chroot, but after we're the real uid */
resolve_symlinks_in_ops ();
/* Mark everything as slave, so that we still
* receive mounts from the real root, but don't
* propagate mounts to the real root. */
if (mount (NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make / slave");
/* Create a tmpfs which we will use as / in the namespace */
if (mount ("", base_path, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV | MS_NOSUID, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to mount tmpfs");
old_cwd = get_current_dir_name ();
/* Chdir to the new root tmpfs mount. This will be the CWD during
the entire setup. Access old or new root via "oldroot" and "newroot". */
if (chdir (base_path) != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir base_path");
/* We create a subdir "$base_path/newroot" for the new root, that
* way we can pivot_root to base_path, and put the old root at
* "$base_path/oldroot". This avoids problems accessing the oldroot
* dir if the user requested to bind mount something over / */
if (mkdir ("newroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating newroot failed");
if (mkdir ("oldroot", 0755))
die_with_error ("Creating oldroot failed");
if (pivot_root (base_path, "oldroot"))
die_with_error ("pivot_root");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir / (base path)");
if (is_privileged)
{
pid_t child;
int privsep_sockets[2];
if (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, privsep_sockets) != 0)
die_with_error ("Can't create privsep socket");
child = fork ();
if (child == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork unprivileged helper");
if (child == 0)
{
/* Unprivileged setup process */
drop_privs ();
close (privsep_sockets[0]);
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, privsep_sockets[1]);
exit (0);
}
else
{
int status;
uint32_t buffer[2048]; /* 8k, but is int32 to guarantee nice alignment */
uint32_t op, flags;
const char *arg1, *arg2;
cleanup_fd int unpriv_socket = -1;
unpriv_socket = privsep_sockets[0];
close (privsep_sockets[1]);
do
{
op = read_priv_sec_op (unpriv_socket, buffer, sizeof (buffer),
&flags, &arg1, &arg2);
privileged_op (-1, op, flags, arg1, arg2);
if (write (unpriv_socket, buffer, 1) != 1)
die ("Can't write to op_socket");
}
while (op != PRIV_SEP_OP_DONE);
waitpid (child, &status, 0);
/* Continue post setup */
}
}
else
{
setup_newroot (opt_unshare_pid, -1);
}
/* The old root better be rprivate or we will send unmount events to the parent namespace */
if (mount ("oldroot", "oldroot", NULL, MS_REC | MS_PRIVATE, NULL) != 0)
die_with_error ("Failed to make old root rprivate");
if (umount2 ("oldroot", MNT_DETACH))
die_with_error ("unmount old root");
if (opt_unshare_user &&
(ns_uid != opt_sandbox_uid || ns_gid != opt_sandbox_gid))
{
/* Now that devpts is mounted and we've no need for mount
permissions we can create a new userspace and map our uid
1:1 */
if (unshare (CLONE_NEWUSER))
die_with_error ("unshare user ns");
write_uid_gid_map (opt_sandbox_uid, ns_uid,
opt_sandbox_gid, ns_gid,
-1, FALSE, FALSE);
}
/* Now make /newroot the real root */
if (chdir ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir newroot");
if (chroot ("/newroot") != 0)
die_with_error ("chroot /newroot");
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
die_with_error ("chdir /");
/* All privileged ops are done now, so drop it */
drop_privs ();
if (opt_block_fd != -1)
{
char b[1];
read (opt_block_fd, b, 1);
close (opt_block_fd);
}
if (opt_seccomp_fd != -1)
{
cleanup_free char *seccomp_data = NULL;
size_t seccomp_len;
struct sock_fprog prog;
seccomp_data = load_file_data (opt_seccomp_fd, &seccomp_len);
if (seccomp_data == NULL)
die_with_error ("Can't read seccomp data");
if (seccomp_len % 8 != 0)
die ("Invalid seccomp data, must be multiple of 8");
prog.len = seccomp_len / 8;
prog.filter = (struct sock_filter *) seccomp_data;
close (opt_seccomp_fd);
if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog) != 0)
die_with_error ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
}
umask (old_umask);
new_cwd = "/";
if (opt_chdir_path)
{
if (chdir (opt_chdir_path))
die_with_error ("Can't chdir to %s", opt_chdir_path);
new_cwd = opt_chdir_path;
}
else if (chdir (old_cwd) == 0)
{
/* If the old cwd is mapped in the sandbox, go there */
new_cwd = old_cwd;
}
else
{
/* If the old cwd is not mapped, go to home */
const char *home = getenv ("HOME");
if (home != NULL &&
chdir (home) == 0)
new_cwd = home;
}
xsetenv ("PWD", new_cwd, 1);
free (old_cwd);
__debug__ (("forking for child\n"));
if (opt_unshare_pid || lock_files != NULL || opt_sync_fd != -1)
{
/* We have to have a pid 1 in the pid namespace, because
* otherwise we'll get a bunch of zombies as nothing reaps
* them. Alternatively if we're using sync_fd or lock_files we
* need some process to own these.
*/
pid = fork ();
if (pid == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't fork for pid 1");
if (pid != 0)
{
/* Close fds in pid 1, except stdio and optionally event_fd
(for syncing pid 2 lifetime with monitor_child) and
opt_sync_fd (for syncing sandbox lifetime with outside
process).
Any other fds will been passed on to the child though. */
{
int dont_close[3];
int j = 0;
if (event_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = event_fd;
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = opt_sync_fd;
dont_close[j++] = -1;
fdwalk (proc_fd, close_extra_fds, dont_close);
}
return do_init (event_fd, pid);
}
}
__debug__ (("launch executable %s\n", argv[0]));
if (proc_fd != -1)
close (proc_fd);
if (opt_sync_fd != -1)
close (opt_sync_fd);
/* We want sigchild in the child */
unblock_sigchild ();
if (setsid () == (pid_t) -1)
die_with_error ("setsid");
if (label_exec (opt_exec_label) == -1)
die_with_error ("label_exec %s", argv[0]);
if (execvp (argv[0], argv) == -1)
die_with_error ("execvp %s", argv[0]);
return 0;
}
| 168,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation(
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation) {
OperationID id = next_operation_id_++;
operations_.emplace(id, std::move(operation));
return id;
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190
|
OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation(
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation) {
OperationID id = next_operation_id_++;
operations_[id] = std::move(operation);
return id;
}
| 173,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: accept_ice_connection (GIOChannel *source,
GIOCondition condition,
GsmIceConnectionData *data)
{
IceListenObj listener;
IceConn ice_conn;
IceAcceptStatus status;
GsmClient *client;
GsmXsmpServer *server;
listener = data->listener;
server = data->server;
g_debug ("GsmXsmpServer: accept_ice_connection()");
ice_conn = IceAcceptConnection (listener, &status);
if (status != IceAcceptSuccess) {
g_debug ("GsmXsmpServer: IceAcceptConnection returned %d", status);
return TRUE;
}
client = gsm_xsmp_client_new (ice_conn);
ice_conn->context = client;
gsm_store_add (server->priv->client_store, gsm_client_peek_id (client), G_OBJECT (client));
/* the store will own the ref */
g_object_unref (client);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835
|
accept_ice_connection (GIOChannel *source,
GIOCondition condition,
GsmIceConnectionData *data)
{
IceConn ice_conn;
IceAcceptStatus status;
g_debug ("GsmXsmpServer: accept_ice_connection()");
ice_conn = IceAcceptConnection (data->listener, &status);
if (status != IceAcceptSuccess) {
g_debug ("GsmXsmpServer: IceAcceptConnection returned %d", status);
return TRUE;
}
auth_ice_connection (ice_conn);
return TRUE;
}
| 168,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
if (!GetTabEntry(contents->web_contents())) {
return;
}
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args(new ListValue());
args->Append(Value::CreateIntegerValue(
ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents->web_contents())));
DictionaryValue* object_args = new DictionaryValue();
object_args->Set(tab_keys::kOldWindowIdKey, Value::CreateIntegerValue(
ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowIdOfTab(contents->web_contents())));
object_args->Set(tab_keys::kOldPositionKey, Value::CreateIntegerValue(
index));
args->Append(object_args);
DispatchEvent(contents->profile(), events::kOnTabDetached, args.Pass(),
EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_UNKNOWN);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
void BrowserEventRouter::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents, int index) {
void BrowserEventRouter::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents, int index) {
if (!GetTabEntry(contents)) {
return;
}
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args(new ListValue());
args->Append(Value::CreateIntegerValue(ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents)));
DictionaryValue* object_args = new DictionaryValue();
object_args->Set(tab_keys::kOldWindowIdKey, Value::CreateIntegerValue(
ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowIdOfTab(contents)));
object_args->Set(tab_keys::kOldPositionKey, Value::CreateIntegerValue(
index));
args->Append(object_args);
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
DispatchEvent(profile, events::kOnTabDetached, args.Pass(),
EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_UNKNOWN);
}
| 171,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int perf_swevent_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int event_id = event->attr.config;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
return -ENOENT;
/*
* no branch sampling for software events
*/
if (has_branch_stack(event))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
switch (event_id) {
case PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK:
case PERF_COUNT_SW_TASK_CLOCK:
return -ENOENT;
default:
break;
}
if (event_id >= PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX)
return -ENOENT;
if (!event->parent) {
int err;
err = swevent_hlist_get(event);
if (err)
return err;
static_key_slow_inc(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id]);
event->destroy = sw_perf_event_destroy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static int perf_swevent_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 event_id = event->attr.config;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
return -ENOENT;
/*
* no branch sampling for software events
*/
if (has_branch_stack(event))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
switch (event_id) {
case PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK:
case PERF_COUNT_SW_TASK_CLOCK:
return -ENOENT;
default:
break;
}
if (event_id >= PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX)
return -ENOENT;
if (!event->parent) {
int err;
err = swevent_hlist_get(event);
if (err)
return err;
static_key_slow_inc(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id]);
event->destroy = sw_perf_event_destroy;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void ForeignSessionHelper::SetInvalidationsForSessionsEnabled(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
jboolean enabled) {
browser_sync::ProfileSyncService* service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetInstance()->GetForProfile(profile_);
if (!service)
return;
service->SetInvalidationsForSessionsEnabled(enabled);
}
Commit Message: Prefer SyncService over ProfileSyncService in foreign_session_helper
SyncService is the interface, ProfileSyncService is the concrete
implementation. Generally no clients should need to use the conrete
implementation - for one, testing will be much easier once everyone
uses the interface only.
Bug: 924508
Change-Id: Ia210665f8f02512053d1a60d627dea0f22758387
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1461119
Auto-Submit: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yaron Friedman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630662}
CWE ID: CWE-254
|
void ForeignSessionHelper::SetInvalidationsForSessionsEnabled(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
jboolean enabled) {
syncer::SyncService* service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetSyncServiceForProfile(profile_);
if (!service)
return;
service->SetInvalidationsForSessionsEnabled(enabled);
}
| 172,058 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
{
u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct msg_register_event *emsg;
int len;
emsg = (struct msg_register_event *) buf;
len = sizeof (struct msg_register_event) +
filter->num_areas * sizeof (struct in_addr);
emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
new_msg_register_event (u_int32_t seqnum, struct lsa_filter_type *filter)
{
u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct msg_register_event *emsg;
int len;
emsg = (struct msg_register_event *) buf;
len = sizeof (struct msg_register_event) +
filter->num_areas * sizeof (struct in_addr);
emsg->filter.typemask = htons (filter->typemask);
emsg->filter.origin = filter->origin;
emsg->filter.num_areas = filter->num_areas;
if (len > sizeof (buf))
len = sizeof(buf);
/* API broken - missing memcpy to fill data */
return msg_new (MSG_REGISTER_EVENT, emsg, seqnum, len);
}
| 164,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int vp8_lossy_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVFrame *p,
int *got_frame, uint8_t *data_start,
unsigned int data_size)
{
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
AVPacket pkt;
int ret;
if (!s->initialized) {
ff_vp8_decode_init(avctx);
s->initialized = 1;
if (s->has_alpha)
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P;
}
s->lossless = 0;
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unsupported chunk size\n");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
av_init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.data = data_start;
pkt.size = data_size;
ret = ff_vp8_decode_frame(avctx, p, got_frame, &pkt);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
update_canvas_size(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (s->has_alpha) {
ret = vp8_lossy_decode_alpha(avctx, p, s->alpha_data,
s->alpha_data_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static int vp8_lossy_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVFrame *p,
int *got_frame, uint8_t *data_start,
unsigned int data_size)
{
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
AVPacket pkt;
int ret;
if (!s->initialized) {
ff_vp8_decode_init(avctx);
s->initialized = 1;
}
avctx->pix_fmt = s->has_alpha ? AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P : AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P;
s->lossless = 0;
if (data_size > INT_MAX) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "unsupported chunk size\n");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
av_init_packet(&pkt);
pkt.data = data_start;
pkt.size = data_size;
ret = ff_vp8_decode_frame(avctx, p, got_frame, &pkt);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
update_canvas_size(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (s->has_alpha) {
ret = vp8_lossy_decode_alpha(avctx, p, s->alpha_data,
s->alpha_data_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
| 168,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
|
jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jp2_box_create0())) {
goto error;
}
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: "
"type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%"PRIuFAST32"\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("big length\n"));
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: ns_nprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, register const u_char *bp)
{
register u_int i, l;
register const u_char *rp = NULL;
register int compress = 0;
int chars_processed;
int elt;
int data_size = ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
chars_processed = 1;
if (((i = *cp++) & INDIR_MASK) != INDIR_MASK) {
compress = 0;
rp = cp + l;
}
if (i != 0)
while (i && cp < ndo->ndo_snapend) {
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == INDIR_MASK) {
if (!compress) {
rp = cp + 1;
compress = 1;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
cp = bp + (((i << 8) | *cp) & 0x3fff);
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
chars_processed++;
/*
* If we've looked at every character in
* the message, this pointer will make
* us look at some character again,
* which means we're looping.
*/
if (chars_processed >= data_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<LOOP>"));
return (NULL);
}
continue;
}
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == EDNS0_MASK) {
elt = (i & ~INDIR_MASK);
switch(elt) {
case EDNS0_ELT_BITLABEL:
if (blabel_print(ndo, cp) == NULL)
return (NULL);
break;
default:
/* unknown ELT */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<ELT %d>", elt));
return(NULL);
}
} else {
if (fn_printn(ndo, cp, l, ndo->ndo_snapend))
return(NULL);
}
cp += l;
chars_processed += l;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
chars_processed++;
if (!compress)
rp += l + 1;
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
return (rp);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12995/Check for DNS compression pointers that don't point backwards.
This is what BIND 9.11.0-P2 does; it not only detects pointers that
loop, as "point backwards" means "point before anything we've processed
so far, including what we're processing right now", so the pointer can't
point to itself (as that's what we're processing right now).
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Also, add some infinite-pointer-loop captures.
More checks should be done. We might, for example, want to make sure
the upper 2 bits of the label length/pointer byte are 00 or 11, and that
if we encounter a pointer and jump backwards to what we think is a label
the label ends before the beginning of the last label we processed, to
make sure the pointer doesn't point backwards into the *middle* of a
label, and also make sure the entire name is <= 255 bytes long.
CWE ID: CWE-835
|
ns_nprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, register const u_char *bp)
{
register u_int i, l;
register const u_char *rp = NULL;
register int compress = 0;
int elt;
u_int offset, max_offset;
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
max_offset = (u_int)(cp - bp);
if (((i = *cp++) & INDIR_MASK) != INDIR_MASK) {
compress = 0;
rp = cp + l;
}
if (i != 0)
while (i && cp < ndo->ndo_snapend) {
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == INDIR_MASK) {
if (!compress) {
rp = cp + 1;
compress = 1;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
offset = (((i << 8) | *cp) & 0x3fff);
/*
* This must move backwards in the packet.
* No RFC explicitly says that, but BIND's
* name decompression code requires it,
* as a way of preventing infinite loops
* and other bad behavior, and it's probably
* what was intended (compress by pointing
* to domain name suffixes already seen in
* the packet).
*/
if (offset >= max_offset) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<BAD PTR>"));
return(NULL);
}
max_offset = offset;
cp = bp + offset;
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
continue;
}
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == EDNS0_MASK) {
elt = (i & ~INDIR_MASK);
switch(elt) {
case EDNS0_ELT_BITLABEL:
if (blabel_print(ndo, cp) == NULL)
return (NULL);
break;
default:
/* unknown ELT */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<ELT %d>", elt));
return(NULL);
}
} else {
if (fn_printn(ndo, cp, l, ndo->ndo_snapend))
return(NULL);
}
cp += l;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
if (!compress)
rp += l + 1;
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
return (rp);
}
| 167,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static bool on_accept(private_stroke_socket_t *this, stream_t *stream)
{
stroke_msg_t *msg;
uint16_t len;
FILE *out;
/* read length */
if (!stream->read_all(stream, &len, sizeof(len)))
{
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "reading length of stroke message failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
return FALSE;
}
/* read message (we need an additional byte to terminate the buffer) */
msg = malloc(len + 1);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "reading stroke message failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
|
static bool on_accept(private_stroke_socket_t *this, stream_t *stream)
{
stroke_msg_t *msg;
uint16_t len;
FILE *out;
/* read length */
if (!stream->read_all(stream, &len, sizeof(len)))
{
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "reading length of stroke message failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
return FALSE;
}
if (len < offsetof(stroke_msg_t, buffer))
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "invalid stroke message length %d", len);
return FALSE;
}
/* read message (we need an additional byte to terminate the buffer) */
msg = malloc(len + 1);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "reading stroke message failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
| 165,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePICTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxCount 128
#define PictCropRegionOp 0x01
#define PictEndOfPictureOp 0xff
#define PictJPEGOp 0x8200
#define PictInfoOp 0x0C00
#define PictInfoSize 512
#define PictPixmapOp 0x9A
#define PictPICTOp 0x98
#define PictVersion 0x11
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
PICTPixmap
pixmap;
PICTRectangle
bounds,
crop_rectangle,
destination_rectangle,
frame_rectangle,
size_rectangle,
source_rectangle;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
count,
storage_class;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*buffer,
*packed_scanline,
*scanline;
unsigned short
base_address,
row_bytes,
transfer_mode;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->columns > 65535L) || (image->rows > 65535L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
/*
Initialize image info.
*/
size_rectangle.top=0;
size_rectangle.left=0;
size_rectangle.bottom=(short) image->rows;
size_rectangle.right=(short) image->columns;
frame_rectangle=size_rectangle;
crop_rectangle=size_rectangle;
source_rectangle=size_rectangle;
destination_rectangle=size_rectangle;
base_address=0xff;
row_bytes=(unsigned short) (image->columns | 0x8000);
bounds.top=0;
bounds.left=0;
bounds.bottom=(short) image->rows;
bounds.right=(short) image->columns;
pixmap.version=0;
pixmap.pack_type=0;
pixmap.pack_size=0;
pixmap.pixel_type=0;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=8;
pixmap.component_count=1;
pixmap.component_size=8;
pixmap.plane_bytes=0;
pixmap.table=0;
pixmap.reserved=0;
transfer_mode=0;
x_resolution=image->resolution.x != 0.0 ? image->resolution.x :
DefaultResolution;
y_resolution=image->resolution.y != 0.0 ? image->resolution.y :
DefaultResolution;
storage_class=image->storage_class;
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
storage_class=DirectClass;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
{
pixmap.component_count=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4 : 3;
pixmap.pixel_type=16;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=32;
pixmap.pack_type=0x04;
transfer_mode=0x40;
row_bytes=(unsigned short) ((4*image->columns) | 0x8000);
}
/*
Allocate memory.
*/
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
bytes_per_line*=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4 : 3;
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(PictInfoSize,sizeof(*buffer));
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(row_bytes+MaxCount),sizeof(*packed_scanline));
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_bytes,sizeof(*scanline));
if ((buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(packed_scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(packed_scanline,0,(size_t) (row_bytes+MaxCount));
/*
Write header, header size, size bounding box, version, and reserved.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(buffer,0,PictInfoSize);
(void) WriteBlob(image,PictInfoSize,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictVersion);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x02ff); /* version #2 */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictInfoOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0xFFFE0000UL);
/*
Write full size of the file, resolution, frame bounding box, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"iptc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x1f2);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"8BIM");
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,4);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000002UL);
}
/*
Write crop region opcode and crop bounding box.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictCropRegionOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.right);
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
Image
*jpeg_image;
ImageInfo
*jpeg_info;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*blob;
jpeg_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
jpeg_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_info->magick,"JPEG",MagickPathExtent);
length=0;
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(jpeg_info,jpeg_image,&length,
exception);
jpeg_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_info);
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictJPEGOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length+154);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x40000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00400000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00566A70UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x65670000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00016170UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x706C0000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x87AC0001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0B466F74UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x6F202D20UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x4A504547UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0018FFFFUL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
if ((length & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
}
/*
Write picture opcode, row bytes, and picture bounding box, and version.
*/
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPICTOp);
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPixmapOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(size_t) base_address);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (row_bytes | 0x8000));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.right);
/*
Write pack type, pack size, resolution, pixel type, and pixel size.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pack_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.pack_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (x_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (y_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pixel_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.bits_per_pixel);
/*
Write component count, size, plane bytes, table size, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_count);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.plane_bytes);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.table);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.reserved);
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Write image colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L); /* color seed */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0L); /* color flags */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->colors-1));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) i);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].red));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].green));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].blue));
}
}
/*
Write source and destination rectangle.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) transfer_mode);
/*
Write picture data.
*/
count=0;
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
scanline[x]=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
}
else
{
register unsigned char
*blue,
*green,
*opacity,
*red;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
opacity=scanline+3*image->columns;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
opacity=scanline;
red=scanline+image->columns;
green=scanline+2*image->columns;
blue=scanline+3*image->columns;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*red++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
*green++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*blue++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
*opacity++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum) (GetPixelAlpha(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,bytes_per_line & 0x7FFF,
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictEndOfPictureOp);
offset=TellBlob(image);
offset=SeekBlob(image,512,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) offset);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packed_scanline);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
|
static MagickBooleanType WritePICTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxCount 128
#define PictCropRegionOp 0x01
#define PictEndOfPictureOp 0xff
#define PictJPEGOp 0x8200
#define PictInfoOp 0x0C00
#define PictInfoSize 512
#define PictPixmapOp 0x9A
#define PictPICTOp 0x98
#define PictVersion 0x11
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
PICTPixmap
pixmap;
PICTRectangle
bounds,
crop_rectangle,
destination_rectangle,
frame_rectangle,
size_rectangle,
source_rectangle;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
count,
row_bytes,
storage_class;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*buffer,
*packed_scanline,
*scanline;
unsigned short
base_address,
transfer_mode;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->columns > 65535L) || (image->rows > 65535L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
/*
Initialize image info.
*/
size_rectangle.top=0;
size_rectangle.left=0;
size_rectangle.bottom=(short) image->rows;
size_rectangle.right=(short) image->columns;
frame_rectangle=size_rectangle;
crop_rectangle=size_rectangle;
source_rectangle=size_rectangle;
destination_rectangle=size_rectangle;
base_address=0xff;
row_bytes=image->columns;
bounds.top=0;
bounds.left=0;
bounds.bottom=(short) image->rows;
bounds.right=(short) image->columns;
pixmap.version=0;
pixmap.pack_type=0;
pixmap.pack_size=0;
pixmap.pixel_type=0;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=8;
pixmap.component_count=1;
pixmap.component_size=8;
pixmap.plane_bytes=0;
pixmap.table=0;
pixmap.reserved=0;
transfer_mode=0;
x_resolution=image->resolution.x != 0.0 ? image->resolution.x :
DefaultResolution;
y_resolution=image->resolution.y != 0.0 ? image->resolution.y :
DefaultResolution;
storage_class=image->storage_class;
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
storage_class=DirectClass;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
{
pixmap.component_count=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4 : 3;
pixmap.pixel_type=16;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=32;
pixmap.pack_type=0x04;
transfer_mode=0x40;
row_bytes=4*image->columns;
}
/*
Allocate memory.
*/
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
if (storage_class == DirectClass)
bytes_per_line*=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ? 4 : 3;
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(PictInfoSize,sizeof(*buffer));
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(row_bytes+MaxCount),sizeof(*packed_scanline));
scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_bytes,sizeof(*scanline));
if ((buffer == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(packed_scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(packed_scanline,0,(size_t) (row_bytes+MaxCount));
/*
Write header, header size, size bounding box, version, and reserved.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(buffer,0,PictInfoSize);
(void) WriteBlob(image,PictInfoSize,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictVersion);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x02ff); /* version #2 */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictInfoOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0xFFFE0000UL);
/*
Write full size of the file, resolution, frame bounding box, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) frame_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"iptc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x1f2);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"8BIM");
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(GetStringInfoLength(profile)+4));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa1);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xe0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,4);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000002UL);
}
/*
Write crop region opcode and crop bounding box.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictCropRegionOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0xa);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) crop_rectangle.right);
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
Image
*jpeg_image;
ImageInfo
*jpeg_info;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*blob;
jpeg_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (jpeg_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
jpeg_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(jpeg_info->magick,"JPEG",MagickPathExtent);
length=0;
blob=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(jpeg_info,jpeg_image,&length,
exception);
jpeg_info=DestroyImageInfo(jpeg_info);
if (blob == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
jpeg_image=DestroyImage(jpeg_image);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictJPEGOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length+154);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00010000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x40000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00400000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00566A70UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x65670000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00016170UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x706C0000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,768);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) x_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x87AC0001UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0B466F74UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x6F202D20UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x4A504547UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000UL);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x0018FFFFUL);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,blob);
if ((length & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
blob=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blob);
}
/*
Write picture opcode, row bytes, and picture bounding box, and version.
*/
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPICTOp);
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictPixmapOp);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(size_t) base_address);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (row_bytes | 0x8000));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) bounds.right);
/*
Write pack type, pack size, resolution, pixel type, and pixel size.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.version);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pack_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.pack_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (x_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (y_resolution+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.pixel_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.bits_per_pixel);
/*
Write component count, size, plane bytes, table size, and reserved.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_count);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) pixmap.component_size);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.plane_bytes);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.table);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) pixmap.reserved);
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Write image colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0x00000000L); /* color seed */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0L); /* color flags */
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->colors-1));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) i);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].red));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].green));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
image->colormap[i].blue));
}
}
/*
Write source and destination rectangle.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) source_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.top);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.left);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) destination_rectangle.right);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) transfer_mode);
/*
Write picture data.
*/
count=0;
if (storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
scanline[x]=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image_info->compression == JPEGCompression)
{
(void) ResetMagickMemory(scanline,0,row_bytes);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,(size_t) (row_bytes & 0x7FFF),
packed_scanline);
}
else
{
register unsigned char
*blue,
*green,
*opacity,
*red;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
opacity=scanline+3*image->columns;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
red=scanline;
green=scanline+image->columns;
blue=scanline+2*image->columns;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
opacity=scanline;
red=scanline+image->columns;
green=scanline+2*image->columns;
blue=scanline+3*image->columns;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*red++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
*green++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*blue++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
*opacity++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum) (GetPixelAlpha(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
count+=EncodeImage(image,scanline,bytes_per_line & 0x7FFF,
packed_scanline);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,PictEndOfPictureOp);
offset=TellBlob(image);
offset=SeekBlob(image,512,SEEK_SET);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) offset);
scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline);
packed_scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packed_scanline);
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,864 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: nfssvc_decode_readdirargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_readdirargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->cookie = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = min_t(u32, args->count, PAGE_SIZE);
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
|
nfssvc_decode_readdirargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_readdirargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->cookie = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
args->count = min_t(u32, args->count, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return 1;
}
| 168,151 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: AudioOutputAuthorizationHandlerTest() {
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->AppendSwitch(
switches::kUseFakeDeviceForMediaStream);
thread_bundle_ = base::MakeUnique<TestBrowserThreadBundle>(
TestBrowserThreadBundle::Options::REAL_IO_THREAD);
audio_thread_ = base::MakeUnique<AudioManagerThread>();
audio_manager_.reset(new media::FakeAudioManager(
audio_thread_->task_runner(), audio_thread_->worker_task_runner(),
&log_factory_));
media_stream_manager_ =
base::MakeUnique<MediaStreamManager>(audio_manager_.get());
SyncWithAllThreads();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
|
AudioOutputAuthorizationHandlerTest() {
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->AppendSwitch(
switches::kUseFakeDeviceForMediaStream);
thread_bundle_ = base::MakeUnique<TestBrowserThreadBundle>(
TestBrowserThreadBundle::Options::REAL_IO_THREAD);
audio_thread_ = base::MakeUnique<AudioManagerThread>();
audio_manager_.reset(new media::FakeAudioManager(
audio_thread_->task_runner(), audio_thread_->worker_task_runner(),
&log_factory_));
audio_system_ = media::AudioSystemImpl::Create(audio_manager_.get());
media_stream_manager_ =
base::MakeUnique<MediaStreamManager>(audio_manager_.get());
SyncWithAllThreads();
}
| 171,983 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
|
kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
| 166,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int update_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *open_stateid, nfs4_stateid *delegation, int open_flags)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_delegation *deleg_cur;
int ret = 0;
open_flags &= (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
rcu_read_lock();
deleg_cur = rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation);
if (deleg_cur == NULL)
goto no_delegation;
spin_lock(&deleg_cur->lock);
if (nfsi->delegation != deleg_cur ||
(deleg_cur->type & open_flags) != open_flags)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
if (delegation == NULL)
delegation = &deleg_cur->stateid;
else if (memcmp(deleg_cur->stateid.data, delegation->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE) != 0)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(deleg_cur);
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, &deleg_cur->stateid, open_flags);
ret = 1;
no_delegation_unlock:
spin_unlock(&deleg_cur->lock);
no_delegation:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!ret && open_stateid != NULL) {
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, NULL, open_flags);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
|
static int update_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *open_stateid, nfs4_stateid *delegation, int open_flags)
static int update_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *open_stateid, nfs4_stateid *delegation, fmode_t fmode)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(state->inode);
struct nfs_delegation *deleg_cur;
int ret = 0;
fmode &= (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
rcu_read_lock();
deleg_cur = rcu_dereference(nfsi->delegation);
if (deleg_cur == NULL)
goto no_delegation;
spin_lock(&deleg_cur->lock);
if (nfsi->delegation != deleg_cur ||
(deleg_cur->type & fmode) != fmode)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
if (delegation == NULL)
delegation = &deleg_cur->stateid;
else if (memcmp(deleg_cur->stateid.data, delegation->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE) != 0)
goto no_delegation_unlock;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(deleg_cur);
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, &deleg_cur->stateid, fmode);
ret = 1;
no_delegation_unlock:
spin_unlock(&deleg_cur->lock);
no_delegation:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!ret && open_stateid != NULL) {
__update_open_stateid(state, open_stateid, NULL, fmode);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
| 165,708 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::free_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nPortIndex;
(void) hComp;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("In for decoder free_buffer");
if (m_state == OMX_StateIdle &&
(BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags ,OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" free buffer while Component in Loading pending");
} else if ((m_inp_bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && port == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX)||
(m_out_bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && port == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Buffer while port %u disabled", (unsigned int)port);
} else if ((port == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX &&
BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING)) ||
(port == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX &&
BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Buffer while port %u enable pending", (unsigned int)port);
} else if (m_state == OMX_StateExecuting || m_state == OMX_StatePause) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid state to free buffer,ports need to be disabled");
post_event(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorPortUnpopulated,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
} else if (m_state != OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid state to free buffer,port lost Buffers");
post_event(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorPortUnpopulated,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
if (port == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
/*Check if arbitrary bytes*/
if (!arbitrary_bytes && !input_use_buffer)
nPortIndex = buffer - m_inp_mem_ptr;
else
nPortIndex = buffer - m_inp_heap_ptr;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("free_buffer on i/p port - Port idx %d", nPortIndex);
if (nPortIndex < drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount) {
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_inp_bm_count,nPortIndex);
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_heap_inp_bm_count,nPortIndex);
if (input_use_buffer == true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free pmem Buffer index %d",nPortIndex);
if (m_phdr_pmem_ptr)
free_input_buffer(m_phdr_pmem_ptr[nPortIndex]);
} else {
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
if (m_phdr_pmem_ptr)
free_input_buffer(nPortIndex,m_phdr_pmem_ptr[nPortIndex]);
else
free_input_buffer(nPortIndex,NULL);
} else
free_input_buffer(buffer);
}
m_inp_bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
if(release_input_done())
release_buffers(this, VDEC_BUFFER_TYPE_INPUT);
/*Free the Buffer Header*/
if (release_input_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("ALL input buffers are freed/released");
free_input_buffer_header();
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error: free_buffer ,Port Index Invalid");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (BITMASK_PRESENT((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING)
&& release_input_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MOVING TO DISABLED STATE");
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,
OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
} else if (port == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
nPortIndex = buffer - client_buffers.get_il_buf_hdr();
if (nPortIndex < drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("free_buffer on o/p port - Port idx %d", nPortIndex);
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_out_bm_count,nPortIndex);
m_out_bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
client_buffers.free_output_buffer (buffer);
if(release_output_done()) {
release_buffers(this, VDEC_BUFFER_TYPE_OUTPUT);
}
if (release_output_done()) {
free_output_buffer_header();
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error: free_buffer , Port Index Invalid");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (BITMASK_PRESENT((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING)
&& release_output_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer : If any Disable event pending,post it");
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MOVING TO DISABLED STATE");
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (m_enable_android_native_buffers) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer - outport disabled: reset native buffers");
memset(&native_buffer, 0 ,(sizeof(struct nativebuffer) * MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS));
}
#endif
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,
OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
} else {
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if ((eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) &&
(BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags ,OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING))) {
if (release_done()) {
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandStateSet, OMX_StateLoaded,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Do not allow changing theactual buffer count while still
holding allocation (Client can technically negotiate
buffer count on a free/disabled port)
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Heap Overflow and Possible Local
Privilege Escalation in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #3)
Bug: 27532282 27661749
Change-Id: I06dd680d43feaef3efdc87311e8a6703e234b523
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::free_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nPortIndex;
(void) hComp;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("In for decoder free_buffer");
if (m_state == OMX_StateIdle &&
(BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags ,OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW(" free buffer while Component in Loading pending");
} else if ((m_inp_bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && port == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX)||
(m_out_bEnabled == OMX_FALSE && port == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Buffer while port %u disabled", (unsigned int)port);
} else if ((port == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX &&
BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING)) ||
(port == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX &&
BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags, OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING))) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free Buffer while port %u enable pending", (unsigned int)port);
} else if (m_state == OMX_StateExecuting || m_state == OMX_StatePause) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid state to free buffer,ports need to be disabled");
post_event(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorPortUnpopulated,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
} else if (m_state != OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid state to free buffer,port lost Buffers");
post_event(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorPortUnpopulated,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
if (port == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
/*Check if arbitrary bytes*/
if (!arbitrary_bytes && !input_use_buffer)
nPortIndex = buffer - m_inp_mem_ptr;
else
nPortIndex = buffer - m_inp_heap_ptr;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("free_buffer on i/p port - Port idx %d", nPortIndex);
if (nPortIndex < drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount &&
BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_inp_bm_count, nPortIndex)) {
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_inp_bm_count,nPortIndex);
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_heap_inp_bm_count,nPortIndex);
if (input_use_buffer == true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free pmem Buffer index %d",nPortIndex);
if (m_phdr_pmem_ptr)
free_input_buffer(m_phdr_pmem_ptr[nPortIndex]);
} else {
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
if (m_phdr_pmem_ptr)
free_input_buffer(nPortIndex,m_phdr_pmem_ptr[nPortIndex]);
else
free_input_buffer(nPortIndex,NULL);
} else
free_input_buffer(buffer);
}
m_inp_bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
if(release_input_done())
release_buffers(this, VDEC_BUFFER_TYPE_INPUT);
/*Free the Buffer Header*/
if (release_input_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("ALL input buffers are freed/released");
free_input_buffer_header();
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error: free_buffer ,Port Index Invalid");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (BITMASK_PRESENT((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING)
&& release_input_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MOVING TO DISABLED STATE");
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,
OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
} else if (port == OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
nPortIndex = buffer - client_buffers.get_il_buf_hdr();
if (nPortIndex < drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount &&
BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_out_bm_count, nPortIndex)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("free_buffer on o/p port - Port idx %d", nPortIndex);
BITMASK_CLEAR(&m_out_bm_count,nPortIndex);
m_out_bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
client_buffers.free_output_buffer (buffer);
if(release_output_done()) {
release_buffers(this, VDEC_BUFFER_TYPE_OUTPUT);
}
if (release_output_done()) {
free_output_buffer_header();
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Error: free_buffer , Port Index Invalid");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if (BITMASK_PRESENT((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING)
&& release_output_done()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer : If any Disable event pending,post it");
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MOVING TO DISABLED STATE");
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_DISABLE_PENDING);
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (m_enable_android_native_buffers) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("FreeBuffer - outport disabled: reset native buffers");
memset(&native_buffer, 0 ,(sizeof(struct nativebuffer) * MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS));
}
#endif
post_event(OMX_CommandPortDisable,
OMX_CORE_OUTPUT_PORT_INDEX,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
} else {
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
if ((eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) &&
(BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags ,OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING))) {
if (release_done()) {
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_LOADING_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandStateSet, OMX_StateLoaded,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
}
return eRet;
}
| 173,785 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: DeviceOrientationController::DeviceOrientationController(Document* document)
: DeviceSensorEventController(document)
, DOMWindowLifecycleObserver(document->domWindow())
{
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
|
DeviceOrientationController::DeviceOrientationController(Document* document)
: DeviceSensorEventController(document)
, DOMWindowLifecycleObserver(document->domWindow())
{
Page* page = document->page();
ASSERT(page);
OwnPtr<DeviceOrientationInspectorAgent> deviceOrientationAgent(DeviceOrientationInspectorAgent::create(page));
InspectorController& inspectorController = page->inspectorController();
if (!inspectorController.hasAgent(deviceOrientationAgent.get()->name()))
inspectorController.registerModuleAgent(deviceOrientationAgent.release());
}
| 171,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: image_transform_default_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
|
image_transform_default_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(colour_type)
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return 1;
}
| 173,620 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(
const std::string& preview_ui_addr,
int request_id,
bool* cancel) {
int current_id = -1;
if (!g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Get(preview_ui_addr, ¤t_id)) {
*cancel = true;
return;
}
*cancel = (request_id != current_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
void PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(
void PrintPreviewUI::GetCurrentPrintPreviewStatus(int32 preview_ui_id,
int request_id,
bool* cancel) {
int current_id = -1;
if (!g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Get(preview_ui_id, ¤t_id)) {
*cancel = true;
return;
}
*cancel = (request_id != current_id);
}
| 170,833 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void scsi_write_data(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
/* No data transfer may already be in progress */
assert(r->req.aiocb == NULL);
if (r->req.cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
DPRINTF("Data transfer direction invalid\n");
scsi_write_complete(r, -EINVAL);
return;
}
n = r->iov.iov_len / 512;
if (n) {
if (s->tray_open) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEDIUM);
}
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BDRV_ACCT_WRITE);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_writev(s->bs, r->sector, &r->qiov, n,
scsi_write_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEM);
}
} else {
/* Invoke completion routine to fetch data from host. */
scsi_write_complete(r, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: commonize iovec creation between reads and writes
Also, consistently use qiov.size instead of iov.iov_len.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
static void scsi_write_data(SCSIRequest *req)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, r->req.dev);
uint32_t n;
/* No data transfer may already be in progress */
assert(r->req.aiocb == NULL);
if (r->req.cmd.mode != SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
DPRINTF("Data transfer direction invalid\n");
scsi_write_complete(r, -EINVAL);
return;
}
n = r->qiov.size / 512;
if (n) {
if (s->tray_open) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEDIUM);
}
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, BDRV_ACCT_WRITE);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_writev(s->bs, r->sector, &r->qiov, n,
scsi_write_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_write_complete(r, -ENOMEM);
}
} else {
/* Called for the first time. Ask the driver to send us more data. */
scsi_write_complete(r, 0);
}
}
| 169,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: xmlParse3986Port(xmlURIPtr uri, const char **str)
{
const char *cur = *str;
unsigned port = 0; /* unsigned for defined overflow behavior */
if (ISA_DIGIT(cur)) {
while (ISA_DIGIT(cur)) {
port = port * 10 + (*cur - '0');
cur++;
}
if (uri != NULL)
uri->port = port & INT_MAX; /* port value modulo INT_MAX+1 */
*str = cur;
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
xmlParse3986Port(xmlURIPtr uri, const char **str)
{
const char *cur = *str;
unsigned port = 0; /* unsigned for defined overflow behavior */
if (ISA_DIGIT(cur)) {
while (ISA_DIGIT(cur)) {
port = port * 10 + (*cur - '0');
cur++;
}
if (uri != NULL)
uri->port = port & USHRT_MAX; /* port value modulo INT_MAX+1 */
*str = cur;
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
| 174,119 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void hugetlbfs_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbi = HUGETLBFS_SB(sb);
if (sbi) {
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
kfree(sbi);
}
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
|
static void hugetlbfs_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *sbi = HUGETLBFS_SB(sb);
if (sbi) {
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
if (sbi->spool)
hugepage_put_subpool(sbi->spool);
kfree(sbi);
}
}
| 165,606 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: decompileAction(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn)
{
if( n > maxn ) SWF_error("Action overflow!!");
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,"%d:\tACTION[%3.3d]: %s\n",
actions[n].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.Offset, n,
actionName(actions[n].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.ActionCode));
#endif
switch(actions[n].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.ActionCode)
{
case SWFACTION_END:
return 0;
case SWFACTION_CONSTANTPOOL:
decompileCONSTANTPOOL(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GOTOLABEL:
return decompileGOTOFRAME(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_GOTOFRAME:
return decompileGOTOFRAME(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_GOTOFRAME2:
return decompileGOTOFRAME2(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_WAITFORFRAME:
decompileWAITFORFRAME(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETURL2:
decompileGETURL2(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETURL:
decompileGETURL(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_PUSH:
decompilePUSH(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_PUSHDUP:
decompilePUSHDUP(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_STACKSWAP:
decompileSTACKSWAP(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETPROPERTY:
decompileSETPROPERTY(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETPROPERTY:
decompileGETPROPERTY(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETTIME:
return decompileGETTIME(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_TRACE:
decompileTRACE(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_CALLFRAME:
decompileCALLFRAME(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_EXTENDS:
decompileEXTENDS(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_INITOBJECT:
decompileINITOBJECT(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_NEWOBJECT:
decompileNEWOBJECT(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_NEWMETHOD:
decompileNEWMETHOD(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETMEMBER:
decompileGETMEMBER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETMEMBER:
decompileSETMEMBER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETVARIABLE:
decompileGETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETVARIABLE:
decompileSETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn, 0);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DEFINELOCAL:
decompileSETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn, 1);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DEFINELOCAL2:
decompileDEFINELOCAL2(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DECREMENT:
return decompileINCR_DECR(n, actions, maxn, 0);
case SWFACTION_INCREMENT:
return decompileINCR_DECR(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_STOREREGISTER:
decompileSTOREREGISTER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_JUMP:
return decompileJUMP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_RETURN:
decompileRETURN(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_LOGICALNOT:
return decompileLogicalNot(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_IF:
return decompileIF(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_WITH:
decompileWITH(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_ENUMERATE:
return decompileENUMERATE(n, actions, maxn, 0);
case SWFACTION_ENUMERATE2 :
return decompileENUMERATE(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_INITARRAY:
return decompileINITARRAY(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DEFINEFUNCTION:
return decompileDEFINEFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_DEFINEFUNCTION2:
return decompileDEFINEFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_CALLFUNCTION:
return decompileCALLFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_CALLMETHOD:
return decompileCALLMETHOD(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_INSTANCEOF:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTLEFT:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTRIGHT:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTRIGHT2:
case SWFACTION_ADD:
case SWFACTION_ADD2:
case SWFACTION_SUBTRACT:
case SWFACTION_MULTIPLY:
case SWFACTION_DIVIDE:
case SWFACTION_MODULO:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEAND:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEOR:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEXOR:
case SWFACTION_EQUAL:
case SWFACTION_EQUALS2:
case SWFACTION_LESS2:
case SWFACTION_LOGICALAND:
case SWFACTION_LOGICALOR:
case SWFACTION_GREATER:
case SWFACTION_LESSTHAN:
case SWFACTION_STRINGEQ:
case SWFACTION_STRINGCOMPARE:
case SWFACTION_STRICTEQUALS:
return decompileArithmeticOp(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_POP:
pop();
return 0;
case SWFACTION_STARTDRAG:
return decompileSTARTDRAG(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DELETE:
return decompileDELETE(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_DELETE2:
return decompileDELETE(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_TARGETPATH:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"targetPath");
case SWFACTION_TYPEOF:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"typeof");
case SWFACTION_ORD:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"ord");
case SWFACTION_CHR:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"chr");
case SWFACTION_INT:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"int");
case SWFACTION_TOSTRING:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"String");
case SWFACTION_TONUMBER:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"Number");
case SWFACTION_RANDOMNUMBER:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"random");
case SWFACTION_STRINGLENGTH:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"length");
case SWFACTION_PLAY:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"play");
case SWFACTION_STOP:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stop");
case SWFACTION_NEXTFRAME:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"nextFrame");
case SWFACTION_PREVFRAME:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"prevFrame");
case SWFACTION_ENDDRAG:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stopDrag");
case SWFACTION_STOPSOUNDS:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stopAllSounds");
case SWFACTION_TOGGLEQUALITY:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"toggleHighQuality");
case SWFACTION_MBSUBSTRING:
case SWFACTION_SUBSTRING:
return decompileSUBSTRING(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_STRINGCONCAT:
return decompileSTRINGCONCAT(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_REMOVECLIP:
return decompileREMOVECLIP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DUPLICATECLIP:
return decompileDUPLICATECLIP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_SETTARGET:
return decompileSETTARGET(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_SETTARGET2:
return decompileSETTARGET(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_IMPLEMENTSOP:
return decompileIMPLEMENTS(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_CASTOP:
return decompileCAST(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_THROW:
return decompileTHROW(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_TRY:
return decompileTRY(n, actions, maxn);
default:
outputSWF_ACTION(n,&actions[n]);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
decompileAction(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,"%d:\tACTION[%3.3d]: %s\n",
actions[n].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.Offset, n,
actionName(actions[n].SWF_ACTIONRECORD.ActionCode));
#endif
switch(OpCode(actions, n, maxn))
{
case SWFACTION_END:
return 0;
case SWFACTION_CONSTANTPOOL:
decompileCONSTANTPOOL(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GOTOLABEL:
return decompileGOTOFRAME(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_GOTOFRAME:
return decompileGOTOFRAME(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_GOTOFRAME2:
return decompileGOTOFRAME2(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_WAITFORFRAME:
decompileWAITFORFRAME(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETURL2:
decompileGETURL2(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETURL:
decompileGETURL(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_PUSH:
decompilePUSH(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_PUSHDUP:
decompilePUSHDUP(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_STACKSWAP:
decompileSTACKSWAP(&actions[n]);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETPROPERTY:
decompileSETPROPERTY(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETPROPERTY:
decompileGETPROPERTY(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETTIME:
return decompileGETTIME(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_TRACE:
decompileTRACE(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_CALLFRAME:
decompileCALLFRAME(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_EXTENDS:
decompileEXTENDS(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_INITOBJECT:
decompileINITOBJECT(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_NEWOBJECT:
decompileNEWOBJECT(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_NEWMETHOD:
decompileNEWMETHOD(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETMEMBER:
decompileGETMEMBER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETMEMBER:
decompileSETMEMBER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_GETVARIABLE:
decompileGETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_SETVARIABLE:
decompileSETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn, 0);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DEFINELOCAL:
decompileSETVARIABLE(n, actions, maxn, 1);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DEFINELOCAL2:
decompileDEFINELOCAL2(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_DECREMENT:
return decompileINCR_DECR(n, actions, maxn, 0);
case SWFACTION_INCREMENT:
return decompileINCR_DECR(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_STOREREGISTER:
decompileSTOREREGISTER(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_JUMP:
return decompileJUMP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_RETURN:
decompileRETURN(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_LOGICALNOT:
return decompileLogicalNot(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_IF:
return decompileIF(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_WITH:
decompileWITH(n, actions, maxn);
return 0;
case SWFACTION_ENUMERATE:
return decompileENUMERATE(n, actions, maxn, 0);
case SWFACTION_ENUMERATE2 :
return decompileENUMERATE(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_INITARRAY:
return decompileINITARRAY(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DEFINEFUNCTION:
return decompileDEFINEFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_DEFINEFUNCTION2:
return decompileDEFINEFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_CALLFUNCTION:
return decompileCALLFUNCTION(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_CALLMETHOD:
return decompileCALLMETHOD(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_INSTANCEOF:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTLEFT:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTRIGHT:
case SWFACTION_SHIFTRIGHT2:
case SWFACTION_ADD:
case SWFACTION_ADD2:
case SWFACTION_SUBTRACT:
case SWFACTION_MULTIPLY:
case SWFACTION_DIVIDE:
case SWFACTION_MODULO:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEAND:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEOR:
case SWFACTION_BITWISEXOR:
case SWFACTION_EQUAL:
case SWFACTION_EQUALS2:
case SWFACTION_LESS2:
case SWFACTION_LOGICALAND:
case SWFACTION_LOGICALOR:
case SWFACTION_GREATER:
case SWFACTION_LESSTHAN:
case SWFACTION_STRINGEQ:
case SWFACTION_STRINGCOMPARE:
case SWFACTION_STRICTEQUALS:
return decompileArithmeticOp(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_POP:
pop();
return 0;
case SWFACTION_STARTDRAG:
return decompileSTARTDRAG(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DELETE:
return decompileDELETE(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_DELETE2:
return decompileDELETE(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_TARGETPATH:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"targetPath");
case SWFACTION_TYPEOF:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"typeof");
case SWFACTION_ORD:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"ord");
case SWFACTION_CHR:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"chr");
case SWFACTION_INT:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"int");
case SWFACTION_TOSTRING:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"String");
case SWFACTION_TONUMBER:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"Number");
case SWFACTION_RANDOMNUMBER:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"random");
case SWFACTION_STRINGLENGTH:
return decompileSingleArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"length");
case SWFACTION_PLAY:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"play");
case SWFACTION_STOP:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stop");
case SWFACTION_NEXTFRAME:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"nextFrame");
case SWFACTION_PREVFRAME:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"prevFrame");
case SWFACTION_ENDDRAG:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stopDrag");
case SWFACTION_STOPSOUNDS:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"stopAllSounds");
case SWFACTION_TOGGLEQUALITY:
return decompile_Null_ArgBuiltInFunctionCall(n, actions, maxn,"toggleHighQuality");
case SWFACTION_MBSUBSTRING:
case SWFACTION_SUBSTRING:
return decompileSUBSTRING(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_STRINGCONCAT:
return decompileSTRINGCONCAT(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_REMOVECLIP:
return decompileREMOVECLIP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_DUPLICATECLIP:
return decompileDUPLICATECLIP(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_SETTARGET:
return decompileSETTARGET(n, actions, maxn,0);
case SWFACTION_SETTARGET2:
return decompileSETTARGET(n, actions, maxn,1);
case SWFACTION_IMPLEMENTSOP:
return decompileIMPLEMENTS(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_CASTOP:
return decompileCAST(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_THROW:
return decompileTHROW(n, actions, maxn);
case SWFACTION_TRY:
return decompileTRY(n, actions, maxn);
default:
outputSWF_ACTION(n,&actions[n]);
return 0;
}
}
| 169,646 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
int* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int encoded_pixels;
int rle_size;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (int*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
rle_size = gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx);
if (rle_size <= 0) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < rle_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & ~TGA_RLE_FLAG ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size
|| buffer_caret + pixel_block_size > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size
|| buffer_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size) > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
buffer_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB reads of the TGA decompression buffer
It is possible to craft TGA files which will overflow the decompression
buffer, but not the image's bitmap. Therefore we also have to check for
potential decompression buffer overflows.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to [email protected];
a modified case exposing an off-by-one error of the first patch had been
provided by Konrad Beckmann.
This commit is an amendment to commit fb0e0cce, so we use CVE-2016-6906
as well.
CWE ID: CWE-125
|
int read_image_tga( gdIOCtx *ctx, oTga *tga )
{
int pixel_block_size = (tga->bits / 8);
int image_block_size = (tga->width * tga->height) * pixel_block_size;
int* decompression_buffer = NULL;
unsigned char* conversion_buffer = NULL;
int buffer_caret = 0;
int bitmap_caret = 0;
int i = 0;
int encoded_pixels;
int rle_size;
if(overflow2(tga->width, tga->height)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(tga->width * tga->height, pixel_block_size)) {
return -1;
}
if(overflow2(image_block_size, sizeof(int))) {
return -1;
}
/*! \todo Add more image type support.
*/
if (tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB && tga->imagetype != TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE)
return -1;
/*! \brief Allocate memmory for image block
* Allocate a chunk of memory for the image block to be passed into.
*/
tga->bitmap = (int *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (tga->bitmap == NULL)
return -1;
switch (tga->imagetype) {
case TGA_TYPE_RGB:
/*! \brief Read in uncompressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an uncompressed RGB type TGA.
*/
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx) != image_block_size) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
return -1;
}
while (buffer_caret < image_block_size) {
tga->bitmap[buffer_caret] = (int) conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
break;
case TGA_TYPE_RGB_RLE:
/*! \brief Read in RLE compressed RGB TGA
* Chunk load the pixel data from an RLE compressed RGB type TGA.
*/
decompression_buffer = (int*) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(int));
if (decompression_buffer == NULL) {
return -1;
}
conversion_buffer = (unsigned char *) gdMalloc(image_block_size * sizeof(unsigned char));
if (conversion_buffer == NULL) {
gd_error("gd-tga: premature end of image data\n");
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
return -1;
}
rle_size = gdGetBuf(conversion_buffer, image_block_size, ctx);
if (rle_size <= 0) {
gdFree(conversion_buffer);
gdFree(decompression_buffer);
return -1;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( buffer_caret < rle_size) {
decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] = (int)conversion_buffer[buffer_caret];
buffer_caret++;
}
buffer_caret = 0;
while( bitmap_caret < image_block_size ) {
if (buffer_caret + pixel_block_size > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
if ((decompression_buffer[buffer_caret] & TGA_RLE_FLAG) == TGA_RLE_FLAG) {
encoded_pixels = ( ( decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] & ~TGA_RLE_FLAG ) + 1 );
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size
|| buffer_caret + pixel_block_size > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < encoded_pixels; i++) {
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += pixel_block_size;
}
buffer_caret += pixel_block_size;
} else {
encoded_pixels = decompression_buffer[ buffer_caret ] + 1;
buffer_caret++;
if ((bitmap_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size)) > image_block_size
|| buffer_caret + (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size) > rle_size) {
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
return -1;
}
memcpy(tga->bitmap + bitmap_caret, decompression_buffer + buffer_caret, encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size * sizeof(int));
bitmap_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
buffer_caret += (encoded_pixels * pixel_block_size);
}
}
gdFree( decompression_buffer );
gdFree( conversion_buffer );
break;
}
return 1;
}
| 170,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void make_response(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring, u64 id,
unsigned short op, int st)
{
struct blkif_response resp;
unsigned long flags;
union blkif_back_rings *blk_rings;
int notify;
resp.id = id;
resp.operation = op;
resp.status = st;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ring->blk_ring_lock, flags);
blk_rings = &ring->blk_rings;
/* Place on the response ring for the relevant domain. */
switch (ring->blkif->blk_protocol) {
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_NATIVE:
memcpy(RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blk_rings->native, blk_rings->native.rsp_prod_pvt),
&resp, sizeof(resp));
break;
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_32:
memcpy(RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blk_rings->x86_32, blk_rings->x86_32.rsp_prod_pvt),
&resp, sizeof(resp));
break;
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_64:
memcpy(RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blk_rings->x86_64, blk_rings->x86_64.rsp_prod_pvt),
&resp, sizeof(resp));
break;
default:
BUG();
}
blk_rings->common.rsp_prod_pvt++;
RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&blk_rings->common, notify);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ring->blk_ring_lock, flags);
if (notify)
notify_remote_via_irq(ring->irq);
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
|
static void make_response(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring, u64 id,
unsigned short op, int st)
{
struct blkif_response *resp;
unsigned long flags;
union blkif_back_rings *blk_rings;
int notify;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ring->blk_ring_lock, flags);
blk_rings = &ring->blk_rings;
/* Place on the response ring for the relevant domain. */
switch (ring->blkif->blk_protocol) {
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_NATIVE:
resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blk_rings->native,
blk_rings->native.rsp_prod_pvt);
break;
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_32:
resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blk_rings->x86_32,
blk_rings->x86_32.rsp_prod_pvt);
break;
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_64:
resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blk_rings->x86_64,
blk_rings->x86_64.rsp_prod_pvt);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
resp->id = id;
resp->operation = op;
resp->status = st;
blk_rings->common.rsp_prod_pvt++;
RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&blk_rings->common, notify);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ring->blk_ring_lock, flags);
if (notify)
notify_remote_via_irq(ring->irq);
}
| 168,059 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_login(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char q_user[SHORT_STRING], q_pass[SHORT_STRING];
char buf[STRING];
int rc;
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, LOGINDISABLED))
{
mutt_message(_("LOGIN disabled on this server."));
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
if (mutt_account_getuser(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
mutt_message(_("Logging in..."));
imap_quote_string(q_user, sizeof(q_user), idata->conn->account.user);
imap_quote_string(q_pass, sizeof(q_pass), idata->conn->account.pass);
/* don't print the password unless we're at the ungodly debugging level
* of 5 or higher */
if (DebugLevel < IMAP_LOG_PASS)
mutt_debug(2, "Sending LOGIN command for %s...\n", idata->conn->account.user);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LOGIN %s %s", q_user, q_pass);
rc = imap_exec(idata, buf, IMAP_CMD_FAIL_OK | IMAP_CMD_PASS);
if (!rc)
{
mutt_clear_error(); /* clear "Logging in...". fixes #3524 */
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
mutt_error(_("Login failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-77
|
enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_login(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char q_user[SHORT_STRING], q_pass[SHORT_STRING];
char buf[STRING];
int rc;
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, LOGINDISABLED))
{
mutt_message(_("LOGIN disabled on this server."));
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
if (mutt_account_getuser(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
mutt_message(_("Logging in..."));
imap_quote_string(q_user, sizeof(q_user), idata->conn->account.user, false);
imap_quote_string(q_pass, sizeof(q_pass), idata->conn->account.pass, false);
/* don't print the password unless we're at the ungodly debugging level
* of 5 or higher */
if (DebugLevel < IMAP_LOG_PASS)
mutt_debug(2, "Sending LOGIN command for %s...\n", idata->conn->account.user);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LOGIN %s %s", q_user, q_pass);
rc = imap_exec(idata, buf, IMAP_CMD_FAIL_OK | IMAP_CMD_PASS);
if (!rc)
{
mutt_clear_error(); /* clear "Logging in...". fixes #3524 */
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
mutt_error(_("Login failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
| 169,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler::GetDeviceParameters(
AuthorizationCompletedCallback cb,
const std::string& raw_device_id) const {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(!raw_device_id.empty());
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
audio_manager_->GetTaskRunner(), FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GetDeviceParametersOnDeviceThread,
base::Unretained(audio_manager_), raw_device_id),
base::Bind(&AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler::DeviceParametersReceived,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(cb), false,
raw_device_id));
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
|
void AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler::GetDeviceParameters(
AuthorizationCompletedCallback cb,
const std::string& raw_device_id) const {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(!raw_device_id.empty());
audio_system_->GetOutputStreamParameters(
raw_device_id,
base::Bind(&AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler::DeviceParametersReceived,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(cb), false,
raw_device_id));
}
| 171,981 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl> RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create(ScriptExecutionContext* context, PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionCallback> successCallback, PassRefPtr<RTCErrorCallback> errorCallback)
{
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl> request = adoptRef(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl(context, successCallback, errorCallback));
request->suspendIfNeeded();
return request.release();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl> RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create(ScriptExecutionContext* context, PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionCallback> successCallback, PassRefPtr<RTCErrorCallback> errorCallback)
PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl> RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create(ScriptExecutionContext* context, PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionCallback> successCallback, PassRefPtr<RTCErrorCallback> errorCallback, PassRefPtr<RTCPeerConnection> owner)
{
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl> request = adoptRef(new RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl(context, successCallback, errorCallback, owner));
request->suspendIfNeeded();
return request.release();
}
| 170,342 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: _TIFFmalloc(tsize_t s)
{
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
|
_TIFFmalloc(tsize_t s)
{
if (s == 0)
return ((void *) NULL);
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
| 169,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
int ret, countersize;
struct ebt_table_info *newinfo;
struct ebt_replace tmp;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) {
BUGPRINT("Wrong len argument\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tmp.entries_size == 0) {
BUGPRINT("Entries_size never zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.nentries >= ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct ebt_table_info)) /
NR_CPUS - SMP_CACHE_BYTES) / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -ENOMEM;
countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
if (countersize)
memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
if (!newinfo->entries) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_newinfo;
}
if (copy_from_user(
newinfo->entries, tmp.entries, tmp.entries_size) != 0) {
BUGPRINT("Couldn't copy entries from userspace\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_entries;
}
ret = do_replace_finish(net, &tmp, newinfo);
if (ret == 0)
return ret;
free_entries:
vfree(newinfo->entries);
free_newinfo:
vfree(newinfo);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
|
static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
int ret, countersize;
struct ebt_table_info *newinfo;
struct ebt_replace tmp;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) {
BUGPRINT("Wrong len argument\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tmp.entries_size == 0) {
BUGPRINT("Entries_size never zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.nentries >= ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct ebt_table_info)) /
NR_CPUS - SMP_CACHE_BYTES) / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -ENOMEM;
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
if (countersize)
memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
if (!newinfo->entries) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_newinfo;
}
if (copy_from_user(
newinfo->entries, tmp.entries, tmp.entries_size) != 0) {
BUGPRINT("Couldn't copy entries from userspace\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_entries;
}
ret = do_replace_finish(net, &tmp, newinfo);
if (ret == 0)
return ret;
free_entries:
vfree(newinfo->entries);
free_newinfo:
vfree(newinfo);
return ret;
}
| 165,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void prefetch_table(const void *tab, size_t len)
{
const volatile byte *vtab = tab;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8 * 32)
{
(void)vtab[i + 0 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 1 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 2 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 3 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 4 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 5 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 6 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 7 * 32];
}
(void)vtab[len - 1];
}
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
|
void prefetch_table(const void *tab, size_t len)
{
const volatile byte *vtab = tab;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; len - i >= 8 * 32; i += 8 * 32)
{
(void)vtab[i + 0 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 1 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 2 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 3 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 4 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 5 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 6 * 32];
(void)vtab[i + 7 * 32];
}
for (; i < len; i += 32)
{
(void)vtab[i];
}
(void)vtab[len - 1];
}
| 169,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: do_async_increment (IncrementData *data)
{
gint32 newx = data->x + 1;
dbus_g_method_return (data->context, newx);
g_free (data);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
do_async_increment (IncrementData *data)
| 165,083 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: long Segment::ParseCues(
long long off,
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
if (m_pCues)
return 0; //success
if (off < 0)
return -1;
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_start + off;
if ((total < 0) || (pos >= total))
return 1; //don't bother parsing cues
const long long element_start = pos;
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id != 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume ID
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0) //weird, although technically not illegal
return 1; //done
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
const long long element_stop = pos + size;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (element_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (element_stop > total))
return 1; //don't bother parsing anymore
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if (element_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long element_size = element_stop - element_start;
m_pCues = new (std::nothrow) Cues(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
assert(m_pCues); //TODO
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
long Segment::ParseCues(
long Segment::ParseCues(long long off, long long& pos, long& len) {
if (m_pCues)
return 0; // success
if (off < 0)
return -1;
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_start + off;
if ((total < 0) || (pos >= total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing cues
const long long element_start = pos;
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id != 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume ID
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
// Read Size
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0) // weird, although technically not illegal
return 1; // done
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
// Pos now points to start of payload
const long long element_stop = pos + size;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (element_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (element_stop > total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing anymore
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if (element_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long element_size = element_stop - element_start;
m_pCues =
new (std::nothrow) Cues(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
assert(m_pCues); // TODO
return 0; // success
}
| 174,421 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
| 174,502 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: static void LongOrNullAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "longOrNullAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
bool is_null = IsUndefinedOrNull(v8_value);
impl->setLongOrNullAttribute(cpp_value, is_null);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
|
static void LongOrNullAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "longOrNullAttribute");
bool is_null = IsUndefinedOrNull(v8_value);
int32_t cpp_value = is_null ? int32_t() : NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setLongOrNullAttribute(cpp_value, is_null);
}
| 172,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateCssClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsCssClip(object_)) {
DCHECK(object_.CanContainAbsolutePositionObjects());
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateCssClip(
context_.current.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{context_.current.transform,
ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).ClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset))}));
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearCssClip());
}
}
if (properties_->CssClip())
context_.current.clip = properties_->CssClip();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
|
void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateCssClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsCssClip(object_)) {
DCHECK(object_.CanContainAbsolutePositionObjects());
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateCssClip(
*context_.current.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{context_.current.transform,
ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).ClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset))}));
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearCssClip());
}
}
if (properties_->CssClip())
context_.current.clip = properties_->CssClip();
}
| 171,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::SetDataReductionProxyEnabled(bool enabled) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() != enabled) {
spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.SetValue(enabled);
OnProxyEnabledPrefChange();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(enabled);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
|
void DataReductionProxySettings::SetDataReductionProxyEnabled(bool enabled) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
if (GetOriginalProfilePrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataSaverEnabled) !=
enabled) {
GetOriginalProfilePrefs()->SetBoolean(prefs::kDataSaverEnabled, enabled);
OnProxyEnabledPrefChange();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(enabled);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
}
| 172,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation.
|
Code: void TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask(int32_t unused) {
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
} else {
PP_NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264
|
void TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask(int32_t unused) {
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = nullptr;
} else {
PP_NOTREACHED();
}
}
| 172,124 |
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