wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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are built upon the FIPPs specified by the OECD.32 Many of these privacy
laws include protections for data security.
Starting in the early 2000s, a separate and more distinctive body of law
around data security developed, especially in the United States. Breach
notification laws and safeguards laws started popping up everywhere, and
these laws focused more exclusively on data security.
Although data security is often lumped in as part of privacy and data
protection regimes, it is now treated as a distinct area centered around
safeguards and notification. If organizations provide notification of
breaches and properly implement safeguards, in the eyes of the law, they
will be seen to have fulfilled their data security obligations. The law often
has stronger penalties for data security violations than for privacy
violations, so when data breaches are caused by privacy problems, such as
in the Cambridge Analytica case (discussed below), companies want to
frame them in terms of privacy rather than security and avoid giving them
the dreaded moniker of “data breach.”
The classic formulation of data security is to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of data—a triad often referred to with the acronym
CIA. It is important to note that the first element of this triad—
confidentiality—is a key dimension of privacy. Data integrity also involves
privacy, as many privacy laws protect a principle called “data quality,”
which involves the accuracy and completeness of data.
Privacy and data security have much in common. Over time they have
become estranged relatives, but they should go hand-in-hand. Recent data
security breaches indicate that it is time for them to be united again.
THE FRONT DOOR AND THE BACK DOOR
Everyone is so obsessed with preventing a breach through the back door
that they neglect to pay enough attention to the front door. The “back door”
is a metaphor to describe the illicit break-ins by hackers or other intruders.
We clearly know that they don’t belong in the computer network. The “front
door” describes the many people who are invited into the network or who
already have access to the network.
Security focuses mostly on the back door, on keeping the bad guys from
intruding. Privacy focuses mostly on the front door. The people coming into
the front door often don’t appear to be bad guys, but they are also a security
risk. Like a nosy visitor to one’s home, front-door people might start
snooping into things that they are not authorized to see.
Hackers know that sometimes the easiest way to break in is through the
front door, so they pose as regular customers. Recall the ChoicePoint breach
that we discussed earlier. In that breach, the hackers posed as a legitimate
ChoicePoint customer. They didn’t need to break in—ChoicePoint opened
the door and let them in. No security alarm bells went off because the
hackers weren’t intruding; they were customers. The problem was one that
is typically in the domain of privacy—decisions about who has access to
data and how it is shared. ChoicePoint was too loose about who could be its
customer; it too freely shared personal data without making sure it was
doing so carefully.
At the end of the day, front-door breaches and back-door breaches are
both breaches, but front-door breaches are often harder to guard against.
Many front-door people differ from hackers because they don’t think they
are doing anything wrong, or they think what they are doing is only a minor
transgression.
To address back-door and front-door breaches, security and privacy must
work together. Guarding the back door is all for naught if the front door is
left wide open.

Figure 7.1
The Moneyball “Hack”
Jeff Luhnow, Sig Mejdal, and Chris Correa were executives with the St.
Louis Cardinals major league baseball team. Luhnow and Mejdal built a
database called Redbird, which contained information and statistics about
players. The database adopted the Moneyball approach to baseball, which is
chronicled in the bestselling book of the same name by Michael Lewis. This
approach involves analyzing enormous troves of data to make baseball
decisions, as opposed to the good old-fashioned technique of going with
one’s gut. Essentially, Moneyball is baseball’s version of Big Data.
Correa and Mejdal were rivals who worked under Luhnow. Later,
Luhnow left the Cardinals to become the general manager for the Houston
Astros, a team that was one of the main rivals to the Cardinals in the same
NL Central division.33 Luhnow hired Mejdal to join him in Houston and
named him to be head of the analytics department. There, Luhnow and
Mejdal launched a similar Moneyball-style program called Ground Control.
Back in St. Louis, Correa had become head of analytics. He sought to
access the scouting data Luhnow and Mejdal were gathering in Ground
Control for the Astros. Correa knew Mejdal’s password to Redbird because
Mejdal was required to turn over his laptop and password when he left the
Cardinals, and Correa figured that perhaps Mejdal, like so many other
people, might reuse the same password for his other accounts, including his
account for Ground Control.34
In March 2013, Correa tried the old password, and it worked. Over the
next two-and-a-half years, Correa accessed Ground Control numerous
times. He viewed scouting reports, player health information, and other
data.35
In January 2014, Correa lost access to Ground Control when there was a
system-wide password reset. But a few months later, the Astros reset all
Ground Control user passwords to a default password. Correa found the
default password in Mejdal’s email, and he was back in.
In June 2014, the Astros were last in their division, but Sports Illustrated
ran a feature story called “Astro-Matic Baseball” filled with praise for
Mejdal and Luhnow about their Moneyball approach. The cover of the issue
had an Astros player swinging his bat with the title: “Your 2017 World
Series Champs.” Mejdal was also featured in another article in the issue.
Perhaps sparked by the fact that his rival Mejdal was being praised even
though his team was currently dead last in the division, Correa again
attempted to log back into Ground Control. Correa then allegedly leaked
confidential notes about Astros’ trade discussions.36 The leaks created
tensions between several baseball teams and their players, and the Astros
ended up apologizing individually to other teams.
It was these leaks that would be Correa’s undoing. The FBI began
investigating, and everything came to light.37 The FBI discovered that

are built upon the FIPPs specified by the OECD.32 Many of these privacy

laws include protections for data security.

Starting in the early 2000s, a separate and more distinctive body of law

around data security developed, especially in the United States. Breach

notification laws and safeguards laws started popping up everywhere, and

these laws focused more exclusively on data security.

Although data security is often lumped in as part of privacy and data

protection regimes, it is now treated as a distinct area centered around

safeguards and notification. If organizations provide notification of

breaches and properly implement safeguards, in the eyes of the law, they

will be seen to have fulfilled their data security obligations. The law often

has stronger penalties for data security violations than for privacy

violations, so when data breaches are caused by privacy problems, such as

in the Cambridge Analytica case (discussed below), companies want to

frame them in terms of privacy rather than security and avoid giving them

the dreaded moniker of “data breach.”

The classic formulation of data security is to protect the confidentiality,

integrity, and availability of data—a triad often referred to with the acronym

CIA. It is important to note that the first element of this triad—

confidentiality—is a key dimension of privacy. Data integrity also involves

privacy, as many privacy laws protect a principle called “data quality,”

which involves the accuracy and completeness of data.

Privacy and data security have much in common. Over time they have

become estranged relatives, but they should go hand-in-hand. Recent data

security breaches indicate that it is time for them to be united again.

THE FRONT DOOR AND THE BACK DOOR

Everyone is so obsessed with preventing a breach through the back door

that they neglect to pay enough attention to the front door. The “back door”

is a metaphor to describe the illicit break-ins by hackers or other intruders.

We clearly know that they don’t belong in the computer network. The “front

door” describes the many people who are invited into the network or who

already have access to the network.

Security focuses mostly on the back door, on keeping the bad guys from

intruding. Privacy focuses mostly on the front door. The people coming into

the front door often don’t appear to be bad guys, but they are also a security

risk. Like a nosy visitor to one’s home, front-door people might start

snooping into things that they are not authorized to see.

Hackers know that sometimes the easiest way to break in is through the

front door, so they pose as regular customers. Recall the ChoicePoint breach

that we discussed earlier. In that breach, the hackers posed as a legitimate

ChoicePoint customer. They didn’t need to break in—ChoicePoint opened

the door and let them in. No security alarm bells went off because the

hackers weren’t intruding; they were customers. The problem was one that

is typically in the domain of privacy—decisions about who has access to

data and how it is shared. ChoicePoint was too loose about who could be its

customer; it too freely shared personal data without making sure it was

doing so carefully.

At the end of the day, front-door breaches and back-door breaches are

both breaches, but front-door breaches are often harder to guard against.

Many front-door people differ from hackers because they don’t think they

are doing anything wrong, or they think what they are doing is only a minor

transgression.

To address back-door and front-door breaches, security and privacy must

work together. Guarding the back door is all for naught if the front door is

left wide open.

Figure 7.1

The Moneyball “Hack”

Jeff Luhnow, Sig Mejdal, and Chris Correa were executives with the St.

Louis Cardinals major league baseball team. Luhnow and Mejdal built a

database called Redbird, which contained information and statistics about

players. The database adopted the Moneyball approach to baseball, which is

chronicled in the bestselling book of the same name by Michael Lewis. This

approach involves analyzing enormous troves of data to make baseball

decisions, as opposed to the good old-fashioned technique of going with

one’s gut. Essentially, Moneyball is baseball’s version of Big Data.

Correa and Mejdal were rivals who worked under Luhnow. Later,

Luhnow left the Cardinals to become the general manager for the Houston

Astros, a team that was one of the main rivals to the Cardinals in the same

NL Central division.33 Luhnow hired Mejdal to join him in Houston and

named him to be head of the analytics department. There, Luhnow and

Mejdal launched a similar Moneyball-style program called Ground Control.

Back in St. Louis, Correa had become head of analytics. He sought to

access the scouting data Luhnow and Mejdal were gathering in Ground

Control for the Astros. Correa knew Mejdal’s password to Redbird because

Mejdal was required to turn over his laptop and password when he left the

Cardinals, and Correa figured that perhaps Mejdal, like so many other

people, might reuse the same password for his other accounts, including his

account for Ground Control.34

In March 2013, Correa tried the old password, and it worked. Over the

next two-and-a-half years, Correa accessed Ground Control numerous

times. He viewed scouting reports, player health information, and other

data.35

In January 2014, Correa lost access to Ground Control when there was a

system-wide password reset. But a few months later, the Astros reset all

Ground Control user passwords to a default password. Correa found the

default password in Mejdal’s email, and he was back in.

In June 2014, the Astros were last in their division, but Sports Illustrated

ran a feature story called “Astro-Matic Baseball” filled with praise for

Mejdal and Luhnow about their Moneyball approach. The cover of the issue

had an Astros player swinging his bat with the title: “Your 2017 World

Series Champs.” Mejdal was also featured in another article in the issue.

Perhaps sparked by the fact that his rival Mejdal was being praised even

though his team was currently dead last in the division, Correa again

attempted to log back into Ground Control. Correa then allegedly leaked

confidential notes about Astros’ trade discussions.36 The leaks created

tensions between several baseball teams and their players, and the Astros

ended up apologizing individually to other teams.

It was these leaks that would be Correa’s undoing. The FBI began

investigating, and everything came to light.37 The FBI discovered that