text
stringlengths 0
118
|
---|
51. |
Samuel Gibbs, Apple, Google and Microsoft: Weakening Encryption Lets the Bad Guys In, |
Guardian, (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/23/apple-google- |
microsoft-weakening-encryption-back-doors. |
52. |
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, provides: “(a) The Supreme Court and all courts |
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their |
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. (b) An alternative |
writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction.” |
53. |
Apple, A Message to Our Consumers (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/. |
54. |
See Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steve Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, |
John Gilmore, Matthew Green, Susan Landau, Peter Neumann, Ron Rivest, Jeff Schiller, Bruce |
Schneier, Michael Specter, and Danny Weitzner, Keys Under Doormats: Mandating insecurity |
by requiring government access to all data and communications, CSAIL Technical Reports, |
(July 6, 2015), http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/97690. |
55. |
Ransomware Attack ‘Like Having a Tomahawk Missile Stolen’, Says Microsoft Boss, Guardian, |
(May 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/15/ransomware-attack- |
like-having-a-tomahawk-missile-stolen-says-microsoft-boss. |
56. |
Brad Smith, The Need For Urgent Collective Action to Keep People Safe Online: Lessons From |
Last |
Week’s |
Cyberattack, |
(May |
14, |
2017), |
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the- |
issues/2017/05/14/need-urgent-collective-action-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks- |
cyberattack/. |
57. |
Paul Wagenseil, Evernote Breaks Own Security Rule in Data-Breach Email, TechNewsDaily, |
(Mar. |
4, |
2013), |
http://www.mnn.com/green-tech/computers/stories/evernote-breaks-own- |
security-rule-in-data-breach-email. |
58. |
See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 513 (2015); Woodrow |
Hartzog & Fred Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2013); Jessica |
Silbey & Woodrow Hartzog, The Upside of Deep Fakes, 78 Md. L. Rev. 960 (2019) (arguing |
that deep fakes are symptoms of much deeper and long-existing problems). |
59. |
See Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts: Expanding Civil Liability Standards to Address |
Corporate Remote Interference, 69 Duke L.J. 583 (2019). |
60. |
Ms. Smith, Hacking Pacemakers, Insulin Pumps and Patients’ Vital Signs in Real Time, CSO, |
(Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3296633/hacking-pacemakers-insulin- |
pumps-and-patients-vital-signs-in-real-time.html. |
61. |
See Andrea Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61 William & Mary L. Rev. (2019). |
62. |
Id. at 88. |
63. |
See Andrew Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human Users, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 1315 (2020). |
64. |
Given the difficulties of proving causation and harm thresholds, strict liability in combination |
with a functional insurance scheme could approximate a risk-based approach by forcing a |
redistribution of the costs of a breach as a way for organizations to minimize and calibrate risk. |
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private |
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 241, 242 (2007); Mark A. |
Geistfeld, Protecting Confidential Information Entrusted to Others in Business Transactions: |
Data Breaches, Identity Theft, and Tort Liability, 66 DePaul L. Rev. 385, 387–88 (2017)(“[t]he |
rule *388 of strict liability supplies the necessary means for customers to adequately enforce |
the tort duty obligating businesses to adopt reasonable precautions for protecting entrusted |
confidential information.”); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 Conn. L. Rev. |
1495, 1500 (2017) (“[I]mposing strict liability on firms hosting consumer data would achieve |
the key purposes of cyber insurance that have so far remained elusive, and it would do so in a |
way that addresses some of the key challenges generally facing the use of strict liability to |
address cybersecurity issues.”) Bryan Choi has suggested and professionalizing software |
development and developing a concept of “crashworthy code” to help courts ascertain when |
technology design decisions and practices are unreasonable or uncustomary. Bryan H. Choi, |
Crashworthy Code, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 39 (2019); Bryan H. Choi, Software as a Profession, 33 |
Harv. J. L. & Tech. 557 (2020). |
65. |
Wolff, supra, at 208. Wolff argues that a corollary to this wisdom is that “there is no single |
bulletproof defender who can, unilaterally, prevent all compromises and detect every breach.” |
Id. |
66. |
Josephine Wolff, You’ll see this message when it is too late: The Legal and Economic Aftermath |
of Cybersecurity Breaches (2018). |
67. |
Id. |
68. |
Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 1495, 1508 (2017). (“This |
multiplicity of actors makes establishing cybersecurity responsibility difficult. Each of the |
actors has some legitimate argument that at least some of the others bear responsibility for |
almost any cyber-incident. . . . The response to any security incident will invariably be to assign |
blame to any number of other parties.”) 69. |
Id. at 1174. (“[W]e can expect insurers will do |
even more to drive adherence to a predefined duty of data security. Many experts agree that |
making these insurance policies more affordable—and therefore more widespread—will require |
better information for insurers to use in making more efficient risk assessments, and more |
uniform recommendations for what minimum security measures insurers should require of |
policyholders.”) |
CHAPTER 6 |
1. |
David Lazarus, An Advocate for Readers, A Name You Can Trust, L.A. Times, (Aug. 12, 2007), |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.