instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
139k
| output
stringlengths 16
138k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
{
if (BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->remove(url.string());
if (isMainThread())
blobRegistry().unregisterBlobURL(url);
else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&unregisterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
void BlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(const KURL& url)
{
if (BlobURL::getOrigin(url) == "null")
originMap()->remove(url.string());
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry())
registry->unregisterBlobURL(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&unregisterBlobURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,690 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int re_yylex_init_extra(YY_EXTRA_TYPE yy_user_defined,yyscan_t* ptr_yy_globals )
{
struct yyguts_t dummy_yyguts;
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, &dummy_yyguts);
if (ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = EINVAL;
return 1;
}
*ptr_yy_globals = (yyscan_t) re_yyalloc ( sizeof( struct yyguts_t ), &dummy_yyguts );
if (*ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = ENOMEM;
return 1;
}
/* By setting to 0xAA, we expose bugs in
yy_init_globals. Leave at 0x00 for releases. */
memset(*ptr_yy_globals,0x00,sizeof(struct yyguts_t));
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, *ptr_yy_globals);
return yy_init_globals ( *ptr_yy_globals );
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int re_yylex_init_extra(YY_EXTRA_TYPE yy_user_defined,yyscan_t* ptr_yy_globals )
{
struct yyguts_t dummy_yyguts;
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, &dummy_yyguts);
if (ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = EINVAL;
return 1;
}
*ptr_yy_globals = (yyscan_t) re_yyalloc ( sizeof( struct yyguts_t ), &dummy_yyguts );
if (*ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = ENOMEM;
return 1;
}
/* By setting to 0xAA, we expose bugs in
yy_init_globals. Leave at 0x00 for releases. */
memset(*ptr_yy_globals,0x00,sizeof(struct yyguts_t));
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, *ptr_yy_globals);
return yy_init_globals ( *ptr_yy_globals );
}
| 168,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakNow(Utterance* utterance) {
std::string extension_id = GetMatchingExtensionId(utterance);
if (!extension_id.empty()) {
current_utterance_ = utterance;
utterance->set_extension_id(extension_id);
ListValue args;
args.Set(0, Value::CreateStringValue(utterance->text()));
DictionaryValue* options = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(
utterance->options()->DeepCopy());
if (options->HasKey(util::kEnqueueKey))
options->Remove(util::kEnqueueKey, NULL);
args.Set(1, options);
args.Set(2, Value::CreateIntegerValue(utterance->id()));
std::string json_args;
base::JSONWriter::Write(&args, false, &json_args);
utterance->profile()->GetExtensionEventRouter()->DispatchEventToExtension(
extension_id,
events::kOnSpeak,
json_args,
utterance->profile(),
GURL());
return;
}
GetPlatformImpl()->clear_error();
bool success = GetPlatformImpl()->Speak(
utterance->text(),
utterance->locale(),
utterance->gender(),
utterance->rate(),
utterance->pitch(),
utterance->volume());
if (!success) {
utterance->set_error(GetPlatformImpl()->error());
utterance->FinishAndDestroy();
return;
}
current_utterance_ = utterance;
CheckSpeechStatus();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ExtensionTtsController::SpeakNow(Utterance* utterance) {
}
double pitch = 1.0;
if (options->HasKey(constants::kPitchKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetDouble(constants::kPitchKey, &pitch));
if (pitch < 0.0 || pitch > 2.0) {
error_ = constants::kErrorInvalidPitch;
return false;
}
}
| 170,388 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void processRequest(struct reqelem * req)
{
ssize_t n;
unsigned int l, m;
unsigned char buf[2048];
const unsigned char * p;
int type;
struct device * d = devlist;
unsigned char rbuf[4096];
unsigned char * rp = rbuf+1;
unsigned char nrep = 0;
time_t t;
struct service * newserv = NULL;
struct service * serv;
n = read(req->socket, buf, sizeof(buf));
if(n<0) {
if(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
return; /* try again later */
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) processRequest(): read(): %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
if(n==0) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "(s=%d) request connection closed", req->socket);
goto error;
}
t = time(NULL);
type = buf[0];
p = buf + 1;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(l == 0 && type != 3) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length=0)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "(s=%d) request type=%d str='%.*s'",
req->socket, type, l, p);
switch(type) {
case 1: /* request by type */
case 2: /* request by USN (unique id) */
case 3: /* everything */
while(d && (nrep < 255)) {
if(d->t < t) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "outdated device");
} else {
/* test if we can put more responses in the buffer */
if(d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l + d->headers[HEADER_NT].l
+ d->headers[HEADER_USN].l + 6
+ (rp - rbuf) >= (int)sizeof(rbuf))
break;
if( (type==1 && 0==memcmp(d->headers[HEADER_NT].p, p, l))
||(type==2 && 0==memcmp(d->headers[HEADER_USN].p, p, l))
||(type==3) ) {
/* response :
* 1 - Location
* 2 - NT (device/service type)
* 3 - usn */
m = d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].p, d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l;
m = d->headers[HEADER_NT].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_NT].p, d->headers[HEADER_NT].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_NT].l;
m = d->headers[HEADER_USN].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_USN].p, d->headers[HEADER_USN].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_USN].l;
nrep++;
}
}
d = d->next;
}
/* Also look in service list */
for(serv = servicelisthead.lh_first;
serv && (nrep < 255);
serv = serv->entries.le_next) {
/* test if we can put more responses in the buffer */
if(strlen(serv->location) + strlen(serv->st)
+ strlen(serv->usn) + 6 + (rp - rbuf) >= sizeof(rbuf))
break;
if( (type==1 && 0==strncmp(serv->st, (const char *)p, l))
||(type==2 && 0==strncmp(serv->usn, (const char *)p, l))
||(type==3) ) {
/* response :
* 1 - Location
* 2 - NT (device/service type)
* 3 - usn */
m = strlen(serv->location);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->location, m);
rp += m;
m = strlen(serv->st);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->st, m);
rp += m;
m = strlen(serv->usn);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->usn, m);
rp += m;
nrep++;
}
}
rbuf[0] = nrep;
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "(s=%d) response : %d device%s",
req->socket, nrep, (nrep > 1) ? "s" : "");
if(write(req->socket, rbuf, rp - rbuf) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
break;
case 4: /* submit service */
newserv = malloc(sizeof(struct service));
if(!newserv) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (st contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
newserv->st = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->st) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->st, p, l);
newserv->st[l] = '\0';
p += l;
if(p >= buf + n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (missing usn)");
goto error;
}
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (usn contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "usn='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->usn = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->usn) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->usn, p, l);
newserv->usn[l] = '\0';
p += l;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (server contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "server='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->server = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->server) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->server, p, l);
newserv->server[l] = '\0';
p += l;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (location contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "location='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->location = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->location) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->location, p, l);
newserv->location[l] = '\0';
/* look in service list for duplicate */
for(serv = servicelisthead.lh_first;
serv;
serv = serv->entries.le_next) {
if(0 == strcmp(newserv->usn, serv->usn)
&& 0 == strcmp(newserv->st, serv->st)) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Service allready in the list. Updating...");
free(newserv->st);
free(newserv->usn);
free(serv->server);
serv->server = newserv->server;
free(serv->location);
serv->location = newserv->location;
free(newserv);
newserv = NULL;
return;
}
}
/* Inserting new service */
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&servicelisthead, newserv, entries);
newserv = NULL;
/*rbuf[0] = '\0';
if(write(req->socket, rbuf, 1) < 0)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
*/
break;
default:
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Unknown request type %d", type);
rbuf[0] = '\0';
if(write(req->socket, rbuf, 1) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
}
return;
error:
if(newserv) {
free(newserv->st);
free(newserv->usn);
free(newserv->server);
free(newserv->location);
free(newserv);
newserv = NULL;
}
close(req->socket);
req->socket = -1;
return;
}
Commit Message: minissdpd.c: Initialize pointers to NULL (fix)
CWE ID: CWE-388 | void processRequest(struct reqelem * req)
{
ssize_t n;
unsigned int l, m;
unsigned char buf[2048];
const unsigned char * p;
int type;
struct device * d = devlist;
unsigned char rbuf[4096];
unsigned char * rp = rbuf+1;
unsigned char nrep = 0;
time_t t;
struct service * newserv = NULL;
struct service * serv;
n = read(req->socket, buf, sizeof(buf));
if(n<0) {
if(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
return; /* try again later */
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) processRequest(): read(): %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
if(n==0) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "(s=%d) request connection closed", req->socket);
goto error;
}
t = time(NULL);
type = buf[0];
p = buf + 1;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(l == 0 && type != 3) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length=0)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "(s=%d) request type=%d str='%.*s'",
req->socket, type, l, p);
switch(type) {
case 1: /* request by type */
case 2: /* request by USN (unique id) */
case 3: /* everything */
while(d && (nrep < 255)) {
if(d->t < t) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "outdated device");
} else {
/* test if we can put more responses in the buffer */
if(d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l + d->headers[HEADER_NT].l
+ d->headers[HEADER_USN].l + 6
+ (rp - rbuf) >= (int)sizeof(rbuf))
break;
if( (type==1 && 0==memcmp(d->headers[HEADER_NT].p, p, l))
||(type==2 && 0==memcmp(d->headers[HEADER_USN].p, p, l))
||(type==3) ) {
/* response :
* 1 - Location
* 2 - NT (device/service type)
* 3 - usn */
m = d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].p, d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l;
m = d->headers[HEADER_NT].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_NT].p, d->headers[HEADER_NT].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_NT].l;
m = d->headers[HEADER_USN].l;
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, d->headers[HEADER_USN].p, d->headers[HEADER_USN].l);
rp += d->headers[HEADER_USN].l;
nrep++;
}
}
d = d->next;
}
/* Also look in service list */
for(serv = servicelisthead.lh_first;
serv && (nrep < 255);
serv = serv->entries.le_next) {
/* test if we can put more responses in the buffer */
if(strlen(serv->location) + strlen(serv->st)
+ strlen(serv->usn) + 6 + (rp - rbuf) >= sizeof(rbuf))
break;
if( (type==1 && 0==strncmp(serv->st, (const char *)p, l))
||(type==2 && 0==strncmp(serv->usn, (const char *)p, l))
||(type==3) ) {
/* response :
* 1 - Location
* 2 - NT (device/service type)
* 3 - usn */
m = strlen(serv->location);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->location, m);
rp += m;
m = strlen(serv->st);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->st, m);
rp += m;
m = strlen(serv->usn);
CODELENGTH(m, rp);
memcpy(rp, serv->usn, m);
rp += m;
nrep++;
}
}
rbuf[0] = nrep;
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "(s=%d) response : %d device%s",
req->socket, nrep, (nrep > 1) ? "s" : "");
if(write(req->socket, rbuf, rp - rbuf) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
break;
case 4: /* submit service */
newserv = malloc(sizeof(struct service));
if(!newserv) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memset(newserv, 0, sizeof(struct service)); /* set pointers to NULL */
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (st contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
newserv->st = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->st) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->st, p, l);
newserv->st[l] = '\0';
p += l;
if(p >= buf + n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (missing usn)");
goto error;
}
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (usn contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "usn='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->usn = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->usn) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->usn, p, l);
newserv->usn[l] = '\0';
p += l;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (server contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "server='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->server = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->server) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->server, p, l);
newserv->server[l] = '\0';
p += l;
DECODELENGTH_CHECKLIMIT(l, p, buf + n);
if(p+l > buf+n) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "bad request (length encoding)");
goto error;
}
if(containsForbiddenChars(p, l)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad request (location contains forbidden chars)");
goto error;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "location='%.*s'", l, p);
newserv->location = malloc(l + 1);
if(!newserv->location) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot allocate memory");
goto error;
}
memcpy(newserv->location, p, l);
newserv->location[l] = '\0';
/* look in service list for duplicate */
for(serv = servicelisthead.lh_first;
serv;
serv = serv->entries.le_next) {
if(0 == strcmp(newserv->usn, serv->usn)
&& 0 == strcmp(newserv->st, serv->st)) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Service allready in the list. Updating...");
free(newserv->st);
free(newserv->usn);
free(serv->server);
serv->server = newserv->server;
free(serv->location);
serv->location = newserv->location;
free(newserv);
newserv = NULL;
return;
}
}
/* Inserting new service */
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&servicelisthead, newserv, entries);
newserv = NULL;
/*rbuf[0] = '\0';
if(write(req->socket, rbuf, 1) < 0)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
*/
break;
default:
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Unknown request type %d", type);
rbuf[0] = '\0';
if(write(req->socket, rbuf, 1) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "(s=%d) write: %m", req->socket);
goto error;
}
}
return;
error:
if(newserv) {
free(newserv->st);
free(newserv->usn);
free(newserv->server);
free(newserv->location);
free(newserv);
newserv = NULL;
}
close(req->socket);
req->socket = -1;
return;
}
| 168,843 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->platformTimeStamp());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
ReferrerPolicy policy;
if (hasAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr) && SecurityPolicy::referrerPolicyFromString(fastGetAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr), &policy) && !hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
request.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(policy, completedURL, document().outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().getSecurityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName, false);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
}
if (hasRel(RelationNoOpener))
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->platformTimeStamp());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
ReferrerPolicy policy;
if (hasAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr) && SecurityPolicy::referrerPolicyFromString(fastGetAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr), &policy) && !hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
request.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(policy, completedURL, document().outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().getSecurityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName, false);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
}
if (hasRel(RelationNoOpener))
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
// TODO(japhet): Link clicks can be emulated via JS without a user gesture.
// Why doesn't this go through NavigationScheduler?
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
| 172,257 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPALMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
totalOffset,
seekNextDepth;
MagickPixelPacket
transpix;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
y;
size_t
bytes_per_row,
flags,
bits_per_pixel,
version,
nextDepthOffset,
transparentIndex,
compressionType,
byte,
mask,
redbits,
greenbits,
bluebits,
one,
pad,
size,
bit;
unsigned char
*lastrow,
*one_row,
*ptr;
unsigned short
color16;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
totalOffset=0;
do
{
image->columns=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
bytes_per_row=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
flags=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
bits_per_pixel=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((bits_per_pixel == 0) || (bits_per_pixel > 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
version=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) version;
nextDepthOffset=(size_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
transparentIndex=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
compressionType=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
pad=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) pad;
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
one=1;
if ((bits_per_pixel < 16) &&
(AcquireImageColormap(image,one << bits_per_pixel) == MagickFalse))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&transpix);
if (bits_per_pixel == 16) /* Direct Color */
{
redbits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of red */
(void) redbits;
greenbits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of green */
(void) greenbits;
bluebits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of blue */
(void) bluebits;
ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved by Palm */
ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved by Palm */
transpix.red=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/31);
transpix.green=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/63);
transpix.blue=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/31);
}
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
{
IndexPacket
index;
if (flags & PALM_HAS_COLORMAP_FLAG)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
ReadBlobByte(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) (255-i));
image->colormap[(int) index].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[(int) index].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[(int) index].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
}
}
else
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (1L << bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) (255-i));
image->colormap[(int) index].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][0]);
image->colormap[(int) index].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][1]);
image->colormap[(int) index].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][2]);
}
}
}
if (flags & PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG)
size=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) size;
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->depth=8;
}
one_row=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(bytes_per_row,
2*image->columns),sizeof(*one_row));
if (one_row == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
lastrow=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE) {
lastrow=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(bytes_per_row,
2*image->columns),sizeof(*lastrow));
if (lastrow == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
mask=(size_t) (1U << bits_per_pixel)-1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if ((flags & PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG) == 0)
{
/* TODO move out of loop! */
image->compression=NoCompression;
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_row,one_row);
}
else
{
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_RLE)
{
/* TODO move out of loop! */
image->compression=RLECompression;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row; )
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) bytes_per_row-i);
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(one_row+i,(int) byte,(size_t) count);
i+=count;
}
}
else
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
{
size_t
one;
/* TODO move out of loop! */
one=1;
image->compression=FaxCompression;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row; i+=8)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
byte=(size_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) bytes_per_row-i,8);
for (bit=0; bit < byte; bit++)
{
if ((y == 0) || (count & (one << (7 - bit))))
one_row[i+bit]=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
else
one_row[i+bit]=lastrow[i+bit];
}
}
(void) CopyMagickMemory(lastrow, one_row, bytes_per_row);
}
}
ptr=one_row;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
if (image->columns > (2*bytes_per_row))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
color16=(*ptr++ << 8);
color16|=(*ptr++);
SetPixelRed(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 11) & 0x1f))/0x1f);
SetPixelGreen(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 5) & 0x3f))/0x3f);
SetPixelBlue(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 0) & 0x1f))/0x1f);
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
}
else
{
bit=8-bits_per_pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((size_t) (ptr-one_row) >= bytes_per_row)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
index=(IndexPacket) (mask-(((*ptr) & (mask << bit)) >> bit));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
if (bit)
bit-=bits_per_pixel;
else
{
ptr++;
bit=8-bits_per_pixel;
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (flags & PALM_HAS_TRANSPARENCY_FLAG)
{
if (bits_per_pixel != 16)
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,image->colormap+(mask-transparentIndex),
(const IndexPacket *) NULL,&transpix);
(void) TransparentPaintImage(image,&transpix,(Quantum)
TransparentOpacity,MagickFalse);
}
one_row=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(one_row);
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
lastrow=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(lastrow);
/*
Proceed to next image. Copied from coders/pnm.c
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (nextDepthOffset != 0)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
totalOffset+=(MagickOffsetType) (nextDepthOffset*4);
if (totalOffset >= (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
else
{
seekNextDepth=SeekBlob(image,totalOffset,SEEK_SET);
}
if (seekNextDepth != totalOffset)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Allocate next image structure. Copied from coders/pnm.c
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (nextDepthOffset != 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadPALMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
totalOffset,
seekNextDepth;
MagickPixelPacket
transpix;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
y;
size_t
bytes_per_row,
flags,
bits_per_pixel,
version,
nextDepthOffset,
transparentIndex,
compressionType,
byte,
mask,
redbits,
greenbits,
bluebits,
one,
pad,
size,
bit;
unsigned char
*lastrow,
*one_row,
*ptr;
unsigned short
color16;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
totalOffset=0;
do
{
image->columns=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->rows=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
bytes_per_row=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
flags=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
bits_per_pixel=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((bits_per_pixel == 0) || (bits_per_pixel > 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
version=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) version;
nextDepthOffset=(size_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
transparentIndex=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
compressionType=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
pad=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) pad;
/*
Initialize image colormap.
*/
one=1;
if ((bits_per_pixel < 16) &&
(AcquireImageColormap(image,one << bits_per_pixel) == MagickFalse))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&transpix);
if (bits_per_pixel == 16) /* Direct Color */
{
redbits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of red */
(void) redbits;
greenbits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of green */
(void) greenbits;
bluebits=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image); /* # of bits of blue */
(void) bluebits;
ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved by Palm */
ReadBlobByte(image); /* reserved by Palm */
transpix.red=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/31);
transpix.green=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/63);
transpix.blue=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*ReadBlobByte(image)/31);
}
if (bits_per_pixel == 8)
{
IndexPacket
index;
if (flags & PALM_HAS_COLORMAP_FLAG)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
ReadBlobByte(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) (255-i));
image->colormap[(int) index].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[(int) index].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[(int) index].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image));
}
}
else
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (1L << bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) (255-i));
image->colormap[(int) index].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][0]);
image->colormap[(int) index].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][1]);
image->colormap[(int) index].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(
PalmPalette[i][2]);
}
}
}
if (flags & PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG)
size=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) size;
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->depth=8;
}
one_row=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(bytes_per_row,
2*image->columns),sizeof(*one_row));
if (one_row == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
lastrow=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE) {
lastrow=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(bytes_per_row,
2*image->columns),sizeof(*lastrow));
if (lastrow == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
mask=(size_t) (1U << bits_per_pixel)-1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if ((flags & PALM_IS_COMPRESSED_FLAG) == 0)
{
/* TODO move out of loop! */
image->compression=NoCompression;
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_row,one_row);
}
else
{
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_RLE)
{
/* TODO move out of loop! */
image->compression=RLECompression;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row; )
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
count=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) bytes_per_row-i);
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(one_row+i,(int) byte,(size_t) count);
i+=count;
}
}
else
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
{
size_t
one;
/* TODO move out of loop! */
one=1;
image->compression=FaxCompression;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) bytes_per_row; i+=8)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
byte=(size_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) bytes_per_row-i,8);
for (bit=0; bit < byte; bit++)
{
if ((y == 0) || (count & (one << (7 - bit))))
one_row[i+bit]=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
else
one_row[i+bit]=lastrow[i+bit];
}
}
(void) CopyMagickMemory(lastrow, one_row, bytes_per_row);
}
}
ptr=one_row;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
if (bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
if (image->columns > (2*bytes_per_row))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
color16=(*ptr++ << 8);
color16|=(*ptr++);
SetPixelRed(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 11) & 0x1f))/0x1f);
SetPixelGreen(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 5) & 0x3f))/0x3f);
SetPixelBlue(q,(QuantumRange*((color16 >> 0) & 0x1f))/0x1f);
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
}
else
{
bit=8-bits_per_pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((size_t) (ptr-one_row) >= bytes_per_row)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
index=(IndexPacket) (mask-(((*ptr) & (mask << bit)) >> bit));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
if (bit)
bit-=bits_per_pixel;
else
{
ptr++;
bit=8-bits_per_pixel;
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (flags & PALM_HAS_TRANSPARENCY_FLAG)
{
if (bits_per_pixel != 16)
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,image->colormap+(mask-transparentIndex),
(const IndexPacket *) NULL,&transpix);
(void) TransparentPaintImage(image,&transpix,(Quantum)
TransparentOpacity,MagickFalse);
}
one_row=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(one_row);
if (compressionType == PALM_COMPRESSION_SCANLINE)
lastrow=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(lastrow);
/*
Proceed to next image. Copied from coders/pnm.c
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (nextDepthOffset != 0)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
totalOffset+=(MagickOffsetType) (nextDepthOffset*4);
if (totalOffset >= (MagickOffsetType) GetBlobSize(image))
{
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
else
{
seekNextDepth=SeekBlob(image,totalOffset,SEEK_SET);
}
if (seekNextDepth != totalOffset)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Allocate next image structure. Copied from coders/pnm.c
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (nextDepthOffset != 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 168,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Make sure that id->index does not overflow
The ALSA control code expects that the range of assigned indices to a control is
continuous and does not overflow. Currently there are no checks to enforce this.
If a control with a overflowing index range is created that control becomes
effectively inaccessible and unremovable since snd_ctl_find_id() will not be
able to find it. This patch adds a check that makes sure that controls with a
overflowing index range can not be created.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id;
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int count;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (! kcontrol)
return err;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info))
goto error;
id = kcontrol->id;
if (id.index > UINT_MAX - kcontrol->count)
goto error;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n",
id.iface,
id.device,
id.subdevice,
id.name,
id.index);
err = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) {
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls);
card->controls_count += kcontrol->count;
kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1;
card->last_numid += kcontrol->count;
count = kcontrol->count;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++)
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id);
return 0;
error:
snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol);
return err;
}
| 169,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding*[count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos,
size,
pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::ParseContentEncodingsEntry(long long start, long long size) {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
assert(pReader);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
int count = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
// pos now designates start of element
if (id == 0x2240) // ContentEncoding ID
++count;
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (count <= 0)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_ = new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding* [count];
if (!content_encoding_entries_)
return -1;
content_encoding_entries_end_ = content_encoding_entries_;
pos = start;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
// pos now designates start of element
if (id == 0x2240) { // ContentEncoding ID
ContentEncoding* const content_encoding =
new (std::nothrow) ContentEncoding();
if (!content_encoding)
return -1;
status = content_encoding->ParseContentEncodingEntry(pos, size, pReader);
if (status) {
delete content_encoding;
return status;
}
*content_encoding_entries_end_++ = content_encoding;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
| 174,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void llc_conn_handler(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_addr saddr, daddr;
struct sock *sk;
llc_pdu_decode_sa(skb, saddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_ssap(skb, &saddr.lsap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, daddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &daddr.lsap);
sk = __llc_lookup(sap, &saddr, &daddr);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This has to be done here and not at the upper layer ->accept
* method because of the way the PROCOM state machine works:
* it needs to set several state variables (see, for instance,
* llc_adm_actions_2 in net/llc/llc_c_st.c) and send a packet to
* the originator of the new connection, and this state has to be
* in the newly created struct sock private area. -acme
*/
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
struct sock *newsk = llc_create_incoming_sock(sk, skb->dev,
&saddr, &daddr);
if (!newsk)
goto drop_unlock;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
} else {
/*
* Can't be skb_set_owner_r, this will be done at the
* llc_conn_state_process function, later on, when we will use
* skb_queue_rcv_skb to send it to upper layers, this is
* another trick required to cope with how the PROCOM state
* machine works. -acme
*/
skb->sk = sk;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
llc_conn_rcv(sk, skb);
else {
dprintk("%s: adding to backlog...\n", __func__);
llc_set_backlog_type(skb, LLC_PACKET);
if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
goto drop_unlock;
}
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
drop_unlock:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void llc_conn_handler(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_addr saddr, daddr;
struct sock *sk;
llc_pdu_decode_sa(skb, saddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_ssap(skb, &saddr.lsap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, daddr.mac);
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &daddr.lsap);
sk = __llc_lookup(sap, &saddr, &daddr);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This has to be done here and not at the upper layer ->accept
* method because of the way the PROCOM state machine works:
* it needs to set several state variables (see, for instance,
* llc_adm_actions_2 in net/llc/llc_c_st.c) and send a packet to
* the originator of the new connection, and this state has to be
* in the newly created struct sock private area. -acme
*/
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) {
struct sock *newsk = llc_create_incoming_sock(sk, skb->dev,
&saddr, &daddr);
if (!newsk)
goto drop_unlock;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, newsk);
} else {
/*
* Can't be skb_set_owner_r, this will be done at the
* llc_conn_state_process function, later on, when we will use
* skb_queue_rcv_skb to send it to upper layers, this is
* another trick required to cope with how the PROCOM state
* machine works. -acme
*/
skb_orphan(skb);
sock_hold(sk);
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_efree;
}
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
llc_conn_rcv(sk, skb);
else {
dprintk("%s: adding to backlog...\n", __func__);
llc_set_backlog_type(skb, LLC_PACKET);
if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb, sk->sk_rcvbuf))
goto drop_unlock;
}
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
drop_unlock:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
| 168,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Utterance::FinishAndDestroy() {
completion_task_->Run();
completion_task_ = NULL;
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Utterance::FinishAndDestroy() {
| 170,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void bnep_net_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
memset(dev->broadcast, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
dev->addr_len = ETH_ALEN;
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &bnep_netdev_ops;
dev->watchdog_timeo = HZ * 2;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void bnep_net_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
memset(dev->broadcast, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
dev->addr_len = ETH_ALEN;
ether_setup(dev);
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING;
dev->netdev_ops = &bnep_netdev_ops;
dev->watchdog_timeo = HZ * 2;
}
| 165,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_do_read_interlace(png_structp png_ptr)
{
png_row_infop row_info = &(png_ptr->row_info);
png_bytep row = png_ptr->row_buf + 1;
int pass = png_ptr->pass;
png_uint_32 transformations = png_ptr->transformations;
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Offset to next interlace block */
PNG_CONST int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
png_debug(1, "in png_do_read_interlace");
if (row != NULL && row_info != NULL)
{
png_uint_32 final_width;
final_width = row_info->width * png_pass_inc[pass];
switch (row_info->pixel_depth)
{
case 1:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)((row_info->width - 1) >> 3);
png_bytep dp = row + (png_size_t)((final_width - 1) >> 3);
int sshift, dshift;
int s_start, s_end, s_inc;
int jstop = png_pass_inc[pass];
png_byte v;
png_uint_32 i;
int j;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
sshift = (int)((row_info->width + 7) & 0x07);
dshift = (int)((final_width + 7) & 0x07);
s_start = 7;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -1;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = 7 - (int)((row_info->width + 7) & 0x07);
dshift = 7 - (int)((final_width + 7) & 0x07);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 7;
s_inc = 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0x01);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
*dp &= (png_byte)((0x7f7f >> (7 - dshift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(v << dshift);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift += s_inc;
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift += s_inc;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_uint_32)((row_info->width - 1) >> 2);
png_bytep dp = row + (png_uint_32)((final_width - 1) >> 2);
int sshift, dshift;
int s_start, s_end, s_inc;
int jstop = png_pass_inc[pass];
png_uint_32 i;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
sshift = (int)(((row_info->width + 3) & 0x03) << 1);
dshift = (int)(((final_width + 3) & 0x03) << 1);
s_start = 6;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -2;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = (int)((3 - ((row_info->width + 3) & 0x03)) << 1);
dshift = (int)((3 - ((final_width + 3) & 0x03)) << 1);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 6;
s_inc = 2;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v;
int j;
v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0x03);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
*dp &= (png_byte)((0x3f3f >> (6 - dshift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(v << dshift);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift += s_inc;
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift += s_inc;
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)((row_info->width - 1) >> 1);
png_bytep dp = row + (png_size_t)((final_width - 1) >> 1);
int sshift, dshift;
int s_start, s_end, s_inc;
png_uint_32 i;
int jstop = png_pass_inc[pass];
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
sshift = (int)(((row_info->width + 1) & 0x01) << 2);
dshift = (int)(((final_width + 1) & 0x01) << 2);
s_start = 4;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -4;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = (int)((1 - ((row_info->width + 1) & 0x01)) << 2);
dshift = (int)((1 - ((final_width + 1) & 0x01)) << 2);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 4;
s_inc = 4;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0xf);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
*dp &= (png_byte)((0xf0f >> (4 - dshift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(v << dshift);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift += s_inc;
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift += s_inc;
}
break;
}
default:
{
png_size_t pixel_bytes = (row_info->pixel_depth >> 3);
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)(row_info->width - 1)
* pixel_bytes;
png_bytep dp = row + (png_size_t)(final_width - 1) * pixel_bytes;
int jstop = png_pass_inc[pass];
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v[8];
int j;
png_memcpy(v, sp, pixel_bytes);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
png_memcpy(dp, v, pixel_bytes);
dp -= pixel_bytes;
}
sp -= pixel_bytes;
}
break;
}
}
row_info->width = final_width;
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, final_width);
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
PNG_UNUSED(transformations) /* Silence compiler warning */
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_do_read_interlace(png_structp png_ptr)
{
png_row_infop row_info = &(png_ptr->row_info);
png_bytep row = png_ptr->row_buf + 1;
int pass = png_ptr->pass;
png_uint_32 transformations = png_ptr->transformations;
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Offset to next interlace block */
#ifndef PNG_USE_GLOBAL_ARRAYS
PNG_CONST int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
#endif
png_debug(1, "in png_do_read_interlace");
if (row != NULL && row_info != NULL)
{
png_uint_32 final_width;
final_width = row_info->width * png_pass_inc[pass];
switch (row_info->pixel_depth)
{
case 1:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)((row_info->width - 1) >> 3);
png_bytep dp = row + (png_size_t)((final_width - 1) >> 3);
int sshift, dshift;
int s_start, s_end, s_inc;
int jstop = png_pass_inc[pass];
png_byte v;
png_uint_32 i;
int j;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
sshift = (int)((row_info->width + 7) & 0x07);
dshift = (int)((final_width + 7) & 0x07);
s_start = 7;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -1;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = 7 - (int)((row_info->width + 7) & 0x07);
dshift = 7 - (int)((final_width + 7) & 0x07);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 7;
s_inc = 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0x01);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
*dp &= (png_byte)((0x7f7f >> (7 - dshift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(v << dshift);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift += s_inc;
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift += s_inc;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_uint_32)((row_info->width - 1) >> 2);
png_bytep dp = row + (png_uint_32)((final_width - 1) >> 2);
int sshift, dshift;
int s_start, s_end, s_inc;
int jstop = png_pass_inc[pass];
png_uint_32 i;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
sshift = (int)(((row_info->width + 3) & 0x03) << 1);
dshift = (int)(((final_width + 3) & 0x03) << 1);
s_start = 6;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -2;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = (int)((3 - ((row_info->width + 3) & 0x03)) << 1);
dshift = (int)((3 - ((final_width + 3) & 0x03)) << 1);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 6;
s_inc = 2;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v;
int j;
v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0x03);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
*dp &= (png_byte)((0x3f3f >> (6 - dshift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(v << dshift);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift += s_inc;
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift += s_inc;
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)((row_info->width - 1) >> 1);
png_bytep dp = row + (png_size_t)((final_width - 1) >> 1);
int sshift, dshift;
int s_start, s_end, s_inc;
png_uint_32 i;
int jstop = png_pass_inc[pass];
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
if (transformations & PNG_PACKSWAP)
{
sshift = (int)(((row_info->width + 1) & 0x01) << 2);
dshift = (int)(((final_width + 1) & 0x01) << 2);
s_start = 4;
s_end = 0;
s_inc = -4;
}
else
#endif
{
sshift = (int)((1 - ((row_info->width + 1) & 0x01)) << 2);
dshift = (int)((1 - ((final_width + 1) & 0x01)) << 2);
s_start = 0;
s_end = 4;
s_inc = 4;
}
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v = (png_byte)((*sp >> sshift) & 0xf);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
*dp &= (png_byte)((0xf0f >> (4 - dshift)) & 0xff);
*dp |= (png_byte)(v << dshift);
if (dshift == s_end)
{
dshift = s_start;
dp--;
}
else
dshift += s_inc;
}
if (sshift == s_end)
{
sshift = s_start;
sp--;
}
else
sshift += s_inc;
}
break;
}
default:
{
png_size_t pixel_bytes = (row_info->pixel_depth >> 3);
png_bytep sp = row + (png_size_t)(row_info->width - 1)
* pixel_bytes;
png_bytep dp = row + (png_size_t)(final_width - 1) * pixel_bytes;
int jstop = png_pass_inc[pass];
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0; i < row_info->width; i++)
{
png_byte v[8];
int j;
png_memcpy(v, sp, pixel_bytes);
for (j = 0; j < jstop; j++)
{
png_memcpy(dp, v, pixel_bytes);
dp -= pixel_bytes;
}
sp -= pixel_bytes;
}
break;
}
}
row_info->width = final_width;
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, final_width);
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_PACKSWAP_SUPPORTED
PNG_UNUSED(transformations) /* Silence compiler warning */
#endif
}
| 172,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_set_station_nickname");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
wl_lock(lp, &flags);
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
memcpy(lp->StationName, extra, wrqu->data.length);
/* Commit the adapter parameters */
wl_apply(lp);
wl_unlock(lp, &flags);
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return ret;
} /* wvlan_set_station_nickname */
Commit Message: staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int wvlan_set_station_nickname(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct wl_private *lp = wl_priv(dev);
unsigned long flags;
size_t len;
int ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_set_station_nickname");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
wl_lock(lp, &flags);
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
len = min_t(size_t, wrqu->data.length, sizeof(lp->StationName));
strlcpy(lp->StationName, extra, len);
/* Commit the adapter parameters */
wl_apply(lp);
wl_unlock(lp, &flags);
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return ret;
} /* wvlan_set_station_nickname */
| 165,963 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebContents* TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::GetWebContentsForID(
int window_id,
std::string* error) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(chrome_details_, window_id, &browser, error))
return nullptr;
WebContents* contents = browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!contents) {
*error = "No active web contents to capture";
return nullptr;
}
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
contents->GetLastCommittedURL(),
SessionTabHelper::IdForTab(contents).id(), error)) {
return nullptr;
}
return contents;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | WebContents* TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::GetWebContentsForID(
int window_id,
std::string* error) {
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(chrome_details_, window_id, &browser, error))
return nullptr;
WebContents* contents = browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!contents) {
*error = "No active web contents to capture";
return nullptr;
}
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
contents->GetLastCommittedURL(),
SessionTabHelper::IdForTab(contents).id(), error,
extensions::CaptureRequirement::kActiveTabOrAllUrls)) {
return nullptr;
}
return contents;
}
| 173,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
int err;
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = usin->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
IP6_ECN_flow_init(fl6.flowlabel);
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel;
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
}
}
/*
* connect() to INADDR_ANY means loopback (BSD'ism).
*/
if (ipv6_addr_any(&usin->sin6_addr))
usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -ENETUNREACH;
if (addr_type&IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
usin->sin6_scope_id) {
/* If interface is set while binding, indices
* must coincide.
*/
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
sk->sk_bound_dev_if != usin->sin6_scope_id)
return -EINVAL;
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = usin->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Connect to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp &&
!ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_daddr, &usin->sin6_addr)) {
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = 0;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = 0;
tp->write_seq = 0;
}
sk->sk_v6_daddr = usin->sin6_addr;
np->flow_label = fl6.flowlabel;
/*
* TCP over IPv4
*/
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
u32 exthdrlen = icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "connect: ipv4 mapped\n");
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = usin->sin6_port;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
err = tcp_v4_connect(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
if (err) {
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = exthdrlen;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_specific;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v6_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_specific;
#endif
goto failure;
}
np->saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
return err;
}
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr))
saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = saddr ? *saddr : np->saddr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, np->opt, &final);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto failure;
}
if (!saddr) {
saddr = &fl6.saddr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = *saddr;
}
/* set the source address */
np->saddr = *saddr;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
sk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
if (tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle &&
!tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
tcp_fetch_timewait_stamp(sk, dst);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (np->opt)
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (np->opt->opt_flen +
np->opt->opt_nflen);
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_SYN_SENT);
err = inet6_hash_connect(&tcp_death_row, sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
sk_set_txhash(sk);
if (!tp->write_seq && likely(!tp->repair))
tp->write_seq = secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
inet->inet_sport,
inet->inet_dport);
err = tcp_connect(sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
return 0;
late_failure:
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
__sk_dst_reset(sk);
failure:
inet->inet_dport = 0;
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *usin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *saddr = NULL, *final_p, final;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int addr_type;
int err;
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = usin->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
IP6_ECN_flow_init(fl6.flowlabel);
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel;
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
}
}
/*
* connect() to INADDR_ANY means loopback (BSD'ism).
*/
if (ipv6_addr_any(&usin->sin6_addr))
usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&usin->sin6_addr);
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -ENETUNREACH;
if (addr_type&IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
usin->sin6_scope_id) {
/* If interface is set while binding, indices
* must coincide.
*/
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if &&
sk->sk_bound_dev_if != usin->sin6_scope_id)
return -EINVAL;
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = usin->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Connect to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp &&
!ipv6_addr_equal(&sk->sk_v6_daddr, &usin->sin6_addr)) {
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = 0;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = 0;
tp->write_seq = 0;
}
sk->sk_v6_daddr = usin->sin6_addr;
np->flow_label = fl6.flowlabel;
/*
* TCP over IPv4
*/
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
u32 exthdrlen = icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len;
struct sockaddr_in sin;
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "connect: ipv4 mapped\n");
if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -ENETUNREACH;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_port = usin->sin6_port;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = usin->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
err = tcp_v4_connect(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
if (err) {
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = exthdrlen;
icsk->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_specific;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v6_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_specific;
#endif
goto failure;
}
np->saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
return err;
}
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr))
saddr = &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = saddr ? *saddr : np->saddr;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = usin->sin6_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
opt = rcu_dereference_protected(np->opt, sock_owned_by_user(sk));
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto failure;
}
if (!saddr) {
saddr = &fl6.saddr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = *saddr;
}
/* set the source address */
np->saddr = *saddr;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
sk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
if (tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle &&
!tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&fl6.daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
tcp_fetch_timewait_stamp(sk, dst);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (opt)
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen +
opt->opt_nflen;
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin6_port;
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_SYN_SENT);
err = inet6_hash_connect(&tcp_death_row, sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
sk_set_txhash(sk);
if (!tp->write_seq && likely(!tp->repair))
tp->write_seq = secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(np->saddr.s6_addr32,
sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32,
inet->inet_sport,
inet->inet_dport);
err = tcp_connect(sk);
if (err)
goto late_failure;
return 0;
late_failure:
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
__sk_dst_reset(sk);
failure:
inet->inet_dport = 0;
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
return err;
}
| 167,340 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: krb5_gss_process_context_token(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 majerr;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* "unseal" the token */
if (GSS_ERROR(majerr = kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, NULL, NULL,
KG_TOK_DEL_CTX)))
return(majerr);
/* that's it. delete the context */
return(krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, &context_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER));
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | krb5_gss_process_context_token(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
OM_uint32 majerr;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
/* We only support context deletion tokens for now, and RFC 4121 does not
* define a context deletion token. */
if (ctx->proto) {
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
}
/* "unseal" the token */
if (GSS_ERROR(majerr = kg_unseal(minor_status, context_handle,
token_buffer,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, NULL, NULL,
KG_TOK_DEL_CTX)))
return(majerr);
/* Mark the context as terminated, but do not delete it (as that would
* leave the caller with a dangling context handle). */
ctx->terminated = 1;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
| 166,823 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int bta_co_rfc_data_outgoing(void *user_data, uint8_t *buf, uint16_t size) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
int ret = false;
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (!slot)
goto out;
int received = recv(slot->fd, buf, size, 0);
if(received == size) {
ret = true;
} else {
LOG_ERROR("%s error receiving RFCOMM data from app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
out:;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int bta_co_rfc_data_outgoing(void *user_data, uint8_t *buf, uint16_t size) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
int ret = false;
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (!slot)
goto out;
int received = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(slot->fd, buf, size, 0));
if(received == size) {
ret = true;
} else {
LOG_ERROR("%s error receiving RFCOMM data from app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
out:;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
return ret;
}
| 173,455 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool radeon_atom_get_tv_timings(struct radeon_device *rdev, int index,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *tv_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *tv_info_v1_2;
ATOM_DTD_FORMAT *dtd_timings;
int data_index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, AnalogTV_Info);
u8 frev, crev;
u16 data_offset, misc;
if (!atom_parse_data_header(mode_info->atom_context, data_index, NULL,
&frev, &crev, &data_offset))
return false;
switch (crev) {
case 1:
tv_info = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING)
return false;
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Total);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Disp);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Total);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Disp);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usPixelClock) * 10;
if (index == 1) {
/* PAL timings appear to have wrong values for totals */
mode->crtc_htotal -= 1;
mode->crtc_vtotal -= 1;
}
break;
case 2:
tv_info_v1_2 = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index > MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2)
return false;
dtd_timings = &tv_info_v1_2->aModeTimings[index];
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = mode->crtc_hsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = mode->crtc_vsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usPixClk) * 10;
break;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool radeon_atom_get_tv_timings(struct radeon_device *rdev, int index,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *tv_info;
ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *tv_info_v1_2;
ATOM_DTD_FORMAT *dtd_timings;
int data_index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, AnalogTV_Info);
u8 frev, crev;
u16 data_offset, misc;
if (!atom_parse_data_header(mode_info->atom_context, data_index, NULL,
&frev, &crev, &data_offset))
return false;
switch (crev) {
case 1:
tv_info = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index >= MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING)
return false;
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Total);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_Disp);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_H_SyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Total);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_Disp);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncStart) +
le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usCRTC_V_SyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(tv_info->aModeTimings[index].usPixelClock) * 10;
if (index == 1) {
/* PAL timings appear to have wrong values for totals */
mode->crtc_htotal -= 1;
mode->crtc_vtotal -= 1;
}
break;
case 2:
tv_info_v1_2 = (ATOM_ANALOG_TV_INFO_V1_2 *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (index >= MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2)
return false;
dtd_timings = &tv_info_v1_2->aModeTimings[index];
mode->crtc_htotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_hdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive);
mode->crtc_hsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_hsync_end = mode->crtc_hsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usHSyncWidth);
mode->crtc_vtotal = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVBlanking_Time);
mode->crtc_vdisplay = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive);
mode->crtc_vsync_start = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVActive) +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncOffset);
mode->crtc_vsync_end = mode->crtc_vsync_start +
le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usVSyncWidth);
mode->flags = 0;
misc = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->susModeMiscInfo.usAccess);
if (misc & ATOM_VSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_HSYNC_POLARITY)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_COMPOSITESYNC)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_CSYNC;
if (misc & ATOM_INTERLACE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE;
if (misc & ATOM_DOUBLE_CLOCK_MODE)
mode->flags |= DRM_MODE_FLAG_DBLSCAN;
mode->clock = le16_to_cpu(dtd_timings->usPixClk) * 10;
break;
}
return true;
}
| 169,873 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: delete_policy_2_svc(dpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_policy((void *)handle, arg->name);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | delete_policy_2_svc(dpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
prime_arg = arg->name;
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, NULL, NULL)) {
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_policy", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_policy((void *)handle, arg->name);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_policy",
((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,511 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct ssh *ssh = ctxt;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
| 165,483 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: init_util(void)
{
filegen_register(statsdir, "peerstats", &peerstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "loopstats", &loopstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "clockstats", &clockstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "rawstats", &rawstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "sysstats", &sysstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "protostats", &protostats);
#ifdef AUTOKEY
filegen_register(statsdir, "cryptostats", &cryptostats);
#endif /* AUTOKEY */
#ifdef DEBUG_TIMING
filegen_register(statsdir, "timingstats", &timingstats);
#endif /* DEBUG_TIMING */
/*
* register with libntp ntp_set_tod() to call us back
* when time is stepped.
*/
step_callback = &ntpd_time_stepped;
#ifdef DEBUG
atexit(&uninit_util);
#endif /* DEBUG */
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | init_util(void)
{
filegen_register(statsdir, "peerstats", &peerstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "loopstats", &loopstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "clockstats", &clockstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "rawstats", &rawstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "sysstats", &sysstats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "protostats", &protostats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "cryptostats", &cryptostats);
filegen_register(statsdir, "timingstats", &timingstats);
/*
* register with libntp ntp_set_tod() to call us back
* when time is stepped.
*/
step_callback = &ntpd_time_stepped;
#ifdef DEBUG
atexit(&uninit_util);
#endif /* DEBUG */
}
| 168,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuFeatureFlags() {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this, &GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuFeatureFlags));
return;
}
GpuBlacklist* gpu_blacklist = GetGpuBlacklist();
if (gpu_blacklist == NULL)
return;
if (!gpu_blacklist) {
gpu_feature_flags_.set_flags(0);
return;
}
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
gpu_feature_flags_ = gpu_blacklist->DetermineGpuFeatureFlags(
GpuBlacklist::kOsAny, NULL, gpu_info_);
}
uint32 max_entry_id = gpu_blacklist->max_entry_id();
if (!gpu_feature_flags_.flags()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.BlacklistTestResultsPerEntry",
0, max_entry_id + 1);
return;
}
RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks();
std::vector<uint32> flag_entries;
gpu_blacklist->GetGpuFeatureFlagEntries(
GpuFeatureFlags::kGpuFeatureAll, flag_entries);
DCHECK_GT(flag_entries.size(), 0u);
for (size_t i = 0; i < flag_entries.size(); ++i) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.BlacklistTestResultsPerEntry",
flag_entries[i], max_entry_id + 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuFeatureFlags() {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(this, &GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuFeatureFlags));
return;
}
GpuBlacklist* gpu_blacklist = GetGpuBlacklist();
if (!gpu_blacklist) {
gpu_feature_flags_.set_flags(0);
return;
}
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
gpu_feature_flags_ = gpu_blacklist->DetermineGpuFeatureFlags(
GpuBlacklist::kOsAny, NULL, gpu_info_);
}
uint32 max_entry_id = gpu_blacklist->max_entry_id();
if (!gpu_feature_flags_.flags()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.BlacklistTestResultsPerEntry",
0, max_entry_id + 1);
return;
}
RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks();
std::vector<uint32> flag_entries;
gpu_blacklist->GetGpuFeatureFlagEntries(
GpuFeatureFlags::kGpuFeatureAll, flag_entries);
DCHECK_GT(flag_entries.size(), 0u);
for (size_t i = 0; i < flag_entries.size(); ++i) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.BlacklistTestResultsPerEntry",
flag_entries[i], max_entry_id + 1);
}
}
| 170,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dns_stricmp(const char* str1, const char* str2)
{
char c1, c2;
*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* DNS variables */
static struct udp_pcb *dns_pcb;
static u8_t dns_seqno;
static struct dns_table_entry dns_table[DNS_TABLE_SIZE];
static struct dns_req_entry dns_requests[DNS_MAX_REQUESTS];
if (c1_upc != c2_upc) {
/* still not equal */
/* don't care for < or > */
return 1;
}
} else {
/* characters are not equal but none is in the alphabet range */
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-345 | dns_stricmp(const char* str1, const char* str2)
{
char c1, c2;
*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* DNS variables */
static struct udp_pcb *dns_pcbs[DNS_MAX_SOURCE_PORTS];
#if ((LWIP_DNS_SECURE & LWIP_DNS_SECURE_RAND_SRC_PORT) != 0)
static u8_t dns_last_pcb_idx;
#endif
static u8_t dns_seqno;
static struct dns_table_entry dns_table[DNS_TABLE_SIZE];
static struct dns_req_entry dns_requests[DNS_MAX_REQUESTS];
if (c1_upc != c2_upc) {
/* still not equal */
/* don't care for < or > */
return 1;
}
} else {
/* characters are not equal but none is in the alphabet range */
return 1;
}
| 165,048 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadXWDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define CheckOverflowException(length,width,height) \
(((height) != 0) && ((length)/((size_t) height) != ((size_t) width)))
char
*comment;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
int
x_status;
MagickBooleanType
authentic_colormap;
MagickStatusType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register size_t
pixel;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
XColor
*colors;
XImage
*ximage;
XWDFileHeader
header;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read in header information.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDheader,(unsigned char *) &header);
if (count != sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageHeader");
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &header,sz_XWDheader);
/*
Check to see if the dump file is in the proper format.
*/
if (header.file_version != XWD_FILE_VERSION)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"FileFormatVersionMismatch");
if (header.header_size < sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((header.bits_per_pixel == 0) || (header.bits_per_pixel > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (((header.bitmap_pad % 8) != 0) || (header.bitmap_pad > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (header.bitmap_unit > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (header.ncolors > 256)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
switch (header.visual_class)
{
case StaticGray:
case GrayScale:
case StaticColor:
case PseudoColor:
case TrueColor:
case DirectColor:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.pixmap_format)
{
case XYBitmap:
case XYPixmap:
case ZPixmap:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
length=(size_t) (header.header_size-sz_XWDheader);
if ((length+1) != ((size_t) ((CARD32) (length+1))))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
/*
Initialize the X image.
*/
ximage=(XImage *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*ximage));
if (ximage == (XImage *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
ximage->depth=(int) header.pixmap_depth;
ximage->format=(int) header.pixmap_format;
ximage->xoffset=(int) header.xoffset;
ximage->data=(char *) NULL;
ximage->width=(int) header.pixmap_width;
ximage->height=(int) header.pixmap_height;
ximage->bitmap_pad=(int) header.bitmap_pad;
ximage->bytes_per_line=(int) header.bytes_per_line;
ximage->byte_order=(int) header.byte_order;
ximage->bitmap_unit=(int) header.bitmap_unit;
ximage->bitmap_bit_order=(int) header.bitmap_bit_order;
ximage->bits_per_pixel=(int) header.bits_per_pixel;
ximage->red_mask=header.red_mask;
ximage->green_mask=header.green_mask;
ximage->blue_mask=header.blue_mask;
if ((ximage->width < 0) || (ximage->height < 0) || (ximage->depth < 0) ||
(ximage->format < 0) || (ximage->byte_order < 0) ||
(ximage->bitmap_bit_order < 0) || (ximage->bitmap_pad < 0) ||
(ximage->bytes_per_line < 0))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->width > 65535) || (ximage->height > 65535))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->bits_per_pixel > 32) || (ximage->bitmap_unit > 32))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
x_status=XInitImage(ximage);
if (x_status == 0)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
/*
Read colormap.
*/
authentic_colormap=MagickFalse;
colors=(XColor *) NULL;
if (header.ncolors != 0)
{
XWDColor
color;
length=(size_t) header.ncolors;
if (length > ((~0UL)/sizeof(*colors)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
colors=(XColor *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*colors));
if (colors == (XColor *) NULL)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDColor,(unsigned char *) &color);
if (count != sz_XWDColor)
{
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
colors[i].pixel=color.pixel;
colors[i].red=color.red;
colors[i].green=color.green;
colors[i].blue=color.blue;
colors[i].flags=(char) color.flags;
if (color.flags != 0)
authentic_colormap=MagickTrue;
}
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &colors[i].pixel,
sizeof(colors[i].pixel));
MSBOrderShort((unsigned char *) &colors[i].red,3*
sizeof(colors[i].red));
}
}
/*
Allocate the pixel buffer.
*/
length=(size_t) ximage->bytes_per_line*ximage->height;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,ximage->bytes_per_line,ximage->height))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (ximage->format != ZPixmap)
{
size_t
extent;
extent=length;
length*=ximage->depth;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,extent,ximage->depth))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
ximage->data=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*ximage->data));
if (ximage->data == (char *) NULL)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) ximage->data);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
/*
Convert image to MIFF format.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) ximage->width;
image->rows=(size_t) ximage->height;
image->depth=8;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((header.ncolors == 0U) || (ximage->red_mask != 0) ||
(ximage->green_mask != 0) || (ximage->blue_mask != 0))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
else
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=header.ncolors;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
switch (image->storage_class)
{
case DirectClass:
default:
{
register size_t
color;
size_t
blue_mask,
blue_shift,
green_mask,
green_shift,
red_mask,
red_shift;
/*
Determine shift and mask for red, green, and blue.
*/
red_mask=ximage->red_mask;
red_shift=0;
while ((red_mask != 0) && ((red_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
red_mask>>=1;
red_shift++;
}
green_mask=ximage->green_mask;
green_shift=0;
while ((green_mask != 0) && ((green_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
green_mask>>=1;
green_shift++;
}
blue_mask=ximage->blue_mask;
blue_shift=0;
while ((blue_mask != 0) && ((blue_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
blue_mask>>=1;
blue_shift++;
}
/*
Convert X image to DirectClass packets.
*/
if ((image->colors != 0) && (authentic_colormap != MagickFalse))
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
red_shift) & red_mask);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t) index].red));
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
green_shift) & green_mask);
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t)
index].green));
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
blue_shift) & blue_mask);
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t) index].blue));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
color=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
if (red_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/red_mask;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
color=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
if (green_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
color=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
if (blue_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PseudoClass:
{
/*
Convert X image to PseudoClass packets.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].blue);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) XGetPixel(ximage,(int)
x,(int) y));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
/*
Free image and colormap.
*/
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1546
CWE ID: CWE-369 | static Image *ReadXWDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define CheckOverflowException(length,width,height) \
(((height) != 0) && ((length)/((size_t) height) != ((size_t) width)))
char
*comment;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
int
x_status;
MagickBooleanType
authentic_colormap;
MagickStatusType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register size_t
pixel;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
XColor
*colors;
XImage
*ximage;
XWDFileHeader
header;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read in header information.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDheader,(unsigned char *) &header);
if (count != sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageHeader");
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &header,sz_XWDheader);
/*
Check to see if the dump file is in the proper format.
*/
if (header.file_version != XWD_FILE_VERSION)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"FileFormatVersionMismatch");
if (header.header_size < sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((header.bits_per_pixel == 0) || (header.bits_per_pixel > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((header.bitmap_bit_order != MSBFirst) &&
(header.bitmap_bit_order != LSBFirst))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (((header.bitmap_pad % 8) != 0) || (header.bitmap_pad > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (header.bitmap_unit > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (header.ncolors > 256)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
switch (header.visual_class)
{
case StaticGray:
case GrayScale:
case StaticColor:
case PseudoColor:
case TrueColor:
case DirectColor:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.pixmap_format)
{
case XYBitmap:
case XYPixmap:
case ZPixmap:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
length=(size_t) (header.header_size-sz_XWDheader);
if ((length+1) != ((size_t) ((CARD32) (length+1))))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
/*
Initialize the X image.
*/
ximage=(XImage *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*ximage));
if (ximage == (XImage *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
ximage->depth=(int) header.pixmap_depth;
ximage->format=(int) header.pixmap_format;
ximage->xoffset=(int) header.xoffset;
ximage->data=(char *) NULL;
ximage->width=(int) header.pixmap_width;
ximage->height=(int) header.pixmap_height;
ximage->bitmap_pad=(int) header.bitmap_pad;
ximage->bytes_per_line=(int) header.bytes_per_line;
ximage->byte_order=(int) header.byte_order;
ximage->bitmap_unit=(int) header.bitmap_unit;
ximage->bitmap_bit_order=(int) header.bitmap_bit_order;
ximage->bits_per_pixel=(int) header.bits_per_pixel;
ximage->red_mask=header.red_mask;
ximage->green_mask=header.green_mask;
ximage->blue_mask=header.blue_mask;
if ((ximage->width < 0) || (ximage->height < 0) || (ximage->depth < 0) ||
(ximage->format < 0) || (ximage->byte_order < 0) ||
(ximage->bitmap_bit_order < 0) || (ximage->bitmap_pad < 0) ||
(ximage->bytes_per_line < 0))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->width > 65535) || (ximage->height > 65535))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->bits_per_pixel > 32) || (ximage->bitmap_unit > 32))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
x_status=XInitImage(ximage);
if (x_status == 0)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
/*
Read colormap.
*/
authentic_colormap=MagickFalse;
colors=(XColor *) NULL;
if (header.ncolors != 0)
{
XWDColor
color;
length=(size_t) header.ncolors;
if (length > ((~0UL)/sizeof(*colors)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
colors=(XColor *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*colors));
if (colors == (XColor *) NULL)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDColor,(unsigned char *) &color);
if (count != sz_XWDColor)
{
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
colors[i].pixel=color.pixel;
colors[i].red=color.red;
colors[i].green=color.green;
colors[i].blue=color.blue;
colors[i].flags=(char) color.flags;
if (color.flags != 0)
authentic_colormap=MagickTrue;
}
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &colors[i].pixel,
sizeof(colors[i].pixel));
MSBOrderShort((unsigned char *) &colors[i].red,3*
sizeof(colors[i].red));
}
}
/*
Allocate the pixel buffer.
*/
length=(size_t) ximage->bytes_per_line*ximage->height;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,ximage->bytes_per_line,ximage->height))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (ximage->format != ZPixmap)
{
size_t
extent;
extent=length;
length*=ximage->depth;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,extent,ximage->depth))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
ximage->data=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*ximage->data));
if (ximage->data == (char *) NULL)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) ximage->data);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
/*
Convert image to MIFF format.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) ximage->width;
image->rows=(size_t) ximage->height;
image->depth=8;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((header.ncolors == 0U) || (ximage->red_mask != 0) ||
(ximage->green_mask != 0) || (ximage->blue_mask != 0))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
else
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=header.ncolors;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
switch (image->storage_class)
{
case DirectClass:
default:
{
register size_t
color;
size_t
blue_mask,
blue_shift,
green_mask,
green_shift,
red_mask,
red_shift;
/*
Determine shift and mask for red, green, and blue.
*/
red_mask=ximage->red_mask;
red_shift=0;
while ((red_mask != 0) && ((red_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
red_mask>>=1;
red_shift++;
}
green_mask=ximage->green_mask;
green_shift=0;
while ((green_mask != 0) && ((green_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
green_mask>>=1;
green_shift++;
}
blue_mask=ximage->blue_mask;
blue_shift=0;
while ((blue_mask != 0) && ((blue_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
blue_mask>>=1;
blue_shift++;
}
/*
Convert X image to DirectClass packets.
*/
if ((image->colors != 0) && (authentic_colormap != MagickFalse))
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
red_shift) & red_mask);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t) index].red));
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
green_shift) & green_mask);
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t)
index].green));
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
blue_shift) & blue_mask);
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[(ssize_t) index].blue));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
color=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
if (red_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/red_mask;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
color=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
if (green_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
color=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
if (blue_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PseudoClass:
{
/*
Convert X image to PseudoClass packets.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].blue);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) XGetPixel(ximage,(int)
x,(int) y));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
/*
Free image and colormap.
*/
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 169,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
size_t tail = (i << 1) + 1;
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, p, tail * sizeof(uint32_t),
__LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
size_t ofs = CDF_GETUINT32(p, tail);
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p + ofs
- 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n",
i, inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p, offs));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
if (nelements == 0) {
DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
goto out;
}
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Prevent wrap around (Remi Collet at redhat)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
size_t tail = (i << 1) + 1;
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, p, tail * sizeof(uint32_t),
__LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
size_t ofs = CDF_GETUINT32(p, tail);
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p + ofs
- 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (q < p) {
DPRINTF(("Wrapped around %p < %p\n", q, p));
goto out;
}
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n",
i, inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p, offs));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
if (nelements == 0) {
DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
goto out;
}
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
| 169,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Display::ShallowCopy(Display& rhs) const
{
rhs.m_string = m_string;
rhs.m_language = m_language;
rhs.m_country = m_country;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Display::ShallowCopy(Display& rhs) const
| 174,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: json_t *json_object(void)
{
json_object_t *object = jsonp_malloc(sizeof(json_object_t));
if(!object)
return NULL;
json_init(&object->json, JSON_OBJECT);
if(hashtable_init(&object->hashtable))
{
jsonp_free(object);
return NULL;
}
object->serial = 0;
object->visited = 0;
return &object->json;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | json_t *json_object(void)
{
json_object_t *object = jsonp_malloc(sizeof(json_object_t));
if(!object)
return NULL;
if (!hashtable_seed) {
/* Autoseed */
json_object_seed(0);
}
json_init(&object->json, JSON_OBJECT);
if(hashtable_init(&object->hashtable))
{
jsonp_free(object);
return NULL;
}
object->serial = 0;
object->visited = 0;
return &object->json;
}
| 166,535 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Segment::ParseCues(long long off, long long& pos, long& len) {
if (m_pCues)
return 0; // success
if (off < 0)
return -1;
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_start + off;
if ((total < 0) || (pos >= total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing cues
const long long element_start = pos;
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id != 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume ID
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0) // weird, although technically not illegal
return 1; // done
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
const long long element_stop = pos + size;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (element_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (element_stop > total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing anymore
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if (element_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long element_size = element_stop - element_start;
m_pCues =
new (std::nothrow) Cues(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
assert(m_pCues); // TODO
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Segment::ParseCues(long long off, long long& pos, long& len) {
if (m_pCues)
return 0; // success
if (off < 0)
return -1;
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
pos = m_start + off;
if ((total < 0) || (pos >= total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing cues
const long long element_start = pos;
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadID(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id != 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume ID
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
if (size == 0) // weird, although technically not illegal
return 1; // done
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
const long long element_stop = pos + size;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (element_stop > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((total >= 0) && (element_stop > total))
return 1; // don't bother parsing anymore
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if (element_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long element_size = element_stop - element_start;
m_pCues =
new (std::nothrow) Cues(this, pos, size, element_start, element_size);
if (m_pCues == NULL)
return -1;
return 0; // success
}
| 173,852 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HistogramsCallback() {
MockHistogramsCallback();
QuitMessageLoop();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94 | void HistogramsCallback() {
void HistogramsCallback(base::RepeatingClosure on_done) {
MockHistogramsCallback();
on_done.Run();
}
| 172,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixget)
{
double affine[6];
long type;
zval *options = NULL;
zval **tmp;
int res = GD_FALSE, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &type, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch((gdAffineStandardMatrix)type) {
case GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SCALE: {
double x, y;
if (!options || Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Array expected as options");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
x = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
x = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "y", sizeof("y"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
y = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
y = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE) {
res = gdAffineTranslate(affine, x, y);
} else {
res = gdAffineScale(affine, x, y);
}
break;
}
case GD_AFFINE_ROTATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL: {
double angle;
if (!options) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number is expected as option");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = *options;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
angle = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
angle = Z_DVAL_P(options);
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL) {
res = gdAffineShearHorizontal(affine, angle);
} else if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL) {
res = gdAffineShearVertical(affine, angle);
} else {
res = gdAffineRotate(affine, angle);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %li", type);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (res == GD_FALSE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, affine[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
CWE ID: CWE-787 | PHP_FUNCTION(imageaffinematrixget)
{
double affine[6];
long type;
zval *options = NULL;
zval **tmp;
int res = GD_FALSE, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l|z", &type, &options) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
switch((gdAffineStandardMatrix)type) {
case GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SCALE: {
double x, y;
if (!options || Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Array expected as options");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "x", sizeof("x"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
x = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
x = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing x position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(HASH_OF(options), "y", sizeof("y"), (void **)&tmp) != FAILURE) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = **tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
y = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
y = Z_DVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Missing y position");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_TRANSLATE) {
res = gdAffineTranslate(affine, x, y);
} else {
res = gdAffineScale(affine, x, y);
}
break;
}
case GD_AFFINE_ROTATE:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL:
case GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL: {
double angle;
if (!options) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number is expected as option");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(Z_TYPE_P(options) != IS_DOUBLE) {
zval dval;
dval = *options;
zval_copy_ctor(&dval);
convert_to_double(&dval);
angle = Z_DVAL(dval);
} else {
angle = Z_DVAL_P(options);
}
if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_HORIZONTAL) {
res = gdAffineShearHorizontal(affine, angle);
} else if (type == GD_AFFINE_SHEAR_VERTICAL) {
res = gdAffineShearVertical(affine, angle);
} else {
res = gdAffineRotate(affine, angle);
}
break;
}
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid type for element %li", type);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (res == GD_FALSE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
add_index_double(return_value, i, affine[i]);
}
}
}
| 166,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
l_data_size = (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_byteout(). Discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB (#835)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
/* The +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
l_data_size = 1 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
| 168,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadPNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile");
/*
Verify PNG signature.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error.");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if ((IssRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((image->gamma < .45) || (image->gamma > .46)) &&
!(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f))
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" page.w: %.20g, page.h: %.20g,page.x: %.20g, page.y: %.20g.",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadPNGImage()");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | static Image *ReadPNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadPNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile");
/*
Verify PNG signature.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Verify that file size large enough to contain a PNG datastream.
*/
if (GetBlobSize(image) < 61)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error.");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if ((IssRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((image->gamma < .45) || (image->gamma > .46)) &&
!(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f))
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" page.w: %.20g, page.h: %.20g,page.x: %.20g, page.y: %.20g.",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadPNGImage()");
return(image);
}
| 167,812 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
MATLAB_KO: ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = DecompressBlock(image,MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(unsigned char)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
MATLAB_KO: ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = DecompressBlock(image,MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(unsigned char)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
| 168,580 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: EntrySync* EntrySync::moveTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->move(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | EntrySync* EntrySync::moveTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
EntrySyncCallbackHelper* helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->move(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,422 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PermissionsData::CanCaptureVisiblePage(const GURL& document_url,
int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
bool has_active_tab = false;
bool has_all_urls = false;
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(document_url);
const GURL origin_url = origin.GetURL();
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
if (location_ != Manifest::COMPONENT &&
IsPolicyBlockedHostUnsafe(origin_url)) {
if (error)
*error = extension_misc::kPolicyBlockedScripting;
return false;
}
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
has_active_tab = tab_permissions &&
tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(APIPermission::kTab);
const URLPattern all_urls(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL,
URLPattern::kAllUrlsPattern);
has_all_urls =
active_permissions_unsafe_->explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(all_urls);
}
if (!has_active_tab && !has_all_urls) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kAllURLOrActiveTabNeeded;
return false;
}
std::string access_error;
if (GetPageAccess(origin_url, tab_id, &access_error) == PageAccess::kAllowed)
return true;
if (origin_url.host() == extension_id_)
return true;
bool allowed_with_active_tab =
origin_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) ||
origin_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme) ||
document_url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme) ||
origin.IsSameOriginWith(
url::Origin::Create(ExtensionsClient::Get()->GetWebstoreBaseURL()));
if (!allowed_with_active_tab) {
if (error)
*error = access_error;
return false;
}
if (has_active_tab)
return true;
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kActiveTabPermissionNotGranted;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool PermissionsData::CanCaptureVisiblePage(const GURL& document_url,
bool PermissionsData::CanCaptureVisiblePage(
const GURL& document_url,
int tab_id,
std::string* error,
CaptureRequirement capture_requirement) const {
bool has_active_tab = false;
bool has_all_urls = false;
bool has_page_capture = false;
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(document_url);
const GURL origin_url = origin.GetURL();
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
if (location_ != Manifest::COMPONENT &&
IsPolicyBlockedHostUnsafe(origin_url)) {
if (error)
*error = extension_misc::kPolicyBlockedScripting;
return false;
}
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
has_active_tab = tab_permissions &&
tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(APIPermission::kTab);
const URLPattern all_urls(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL,
URLPattern::kAllUrlsPattern);
has_all_urls =
active_permissions_unsafe_->explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(all_urls);
has_page_capture = active_permissions_unsafe_->HasAPIPermission(
APIPermission::kPageCapture);
}
std::string access_error;
if (capture_requirement == CaptureRequirement::kActiveTabOrAllUrls) {
if (!has_active_tab && !has_all_urls) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kAllURLOrActiveTabNeeded;
return false;
}
// We check GetPageAccess() (in addition to the <all_urls> and activeTab
// checks below) for the case of URLs that can be conditionally granted
// (such as file:// URLs or chrome:// URLs for component extensions). If an
// extension has <all_urls>, GetPageAccess() will still (correctly) return
// false if, for instance, the URL is a file:// URL and the extension does
// not have file access. See https://crbug.com/810220. If the extension has
// page access (and has activeTab or <all_urls>), allow the capture.
if (GetPageAccess(origin_url, tab_id, &access_error) ==
PageAccess::kAllowed)
return true;
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(CaptureRequirement::kPageCapture, capture_requirement);
if (!has_page_capture) {
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kPageCaptureNeeded;
}
// If the URL is a typical web URL, the pageCapture permission is
// sufficient.
if ((origin_url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpScheme) ||
origin_url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme)) &&
!origin.IsSameOriginWith(url::Origin::Create(
ExtensionsClient::Get()->GetWebstoreBaseURL()))) {
return true;
}
}
// activeTab (since the extension scheme is not included in the list of
// valid schemes for extension permissions). To capture an extension's own
// page, either activeTab or <all_urls> is needed (it's no higher privilege
// than a normal web page). At least one of these is still needed because
// the extension page may have embedded web content.
if (origin_url.host() == extension_id_)
return true;
bool allowed_with_active_tab =
origin_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) ||
origin_url.SchemeIs(kExtensionScheme) ||
document_url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme) ||
origin.IsSameOriginWith(
url::Origin::Create(ExtensionsClient::Get()->GetWebstoreBaseURL()));
if (!allowed_with_active_tab) {
if (error)
*error = access_error;
return false;
}
if (has_active_tab)
return true;
if (error)
*error = manifest_errors::kActiveTabPermissionNotGranted;
return false;
}
| 173,010 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool parse_reconnect(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *sockaddr_url, *stratum_port, *tmp;
char *url, *port, address[256];
if (opt_disable_client_reconnect) {
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Stratum client.reconnect forbidden, aborting.");
return false;
}
memset(address, 0, 255);
url = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 0));
if (!url)
url = pool->sockaddr_url;
port = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!port)
port = pool->stratum_port;
sprintf(address, "%s:%s", url, port);
if (!extract_sockaddr(address, &sockaddr_url, &stratum_port))
return false;
applog(LOG_NOTICE, "Reconnect requested from %s to %s", get_pool_name(pool), address);
clear_pool_work(pool);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
__suspend_stratum(pool);
tmp = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->sockaddr_url = sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
free(tmp);
tmp = pool->stratum_port;
pool->stratum_port = stratum_port;
free(tmp);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (!restart_stratum(pool)) {
pool_failed(pool);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_reconnect(): treat pool-sent URL as untrusted.
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <[email protected]> for reminding
that this existed and highlighting the offender.
Also to Luke-jr for actually fixing this in bfgminer. :D
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static bool parse_reconnect(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
if (opt_disable_client_reconnect) {
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Stratum client.reconnect received but is disabled, not reconnecting.");
return false;
}
char *url, *port, address[256];
char *sockaddr_url, *stratum_port, *tmp; /* Tempvars. */
url = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 0));
if (!url)
url = pool->sockaddr_url;
port = (char *)json_string_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!port)
port = pool->stratum_port;
snprintf(address, sizeof(address), "%s:%s", url, port);
if (!extract_sockaddr(address, &sockaddr_url, &stratum_port))
return false;
applog(LOG_NOTICE, "Reconnect requested from %s to %s", get_pool_name(pool), address);
clear_pool_work(pool);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
__suspend_stratum(pool);
tmp = pool->sockaddr_url;
pool->sockaddr_url = sockaddr_url;
pool->stratum_url = pool->sockaddr_url;
free(tmp);
tmp = pool->stratum_port;
pool->stratum_port = stratum_port;
free(tmp);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (!restart_stratum(pool)) {
pool_failed(pool);
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 169,907 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string GetUploadData(const std::string& brand) {
DCHECK(!brand.empty());
std::string data(kPostXml);
const std::string placeholder("__BRANDCODE_PLACEHOLDER__");
size_t placeholder_pos = data.find(placeholder);
DCHECK(placeholder_pos != std::string::npos);
data.replace(placeholder_pos, placeholder.size(), brand);
return data;
}
Commit Message: Use install_static::GetAppGuid instead of the hardcoded string in BrandcodeConfigFetcher.
Bug: 769756
Change-Id: Ifdcb0a5145ffad1d563562e2b2ea2390ff074cdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1213178
Reviewed-by: Dominic Battré <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#590275}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | std::string GetUploadData(const std::string& brand) {
std::string app_id(kDefaultAppID);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
app_id = install_static::UTF16ToUTF8(install_static::GetAppGuid());
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(!brand.empty());
return base::StringPrintf(kPostXml, app_id.c_str(), brand.c_str());
}
| 172,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
return 0;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
p += i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p > limit)
return -1;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if ((p + 2) >= limit)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (p + size > limit)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
int r;
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
return 2;
}
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
switch (r) {
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 2;
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
return r;
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 3;
default: /* fatal error */
return -1;
}
}
p += size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
return 0;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
i = *(p++);
if (limit - p <= i)
return -1;
p += i;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
if (limit - p <= i)
return -1;
p += i;
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
if (limit - p < i)
return -1;
p += i;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if (limit - p <= 2)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
while (limit - p >= 4) {
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (limit - p < size)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
int r;
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
return 2;
}
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
switch (r) {
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 2;
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
return r;
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 3;
default: /* fatal error */
return -1;
}
}
p += size;
}
| 165,206 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i].Equals(callback)) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Convert Uses of base::RepeatingCallback<>::Equals to Use == or != in //base
Staging this change because some conversions will have semantic changes.
BUG=937566
Change-Id: I2d4950624c0fab00e107814421a161e43da965cc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1507245
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639702}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i] == callback) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
| 172,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: horizontalDifferenceF(float *ip, int n, int stride, uint16 *wp, uint16 *FromLT2)
{
int32 r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
float fltsize = Fltsize;
#define CLAMP(v) ( (v<(float)0.) ? 0 \
: (v<(float)2.) ? FromLT2[(int)(v*fltsize)] \
: (v>(float)24.2) ? 2047 \
: LogK1*log(v*LogK2) + 0.5 )
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
g2 = wp[1] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
g2 = wp[1] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[2]);
a2 = wp[3] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
ip += n - 1; /* point to last one */
wp += n - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | horizontalDifferenceF(float *ip, int n, int stride, uint16 *wp, uint16 *FromLT2)
{
int32 r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
float fltsize = Fltsize;
#define CLAMP(v) ( (v<(float)0.) ? 0 \
: (v<(float)2.) ? FromLT2[(int)(v*fltsize)] \
: (v>(float)24.2) ? 2047 \
: LogK1*log(v*LogK2) + 0.5 )
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
g2 = wp[1] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
g2 = wp[1] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[2]);
a2 = wp[3] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp++; ip++)
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride,
wp[0] = (uint16)(((int32)CLAMP(ip[0])-(int32)CLAMP(ip[-stride])) & mask);
wp++; ip++)
n -= stride;
}
}
}
}
| 166,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_framing_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_CAP_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_CAP_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_framing_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_framing_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_CAP_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_CAP_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
}
| 167,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long start_,
long long size_)
{
const long long stop = start_ + size_;
long long pos = start_;
m_track = -1;
m_pos = -1;
m_block = 1; //default
while (pos < stop)
{
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); //TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; //consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x77) //CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) //CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) //CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_pos >= 0);
assert(m_track > 0);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x77) // CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) // CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) // CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_pos >= 0);
assert(m_track > 0);
// assert(m_block > 0);
}
| 174,414 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int validation_gamma(int argc, char **argv)
{
double gamma[9] = { 2.2, 1.8, 1.52, 1.45, 1., 1/1.45, 1/1.52, 1/1.8, 1/2.2 };
double maxerr;
int i, silent=0, onlygamma=0;
/* Silence the output with -s, just test the gamma functions with -g: */
while (--argc > 0)
if (strcmp(*++argv, "-s") == 0)
silent = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-g") == 0)
onlygamma = 1;
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "unknown argument %s\n", *argv);
return 1;
}
if (!onlygamma)
{
/* First validate the log functions: */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<256; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/255.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log8bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log8bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log8bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8 bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f\n",
i, png_log8bit(i), correct);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8 bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<65536; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/65535.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log16bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log16bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log16bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
if (error > .68) /* By experiment error is less than .68 */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16 bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_log16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16 bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
/* Now exponentiations. */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * (65536. * 65536);
double error = png_exp(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1883) /* By experiment. */
{
fprintf(stderr, "32 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 32 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 255;
double error = png_exp8bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .50002) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "8 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp8bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 65535;
double error = png_exp16bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .524) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16 bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16 bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
} /* !onlygamma */
/* Test the overall gamma correction. */
for (i=0; i<9; ++i)
{
unsigned j;
double g = gamma[i];
png_fixed_point gfp = floor(g * PNG_FP_1 + .5);
if (!silent)
printf("Test gamma %f\n", g);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<256; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/255., g) * 255;
png_byte out = png_gamma_8bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (out != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 8 bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<65536; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/65535., g) * 65535;
png_uint_16 out = png_gamma_16bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1.62)
{
fprintf(stderr, "16bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 16 bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | int validation_gamma(int argc, char **argv)
{
double gamma[9] = { 2.2, 1.8, 1.52, 1.45, 1., 1/1.45, 1/1.52, 1/1.8, 1/2.2 };
double maxerr;
int i, silent=0, onlygamma=0;
/* Silence the output with -s, just test the gamma functions with -g: */
while (--argc > 0)
if (strcmp(*++argv, "-s") == 0)
silent = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-g") == 0)
onlygamma = 1;
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "unknown argument %s\n", *argv);
return 1;
}
if (!onlygamma)
{
/* First validate the log functions: */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<256; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/255.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log8bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log8bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log8bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8-bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f\n",
i, png_log8bit(i), correct);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8-bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<65536; ++i)
{
double correct = -log(i/65535.)/log(2.)*65536;
double error = png_log16bit(i) - correct;
if (i != 0 && fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (i == 0 && png_log16bit(i) != 0xffffffff ||
i != 0 && png_log16bit(i) != floor(correct+.5))
{
if (error > .68) /* By experiment error is less than .68 */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16-bit log error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_log16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16-bit log error = %f\n", maxerr);
/* Now exponentiations. */
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * (65536. * 65536);
double error = png_exp(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1883) /* By experiment. */
{
fprintf(stderr, "32-bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 32-bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 255;
double error = png_exp8bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .50002) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "8-bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp8bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 8-bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (i=0; i<=0xfffff; ++i)
{
double correct = exp(-i/65536. * log(2.)) * 65535;
double error = png_exp16bit(i) - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > .524) /* By experiment */
{
fprintf(stderr, "16-bit exp error: %d: got %u, expected %f"
" error: %f\n", i, png_exp16bit(i), correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("maximum 16-bit exp error = %f\n", maxerr);
} /* !onlygamma */
/* Test the overall gamma correction. */
for (i=0; i<9; ++i)
{
unsigned j;
double g = gamma[i];
png_fixed_point gfp = floor(g * PNG_FP_1 + .5);
if (!silent)
printf("Test gamma %f\n", g);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<256; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/255., g) * 255;
png_byte out = png_gamma_8bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (out != floor(correct+.5))
{
fprintf(stderr, "8bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 8-bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
maxerr = 0;
for (j=0; j<65536; ++j)
{
double correct = pow(j/65535., g) * 65535;
png_uint_16 out = png_gamma_16bit_correct(j, gfp);
double error = out - correct;
if (fabs(error) > maxerr)
maxerr = fabs(error);
if (fabs(error) > 1.62)
{
fprintf(stderr, "16bit %d ^ %f: got %d expected %f error %f\n",
j, g, out, correct, error);
}
}
if (!silent)
printf("gamma %f: maximum 16-bit error %f\n", g, maxerr);
}
return 0;
}
| 173,720 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
size_t len;
int use_ret;
if( buflen == 0 )
return;
memset( buf, 0x00, buflen );
if( ret < 0 )
ret = -ret;
if( ret & 0xFF80 )
{
use_ret = ret & 0xFF80;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Making of the public value failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Read/write of file failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Requested curve not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The signature is not valid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Memory allocation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Generation of random value, such as (ephemeral) key, failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Invalid private or public key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Signature is valid but shorter than the user-supplied length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - The selected feature is not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Failed to allocate memory" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Memory allocation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Read/write of file failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unsupported key version" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Invalid key tag or value" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Private key password can't be empty" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The signature is valid but its length is less than expected" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Key failed to pass the library's validity check" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The public key operation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The private key operation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The requested feature is not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE) )
{
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" );
return;
}
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Memory allocation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Session ticket has expired" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Connection requires a read call" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Connection requires a write call" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The operation timed out" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Input invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Read/write of file failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */
if( strlen( buf ) == 0 )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", use_ret );
}
use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80;
if( use_ret == 0 )
return;
len = strlen( buf );
if( len > 0 )
{
if( buflen - len < 5 )
return;
mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " );
buf += len + 3;
buflen -= len + 3;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid key length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Data is invalid. (not used)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Invalid key length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Invalid key length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - Read/write error in file" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DES - The data input has an invalid length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Failed to open a socket" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Binding of the socket failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Could not listen on the socket" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Connection was reset by peer" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "OID - OID is not found" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "OID - output buffer is too small" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */
if( strlen( buf ) != 0 )
return;
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", use_ret );
}
Commit Message: Only return VERIFY_FAILED from a single point
Everything else is a fatal error. Also improve documentation about that for
the vrfy callback.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
size_t len;
int use_ret;
if( buflen == 0 )
return;
memset( buf, 0x00, buflen );
if( ret < 0 )
ret = -ret;
if( ret & 0xFF80 )
{
use_ret = ret & 0xFF80;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CIPHER - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Making of the public value failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DHM - Read/write of file failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Requested curve not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The signature is not valid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Memory allocation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Generation of random value, such as (ephemeral) key, failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Invalid private or public key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Signature is valid but shorter than the user-supplied length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - The selected feature is not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Failed to allocate memory" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Memory allocation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Read/write of file failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unsupported key version" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Invalid key tag or value" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Private key password can't be empty" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PK - The signature is valid but its length is less than expected" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - Key failed to pass the library's validity check" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The public key operation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The private key operation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The requested feature is not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE) )
{
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" );
return;
}
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Memory allocation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Session ticket has expired" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Connection requires a read call" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Connection requires a write call" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The operation timed out" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Input invalid" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Read/write of file failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */
if( strlen( buf ) == 0 )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", use_ret );
}
use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80;
if( use_ret == 0 )
return;
len = strlen( buf );
if( len > 0 )
{
if( buflen - len < 5 )
return;
mbedtls_snprintf( buf + len, buflen - len, " : " );
buf += len + 3;
buflen -= len + 3;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid key length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "AES - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Data is invalid. (not used)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Invalid key length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Invalid key length" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "CTR_DRBG - Read/write error in file" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "DES - The data input has an invalid length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Failed to open a socket" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Binding of the socket failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Could not listen on the socket" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Connection was reset by peer" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "OID - OID is not found" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "OID - output buffer is too small" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */
if( strlen( buf ) != 0 )
return;
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", use_ret );
}
| 170,018 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125 | MagickExport int LocaleLowercase(const int c)
{
if (c < 0)
return(c);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(tolower_l((int) ((unsigned char) c),c_locale));
#endif
return(tolower((int) ((unsigned char) c)));
}
| 169,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int hns_ppe_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ETH_PPE_STATIC_NUM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int hns_ppe_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS || stringset == ETH_SS_PRIV_FLAGS)
return ETH_PPE_STATIC_NUM;
return 0;
}
| 169,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static size_t php_stream_temp_read(php_stream *stream, char *buf, size_t count TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
size_t got;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
return -1;
}
got = php_stream_read(ts->innerstream, buf, count);
stream->eof = ts->innerstream->eof;
return got;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static size_t php_stream_temp_read(php_stream *stream, char *buf, size_t count TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
size_t got;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
return -1;
}
got = php_stream_read(ts->innerstream, buf, count);
stream->eof = ts->innerstream->eof;
return got;
}
| 165,480 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void TIFFGetProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent],
*text;
uint32
count,
length,
type;
unsigned long
*tietz;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ARTIST,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:artist",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COPYRIGHT,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:copyright",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DATETIME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:timestamp",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DOCUMENTNAME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:document",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_HOSTCOMPUTER,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:hostcomputer",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEDESCRIPTION,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAKE,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:make",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MODEL,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:model",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_OPIIMAGEID,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:image-id",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENAME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SOFTWARE,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:software",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,33423,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-33423",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,36867,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-36867",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,&type) == 1)
switch (type)
{
case 0x01:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","PAGE",exception);
break;
}
case 0x04:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","MASK",exception);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,37706,&length,&tietz) == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%lu",tietz[0]);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:tietz_offset",message,exception);
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static void TIFFGetProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent],
*text;
uint32
count,
length,
type;
unsigned long
*tietz;
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ARTIST,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:artist",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COPYRIGHT,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:copyright",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DATETIME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:timestamp",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DOCUMENTNAME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:document",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_HOSTCOMPUTER,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:hostcomputer",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEDESCRIPTION,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAKE,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:make",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MODEL,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:model",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_OPIIMAGEID,&count,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:image-id",message,exception);
}
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENAME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SOFTWARE,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:software",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,33423,&count,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-33423",message,exception);
}
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,36867,&count,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-36867",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,&type) == 1)
switch (type)
{
case 0x01:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","PAGE",exception);
break;
}
case 0x04:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","MASK",exception);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,37706,&length,&tietz) == 1) &&
(tietz != (unsigned long *) NULL))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%lu",tietz[0]);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:tietz_offset",message,exception);
}
}
| 168,679 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ras_putdatastd(jas_stream_t *out, ras_hdr_t *hdr, jas_image_t *image, int numcmpts, int *cmpts)
{
int rowsize;
int pad;
unsigned int z;
int nz;
int c;
int x;
int y;
int v;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
data[i] = jas_matrix_create(jas_image_height(image), jas_image_width(image));
assert(data[i]);
}
rowsize = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr);
pad = rowsize - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
hdr->length = hdr->height * rowsize;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
if (jas_image_readcmpt(image, cmpts[i], 0, y,
jas_image_width(image), 1, data[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
z = 0;
nz = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
z <<= hdr->depth;
if (RAS_ISRGB(hdr)) {
v = RAS_RED((jas_matrix_getv(data[0], x))) |
RAS_GREEN((jas_matrix_getv(data[1], x))) |
RAS_BLUE((jas_matrix_getv(data[2], x)));
} else {
v = (jas_matrix_getv(data[0], x));
}
z |= v & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
nz += hdr->depth;
while (nz >= 8) {
c = (z >> (nz - 8)) & 0xff;
if (jas_stream_putc(out, c) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
nz -= 8;
z &= RAS_ONES(nz);
}
}
if (nz > 0) {
c = (z >> (8 - nz)) & RAS_ONES(nz);
if (jas_stream_putc(out, c) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
if (pad % 2) {
if (jas_stream_putc(out, 0) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a few bugs in the RAS encoder and decoder where errors were tested
with assertions instead of being gracefully handled.
CWE ID: | static int ras_putdatastd(jas_stream_t *out, ras_hdr_t *hdr, jas_image_t *image, int numcmpts, int *cmpts)
{
int rowsize;
int pad;
unsigned int z;
int nz;
int c;
int x;
int y;
int v;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
int i;
assert(numcmpts <= 3);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
data[i] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
if (!(data[i] = jas_matrix_create(jas_image_height(image),
jas_image_width(image)))) {
goto error;
}
}
rowsize = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr);
pad = rowsize - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
hdr->length = hdr->height * rowsize;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
if (jas_image_readcmpt(image, cmpts[i], 0, y,
jas_image_width(image), 1, data[i])) {
goto error;
}
}
z = 0;
nz = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
z <<= hdr->depth;
if (RAS_ISRGB(hdr)) {
v = RAS_RED((jas_matrix_getv(data[0], x))) |
RAS_GREEN((jas_matrix_getv(data[1], x))) |
RAS_BLUE((jas_matrix_getv(data[2], x)));
} else {
v = (jas_matrix_getv(data[0], x));
}
z |= v & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
nz += hdr->depth;
while (nz >= 8) {
c = (z >> (nz - 8)) & 0xff;
if (jas_stream_putc(out, c) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
nz -= 8;
z &= RAS_ONES(nz);
}
}
if (nz > 0) {
c = (z >> (8 - nz)) & RAS_ONES(nz);
if (jas_stream_putc(out, c) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
}
if (pad % 2) {
if (jas_stream_putc(out, 0) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
data[i] = 0;
}
return 0;
error:
for (i = 0; i < numcmpts; ++i) {
if (data[i]) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
}
return -1;
}
| 168,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorController::initializeDeferredAgents()
{
if (m_deferredAgentsInitialized)
return;
m_deferredAgentsInitialized = true;
InjectedScriptManager* injectedScriptManager = m_injectedScriptManager.get();
InspectorOverlay* overlay = m_overlay.get();
OwnPtr<InspectorResourceAgent> resourceAgentPtr(InspectorResourceAgent::create(m_pageAgent, m_inspectorClient));
InspectorResourceAgent* resourceAgent = resourceAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(resourceAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorCSSAgent::create(m_domAgent, m_pageAgent, resourceAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMStorageAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorMemoryAgent::create());
m_agents.append(InspectorApplicationCacheAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
PageScriptDebugServer* pageScriptDebugServer = &PageScriptDebugServer::shared();
OwnPtr<InspectorDebuggerAgent> debuggerAgentPtr(PageDebuggerAgent::create(pageScriptDebugServer, m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager, overlay));
InspectorDebuggerAgent* debuggerAgent = debuggerAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(debuggerAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMDebuggerAgent::create(m_domAgent, debuggerAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager, overlay));
m_agents.append(InspectorHeapProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorCanvasAgent::create(m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorInputAgent::create(m_page, m_inspectorClient));
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void InspectorController::initializeDeferredAgents()
{
if (m_deferredAgentsInitialized)
return;
m_deferredAgentsInitialized = true;
InjectedScriptManager* injectedScriptManager = m_injectedScriptManager.get();
InspectorOverlay* overlay = m_overlay.get();
OwnPtr<InspectorResourceAgent> resourceAgentPtr(InspectorResourceAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
InspectorResourceAgent* resourceAgent = resourceAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(resourceAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorCSSAgent::create(m_domAgent, m_pageAgent, resourceAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMStorageAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorMemoryAgent::create());
m_agents.append(InspectorApplicationCacheAgent::create(m_pageAgent));
PageScriptDebugServer* pageScriptDebugServer = &PageScriptDebugServer::shared();
OwnPtr<InspectorDebuggerAgent> debuggerAgentPtr(PageDebuggerAgent::create(pageScriptDebugServer, m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager, overlay));
InspectorDebuggerAgent* debuggerAgent = debuggerAgentPtr.get();
m_agents.append(debuggerAgentPtr.release());
m_agents.append(InspectorDOMDebuggerAgent::create(m_domAgent, debuggerAgent));
m_agents.append(InspectorProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager, overlay));
m_agents.append(InspectorHeapProfilerAgent::create(injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorCanvasAgent::create(m_pageAgent, injectedScriptManager));
m_agents.append(InspectorInputAgent::create(m_page, m_inspectorClient));
}
| 171,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN);
asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp);
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
} else {
*v = false;
}
asn1_end_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool asn1_read_BOOLEAN(struct asn1_data *data, bool *v)
{
uint8_t tmp = 0;
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_BOOLEAN)) return false;
*v = false;
if (!asn1_read_uint8(data, &tmp)) return false;
if (tmp == 0xFF) {
*v = true;
}
return asn1_end_tag(data);
}
| 164,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pBlockEntry) const {
const Cluster* pCluster = m_pSegment->GetFirst();
for (int i = 0;;) {
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) { //all clusters have been loaded
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pBlockEntry = 0;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long status = pCluster->GetFirst(pBlockEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pBlockEntry == 0) { // empty cluster
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
continue;
}
for (;;) {
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long tn = pBlock->GetTrackNumber();
if ((tn == m_info.number) && VetEntry(pBlockEntry))
return 0;
const BlockEntry* pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pBlockEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == 0)
break;
pBlockEntry = pNextEntry;
}
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
}
pBlockEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Track::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pBlockEntry) const {
const Cluster* pCluster = m_pSegment->GetFirst();
for (int i = 0;;) {
if (pCluster == NULL) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
pBlockEntry = 0;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long status = pCluster->GetFirst(pBlockEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pBlockEntry == 0) { // empty cluster
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
continue;
}
for (;;) {
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long tn = pBlock->GetTrackNumber();
if ((tn == m_info.number) && VetEntry(pBlockEntry))
return 0;
const BlockEntry* pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pBlockEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == 0)
break;
pBlockEntry = pNextEntry;
}
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
}
pBlockEntry = GetEOS(); // so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
| 173,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_window
When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
priviledge escalation.
We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
replay_window.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
return -EINVAL;
if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
| 170,075 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetUpdateLibrary(
UpdateLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->update_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetUpdateLibrary(
| 170,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
| 165,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadOneMNGImage(MngInfo* mng_info, const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
page_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
volatile int
first_mng_object,
object_id,
term_chunk_found,
skip_to_iend;
volatile ssize_t
image_count=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MngBox
default_fb,
fb,
previous_fb;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
PixelPacket
mng_background_color;
#endif
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count;
ssize_t
loop_level;
volatile short
skipping_loop;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
unsigned int
mandatory_back=0;
#endif
volatile unsigned int
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
mng_background_object=0,
#endif
mng_type=0; /* 0: PNG or JNG; 1: MNG; 2: MNG-LC; 3: MNG-VLC */
size_t
default_frame_timeout,
frame_timeout,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
image_height,
image_width,
#endif
length;
/* These delays are all measured in image ticks_per_second,
* not in MNG ticks_per_second
*/
volatile size_t
default_frame_delay,
final_delay,
final_image_delay,
frame_delay,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers,
#endif
mng_iterations=1,
simplicity=0,
subframe_height=0,
subframe_width=0;
previous_fb.top=0;
previous_fb.bottom=0;
previous_fb.left=0;
previous_fb.right=0;
default_fb.top=0;
default_fb.bottom=0;
default_fb.left=0;
default_fb.right=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneMNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
/* Verify MNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (memcmp(magic_number,"\212MNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Initialize some nonzero members of the MngInfo structure. */
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
{
mng_info->object_clip[i].right=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
mng_info->object_clip[i].bottom=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
}
mng_info->exists[0]=MagickTrue;
}
skipping_loop=(-1);
first_mng_object=MagickTrue;
mng_type=0;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers=MagickFalse; /* should be False when converting or mogrifying */
#endif
default_frame_delay=0;
default_frame_timeout=0;
frame_delay=0;
final_delay=1;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=1UL*image->ticks_per_second;
object_id=0;
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
mng_info->framing_mode=1;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mandatory_back=MagickFalse;
#endif
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mng_background_color=image->background_color;
#endif
default_fb=mng_info->frame;
previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
do
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
unsigned char
*chunk;
/*
Read a new chunk.
*/
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading MNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
#if !defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->jhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"JNGCompressNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->jhdr_warning++;
}
#endif
if (memcmp(type,mng_DHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->dhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DeltaPNGNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->dhdr_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MEND,4) == 0)
break;
if (skip_to_iend)
{
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4) == 0)
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skip to IEND.");
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length != 28)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
mng_info->mng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
mng_info->mng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG width: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG height: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
p+=8;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second == 0)
default_frame_delay=0;
else
default_frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second/
mng_info->ticks_per_second;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
simplicity=0;
/* Skip nominal layer count, frame count, and play time */
p+=16;
simplicity=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_type=1; /* Full MNG */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 11) == 11))
mng_type=2; /* LC */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 9) == 9))
mng_type=3; /* VLC */
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (mng_type != 3)
insert_layers=MagickTrue;
#endif
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
mng_info->image=image;
}
if ((mng_info->mng_width > 65535L) ||
(mng_info->mng_height > 65535L))
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g+0+0",(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double)
mng_info->mng_height);
mng_info->frame.left=0;
mng_info->frame.right=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width;
mng_info->frame.top=0;
mng_info->frame.bottom=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height;
mng_info->clip=default_fb=previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
mng_info->object_clip[i]=mng_info->frame;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_TERM,4) == 0)
{
int
repeat=0;
if (length != 0)
repeat=p[0];
if (repeat == 3 && length > 8)
{
final_delay=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[2]);
mng_iterations=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[6]);
if (mng_iterations == PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
mng_iterations=0;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickTrue;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" repeat=%d, final_delay=%.20g, iterations=%.20g",
repeat,(double) final_delay, (double) image->iterations);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_DEFI,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DEFI chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (length > 1)
{
object_id=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (mng_type == 2 && object_id != 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Nonzero object_id in MNG-LC datastream",
"`%s'", image->filename);
if (object_id > MNG_MAX_OBJECTS)
{
/*
Instead of using a warning we should allocate a larger
MngInfo structure and continue.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(), CoderError,
"object id too large","`%s'",image->filename);
object_id=MNG_MAX_OBJECTS;
}
if (mng_info->exists[object_id])
if (mng_info->frozen[object_id])
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"DEFI cannot redefine a frozen MNG object","`%s'",
image->filename);
continue;
}
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (length > 2)
mng_info->invisible[object_id]=p[2];
/*
Extract object offset info.
*/
if (length > 11)
{
mng_info->x_off[object_id]=(ssize_t) ((p[4] << 24) |
(p[5] << 16) | (p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
mng_info->y_off[object_id]=(ssize_t) ((p[8] << 24) |
(p[9] << 16) | (p[10] << 8) | p[11]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" x_off[%d]: %.20g, y_off[%d]: %.20g",
object_id,(double) mng_info->x_off[object_id],
object_id,(double) mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
}
}
/*
Extract object clipping info.
*/
if (length > 27)
mng_info->object_clip[object_id]=
mng_read_box(mng_info->frame,0, &p[12]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickFalse;
if (length > 5)
{
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickTrue;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BACK,4) == 0)
{
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length > 6)
mandatory_back=p[6];
else
mandatory_back=0;
if (mandatory_back && length > 5)
{
mng_background_color.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_background_color.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_background_color.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_background_color.opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (length > 8)
mng_background_object=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
#endif
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PLTE,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global PLTE. */
if (length && (length < 769))
{
if (mng_info->global_plte == (png_colorp) NULL)
mng_info->global_plte=(png_colorp) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,
sizeof(*mng_info->global_plte));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length/3); i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=p[3*i];
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=p[3*i+1];
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=p[3*i+2];
}
mng_info->global_plte_length=(unsigned int) (length/3);
}
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=i;
}
if (length != 0)
mng_info->global_plte_length=256;
#endif
else
mng_info->global_plte_length=0;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_tRNS,4) == 0)
{
/* read global tRNS */
if (length > 0 && length < 257)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=p[i];
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=255;
#endif
mng_info->global_trns_length=(unsigned int) length;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
{
ssize_t
igamma;
igamma=mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_gamma=((float) igamma)*0.00001;
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global cHRM */
if (length == 32)
{
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[12]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[16]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[20]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[24]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[28]);
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
/*
Read global sRGB.
*/
if (length != 0)
{
mng_info->global_srgb_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
/*
Read global iCCP.
*/
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_FRAM,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"FRAM chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if ((mng_info->framing_mode == 2) || (mng_info->framing_mode == 4))
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
frame_timeout=default_frame_timeout;
fb=default_fb;
if (length > 0)
if (p[0])
mng_info->framing_mode=p[0];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_mode=%d",mng_info->framing_mode);
if (length > 6)
{
/* Note the delay and frame clipping boundaries. */
p++; /* framing mode */
while (*p && ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) length))
p++; /* frame name */
p++; /* frame name terminator */
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
int
change_delay,
change_timeout,
change_clipping;
change_delay=(*p++);
change_timeout=(*p++);
change_clipping=(*p++);
p++; /* change_sync */
if (change_delay && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_delay/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_delay=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_delay == 2)
default_frame_delay=frame_delay;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_delay=%.20g",(double) frame_delay);
}
if (change_timeout && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
frame_timeout=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_timeout/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_timeout=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_timeout == 2)
default_frame_timeout=frame_timeout;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_timeout=%.20g",(double) frame_timeout);
}
if (change_clipping && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
{
fb=mng_read_box(previous_fb,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
p+=17;
previous_fb=fb;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Frame_clip: L=%.20g R=%.20g T=%.20g B=%.20g",
(double) fb.left,(double) fb.right,(double) fb.top,
(double) fb.bottom);
if (change_clipping == 2)
default_fb=fb;
}
}
}
mng_info->clip=fb;
mng_info->clip=mng_minimum_box(fb,mng_info->frame);
subframe_width=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.right
-mng_info->clip.left);
subframe_height=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.bottom
-mng_info->clip.top);
/*
Insert a background layer behind the frame if framing_mode is 4.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" subframe_width=%.20g, subframe_height=%.20g",(double)
subframe_width,(double) subframe_height);
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 4) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height))
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert backgd layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLIP,4) == 0)
{
unsigned int
first_object,
last_object;
/*
Read CLIP.
*/
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(int) first_object; i <= (int) last_object; i++)
{
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i])
{
MngBox
box;
box=mng_info->object_clip[i];
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
mng_info->object_clip[i]=
mng_read_box(box,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SAVE,4) == 0)
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
if (mng_info->exists[i])
{
mng_info->frozen[i]=MagickTrue;
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (mng_info->ob[i] != (MngBuffer *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[i]->frozen=MagickTrue;
#endif
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_DISC,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4) == 0))
{
/* Read DISC or SEEK. */
if ((length == 0) || !memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4))
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
else
{
register ssize_t
j;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=2)
{
i=p[j-1] << 8 | p[j];
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MOVE,4) == 0)
{
size_t
first_object,
last_object;
/* read MOVE */
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(ssize_t) first_object; i <= (ssize_t) last_object; i++)
{
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i] &&
(p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-8))
{
MngPair
new_pair;
MngPair
old_pair;
old_pair.a=mng_info->x_off[i];
old_pair.b=mng_info->y_off[i];
new_pair=mng_read_pair(old_pair,(int) p[0],&p[1]);
mng_info->x_off[i]=new_pair.a;
mng_info->y_off[i]=new_pair.b;
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_LOOP,4) == 0)
{
ssize_t loop_iters=1;
if (length > 4)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=1; /* mark loop active */
/* Record starting point. */
loop_iters=mng_get_long(&chunk[1]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" LOOP level %.20g has %.20g iterations ",
(double) loop_level, (double) loop_iters);
if (loop_iters == 0)
skipping_loop=loop_level;
else
{
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level]=TellBlob(image);
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]=loop_iters;
}
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]=0;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_ENDL,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 0)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
if (skipping_loop > 0)
{
if (skipping_loop == loop_level)
{
/*
Found end of zero-iteration loop.
*/
skipping_loop=(-1);
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
}
}
else
{
if (mng_info->loop_active[loop_level] == 1)
{
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]--;
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]++;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ENDL: LOOP level %.20g has %.20g remaining iters ",
(double) loop_level,(double)
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]);
if (mng_info->loop_count[loop_level] != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level], SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
else
{
short
last_level;
/*
Finished loop.
*/
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
last_level=(-1);
for (i=0; i < loop_level; i++)
if (mng_info->loop_active[i] == 1)
last_level=(short) i;
loop_level=last_level;
}
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLON,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->clon_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CLON is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->clon_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MAGN,4) == 0)
{
png_uint_16
magn_first,
magn_last,
magn_mb,
magn_ml,
magn_mr,
magn_mt,
magn_mx,
magn_my,
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
if (length > 1)
magn_first=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
else
magn_first=0;
if (length > 3)
magn_last=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
else
magn_last=magn_first;
#ifndef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (magn_first || magn_last)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"MAGN is not implemented yet for nonzero objects",
"`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#endif
if (length > 4)
magn_methx=p[4];
else
magn_methx=0;
if (length > 6)
magn_mx=(p[5] << 8) | p[6];
else
magn_mx=1;
if (magn_mx == 0)
magn_mx=1;
if (length > 8)
magn_my=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
else
magn_my=magn_mx;
if (magn_my == 0)
magn_my=1;
if (length > 10)
magn_ml=(p[9] << 8) | p[10];
else
magn_ml=magn_mx;
if (magn_ml == 0)
magn_ml=1;
if (length > 12)
magn_mr=(p[11] << 8) | p[12];
else
magn_mr=magn_mx;
if (magn_mr == 0)
magn_mr=1;
if (length > 14)
magn_mt=(p[13] << 8) | p[14];
else
magn_mt=magn_my;
if (magn_mt == 0)
magn_mt=1;
if (length > 16)
magn_mb=(p[15] << 8) | p[16];
else
magn_mb=magn_my;
if (magn_mb == 0)
magn_mb=1;
if (length > 17)
magn_methy=p[17];
else
magn_methy=magn_methx;
if (magn_methx > 5 || magn_methy > 5)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"Unknown MAGN method in MNG datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
/* Magnify existing objects in the range magn_first to magn_last */
#endif
if (magn_first == 0 || magn_last == 0)
{
/* Save the magnification factors for object 0 */
mng_info->magn_mb=magn_mb;
mng_info->magn_ml=magn_ml;
mng_info->magn_mr=magn_mr;
mng_info->magn_mt=magn_mt;
mng_info->magn_mx=magn_mx;
mng_info->magn_my=magn_my;
mng_info->magn_methx=magn_methx;
mng_info->magn_methy=magn_methy;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PAST,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->past_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"PAST is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->past_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SHOW,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->show_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"SHOW is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->show_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sBIT,4) == 0)
{
if (length < 4)
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickFalse;
else
{
mng_info->global_sbit.gray=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.red=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.green=p[1];
mng_info->global_sbit.blue=p[2];
mng_info->global_sbit.alpha=p[3];
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
mng_info->global_x_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_y_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_phys_unit_type=p[8];
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickFalse;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYg,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->phyg_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"pHYg is not implemented.","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->phyg_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BASI,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->basi_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"BASI is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->basi_warning++;
#ifdef MNG_BASI_SUPPORTED
if (length > 11)
{
basi_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
basi_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
basi_color_type=p[8];
basi_compression_method=p[9];
basi_filter_type=p[10];
basi_interlace_method=p[11];
}
if (length > 13)
basi_red=(p[12] << 8) & p[13];
else
basi_red=0;
if (length > 15)
basi_green=(p[14] << 8) & p[15];
else
basi_green=0;
if (length > 17)
basi_blue=(p[16] << 8) & p[17];
else
basi_blue=0;
if (length > 19)
basi_alpha=(p[18] << 8) & p[19];
else
{
if (basi_sample_depth == 16)
basi_alpha=65535L;
else
basi_alpha=255;
}
if (length > 20)
basi_viewable=p[20];
else
basi_viewable=0;
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4)
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
&& memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4)
#endif
)
{
/* Not an IHDR or JHDR chunk */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
/* Process IHDR */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3]);
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
mng_info->viewable[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->invisible[object_id])
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping invisible object");
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length < 8)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image_width=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
image_height=(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
/*
Insert a transparent background layer behind the entire animation
if it is not full screen.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && mng_type && first_mng_object)
{
if ((mng_info->clip.left > 0) || (mng_info->clip.top > 0) ||
(image_width < mng_info->mng_width) ||
(mng_info->clip.right < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width) ||
(image_height < mng_info->mng_height) ||
(mng_info->clip.bottom < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
/* Make a background rectangle. */
image->delay=0;
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Inserted transparent background layer, W=%.20g, H=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
}
/*
Insert a background layer behind the upcoming image if
framing_mode is 3, and we haven't already inserted one.
*/
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 3) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height) && (simplicity == 0 ||
(simplicity & 0x08)))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert background layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif /* MNG_INSERT_LAYERS */
first_mng_object=MagickFalse;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
if (mng_info->framing_mode == 1 || mng_info->framing_mode == 3)
{
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
}
else
image->delay=0;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[object_id];
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
/*
Seek back to the beginning of the IHDR or JHDR chunk's length field.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Seeking back to beginning of %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],
type[2],type[3]);
offset=SeekBlob(image,-((ssize_t) length+12),SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
mng_info->image=image;
mng_info->mng_type=mng_type;
mng_info->object_id=object_id;
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4) == 0)
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
else
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#endif
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (mng_type)
{
MngBox
crop_box;
if (mng_info->magn_methx || mng_info->magn_methy)
{
png_uint_32
magnified_height,
magnified_width;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing MNG MAGN chunk");
if (mng_info->magn_methx == 1)
{
magnified_width=mng_info->magn_ml;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-2)*(mng_info->magn_mx));
}
else
{
magnified_width=(png_uint_32) image->columns;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_ml-1;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr-1;
if (image->columns > 3)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-3)*(mng_info->magn_mx-1));
}
if (mng_info->magn_methy == 1)
{
magnified_height=mng_info->magn_mt;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-2)*(mng_info->magn_my));
}
else
{
magnified_height=(png_uint_32) image->rows;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mt-1;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb-1;
if (image->rows > 3)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-3)*(mng_info->magn_my-1));
}
if (magnified_height > image->rows ||
magnified_width > image->columns)
{
Image
*large_image;
int
yy;
ssize_t
m,
y;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*n,
*q;
PixelPacket
*next,
*prev;
png_uint_16
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocate magnified image");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
large_image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
large_image->columns=magnified_width;
large_image->rows=magnified_height;
magn_methx=mng_info->magn_methx;
magn_methy=mng_info->magn_methy;
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
#define QM unsigned short
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Scale pixels to unsigned shorts to prevent
overflow of intermediate values of interpolations
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelRed(q)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelGreen(q)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelBlue(q)));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelOpacity(q)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#else
#define QM Quantum
#endif
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image);
else
{
large_image->background_color.opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image);
if (magn_methx == 4)
magn_methx=2;
if (magn_methx == 5)
magn_methx=3;
if (magn_methy == 4)
magn_methy=2;
if (magn_methy == 5)
magn_methy=3;
}
/* magnify the rows into the right side of the large image */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the rows to %.20g",(double) large_image->rows);
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
yy=0;
length=(size_t) image->columns;
next=(PixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*next));
prev=(PixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*prev));
if ((prev == (PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(next == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (y == 0)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy <= 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_my;
n=prev;
prev=next;
next=n;
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
{
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y+1,image->columns,1,
exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
}
for (i=0; i < m; i++, yy++)
{
register PixelPacket
*pixels;
assert(yy < (ssize_t) large_image->rows);
pixels=prev;
n=next;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(large_image,0,yy,large_image->columns,
1,exception);
q+=(large_image->columns-image->columns);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
/* To do: get color as function of indexes[x] */
/*
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
}
*/
if (magn_methy <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else if (magn_methy == 2 || magn_methy == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelRed(n)
-GetPixelRed(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelRed(pixels)))));
SetPixelGreen(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelGreen(n)
-GetPixelGreen(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelGreen(pixels)))));
SetPixelBlue(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelBlue(n)
-GetPixelBlue(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelBlue(pixels)))));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels)+m))
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)))));
}
if (magn_methy == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(*pixels).opacity+0);
else
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(*n).opacity+0);
}
}
else /* if (magn_methy == 3 || magn_methy == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(n));
}
if (magn_methy == 5)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) (((ssize_t) (2*i*
(GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))
+m))/((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
}
n++;
q++;
pixels++;
} /* x */
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(large_image,exception) == 0)
break;
} /* i */
} /* y */
prev=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(prev);
next=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(next);
length=image->columns;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Delete original image");
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
image=large_image;
mng_info->image=image;
/* magnify the columns */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the columns to %.20g",(double) image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
pixels=q+(image->columns-length);
n=pixels+1;
for (x=(ssize_t) (image->columns-length);
x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelComponent() */
if (x == (ssize_t) (image->columns-length))
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_ml;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx <= 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mx;
for (i=0; i < m; i++)
{
if (magn_methx <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else if (magn_methx == 2 || magn_methx == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelComponent() */
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelRed(n)
-GetPixelRed(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelRed(pixels)));
SetPixelGreen(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelGreen(n)
-GetPixelGreen(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelGreen(pixels)));
SetPixelBlue(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelBlue(n)
-GetPixelBlue(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelBlue(pixels)));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
if (magn_methx == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)+0);
}
else
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
GetPixelOpacity(n)+0);
}
}
}
else /* if (magn_methx == 3 || magn_methx == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(n));
}
if (magn_methx == 5)
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) ((2*i*( GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))+m)/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
}
q++;
}
n++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Rescale pixels to Quantum
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelRed(q)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelGreen(q)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelBlue(q)));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelOpacity(q)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished MAGN processing");
}
}
/*
Crop_box is with respect to the upper left corner of the MNG.
*/
crop_box.left=mng_info->image_box.left+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.right=mng_info->image_box.right+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.top=mng_info->image_box.top+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box.bottom=mng_info->image_box.bottom+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->clip);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->frame);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->object_clip[object_id]);
if ((crop_box.left != (mng_info->image_box.left
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.right != (mng_info->image_box.right
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.top != (mng_info->image_box.top
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.bottom != (mng_info->image_box.bottom
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Crop the PNG image");
if ((crop_box.left < crop_box.right) &&
(crop_box.top < crop_box.bottom))
{
Image
*im;
RectangleInfo
crop_info;
/*
Crop_info is with respect to the upper left corner of
the image.
*/
crop_info.x=(crop_box.left-mng_info->x_off[object_id]);
crop_info.y=(crop_box.top-mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
crop_info.width=(size_t) (crop_box.right-crop_box.left);
crop_info.height=(size_t) (crop_box.bottom-crop_box.top);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
im=CropImage(image,&crop_info,exception);
if (im != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->columns=im->columns;
image->rows=im->rows;
im=DestroyImage(im);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=crop_box.left;
image->page.y=crop_box.top;
}
}
else
{
/*
No pixels in crop area. The MNG spec still requires
a layer, though, so make a single transparent pixel in
the top left corner.
*/
image->columns=1;
image->rows=1;
image->colors=2;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
image->page.width=1;
image->page.height=1;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
}
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
image=mng_info->image;
#endif
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
/* PNG does not handle depths greater than 16 so reduce it even
* if lossy, and promote any depths > 8 to 16.
*/
if (image->depth > 16)
image->depth=16;
#endif
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 8)
if (image->depth > 8)
{
/* To do: fill low byte properly */
image->depth=16;
}
if (LosslessReduceDepthOK(image) != MagickFalse)
image->depth = 8;
#endif
GetImageException(image,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (mng_info->scenes_found >
(ssize_t) (image_info->first_scene+image_info->number_scenes))
break;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading image datastream.");
} while (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading all image datastreams.");
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && !mng_info->image_found && (mng_info->mng_width) &&
(mng_info->mng_height))
{
/*
Insert a background layer if nothing else was found.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No images found. Inserting a background layer.");
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocation failed, returning NULL.");
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
mng_info->image_found++;
}
#endif
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
if (mng_iterations == 1)
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
while (GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image_count++;
if (image_count > 10*mng_info->image_found)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," No beginning");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted, beginning of list not found",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=GetPreviousImageInList(image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Corrupt list");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted; next_image is NULL","`%s'",
image_info->filename);
}
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second && mng_info->image_found > 1 &&
GetNextImageInList(image) ==
(Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" First image null");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"image->next for first image is NULL but shouldn't be.",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
}
if (mng_info->image_found == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No visible images found.");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"No visible images in file","`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second)
final_delay=1UL*MagickMax(image->ticks_per_second,1L)*
final_delay/mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
/* Find final nonzero image delay */
final_image_delay=0;
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (image->delay)
final_image_delay=image->delay;
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
}
if (final_delay < final_image_delay)
final_delay=final_image_delay;
image->delay=final_delay;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->delay=%.20g, final_delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) final_delay);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Before coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g",(double) scene++,(double) image->delay);
}
}
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
#ifdef MNG_COALESCE_LAYERS
if (insert_layers)
{
Image
*next_image,
*next;
size_t
scene;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Coalesce Images");
scene=image->scene;
next_image=CoalesceImages(image,&image->exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image=DestroyImageList(image);
image=next_image;
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next_image)
{
next->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
next->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
next->page.x=0;
next->page.y=0;
next->scene=scene++;
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (next->delay == 0)
{
scene--;
next_image->previous=GetPreviousImageInList(next);
if (GetPreviousImageInList(next) == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
next->previous->next=next_image;
next=DestroyImage(next);
}
}
}
#endif
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
image->dispose=BackgroundDispose;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" After coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) image->dispose);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) scene++,
(double) image->delay,(double) image->dispose);
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage();");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | static Image *ReadOneMNGImage(MngInfo* mng_info, const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
page_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
volatile int
first_mng_object,
object_id,
term_chunk_found,
skip_to_iend;
volatile ssize_t
image_count=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MngBox
default_fb,
fb,
previous_fb;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
PixelPacket
mng_background_color;
#endif
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count;
ssize_t
loop_level;
volatile short
skipping_loop;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
unsigned int
mandatory_back=0;
#endif
volatile unsigned int
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
mng_background_object=0,
#endif
mng_type=0; /* 0: PNG or JNG; 1: MNG; 2: MNG-LC; 3: MNG-VLC */
size_t
default_frame_timeout,
frame_timeout,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
image_height,
image_width,
#endif
length;
/* These delays are all measured in image ticks_per_second,
* not in MNG ticks_per_second
*/
volatile size_t
default_frame_delay,
final_delay,
final_image_delay,
frame_delay,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers,
#endif
mng_iterations=1,
simplicity=0,
subframe_height=0,
subframe_width=0;
previous_fb.top=0;
previous_fb.bottom=0;
previous_fb.left=0;
previous_fb.right=0;
default_fb.top=0;
default_fb.bottom=0;
default_fb.left=0;
default_fb.right=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneMNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
/* Verify MNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (memcmp(magic_number,"\212MNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Initialize some nonzero members of the MngInfo structure. */
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
{
mng_info->object_clip[i].right=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
mng_info->object_clip[i].bottom=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
}
mng_info->exists[0]=MagickTrue;
}
skipping_loop=(-1);
first_mng_object=MagickTrue;
mng_type=0;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers=MagickFalse; /* should be False when converting or mogrifying */
#endif
default_frame_delay=0;
default_frame_timeout=0;
frame_delay=0;
final_delay=1;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=1UL*image->ticks_per_second;
object_id=0;
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
mng_info->framing_mode=1;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mandatory_back=MagickFalse;
#endif
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mng_background_color=image->background_color;
#endif
default_fb=mng_info->frame;
previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
do
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
unsigned char
*chunk;
/*
Read a new chunk.
*/
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading MNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
#if !defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->jhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"JNGCompressNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->jhdr_warning++;
}
#endif
if (memcmp(type,mng_DHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->dhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DeltaPNGNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->dhdr_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MEND,4) == 0)
break;
if (skip_to_iend)
{
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4) == 0)
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skip to IEND.");
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length != 28)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
mng_info->mng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
mng_info->mng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG width: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG height: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
p+=8;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second == 0)
default_frame_delay=0;
else
default_frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second/
mng_info->ticks_per_second;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
simplicity=0;
/* Skip nominal layer count, frame count, and play time */
p+=16;
simplicity=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_type=1; /* Full MNG */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 11) == 11))
mng_type=2; /* LC */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 9) == 9))
mng_type=3; /* VLC */
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (mng_type != 3)
insert_layers=MagickTrue;
#endif
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
mng_info->image=image;
}
if ((mng_info->mng_width > 65535L) ||
(mng_info->mng_height > 65535L))
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g+0+0",(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double)
mng_info->mng_height);
mng_info->frame.left=0;
mng_info->frame.right=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width;
mng_info->frame.top=0;
mng_info->frame.bottom=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height;
mng_info->clip=default_fb=previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
mng_info->object_clip[i]=mng_info->frame;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_TERM,4) == 0)
{
int
repeat=0;
if (length != 0)
repeat=p[0];
if (repeat == 3 && length > 8)
{
final_delay=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[2]);
mng_iterations=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[6]);
if (mng_iterations == PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
mng_iterations=0;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickTrue;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" repeat=%d, final_delay=%.20g, iterations=%.20g",
repeat,(double) final_delay, (double) image->iterations);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_DEFI,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DEFI chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (length > 1)
{
object_id=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (mng_type == 2 && object_id != 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Nonzero object_id in MNG-LC datastream",
"`%s'", image->filename);
if (object_id > MNG_MAX_OBJECTS)
{
/*
Instead of using a warning we should allocate a larger
MngInfo structure and continue.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(), CoderError,
"object id too large","`%s'",image->filename);
object_id=MNG_MAX_OBJECTS;
}
if (mng_info->exists[object_id])
if (mng_info->frozen[object_id])
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"DEFI cannot redefine a frozen MNG object","`%s'",
image->filename);
continue;
}
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (length > 2)
mng_info->invisible[object_id]=p[2];
/*
Extract object offset info.
*/
if (length > 11)
{
mng_info->x_off[object_id]=(ssize_t) ((p[4] << 24) |
(p[5] << 16) | (p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
mng_info->y_off[object_id]=(ssize_t) ((p[8] << 24) |
(p[9] << 16) | (p[10] << 8) | p[11]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" x_off[%d]: %.20g, y_off[%d]: %.20g",
object_id,(double) mng_info->x_off[object_id],
object_id,(double) mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
}
}
/*
Extract object clipping info.
*/
if (length > 27)
mng_info->object_clip[object_id]=
mng_read_box(mng_info->frame,0, &p[12]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickFalse;
if (length > 5)
{
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickTrue;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BACK,4) == 0)
{
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length > 6)
mandatory_back=p[6];
else
mandatory_back=0;
if (mandatory_back && length > 5)
{
mng_background_color.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_background_color.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_background_color.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_background_color.opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (length > 8)
mng_background_object=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
#endif
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PLTE,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global PLTE. */
if (length && (length < 769))
{
if (mng_info->global_plte == (png_colorp) NULL)
mng_info->global_plte=(png_colorp) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,
sizeof(*mng_info->global_plte));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length/3); i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=p[3*i];
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=p[3*i+1];
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=p[3*i+2];
}
mng_info->global_plte_length=(unsigned int) (length/3);
}
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=i;
}
if (length != 0)
mng_info->global_plte_length=256;
#endif
else
mng_info->global_plte_length=0;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_tRNS,4) == 0)
{
/* read global tRNS */
if (length > 0 && length < 257)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=p[i];
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=255;
#endif
mng_info->global_trns_length=(unsigned int) length;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
{
ssize_t
igamma;
igamma=mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_gamma=((float) igamma)*0.00001;
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global cHRM */
if (length == 32)
{
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[12]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[16]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[20]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[24]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[28]);
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
/*
Read global sRGB.
*/
if (length != 0)
{
mng_info->global_srgb_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
/*
Read global iCCP.
*/
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_FRAM,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"FRAM chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if ((mng_info->framing_mode == 2) || (mng_info->framing_mode == 4))
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
frame_timeout=default_frame_timeout;
fb=default_fb;
if (length > 0)
if (p[0])
mng_info->framing_mode=p[0];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_mode=%d",mng_info->framing_mode);
if (length > 6)
{
/* Note the delay and frame clipping boundaries. */
p++; /* framing mode */
while (*p && ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) length))
p++; /* frame name */
p++; /* frame name terminator */
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
int
change_delay,
change_timeout,
change_clipping;
change_delay=(*p++);
change_timeout=(*p++);
change_clipping=(*p++);
p++; /* change_sync */
if (change_delay && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_delay/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_delay=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_delay == 2)
default_frame_delay=frame_delay;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_delay=%.20g",(double) frame_delay);
}
if (change_timeout && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
frame_timeout=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_timeout/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_timeout=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_timeout == 2)
default_frame_timeout=frame_timeout;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_timeout=%.20g",(double) frame_timeout);
}
if (change_clipping && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
{
fb=mng_read_box(previous_fb,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
p+=17;
previous_fb=fb;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Frame_clip: L=%.20g R=%.20g T=%.20g B=%.20g",
(double) fb.left,(double) fb.right,(double) fb.top,
(double) fb.bottom);
if (change_clipping == 2)
default_fb=fb;
}
}
}
mng_info->clip=fb;
mng_info->clip=mng_minimum_box(fb,mng_info->frame);
subframe_width=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.right
-mng_info->clip.left);
subframe_height=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.bottom
-mng_info->clip.top);
/*
Insert a background layer behind the frame if framing_mode is 4.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" subframe_width=%.20g, subframe_height=%.20g",(double)
subframe_width,(double) subframe_height);
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 4) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height))
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert backgd layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLIP,4) == 0)
{
unsigned int
first_object,
last_object;
/*
Read CLIP.
*/
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(int) first_object; i <= (int) last_object; i++)
{
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i])
{
MngBox
box;
box=mng_info->object_clip[i];
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
mng_info->object_clip[i]=
mng_read_box(box,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SAVE,4) == 0)
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
if (mng_info->exists[i])
{
mng_info->frozen[i]=MagickTrue;
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (mng_info->ob[i] != (MngBuffer *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[i]->frozen=MagickTrue;
#endif
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_DISC,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4) == 0))
{
/* Read DISC or SEEK. */
if ((length == 0) || !memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4))
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
else
{
register ssize_t
j;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=2)
{
i=p[j-1] << 8 | p[j];
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MOVE,4) == 0)
{
size_t
first_object,
last_object;
/* read MOVE */
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(ssize_t) first_object; i <= (ssize_t) last_object; i++)
{
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i] &&
(p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-8))
{
MngPair
new_pair;
MngPair
old_pair;
old_pair.a=mng_info->x_off[i];
old_pair.b=mng_info->y_off[i];
new_pair=mng_read_pair(old_pair,(int) p[0],&p[1]);
mng_info->x_off[i]=new_pair.a;
mng_info->y_off[i]=new_pair.b;
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_LOOP,4) == 0)
{
ssize_t loop_iters=1;
if (length > 4)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=1; /* mark loop active */
/* Record starting point. */
loop_iters=mng_get_long(&chunk[1]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" LOOP level %.20g has %.20g iterations ",
(double) loop_level, (double) loop_iters);
if (loop_iters == 0)
skipping_loop=loop_level;
else
{
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level]=TellBlob(image);
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]=loop_iters;
}
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]=0;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_ENDL,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 0)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
if (skipping_loop > 0)
{
if (skipping_loop == loop_level)
{
/*
Found end of zero-iteration loop.
*/
skipping_loop=(-1);
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
}
}
else
{
if (mng_info->loop_active[loop_level] == 1)
{
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]--;
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]++;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ENDL: LOOP level %.20g has %.20g remaining iters ",
(double) loop_level,(double)
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]);
if (mng_info->loop_count[loop_level] != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level], SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
else
{
short
last_level;
/*
Finished loop.
*/
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
last_level=(-1);
for (i=0; i < loop_level; i++)
if (mng_info->loop_active[i] == 1)
last_level=(short) i;
loop_level=last_level;
}
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLON,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->clon_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CLON is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->clon_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MAGN,4) == 0)
{
png_uint_16
magn_first,
magn_last,
magn_mb,
magn_ml,
magn_mr,
magn_mt,
magn_mx,
magn_my,
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
if (length > 1)
magn_first=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
else
magn_first=0;
if (length > 3)
magn_last=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
else
magn_last=magn_first;
#ifndef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (magn_first || magn_last)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"MAGN is not implemented yet for nonzero objects",
"`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#endif
if (length > 4)
magn_methx=p[4];
else
magn_methx=0;
if (length > 6)
magn_mx=(p[5] << 8) | p[6];
else
magn_mx=1;
if (magn_mx == 0)
magn_mx=1;
if (length > 8)
magn_my=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
else
magn_my=magn_mx;
if (magn_my == 0)
magn_my=1;
if (length > 10)
magn_ml=(p[9] << 8) | p[10];
else
magn_ml=magn_mx;
if (magn_ml == 0)
magn_ml=1;
if (length > 12)
magn_mr=(p[11] << 8) | p[12];
else
magn_mr=magn_mx;
if (magn_mr == 0)
magn_mr=1;
if (length > 14)
magn_mt=(p[13] << 8) | p[14];
else
magn_mt=magn_my;
if (magn_mt == 0)
magn_mt=1;
if (length > 16)
magn_mb=(p[15] << 8) | p[16];
else
magn_mb=magn_my;
if (magn_mb == 0)
magn_mb=1;
if (length > 17)
magn_methy=p[17];
else
magn_methy=magn_methx;
if (magn_methx > 5 || magn_methy > 5)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"Unknown MAGN method in MNG datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
/* Magnify existing objects in the range magn_first to magn_last */
#endif
if (magn_first == 0 || magn_last == 0)
{
/* Save the magnification factors for object 0 */
mng_info->magn_mb=magn_mb;
mng_info->magn_ml=magn_ml;
mng_info->magn_mr=magn_mr;
mng_info->magn_mt=magn_mt;
mng_info->magn_mx=magn_mx;
mng_info->magn_my=magn_my;
mng_info->magn_methx=magn_methx;
mng_info->magn_methy=magn_methy;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PAST,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->past_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"PAST is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->past_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SHOW,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->show_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"SHOW is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->show_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sBIT,4) == 0)
{
if (length < 4)
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickFalse;
else
{
mng_info->global_sbit.gray=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.red=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.green=p[1];
mng_info->global_sbit.blue=p[2];
mng_info->global_sbit.alpha=p[3];
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
mng_info->global_x_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_y_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_phys_unit_type=p[8];
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickFalse;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYg,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->phyg_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"pHYg is not implemented.","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->phyg_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BASI,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->basi_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"BASI is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->basi_warning++;
#ifdef MNG_BASI_SUPPORTED
if (length > 11)
{
basi_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
basi_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
basi_color_type=p[8];
basi_compression_method=p[9];
basi_filter_type=p[10];
basi_interlace_method=p[11];
}
if (length > 13)
basi_red=(p[12] << 8) & p[13];
else
basi_red=0;
if (length > 15)
basi_green=(p[14] << 8) & p[15];
else
basi_green=0;
if (length > 17)
basi_blue=(p[16] << 8) & p[17];
else
basi_blue=0;
if (length > 19)
basi_alpha=(p[18] << 8) & p[19];
else
{
if (basi_sample_depth == 16)
basi_alpha=65535L;
else
basi_alpha=255;
}
if (length > 20)
basi_viewable=p[20];
else
basi_viewable=0;
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4)
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
&& memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4)
#endif
)
{
/* Not an IHDR or JHDR chunk */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
/* Process IHDR */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3]);
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
mng_info->viewable[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->invisible[object_id])
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping invisible object");
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length < 8)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image_width=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
image_height=(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
/*
Insert a transparent background layer behind the entire animation
if it is not full screen.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && mng_type && first_mng_object)
{
if ((mng_info->clip.left > 0) || (mng_info->clip.top > 0) ||
(image_width < mng_info->mng_width) ||
(mng_info->clip.right < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width) ||
(image_height < mng_info->mng_height) ||
(mng_info->clip.bottom < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
/* Make a background rectangle. */
image->delay=0;
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Inserted transparent background layer, W=%.20g, H=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
}
/*
Insert a background layer behind the upcoming image if
framing_mode is 3, and we haven't already inserted one.
*/
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 3) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height) && (simplicity == 0 ||
(simplicity & 0x08)))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert background layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif /* MNG_INSERT_LAYERS */
first_mng_object=MagickFalse;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
if (mng_info->framing_mode == 1 || mng_info->framing_mode == 3)
{
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
}
else
image->delay=0;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[object_id];
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
/*
Seek back to the beginning of the IHDR or JHDR chunk's length field.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Seeking back to beginning of %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],
type[2],type[3]);
offset=SeekBlob(image,-((ssize_t) length+12),SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
mng_info->image=image;
mng_info->mng_type=mng_type;
mng_info->object_id=object_id;
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4) == 0)
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
else
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#endif
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (mng_type)
{
MngBox
crop_box;
if (mng_info->magn_methx || mng_info->magn_methy)
{
png_uint_32
magnified_height,
magnified_width;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing MNG MAGN chunk");
if (mng_info->magn_methx == 1)
{
magnified_width=mng_info->magn_ml;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-2)*(mng_info->magn_mx));
}
else
{
magnified_width=(png_uint_32) image->columns;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_ml-1;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr-1;
if (image->columns > 3)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-3)*(mng_info->magn_mx-1));
}
if (mng_info->magn_methy == 1)
{
magnified_height=mng_info->magn_mt;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-2)*(mng_info->magn_my));
}
else
{
magnified_height=(png_uint_32) image->rows;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mt-1;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb-1;
if (image->rows > 3)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-3)*(mng_info->magn_my-1));
}
if (magnified_height > image->rows ||
magnified_width > image->columns)
{
Image
*large_image;
int
yy;
ssize_t
m,
y;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*n,
*q;
PixelPacket
*next,
*prev;
png_uint_16
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocate magnified image");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
large_image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
large_image->columns=magnified_width;
large_image->rows=magnified_height;
magn_methx=mng_info->magn_methx;
magn_methy=mng_info->magn_methy;
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
#define QM unsigned short
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Scale pixels to unsigned shorts to prevent
overflow of intermediate values of interpolations
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelRed(q)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelGreen(q)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelBlue(q)));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelOpacity(q)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#else
#define QM Quantum
#endif
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image);
else
{
large_image->background_color.opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image);
if (magn_methx == 4)
magn_methx=2;
if (magn_methx == 5)
magn_methx=3;
if (magn_methy == 4)
magn_methy=2;
if (magn_methy == 5)
magn_methy=3;
}
/* magnify the rows into the right side of the large image */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the rows to %.20g",(double) large_image->rows);
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
yy=0;
length=(size_t) image->columns;
next=(PixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*next));
prev=(PixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*prev));
if ((prev == (PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(next == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (y == 0)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy <= 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_my;
n=prev;
prev=next;
next=n;
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
{
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y+1,image->columns,1,
exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
}
for (i=0; i < m; i++, yy++)
{
register PixelPacket
*pixels;
assert(yy < (ssize_t) large_image->rows);
pixels=prev;
n=next;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(large_image,0,yy,large_image->columns,
1,exception);
q+=(large_image->columns-image->columns);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
/* To do: get color as function of indexes[x] */
/*
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
}
*/
if (magn_methy <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else if (magn_methy == 2 || magn_methy == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelRed(n)
-GetPixelRed(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelRed(pixels)))));
SetPixelGreen(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelGreen(n)
-GetPixelGreen(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelGreen(pixels)))));
SetPixelBlue(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelBlue(n)
-GetPixelBlue(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelBlue(pixels)))));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels)+m))
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)))));
}
if (magn_methy == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(*pixels).opacity+0);
else
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(*n).opacity+0);
}
}
else /* if (magn_methy == 3 || magn_methy == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(n));
}
if (magn_methy == 5)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) (((ssize_t) (2*i*
(GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))
+m))/((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
}
n++;
q++;
pixels++;
} /* x */
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(large_image,exception) == 0)
break;
} /* i */
} /* y */
prev=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(prev);
next=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(next);
length=image->columns;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Delete original image");
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
image=large_image;
mng_info->image=image;
/* magnify the columns */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the columns to %.20g",(double) image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
pixels=q+(image->columns-length);
n=pixels+1;
for (x=(ssize_t) (image->columns-length);
x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelComponent() */
if (x == (ssize_t) (image->columns-length))
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_ml;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx <= 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mx;
for (i=0; i < m; i++)
{
if (magn_methx <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else if (magn_methx == 2 || magn_methx == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelComponent() */
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelRed(n)
-GetPixelRed(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelRed(pixels)));
SetPixelGreen(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelGreen(n)
-GetPixelGreen(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelGreen(pixels)));
SetPixelBlue(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelBlue(n)
-GetPixelBlue(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelBlue(pixels)));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
if (magn_methx == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)+0);
}
else
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
GetPixelOpacity(n)+0);
}
}
}
else /* if (magn_methx == 3 || magn_methx == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(n));
}
if (magn_methx == 5)
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) ((2*i*( GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))+m)/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
}
q++;
}
n++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Rescale pixels to Quantum
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelRed(q)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelGreen(q)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelBlue(q)));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelOpacity(q)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished MAGN processing");
}
}
/*
Crop_box is with respect to the upper left corner of the MNG.
*/
crop_box.left=mng_info->image_box.left+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.right=mng_info->image_box.right+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.top=mng_info->image_box.top+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box.bottom=mng_info->image_box.bottom+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->clip);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->frame);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->object_clip[object_id]);
if ((crop_box.left != (mng_info->image_box.left
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.right != (mng_info->image_box.right
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.top != (mng_info->image_box.top
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.bottom != (mng_info->image_box.bottom
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Crop the PNG image");
if ((crop_box.left < crop_box.right) &&
(crop_box.top < crop_box.bottom))
{
Image
*im;
RectangleInfo
crop_info;
/*
Crop_info is with respect to the upper left corner of
the image.
*/
crop_info.x=(crop_box.left-mng_info->x_off[object_id]);
crop_info.y=(crop_box.top-mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
crop_info.width=(size_t) (crop_box.right-crop_box.left);
crop_info.height=(size_t) (crop_box.bottom-crop_box.top);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
im=CropImage(image,&crop_info,exception);
if (im != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->columns=im->columns;
image->rows=im->rows;
im=DestroyImage(im);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=crop_box.left;
image->page.y=crop_box.top;
}
}
else
{
/*
No pixels in crop area. The MNG spec still requires
a layer, though, so make a single transparent pixel in
the top left corner.
*/
image->columns=1;
image->rows=1;
image->colors=2;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
image->page.width=1;
image->page.height=1;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
}
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
image=mng_info->image;
#endif
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
/* PNG does not handle depths greater than 16 so reduce it even
* if lossy, and promote any depths > 8 to 16.
*/
if (image->depth > 16)
image->depth=16;
#endif
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 8)
if (image->depth > 8)
{
/* To do: fill low byte properly */
image->depth=16;
}
if (LosslessReduceDepthOK(image) != MagickFalse)
image->depth = 8;
#endif
GetImageException(image,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (mng_info->scenes_found >
(ssize_t) (image_info->first_scene+image_info->number_scenes))
break;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading image datastream.");
} while (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading all image datastreams.");
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && !mng_info->image_found && (mng_info->mng_width) &&
(mng_info->mng_height))
{
/*
Insert a background layer if nothing else was found.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No images found. Inserting a background layer.");
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocation failed, returning NULL.");
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
mng_info->image_found++;
}
#endif
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
if (mng_iterations == 1)
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
while (GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image_count++;
if (image_count > 10*mng_info->image_found)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," No beginning");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted, beginning of list not found",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=GetPreviousImageInList(image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Corrupt list");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted; next_image is NULL","`%s'",
image_info->filename);
}
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second && mng_info->image_found > 1 &&
GetNextImageInList(image) ==
(Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" First image null");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"image->next for first image is NULL but shouldn't be.",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
}
if (mng_info->image_found == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No visible images found.");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"No visible images in file","`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second)
final_delay=1UL*MagickMax(image->ticks_per_second,1L)*
final_delay/mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
/* Find final nonzero image delay */
final_image_delay=0;
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (image->delay)
final_image_delay=image->delay;
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
}
if (final_delay < final_image_delay)
final_delay=final_image_delay;
image->delay=final_delay;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->delay=%.20g, final_delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) final_delay);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Before coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g",(double) scene++,(double) image->delay);
}
}
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
#ifdef MNG_COALESCE_LAYERS
if (insert_layers)
{
Image
*next_image,
*next;
size_t
scene;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Coalesce Images");
scene=image->scene;
next_image=CoalesceImages(image,&image->exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image=DestroyImageList(image);
image=next_image;
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next_image)
{
next->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
next->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
next->page.x=0;
next->page.y=0;
next->scene=scene++;
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (next->delay == 0)
{
scene--;
next_image->previous=GetPreviousImageInList(next);
if (GetPreviousImageInList(next) == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
next->previous->next=next_image;
next=DestroyImage(next);
}
}
}
#endif
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
image->dispose=BackgroundDispose;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" After coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) image->dispose);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) scene++,
(double) image->delay,(double) image->dispose);
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage();");
return(image);
}
| 170,026 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Metadata* EntrySync::getMetadata(ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
RefPtr<MetadataSyncCallbackHelper> helper = MetadataSyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->getMetadata(this, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Metadata* EntrySync::getMetadata(ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
MetadataSyncCallbackHelper* helper = MetadataSyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->getMetadata(this, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,421 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::BindRequest(mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void AppControllerImpl::BindRequest(mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
void AppControllerService::BindRequest(mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
| 172,080 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mem_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
int ret;
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
long newbufsize;
long newpos;
assert(buf);
assert(cnt >= 0);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
newpos = m->pos_ + cnt;
if (newpos > m->bufsize_ && m->growable_) {
newbufsize = m->bufsize_;
while (newbufsize < newpos) {
newbufsize <<= 1;
assert(newbufsize >= 0);
}
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write resizing from %d to %z\n", m->bufsize_,
newbufsize));
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write resizing from %d to %ul\n", m->bufsize_,
JAS_CAST(unsigned long, newbufsize)));
if (mem_resize(m, newbufsize)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
/* The current position is beyond the end of the file, so
pad the file to the current position with zeros. */
n = JAS_MIN(m->pos_, m->bufsize_) - m->len_;
if (n > 0) {
memset(&m->buf_[m->len_], 0, n);
m->len_ += n;
}
if (m->pos_ != m->len_) {
/* The buffer is not big enough. */
return 0;
}
}
n = m->bufsize_ - m->pos_;
ret = JAS_MIN(n, cnt);
if (ret > 0) {
memcpy(&m->buf_[m->pos_], buf, ret);
m->pos_ += ret;
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
m->len_ = m->pos_;
}
assert(ret == cnt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int mem_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
size_t n;
int ret;
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
size_t newbufsize;
size_t newpos;
assert(buf);
assert(cnt >= 0);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
newpos = m->pos_ + cnt;
if (newpos > m->bufsize_ && m->growable_) {
newbufsize = m->bufsize_;
while (newbufsize < newpos) {
//newbufsize <<= 1;
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(newbufsize, 2, &newbufsize)) {
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("new buffer size would cause overflow\n"));
return -1;
}
}
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write resizing from %d to %zu\n", m->bufsize_,
newbufsize));
assert(newbufsize > 0);
if (mem_resize(m, newbufsize)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
/* The current position is beyond the end of the file, so
pad the file to the current position with zeros. */
n = JAS_MIN(m->pos_, m->bufsize_) - m->len_;
if (n > 0) {
memset(&m->buf_[m->len_], 0, n);
m->len_ += n;
}
if (m->pos_ != m->len_) {
/* The buffer is not big enough. */
return 0;
}
}
n = m->bufsize_ - m->pos_;
ret = JAS_MIN(n, cnt);
if (ret > 0) {
memcpy(&m->buf_[m->pos_], buf, ret);
m->pos_ += ret;
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
m->len_ = m->pos_;
}
assert(ret == cnt);
return ret;
}
| 168,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WT_InterpolateMono (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
const EAS_I8 *pLoopEnd;
const EAS_I8 *pCurrentPhaseInt;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 currentPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I8 *pLoopStart;
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
/* calculate gain increment */
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
pCurrentPhaseInt = pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum;
currentPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->phaseIncrement;
pLoopStart = pWTVoice->pLoopStart;
pLoopEnd = pWTVoice->pLoopEnd + 1;
InterpolationLoop:
tmp0 = (EAS_I32)(pCurrentPhaseInt - pLoopEnd);
if (tmp0 >= 0)
pCurrentPhaseInt = pLoopStart + tmp0;
tmp0 = *pCurrentPhaseInt;
tmp1 = *(pCurrentPhaseInt + 1);
tmp2 = phaseInc + currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp1 - tmp0;
tmp1 = tmp1 * currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp0 + (tmp1 >> NUM_EG1_FRAC_BITS);
pCurrentPhaseInt += (tmp2 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
currentPhaseFrac = tmp2 & PHASE_FRAC_MASK;
gain += gainIncrement;
tmp2 = (gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
tmp0 = *pMixBuffer;
tmp2 = tmp1 * tmp2;
tmp2 = (tmp2 >> 9);
tmp0 = tmp2 + tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp0;
numSamples--;
if (numSamples > 0)
goto InterpolationLoop;
pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum = pCurrentPhaseInt;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = currentPhaseFrac;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide>*/
pWTVoice->gain = (EAS_I16)(gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void WT_InterpolateMono (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
const EAS_I8 *pLoopEnd;
const EAS_I8 *pCurrentPhaseInt;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 currentPhaseFrac;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I8 *pLoopStart;
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
/* calculate gain increment */
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
pCurrentPhaseInt = pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum;
currentPhaseFrac = pWTVoice->phaseFrac;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->phaseIncrement;
pLoopStart = pWTVoice->pLoopStart;
pLoopEnd = pWTVoice->pLoopEnd + 1;
InterpolationLoop:
tmp0 = (EAS_I32)(pCurrentPhaseInt - pLoopEnd);
if (tmp0 >= 0)
pCurrentPhaseInt = pLoopStart + tmp0;
tmp0 = *pCurrentPhaseInt;
tmp1 = *(pCurrentPhaseInt + 1);
tmp2 = phaseInc + currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp1 - tmp0;
tmp1 = tmp1 * currentPhaseFrac;
tmp1 = tmp0 + (tmp1 >> NUM_EG1_FRAC_BITS);
pCurrentPhaseInt += (tmp2 >> NUM_PHASE_FRAC_BITS);
currentPhaseFrac = tmp2 & PHASE_FRAC_MASK;
gain += gainIncrement;
tmp2 = (gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
tmp0 = *pMixBuffer;
tmp2 = tmp1 * tmp2;
tmp2 = (tmp2 >> 9);
tmp0 = tmp2 + tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp0;
numSamples--;
if (numSamples > 0)
goto InterpolationLoop;
pWTVoice->pPhaseAccum = pCurrentPhaseInt;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = currentPhaseFrac;
/*lint -e{702} <avoid divide>*/
pWTVoice->gain = (EAS_I16)(gain >> SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
}
| 173,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GDataEntry* GDataDirectory::FromDocumentEntry(
GDataDirectory* parent,
DocumentEntry* doc,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
DCHECK(doc->is_folder());
GDataDirectory* dir = new GDataDirectory(parent, directory_service);
dir->title_ = UTF16ToUTF8(doc->title());
dir->SetBaseNameFromTitle();
dir->file_info_.last_modified = doc->updated_time();
dir->file_info_.last_accessed = doc->updated_time();
dir->file_info_.creation_time = doc->published_time();
dir->resource_id_ = doc->resource_id();
dir->content_url_ = doc->content_url();
dir->deleted_ = doc->deleted();
const Link* edit_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::EDIT);
DCHECK(edit_link) << "No edit link for dir " << dir->title_;
if (edit_link)
dir->edit_url_ = edit_link->href();
const Link* parent_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::PARENT);
if (parent_link)
dir->parent_resource_id_ = ExtractResourceId(parent_link->href());
const Link* upload_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_CREATE_MEDIA);
if (upload_link)
dir->upload_url_ = upload_link->href();
return dir;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | GDataEntry* GDataDirectory::FromDocumentEntry(
void GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry(DocumentEntry* doc) {
GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry(doc);
const Link* upload_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_CREATE_MEDIA);
if (upload_link)
upload_url_ = upload_link->href();
}
| 171,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayersInternal(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobSignedLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobSignedLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.width,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double) ((MagickOffsetType)
length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile",image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile",image->filename);
}
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) || (layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info,exception);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Slightly different fix for #714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayersInternal(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobSignedLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobSignedLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.width,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double) ((MagickOffsetType)
length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) (unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile",image->filename);
}
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) || (layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info,exception);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
| 170,017 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: aodv_extension(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct aodv_ext *ep, u_int length)
{
const struct aodv_hello *ah;
switch (ep->type) {
case AODV_EXT_HELLO:
ah = (const struct aodv_hello *)(const void *)ep;
ND_TCHECK(*ah);
if (length < sizeof(struct aodv_hello))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\text HELLO %ld ms",
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&ah->interval)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\text %u %u", ep->type, ep->length));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|hello]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13002/AODV: Add some missing bounds checks.
In aodv_extension() do a bounds check on the extension header before we
look at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, add the RFC number, and check the validity of the
length for the Hello extension.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | aodv_extension(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct aodv_ext *ep, u_int length)
{
const struct aodv_hello *ah;
ND_TCHECK(*ep);
switch (ep->type) {
case AODV_EXT_HELLO:
ah = (const struct aodv_hello *)(const void *)ep;
ND_TCHECK(*ah);
if (length < sizeof(struct aodv_hello))
goto trunc;
if (ep->length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\text HELLO - bad length %u", ep->length));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\text HELLO %ld ms",
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&ah->interval)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\text %u %u", ep->type, ep->length));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|hello]"));
}
| 167,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
int ret = 0, bigname = 0;
memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
fname->usr_fname = iname;
if (!dir->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(dir) ||
fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
ret = fscrypt_get_crypt_info(dir);
if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
return ret;
if (dir->i_crypt_info) {
ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(dir, iname->len,
&fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = fname_encrypt(dir, iname, &fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
goto errout;
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
return 0;
}
if (!lookup)
return -ENOKEY;
/*
* We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
* user-supplied name
*/
if (iname->name[0] == '_')
bigname = 1;
if ((bigname && (iname->len != 33)) || (!bigname && (iname->len > 43)))
return -ENOENT;
fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = digest_decode(iname->name + bigname, iname->len - bigname,
fname->crypto_buf.name);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto errout;
}
fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
if (bigname) {
memcpy(&fname->hash, fname->crypto_buf.name, 4);
memcpy(&fname->minor_hash, fname->crypto_buf.name + 4, 4);
} else {
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
}
return 0;
errout:
fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&fname->crypto_buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
int ret = 0, bigname = 0;
memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
fname->usr_fname = iname;
if (!dir->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(dir) ||
fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
ret = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir);
if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
return ret;
if (dir->i_crypt_info) {
ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(dir, iname->len,
&fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = fname_encrypt(dir, iname, &fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
goto errout;
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
return 0;
}
if (!lookup)
return -ENOKEY;
/*
* We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
* user-supplied name
*/
if (iname->name[0] == '_')
bigname = 1;
if ((bigname && (iname->len != 33)) || (!bigname && (iname->len > 43)))
return -ENOENT;
fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = digest_decode(iname->name + bigname, iname->len - bigname,
fname->crypto_buf.name);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto errout;
}
fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
if (bigname) {
memcpy(&fname->hash, fname->crypto_buf.name, 4);
memcpy(&fname->minor_hash, fname->crypto_buf.name + 4, 4);
} else {
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
}
return 0;
errout:
fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&fname->crypto_buf);
return ret;
}
| 168,280 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
xmlChar limit = 0;
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
xmlChar *rep = NULL;
int len = 0;
int buf_size = 0;
int c, l, in_space = 0;
xmlChar *current = NULL;
xmlEntityPtr ent;
if (NXT(0) == '"') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
limit = '"';
NEXT;
} else if (NXT(0) == '\'') {
limit = '\'';
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* allocate a translation buffer.
*/
buf_size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(buf_size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) goto mem_error;
/*
* OK loop until we reach one of the ending char or a size limit.
*/
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */
(IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) {
if (c == 0) break;
if (c == '&') {
in_space = 0;
if (NXT(1) == '#') {
int val = xmlParseCharRef(ctxt);
if (val == '&') {
if (ctxt->replaceEntities) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
} else {
/*
* The reparsing will be done in xmlStringGetNodeList()
* called by the attribute() function in SAX.c
*/
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
}
} else if (val != 0) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
len += xmlCopyChar(0, &buf[len], val);
}
} else {
ent = xmlParseEntityRef(ctxt);
ctxt->nbentities++;
if (ent != NULL)
ctxt->nbentities += ent->owner;
if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ent->content[0] == '&')) {
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
} else {
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities != 0)) {
if (ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF,
0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
current = rep;
while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming */
if ((*current == 0xD) || (*current == 0xA) ||
(*current == 0x9)) {
buf[len++] = 0x20;
current++;
} else
buf[len++] = *current++;
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
} else {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if (ent->content != NULL)
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if (ent != NULL) {
int i = xmlStrlen(ent->name);
const xmlChar *cur = ent->name;
/*
* This may look absurd but is needed to detect
* entities problems
*/
if ((ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(ent->content != NULL)) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Just output the reference
*/
buf[len++] = '&';
while (len > buf_size - i - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, i + 10);
}
for (;i > 0;i--)
buf[len++] = *cur++;
buf[len++] = ';';
}
}
} else {
if ((c == 0x20) || (c == 0xD) || (c == 0xA) || (c == 0x9)) {
if ((len != 0) || (!normalize)) {
if ((!normalize) || (!in_space)) {
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,0x20);
while (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
in_space = 1;
}
} else {
in_space = 0;
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
NEXTL(l);
}
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if ((in_space) && (normalize)) {
while (buf[len - 1] == 0x20) len--;
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (RAW == '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE, NULL);
} else if (RAW != limit) {
if ((c != 0) && (!IS_CHAR(c))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"invalid character in attribute value\n");
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue: ' expected\n");
}
} else
NEXT;
if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = len;
return(buf);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
if (rep != NULL)
xmlFree(rep);
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add a check to prevent len from going negative in xmlParseAttValueComplex.
BUG=158249
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11343029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@164867 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) {
xmlChar limit = 0;
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
xmlChar *rep = NULL;
int len = 0;
int buf_size = 0;
int c, l, in_space = 0;
xmlChar *current = NULL;
xmlEntityPtr ent;
if (NXT(0) == '"') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
limit = '"';
NEXT;
} else if (NXT(0) == '\'') {
limit = '\'';
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE;
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* allocate a translation buffer.
*/
buf_size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(buf_size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) goto mem_error;
/*
* OK loop until we reach one of the ending char or a size limit.
*/
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while ((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */
(IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) {
if (c == 0) break;
if (c == '&') {
in_space = 0;
if (NXT(1) == '#') {
int val = xmlParseCharRef(ctxt);
if (val == '&') {
if (ctxt->replaceEntities) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
} else {
/*
* The reparsing will be done in xmlStringGetNodeList()
* called by the attribute() function in SAX.c
*/
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
}
} else if (val != 0) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
len += xmlCopyChar(0, &buf[len], val);
}
} else {
ent = xmlParseEntityRef(ctxt);
ctxt->nbentities++;
if (ent != NULL)
ctxt->nbentities += ent->owner;
if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if ((ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ent->content[0] == '&')) {
buf[len++] = '&';
buf[len++] = '#';
buf[len++] = '3';
buf[len++] = '8';
buf[len++] = ';';
} else {
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities != 0)) {
if (ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF,
0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
current = rep;
while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming */
if ((*current == 0xD) || (*current == 0xA) ||
(*current == 0x9)) {
buf[len++] = 0x20;
current++;
} else
buf[len++] = *current++;
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
} else {
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
if (ent->content != NULL)
buf[len++] = ent->content[0];
}
} else if (ent != NULL) {
int i = xmlStrlen(ent->name);
const xmlChar *cur = ent->name;
/*
* This may look absurd but is needed to detect
* entities problems
*/
if ((ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(ent->content != NULL)) {
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content,
XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
if (rep != NULL) {
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Just output the reference
*/
buf[len++] = '&';
while (len > buf_size - i - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, i + 10);
}
for (;i > 0;i--)
buf[len++] = *cur++;
buf[len++] = ';';
}
}
} else {
if ((c == 0x20) || (c == 0xD) || (c == 0xA) || (c == 0x9)) {
if ((len != 0) || (!normalize)) {
if ((!normalize) || (!in_space)) {
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,0x20);
while (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
in_space = 1;
}
} else {
in_space = 0;
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
if (len > buf_size - 10) {
growBuffer(buf, 10);
}
}
NEXTL(l);
}
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if ((in_space) && (normalize)) {
while ((len > 0) && (buf[len - 1] == 0x20)) len--;
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (RAW == '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE, NULL);
} else if (RAW != limit) {
if ((c != 0) && (!IS_CHAR(c))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"invalid character in attribute value\n");
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED,
"AttValue: ' expected\n");
}
} else
NEXT;
if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = len;
return(buf);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
if (rep != NULL)
xmlFree(rep);
return(NULL);
}
| 170,696 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool glfs_check_config(const char *cfgstring, char **reason)
{
char *path;
glfs_t *fs = NULL;
glfs_fd_t *gfd = NULL;
gluster_server *hosts = NULL; /* gluster server defination */
bool result = true;
path = strchr(cfgstring, '/');
if (!path) {
if (asprintf(reason, "No path found") == -1)
*reason = NULL;
result = false;
goto done;
}
path += 1; /* get past '/' */
fs = tcmu_create_glfs_object(path, &hosts);
if (!fs) {
tcmu_err("tcmu_create_glfs_object failed\n");
goto done;
}
gfd = glfs_open(fs, hosts->path, ALLOWED_BSOFLAGS);
if (!gfd) {
if (asprintf(reason, "glfs_open failed: %m") == -1)
*reason = NULL;
result = false;
goto unref;
}
if (glfs_access(fs, hosts->path, R_OK|W_OK) == -1) {
if (asprintf(reason, "glfs_access file not present, or not writable") == -1)
*reason = NULL;
result = false;
goto unref;
}
goto done;
unref:
gluster_cache_refresh(fs, path);
done:
if (gfd)
glfs_close(gfd);
gluster_free_server(&hosts);
return result;
}
Commit Message: glfs: discard glfs_check_config
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar Kalever <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static bool glfs_check_config(const char *cfgstring, char **reason)
| 167,635 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
int interlaced = dctx->interlaced;
int cur_field = dctx->cur_field;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
interlaced = (state&2)>>1; /* byte following the 5-byte header prefix */
cur_field = state&1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i >= dctx->remaining && (!dctx->interlaced || dctx->cur_field)) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = cur_field;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 611b35627488a8d0763e75c25ee0875c5b7987dd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
int interlaced = dctx->interlaced;
int cur_field = dctx->cur_field;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
interlaced = (state&2)>>1; /* byte following the 5-byte header prefix */
cur_field = state&1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
int remaining;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (remaining <= 0) {
remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (remaining <= 0)
continue;
}
dctx->remaining = remaining;
if (buf_size - i >= dctx->remaining && (!dctx->interlaced || dctx->cur_field)) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = cur_field;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
| 168,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int read_tfra(MOVContext *mov, AVIOContext *f)
{
MOVFragmentIndex* index = NULL;
int version, fieldlength, i, j;
int64_t pos = avio_tell(f);
uint32_t size = avio_rb32(f);
void *tmp;
if (avio_rb32(f) != MKBETAG('t', 'f', 'r', 'a')) {
return 1;
}
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "found tfra\n");
index = av_mallocz(sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex));
if (!index) {
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
tmp = av_realloc_array(mov->fragment_index_data,
mov->fragment_index_count + 1,
sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex*));
if (!tmp) {
av_freep(&index);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
mov->fragment_index_data = tmp;
mov->fragment_index_data[mov->fragment_index_count++] = index;
version = avio_r8(f);
avio_rb24(f);
index->track_id = avio_rb32(f);
fieldlength = avio_rb32(f);
index->item_count = avio_rb32(f);
index->items = av_mallocz_array(
index->item_count, sizeof(MOVFragmentIndexItem));
if (!index->items) {
index->item_count = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < index->item_count; i++) {
int64_t time, offset;
if (version == 1) {
time = avio_rb64(f);
offset = avio_rb64(f);
} else {
time = avio_rb32(f);
offset = avio_rb32(f);
}
index->items[i].time = time;
index->items[i].moof_offset = offset;
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 4) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 2) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 0) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
}
avio_seek(f, pos + size, SEEK_SET);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | static int read_tfra(MOVContext *mov, AVIOContext *f)
{
MOVFragmentIndex* index = NULL;
int version, fieldlength, i, j;
int64_t pos = avio_tell(f);
uint32_t size = avio_rb32(f);
void *tmp;
if (avio_rb32(f) != MKBETAG('t', 'f', 'r', 'a')) {
return 1;
}
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "found tfra\n");
index = av_mallocz(sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex));
if (!index) {
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
tmp = av_realloc_array(mov->fragment_index_data,
mov->fragment_index_count + 1,
sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex*));
if (!tmp) {
av_freep(&index);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
mov->fragment_index_data = tmp;
mov->fragment_index_data[mov->fragment_index_count++] = index;
version = avio_r8(f);
avio_rb24(f);
index->track_id = avio_rb32(f);
fieldlength = avio_rb32(f);
index->item_count = avio_rb32(f);
index->items = av_mallocz_array(
index->item_count, sizeof(MOVFragmentIndexItem));
if (!index->items) {
index->item_count = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < index->item_count; i++) {
int64_t time, offset;
if (avio_feof(f)) {
index->item_count = 0;
av_freep(&index->items);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (version == 1) {
time = avio_rb64(f);
offset = avio_rb64(f);
} else {
time = avio_rb32(f);
offset = avio_rb32(f);
}
index->items[i].time = time;
index->items[i].moof_offset = offset;
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 4) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 2) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 0) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
}
avio_seek(f, pos + size, SEEK_SET);
return 0;
}
| 167,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CL_InitRef( void ) {
refimport_t ri;
refexport_t *ret;
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
GetRefAPI_t GetRefAPI;
char dllName[MAX_OSPATH];
#endif
Com_Printf( "----- Initializing Renderer ----\n" );
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
cl_renderer = Cvar_Get("cl_renderer", "opengl1", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH);
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_mp_%s_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT, cl_renderer->string);
if(!(rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse)) && strcmp(cl_renderer->string, cl_renderer->resetString))
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Cvar_ForceReset("cl_renderer");
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_mp_opengl1_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT);
rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse);
}
if(!rendererLib)
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Failed to load renderer");
}
GetRefAPI = Sys_LoadFunction(rendererLib, "GetRefAPI");
if(!GetRefAPI)
{
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Can't load symbol GetRefAPI: '%s'", Sys_LibraryError());
}
#endif
ri.Cmd_AddCommand = Cmd_AddCommand;
ri.Cmd_RemoveCommand = Cmd_RemoveCommand;
ri.Cmd_Argc = Cmd_Argc;
ri.Cmd_Argv = Cmd_Argv;
ri.Cmd_ExecuteText = Cbuf_ExecuteText;
ri.Printf = CL_RefPrintf;
ri.Error = Com_Error;
ri.Milliseconds = CL_ScaledMilliseconds;
#ifdef ZONE_DEBUG
ri.Z_MallocDebug = CL_RefMallocDebug;
#else
ri.Z_Malloc = CL_RefMalloc;
#endif
ri.Free = Z_Free;
ri.Tag_Free = CL_RefTagFree;
ri.Hunk_Clear = Hunk_ClearToMark;
#ifdef HUNK_DEBUG
ri.Hunk_AllocDebug = Hunk_AllocDebug;
#else
ri.Hunk_Alloc = Hunk_Alloc;
#endif
ri.Hunk_AllocateTempMemory = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory;
ri.Hunk_FreeTempMemory = Hunk_FreeTempMemory;
ri.CM_ClusterPVS = CM_ClusterPVS;
ri.CM_DrawDebugSurface = CM_DrawDebugSurface;
ri.FS_ReadFile = FS_ReadFile;
ri.FS_FreeFile = FS_FreeFile;
ri.FS_WriteFile = FS_WriteFile;
ri.FS_FreeFileList = FS_FreeFileList;
ri.FS_ListFiles = FS_ListFiles;
ri.FS_FileIsInPAK = FS_FileIsInPAK;
ri.FS_FileExists = FS_FileExists;
ri.Cvar_Get = Cvar_Get;
ri.Cvar_Set = Cvar_Set;
ri.Cvar_SetValue = Cvar_SetValue;
ri.Cvar_CheckRange = Cvar_CheckRange;
ri.Cvar_VariableIntegerValue = Cvar_VariableIntegerValue;
ri.CIN_UploadCinematic = CIN_UploadCinematic;
ri.CIN_PlayCinematic = CIN_PlayCinematic;
ri.CIN_RunCinematic = CIN_RunCinematic;
ri.CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame = CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame;
ri.IN_Init = IN_Init;
ri.IN_Shutdown = IN_Shutdown;
ri.IN_Restart = IN_Restart;
ri.ftol = Q_ftol;
ri.Sys_SetEnv = Sys_SetEnv;
ri.Sys_GLimpSafeInit = Sys_GLimpSafeInit;
ri.Sys_GLimpInit = Sys_GLimpInit;
ri.Sys_LowPhysicalMemory = Sys_LowPhysicalMemory;
ret = GetRefAPI( REF_API_VERSION, &ri );
if ( !ret ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Couldn't initialize refresh" );
}
re = *ret;
Com_Printf( "---- Renderer Initialization Complete ----\n" );
Cvar_Set( "cl_paused", "0" );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void CL_InitRef( void ) {
refimport_t ri;
refexport_t *ret;
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
GetRefAPI_t GetRefAPI;
char dllName[MAX_OSPATH];
#endif
Com_Printf( "----- Initializing Renderer ----\n" );
#ifdef USE_RENDERER_DLOPEN
cl_renderer = Cvar_Get("cl_renderer", "opengl1", CVAR_ARCHIVE | CVAR_LATCH | CVAR_PROTECTED);
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_mp_%s_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT, cl_renderer->string);
if(!(rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse)) && strcmp(cl_renderer->string, cl_renderer->resetString))
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Cvar_ForceReset("cl_renderer");
Com_sprintf(dllName, sizeof(dllName), "renderer_mp_opengl1_" ARCH_STRING DLL_EXT);
rendererLib = Sys_LoadDll(dllName, qfalse);
}
if(!rendererLib)
{
Com_Printf("failed:\n\"%s\"\n", Sys_LibraryError());
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Failed to load renderer");
}
GetRefAPI = Sys_LoadFunction(rendererLib, "GetRefAPI");
if(!GetRefAPI)
{
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Can't load symbol GetRefAPI: '%s'", Sys_LibraryError());
}
#endif
ri.Cmd_AddCommand = Cmd_AddCommand;
ri.Cmd_RemoveCommand = Cmd_RemoveCommand;
ri.Cmd_Argc = Cmd_Argc;
ri.Cmd_Argv = Cmd_Argv;
ri.Cmd_ExecuteText = Cbuf_ExecuteText;
ri.Printf = CL_RefPrintf;
ri.Error = Com_Error;
ri.Milliseconds = CL_ScaledMilliseconds;
#ifdef ZONE_DEBUG
ri.Z_MallocDebug = CL_RefMallocDebug;
#else
ri.Z_Malloc = CL_RefMalloc;
#endif
ri.Free = Z_Free;
ri.Tag_Free = CL_RefTagFree;
ri.Hunk_Clear = Hunk_ClearToMark;
#ifdef HUNK_DEBUG
ri.Hunk_AllocDebug = Hunk_AllocDebug;
#else
ri.Hunk_Alloc = Hunk_Alloc;
#endif
ri.Hunk_AllocateTempMemory = Hunk_AllocateTempMemory;
ri.Hunk_FreeTempMemory = Hunk_FreeTempMemory;
ri.CM_ClusterPVS = CM_ClusterPVS;
ri.CM_DrawDebugSurface = CM_DrawDebugSurface;
ri.FS_ReadFile = FS_ReadFile;
ri.FS_FreeFile = FS_FreeFile;
ri.FS_WriteFile = FS_WriteFile;
ri.FS_FreeFileList = FS_FreeFileList;
ri.FS_ListFiles = FS_ListFiles;
ri.FS_FileIsInPAK = FS_FileIsInPAK;
ri.FS_FileExists = FS_FileExists;
ri.Cvar_Get = Cvar_Get;
ri.Cvar_Set = Cvar_Set;
ri.Cvar_SetValue = Cvar_SetValue;
ri.Cvar_CheckRange = Cvar_CheckRange;
ri.Cvar_VariableIntegerValue = Cvar_VariableIntegerValue;
ri.CIN_UploadCinematic = CIN_UploadCinematic;
ri.CIN_PlayCinematic = CIN_PlayCinematic;
ri.CIN_RunCinematic = CIN_RunCinematic;
ri.CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame = CL_WriteAVIVideoFrame;
ri.IN_Init = IN_Init;
ri.IN_Shutdown = IN_Shutdown;
ri.IN_Restart = IN_Restart;
ri.ftol = Q_ftol;
ri.Sys_SetEnv = Sys_SetEnv;
ri.Sys_GLimpSafeInit = Sys_GLimpSafeInit;
ri.Sys_GLimpInit = Sys_GLimpInit;
ri.Sys_LowPhysicalMemory = Sys_LowPhysicalMemory;
ret = GetRefAPI( REF_API_VERSION, &ri );
if ( !ret ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Couldn't initialize refresh" );
}
re = *ret;
Com_Printf( "---- Renderer Initialization Complete ----\n" );
Cvar_Set( "cl_paused", "0" );
}
| 170,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t len,
struct iovec *iovec)
{
if (unlikely(!access_ok(!rw, buf, len)))
return -EFAULT;
iovec->iov_base = buf;
iovec->iov_len = len;
*nr_segs = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb,
int rw, char __user *buf,
unsigned long *nr_segs,
size_t len,
struct iovec *iovec,
struct iov_iter *iter)
{
if (len > MAX_RW_COUNT)
len = MAX_RW_COUNT;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(!rw, buf, len)))
return -EFAULT;
iovec->iov_base = buf;
iovec->iov_len = len;
*nr_segs = 1;
iov_iter_init(iter, rw, iovec, *nr_segs, len);
return 0;
}
| 170,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderBlock::styleWillChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle& newStyle)
{
RenderStyle* oldStyle = style();
setReplaced(newStyle.isDisplayInlineType());
if (oldStyle && parent() && diff == StyleDifferenceLayout && oldStyle->position() != newStyle.position()) {
if (newStyle.position() == StaticPosition)
removePositionedObjects(0, NewContainingBlock);
else if (oldStyle->position() == StaticPosition) {
RenderObject* cb = parent();
while (cb && (cb->style()->position() == StaticPosition || (cb->isInline() && !cb->isReplaced())) && !cb->isRenderView()) {
if (cb->style()->position() == RelativePosition && cb->isInline() && !cb->isReplaced()) {
cb = cb->containingBlock();
break;
}
cb = cb->parent();
}
if (cb->isRenderBlock())
toRenderBlock(cb)->removePositionedObjects(this, NewContainingBlock);
}
}
RenderBox::styleWillChange(diff, newStyle);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RenderBlock::styleWillChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle& newStyle)
{
RenderStyle* oldStyle = style();
setReplaced(newStyle.isDisplayInlineType());
if (oldStyle && parent() && diff.needsFullLayout() && oldStyle->position() != newStyle.position()) {
if (newStyle.position() == StaticPosition)
removePositionedObjects(0, NewContainingBlock);
else if (oldStyle->position() == StaticPosition) {
RenderObject* cb = parent();
while (cb && (cb->style()->position() == StaticPosition || (cb->isInline() && !cb->isReplaced())) && !cb->isRenderView()) {
if (cb->style()->position() == RelativePosition && cb->isInline() && !cb->isReplaced()) {
cb = cb->containingBlock();
break;
}
cb = cb->parent();
}
if (cb->isRenderBlock())
toRenderBlock(cb)->removePositionedObjects(this, NewContainingBlock);
}
}
RenderBox::styleWillChange(diff, newStyle);
}
| 171,461 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
bool via_data_reduction_proxy) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
if (!g_browser_process)
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (!prefs)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled =
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->GetDefaultProfile()->
GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthEnabled);
#else
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled = false;
#endif
chrome_browser_net::UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
via_data_reduction_proxy, prefs);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(int received_content_length,
void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
chrome_browser_net::DataReductionRequestType data_reduction_type) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
if (!g_browser_process)
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (!prefs)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled =
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->GetDefaultProfile()->
GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthEnabled);
#else
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled = false;
#endif
chrome_browser_net::UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
data_reduction_type, prefs);
}
| 171,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int linear_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct linear_c *lc = (struct linear_c *) ti->private;
return __blkdev_driver_ioctl(lc->dev->bdev, lc->dev->mode, cmd, arg);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int linear_ioctl(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct linear_c *lc = (struct linear_c *) ti->private;
struct dm_dev *dev = lc->dev;
int r = 0;
/*
* Only pass ioctls through if the device sizes match exactly.
*/
if (lc->start ||
ti->len != i_size_read(dev->bdev->bd_inode) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)
r = scsi_verify_blk_ioctl(NULL, cmd);
return r ? : __blkdev_driver_ioctl(dev->bdev, dev->mode, cmd, arg);
}
| 165,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char *get_header(FILE *fp)
{
long start;
/* First 1024 bytes of doc must be header (1.7 spec pg 1102) */
char *header;
header = calloc(1, 1024);
start = ftell(fp);
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
SAFE_E(fread(header, 1, 1023, fp), 1023, "Failed to load PDF header.\n");
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
return header;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static char *get_header(FILE *fp)
{
/* First 1024 bytes of doc must be header (1.7 spec pg 1102) */
char *header = safe_calloc(1024);
long start = ftell(fp);
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
SAFE_E(fread(header, 1, 1023, fp), 1023, "Failed to load PDF header.\n");
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
return header;
}
| 169,567 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> itemCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestEventTarget.item");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestEventTarget* imp = V8TestEventTarget::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, index, toUInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (UNLIKELY(index < 0)) {
ec = INDEX_SIZE_ERR;
goto fail;
}
return toV8(imp->item(index), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | static v8::Handle<v8::Value> itemCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestEventTarget.item");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate());
TestEventTarget* imp = V8TestEventTarget::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, index, toUInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (UNLIKELY(index < 0)) {
ec = INDEX_SIZE_ERR;
goto fail;
}
return toV8(imp->item(index), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
| 171,071 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void get_frame_stats(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx,
const vpx_image_t *img,
vpx_codec_pts_t pts,
unsigned int duration,
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags,
unsigned int deadline,
vpx_fixed_buf_t *stats) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(ctx, img, pts, duration, flags,
deadline);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(ctx, "Failed to get frame stats.");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(ctx, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_STATS_PKT) {
const uint8_t *const pkt_buf = pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf;
const size_t pkt_size = pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz;
stats->buf = realloc(stats->buf, stats->sz + pkt_size);
memcpy((uint8_t *)stats->buf + stats->sz, pkt_buf, pkt_size);
stats->sz += pkt_size;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void get_frame_stats(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx,
static int get_frame_stats(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx,
const vpx_image_t *img,
vpx_codec_pts_t pts,
unsigned int duration,
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags,
unsigned int deadline,
vpx_fixed_buf_t *stats) {
int got_pkts = 0;
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(ctx, img, pts, duration, flags,
deadline);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(ctx, "Failed to get frame stats.");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(ctx, &iter)) != NULL) {
got_pkts = 1;
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_STATS_PKT) {
const uint8_t *const pkt_buf = pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf;
const size_t pkt_size = pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz;
stats->buf = realloc(stats->buf, stats->sz + pkt_size);
memcpy((uint8_t *)stats->buf + stats->sz, pkt_buf, pkt_size);
stats->sz += pkt_size;
}
}
return got_pkts;
}
| 174,492 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW != '%')
return;
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParsePEReference: no name\n");
return;
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return;
}
NEXT;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Internal: %%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
} else if (ctxt->input->free != deallocblankswrapper) {
input = xmlNewBlanksWrapperInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
} else {
/*
* TODO !!!
* handle the extra spaces added before and after
* c.f. http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml#as-PE
*/
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo ==
XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing
* right here
*/
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return;
}
}
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW != '%')
return;
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParsePEReference: no name\n");
return;
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return;
}
NEXT;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Internal: %%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
} else if (ctxt->input->free != deallocblankswrapper) {
input = xmlNewBlanksWrapperInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
} else {
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDATTR) == 0) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ctxt->validate == 0))
return;
/*
* TODO !!!
* handle the extra spaces added before and after
* c.f. http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml#as-PE
*/
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo ==
XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing
* right here
*/
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return;
}
}
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
}
| 174,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void user_login(struct mt_connection *curconn, struct mt_mactelnet_hdr *pkthdr) {
struct mt_packet pdata;
unsigned char md5sum[17];
char md5data[100];
struct mt_credentials *user;
char *slavename;
/* Reparse user file before each login */
read_userfile();
if ((user = find_user(curconn->username)) != NULL) {
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5sum));
if (user->password != NULL) {
mlock(user->password, strlen(user->password));
}
#endif
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
strncpy(md5data + 1, user->password, 82);
memcpy(md5data + 1 + strlen(user->password), curconn->pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, strlen(user->password) + 17);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_DATA, pkthdr->dstaddr, pkthdr->srcaddr, pkthdr->seskey, curconn->outcounter);
curconn->outcounter += add_control_packet(&pdata, MT_CPTYPE_END_AUTH, NULL, 0);
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
if (curconn->state == STATE_ACTIVE) {
return;
}
}
if (user == NULL || memcmp(md5sum, curconn->trypassword, 17) != 0) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("(%d) Invalid login by %s."), curconn->seskey, curconn->username);
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Login failed, incorrect username or password\r\n"));
/* TODO: should wait some time (not with sleep) before returning, to minimalize brute force attacks */
return;
}
/* User is logged in */
curconn->state = STATE_ACTIVE;
/* Enter terminal mode */
curconn->terminal_mode = 1;
/* Open pts handle */
curconn->ptsfd = posix_openpt(O_RDWR);
if (curconn->ptsfd == -1 || grantpt(curconn->ptsfd) == -1 || unlockpt(curconn->ptsfd) == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "posix_openpt: %s", strerror(errno));
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Terminal error\r\n"));
return;
}
/* Get file path for our pts */
slavename = ptsname(curconn->ptsfd);
if (slavename != NULL) {
pid_t pid;
struct stat sb;
struct passwd *user = (struct passwd *)malloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
struct passwd *tmpuser=user;
char *buffer = malloc(1024);
if (user == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_CRIT, _("(%d) Error allocating memory."), curconn->seskey);
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("System error, out of memory\r\n"));
return;
}
if (getpwnam_r(curconn->username, user, buffer, 1024, &tmpuser) != 0) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("(%d) Login ok, but local user not accessible (%s)."), curconn->seskey, curconn->username);
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Local user not accessible\r\n"));
free(user);
free(buffer);
return;
}
/* Change the owner of the slave pts */
chown(slavename, user->pw_uid, user->pw_gid);
curconn->slavefd = open(slavename, O_RDWR);
if (curconn->slavefd == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error opening %s: %s"), slavename, strerror(errno));
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Error opening terminal\r\n"));
list_remove_connection(curconn);
return;
}
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
struct net_interface *interface;
/* Add login information to utmp/wtmp */
uwtmp_login(curconn);
syslog(LOG_INFO, _("(%d) User %s logged in."), curconn->seskey, curconn->username);
/* Initialize terminal environment */
setenv("USER", user->pw_name, 1);
setenv("HOME", user->pw_dir, 1);
setenv("SHELL", user->pw_shell, 1);
setenv("TERM", curconn->terminal_type, 1);
close(sockfd);
close(insockfd);
DL_FOREACH(interfaces, interface) {
if (interface->socketfd > 0) {
close(interface->socketfd);
}
}
setsid();
/* Don't let shell process inherit slavefd */
fcntl (curconn->slavefd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
close(curconn->ptsfd);
/* Redirect STDIN/STDIO/STDERR */
close(0);
dup(curconn->slavefd);
close(1);
dup(curconn->slavefd);
close(2);
dup(curconn->slavefd);
/* Set controlling terminal */
ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1);
tcsetpgrp(0, getpid());
/* Set user id/group id */
if ((setgid(user->pw_gid) != 0) || (setuid(user->pw_uid) != 0)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("(%d) Could not log in %s (%d:%d): setuid/setgid: %s"), curconn->seskey, curconn->username, user->pw_uid, user->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Internal error\r\n"));
exit(0);
}
/* Abort login if /etc/nologin exists */
if (stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &sb) == 0 && getuid() != 0) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("(%d) User %s disconnected with " _PATH_NOLOGIN " message."), curconn->seskey, curconn->username);
display_nologin();
curconn->state = STATE_CLOSED;
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_END, pkthdr->dstaddr, pkthdr->srcaddr, pkthdr->seskey, curconn->outcounter);
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
exit(0);
}
/* Display MOTD */
display_motd();
chdir(user->pw_dir);
/* Spawn shell */
/* TODO: Maybe use "login -f USER" instead? renders motd and executes shell correctly for system */
execl(user->pw_shell, user->pw_shell, "-", (char *) 0);
exit(0); // just to be sure.
}
free(user);
free(buffer);
close(curconn->slavefd);
curconn->pid = pid;
set_terminal_size(curconn->ptsfd, curconn->terminal_width, curconn->terminal_height);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void user_login(struct mt_connection *curconn, struct mt_mactelnet_hdr *pkthdr) {
struct mt_packet pdata;
unsigned char md5sum[17];
char md5data[100];
struct mt_credentials *user;
char *slavename;
int act_pass_len;
/* Reparse user file before each login */
read_userfile();
if ((user = find_user(curconn->username)) != NULL) {
md5_state_t state;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(_POSIX_MEMLOCK_RANGE)
mlock(md5data, sizeof(md5data));
mlock(md5sum, sizeof(md5sum));
if (user->password != NULL) {
mlock(user->password, strlen(user->password));
}
#endif
/* calculate the password's actual length */
act_pass_len = strlen(user->password);
act_pass_len = act_pass_len <= 82 ? act_pass_len : 82;
/* Concat string of 0 + password + pass_salt */
md5data[0] = 0;
memcpy(md5data + 1, user->password, act_pass_len);
memcpy(md5data + 1 + act_pass_len, curconn->pass_salt, 16);
/* Generate md5 sum of md5data with a leading 0 */
md5_init(&state);
md5_append(&state, (const md5_byte_t *)md5data, 1 + act_pass_len + 16);
md5_finish(&state, (md5_byte_t *)md5sum + 1);
md5sum[0] = 0;
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_DATA, pkthdr->dstaddr, pkthdr->srcaddr, pkthdr->seskey, curconn->outcounter);
curconn->outcounter += add_control_packet(&pdata, MT_CPTYPE_END_AUTH, NULL, 0);
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
if (curconn->state == STATE_ACTIVE) {
return;
}
}
if (user == NULL || memcmp(md5sum, curconn->trypassword, 17) != 0) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("(%d) Invalid login by %s."), curconn->seskey, curconn->username);
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Login failed, incorrect username or password\r\n"));
/* TODO: should wait some time (not with sleep) before returning, to minimalize brute force attacks */
return;
}
/* User is logged in */
curconn->state = STATE_ACTIVE;
/* Enter terminal mode */
curconn->terminal_mode = 1;
/* Open pts handle */
curconn->ptsfd = posix_openpt(O_RDWR);
if (curconn->ptsfd == -1 || grantpt(curconn->ptsfd) == -1 || unlockpt(curconn->ptsfd) == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "posix_openpt: %s", strerror(errno));
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Terminal error\r\n"));
return;
}
/* Get file path for our pts */
slavename = ptsname(curconn->ptsfd);
if (slavename != NULL) {
pid_t pid;
struct stat sb;
struct passwd *user = (struct passwd *)malloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
struct passwd *tmpuser=user;
char *buffer = malloc(1024);
if (user == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_CRIT, _("(%d) Error allocating memory."), curconn->seskey);
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("System error, out of memory\r\n"));
return;
}
if (getpwnam_r(curconn->username, user, buffer, 1024, &tmpuser) != 0) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("(%d) Login ok, but local user not accessible (%s)."), curconn->seskey, curconn->username);
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Local user not accessible\r\n"));
free(user);
free(buffer);
return;
}
/* Change the owner of the slave pts */
chown(slavename, user->pw_uid, user->pw_gid);
curconn->slavefd = open(slavename, O_RDWR);
if (curconn->slavefd == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error opening %s: %s"), slavename, strerror(errno));
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Error opening terminal\r\n"));
list_remove_connection(curconn);
return;
}
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
struct net_interface *interface;
/* Add login information to utmp/wtmp */
uwtmp_login(curconn);
syslog(LOG_INFO, _("(%d) User %s logged in."), curconn->seskey, curconn->username);
/* Initialize terminal environment */
setenv("USER", user->pw_name, 1);
setenv("HOME", user->pw_dir, 1);
setenv("SHELL", user->pw_shell, 1);
setenv("TERM", curconn->terminal_type, 1);
close(sockfd);
close(insockfd);
DL_FOREACH(interfaces, interface) {
if (interface->socketfd > 0) {
close(interface->socketfd);
}
}
setsid();
/* Don't let shell process inherit slavefd */
fcntl (curconn->slavefd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
close(curconn->ptsfd);
/* Redirect STDIN/STDIO/STDERR */
close(0);
dup(curconn->slavefd);
close(1);
dup(curconn->slavefd);
close(2);
dup(curconn->slavefd);
/* Set controlling terminal */
ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1);
tcsetpgrp(0, getpid());
/* Set user id/group id */
if ((setgid(user->pw_gid) != 0) || (setuid(user->pw_uid) != 0)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("(%d) Could not log in %s (%d:%d): setuid/setgid: %s"), curconn->seskey, curconn->username, user->pw_uid, user->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
/*_ Please include both \r and \n in translation, this is needed for the terminal emulator. */
abort_connection(curconn, pkthdr, _("Internal error\r\n"));
exit(0);
}
/* Abort login if /etc/nologin exists */
if (stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &sb) == 0 && getuid() != 0) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("(%d) User %s disconnected with " _PATH_NOLOGIN " message."), curconn->seskey, curconn->username);
display_nologin();
curconn->state = STATE_CLOSED;
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_END, pkthdr->dstaddr, pkthdr->srcaddr, pkthdr->seskey, curconn->outcounter);
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
exit(0);
}
/* Display MOTD */
display_motd();
chdir(user->pw_dir);
/* Spawn shell */
/* TODO: Maybe use "login -f USER" instead? renders motd and executes shell correctly for system */
execl(user->pw_shell, user->pw_shell, "-", (char *) 0);
exit(0); // just to be sure.
}
free(user);
free(buffer);
close(curconn->slavefd);
curconn->pid = pid;
set_terminal_size(curconn->ptsfd, curconn->terminal_width, curconn->terminal_height);
}
}
| 166,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
UUT_ = GET_PARAM(2);
/* Set up guard blocks for an inner block centered in the outer block */
for (int i = 0; i < kOutputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (IsIndexInBorder(i))
output_[i] = 255;
else
output_[i] = 0;
}
::libvpx_test::ACMRandom prng;
for (int i = 0; i < kInputBufferSize; ++i)
input_[i] = prng.Rand8Extremes();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
UUT_ = GET_PARAM(2);
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
if (UUT_->use_highbd_ != 0)
mask_ = (1 << UUT_->use_highbd_) - 1;
else
mask_ = 255;
#endif
/* Set up guard blocks for an inner block centered in the outer block */
for (int i = 0; i < kOutputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (IsIndexInBorder(i))
output_[i] = 255;
else
output_[i] = 0;
}
::libvpx_test::ACMRandom prng;
for (int i = 0; i < kInputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (i & 1) {
input_[i] = 255;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
input16_[i] = mask_;
#endif
} else {
input_[i] = prng.Rand8Extremes();
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
input16_[i] = prng.Rand16() & mask_;
#endif
}
}
}
| 174,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"([ijl\u0131]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Commit Message: Block dotless-i / j + a combining mark
U+0131 (doltess i) and U+0237 (dotless j) are blocked from being
followed by a combining mark in U+0300 block.
Bug: 774842
Test: See the bug
Change-Id: I92aac0e97233184864d060fd0f137a90b042c679
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/767888
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517605}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
// - Disallow dotless i (U+0131) followed by a combining mark.
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u0131[\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"([ijl]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
| 172,692 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
{
if (keyring->description)
seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
else
seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0)
seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree);
else
seq_puts(m, ": empty");
}
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
{
if (keyring->description)
seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
else
seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
if (key_is_positive(keyring)) {
if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0)
seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree);
else
seq_puts(m, ": empty");
}
}
| 167,702 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static long do_get_mempolicy(int *policy, nodemask_t *nmask,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags)
{
int err;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
struct mempolicy *pol = current->mempolicy;
if (flags &
~(unsigned long)(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR|MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED) {
if (flags & (MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR))
return -EINVAL;
*policy = 0; /* just so it's initialized */
task_lock(current);
*nmask = cpuset_current_mems_allowed;
task_unlock(current);
return 0;
}
if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
/*
* Do NOT fall back to task policy if the
* vma/shared policy at addr is NULL. We
* want to return MPOL_DEFAULT in this case.
*/
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_intersection(mm, addr, addr+1);
if (!vma) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->get_policy)
pol = vma->vm_ops->get_policy(vma, addr);
else
pol = vma->vm_policy;
} else if (addr)
return -EINVAL;
if (!pol)
pol = &default_policy; /* indicates default behavior */
if (flags & MPOL_F_NODE) {
if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
err = lookup_node(addr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
*policy = err;
} else if (pol == current->mempolicy &&
pol->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE) {
*policy = next_node_in(current->il_prev, pol->v.nodes);
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else {
*policy = pol == &default_policy ? MPOL_DEFAULT :
pol->mode;
/*
* Internal mempolicy flags must be masked off before exposing
* the policy to userspace.
*/
*policy |= (pol->flags & MPOL_MODE_FLAGS);
}
if (vma) {
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
vma = NULL;
}
err = 0;
if (nmask) {
if (mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)) {
*nmask = pol->w.user_nodemask;
} else {
task_lock(current);
get_policy_nodemask(pol, nmask);
task_unlock(current);
}
}
out:
mpol_cond_put(pol);
if (vma)
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy
I hit a use after free issue when executing trinity and repoduced it
with KASAN enabled. The related call trace is as follows.
BUG: KASan: use after free in SyS_get_mempolicy+0x3c8/0x960 at addr ffff8801f582d766
Read of size 2 by task syz-executor1/798
INFO: Allocated in mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160 age=3 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_alloc+0x768/0x970
kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x450
mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160
mpol_new+0x66/0x80
SyS_mbind+0x267/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Freed in __mpol_put+0x2b/0x40 age=4 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_free+0x495/0x8e0
kmem_cache_free+0x2f3/0x4c0
__mpol_put+0x2b/0x40
SyS_mbind+0x383/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0009cb8dc0 objects=23 used=8 fp=0xffff8801f582de40 flags=0x200000000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff8801f582d760 @offset=5984 fp=0xffff8801f582d600
Bytes b4 ffff8801f582d750: ae 01 ff ff 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
Object ffff8801f582d760: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object ffff8801f582d770: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkk.
Redzone ffff8801f582d778: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Padding ffff8801f582d8b8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801f582d600: fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801f582d680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8801f582d700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fc
!shared memory policy is not protected against parallel removal by other
thread which is normally protected by the mmap_sem. do_get_mempolicy,
however, drops the lock midway while we can still access it later.
Early premature up_read is a historical artifact from times when
put_user was called in this path see https://lwn.net/Articles/124754/
but that is gone since 8bccd85ffbaf ("[PATCH] Implement sys_* do_*
layering in the memory policy layer."). but when we have the the
current mempolicy ref count model. The issue was introduced
accordingly.
Fix the issue by removing the premature release.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static long do_get_mempolicy(int *policy, nodemask_t *nmask,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags)
{
int err;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
struct mempolicy *pol = current->mempolicy;
if (flags &
~(unsigned long)(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR|MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED) {
if (flags & (MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR))
return -EINVAL;
*policy = 0; /* just so it's initialized */
task_lock(current);
*nmask = cpuset_current_mems_allowed;
task_unlock(current);
return 0;
}
if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
/*
* Do NOT fall back to task policy if the
* vma/shared policy at addr is NULL. We
* want to return MPOL_DEFAULT in this case.
*/
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_intersection(mm, addr, addr+1);
if (!vma) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->get_policy)
pol = vma->vm_ops->get_policy(vma, addr);
else
pol = vma->vm_policy;
} else if (addr)
return -EINVAL;
if (!pol)
pol = &default_policy; /* indicates default behavior */
if (flags & MPOL_F_NODE) {
if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
err = lookup_node(addr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
*policy = err;
} else if (pol == current->mempolicy &&
pol->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE) {
*policy = next_node_in(current->il_prev, pol->v.nodes);
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else {
*policy = pol == &default_policy ? MPOL_DEFAULT :
pol->mode;
/*
* Internal mempolicy flags must be masked off before exposing
* the policy to userspace.
*/
*policy |= (pol->flags & MPOL_MODE_FLAGS);
}
err = 0;
if (nmask) {
if (mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)) {
*nmask = pol->w.user_nodemask;
} else {
task_lock(current);
get_policy_nodemask(pol, nmask);
task_unlock(current);
}
}
out:
mpol_cond_put(pol);
if (vma)
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
return err;
}
| 169,248 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
{
md_context m;
switch (xfersum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5: {
uchar seedbuf[4];
md5_begin(&m);
if (proper_seed_order) {
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
} else {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
}
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
}
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED: {
int32 i;
static char *buf1;
static int32 len1;
mdfour_begin(&m);
if (len > len1) {
if (buf1)
free(buf1);
buf1 = new_array(char, len+4);
len1 = len;
if (!buf1)
out_of_memory("get_checksum2");
}
memcpy(buf1, buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVAL(buf1,len,checksum_seed);
len += 4;
}
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), CSUM_CHUNK);
/*
* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes.
*/
if (len - i > 0 || xfersum_type != CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), len-i);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354 | void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
{
md_context m;
switch (xfersum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5: {
uchar seedbuf[4];
md5_begin(&m);
if (proper_seed_order) {
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
} else {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
}
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
}
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC: {
int32 i;
static char *buf1;
static int32 len1;
mdfour_begin(&m);
if (len > len1) {
if (buf1)
free(buf1);
buf1 = new_array(char, len+4);
len1 = len;
if (!buf1)
out_of_memory("get_checksum2");
}
memcpy(buf1, buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVAL(buf1,len,checksum_seed);
len += 4;
}
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), CSUM_CHUNK);
/*
* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes.
*/
if (len - i > 0 || xfersum_type > CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), len-i);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
}
}
}
| 164,644 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
}
| 173,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static CURLcode imap_parse_url_path(struct connectdata *conn)
{
/* the imap struct is already inited in imap_connect() */
struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
const char *path = data->state.path;
int len;
if(!*path)
path = "INBOX";
/* url decode the path and use this mailbox */
imapc->mailbox = curl_easy_unescape(data, path, 0, &len);
if(!imapc->mailbox)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89 | static CURLcode imap_parse_url_path(struct connectdata *conn)
{
/* the imap struct is already inited in imap_connect() */
struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
const char *path = data->state.path;
if(!*path)
path = "INBOX";
/* url decode the path and use this mailbox */
return Curl_urldecode(data, path, 0, &imapc->mailbox, NULL, TRUE);
}
| 165,666 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int handle_popc(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u64 value;
int ret, i, rd = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1f);
int from_kernel = (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) != 0;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
if (insn & 0x2000) {
maybe_flush_windows(0, 0, rd, from_kernel);
value = sign_extend_imm13(insn);
} else {
maybe_flush_windows(0, insn & 0x1f, rd, from_kernel);
value = fetch_reg(insn & 0x1f, regs);
}
for (ret = 0, i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
ret += popc_helper[value & 0xf];
value >>= 4;
}
if (rd < 16) {
if (rd)
regs->u_regs[rd] = ret;
} else {
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
struct reg_window32 __user *win32;
win32 = (struct reg_window32 __user *)((unsigned long)((u32)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]));
put_user(ret, &win32->locals[rd - 16]);
} else {
struct reg_window __user *win;
win = (struct reg_window __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS);
put_user(ret, &win->locals[rd - 16]);
}
}
advance(regs);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int handle_popc(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u64 value;
int ret, i, rd = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1f);
int from_kernel = (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) != 0;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, regs, 0);
if (insn & 0x2000) {
maybe_flush_windows(0, 0, rd, from_kernel);
value = sign_extend_imm13(insn);
} else {
maybe_flush_windows(0, insn & 0x1f, rd, from_kernel);
value = fetch_reg(insn & 0x1f, regs);
}
for (ret = 0, i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
ret += popc_helper[value & 0xf];
value >>= 4;
}
if (rd < 16) {
if (rd)
regs->u_regs[rd] = ret;
} else {
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
struct reg_window32 __user *win32;
win32 = (struct reg_window32 __user *)((unsigned long)((u32)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]));
put_user(ret, &win32->locals[rd - 16]);
} else {
struct reg_window __user *win;
win = (struct reg_window __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS);
put_user(ret, &win->locals[rd - 16]);
}
}
advance(regs);
return 1;
}
| 165,810 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GpuChannel::OnControlMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(GpuChannel, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuChannelMsg_Initialize, OnInitialize)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuChannelMsg_CreateOffscreenCommandBuffer,
OnCreateOffscreenCommandBuffer)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuChannelMsg_DestroyCommandBuffer,
OnDestroyCommandBuffer)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuChannelMsg_WillGpuSwitchOccur,
OnWillGpuSwitchOccur)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuChannelMsg_CloseChannel, OnCloseChannel)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
DCHECK(handled) << msg.type();
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool GpuChannel::OnControlMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(GpuChannel, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuChannelMsg_CreateOffscreenCommandBuffer,
OnCreateOffscreenCommandBuffer)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuChannelMsg_DestroyCommandBuffer,
OnDestroyCommandBuffer)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuChannelMsg_WillGpuSwitchOccur,
OnWillGpuSwitchOccur)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuChannelMsg_CloseChannel, OnCloseChannel)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
DCHECK(handled) << msg.type();
return handled;
}
| 170,933 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int length, type, size;
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
goto ri_check;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
const unsigned char *data;
PACKET spkt;
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
|| !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
tlsext_servername = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
|| ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
ecpointformatlist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
/*
* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
* request message.
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
/*
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
* callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
* need to let control continue to flow to that.
*/
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
/* Simply copy it off for later processing */
if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
}
s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
if (size > 0) {
s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* The data must be valid */
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
size,
s->
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/*
* Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
* a single Serverhello
*/
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
unsigned len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/*-
* The extension data consists of:
* uint16 list_length
* uint8 proto_length;
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
|| PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
|| PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
switch (hbtype) {
case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
}
/*
* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
* custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
*/
else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
s->session->tlsext_hostname =
OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
} else {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
ri_check:
/*
* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
* an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
* because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
* However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
* doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
*/
if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
if (s->hit) {
/*
* Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
* original session.
*/
if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
!(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int length, type, size;
int tlsext_servername = 0;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
goto ri_check;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
const unsigned char *data;
PACKET spkt;
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
|| !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
tlsext_servername = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
|| ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
ecpointformatlist_length;
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
ecpointformatlist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
/*
* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
* request message.
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
/*
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
* callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
* need to let control continue to flow to that.
*/
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
/* Simply copy it off for later processing */
if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
}
s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
if (size > 0) {
s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/* The data must be valid */
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
size,
s->
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/*
* Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
* a single Serverhello
*/
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
unsigned len;
/* We must have requested it. */
if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
/*-
* The extension data consists of:
* uint16 list_length
* uint8 proto_length;
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
|| PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
|| PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
switch (hbtype) {
case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
}
/*
* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
* custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
*/
else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
s->session->tlsext_hostname =
OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
} else {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
ri_check:
/*
* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
* an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
* because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
* However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
* doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
*/
if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
if (s->hit) {
/*
* Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
* original session.
*/
if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
!(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
| 168,429 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void P2PQuicStreamImpl::OnStreamReset(const quic::QuicRstStreamFrame& frame) {
quic::QuicStream::OnStreamReset(frame);
delegate_->OnRemoteReset();
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void P2PQuicStreamImpl::OnStreamReset(const quic::QuicRstStreamFrame& frame) {
quic::QuicStream::OnStreamReset(frame);
delegate_->OnRemoteReset();
}
| 172,262 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BOOL transport_accept_nla(rdpTransport* transport)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (transport->TlsIn == NULL)
transport->TlsIn = tls_new(transport->settings);
if (transport->TlsOut == NULL)
transport->TlsOut = transport->TlsIn;
transport->layer = TRANSPORT_LAYER_TLS;
transport->TlsIn->sockfd = transport->TcpIn->sockfd;
if (tls_accept(transport->TlsIn, transport->settings->CertificateFile, transport->settings->PrivateKeyFile) != TRUE)
return FALSE;
/* Network Level Authentication */
if (transport->settings->Authentication != TRUE)
return TRUE;
settings = transport->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
if (transport->credssp == NULL)
transport->credssp = credssp_new(instance, transport, settings);
if (credssp_authenticate(transport->credssp) < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "client authentication failure\n");
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return FALSE;
}
/* don't free credssp module yet, we need to copy the credentials from it first */
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | BOOL transport_accept_nla(rdpTransport* transport)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (transport->TlsIn == NULL)
transport->TlsIn = tls_new(transport->settings);
if (transport->TlsOut == NULL)
transport->TlsOut = transport->TlsIn;
transport->layer = TRANSPORT_LAYER_TLS;
transport->TlsIn->sockfd = transport->TcpIn->sockfd;
if (tls_accept(transport->TlsIn, transport->settings->CertificateFile, transport->settings->PrivateKeyFile) != TRUE)
return FALSE;
/* Network Level Authentication */
if (transport->settings->Authentication != TRUE)
return TRUE;
settings = transport->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
if (transport->credssp == NULL)
transport->credssp = credssp_new(instance, transport, settings);
if (credssp_authenticate(transport->credssp) < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "client authentication failure\n");
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
transport->credssp = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
/* don't free credssp module yet, we need to copy the credentials from it first */
return TRUE;
}
| 167,601 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageloadfont)
{
char *file;
int file_name, hdr_size = sizeof(gdFont) - sizeof(char *);
int ind, body_size, n = 0, b, i, body_size_check;
gdFontPtr font;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &file, &file_name) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", IGNORE_PATH | IGNORE_URL_WIN | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Only supports a architecture-dependent binary dump format
* at the moment.
* The file format is like this on machines with 32-byte integers:
*
* byte 0-3: (int) number of characters in the font
* byte 4-7: (int) value of first character in the font (often 32, space)
* byte 8-11: (int) pixel width of each character
* byte 12-15: (int) pixel height of each character
* bytes 16-: (char) array with character data, one byte per pixel
* in each character, for a total of
* (nchars*width*height) bytes.
*/
font = (gdFontPtr) emalloc(sizeof(gdFont));
b = 0;
while (b < hdr_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, (char*)&font[b], hdr_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading header");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading header");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
i = php_stream_tell(stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_END);
body_size_check = php_stream_tell(stream) - hdr_size;
php_stream_seek(stream, i, SEEK_SET);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
font->w = FLIPWORD(font->w);
font->h = FLIPWORD(font->h);
font->nchars = FLIPWORD(font->nchars);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars, font->h)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars * font->h, font->w )) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
font->data = emalloc(body_size);
b = 0;
while (b < body_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, &font->data[b], body_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font->data);
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading body");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading body");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_close(stream);
/* Adding 5 to the font index so we will never have font indices
* that overlap with the old fonts (with indices 1-5). The first
* list index given out is always 1.
*/
ind = 5 + zend_list_insert(font, le_gd_font TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ind);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | PHP_FUNCTION(imageloadfont)
{
char *file;
int file_name, hdr_size = sizeof(gdFont) - sizeof(char *);
int ind, body_size, n = 0, b, i, body_size_check;
gdFontPtr font;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &file, &file_name) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", IGNORE_PATH | IGNORE_URL_WIN | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Only supports a architecture-dependent binary dump format
* at the moment.
* The file format is like this on machines with 32-byte integers:
*
* byte 0-3: (int) number of characters in the font
* byte 4-7: (int) value of first character in the font (often 32, space)
* byte 8-11: (int) pixel width of each character
* byte 12-15: (int) pixel height of each character
* bytes 16-: (char) array with character data, one byte per pixel
* in each character, for a total of
* (nchars*width*height) bytes.
*/
font = (gdFontPtr) emalloc(sizeof(gdFont));
b = 0;
while (b < hdr_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, (char*)&font[b], hdr_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading header");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading header");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
i = php_stream_tell(stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_END);
body_size_check = php_stream_tell(stream) - hdr_size;
php_stream_seek(stream, i, SEEK_SET);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
font->w = FLIPWORD(font->w);
font->h = FLIPWORD(font->h);
font->nchars = FLIPWORD(font->nchars);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars, font->h)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars * font->h, font->w )) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
font->data = emalloc(body_size);
b = 0;
while (b < body_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, &font->data[b], body_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font->data);
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading body");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading body");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_close(stream);
/* Adding 5 to the font index so we will never have font indices
* that overlap with the old fonts (with indices 1-5). The first
* list index given out is always 1.
*/
ind = 5 + zend_list_insert(font, le_gd_font TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ind);
}
| 165,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int sd_compat_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct scsi_device *sdev = scsi_disk(bdev->bd_disk)->device;
/*
* If we are in the middle of error recovery, don't let anyone
* else try and use this device. Also, if error recovery fails, it
* may try and take the device offline, in which case all further
* access to the device is prohibited.
*/
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdev))
return -ENODEV;
if (sdev->host->hostt->compat_ioctl) {
int ret;
ret = sdev->host->hostt->compat_ioctl(sdev, cmd, (void __user *)arg);
return ret;
}
/*
* Let the static ioctl translation table take care of it.
*/
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int sd_compat_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct scsi_device *sdev = scsi_disk(bdev->bd_disk)->device;
int ret;
ret = scsi_verify_blk_ioctl(bdev, cmd);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/*
* If we are in the middle of error recovery, don't let anyone
* else try and use this device. Also, if error recovery fails, it
* may try and take the device offline, in which case all further
* access to the device is prohibited.
*/
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdev))
return -ENODEV;
if (sdev->host->hostt->compat_ioctl) {
ret = sdev->host->hostt->compat_ioctl(sdev, cmd, (void __user *)arg);
return ret;
}
/*
* Let the static ioctl translation table take care of it.
*/
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
| 169,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(struct genl_info *info,
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
{
struct nlattr *nla;
int nla_rem;
u32 iter = 0;
doi_def->doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
if (nla_validate_nested(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST],
NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX,
netlbl_cipsov4_genl_policy) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
nla_for_each_nested(nla, info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST], nla_rem)
if (nla->nla_type == NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAG) {
if (iter > CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)
return -EINVAL;
doi_def->tags[iter++] = nla_get_u8(nla);
}
if (iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)
doi_def->tags[iter] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NetLabel: correct CIPSO tag handling when adding new DOI definitions
The current netlbl_cipsov4_add_common() function has two problems which are
fixed with this patch. The first is an off-by-one bug where it is possibile to
overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. The second is a bug where the same
doi_def->tags[] array was not always fully initialized, which caused sporadic
failures.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(struct genl_info *info,
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
{
struct nlattr *nla;
int nla_rem;
u32 iter = 0;
doi_def->doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
if (nla_validate_nested(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST],
NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MAX,
netlbl_cipsov4_genl_policy) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
nla_for_each_nested(nla, info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAGLST], nla_rem)
if (nla->nla_type == NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_TAG) {
if (iter >= CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)
return -EINVAL;
doi_def->tags[iter++] = nla_get_u8(nla);
}
while (iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT)
doi_def->tags[iter++] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 169,874 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_proto_ver_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint16_t *dat)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u", (EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) >> 8),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) & 0xff)));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_proto_ver_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint16_t *dat)
l2tp_proto_ver_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint16_t *dat, u_int length)
{
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u", (EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) >> 8),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) & 0xff)));
}
| 167,898 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: StorageHandler::StorageHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Storage::Metainfo::domainName),
process_(nullptr),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | StorageHandler::StorageHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Storage::Metainfo::domainName),
storage_partition_(nullptr),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
| 172,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EnqueueData() {
scoped_array<uint8> audio_data(new uint8[kRawDataSize]);
CHECK_EQ(kRawDataSize % algorithm_.bytes_per_channel(), 0u);
CHECK_EQ(kRawDataSize % algorithm_.bytes_per_frame(), 0u);
size_t length = kRawDataSize / algorithm_.bytes_per_channel();
switch (algorithm_.bytes_per_channel()) {
case 4:
WriteFakeData<int32>(audio_data.get(), length);
break;
case 2:
WriteFakeData<int16>(audio_data.get(), length);
break;
case 1:
WriteFakeData<uint8>(audio_data.get(), length);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported audio bit depth in crossfade.";
}
algorithm_.EnqueueBuffer(new DataBuffer(audio_data.Pass(), kRawDataSize));
bytes_enqueued_ += kRawDataSize;
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void EnqueueData() {
scoped_array<uint8> audio_data(new uint8[kRawDataSize]);
CHECK_EQ(kRawDataSize % algorithm_.bytes_per_channel(), 0u);
CHECK_EQ(kRawDataSize % algorithm_.bytes_per_frame(), 0u);
// The value of the data is meaningless; we just want non-zero data to
// differentiate it from muted data.
memset(audio_data.get(), 1, kRawDataSize);
algorithm_.EnqueueBuffer(new DataBuffer(audio_data.Pass(), kRawDataSize));
bytes_enqueued_ += kRawDataSize;
}
| 171,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_exif_tag_dbl_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
double *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
unsigned int value_pos;
unsigned int numer, denom;
field_type = iw_get_ui16_e(&e->d[tag_pos+2],e->endian);
value_count = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+4],e->endian);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type!=5) return 0; // 5=Rational (two uint32's)
value_pos = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[tag_pos+8],e->endian);
if(value_pos > e->d_len-8) return 0;
numer = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[value_pos ],e->endian);
denom = iw_get_ui32_e(&e->d[value_pos+4],e->endian);
if(denom==0) return 0;
*pv = ((double)numer)/denom;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed invalid memory access bugs when decoding JPEG Exif data
Fixes issues #22, #23, #24, #25
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int get_exif_tag_dbl_value(struct iw_exif_state *e, unsigned int tag_pos,
double *pv)
{
unsigned int field_type;
unsigned int value_count;
unsigned int value_pos;
unsigned int numer, denom;
field_type = get_exif_ui16(e, tag_pos+2);
value_count = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+4);
if(value_count!=1) return 0;
if(field_type!=5) return 0; // 5=Rational (two uint32's)
value_pos = get_exif_ui32(e, tag_pos+8);
if(value_pos > e->d_len-8) return 0;
numer = get_exif_ui32(e, value_pos);
denom = get_exif_ui32(e, value_pos+4);
if(denom==0) return 0;
*pv = ((double)numer)/denom;
return 1;
}
| 168,113 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Response PageHandler::SetDownloadBehavior(const std::string& behavior,
Maybe<std::string> download_path) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::InternalError();
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow &&
!download_path.isJust())
return Response::Error("downloadPath not provided");
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Default) {
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::RemoveFromWebContents(web_contents);
download_manager_delegate_ = nullptr;
return Response::OK();
}
content::BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents->GetBrowserContext();
DCHECK(browser_context);
content::DownloadManager* download_manager =
content::BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(browser_context);
download_manager_delegate_ =
DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::TakeOver(download_manager);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper* download_helper =
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::DENY);
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow) {
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::ALLOW);
download_helper->SetDownloadPath(download_path.fromJust());
}
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | Response PageHandler::SetDownloadBehavior(const std::string& behavior,
Maybe<std::string> download_path) {
if (!allow_set_download_behavior_)
return Response::Error("Not allowed.");
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::InternalError();
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow &&
!download_path.isJust())
return Response::Error("downloadPath not provided");
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Default) {
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::RemoveFromWebContents(web_contents);
download_manager_delegate_ = nullptr;
return Response::OK();
}
content::BrowserContext* browser_context = web_contents->GetBrowserContext();
DCHECK(browser_context);
content::DownloadManager* download_manager =
content::BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(browser_context);
download_manager_delegate_ =
DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::TakeOver(download_manager);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper* download_helper =
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::DENY);
if (behavior == Page::SetDownloadBehavior::BehaviorEnum::Allow) {
download_helper->SetDownloadBehavior(
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::DownloadBehavior::ALLOW);
download_helper->SetDownloadPath(download_path.fromJust());
}
return Response::OK();
}
| 172,608 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int asf_build_simple_index(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index)
{
ff_asf_guid g;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int64_t current_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
int64_t ret;
if((ret = avio_seek(s->pb, asf->data_object_offset + asf->data_object_size, SEEK_SET)) < 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
/* the data object can be followed by other top-level objects,
* skip them until the simple index object is reached */
while (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_simple_index_header)) {
int64_t gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if (gsize < 24 || avio_feof(s->pb)) {
goto end;
}
avio_skip(s->pb, gsize - 24);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
}
{
int64_t itime, last_pos = -1;
int pct, ict;
int i;
int64_t av_unused gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
itime = avio_rl64(s->pb);
pct = avio_rl32(s->pb);
ict = avio_rl32(s->pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"itime:0x%"PRIx64", pct:%d, ict:%d\n", itime, pct, ict);
for (i = 0; i < ict; i++) {
int pktnum = avio_rl32(s->pb);
int pktct = avio_rl16(s->pb);
int64_t pos = s->internal->data_offset + s->packet_size * (int64_t)pktnum;
int64_t index_pts = FFMAX(av_rescale(itime, i, 10000) - asf->hdr.preroll, 0);
if (pos != last_pos) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "pktnum:%d, pktct:%d pts: %"PRId64"\n",
pktnum, pktct, index_pts);
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[stream_index], pos, index_pts,
s->packet_size, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
last_pos = pos;
}
}
asf->index_read = ict > 1;
}
end:
avio_seek(s->pb, current_pos, SEEK_SET);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int asf_build_simple_index(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index)
{
ff_asf_guid g;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int64_t current_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
int64_t ret;
if((ret = avio_seek(s->pb, asf->data_object_offset + asf->data_object_size, SEEK_SET)) < 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
/* the data object can be followed by other top-level objects,
* skip them until the simple index object is reached */
while (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_simple_index_header)) {
int64_t gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if (gsize < 24 || avio_feof(s->pb)) {
goto end;
}
avio_skip(s->pb, gsize - 24);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
}
{
int64_t itime, last_pos = -1;
int pct, ict;
int i;
int64_t av_unused gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
itime = avio_rl64(s->pb);
pct = avio_rl32(s->pb);
ict = avio_rl32(s->pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"itime:0x%"PRIx64", pct:%d, ict:%d\n", itime, pct, ict);
for (i = 0; i < ict; i++) {
int pktnum = avio_rl32(s->pb);
int pktct = avio_rl16(s->pb);
int64_t pos = s->internal->data_offset + s->packet_size * (int64_t)pktnum;
int64_t index_pts = FFMAX(av_rescale(itime, i, 10000) - asf->hdr.preroll, 0);
if (avio_feof(s->pb)) {
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto end;
}
if (pos != last_pos) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "pktnum:%d, pktct:%d pts: %"PRId64"\n",
pktnum, pktct, index_pts);
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[stream_index], pos, index_pts,
s->packet_size, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
last_pos = pos;
}
}
asf->index_read = ict > 1;
}
end:
avio_seek(s->pb, current_pos, SEEK_SET);
return ret;
}
| 167,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output the fixed function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void svc_rdma_send_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
int status)
{
struct ib_send_wr err_wr;
struct page *p;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
enum rpcrdma_errcode err;
__be32 *va;
int length;
int ret;
ret = svc_rdma_repost_recv(xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
return;
p = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return;
va = page_address(p);
/* XDR encode an error reply */
err = ERR_CHUNK;
if (status == -EPROTONOSUPPORT)
err = ERR_VERS;
length = svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(xprt, rmsgp, err, va);
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(xprt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->count = 1;
ctxt->pages[0] = p;
/* Prepare SGE for local address */
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = xprt->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length = length;
ctxt->sge[0].addr = ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
p, 0, length, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(xprt->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error mapping buffer for protocol error\n");
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return;
}
svc_rdma_count_mappings(xprt, ctxt);
/* Prepare SEND WR */
memset(&err_wr, 0, sizeof(err_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
err_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
err_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
err_wr.num_sge = 1;
err_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
err_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
/* Post It */
ret = svc_rdma_send(xprt, &err_wr);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error %d posting send for protocol error\n",
ret);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | void svc_rdma_send_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
| 168,174 |
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