wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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the use of third-party software. Snapchat didn’t explain that the ban was to
protect security; no reason for the ban was given. This dense, boilerplate
agreement places the burden of securing against this attack on the party in
the relationship least likely to have knowledge of the vulnerability—the
user.
In the aftermath of a data breach, this kind of blame game is typical.2 A
legion of regulators will investigate. Insurance companies will balk.
Penalties will be issued. Lawsuits will be launched. Commentators will
castigate the organization for its carelessness. And, victims will often be
blamed, typically for acting in predictable ways.
There are many actors lurking in the shadows. They aren’t in the
spotlight, but they are not bit players. These other actors are often not evil
or malicious. They are doing exactly what our system allows them to do.
In this chapter, we will describe the various types of actors that
contribute to data breaches and the role that each plays. The law should
hold these actors more responsible for their contribution to the risk. When
we speak about the law imposing more responsibility, we are not referring
to a particular legal strategy for doing so. The law can impose responsibility
through lawsuits, monetary penalties, prohibitions, nudges, or regulatory
interventions that are more cooperative than punitive. There are plenty of
tools in the law’s toolbox. Our focus is on the first step, which is bringing
the law to focus on risk management and to address risk throughout the
entire data ecosystem.
THE ACTORS
Data breach stories often focus on the immediate events leading up to the
breach. The stories typically begin with a person who makes a blunder, such
as losing a device with data, failing to patch software, or falling for a
phishing trick.
But there is a lot more to the story than we often hear about. In fact,
what we often learn about a breach is just one chapter of a long novel. To
fully understand the problem, we must read all the chapters, where we will
encounter a sweeping cast of characters who each play a role in the breach.
Designers
Actors who design insecure devices and buggy software with security vulnerabilities.
Distributors
Actors who distribute security threats, such as ad networks that fail to screen out malicious ads
or platforms that fail to vet insecure apps.
Amplifiers
Actors who amplify the risks by collecting and storing massive amounts of personal data, such
as consumer reporting agencies and other Big Data companies.
Facilitators
Actors who facilitate bad security by creating vulnerabilities for hackers to exploit, such as
government entities that demand back doors that weaken security.
Exploiters
Actors who exploit existing vulnerabilities rather than reporting them and trying to fix them.
Miseducators
Actors who train people to engage in risky behavior and that undermine efforts to teach people
safe practices.
Designers
Designers are the creators of countless devices, apps, and software
programs that are riddled with security flaws. Designers usually don’t
intentionally make insecure products; they just don’t prioritize security
when designing. Instead, their energy is spent making things cheap and
convenient because these are the services that the market typically rewards.
Technology companies have also developed a culture of pushing a software
release as soon as it works and then fixing it post-release through updates.
The continual drive for updated systems and general tolerance for bugs in
the software creates many issues.
DEVICE DESIGNERS
Brian Krebs, one of the leading security journalists, formerly wrote for The
Washington Post. He later left the Post to write independently about
security on his popular blog, KrebsOnSecurity.
One evening in 2016, a DDoS attack was launched against Krebs’s
website. A DDoS attack—short for a “distributed denial-of-service” attack
—is one way malicious individuals use to shut down a site. They send a
tsunami of traffic from other computers (usually infected with malware) to
a site. The huge wave of traffic becomes too much for the computer server
to handle, and the overload overwhelms the system. This floods out a
website, rendering it inaccessible. DDoS attacks are automated, so millions
of requests can occur in a short amount of time. On this fateful night, the
DDoS attack knocked Krebs’s site down.3
Who did this? And why? Krebs and his readers suspected that the attack
was payback for Krebs’ investigation into vDOS, a service that conducted
DDoS attacks for hire. Krebs’ investigation led to the service being shut
down and to the arrest of two of its founders.4 Unfortunately, there was no
way to confirm his suspicion about the attack, as the perpetrators couldn’t
be found.
KrebsOnSecurity remained offline for days. Fortunately for Krebs, he
had friends in high places. Ultimately, Google jumped in to rescue Krebs
with Project Shield, a DDoS mitigation service for journalists and non-
profit organizations.5
A DDoS attack comes from multiple different computers and devices. If
all the traffic were to come from one source, the attack would be easy to
stop—just block the source. What makes DDoS attacks challenging is that
there are swarms of sources. Hackers locate sources by briefly
commandeering them and commanding them to visit a website. This is
known as a “botnet”—an army of machines that are taken over briefly to
preform the DDoS attack. These machines aren’t a group of computers
owned by hackers. Rather, they are machines owned by ordinary people,
who often have no idea that their computers and devices are involved.
The attack on Krebs involved the Mirai botnet. The botnet targeted
Internet-enabled security cameras, DVRs, and printers.6 If you owned a
security camera, it might have been involved in the Krebs attack, or it could
be involved in another attack. You might never know. Indeed, many of your
connected devices might be moonlighting as robot warriors, commanded by
hackers from around the world.
The hackers arranged a two-step strategy to attack Krebs. First, they
hacked into these devices so that they could take them over at will. Then,
they coordinated their robot army and told all the devices to request
information from the web servers at once.

the use of third-party software. Snapchat didn’t explain that the ban was to

protect security; no reason for the ban was given. This dense, boilerplate

agreement places the burden of securing against this attack on the party in

the relationship least likely to have knowledge of the vulnerability—the

user.

In the aftermath of a data breach, this kind of blame game is typical.2 A

legion of regulators will investigate. Insurance companies will balk.

Penalties will be issued. Lawsuits will be launched. Commentators will

castigate the organization for its carelessness. And, victims will often be

blamed, typically for acting in predictable ways.

There are many actors lurking in the shadows. They aren’t in the

spotlight, but they are not bit players. These other actors are often not evil

or malicious. They are doing exactly what our system allows them to do.

In this chapter, we will describe the various types of actors that

contribute to data breaches and the role that each plays. The law should

hold these actors more responsible for their contribution to the risk. When

we speak about the law imposing more responsibility, we are not referring

to a particular legal strategy for doing so. The law can impose responsibility

through lawsuits, monetary penalties, prohibitions, nudges, or regulatory

interventions that are more cooperative than punitive. There are plenty of

tools in the law’s toolbox. Our focus is on the first step, which is bringing

the law to focus on risk management and to address risk throughout the

entire data ecosystem.

THE ACTORS

Data breach stories often focus on the immediate events leading up to the

breach. The stories typically begin with a person who makes a blunder, such

as losing a device with data, failing to patch software, or falling for a

phishing trick.

But there is a lot more to the story than we often hear about. In fact,

what we often learn about a breach is just one chapter of a long novel. To

fully understand the problem, we must read all the chapters, where we will

encounter a sweeping cast of characters who each play a role in the breach.

Designers

Actors who design insecure devices and buggy software with security vulnerabilities.

Distributors

Actors who distribute security threats, such as ad networks that fail to screen out malicious ads

or platforms that fail to vet insecure apps.

Amplifiers

Actors who amplify the risks by collecting and storing massive amounts of personal data, such

as consumer reporting agencies and other Big Data companies.

Facilitators

Actors who facilitate bad security by creating vulnerabilities for hackers to exploit, such as

government entities that demand back doors that weaken security.

Exploiters

Actors who exploit existing vulnerabilities rather than reporting them and trying to fix them.

Miseducators

Actors who train people to engage in risky behavior and that undermine efforts to teach people

safe practices.

Designers

Designers are the creators of countless devices, apps, and software

programs that are riddled with security flaws. Designers usually don’t

intentionally make insecure products; they just don’t prioritize security

when designing. Instead, their energy is spent making things cheap and

convenient because these are the services that the market typically rewards.

Technology companies have also developed a culture of pushing a software

release as soon as it works and then fixing it post-release through updates.

The continual drive for updated systems and general tolerance for bugs in

the software creates many issues.

DEVICE DESIGNERS

Brian Krebs, one of the leading security journalists, formerly wrote for The

Washington Post. He later left the Post to write independently about

security on his popular blog, KrebsOnSecurity.

One evening in 2016, a DDoS attack was launched against Krebs’s

website. A DDoS attack—short for a “distributed denial-of-service” attack

—is one way malicious individuals use to shut down a site. They send a

tsunami of traffic from other computers (usually infected with malware) to

a site. The huge wave of traffic becomes too much for the computer server

to handle, and the overload overwhelms the system. This floods out a

website, rendering it inaccessible. DDoS attacks are automated, so millions

of requests can occur in a short amount of time. On this fateful night, the

DDoS attack knocked Krebs’s site down.3

Who did this? And why? Krebs and his readers suspected that the attack

was payback for Krebs’ investigation into vDOS, a service that conducted

DDoS attacks for hire. Krebs’ investigation led to the service being shut

down and to the arrest of two of its founders.4 Unfortunately, there was no

way to confirm his suspicion about the attack, as the perpetrators couldn’t

be found.

KrebsOnSecurity remained offline for days. Fortunately for Krebs, he

had friends in high places. Ultimately, Google jumped in to rescue Krebs

with Project Shield, a DDoS mitigation service for journalists and non-

profit organizations.5

A DDoS attack comes from multiple different computers and devices. If

all the traffic were to come from one source, the attack would be easy to

stop—just block the source. What makes DDoS attacks challenging is that

there are swarms of sources. Hackers locate sources by briefly

commandeering them and commanding them to visit a website. This is

known as a “botnet”—an army of machines that are taken over briefly to

preform the DDoS attack. These machines aren’t a group of computers

owned by hackers. Rather, they are machines owned by ordinary people,

who often have no idea that their computers and devices are involved.

The attack on Krebs involved the Mirai botnet. The botnet targeted

Internet-enabled security cameras, DVRs, and printers.6 If you owned a

security camera, it might have been involved in the Krebs attack, or it could

be involved in another attack. You might never know. Indeed, many of your

connected devices might be moonlighting as robot warriors, commanded by

hackers from around the world.

The hackers arranged a two-step strategy to attack Krebs. First, they

hacked into these devices so that they could take them over at will. Then,

they coordinated their robot army and told all the devices to request

information from the web servers at once.