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d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 9 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Boiler and Machinery Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 10 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Elevator Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 11 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Animal Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 12 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Collision Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 13 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Personal Injury Liability Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 14 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Property Damage Liability Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 15 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 16 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Fidelity and Surety Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 17 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Credit Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 18 [SPECIAL NOTES] Property and Casualty companies are not permitted to write this kind of insurance. [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Title Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 19 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Motor Vehicle and Aircraft Physical Damage Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 20 [SPECIAL NOTES] Inland Marine Only without Paragraph 21 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Marine and Inland Marine Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 21 [SPECIAL NOTES] Marine - (Marine and Inland when combined with Paragraph 21) [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Marine Protection and Indemnity Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 22 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Residual Value Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 23 [SPECIAL NOTES] Property and Casualty companies are not permitted to write this kind of insurance. [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Mortgage Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 24 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Credit Unemployment Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 25 [SPECIAL NOTES] With certain temporary exceptions specified in Chapter 48 of the Laws of 1989, Property and Casualty companies are not permitted to write this kind of insurance. [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Financial Guaranty Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 26 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | GAP Insurance (Subsections A through D) | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 27 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Prize Indemnification Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 28 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Service Contract Reimbursement Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 29 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Legal Services | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
d6856871_Insurance_Company_Search__DESCRIPTION_OF_POWER_LINE | [POWER] 30 [DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE] | Involuntary Unemployment Insurance | [] | Insurance Company Search | DESCRIPTION OF POWER/LINE | http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/tocol4.htm | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00000-ip-10-236-191-2_398893196_0.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] PVC (Poly Vinyl Chloride)/vinyl/pleather/artificial leather/Moleskine notebooks [DANGER!] Emits pure chlorine gas when cut! [Cause/Consequence] | Don't ever cut this material as it will ruin the optics, cause the metal of the machine to corrode, and ruin the motion control system. | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] Thick ( >1mm ) Polycarbonate/Lexan [DANGER!] Cut very poorly, discolor, catch fire [Cause/Consequence] | Polycarbonate is often found as flat, sheet material. The window of the laser cutter is made of Polycarbonate because polycarbonate strongly absorbs infrared radiation! This is the frequency of light the laser cutter uses to cut materials, so it is very ineffective at cutting polycarbonate. Polycarbonate is a poor choice for laser cutting. | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] ABS [DANGER!] Emits cyanide gas and tends to melt [Cause/Consequence] | ABS does not cut well in a laser cutter. It tends to melt rather than vaporize, and has a higher chance of catching on fire and leaving behind melted gooey deposits on the vector cutting grid. It also does not engrave well (again, tends to melt). | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] HDPE/milk bottle plastic [DANGER!] Catches fire and melts [Cause/Consequence] | It melts. It gets gooey. Don't use it. | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] PolyStyrene Foam [DANGER!] Catches fire [Cause/Consequence] | It catches fire, it melts, and only thin pieces cut. This is the #1 material that causes laser fires!!! | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] PolyPropylene Foam [DANGER!] Catches fire [Cause/Consequence] | Like PolyStyrene, it melts, catches fire, and the melted drops continue to burn and turn into rock-hard drips and pebbles. | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] Fiberglass [DANGER!] Emits fumes [Cause/Consequence] | It's a mix of two materials that cant' be cut. Glass (etch, no cut) and epoxy resin (fumes) | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] Coated Carbon Fiber [DANGER!] Emits noxious fumes [Cause/Consequence] | A mix of two materials. Thin carbon fiber mat can be cut, with some fraying - but not when coated. | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
1e48cc3d_Laser_infobase____BloomingLabs__Cause_Consequence | [Material] Any powder [Cause/Consequence] | the compressed air will blow it away | [] | Difference between revisions of "Laser infobase" - BloomingLabs | Cause/Consequence | http://bloominglabs.org/index.php?title=Laser_infobase&diff=1653&oldid=1423 | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00120-ip-10-236-191-2_33845748_2.json |
d1a85d11_Regions___The_PokΓ©mon_Wiki__Japanese | [English] Chicole Village [Japanese] | γγ³γ¬γγ | [
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d1a85d11_Regions___The_PokΓ©mon_Wiki__Japanese | [English] Vientown [Japanese] | γγ¨γ³γΏγ¦γ³ | [
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d1a85d11_Regions___The_PokΓ©mon_Wiki__Japanese | [English] Pueltown [Japanese] | γγ¨γ«γΏγ¦γ³ | [
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d1a85d11_Regions___The_PokΓ©mon_Wiki__Japanese | [English] Shiver Camp [Japanese] | γγ«γγ«γγ£γ³γ | [
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d1a85d11_Regions___The_PokΓ©mon_Wiki__Japanese | [English] Haruba Village [Japanese] | γγ«γγγ | [
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d1a85d11_Regions___The_PokΓ©mon_Wiki__Japanese | [English] Boyleland [Japanese] | γγ€γ«γ©γ³γ | [
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7d85f589__Website___Regatta_Information__Class | [Discipline] Windsurfing [Type] Men [Results] Overall Results [Class] | Formula Experience | [
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7d85f589__Website___Regatta_Information__Class | [Discipline] Fleet racing [Type] Men [Grade] 50 [Results] Overall Results [Class] | Laser | [
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7d85f589__Website___Regatta_Information__Class | [Discipline] Fleet racing [Type] Women [Grade] 50 [Results] Overall Results [Class] | Laser Radial | [
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7d85f589__Website___Regatta_Information__Class | [Discipline] Fleet racing [Type] Youth [Results] Overall Results [Class] | Optimist | [
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7d85f589__Website___Regatta_Information__Class | [Discipline] Fleet racing [Type] Men [Results] Overall Results [Class] | Sunfish | [
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0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] Here are some things that can help: Take medicine to help control the symptoms. Using medicine can double your chances of quitting.1 Get active. Start a new activity, take a class, or read a book on a subject that interests you. Get counseling and phone support. Try to avoid smoking triggers. Distract yourself with a walk, household chore, or a game. [Possible roadblock] | Cravings and nicotine withdrawal. Symptoms include feeling grouchy or having trouble sleeping or concentrating. | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] If you weren't able to quit in the past, don't lose hope. Each time you try to quit, you will be stronger and will have learned more about what helps and what makes it harder. Most people try to quit many times before they can quit for good. [Possible roadblock] | Failure in the past | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] You may gain some weight when you stop smoking. Don't try to avoid this by going on a strict diet at the same time. This will make it even harder to stop smoking. You can take steps to lower your chance of gaining weight: By being more active. This will also help you feel better. By using stop-smoking medicines. They can help you get through the worst of your cravings and may help you avoid putting on too much weight. Quitting Smoking: Dealing With Weight Gain [Possible roadblock] | Weight gain | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] Medicines or counseling can help treat nervousness or depression. Talk to your doctor or therapist. Depression: Should I Take an Antidepressant? Depression: Stop Negative Thoughts [Possible roadblock] | Depression or nervousness | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] Support can improve your chances of quitting. Look for people who have stopped smoking, or seek out those family and friends who support your goal to quit. Online and phone support can also help: National tobacco quitline: 1-800-QUIT NOW (1-800-784-8669) Stop-smoking programs, such as the American Lung Association's Freedom from Smoking program (www.lungusa.org) or QuitNet (www.quitnet.com) Check with your local hospital or health department for programs to quit smoking. Quitting Smoking: Getting Support [Possible roadblock] | Lack of support | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] It would be easier for you to quit if those around you didn't smoke. Discuss quitting together. If this isn't an option, talk to the person(s) about not smoking around you and about not leaving their cigarettes in places where you might see them. When you can, avoid places where others are smoking. [Possible roadblock] | Living with or being around someone who smokes | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] If you enjoy smoking when you drink alcohol, you may need to cut down or give up alcohol when you quit smoking, at least for a while. [Possible roadblock] | Alcohol | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] Stress can lead to smoking, but smoking doesn't really make stress go away. To control stress, learn what causes your stress and how to change the way you react. For suggestions, see the topic Stress Management. [Possible roadblock] | Stress | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] Assess your tobacco use (What is a PDF document?) to discover your smoking triggers. For some people, morning coffee and going out with friends are common smoking triggers. Drinking coffee. Change the way you have coffee: the place, the coffee mug, everything that you did when you were smoking. Or if just drinking coffee makes you want to smoke, try taking a walk during coffee breaks instead. Going out with friends. If drinking makes you want to smoke, see about going to a movie rather than going out for drinks. [Possible roadblock] | Missing your smoking habits or not being able to avoid smoking triggers | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
0bdd35ed_oking_Thinking_About_Quitting___Possible_roadblock | [What you need to know] Healthier skin, cleaner teeth, and being seen as more attractive to others are just a few reasons for teens to quit smoking. Quitting can help student athletes perform their best at their sport. Teens who are smoke-free have an easier time being active. And being physically active can help you deal with stress in healthier ways than by smoking. Substance Abuse: Dealing With Teen Substance Abuse [Possible roadblock] | Teen issues, such as fitting in with the crowd and dealing with stress | [] | Quitting Smoking-Thinking About Quitting? | Possible roadblock | http://www.webmd.com/smoking-cessation/quitting-tobacco-use-getting-ready-to-quit?page=2 | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00199-ip-10-236-191-2_828451376_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] AllowedOOFType [Default value] External [Description] | In Windows PowerShell, use this parameter to specify the type of automatic replies or OOF notifications that are returned to users in the destination domain. Valid values are External, ExternalLegacy, InternalLegacy, and None. External allows only external auto-replies to be sent to the destination domain. Internal auto-replies or auto-replies that aren't designated as external aren't delivered. ExternalLegacy allows the following types of auto-replies to be sent to the destination domain: Auto-replies that aren't designated as internal or external. External auto-replies. InternalLegacy allows the following types of auto-replies to be sent to the destination domain: Auto-replies that aren't designated as internal or external. Internal auto-replies. None allows no auto-replies to be sent to the destination domain. Only certain email clients, such as Outlook Web App or Microsoft Office Outlook 2007 or later can designate auto-replies as internal or external. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] AutoForwardEnabled [Default value] True [Description] | Use this parameter to allow or suppress messages that are auto-forwarded by client email programs in your organisation. Setting this parameter to $false prevents auto-forwarded messages from being delivered to the destination domain. For detailed instructions, see Manage Message Forwarding with Remote Domains. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] AutoReplyEnabled [Default value] True [Description] | Use this parameter to allow or suppress automatic replies that are generated by inbox rules that your users set in their email client. Setting this parameter to $false prevents automatic replies from being generated. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] CharacterSet [Default value] Iso-8859-1 or blank [Description] | Use this parameter to specify a character set of last resort for MIME messages sent to this domain. The character set that you specify will be used only for MIME messages that don't have their own character set specified. Setting this parameter won't overwrite character sets that are already specified in the message. For a list of valid character set names, see Supported Character Sets for Remote Domain Configuration. If you don't want to specify a character set, set the value to $null. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] ContentType [Default value] MimeHtmlText [Description] | Use this parameter to define the outbound message content type and formatting. Valid values for this parameter are MimeHtmlText, MimeText, and MimeHtml. MimeHtmlText converts messages to MIME messages that use HTML formatting, unless the original message is a text message. If the original message is a text message, the outbound message will be a MIME message that uses text formatting. MimeText converts all messages to MIME messages that use text formatting. MimeHtml converts all messages to MIME messages that use HTML formatting. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] DeliveryReportEnabled [Default value] True [Description] | Use this parameter to allow or suppress delivery reports from client email programs in your organisation to the destination domain. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] DisplaySenderName [Default value] True [Description] | This parameter is used for older versions of Microsoft Exchange and should only be changed under direction of Microsoft support. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] LineWrapSize [Default value] Unlimited [Description] | Use this parameter to specify the maximum number of characters permitted on each line of text in outbound messages. Valid values for this parameter are integers up to 132. If you don't want to specify a line wrap size, use the value unlimited. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] MeetingForwardNotificationEnabled [Default value] False [Description] | Use this parameter to enable or disable notifications to the meeting organiser that a meeting request has been forwarded. Valid values for this parameter are $true or $false. $True: Meeting requests that are forwarded to recipients in the destination domain generate a notification to the meeting organiser. $False: Meeting requests that are forwarded to recipients in the destination domain don't generate a notification to the meeting organiser. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] NDREnabled [Default value] True [Description] | Use this parameter to allow or suppress non-delivery reports (NDRs) from your organisation. Setting this parameter to $false suppresses NDRs to the destination domain. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] NonMimeCharacterSet [Default value] Iso-8859-1 or blank [Description] | Use this parameter to specify a character set of last resort for plain text messages sent to this domain. The character set that you specify will be used only for plain text messages that don't have their own character set specified. Setting this parameter won't overwrite character sets that are already specified in the outbound mail. For a list of valid character set names, see Supported Character Sets for Remote Domain Configuration. If you don't want to specify a character set, set the value to $null. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] TargetDeliveryDomain [Default value] False [Description] | This parameter specifies the email domain that's used when generating target addresses for new mail users in a cross-premises deployment scenario. In a cross-premises deployment, the remote user mailboxes are represented as mail users. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] TNEFEnabled [Default value] blank [Description] | Use this parameter to control whether Transport Neutral Encapsulation Format (TNEF) message encoding is used on messages that are sent to the destination domain. A TNEF-encoded message contains a plain text version of the message, and a binary attachment that packages parts of the message. The binary attachment may include special Outlook features, such as voting buttons, meeting requests and custom forms. Valid values for this parameter are $true, $false, and $null. $True: TNEF encoding is used on all messages that are sent to the destination domain. $False: TNEF encoding isn't used on any messages that are sent to the destination domain. $Null: TNEF encoding isn't specified for the destination domain. The TNEF settings are controlled by the message sender or the message recipient. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] TrustedMailInboundEnabled [Default value] False [Description] | This parameter trusts messages received from senders in the remote domain. If you set this parameter to $true, all incoming messages from senders in the remote domain are considered safe, so the messages bypass content and recipient filtering. We recommend that you set this parameter to $true for cross-premises deployment scenarios. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] TrustedMailOutboundEnabled [Default value] False [Description] | This parameter specifies the remote domain as a trusted domain. We recommend that you set this parameter to $true for cross-premises deployment scenarios. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
be66453b_Remote_Domains__Description | [Parameter] UseSimpleDisplayName [Default value] False [Description] | This parameter controls whether the sender's simple display name appears in the From field of messages sent to the domain. Setting this parameter to $true displays the sender's simple display name in the From field for messages sent to this remote domain. You can use the simple display name as an alternative to the display name if the display name contains internal information that's inappropriate for external recipients. Note that in the cloud-based service, the simple display name of a mailbox isn't populated by default. | [] | Remote Domains | Description | http://help.outlook.com/en-gb/140/dd207273.aspx | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00195-ip-10-236-191-2_106883774_0.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 0:36 | Intro. [Recording date: September 25, 2009.] Book life-changing; written 2004; fundamental questions of the financial crisis. Why would a firm like Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers take so much risk? Why would they be so leveraged, put themselves in a position where a bad quarter would kill their firm? Yes, there have been bailouts in the past, but they were partial; punished equity-holders. Should induce some prudence. But punishing equity holders while bailing out bond holders and creditors has some subtle incentives that are not so obvious. Start with modern history of bank bailouts in the last 25 years. What has happened and what form? Continental Illinois, forefather in modern times. At the time, highly regarded commercial bank, highly regarded. Failed because of energy-related exposures throughout the country. Creditors, large and small, and even beyond the creditors were protected by the Federal government and didn't suffer any losses. Reason for that protection: policy-makers' concerns about contagion or spillover effects, meaning the concern was that problems at Continental would affect other financial institutions, other markets, and the performance of the economy in terms of output and employment. Decision made to try to limit the damage. They were the 7th or 8th largest bank in the United States at the time, though listeners today have never heard of them. Very large bank, 5000 counterparties, connected with other creditors, borrowers, and lenders. Had borrowed a lot of money from community banks around the country, who had exposure to Continental in excess of their capital. Would have cascaded. Wasn't the only problem, but part of it. Congressional testimony after episode, Comptroller of the Currency indicated there were 11 banks he considered too big to fail. Message received by creditors. Moral hazard: normal prudence for a creditor is that you don't want your borrower to go bankrupt so you can be repaid for your loan. Creditors don't get any upside--collect interest, expect to get principal back; no matter how well the firm does you won't do any better than that. Compare with equity holders. Imposing losses on equity holders doesn't do any good in terms of moral hazard. Seems counter-intuitive. They don't want to lose their equity. Depends on how diversified the equity holder is. If you are a large institutional investor owning equity in lots of different companies around country or globe, don't have a large exposure to any one company. If one goes bankrupt, it doesn't have a large effect on your performance. Contrast to a community bank that is family owned--lots of incentive to be prudent. Can't say the same for equity holders of large institutions where equity is broadly held. Deep insight: bond holders, creditors, and equity holders. Tend to think of the equity holders as group standing on the side reminding firm not to be too risky. High-risk stock adds zest to their portfolios; risk versus return. Don't get above normal returns without above normal risk; diversify portfolios. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 8:57 | The management themselves are stockholders, often. Surely they don't want to be wiped out. Correct. That's where we get back to the moral hazard issue. Not excessively greedy; rather were responding to the incentives they confronted. Creditors expect to be protected, so they have no incentive to worry about the risks the company is taking, which is another way of saying that risk-taking is mispriced. It's priced too low, and when something is priced too low, too much of it will be taken on. That's what happened in some of the high-profile cases in the last couple of years. Some large institutions avoided the problems--didn't go out of business or require bailouts, but did suffer declines in equity values for the present time. Conversation with Paul Romer: salary. Downside risk--don't want their equity to be wiped out. But they usually can't cash in their equity. When they lose hundreds of millions when their stocks fell, comforted by the fact that they couldn't have cashed that out when they were high; and secondly, they made large sums of money in salary along the way; and they did sell some of their stock in the good times. Diversified the rest of their assets; making $10-20 million a year and using that to diversify into safer assets. Not stupid; not greedy. Prudent with their own money. Strange to believe that people are more greedy in the first decade of the 21st century than they were ten or thirty or forty years ago. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 12:18 | History: Continental Illinois's creditors and bondholders avoided direct losses, though can assume the value of the bonds went down when the company got into trouble; once the bailout announced, bonds returned to face value. Equity holders were close to wiped out, or at least not coddled by the government. 1984, one event. Testimony by office of Comptroller of the Currency makes imprudent remark--not just this one company--we'd bail out all eleven. What happens going forward? There was another banking crisis in the late 1980s, early 1990s; many savings and loans institutions did fail and a lot of people lost money. Also episodes of forbearance when some large financial institutions had you marked their balance sheet to market would have been seen to be insolvent. Wasn't done; given time to recover, which they did. Creditors surely understood what was going on; served to reinforce the notion that if you were a creditor of a systemically important financial institution you were likely to be protected directly or indirectly. Next high-profile episode was Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)--different kind of fish, but creditors drew the same conclusion. During the period between 1984 and 1998 (LTCM crisis) many banks went broke. The FDIC covered almost every dollar of depositors' money even when it exceeded the limits the FDIC had promised to guarantee. Changed in 1991 with FDICIA legislation. Government had to engage in least-cost resolution of banks that became insolvent--idea was to impose losses on creditors. Following FDICIA, putting LTCM aside, the FDIC did pursue that policy. Also in FDICIA an out that said to the regulators that you could avoid least-cost resolution if you thought there could be significant systemic adverse consequences from pursuing it. A lot of people thought FDICIA dealt with the too-big-to-fail problem. Because of the loopholes, it didn't deal with it, and what happened in the Continental Illinois case. Have to have agreement among the FDIC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the President, and the Secretary of the Treasury in order to exercise the loophole that you are not going to pursue least-cost resolution. But those were the people involved in the decision to bail out the creditors of Continental Illinois. So, FDICIA was just formalizing what was past practice. But in the interim there were some crises paid by creditors in that period. Don't mention the Savings and Loan crisis, Mexican crisis, or other international crises before 1998. Any role in perception of creditors? No significant separate effects. In the wake of FDICIA some creditors did lose money--but all were creditors of relatively small financial institutions. FDICIA never tested; when tested, found wanting. Alan Meltzer, recent podcast: why wasn't FDICIA used in the current crisis? Told Hank Paulson to use it; Paulson said he asked the banks and they were against it. Of course they were against it--it removes their management! People shouldn't have kidded themselves about the prospective effectiveness of FDICIA. Have to prepare for a crisis in advance. Preparation is not easy, but essential. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 20:39 | LTCM, 1998. They were a hedge fund; podcast with William Cohan. They were not a bank, not FDIC or SIPC insured--just a hedge fund that was highly leveraged, meaning they had borrowed a lot of the money they had used to make their bets with. No government money was explicitly put in. Federal Reserve Bank of New York convened a lot of large Wall Street counterparties and persuaded them to put in enough funds so that LTCM's positions could be unwound in an orderly way. They did have exposures around the world to lots of counterparties so had they been unable to honor their commitments, they would have had global implications. Also concerns about fire sales of assets--similar concern. If LTCM had to liquidate its positions in short order it would put a lot of downward pressure on asset prices which would impair the conditions of those other firms. That argument used a lot; used now to talk about why mark-to-market is part of the problem. The argument is that if they sell quickly, firms that hold similar assets will have to re-price them on their books; their capital cushion will no longer meet capital requirements, so they will have to start unwinding their positions. Cascade. Gets too much mileage out of the "quickly" part. Suppose they had to sell them slowly. The problem isn't the speed--it's that the assets aren't worth very much. Step back; ask the reaction of creditors to LTCM, reinforcing--even though no government money, when they called that meeting it wasn't so voluntary. What is next event important in reputational effects? Between early 1990s and recent crisis was mostly a period of tranquility in financial markets. Two other episodes: 1991 when Drexel Burnham went out of business--government let them go; wound them down in an orderly way. "Tequila crisis" in the early 1990s--a lot of banks had lent them money--U.S. government anxious not to see those bills--the Mexican obligations to the U.S. banks--go unpaid. Forbearance: some of those international exposures was part of the reason it was practiced. Forbearance is when you look at a financial institution, value its assets relative to its liabilities; if you are rigorous you might find the institution is insolvent; forbearance is when you are more generous in how you do the evaluations, which gives institution more time. Subtle: creditors, when they saw the government not enforcing those standards as rigorously as they normally would, saw that the government was trying to help them avoid bankruptcy. Creditors very sophisticated; some were even counting on it when they initiated their exposure to these organizations. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 28:17 | Puzzle about claim, besides example of Drexel. If the claim is that because of the reduced risk to creditors, these institutions became more risky, why did it take so long for it to blow up? Trying to predict in advance what will set off a financial crisis virtually impossible. Some people claim that they knew residential housing was in trouble, but calling the timing--that it would begin in August of 2007 as opposed to August of some other year--nobody really got all of that right and if they did, couldn't repeat that. Institution like Fannie Mae was inherently dysfunctional. As close as you could get to believing that the government would bail them out; bad set of incentives; had their own regulator; takes a while for that process to get corrupted. Couldn't have said when, but not unreasonable to suggest that it was unstable and would eventually blow up. Lots of regulators testified before Congress before the crisis; but no desire to do anything about it. Incentives: If I'm leveraged, say a 2 to 1 ratio between my investments and my capital, so half of what I have invested are my own and the other half are borrowed. Low level of leverage--huge cushion. If they fall very far, my lenders and creditors feel very good because they know I can compensate them. If I live in a world of too big to fail and if my creditors believe I'm likely to be bailed out, don't I have a natural incentive to increase that leverage as much as possible? The other people are comfortable; and I will increase my rate of return on my asset base, with riskier and riskier bets. True? Yes, but would emphasize the incentives or motivations of the creditors. Recognizing that they will be covered by the taxpayer, that's where the misplacing of risk comes in. They are willing to lend money to permit this company to lend out. Lack of market discipline. Creditors' expectations--as long as they are what they are, the problem will persist. One of the outcomes of the last couple of years is to more deeply embed creditors' expectations that they will be bailed out. What would a firm's optimal level of leverage be in a case of too big to fail? Puzzling why a firm would, like Bear Stearns or Lehman, be leveraged 30, 40, 50 to 1--putting in a dollar or two for every hundred being borrowed? When you do that, you put the existence of the firm at risk. What are they getting in return? Opportunity to make much larger bets, and will take riskier debts. These firms could borrow cheaply and saw investment opportunities. Given how cheaply they could borrow, they felt they would be well compensated for the risks they were taking on the assets they were acquiring. A lot of these companies survived; their stock didn't go to zero; had big return as their competitors were destroyed. Worst part of story--why could they borrow at such low rates of interest when they were putting those lenders at such risk? Standard answer is they just expecting housing prices to keep going up. Alternative answer is: they were lending to each other. So, their likelihood of being bailed out than if it were the Chinese lending to Fannie Mae. Except for Lehman Brothers, their bets turned out to be right. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 37:42 | Lehman Brothers: why were they left to twist in the wind and not bailed out? No effective means to deal with Lehman Bros. Private sector acquirers backed away; senior management at Lehman may have misjudged the situation and was asking too much. Not on the scene. May also have been a view that in the wake of Bear Stearns that Lehman Brothers's creditors had had ample opportunity to adjust their exposures if they were concerned; and if they didn't, that's too bad and they should bear some losses. People have used Lehman Brothers as a marker for the real onset of the deepening financial crisis, but Lehman Brothers gets too much blame and AIG not enough. AIG was a triple-A rated institution with exposures around the world and no effective comprehensive supervision and really did come out of the blue. Didn't know about AIG but knew they were big and would be lots of trouble if they were permitted to fail. When Bear Stearns died in March of 2008, married off to J.P. Morgan Chase; creditors, lenders, and others taken care of, but stockholders' investment went down drastically. Between March and September two things happened that have not gotten enough attention: Lehman becomes a lot more leveraged. Lehman has similar assets to Bear Stearns, and yet can continue borrowing money, which suggests strongly that people thought they would be taken care of. More dramatic: money market fund Reserve Primary--first money market fund--lends Lehman hundreds of millions of dollars during this period, and when Lehman goes bankrupt, has to "break the buck"--lower their asset value from $1 to $.97, which sent tremendous shock waves through the financial world. Even money market funds may be taking on too much risk. But why would they do that? Answer, per Arnold Kling and James Stewart in the New Yorker: they figured there was a decent chance they'd get bailed out when Lehman went bankrupt. Friend running a money market fund before Continental was bailed out--knew it was shaky--buying Continental certificates of deposit (CDs). A lot is a probability game; friend said he was willing to buy 1-mo. or 2-mo. CDs because they may fail but not in the next month or two. Worked out because Continental creditors were bailed out. Even if you think the institution may not last, there is a timing dimension. Even in the case of Bear Stearns the plug gets pulled on them when people in the repo market say they won't lend any more. Why didn't they just say the government would bail them out? Why stop lending? Did a risk/reward calculation and said maybe the government would bail them out, but didn't want to be there to find out. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 44:40 | Reaction when you put this hypothesis forward. Same issue: saying that history and empirical evidence suggest that there is a moral hazard problem is met with response that equity holders still have a risk. Lots of pushback, skepticism; practitioners don't like it. Less skepticism now than when book came out. There were a lot of people who thought that FDICIA addressed the problem and the book was just wrong. There are people who believe it's just not good public policy to impose losses on creditors of large financial institutions. Don't know what underlies that view--they must feel that it's potentially too disruptive. Third thing: the best thing to do is to make supervision and regulation sufficiently effective that you can prevent these episodes going forward. Given incentives we confront, that's not possible. We should make supervision effective but we shouldn't kid ourselves. The track record suggests it's not going to be sufficient. Arnold Kling paper: stiffened capital requirements, think there will be fewer systemic losses, but there is a political dynamic. Argument made by many is that we have to recreate Fannie and Freddie but this time we'll just have different restrictions so they won't get out of control. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 48:51 | Solutions to Too Big to Fail itself. What might we do to encourage more prudence on the part of creditors than now? Have to find a way to credibly put creditors of these systemic institutions at risk of loss. Can't simply say we're not going to bail you out--not credible. Preparation--very important. The reason policy-makers intervene is because of concern about spillovers. Preparation means identifying and taking steps to limit those spillover effects. Analytical question; a lot of that information is already available. Where do these institutions have exposures? Are those exposures prudent? In some cases, don't have to do anything. If it fails, you can impose losses on the creditors because you've prepared--you've done the analysis and satisfied yourself that the spillovers are manageable. In cases where you are concerned, have to use authority to reduce the chances of those spillovers. Don't want to reduce to zero--don't want a world where nobody has exposures to each other, but they can be reduced. Should be done in tranquil, sound times, not in the middle of a crisis. Two problems. Appealing, good to add transparency, but if you have a policy that says if we think you are not too systemically connected, we're going to let the chips fall where they may, you create an incentive to become more connected. Some people say Lehman's mistake was they weren't connected enough--they blew it, they should have been taking riskier bets with more people. Other side of the process: Has to be ongoing work; authorities have to be prepared to intervene. How do you keep that from being an ad hoc process that is prone to rent-seeking? Would you make them sell stuff? Head of the monitoring process will be intervening in financial institutions on an ongoing basis. Always devils in the details. Until proposal implemented won't know its strengths or weaknesses. Doesn't mean policy is random. If implemented in a consistent way, financial institutions will understand the rules and will adjust, perhaps pretty quickly. Proposal has the weakness of not having been tried; but the things that have been tried haven't worked. About the first point--idea that we should put in positions of authority people who by reputation or statements they've made at their hearings that they were plausibly people who wouldn't bail out large institutions. Suppose Gary Stern is made head of this new body in charge of systemic risk. You're a pretty credible guy--book, appeared on EconTalk, reputation. Is it imaginable that you would keep your reputation as opposed to bowing to the political pressures? That's why preparation is so important. Can't ask anybody if a financial crisis comes out of the blue without preparation that you should let a large institution go to teach the creditors a lesson. That may not pass a cost-benefit test. Cost may be too large to the economy relative to the lesson taught to the creditors. If the guy who gets to make this decision is sitting there and knows they have acted to limit spillover effects earlier, then easier to decide to not bail out the creditors, because the costs are much reduced. If you communicate to the creditors in advance, get better pricing the marketplace. Potential to set up a virtuous circle. Any traction for that idea? Not as much as might be hoped. Don't know the variety of other proposals that are around. Some proposals make sense--higher capital requirements, higher insurance premiums, greater holdings of liquid assets for systemic institutions; but by themselves they don't get to the moral hazard problem. Too big to fail policy rewards some politically powerful people. What has in fact happened over the last 15 months is that Americans have sent hundreds of billions of dollars to some of the richest people on earth. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
aff38ad8_brary_of_Economics_and_Liberty__ast_Highlights_HIDE_HIGHLIGHTS | [Time] 59:54 | Naive question: What if we had done nothing? What is best case for those interventions? Can't do counterfactual; speculative. Had Bear Stearns been let to fail, consequences would be severe; but can't quantify them. Would be looking at a much weaker economy with more dire prospects. Could be wrong. History gives one pause about inadequate responses. Federal Reserve balance sheet currently has between $6-8 billion in mortgage backed securities that had been issued by Fannie and Freddie. They bought up old ones and have been buying new ones as Fannie and Freddie have issued them, channeling money into mortgage markets to keep interest rates low--trying to keep the price of housing supported so there won't be a fall in existing loans. They are not marked to market--not quite worth what the Fed says they are. What are the implications for inflation as things return to normalcy? Dominant there is the macro objective. Economy entered recession at end of 2007, lasted probably till a couple of months ago; broad and deep by many metrics. When short-term interest rates hit zero, had to look for other ways to have a macro effect. Want to try to operate in deep markets and not operate in corporate credit where you end up picking and choosing among quality. Balance sheet and inflation--exaggerated. One, while there is a strong relationship between money and inflation in the long run, you have to emphasize the long run--probably five or ten years if you look at the evidence. What happens to the Fed's balance sheet during a year or two unless it persists. That gets to the second point: the Fed and all Central Banks have a challenge about when to start tightening and how much. Challenge after any recession or period of accommodation or ease. Inflation performance of U.S. and global economies since the 1980s has been period of low or diminishing inflation over time. History gives you at least some modicum of confidence that they may get it right. | [] | Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail | EconTalk | Library of Economics and Liberty | Podcast Highlights HIDE HIGHLIGHTS | http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2009/10/gary_stern_on_t.html | 39/1438043062723.96_20150728002422-00255-ip-10-236-191-2_427816070_6.json |
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c68b61f9_tals__vacation_rental_by_owner__1 | [0] Wireless HS Internet [2] Heat [3] Automatic Coffee Pot [4] Ironing Board & Iron [1] | Toaster | [
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3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 10 [Bill Title] | A bill to reduce violent juvenile crime, promote accountability by juvenile criminals, punish and deter violent gang crime, and for other purposes. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1121 [Bill Title] | A bill to amend Title 17 to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1123 [Bill Title] | A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 relating to the unemployment tax for individuals employed in the entertainment industry. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1184 [Bill Title] | A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to waive nonimmigrant visa fees for aliens seeking to enter the United States to engage in certain charitable activities. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1256 [Bill Title] | A bill to simplify and expedite access to the Federal courts for injured parties whose rights and privileges, secured by the United States Constitution, have been deprived by final actions of Federal agencies, or other government officials, or entities acting under color of State law; to prevent Federal courts from abstaining from exercising Federal jurisdiction in actions in which no State law claim is alleged; to permit certification of unsettled State law questions that are essential to Federal claims arising under the Constitution; to allow for efficient adjudication of constitutional claims brought by injured parties in the United States district courts and the Court of Federal Claims; to clarify when government action is sufficiently final to ripen certain Federal claims arising under the Constitution; and for other purposes. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1290 [Bill Title] | A bill for the relief of Saeed Rezai. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1291 [Bill Title] | A bill to permit the interstate distribution of State-inspected meat under certain circumstances. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1304 [Bill Title] | A bill for the relief of Belinda McGregor. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1377 [Bill Title] | A bill to amend the Act incorporating the American Legion to make a technical correction. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1464 [Bill Title] | A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend the research credit, and for other purposes. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1521 [Bill Title] | A bill to provide a law enforcement exception to the prohibition on the advertising of certain electronic devices. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1530 [Bill Title] | A bill to resolve ongoing tobacco litigation, to reform the civil justice system responsible for adjudicating tort claims against companies that manufacture tobacco products, and establish a national tobacco policy for the United States that will decrease youth tobacco use and reduce the marketing of tobacco products to young Americans. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1554 [Bill Title] | A bill to provide for relief from excessive punitive damage awards in cases involving primarily financial loss by establishing rules for proportionality between the amount of punitive damages and the amount of economic loss. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1720 [Bill Title] | A bill to amend title 17, United States Code, to reform the copyright law with respect to satellite retransmissions of broadcast signals, and for other purposes. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
3b2b37ee__by_Orrin_Hatch_in_session_105__Bill_Title | [Bill Number] S 1759 [Bill Title] | A bill to grant a Federal charter to the American GI Forum of the United States. | [] | Bills Sponsored and Co-Sponsored by Orrin Hatch in session 105 | Bill Title | http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Profiles/Senate/Utah/Orrin_Hatch/Bills/105/ | 39/1438042989126.22_20150728002309-00121-ip-10-236-191-2_768192771_0.json |
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