wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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commercial
stated.
“Guaranteed!”33
What was this miracle product? What new technology did it employ to
help people remember passwords? In fact, it was just an empty notebook for
people to write down their passwords.
The Password Minder was so mocked that eventually it was “laughed
out of production.”34 But other similar products remain on the market.
There’s one called I Love My Password Book! We suggest an alternative
title: Fraudsters, Here Are All My Passwords for You in One Easy-to-
Recognize Book.
One of these types of books, The Personal Internet Address & Password
Log Book, was at one point ranked #428 out of all books on Amazon, and
was the bestselling book in Amazon’s Internet and Telecommunications
category.35 To our dismay, it has done far better than any of our books.
Maybe it’s time to publish a password keeper book of our own.
These password notebooks are quite humorous, but critics should be
laughing at themselves too. With passwords, we demand the impossible of
people, and then we blame them when they fail.36 It’s quite understandable
why someone would feel the need to write all their passwords down in one
book. It is safer than some alternatives.
The more challenging it becomes to memorize all the passwords, the
more likely people are to write the passwords down in convenient locations,
thus creating additional security risks. Passwords find their way onto sticky
notes near computers or in wallets or in emails or listed in text files in
devices.
Impossible demands are being made on human cognition. Yet
policymakers remain in denial. This isn’t a problem that education can
solve. People can certainly learn good password practices, but they lack the
ability to implement them.
Suppose a person uses only long, complex, or unique passwords and can
remember them all naturally or with the help of a password service. Is the
user safe?
Nope. Fraudsters will just trick users into giving away their passwords.
Even the person with the world’s longest and most complex password will
be defeated if they give their password to a phisher. Often, fake websites
and deceptive hyperlinks look very real and easily deceive many users.

Figure 8.2
Even when users act perfectly in adopting complex, unique passwords
and avoid accidental disclosure, malware can still compromise username
and password credentials.37
The Problem with Password Recovery Questions
Password recovery questions are those questions that you set up in case you
forget your password. Common questions are:
In what city were you born?
What is your mother’s maiden name?
Where did you go to high school?
One problem with these questions is that the answers are sometimes leaked
in security breaches. Another problem is that these answers don’t change.
Furthermore, these answers are easy for hackers to guess. You can create
the world’s best password, but a hacker can reset your password by using
the recovery questions. Information such as mother’s maiden name and the
city of your birth are commonly available in public records. Other
information, such as the name or a pet or a high school can be readily
figured out by looking at social media profiles or Twitter feeds.
One company used a very clever approach to password recovery
questions, asking some rather odd questions.38 Our favorites include:
What is the favorite road on which you most like to travel?
What is your biggest pet peeve?
If you could be a character out of any novel, who would you be?
Who was your least favorite boss?
What was your childhood phone number?
What is the name of your least favorite teacher?
Where do you want to retire?
What is your dream car?
Where were you New Year’s 2000?
What is the name of your most memorable stuffed animal?
Some of the questions seem like they are better suited for a psychological
profile test.
Imagine what would happen if this company had a breach and leaked the
answers. I’m sure hundreds of thousands of bosses will be none too pleased
to learn that they are a least favorite boss.
Although we admire the effort, there’s still a problem with these
unconventional questions—they are difficult for people to remember. Many
years later, are you going to remember where you wanted to retire when
you answered your recovery questions? Or your dream car? Recovery
questions must be easy to remember—easier than one’s password—because
the questions are designed to help people who forgot their password.
One strategy discussed is to answer the security questions with lies. But
it is easy to forget the lies. So, there’s a dilemma—easy-to-remember
questions that might readily be guessed by hackers, or more obscure
questions or wrong answers that might readily be forgotten.
It’s not as though killing the password entirely would solve our
problems. Password systems have proven remarkably resilient, and the
alternatives have their own issues.39 The key for policymakers is to stay
constantly mindful of the costs that data security rules will impose on the
people that use these systems. Advising people to be more careful is all well
and good, but people are bombarded with advice about countless things
throughout their day.
Security researcher Cormac Herley has argued that people rationally
reject most security advice and prompts, because, in essence, the juice isn’t
worth the squeeze.40 People don’t see the immediate benefit of security
measures but definitely feel their daily burden. If there is a harm to be
suffered from poor security, the odds are that it will be borne by someone
else. This makes designing beneficial security advice very hard.41
Ultimately, for effective data security, we must avoid asking people to do
things they can’t do. We also shouldn’t expect success if we merely ask
people to do things that they are highly unmotivated to do. We must find a
way to motivate people, as experience has shown that merely barking out

commercial

stated.

“Guaranteed!”33

What was this miracle product? What new technology did it employ to

help people remember passwords? In fact, it was just an empty notebook for

people to write down their passwords.

The Password Minder was so mocked that eventually it was “laughed

out of production.”34 But other similar products remain on the market.

There’s one called I Love My Password Book! We suggest an alternative

title: Fraudsters, Here Are All My Passwords for You in One Easy-to-

Recognize Book.

One of these types of books, The Personal Internet Address & Password

Log Book, was at one point ranked #428 out of all books on Amazon, and

was the bestselling book in Amazon’s Internet and Telecommunications

category.35 To our dismay, it has done far better than any of our books.

Maybe it’s time to publish a password keeper book of our own.

These password notebooks are quite humorous, but critics should be

laughing at themselves too. With passwords, we demand the impossible of

people, and then we blame them when they fail.36 It’s quite understandable

why someone would feel the need to write all their passwords down in one

book. It is safer than some alternatives.

The more challenging it becomes to memorize all the passwords, the

more likely people are to write the passwords down in convenient locations,

thus creating additional security risks. Passwords find their way onto sticky

notes near computers or in wallets or in emails or listed in text files in

devices.

Impossible demands are being made on human cognition. Yet

policymakers remain in denial. This isn’t a problem that education can

solve. People can certainly learn good password practices, but they lack the

ability to implement them.

Suppose a person uses only long, complex, or unique passwords and can

remember them all naturally or with the help of a password service. Is the

user safe?

Nope. Fraudsters will just trick users into giving away their passwords.

Even the person with the world’s longest and most complex password will

be defeated if they give their password to a phisher. Often, fake websites

and deceptive hyperlinks look very real and easily deceive many users.

Figure 8.2

Even when users act perfectly in adopting complex, unique passwords

and avoid accidental disclosure, malware can still compromise username

and password credentials.37

The Problem with Password Recovery Questions

Password recovery questions are those questions that you set up in case you

forget your password. Common questions are:

In what city were you born?

What is your mother’s maiden name?

Where did you go to high school?

One problem with these questions is that the answers are sometimes leaked

in security breaches. Another problem is that these answers don’t change.

Furthermore, these answers are easy for hackers to guess. You can create

the world’s best password, but a hacker can reset your password by using

the recovery questions. Information such as mother’s maiden name and the

city of your birth are commonly available in public records. Other

information, such as the name or a pet or a high school can be readily

figured out by looking at social media profiles or Twitter feeds.

One company used a very clever approach to password recovery

questions, asking some rather odd questions.38 Our favorites include:

What is the favorite road on which you most like to travel?

What is your biggest pet peeve?

If you could be a character out of any novel, who would you be?

Who was your least favorite boss?

What was your childhood phone number?

What is the name of your least favorite teacher?

Where do you want to retire?

What is your dream car?

Where were you New Year’s 2000?

What is the name of your most memorable stuffed animal?

Some of the questions seem like they are better suited for a psychological

profile test.

Imagine what would happen if this company had a breach and leaked the

answers. I’m sure hundreds of thousands of bosses will be none too pleased

to learn that they are a least favorite boss.

Although we admire the effort, there’s still a problem with these

unconventional questions—they are difficult for people to remember. Many

years later, are you going to remember where you wanted to retire when

you answered your recovery questions? Or your dream car? Recovery

questions must be easy to remember—easier than one’s password—because

the questions are designed to help people who forgot their password.

One strategy discussed is to answer the security questions with lies. But

it is easy to forget the lies. So, there’s a dilemma—easy-to-remember

questions that might readily be guessed by hackers, or more obscure

questions or wrong answers that might readily be forgotten.

It’s not as though killing the password entirely would solve our

problems. Password systems have proven remarkably resilient, and the

alternatives have their own issues.39 The key for policymakers is to stay

constantly mindful of the costs that data security rules will impose on the

people that use these systems. Advising people to be more careful is all well

and good, but people are bombarded with advice about countless things

throughout their day.

Security researcher Cormac Herley has argued that people rationally

reject most security advice and prompts, because, in essence, the juice isn’t

worth the squeeze.40 People don’t see the immediate benefit of security

measures but definitely feel their daily burden. If there is a harm to be

suffered from poor security, the odds are that it will be borne by someone

else. This makes designing beneficial security advice very hard.41

Ultimately, for effective data security, we must avoid asking people to do

things they can’t do. We also shouldn’t expect success if we merely ask

people to do things that they are highly unmotivated to do. We must find a

way to motivate people, as experience has shown that merely barking out