wildercb/PrivacyTextBooks1.2 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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difference; it would remove an enormous security vulnerability in possibly
hundreds of millions of devices. This requirement is based on the
understanding that many people will predictably fail to change the default
password on their own. But this solution carries some risks that must be
addressed. Because users might choose weak passwords, device
manufacturers should find ways to force users to select strong passwords.
Another risk is that if the passwords are only stored locally on the device,
users who forget their passwords could be completely unable to use the
device. Manufacturers should address this problem by enabling a recovery
system for forgotten passwords.
Our recommendation isn’t an easy feat to achieve for many
manufacturers, but it is something not to be ignored just because it is hard.
Connected devices carry tremendous risks not just for their owners, but also
for others. Manufacturers cut corners and create weak security because it is
cheap, consumers don’t know enough to choose secure devices, and there is
no incentive for consumers to consider the security implications of the
devices for other people. The market for online devices thus doesn’t
produce the optimal societal level of data security. The onus should be on
the manufacturers to find ways to make their devices secure.
Promoting Mutual Trust
Part of the gullibility problem is that people expect to be able to trust that an
organization’s website, phone calls, emails, and other communications are
authentic. As we discussed earlier, organizations will make people
authenticate themselves so they know to trust the user. But organizations
won’t authenticate themselves. This leads to a perverse situation where
people are constantly fooled by hackers.
Clever hackers can spoof phone numbers and email addresses. They can
create fake websites that are hard to differentiate from real ones. Countless
phishing attacks occur because people misplace their trust in an imposter.
Unfortunately, our system is designed to encourage people to be too
trusting of the communications they receive from organizations because
receiving unauthenticated communications is the norm.
Imagine if you walked into your bank and asked to withdraw money.
Instead of asking for your identification or bank card, the bank teller just
looked at you and said, “Yes, you sure look familiar. You are well dressed
and don’t look suspicious, so I’m sure you are not a fraudster. Here’s your
money.”
Of course, no bank would do this. Organizations rightfully authenticate
us when we reach out to them. But it doesn’t work the other way around.
Organizations don’t authenticate themselves to us. When organizations
initiate contact with people, they expect people to just assume that their
mail, phone call, or website is legitimate. We know that people are
relatively gullible and can often be easily tricked. Hackers can readily
create websites and communications that look nearly identical to actual
ones. Fortunately, many hackers are sloppy and make mistakes, so they
leave clues. But people fall for their tricks even with these clues. Hackers
who are more careful could avoid leaving many clues and fool a lot more
people.
For example, suppose you bank at Big Bank. You click on a link in an
email and are sent to a website. The site looks the same as what you
remember when visiting Big Bank’s site a few weeks ago. But you want to
be careful, so you look at the site’s address in the browser bar. The site’s
address is:
https://www.bigbank.login.com
You also receive another email that looks like it’s from Big Bank. This
email sends you to a site with the address:
https://www.bigbank.com/login
Which one is correct? The second one is correct. In the first, the site is
actually login.com, not bigbank.com. Maybe you knew this, but many
people don’t. It’s entirely rational for people to miss this distinction.
Cormac Herley argued that “if users spent even a minute a day reading
URLs to avoid phishing, the cost (in terms of user time) would be two
orders of magnitude greater than all phishing losses.”61
Countless emails from organizations have buttons that you can click to
go to the site to login. But these emails can be fake ones sent by hackers,
and the buttons will take you to a site that looks just like the real one.
Hackers don’t even need web design skills because there are numerous
markets on the Dark Web where fraudsters can cheaply purchase
“scampages” that mimic real websites. When you enter your login
information, you will be submitting it directly to the hacker through the
fake site. The hacker can then use your login credentials to go to the real
site and break into your account.
Overall, it is foolish to expect busy lay people to figure out what is real
and what isn’t. Most people don’t know enough or don’t have the time to
study each email or website like Sherlock Holmes. On the internet, people
are sitting ducks, without adequate means to avoid being tricked.
One solution is bilateral authentication. The current authentication
system is unilateral—it works one way, with people authenticating
themselves to organizations. Bilateral authentication (often called “mutual”
authentication) works both ways.62 People authenticate themselves to
organizations, and organizations authenticate themselves to people. With a
system in which organizations authenticated themselves, people would no
longer have to be Sherlock Holmes and spot some obscure detail that was
off in an email or website. People would no longer assume that
unauthenticated communications should be trusted. People would expect
that organizations authenticated themselves.
How would this work? First, when people establish an account or
relationship, they would be given a choice for certain images or passwords
that an organization could provide to them to verify the organization’s
identity. Then, when people were contacted by the organization, or when
they visited the organization’s website and entered their username, they
would be shown the image or password. This would verify that the
organization and its website are legitimate.
Policymakers should create general rules for all organizations to follow
when dealing with people. Organizations should be restricted from using
certain mediums (such as email) to request particular kinds of information
(such as Social Security Numbers or login information). People can
remember short rules such as No legitimate email will ever ask for your
password. It is much harder to remember the long list of things different
organizations might request under certain circumstances. If legitimate

difference; it would remove an enormous security vulnerability in possibly

hundreds of millions of devices. This requirement is based on the

understanding that many people will predictably fail to change the default

password on their own. But this solution carries some risks that must be

addressed. Because users might choose weak passwords, device

manufacturers should find ways to force users to select strong passwords.

Another risk is that if the passwords are only stored locally on the device,

users who forget their passwords could be completely unable to use the

device. Manufacturers should address this problem by enabling a recovery

system for forgotten passwords.

Our recommendation isn’t an easy feat to achieve for many

manufacturers, but it is something not to be ignored just because it is hard.

Connected devices carry tremendous risks not just for their owners, but also

for others. Manufacturers cut corners and create weak security because it is

cheap, consumers don’t know enough to choose secure devices, and there is

no incentive for consumers to consider the security implications of the

devices for other people. The market for online devices thus doesn’t

produce the optimal societal level of data security. The onus should be on

the manufacturers to find ways to make their devices secure.

Promoting Mutual Trust

Part of the gullibility problem is that people expect to be able to trust that an

organization’s website, phone calls, emails, and other communications are

authentic. As we discussed earlier, organizations will make people

authenticate themselves so they know to trust the user. But organizations

won’t authenticate themselves. This leads to a perverse situation where

people are constantly fooled by hackers.

Clever hackers can spoof phone numbers and email addresses. They can

create fake websites that are hard to differentiate from real ones. Countless

phishing attacks occur because people misplace their trust in an imposter.

Unfortunately, our system is designed to encourage people to be too

trusting of the communications they receive from organizations because

receiving unauthenticated communications is the norm.

Imagine if you walked into your bank and asked to withdraw money.

Instead of asking for your identification or bank card, the bank teller just

looked at you and said, “Yes, you sure look familiar. You are well dressed

and don’t look suspicious, so I’m sure you are not a fraudster. Here’s your

money.”

Of course, no bank would do this. Organizations rightfully authenticate

us when we reach out to them. But it doesn’t work the other way around.

Organizations don’t authenticate themselves to us. When organizations

initiate contact with people, they expect people to just assume that their

mail, phone call, or website is legitimate. We know that people are

relatively gullible and can often be easily tricked. Hackers can readily

create websites and communications that look nearly identical to actual

ones. Fortunately, many hackers are sloppy and make mistakes, so they

leave clues. But people fall for their tricks even with these clues. Hackers

who are more careful could avoid leaving many clues and fool a lot more

people.

For example, suppose you bank at Big Bank. You click on a link in an

email and are sent to a website. The site looks the same as what you

remember when visiting Big Bank’s site a few weeks ago. But you want to

be careful, so you look at the site’s address in the browser bar. The site’s

address is:

https://www.bigbank.login.com

You also receive another email that looks like it’s from Big Bank. This

email sends you to a site with the address:

https://www.bigbank.com/login

Which one is correct? The second one is correct. In the first, the site is

actually login.com, not bigbank.com. Maybe you knew this, but many

people don’t. It’s entirely rational for people to miss this distinction.

Cormac Herley argued that “if users spent even a minute a day reading

URLs to avoid phishing, the cost (in terms of user time) would be two

orders of magnitude greater than all phishing losses.”61

Countless emails from organizations have buttons that you can click to

go to the site to login. But these emails can be fake ones sent by hackers,

and the buttons will take you to a site that looks just like the real one.

Hackers don’t even need web design skills because there are numerous

markets on the Dark Web where fraudsters can cheaply purchase

“scampages” that mimic real websites. When you enter your login

information, you will be submitting it directly to the hacker through the

fake site. The hacker can then use your login credentials to go to the real

site and break into your account.

Overall, it is foolish to expect busy lay people to figure out what is real

and what isn’t. Most people don’t know enough or don’t have the time to

study each email or website like Sherlock Holmes. On the internet, people

are sitting ducks, without adequate means to avoid being tricked.

One solution is bilateral authentication. The current authentication

system is unilateral—it works one way, with people authenticating

themselves to organizations. Bilateral authentication (often called “mutual”

authentication) works both ways.62 People authenticate themselves to

organizations, and organizations authenticate themselves to people. With a

system in which organizations authenticated themselves, people would no

longer have to be Sherlock Holmes and spot some obscure detail that was

off in an email or website. People would no longer assume that

unauthenticated communications should be trusted. People would expect

that organizations authenticated themselves.

How would this work? First, when people establish an account or

relationship, they would be given a choice for certain images or passwords

that an organization could provide to them to verify the organization’s

identity. Then, when people were contacted by the organization, or when

they visited the organization’s website and entered their username, they

would be shown the image or password. This would verify that the

organization and its website are legitimate.

Policymakers should create general rules for all organizations to follow

when dealing with people. Organizations should be restricted from using

certain mediums (such as email) to request particular kinds of information

(such as Social Security Numbers or login information). People can

remember short rules such as No legitimate email will ever ask for your

password. It is much harder to remember the long list of things different

organizations might request under certain circumstances. If legitimate